[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 34 (Wednesday, February 20, 2008)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 9235-9239]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-2996]


 ========================================================================
 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
 
 ========================================================================
 

  Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 34 / Wednesday, February 20, 2008 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 9235]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0181; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-180-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Lockheed Model L-1011 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) 
for all Lockheed Model L-1011 series airplanes. This proposed AD would 
require revising the FAA-approved maintenance program by incorporating 
new airworthiness limitations for fuel tank systems to satisfy Special 
Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 requirements. This proposed AD would 
also require the accomplishment of certain fuel system modifications, 
the initial inspections of certain repetitive fuel system limitations 
to phase in those inspections, and repair if necessary. This proposed 
AD results from a design review of the fuel tank systems. We are 
proposing this AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside 
fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or 
maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, 
could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the 
airplane.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by March 21, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this AD, contact Lockheed 
Continued Airworthiness Project Office, Attention: Airworthiness, 86 
South Cobb Drive, Marietta, Georgia 30063-0567.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory 
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street 
address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the 
ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly 
after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert A. Bosak, Aerospace Engineer, 
Propulsion and Services Branch, ACE-118A, FAA, Atlanta Aircraft 
Certification Office, One Crown Center, 1895 Phoenix Boulevard, Suite 
450, Atlanta, Georgia 30349; telephone (770) 703-6094; fax (770) 703-
6097.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2008-0181; 
Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-180-AD'' at the beginning of your 
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
this proposed AD because of those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We 
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel 
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the 
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes 
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for 
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a 
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, 
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' 
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards 
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule 
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' 
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
    Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., 
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders 
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition 
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design 
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for 
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to 
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance 
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety 
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to 
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary 
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
    In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four 
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel 
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of 
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable 
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address 
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in 
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure 
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included 
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for 
further action.

[[Page 9236]]

    We have determined that the actions identified in this proposed AD 
are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel 
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result 
in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

    We have reviewed Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098, Revision 1, 
dated January 22, 2008. The service bulletin describes procedures for 
incorporating new airworthiness limitations for fuel tank systems into 
the operator's FAA-approved maintenance program. The airworthiness 
limitations for fuel tank systems include fuel system limitations 
(FSLs) and critical design configuration control limitations (CDCCLs). 
FSLs are modifications, design features, and periodic inspections of 
certain features for latent failures that could contribute to an 
ignition source. CDCCLs are limitation requirements to preserve a 
critical ignition source prevention feature of the fuel tank system 
design that is necessary to prevent the occurrence of an unsafe 
condition. The purpose of a CDCCL is to provide instruction to retain 
the critical ignition source prevention feature during configuration 
change that may be caused by alterations, repairs, or maintenance 
actions. A CDCCL is not a periodic inspection.
    Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098 refers to the following 
service information for doing certain CDCCLs:
     Hamilton Sundstrand Overhaul Manual 28-24-03, Revision 14, 
dated May 15, 2000, or later, for overhauling and repairing the 
electrically-operated fuel boost pumps.
     Lockheed L-1011 Service Information Letter 28-12 for 
keeping the electrical conduit for the electrically-operated fuel boost 
pumps open and unplugged at the wing rear spar.
     Lockheed Drawing 1527514 for installing the fuel tank 
valves, auxiliary power unit pump, sight gages, fuel quantity 
indicating system tank units, over wing filler cap adapter ring, boost 
pump mounting plate, and access doors for the boost pump, vent box, 
vent valve, and fuel level control switch.
     Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098 also refers to the 
following service bulletins as additional sources of service 
information for doing the FSLs:
     Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-062, Revision 7, dated 
December 9, 1983, for Model L-1011 series airplanes, which describes 
procedures for inspecting and modifying the plug-in valve assemblies of 
the fuel shutoff system.
     Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-089, Revision 3, dated 
October 4, 2006, for Model L-1011-385-3 series airplanes, which 
describes procedures for removing auxiliary fuel tank No. 4.
     Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-093, Revision 1, dated 
February 8, 1999, for Model L-1011 series airplanes, which describes 
procedures for installing and inspecting fuel boost pumps and modifying 
the centrifugal pump and motor.
     Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-094, Revision 1, dated 
June 23, 2006, for Model L-1011 series airplanes. This service bulletin 
describes procedures for (1) modifying the wiring harnesses of the fuel 
level control switch, (2) repetitively inspecting the fuel level 
control switch, wiring harnesses, and harness conduit for any visible 
damage, wear or chafing, broken or missing O-rings, or indications of 
electrical arcing, (3) replacing the fuel level control switch assembly 
with a new assembly if any damage, wear or chafing, or indications of 
electrical arcing to the wiring is found or any broken or missing O-
rings are found, (4) notifying Lockheed of any discrepancies found 
during the inspection, and (5) revising the airplane records and 
maintenance planning documents to require the repetitive inspections. 
The modification involves replacing the braided fiberglass sleeving 
with PVC electrical sleeving over each wiring harness and replacing the 
smaller inside diameter conduit with the larger inside diameter 
conduit, if applicable. (Although AD 2001-08-21, amendment 39-12198 (66 
FR 21072, April 27, 2001) mandated accomplishment of Lockheed Service 
Bulletin 093-28-094, dated March 3, 2000, more work is necessary for 
Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-094.)
     Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-095, dated September 13, 
2006, for Model L-1011 series airplanes. This service bulletin 
describes procedures for (1) repetitively inspecting the airplane fuel 
tanks and vent boxes for cleanliness and evidence of deteriorated or 
damaged fuel/vent tubes and components, (2) repetitively inspecting 
bonding jumpers on the fuel/vent tubes and components for proper 
installation, corrosion, frayed or broken strands, and the condition of 
the environmental sealing or bonding clamps and hardware, (3) 
correcting any discrepant conditions, (4) notifying Lockheed of any 
discrepancies found during the inspection, (5) adding about 444 bonding 
jumpers across the fuel/vent tube fittings located in fuel tanks 1, 2L, 
2R, and 3, (6) repetitively inspecting the bonding jumpers on the fuel/
vent tube fittings, and (7) revising the airplane records and 
maintenance planning documents to require the repetitive inspections.
     Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-096, Revision 2, dated 
June 23, 2006, for Model L-1011 series airplanes. This service bulletin 
describes procedures for (1) repetitively inspecting the wiring 
harnesses of the No. 1 and No. 3 engine tank valves for evidence of 
damage and fuel contamination, (2) replacing any damaged wire with new 
wire, (3) repairing or replacing any contaminated wires as applicable, 
(4) reporting any evidence of damage or wire replacement to Lockheed, 
and (5) revising the airplane records and maintenance planning 
documents to require the repetitive inspections.
     Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-097, dated August 3, 
2006, for Model L-1011 series airplanes. This service bulletin 
describes procedures for (1) installing identification markers or 
sleeving on the wiring harnesses of the fuel quantity indicating system 
(FQIS), (2) repetitively inspecting the FQIS wiring harnesses for any 
visible damage, wear, chafing, or indications of electrical arcing, (3) 
replacing or repairing any damaged wires, (4) notifying Lockheed of any 
discrepancies found during the inspection, and (5) revising the 
airplane records and maintenance planning documents to require the 
repetitive inspection.
    Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is 
intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.

FAA's Findings

    During the SFAR 88 safety assessment, Lockheed concluded that no 
operator had installed auxiliary fuel tank No. 4, in accordance with 
Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-089, on Model L-1011-385-3 series 
airplanes. Thus, safety assessments for the auxiliary fuel tank, 
including the electrical equipment involved with the modification, did 
not need to be analyzed to show compliance with SFAR 88. Since Lockheed 
has not provided the service information required under SFAR 88 that 
could lead the FAA to make a finding of compliance, and there is a 
possibility that there may be unreported installations of the 
modification, we must mandate the removal of auxiliary fuel tank.
    If an operator does not wish to remove the auxiliary fuel tank, we 
will consider requests for alternative methods of compliance (AMOCs). 
The most likely requests would be to allow continued use of the tank by 
showing compliance

[[Page 9237]]

with SFAR 88. This would involve obtaining STCs and developing design 
and maintenance procedures to address all identified safety issues.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD

    We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an 
unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes 
of this same type design. For this reason, we are proposing this AD, 
which would require revising the FAA-approved maintenance program to 
incorporate the FSLs and CDCCLs specified in Lockheed Service Bulletin 
093-28-098. This proposed AD would also require the accomplishment of 
certain fuel system modifications, the initial inspections of certain 
repetitive FSLs to phase in those inspections, and repair if necessary.

Differences Between the Proposed AD and Service Bulletin

    Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098 specifies to revise the 
operator's maintenance program to incorporate Revision 7 of Lockheed 
Service Bulletin 093-28-062 and Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 
093-28-093. However, this proposed AD would not require those actions, 
since Lockheed Service Bulletins 093-28-062 and 093-28-093 are mandated 
by other ADs. AD 99-24-12, amendment 39-11436 (64 FR 66756, November 
30, 1999), mandated Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-093. 
AD 80-25-04, amendment 39-3983 (45 FR 79011, November 28, 1980), 
mandated Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-062, but this 
proposed AD would not require accomplishing Revision 7 of the service 
bulletin since both Revisions 1 and 7 adequately address the unsafe 
condition.
    Where Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098 specifies to inspect, 
this proposed AD would require a general visual inspection. We have 
included Note 2 in this proposed AD to define this type of inspection.
    Although Lockheed Service Bulletins 093-28-094, 093-28-095, 093-28-
096, and 093-28-097 describe procedures for notifying Lockheed of any 
discrepancies found during inspection or any evidence of damage or wire 
replacement, this proposed AD would not require those actions.

Explanation of Compliance Time

    In most ADs, we adopt a compliance time allowing a specified amount 
of time after the AD's effective date. In this case, however, the FAA 
has already issued regulations that require operators to revise their 
maintenance/inspection programs to address fuel tank safety issues. The 
compliance date for these regulations is December 16, 2008. To provide 
for efficient and coordinated implementation of these regulations and 
this proposed AD, we are using that same compliance date in this 
proposed AD.

Costs of Compliance

    There are about 108 airplanes of the affected design in the 
worldwide fleet. The following table provides the estimated costs, at 
an average labor rate of $80 per hour, for U.S. operators to comply 
with this proposed AD.

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                       Number of
                                            Work                            Cost per     U.S.-
                 Action                    hours            Parts           airplane  registered    Fleet cost
                                                                                       airplanes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maintenance program revision to                  4  None.................       $320          63         $20,160
 incorporate FSLs and CDCCLs.
Removal of auxiliary fuel tank No. 4,           40  None.................      3,200           8          25,600
 if applicable.
Modification and inspection of the              19  $974.................      2,494          63         157,122
 wiring harnesses of the fuel level
 control switch.
Inspection of the airplane fuel tanks,         370  $18,491..............     48,091          63       3,029,733
 vent boxes, and bonding jumpers, and
 the addition of bonding jumpers to the
 fuel/vent tube fittings.
Inspection of the wiring harnesses of            2  $41,785..............     41,945          63       2,642,535
 the No. 1 and No. 3 engine tank valves.
Identification and inspection of the             4  $336.................        656          63          41,328
 FQIS wiring harnesses.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed 
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the 
ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:


[[Page 9238]]


    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec.  39.13 by 
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

Lockheed: Docket No. FAA-2008-0181; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-
180-AD.

Comments Due Date

    (a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by March 21, 
2008.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to all Lockheed Model L-1011 series 
airplanes, certificated in any category.

    Note 1: This AD requires revisions to certain operator 
maintenance documents to include new inspections. Compliance with 
these inspections is required by 14 CFR 91.403(c). For airplanes 
that have been previously modified, altered, or repaired in the 
areas addressed by these inspections, the operator may not be able 
to accomplish the inspections described in the revisions. In this 
situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must 
request approval for an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in 
accordance with paragraph (k) of this AD. The request should include 
a description of changes to the required inspections that will 
ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane.

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from a design review of the fuel tank 
systems. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential for 
ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, 
alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination 
with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion 
and consequent loss of the airplane.

Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Service Bulletin Reference

    (f) The term ``service bulletin,'' as used in this AD, means the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-098, 
Revision 1, dated January 22, 2008.

Maintenance Program Revision

    (g) Before December 16, 2008, revise the FAA-approved 
maintenance program to incorporate the fuel system limitations 
(FSLs) specified in paragraph 2.B. of the service bulletin and the 
critical design configuration control limitations (CDCCLs) specified 
in paragraph 2.C. of the service bulletin; except as provided by 
paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this AD.
    (1) Where the FSLs specify to inspect, this AD would require 
doing a general visual inspection.

    Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection 
is: ``A visual examination of an interior or exterior area, 
installation, or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, or 
irregularity. This level of inspection is made from within touching 
distance unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be necessary to 
ensure visual access to all surfaces in the inspection area. This 
level of inspection is made under normally available lighting 
conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or 
droplight and may require removal or opening of access panels or 
doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be required to gain 
proximity to the area being checked.''

    (2) For the CDCCLs specified in paragraphs 2.C.(2)(c), 
2.C.(2)(d), and 2.C.(15)(a) of the service bulletin, do the 
applicable actions using a method approved in accordance with the 
procedures specified in paragraph (k) of this AD. The applicable 
service information listed in Table 1 of this AD is one approved 
method.

                                  Table 1.--Approved Methods for Certain CDCCLs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   For the CDCCL identified in the service
           bulletin in paragraph--                 One approved method is--                   For--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.C.(2)(c)...................................  Hamilton Sundstrand Overhaul      Overhauling and repairing the
                                                Manual 28-24-03, Revision 14,     electrically-operated fuel
                                                dated May 15, 2000.               boost pumps.
2.C.(2)(d)...................................  Lockheed L-1011 Service           Keeping the electrical conduit
                                                Information Letter 28-12, dated   for the electrically-operated
                                                March 17, 1998.                   fuel boost pumps open and
                                                                                  unplugged at the wing rear
                                                                                  spar.
2.C.(15)(a)..................................  Lockheed Drawing 1527514,         Installing the fuel tank
                                                Revision D, dated November 11,    valves, auxiliary power unit
                                                1981.                             pump, sight gages, fuel
                                                                                  quantity indicating system
                                                                                  tank units, over wing filler
                                                                                  cap adapter ring, boost pump
                                                                                  mounting plate, and access
                                                                                  doors for the boost pump, vent
                                                                                  box, vent valve, and fuel
                                                                                  level control switch.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Initial Accomplishment of FSLs and Repair if Necessary

    (h) Before December 16, 2008, do the applicable FSLs specified 
in paragraphs 2.B.(1)(b), 2.B.(1)(d), 2.B.(1)(e), 2.B.(1)(f), and 
2.B.(1)(g) of the service bulletin and repair any discrepancy, in 
accordance with the service bulletin. Any repair must be done before 
further flight.

    Note 3: The service bulletin refers to the service information 
listed in Table 2 of this AD as additional sources of service 
information for doing the FSLs and repair.


                      Table 2.--Additional Sources of Service Information for Certain FSLs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FSL identified in the service bulletin in     Refers to Lockheed Service
                 paragraph--                              Bulletin--                          For--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.B.(1)(b)...................................  093-28-089, Revision 3, dated     Removing auxiliary fuel tank
                                                October 4, 2006 (or later).       No. 4, if applicable.
2.B.(1)(d)...................................  093-28-094, Revision 1, dated     Modifying the wiring harnesses
                                                June 23, 2006 (or later).         of the fuel level control
                                                                                  switch; repetitively
                                                                                  inspecting the fuel level
                                                                                  control switch, wiring
                                                                                  harness, and harness conduit
                                                                                  for any visible damage, wear
                                                                                  or chafing, broken or missing
                                                                                  O-rings, or indications of
                                                                                  electrical arcing; and
                                                                                  replacing the fuel level
                                                                                  control switch assembly with a
                                                                                  new assembly if any damage or
                                                                                  evidence of chafing to the
                                                                                  wiring is found.

[[Page 9239]]

 
2.B.(1)(e)...................................  093-28-095, dated September 13,   Repetitively inspecting the
                                                2006 (or later).                  airplane fuel tanks and vent
                                                                                  boxes for cleanliness and
                                                                                  evidence of deteriorated or
                                                                                  damaged fuel/vent tubes and
                                                                                  components; repetitively
                                                                                  inspecting bonding jumpers for
                                                                                  proper installation,
                                                                                  corrosion, frayed or broken
                                                                                  strands, and the condition of
                                                                                  the environmental sealing or
                                                                                  bonding clamps and hardware;
                                                                                  correcting any discrepant
                                                                                  conditions; adding bonding
                                                                                  jumpers to the fuel/vent tube
                                                                                  fittings; and repetitively
                                                                                  inspecting the bonding jumpers
                                                                                  on the fuel/vent tube
                                                                                  fittings.
2.B.(1)(f)...................................  093-28-096, Revision 2, dated     Repetitively inspecting the
                                                June 23, 2006 (or later).         wiring harnesses of the No. 1
                                                                                  and No. 3 engine tank valves
                                                                                  for evidence of damage and
                                                                                  fuel contamination; replacing
                                                                                  any damaged wire with new
                                                                                  wire; and repairing or
                                                                                  replacing any contaminated
                                                                                  wires as applicable.
2.B.(1)(g)...................................  093-28-097, dated August 3, 2006  Identifying the wiring
                                                (or later).                       harnesses for the fuel
                                                                                  quantity indicator system
                                                                                  (FQIS); repetitively
                                                                                  inspecting the FQIS wiring
                                                                                  harnesses for any visible
                                                                                  damage, wear, chafing, or
                                                                                  indications of electrical
                                                                                  arcing; and replacing or
                                                                                  repairing any damaged wires as
                                                                                  applicable.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No Reporting Requirement

    (i) Although Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-094, Revision 1, 
dated June 23, 2006; Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-095, dated 
September 13, 2006; Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-096, Revision 
2, dated June 23, 2006; and Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-28-097, 
dated August 3, 2006; specify to notify Lockheed of any 
discrepancies found during inspection or any evidence of damage or 
wire replacement, this AD does not require that action.

No Alternative Inspections, Inspection Intervals, or CDCCLs

    (j) After accomplishing the actions specified in paragraphs (g) 
and (h) of this AD, no alternative inspections, inspection 
intervals, or CDCCLs may be used unless the inspections, intervals, 
or CDCCLs are part of a later revision of the service bulletin that 
is approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office 
(ACO), FAA; or unless the inspections, intervals, or CDCCLs are 
approved as an AMOC in accordance with the procedures specified in 
paragraph (k) of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (k)(1) The Manager, Atlanta ACO, FAA, has the authority to 
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the 
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
    (2) To request a different method of compliance or a different 
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. 
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC 
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA 
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 
FSDO.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 11, 2008.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
 [FR Doc. E8-2996 Filed 2-19-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P