[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 241 (Monday, December 17, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 71247-71270]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-24238]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 385 and 395

[Docket No. FMCSA-2004-19608]
RIN-2126-AB14


Hours of Service of Drivers

AGENCY: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), DOT.

ACTION: Interim final rule (IFR); request for comments.

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SUMMARY: FMCSA amends the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations 
effective December 27 to allow commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers 
up to 11 hours of driving time within a 14-hour, non-extendable window 
from the start of the workday, following 10 consecutive hours off duty 
(11-hour limit). This interim rule also allows motor carriers and 
drivers to restart calculations of the weekly on-duty time limits after 
the driver has at least 34 consecutive hours off duty (34-hour 
restart). An IFR is necessary to prevent disruption to enforcement and 
compliance with the hours-of-service (HOS) rules when the stay expires, 
as well as possible effects on the timely delivery of essential goods 
and services. This IFR will ensure that a familiar and uniform set of 
national rules governs motor carrier transportation, while FMCSA 
gathers public comments on all aspects of this interim final rule, 
conducts peer review of our analysis, and considers the appropriate 
final rule that addresses the issues identified by the Court. FMCSA is 
fully committed to issuing a final rule in 2008.

DATES: This rule is effective December 27, 2007. Comments must be 
received on or before February 15, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by Federal Docket 
Management System Number FMCSA-2004-19608 by any of the following 
methods:
     Web Site: http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 
instructions for submitting comments on the Federal electronic docket 
site.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 
DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery: Ground Floor, Room W12-140, DOT Building, 
1200 New

[[Page 71248]]

Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. e.t., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the Agency name and 
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this 
rulemaking. For detailed instructions on submitting comments and 
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Public 
Participation heading below. Note that all comments received will be 
posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any 
personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading 
below.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov at any time or to 
the ground floor, room W12-140, DOT Building, New Jersey Avenue, SE., 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. e.t., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.
    Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all 
comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit http://docketsinfo.dot.gov.
    Public participation: The http://www.regulations.gov Web site is 
generally available 24 hours each day, 365 days each year. You can get 
electronic submission and retrieval help and guidelines under the 
``help'' section of the http://www.regulations.gov Web site and also at 
the DOT's http://docketsinfo.dot.gov Web site. If you want us to notify 
you that we received your comments, please include a self-addressed, 
stamped envelope or postcard or print the acknowledgement page that 
appears after submitting comments online.
    Comments received after the comment closing date will be included 
in the docket, and we will consider late comments to the extent 
practicable. FMCSA may, however, issue a final rule at any time after 
the close of the comment period.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Thomas Yager, Driver and Carrier 
Operations; or [email protected]. Telephone (202) 366-4325. Office hours 
are from 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., e.t., Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

A. Legal Basis for the Rulemaking
B. Why This Interim Final Rule Is Necessary
C. Background
D. FMCSA's Response to the Court's Decision
E. Evaluation of Issues Concerning the Regulatory Impact Analysis
F. Evaluation of Recent Safety and Operational Data Under the 11-
Hour and 34-Hour Rules
G. Regulatory Analyses and Notices

A. Legal Basis for the Rulemaking

    This rule is based on the authority of the Motor Carrier Act of 
1935 and the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984.
    The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 provides that ``The Secretary of 
Transportation may prescribe requirements for (1) qualifications and 
maximum hours of service of employees of, and safety of operation and 
equipment of, a motor carrier; and, (2) qualifications and maximum 
hours of service of employees of, and standards of equipment of, a 
motor private carrier, when needed to promote safety of operation'' [49 
U.S.C. 31502(b)].
    The hours-of-service (HOS) regulations adopted in this interim rule 
pertain directly to the ``maximum hours of service of employees of * * 
* a motor carrier [49 U.S.C. 31502(b)(1)] and the ``maximum hours of 
service of employees of * * * a motor private carrier'' [49 U.S.C. 
31502(b)(2)]. The adoption and enforcement of such rules was 
specifically authorized by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. This rule 
rests squarely on that authority.
    The Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 provides concurrent authority 
to regulate drivers, motor carriers, and vehicle equipment. It requires 
the Secretary of Transportation to ``prescribe regulations on 
commercial motor vehicle safety. The regulations shall prescribe 
minimum safety standards for commercial motor vehicles.'' Although this 
authority is very broad, the Act also includes specific requirements: 
``At a minimum, the regulations shall ensure that (1) commercial motor 
vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely; (2) the 
responsibilities imposed on operators of commercial motor vehicles do 
not impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely; (3) the 
physical condition of operators of commercial motor vehicles is 
adequate to enable them to operate the vehicles safely; and (4) the 
operation of commercial motor vehicles does not have a deleterious 
effect on the physical condition of the operators'' [49 U.S.C. 
31136(a)].
    This rule is based on the authority of the 1984 Act and addresses 
the specific mandates of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(2), (3), and (4). Section 
31136(a)(1) of 49 U.S.C. deals almost entirely with the mechanical 
condition of commercial motor vehicles (CMVs), a subject not included 
in this rulemaking. The phrase ``operated safely'' in paragraph (a)(1) 
refers primarily to the safe operation of the vehicle's equipment, but 
to the extent it encompasses safe driving, this rule also addresses 
that mandate.
    Before prescribing any regulations, the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration (FMCSA) must also consider their ``costs and 
benefits'' [49 U.S.C. 31136(c)(2)(A) and 31502(d)]. Those factors are 
also discussed in this interim rule.

B. Why This Interim Final Rule Is Necessary

    After the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit (the Court or D.C. Circuit) decision in Owner-Operator 
Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, 494 F.3d 188 (D.C. Cir. 2007), FMCSA carefully analyzed 
the current situation to determine the appropriate action to take in 
response to the decision. It is important to note that the D.C. Circuit 
found fault with various procedures related to the Agency's adoption of 
the 11-hour limit and the 34-hour restart, but not with their 
substance. This analysis included a review of the safety data 
concerning motor carrier operations, particularly with respect to 
fatigue-related fatal crashes. The discussion below further explains 
the analysis and reasoning that has led FMCSA to determine this IFR is 
necessary to ensure that a familiar and uniform set of national rules 
governs motor carrier transportation, while FMCSA gathers public 
comments and information and considers the appropriate final rule, 
which FMSCA is fully committed to issuing in 2008.
    We found that the 2005 rule has maintained highway safety outcomes 
while enhancing operational flexibility for the motor carrier industry. 
Every alternative, including immediate restoration of a 10-hour driving 
limit with no 34-hour restart, entails a risk of disrupting that 
achievement. As mentioned above, in the years since 2003, when the 11-
hour driving limit and 34-hour restart provision were adopted (along 
with the critically important 10-hour minimum daily off-duty period), 
there has been no upward trend in the number of fatal crashes as a 
whole or fatigue-related fatal crashes in particular. In fact, the 2006 
fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by 
combination unit trucks (mostly standard tractor-trailer

[[Page 71249]]

combinations) is the lowest since the Department of Transportation 
began keeping such statistics over 30 years ago. The percentage of 
large truck fatal crashes where the driver was coded as fatigued has 
remained essentially the same since 2003, despite small fluctuations. 
Similarly, the percentage of large-truck fatalities in the 11\th\ hour 
of driving where the driver was coded as fatigued has remained below 
the average of the years 1991-2002 since 2003. The D.C. Circuit found 
fault with various procedures related to the Agency's adoption of the 
11-hour limit and the 34-hour restart, but not with their substance. 
These provisions are part of an effective safety rule and must be 
preserved while the Department addresses the issues identified by the 
Court.
    We then examined the alternatives available to the Agency in light 
of the Court's decision and our statutory responsibilities. We believe, 
based on reading the Court's decision in conjunction with the current 
text of the regulation, that there is strong likelihood of confusion 
regarding what HOS rules will be in effect on December 27, 2007, when 
the Court's mandate issues. For example, drivers and motor carriers 
could read the Court's decision to vacate certain provisions of the 
2005 HOS rule in light of 49 CFR 395.0 and conclude that there is no 
daily driving limit in effect. Alternatively, issuance of the Court's 
mandate could be viewed as an immediate restoration of the former 10-
hour driving limit with no 34-hour restart. Regardless of how the 
Court's action is interpreted, we are certain that issuance of the 
mandate will lead to sufficient confusion and uncertainty concerning 
what HOS rules govern, and result in poor compliance by the motor 
carrier industry, as well as reduced and inconsistent enforcement by 
Federal and State officials. FMCSA provides grants to States that agree 
to adopt and enforce State laws or regulations compatible with the 
Federal safety regulations. Some adopt Federal rules by reference, 
while others require the legislature to enact a special measure 
adopting the Federal rule; many allow an administrative agency to adopt 
a rule, but only after publishing a notice and giving the public a 
chance to comment. Because of wide variations in adoption procedures 
and schedules, States have three years to adopt such regulations. In 
order to respond adequately to the Court's procedural concerns we 
believe that, to respond to the Court's decision, we need to issue an 
IFR, with an opportunity for public comment, to ensure there will not 
be a patchwork of laws across the nation--with some States enforcing a 
10-hour limit while others enforce no limit, and still others retained 
the 2005 limits--without a clear general understanding of what Federal 
regulation is in place . Undoubtedly, this would create confusion, 
inconsistency, and have an unpredictable impact on safety, since law 
enforcement may reduce its enforcement as a result of varying State 
laws. To remain legal, each driver would need to know the HOS limits in 
each State where he or she operated; this is simply impractical. 
Drivers could not be sure how their actions in one State would be 
treated in a State with a different HOS regime; officers might reduce 
their enforcement efforts to avoid the perception of unfairness. 
Uncertainty is the enemy of enforcement and compliance; it can only 
impair highway safety. This IFR will ensure that a familiar, uniform 
set of national rules govern motor carrier transportation, while FMCSA 
gathers additional public comments on all aspects of this interim final 
rule, conducts peer review of our analysis, and considers an 
appropriate final rule that addresses the issues identified by the 
Court. FMCSA is fully committed to issuing a final rule in 2008.
    Additionally, an immediate restoration of a 10-hour driving limit 
with no restart provision or entirely eliminating the daily driving 
limit would cause disruption and transition costs. The affidavits of 
motor carrier officials filed by American Trucking Associations, Inc. 
(ATA) in support of its stay motion in the D.C. Circuit (and described 
in more detail below) bear witness to the recruitment, training, 
operational, and equipment costs motor carriers would face, amounting 
in the aggregate to scores and perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars. 
The costs are not merely transitional, however. Our failure to issue an 
IFR could inflict a loss of scheduling flexibility on the industry and 
ultimately raise the cost of highway transportation. There could also 
be adverse safety implications, as new and inexperienced drivers are 
hired to handle loads that could not consistently be delivered in the 
absence of the provisions vacated by the Court. New drivers are less 
safe than veteran operators and would inevitably become involved in 
crashes that a more experienced driver population would avoid. The 
costs of added crashes are very substantial. The IFR avoids all of 
these problems.
    The IFR will also allow FMCSA and commenters to the docket 
additional time to evaluate more recent data and determine the 
appropriate final hours of service rule while avoiding shifting the 
requirements back and forth. Although our analysis indicates these 
policies are the right ones to adopt on an interim basis, FMCSA 
specifically requests comment on all the conclusions reached in this 
preamble and Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA). FMCSA is also submitting 
its analysis to peer review. FMCSA is committed to issuing in 2008 a 
final rule fully responding to all comments to this IFR.
    For example, with respect to the 11-hour driving limit and the 34-
hour restart, the more recent data continue to support them. Although 
the D.C. Circuit raised concerns with the Agency's treatment of the 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) data for crashes that 
occurred beyond the 11th hour in the 2005 rule, the Agency has employed 
a more sophisticated analysis discussed below that shows a lower risk 
from driving in the 11th hour than under FMCSA's earlier method. The 
modeling of time on task (TOT) developed for the 2005 rule was complex 
and comprehensive and remains the best available study of its kind. The 
D.C. Circuit faulted the Agency for failing to make this model 
available for notice and comment; this IFR corrects that oversight, and 
the RIA provides a more detailed explanation of the Agency's methods. 
Analysis of further data collected for the Virginia Tech Transportation 
Institute (VTTI) operational study supports the preliminary results 
described in the 2005 rule: There is no increase in ``critical 
incidents'' (a surrogate for crash risk) in the 11th hour of driving. 
FMCSA's very recent survey data show that, while the 11th hour and the 
34-hour restart provisions are being used more often than in 2005, 
virtually no one attempts to use every minute of driving or on-duty 
time theoretically allowed by the regulations, just as the Agency 
predicted in the 2005 rule. Furthermore, the analysis of fatigue-
related crashes by day of the week, described in detail later in the 
preamble, also supports the belief that the 34-hour restart is not 
resulting in increases in fatigue-related fatal crashes. FMCSA is not 
required to demonstrate that constant, maximum utilization of the HOS 
rules is as safe as the pre-2003 rules, when operational constraints 
(heavy traffic, shortages of parking and truck driver sleeping 
facilities, waiting time at terminals, eating and refueling, etc.) make 
it impossible to achieve that degree of utilization except for brief 
periods. The 2005 rule analyzed the safety implications of the HOS 
rules in

[[Page 71250]]

the real world, and all of the safety data for subsequent years have 
borne out the Agency's conclusion that the rule skillfully and 
successfully combines safety with operational benefits. These are the 
outcomes this IFR seeks to maintain.

C. Background

    The HOS rules limit the number of hours a driver may operate a 
commercial motor vehicle (CMV) during each workday, the length of the 
workday within which driving may occur, the minimum off-duty period 
before starting the next workday, and the cumulative number of on-duty 
hours during the work week after which a CMV may not be driven. The 
rules also allow for the use of a sleeper berth to accumulate the 
equivalent of 10 consecutive hours off duty. Prior to April 2003, FMCSA 
and its predecessor agencies limited driving time to 10 hours within a 
15-hour, extendable workday or window. In practice, the 15-hour window 
could be substantially longer than 15 hours because miscellaneous off-
duty periods were not counted as part of the 15 hours. Drivers were 
required to have at least 8 consecutive hours off duty prior to the 
beginning of a new 15-hour duty window. Drivers using a sleeper berth 
could split their time in the sleeper berth into two separate periods 
to accumulate the equivalent of 8 consecutive hours off duty provided 
neither period was less than 2 hours. Drivers working for a carrier 
that operated 6 days each week could not drive CMVs after 60 hours on 
duty in a 7 consecutive-day period; drivers working for a carrier that 
operated CMVs 7 days each week and which chose to operate under an 
alternate work schedule to the 60-hour rule, could not drive CMVs after 
70 hours on duty in an 8 consecutive-day period. In practice, drivers 
on certain schedules could ``run out'' of available on-duty time within 
a few days and be forced to go off duty for approximately 3 full days 
before being allowed to drive again, regardless of whether the driver 
may have fully recovered from the work demands in a shorter period of 
time.
    In April 2003, FMCSA published a final rule that changed the 
requirements for drivers of property-carrying CMVs. (68 FR 22456, April 
28, 2003) (``2003 Rule'') Driving was limited to 11 hours within a 14-
hour, non-extendable window after coming on duty, following 10 
consecutive hours off duty (known as the 11-hour limit). Although the 
60- and 70-hour rules were unchanged, drivers could restart the 
calculation during any weekly time period after they took 34 
consecutive hours off duty (known as the 34-hour restart provision). 
Drivers using sleeper berths were allowed to continue to split the 
mandatory off duty period, with the minimum period in the sleeper berth 
being 2 hours. (Drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs are still required 
to operate under the pre-2003 rules.)
    The 2003 rule contained several provisions that, when taken 
together, improved the opportunity for drivers to obtain restorative 
sleep, thus decreasing the likelihood of driver fatigue. For example, 
among the most significant provisions, the rule established a 14-hour, 
non-extendable window within which a driver could drive up to 11 hours, 
following a 10 consecutive hour off-duty period. This provision moved 
drivers toward a work-rest schedule that more closely matched the 
natural circadian cycle of 24 hours and gave drivers the opportunity to 
obtain the 7 to 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep per day that most adults 
need. The 34-hour restart provision also gave drivers the opportunity 
for two 8-hour sleep periods, which research has shown can overcome 
cumulative fatigue associated with sleep deprivation. Because the duty 
period within which an operator could drive was more limited than under 
the pre-2003 rule and because the rest period was long enough to 
provide an opportunity for 7 to 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep time, 
FMCSA concluded it was safe and reasonable to extend the number of 
hours an operator could drive within the 14-hour window from 10 hours 
to 11 hours. The 34-hour restart provision also gave drivers and 
carriers operational flexibility and an improved quality of life, 
particularly for long haul operations, where the 7- and 8-day limits 
may limit flexibility by forcing drivers to go off duty for periods 
longer than necessary to fully recover from a typical work week. FMCSA 
concluded that the 14-hour rule and the mandatory 10-hour off-duty 
period improved safety while providing operational flexibility that the 
11 hours of driving time and the 34-hour restart provide.
    In April 2004, the Court overturned the 2003 rule on the grounds 
that FMCSA did not address the issue of driver health, as required by 
49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(4). (Public Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209, D.C. 
Cir. 2004) The Court also indicated that it had concerns about the 
rationale for other provisions in the rule. However, to avoid industry 
disruption and burden on the States, Congress enacted section 7(f) of 
the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004. This section provided 
that the 2003 rule would remain in effect until a new final rule 
addressed the Court's issues or until September 30, 2005, whichever 
occurred first.
    After reviewing the decision and considering the concerns raised by 
the Court, FMCSA decided to re-propose the rule as originally published 
in 2003 and to seek public comments. (70 FR 3339, Jan. 24, 2005) On 
August 25, 2005, FMCSA published a final HOS rule that retained most of 
the provisions of the 2003 rule. (70 FR 49978, Aug. 25, 2005) (``2005 
Rule'') The Agency significantly strengthened the 2003 rule by 
requiring drivers using sleeper berths to spend at least 8 but less 
than 10 consecutive hours in the sleeper berth and take an additional 2 
hours either off duty or in the sleeper berth. The new requirement 
provided drivers the opportunity to obtain 7 to 8 hours of 
uninterrupted sleep each day. Also, the Agency required that the 
shorter sleeper berth period be counted against the 14-hour on-duty 
limit decreasing the extent to which the workday could be extended. The 
2005 rule also provided relief to some short-haul operations using 
lighter trucks.
    The purpose of the HOS rules is to reduce the likelihood of driver 
fatigue and of fatigue-related crashes. Although the rules that existed 
before 2004 (the effective year of the 2003 rule) allowed less daily 
driving time than the 2003 and 2005 rules (10 hours versus 11 hours), 
the driving could occur 15 hours or more after the driver started 
working without any opportunity for intervening restorative rest or 
sleep, and followed a shorter minimum rest period (8 hours versus 10 
hours). The change to a 14-hour non-extendable window and a 10-hour 
rather than an 8-hour rest period was intended to limit the period in 
which a driver could operate a CMV and provide the driver with a work 
schedule that was consistent with the normal 24-hour biological clock. 
The 2005 rule did not limit the number of hours a driver can perform 
work other than driving, but if a driver worked after the 14th hour, he 
or she must take at least 10 consecutive hours off duty after finishing 
work before again operating a CMV. The change to a 10-hour off-duty 
requirement also recognized that drivers may do other things in their 
off-duty time besides sleeping; the 10-hour break gives them an 
opportunity to obtain the 7 to 8 hours of sleep most people need to be 
rested and to carry out other day-to-day personal activities. The 34-
hour restart provision provides drivers with an opportunity to obtain 
two 8-hour rest periods, which research indicates can overcome 
cumulative sleep deprivation. Similarly, the 2005 change to the sleeper 
berth provisions eliminated the

[[Page 71251]]

practice of splitting time in the sleeper berth into increments that 
were too short to provide an opportunity for 7 to 8 consecutive hours 
of sleep.
    FMCSA addressed the issue of driver health in the 2005 rule, as 
required by 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(4). In preparing the 2005 rule, FMCSA 
researched both U.S. and international health and fatigue studies and 
consulted with Federal safety and health experts. In addition, FMCSA 
asked the Transportation Research Board (TRB) of the National Academies 
to contract with a research team of experts in the field of health and 
fatigue to prepare a summary of relevant literature through the TRB 
Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program. The literature 
review was conducted using two teams of health and transportation 
experts to identify and summarize the available research literature 
relevant to the 2005 rule. This review included research findings that 
discussed the relationship between the hours a commercial motor vehicle 
driver works, drives, and the structure of the work schedule (on-duty/
off-duty cycles, time-on-task, especially time in continuous driving, 
sleep time, etc.), and the impact on his/her health. The research 
studies cited in this interim rule are included in the List of 
References in the 2005 final rule (70 FR 49978, at 50067). Copies or 
abstracts are in the docket referenced at the beginning of this notice.
    FMCSA re-affirms its findings on driver health outlined in the 2005 
final rule. For a complete discussion of the health of drivers 
operating under the HOS rules, see the August 25, 2005 final rule (70 
FR 49978, at 49982).
    Public Citizen and others challenged the August 2005 rule on 
several grounds, as did the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers 
Association (OOIDA). On July 24, 2007, the Court rejected OOIDA's 
arguments, which focused on the sleeper berth provision, but accepted 
part of Public Citizen's arguments and vacated the 11-hour driving time 
and 34-hour restart provisions (Owner-Operator Independent Drivers 
Association, Inc. v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 494 
F.3d 188 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Public Citizen challenged the provisions on 
four grounds. First, Public Citizen contended that FMCSA's actions were 
inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirement 
for notice and comment rulemaking because the Agency did not disclose 
in time for comment the methodology of a model central to the Agency's 
justification for the rule. Second, when the methodology was disclosed, 
FMCSA did not provide an explanation for some of its critical elements, 
thus rendering the rule arbitrary and capricious. Third, FMCSA's 
treatment of a number of other safety considerations was also arbitrary 
and capricious. Finally, Public Citizen argued that the rule failed to 
protect driver health. The Court vacated the rule provisions based on 
the first two arguments and did not address the last two.
    The Court concluded that FMCSA did not satisfy the APA's 
requirements because the Agency failed to provide an opportunity for 
public comment on the methodology of the Agency's operator-fatigue 
model, which FMCSA used to assess the costs and benefits of alternative 
changes to the HOS rules. In particular, the Court found the Agency had 
not adequately disclosed and made available for review the 
modifications it made to the 2003 operator-fatigue model to account for 
time-on-task effects in the 2005 analysis. The Court concluded that the 
methodology the Agency used changed and did not remain constant from 
2003 to 2005 because the time-on-task element in the model was new and 
constituted the Agency's response to a defect in its previous 
methodology. The Court listed several elements of the process by which 
the Agency calculated the impact of time-on-task that it held could not 
have been anticipated and that were not disclosed in time to allow for 
public comment.
    The Court also found, turning to Public Citizen's second argument, 
that FMCSA did not provide an adequate explanation for certain critical 
elements in the model's methodology. As its basis for vacating the 
increase in the daily driving limit from 10 to 11 hours, the Court 
found arbitrary and capricious what it described as FMCSA's ``complete 
lack of explanation for an important step in the Agency's analysis,'' 
i.e., the manner in which it had plotted crash risk as a function of 
time-on-task/hours of driving. The Court also found that FMCSA failed 
to provide an explanation for its method for calculating risk relative 
to average driving hours in determining its estimate of the increased 
risk of driving in the 11th hour. As its basis for vacating the 34-hour 
restart provision, the Court found that FMCSA also provided no 
explanation for the failure of its operator-fatigue model to account 
for cumulative fatigue due to the increased weekly driving and working 
hours permitted by the 34-hour restart provision.
    Based on these two findings, the Court found it unnecessary to 
reach Public Citizen's other two arguments. In addition, the Court 
rejected three additional challenges to the 2005 Rule raised by OOIDA.
    In an order filed on September 28, 2007, the Court granted a 90-day 
stay of the mandate. The Court directed that issuance of the mandate be 
withheld until December 27, 2007.

D. FMCSA's Response to the Court's Decision

    This rulemaking addresses the issues that were identified by the 
Court in overturning two provisions of the 2005 rule. It seeks comment 
on the methodology of the model central to the justification for this 
IFR. It is based on the Agency's evaluation of new safety and 
operational data, additional analysis and modeling of the relationship 
between hours of driving and fatigue-related large truck crashes, 
discussion of the concept of cumulative fatigue in the context of 
driving activity, and the collection and evaluation of new data on the 
benefits and costs of the 11-hour driving limit and the 34-hour restart 
provisions. As an additional step to ensure the soundness of the 
Agency's analytical methods, we are subjecting our analysis to peer 
review.
    By re-adopting the 11-hour limit and the 34-hour restart, the 
Agency's intent is to allow motor carriers and drivers to combine work-
rest schedules that follow the optimal 24-hour circadian cycle (10 
hours off duty and 14 hours on duty) while maintaining highway safety 
with operational flexibility. By adopting these rules as interim, the 
Agency is seeking to avoid significant and costly disruption of 
existing industry compliance and State enforcement practices while 
ensuring that the actions and underlying safety analysis are available 
for comment from all interested parties before issuing a final rule. In 
the meantime, this will ensure that an uninterrupted safety regime 
remains in place with State enforcement laws, policies, and personnel.
    The 2005 rule includes a provision stating that ``[a]ny regulations 
on hours of service of drivers in effect before April 28, 2003, which 
were amended or replaced by the final rule adopted on April 28, 2003 
[69 FR 22456] are rescinded and not in effect'' (Sec.  395.0). Because 
the D.C. Circuit did not address this provision, either in OOIDA v. 
FMCSA or in its response to FMCSA's response in support of ATA's motion 
for a stay, the Agency must now adopt an IFR to forestall the 
significant confusion that would otherwise occur in the motor carrier 
industry, interfering with efforts to restore an orderly HOS regime.
    The two provisions being adopted in this rule, on an interim basis, 
are part of a broader, critical set of five HOS

[[Page 71252]]

provisions included in this IFR. The other three critical provisions of 
the 2005 rule are: (1) The increase in the minimum off-duty period from 
8 consecutive hours to 10 consecutive hours to ensure drivers have an 
opportunity to obtain up to 8 hours of sleep; (2) the establishment of 
a 14-hour, non-extendable window from the start of the workday within 
which all driving must be completed; and (3) the modification of the 
sleeper-berth rule to require an 8-hour sleeper berth period, thereby 
ensuring that drivers have an opportunity to obtain up to 8 hours of 
uninterrupted sleep. These provisions function along with the 11-hour 
limit and the 34-hour restart provision to protect against degradation 
of driver's cognitive or psychomotor skills due to fatigue.
    Section E describes additional analysis conducted since 2005 that 
validates the modeling relied upon by the Agency to examine the 
relationship between the risk of a fatigue-related large truck crash 
during the 11th hour of driving. It also addresses cumulative fatigue 
as it relates to the driving and restart provisions. In its analysis of 
the 34-hour restart provisions being adopted in this IFR, the Agency 
re-examined the research pertaining to long work hours and sought 
additional research completed after the 2005 rule. The Agency found no 
new research that addressed the relationship of long work hours to 
motor-vehicle driving safety.
    Safety data collected and analyzed since the 2003 HOS rule became 
effective, described below in Section F, address the impact of the 11-
hour driving limit and the 34-hour restart provisions and validate the 
Agency's argument that safety has been maintained under these 
provisions. The Agency has collected new operational data, described in 
Section F, that support its prior conclusions with regard to the cost-
benefit analysis of the 11-hour driving limit and the 34-hour restart 
provision. These data also suggest that reverting to the pre-2003 rule 
10-hour driving limit and eliminating the 34-hour restart provisions 
would be significantly disruptive to drivers, carriers, and to the 
States where most of the enforcement of HOS violations occur. It would 
also be disruptive to the safe and efficient movement of freight and 
cause delays in the delivery of essential goods and services to the 
American people.

E. Evaluation of Issues Concerning the Regulatory Impact Analysis

    The D.C. Circuit's 2007 decision held that FMCSA failed to provide 
an adequate opportunity for review of certain aspects of the RIA. The 
Agency is providing a 60-day opportunity for review and comment on the 
RIA supporting this interim rule and the interim rule itself. Since the 
public has submitted comment on many aspects of this analysis in 
previous rulemakings, and given the Agency's desire to issue a final 
rule in a timely fashion, FMCSA believes 60 days is an adequate amount 
of time to afford the public opportunity for comment.
    The Court also held that the Agency had not provided an adequate 
explanation for two critical elements of the model in the RIA 
accompanying the 2005 rule: (1) The analysis of time-on-task; and (2) 
the analysis of how the 34-hour restart affected cumulative fatigue. 
This section addresses these two topics. First, in support of this 
interim rule the Agency has reevaluated how the effects of extended 
driving hours (i.e., time-on-task or TOT) were taken into account in 
its cost-benefit model. This section summarizes how, in the RIA 
accompanying this rule, the Agency has responded to questions about the 
TOT analysis raised by Public Citizen and the Court in its July 2007 
opinion. FMCSA's careful analysis uncovered several necessary 
revisions, but the net effects of these revisions are minor. Second, 
this section addresses the issue of cumulative fatigue and describes 
the Agency's conclusion, based on recent crash data and operational 
data, that there is no evidence that the 34-hour restart provision has 
led to harmful cumulative fatigue.

Original Analysis

    The goal of the Agency's 2005 analysis was to assess the change in 
fatigue-related crash risks that would result from eliminating driving 
in an 11th hour of driving. Assuming motor carriers will still deliver 
the same volume of freight even without the 11th hour, FMCSA concluded 
that driving that could not be completed in the 11th hour would be 
completed by additional drivers in somewhat shorter trips. Crashes, 
including some that are fatigue-related, will occur in those shorter 
trips. The 2005 RIA calculated the average fatigue-related crash rate 
in trips that allow the 11th hour compared to the rate in the 
replacement trips that do not.
    A TOT effect was added to the fatigue model by establishing a 
function relating TOT and the percentage of crashes attributable to 
fatigue, relative to typical fatigue levels, and using that relative 
risk to scale up the fatigue crash risk for hours with above-average 
fatigue. The model was then calibrated by scaling the results to bring 
the average fatigue crash risk in the baseline in line with the rate 
projected for long-haul driving in earlier modeling of the impacts of 
the 2003 rule.
    To find the relationship between TOT and fatigue, FMCSA used Trucks 
Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) data from 1991 through 2002 (A 
general discussion of the TIFA data set can be found later in this IFR 
under section F's subheading ``Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 
(TIFA) Data''). For each TOT level from the first hour through the 
12th, FMCSA computed the average percentage of crashes caused by 
fatigue. Few data points were available for TOT levels beyond the 12th 
hour, not least because it was illegal, in most cases, to drive past 10 
hours during this time period. To use the limited data on fatigue 
percentages at high TOT levels without introducing too much 
variability, FMCSA pooled the data for all crashes beyond 12 hours: we 
constructed an observation that assigned the average percent fatigue 
related crashes to the average TOT for all crashes beyond 12 hours, and 
used this as an additional data point in the analysis. Specifically, 
the average percentage of fatigue-related crashes for these crashes was 
24.75 percent; and the average TOT was 16.7 hours.
    A regression analysis included this combined data point and showed 
a clear pattern of increasing fatigue-crash percentages at high TOT 
levels, as shown in Exhibit 1. A cubic function fit the data well, 
including the final, combined point.
    From Exhibit 1, it appears that the data point for the 11th hour by 
itself lies well above the general pattern of most of the data. In the 
years from 1991 through 2002 during which the data were collected, 
driving beyond 10 hours violated the HOS rules. There were two 
exceptions when driving beyond 10 hours would not have violated the HOS 
rules. First, driving beyond 10 hours would not have violated the HOS 
rules when the driver was driving in intrastate commerce under State 
HOS rules. Second, driving beyond 10 hours would not have violated the 
HOS rules when the driver was driving under the Federal adverse driving 
conditions \1\ exception, 49 CFR 395.1(b)(1), which by its very nature 
suggests a more stressful work environment at the time of the 11th hour 
of driving. Thus, the only drivers represented were those who were 
willing to violate the rules or who were exempt from the rule and may,

[[Page 71253]]

therefore, have been unusually fatigued for reasons other than TOT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ ``Adverse driving conditions'' means snow, sleet, fog, other 
adverse weather conditions, a highway covered with snow or ice, or 
unusual road and traffic conditions, none of which were apparent on 
the basis of information known to the person dispatching the run at 
the time it was begun.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As shown in exhibit 1, the model's predicted relative risk at the 
11th hour is lower than the raw percent of fatigue related crashes at 
the 11th hour. This is not surprising, however, given the standard 
errors of the estimates at the longer driving times. There were 94 
crashes in the 11th hour in the data set; even if the predicted value 
of about 7 percent fatigue is correct, a random selection of 94 crashes 
would frequently show 9 or more due to fatigue.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR17DE07.007

    Using the cubic function, FMCSA calculated the probability that a 
crash at a given TOT would be coded as fatigue-related. In order to 
calculate the impacts of allowing the 11th hour of driving, FMCSA then 
had to take these results and apply them to a model of what would 
happen to driving patterns with and without the 11th hour provision. 
FMCSA used these modeling results to calculate a TOT ``adjustment 
factor'' to calculate a total risk of fatigue-related large truck 
crashes, incorporating both TOT and non-TOT fatigue risk factors. In 
order to scale the effects, in the modeling, each fatigue probability 
for TOT levels of 8 hours or more was divided by a measure of the 
average fatigue probability across the first 11 hours, as seen in the 
TIFA data. This was simply to prepare the TOT results for use in the 
overall model, and is explained in more detail in the RIA. If properly 
performed, this rescaling should not affect the results of the analysis 
of each option, since the relative relationship of fatigue-related risk 
to driving hours is unaffected by the scaling factor. In the 2003 
model, for TOT less than 8 hours, no incremental fatigue risk was 
calculated on the grounds that for these hours fatigue was at or below 
average. As discussed later on in this preamble, the lack of adjustment 
for the hours before 8 biased the results, and needed to be addressed 
in revising the analysis.
    This approach created fatigue adjustment factors. For each hour of 
driving that was modeled, the predicted fatigue crash levels in the 
absence of a TOT effect were multiplied by these factors.
    This analysis was used to calculate the reduction in crash risks 
resulting from eliminating the 11th hour. In a model run that allowed 
the 11th hour, some hours of driving would fall into the 11th hour; 
their predicted non-TOT-adjusted fatigue crash likelihoods would be 
multiplied by a factor greater than 1.0, based on the modeling results, 
which would increase the values to reflect the higher fatigue levels 
expected at high TOT levels. In runs that eliminated the 11th hour, the 
predicted non-TOT fatigue crash risks would be multiplied by generally 
smaller TOT multipliers, and so the predicted average crash risk would 
be lower than in the run that allowed the 11th hour. Using this method, 
and calibrating the model so that the baseline run would show 7 percent 
fatigue-related crashes, FMCSA found that eliminating the 11th hour 
would reduce crash-related damages by about 0.3 percent, worth about 
$60 million annually.

Challenges to the Analysis

    In the 2007 challenge by Public Citizen, the original analysis was 
disputed in several ways. First, petitioners questioned the use of a 
function that combined the data points beyond 12 hours and treated them 
as though they fell near the 17th, rather than at some other point on 
the graph (e.g., at the 13th hour). Second, the reason for dividing the 
predicted fatigue levels from the TOT function by the average fatigue-
related crash rate was questioned. Third, the value used to adjust the 
total crash risk to the fatigue-related crash risk was criticized as 
being based on TOT hours 1-11, rather than the hours 1-10 that would be 
allowed in the alternative that eliminated the 11th hour. FMCSA's 
responses to these challenges, and the revisions to the analysis that 
were made as a consequence, are explained here.
    Statistical Approach. FMCSA's basic approach of fitting a function 
to the entire range of TOT hours rather than relying on the percentage 
of crashes at

[[Page 71254]]

a particular hour is a widely accepted statistical method. Relying on 
the percentage of fatigue crashes for individual TOT hours would 
subject the analysis to great uncertainty, because random factors can 
cause large changes in measured percentages of small numbers. The data 
used in the 2005 analysis, for example, shows that in the 13th hour, 25 
percent of fatal crashes are fatigue-related, while the 14th hour shows 
0 percent fatigue crashes; the 11th hour shows 9.6 percent, while the 
12th shows only 8.7 percent. Further, data can vary across years. For 
example, in data and analysis explained below, in 2004 there was not a 
single fatigue-related fatal crash in the 11th hour. None of these 
widely varying values are precise measures of what would be seen if 
more observations were available. If TOT affects fatigue crash risks, 
it is more likely to be due to an underlying tendency to become more 
fatigued with longer periods of driving than to the individual effects 
of particular hours of driving. The need to fit a function to the data, 
extrapolating from the large volumes of crash experience at low TOT 
levels, was in fact recognized by the Court in its 2004 decision:

    The mere fact that the magnitude of time-on-task effects is 
uncertain is no justification for disregarding the effect entirely. 
The agency, for example, could have extrapolated the time-on-task 
effects of driving longer hours using crash-risk data derived from 
drivers who drove for shorter periods of time. (Public Citizen v. 
FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209, D.C. Cir. 2004, Slip opinion at 16)

FMCSA believes the use of a combined data point at the average TOT and 
average fatigue crash risk along with the use of a cubic function were 
reasonable approaches to the need to fit a function and use the limited 
data available for high TOT values. Moreover, in reassessing this 
model, we have evaluated the suggestions made by Public Citizen and 
found that they would have been inappropriate. Specifically, Public 
Citizen suggested a method by which the average crash risk shown in the 
data for longer driving hours could have been combined and then placed 
at 13 hours for the purposes of modeling. If fatigue goes up steadily 
with TOT, one would expect the average fatigue percentage of crashes at 
and beyond 13 hours will be higher than the fatigue percentage at 
exactly 13 hours. Thus, combining all the high-TOT data at 13 hours 
would have biased upward the estimated relationship between TOT and 
fatigue-related crash risk.
    It is true that FMCSA did not use more recent statistical modeling 
techniques that utilize all of the individual observations of crashes 
across all TOT levels, but rather aggregated observations at specific 
hours of TOT to calculate and model those percentages. \2\ One flaw in 
the original approach is that the cubic functional form allows for 
fatigue percentages that are greater than 100 percent or less than 
zero, which are outside the range of possible values for fatigue 
percentages. Another issue is that, by combining the data beyond the 
12th hour, the analysis leaves out some of the available information: 
for example, it does not consider the relative numbers of crashes at 
different TOT levels. The revised analysis, described below, addresses 
these shortcomings in the original approach and employs a superior 
statistical method for analyzing binary outcomes, i.e., whether the 
crash was fatigue-related crash or not. FMCSA specifically requests 
comment on this new modeling approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ In an analysis recently submitted to the Court by ATA, an 
expert statistician states that there is a ``reasonable basis in 
statistical theory and practice for FMCSA's approach.'' He has 
concluded that FMCSA's approach ``has a reasonable basis, in 
contrast with [Public Citizen's] illustrative example, which is 
virtually guaranteed to produce a biased result.'' The expert found 
that ``FMCSA's cubic regression curve matches the curves produced by 
more sophisticated methods quite closely over the relevant range of 
driving hours, in contrast to [Public Citizen's] illustrative 
alternative curve, which departs substantially from the curves 
produced by more sophisticated methods.'' Declaration of Dr. M. 
Laurentius Marais, Ph.D., at ] 6. See Tab F of the ATA Motion's 
Addendum to read Dr. Marais's declaration. It is in the docket 
referenced at the beginning of this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the D.C. Circuit, FMCSA has re-estimated the 
function using a flexible logistic function, which lets predicted 
fatigue values range only from 0 to 100 percent. In this approach, 
every available crash data point was used, and several variants were 
tested to find the best-fitting logistic curve. See the RIA's Appendix 
V for details. The RIA is in the docket referenced at the beginning of 
this notice. In addition, because there are other determinants of 
fatigue-related crash risk besides the number of hours driving, FMCSA 
also explored taking other variables into account, including time of 
day, day of the week, and type of power unit (truck tractors or 
straight trucks). Again, this multivariate approach to predicting risk 
is a standard statistical technique. These extra factors did not change 
the simple relationship of TOT to fatigue crash risk; however, there 
are other interesting results relevant to the restart provision we will 
explain further below. This approach yielded a TOT fatigue crash risk 
function that was generally similar to the original cubic function for 
low TOT levels, but lay somewhat lower at the 11th hour as shown in 
Exhibit 2.

[[Page 71255]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR17DE07.008

    Division of the Fatigue Percentage by its Average. Dividing the 
predicted fatigue crash risk by an average value is a reasonable way to 
create a TOT adjustment factor that changes relative fatigue values 
within a set of data without changing the average value of that set. 
The fatigue model used in the original analysis yielded raw fatigue 
predictions for each simulated driving hour, but did not take TOT 
explicitly into account. Suppose these raw predictions happened to 
average 7 percent fatigue. To adjust these predictions to account for 
TOT effects, each simulated hour's fatigue percentage should be 
multiplied by an adjustment factor based on the TOT fatigue function: 
The raw predicted value for an 11th hour of driving, for example, 
should be multiplied by a larger value than for a 1st or 8th hour.
    FMCSA could have used the TOT fatigue function directly as an 
adjustment factor: Raw predicted values for the 11th hours could have 
been multiplied by 0.072, and those for the 1st hours by 0.014. On 
average, however, the resulting values would have been much smaller 
than the original values, because the average value of the TOT fatigue 
function across all hours is less than 0.03. To return the typical 
fatigue value to a more realistic level, the adjusted values would have 
had to be scaled up by close to two orders of magnitude. As an 
alternative, the TOT fatigue function can first be divided by its 
average. This step creates an adjustment factor that averages 1.0, with 
some values above 1 and some below. Using this adjustment factor will 
take the TOT effect into account while leaving the typical measured 
fatigue level relatively unchanged.
    Choice of the Divisor. In the original analysis, the TOT adjustment 
factor was created by dividing the TOT fatigue function by 2.92 
percent, which was the average relative fatigue-related crash risk 
level for the first 11 hours as seen in the underlying data. It was 
argued by Public Citizen that the average value of the function for the 
first 10 hours would have been more appropriate. Because of the details 
of the analysis, however, and the way the results were scaled, the 
choice of divisor has no effect on the results. As demonstrated in 
Appendix V of the RIA, when the fatigue adjustment factors are applied 
to both the baseline and policy options, the divisor cancels itself 
out, and has no effect on the estimate of the relative fatigue crash 
percentages with or without the 11th hour.
    Thus, FMCSA concluded both that there is a conceptual basis for 
dividing the predicted fatigue levels by TOT by the average fatigue 
level--to create an adjustment factor centered on 1.0--and also that 
the choice of an exact divisor is unimportant because that factor 
cancels out in the mathematical calculation.

Updates to the Analysis

    FMCSA concluded that two issues newly identified by the D.C. 
Circuit needed to be addressed in revising the estimated benefits of 
eliminating the 11th hour. First, the function used by the Agency was 
not ideal. As discussed above, although we continue to believe our 
original approach is reasonable, we have developed a more sophisticated 
model. Second, the approach laid out above was implemented incorrectly. 
Although all TOT hours should have been adjusted, in the 2005 analysis, 
only hour 8 or more were given adjustment factors. The Agency has 
calculated how these two issues would have affected the estimated 
benefits of eliminating the 11th hour by estimating the change in the 
average fatigue crash risk twice: once with the original approach, and 
once with an updated approach. For each approach, this was accomplished 
by
     Estimating the fraction of driving that was done in each 
TOT hour,

[[Page 71256]]

assuming that driving 11 hours was legal;
     Multiplying the fraction for each TOT hour by a TOT 
fatigue adjustment factor;
     Summing the results of this multiplication;
     Repeating these calculations for a case that allowed only 
10 hours of driving; and
     Finding the percentage change in the fatigue percentages 
between the 11 and 10 hour cases.
The details of these calculations are shown in Appendix V of the RIA. 
Under the original analysis, the fatigue crash risk appeared to fall by 
almost 3.6 percent if the 11th driving hour were restricted. Under the 
revised analysis, the fatigue crash risk fell by 5.1 percent. Thus, 
correcting the TOT approach is expected to increase the projected TOT 
safety benefits by a factor of about 5.1 percent/3.6 percent, or about 
1.42 times. Thus, if the analysis had been done correctly, the true 
benefits would be about 1.42 times the original estimate of $60 
million, or about $85 million per year.

Comparisons of Revised Benefits to Estimated Costs

    The increase of $25 million in benefits per year still leaves the 
projected benefits of restricting the 11th hour of driving of $85 
million per year far short of the projected costs. The costs of 
prohibiting the 11th hour were estimated by finding the average 
reduction in driver productivity in shifting between a case that 
assumed driving time is capped at 11 hours and a variant that capped 
driving time at 10 hours. As described in Appendix V of the RIA, the 
change in productivity of almost 2 percent, valued at almost $300 
million per percentage point, led to an estimated cost of $586 million 
per year for eliminating the 11th hour. In the original analysis, 
subtracting the benefits of $60 million left estimated net costs of 
$526 million; with the revised TOT analysis, the net costs are now 
estimated to be $501 million. This reduction in net costs from $526 
million to $501 million amounts to less than 5 percent of total net 
costs. Thus, the revisions to the TOT analysis have very little effect 
on the estimated cost-effectiveness of eliminating the 11th hour.
    The RIA did present a sensitivity analysis that showed, under a 
variety of unique circumstances, the net costs could fall from $526 
million to about $240 million. As such, the conclusion reached in the 
RIA accompanying this rule was that, regardless of the assumptions 
made, whether they were related to the percent of all large truck 
crashes that are fatigue-related, the relative risk associated with 
fatigue-related large truck crashes in the 11th hour, or the value of a 
statistical life, there would still be a minimum annual net cost of 
approximately $160 million to eliminate the 11th hour of driving.
    The 34-hour restart provision.
    The 34-hour restart provision gives drivers, particularly long-haul 
drivers, operational flexibility in planning their trips that 
previously was not available with the 7- and 8-day limits. FMCSA set 
the limit at 34 hours because that would provide drivers with an 
opportunity to obtain two 8-hour sleep periods while keeping them on a 
24-hour cycle. The Agency adopted the 34-hour restart after reviewing 
studies considering the time periods necessary for overcoming 
cumulative fatigue caused by sleep debt. [Dinges, D.F., et al. (1997), 
p. 267; Balkin, T., et al. (2000), p. ES-8; Belenky, G., et al. (2003), 
p. 11; Van Dongen, H.P.A., et al. (2003), p. 125. The research studies 
cited in this interim rule are included in the List of References in 
the 2005 final rule (70 FR 49978, at 50067). Copies or abstracts are in 
the docket referenced at the beginning of this notice.] As the Agency 
explained in 2005, fatigue resulting from sleep loss is usually 
characterized as acute, resulting from a single insufficient sleep 
period; or cumulative, resulting from two or more insufficient sleep 
periods [Rosekind, M.R., et al. (1997), p. 7.2]. Rosekind describes 
three types of sleep loss (i.e., total sleep loss, partial sleep loss, 
and sleep debt): ``Sleep loss can occur either totally or as a partial 
loss. Total sleep loss involves a completely missed sleep opportunity 
and continuous wakefulness for about 24 hours or longer. Partial sleep 
loss occurs when sleep is obtained within a 24-hour period but in an 
amount that is reduced from the physiologically required amount or 
habitual total. Sleep loss also can accumulate over time into what is 
often referred to as 'sleep debt.' Sleep loss, whether total or 
partial, acute or cumulative, results in significantly degraded 
performance, alertness and mood'' [Id.].
    Public Citizen's challenge to the 2005 rule argued that the restart 
provision allows drivers to work more hours each week, leading to 
cumulative fatigue that is different from sleep debt. In its opinion 
invalidating the 34-hour restart the Court agreed, explaining that it 
was interested in a ``different kind'' of cumulative fatigue, the 
cumulative fatigue ``associated with the increased driving and working 
hours that [the 34-hour restart] would permit,'' and not ``the `sleep 
deficit' that `accumulates with successive sleep-deprived days.' '' The 
Court concluded that FMCSA had not adequately considered this 
``cumulative fatigue.''
    This interim rule responds to this finding by the Court in two 
parts. First, the Agency found in 2005 that few studies address the 
effect of recovery periods between work periods spanning multiple days, 
such as a workweek [O'Neill, T.R., et al. (1999), p. 2; Wylie, C.D., et 
al. (1997), p. 27; Smiley, A., & Heslegrave, R. (1997), p. 14]. After 
reviewing the studies relevant to the 34-hour recovery period, as cited 
in the 2003 rule and those submitted by commenters to the 2005 NPRM, 
the Agency determined that current scientific evidence is limited with 
respect to the type of cumulative fatigue raised by Public Citizen and 
the Court. Studies of time-on-task frequently measure ``fatigue'' as a 
function of drowsiness. For example, Wylie, C.D., et al.'s 1996 
operational study of 80 long-haul drivers engaged in revenue-generating 
runs in the U.S. (under the 10-hour driving limit) and Canada (under 
that country's 13-hour driving limit), reported that time-on-task was 
not a strong or consistent predictor of observed fatigue, measured as 
drowsiness, as observed in video records of comparable daytime segments 
of driving. In Wylie's study, no difference in drowsiness was found 
between 10 and 13 hours of driving. Some measures of performance, such 
as lane tracking and individual cognitive performance, as well as self-
rating of fatigue, were better at 10 hours of driving time than at 13 
(lane tracking was confounded by difference in driving routes and road 
conditions in the two countries). Conversely, reaction time was better 
at 13 hours of driving than at 10. The authors noted that the lack of 
variance in drowsiness between driving periods may be attributable to 
the fact that the study measured only daytime drowsiness. Other 
research suggests the body's circadian rhythm limits the negative 
effects of more hours of work during daytime operations. [Wylie, C.D., 
et al. (1996) pp. 5.13-5.14].
    A 1999 study evaluated the effects on fatigue and performance 
during a daytime schedule of 14 hours on duty and 10 hours off duty, 
with drivers performing simulated driving and loading/unloading tasks. 
The authors found mild cumulative effects on subjective measurements of 
sleepiness; a slight but statistically significant deterioration in 
duty-day subjective sleepiness, reaction time response, and measures of 
driving performance over the course of a week; but no cumulative 
deterioration of driver response in

[[Page 71257]]

crash-likely situations. The authors reported that a schedule of 14 
hours on duty (with 12 hours of driving) and 10 hours off duty for 5 
consecutive day periods did not appear to produce significant 
cumulative fatigue over the 2-week testing period [O'Neill, T.R., et 
al. (1999), p. 48].
    Additionally, as its second part of its response to the Court's 
finding, FMCSA sought recent (i.e., post-2005) scientific studies 
addressing cumulative fatigue of the type focused upon by the Court. 
Although some popular literature discusses ``burnout,'' the Agency does 
not consider these anecdotal narratives to be evidence that cumulative 
fatigue is a significant concern under normal driving conditions. While 
the Agency concluded based on a reasonable review of the literature 
that cumulative fatigue associated with increased weekly truck driving 
activity under the conditions similar to that studied in the literature 
was not a substantial problem, the critics of the 2005 rule did not 
provide any scientific literature supporting their claims of cumulative 
fatigue specific to truck driving. It is therefore not surprising that 
FMCSA has been unable at this time to identify an available model that 
it could use to evaluate the effects of cumulative fatigue as a factor 
separate from fatigue caused by sleep deficits in a motor carrier 
context. FMCSA seeks existing studies or models that could be used to 
further analyze and validate the veracity of these claims regarding 
cumulative fatigue, specifically studies or models analyzing or focused 
on truck driving.
    Furthermore, Public Citizen discussed a scenario by which the new 
rulemaking would allow for a substantially higher number of hours than 
would be found under the more normal driving conditions similar to 
those studied in the literature. This would be accomplished by driving 
11 hours, immediately going off duty for 10 hours, and repeating this 
pattern.
    First, although such a pattern could develop in certain operations 
for certain periods, nothing like this was observed in FMCSA's 2005 and 
2007 Field Surveys. Additionally, non-standard driving patterns were 
allowed under the pre-2003 rule that had the potential to result in 
significantly more sleep-associated fatigue than the driving patterns 
that would be allowed even under Public Citizen's unlikely scenario. 
For example, under the pre-2003 HOS rules, a driver was permitted to 
exclude intermittent periods of off-duty time from the maximum 15 hours 
of on-duty time, after which the driver could not drive a CMV. 
Therefore, a driver having several off-duty periods (e.g., meal breaks, 
inactivity awaiting dispatch, personal business) of several hours each 
during the day could legally drive a CMV in the 24th or later hour 
after the start of the duty day. Under the current HOS rules, this 
driver could not drive a CMV after the 14th hour of coming on duty 
following 10 or more consecutive hours off duty, regardless of any 
intermittent off-duty periods. FMCSA therefore believes the pre-2003 
possibilities of ``extreme'' driving behavior are actually eliminated 
under the 2003 or 2005 rule. FMCSA specifically requests comment on 
this conclusion.
    Furthermore, FMCSA has conducted additional technical analysis of 
the Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) data (referenced later in 
this IFR) to examine the potential relationship between the probability 
of a fatigue-related large truck crash and other factors that one might 
expect to influence the likelihood of a fatigue-related crash. We 
believe this further analysis is relevant to both the more standard 
driving schedules commonly observed in the industry, and work schedules 
where commercial drivers may be pressing the daily driving and weekly 
on-duty limits. This is because TIFA data captures various types of 
commercial drivers involved in fatal large truck crashes, without 
regard to specific operating schedules. As such, if cumulative driving 
hours across a non-interrupted series of days independently caused an 
increase in fatigue-related crash risk, FMCSA believes this analysis 
would identify it. After studying the pattern of restarts in the 
industry, FMCSA determined that a reasonable proxy for the time spent 
driving over multiple days after a restart is the day of the week. This 
is because the majority of restarts happen over a weekend, as revealed 
in the 2007 Field Survey discussed later in this preamble.
    Specifically, a logistic regression modeling approach was used for 
this analysis and TIFA data covering the period 1991-2004. Several 
additional TIFA variables of interest were included in the logistic 
regression beyond the ``hours of driving'' used to address time on task 
(TOT) in the regulatory impact analysis (see RIA in docket for details 
of that analysis). These additional variables included day of the week 
of the crash, time of day of the crash, the number of vehicles involved 
in the crash, and the type of vehicle involved (i.e., straight truck 
versus tractor-trailer combination). The additional variables made it 
possible to broaden the analysis of potential causes of large truck 
fatigue-related crashes, which added interesting insights but did not, 
in the end, change the TOT analysis itself (as is fully discussed in 
the RIA). For instance, FMCSA modeled single- and multi-vehicle 
crashes. For these analyses we excluded cases where the hours of 
driving were not reported, where the vehicle was government operated 
and exempt under 49 CFR 390.3(f)(2), or where the vehicle was a daily 
rental and the gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) was 26,000 pounds or 
less. We fitted various logistic models to the data. Specifically FMCSA 
estimated five unique logistical regression models which included the 
following independent variables:
     Model 1: Hours of Driving;
     Model 2: Hours of Driving, Day of week, Time of day (0 to 
24), Large Truck Type (Single or Tractor/Trailer);
     Model 3: Hours of Driving, Day of week grouped (Mon, Tue-
Thu, Fri, Sat-Sun), Time of day in 3-hour groups, Large Truck Type 
(Single or Tractor/Trailer);
     Model 4: Hours of Driving, Time of day (0 to 24), Large 
Truck Type; and
     Model 5: Hours of Driving, Time of day in 3-hour groups, 
Large Truck Type.
    The day-of-week variables in Models 2 and 3 were found not to be 
significant and so were excluded from Models 4 and 5. The fact that 
fatigue did not appear to change systematically throughout the week has 
a direct bearing on the question of the accumulation of fatigue with 
long hours of work over multi-day periods. Drivers of large trucks tend 
to take their extended breaks (i.e., restart periods) over the weekend 
as was revealed by the 2007 FMCSA Field Survey data discussed in a 
later section of this preamble. If heavy working schedules of truck 
drivers actually led to substantial increases in cumulative fatigue, we 
would expect to see driving performance deteriorate over the course of 
the week. FMCSA believes this provides sound evidence that drivers are 
not accumulating significant levels of ``time on task'' (TOT) 
cumulative fatigue over the course of the week.
    The Agency has not identified any evidence that cumulative fatigue 
represents a significant problem under the 2003 or 2005 rule. As it 
stated in the 2005 final rule (70 FR 50022) with respect to the impacts 
of the 11-hour driving rule and the 34-hour restart, FMCSA continues to 
believe that ``the average driver [does] not, and cannot realistically, 
drive and work the longer weekly hours, on a regular basis,'' as 
suggested by opponents of those two provisions. It is virtually 
impossible for a driver to drive 77/88 hours over 7/8 days and to be on 
duty 84/98 hours over the same 7/8 day period. To follow the

[[Page 71258]]

scenario identified by these opponents, the driver would be severely 
limited in his or her ability to obtain fuel and food, to attend to 
personal hygiene needs, to park large trucks, to communicate with 
dispatchers, to pick up loads, to unload, and to do paperwork. FMCSA 
believes this is so unrealistic that seeing this type of driving 
behavior during the course of an inspection would cast doubt on the 
accuracy of the logbooks. Recent operational data do not show that 
drivers are working or driving these maximum amounts of hours. FMCSA 
believes that it is a valid exercise of its judgment to base its 
decision regarding the 11-hour limit and 34-hour restart on the 
emerging factual data about actual driving behavior and not exclusively 
on hypothetical and speculative calculations about the potential 
behavior of drivers. Affidavits submitted to the Court by ATA in 
support of its motion to stay the mandate provide evidence that weekly 
driving hours have not increased significantly under the new HOS rules. 
Instead, the rules, and the 34-hour restart provision in particular, 
are described by several trucking officials as having increased the 
operational flexibility available to drivers and carriers to schedule 
and complete work. There is, furthermore, no evidence in the crash data 
of the harmful effects of the ``cumulative fatigue'' expected by the 
critics of the 2005 rule to result from their extreme estimates of 
increased duty hours. Recent data in fact show that vehicle miles have 
only slightly increased, while the fatal crash rate for the same period 
has declined.
    Although the Court did not reach the issue of the implications for 
drivers' health of the 11-hour driving limit and the 34-hour restart, 
the Agency continues to affirm its previous conclusions, reached after 
a careful examination of the available evidence, that changes to HOS 
under the 2005 rule, including its 11-hour limit and 34-hour restart, 
do not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of drivers. 
FMCSA continues to believe that its conclusions accurately reflect a 
preponderance of the scientific data. FMCSA refers interested parties 
to 70 FR 49978, at 49982-49992.

F. Evaluation of Recent Safety and Operational Data Under 11-Hour and 
34-Hour Rules

    The 11-hour driving limit and the 34-hour restart provisions have 
been in place since January 2004. Thus, FMCSA has been able to compile 
and review a significant amount of new safety and operational data 
throughout the industry (data that were not available for consideration 
during the Court's review of the 2005 Rule). The data from this period 
of more than 3 years has enabled the Agency to assess the impacts of 
the 11-hour limit and 34-hour restart on safety, and to assess 
compliance with the current rules compared to the pre-2003 rules.

Safety Data

    This section focuses on the most current safety data, including 
reviews of the following studies and data sources: (1) Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data for calendar years 2003 and 2006; 
(2) Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) data for calendar years 
2003 through 2005; (3) a Virginia Tech Study of the 10th and 11th 
Driving Hours; (4) an American Trucking Research Institute HOS Safety 
Study (2006); (5) FMCSA HOS compliance rate data between 2003 and 2006; 
and (6) industry crash data filed with the Court docket by ATA in 2007.

Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS)

    FARS is a national census of fatal crashes involving motor 
vehicles, including large trucks. FARS data are reported annually by 
the States, maintained by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), and are generally recognized as the most 
reliable national motor vehicle crash data available. FARS data through 
2006 are available to the public at: http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx. As discussed in the preamble to the HOS final rule in 
2005, FMCSA analyzed the 2003 and 2004 FARS data to examine trends in 
large truck fatal crashes, and fatigue-related fatal crashes before and 
after initial implementation of the 11-hour driving limit and the 34-
hour restart, in January 2004. Analysis of the first 9 months of data 
from the 2003 Annual FARS Report and the 2004 Early FARS Assessment 
Files (which have traditionally contained most of the fatal crashes 
that eventually appear in the FARS Final Report File) revealed that 
fatigue-coded large truck crashes, as a percent of the total large 
truck fatal crashes in those years, decreased from 1.7 percent to 1.5 
percent. (For 2003, 54 fatigue-coded large truck crashes divided by 
3,120 total large truck fatal crashes equals 1.7 percent; for 2004, 43 
fatigue-coded large truck crashes divided by 2,954 total large truck 
fatal crashes equals 1.5 percent.) This 0.2 percent difference in the 
percent of fatigue-coded fatal large truck crashes represented a one-
year decrease of 11.8 percent (0.2 divided by 1.7), using 2003 as the 
baseline.
    It should be noted that NHTSA releases the annual FARS data in 
three waves: The first release is the Early Assessment File, which 
represents a projection of a partial year's worth of data to full-year 
and is released in the spring of the calendar year following the crash 
data year on interest (i.e., 2004 FARS Early Assessment data were 
released in Spring 2005); the second release is the Annual Report File, 
which represents a full year's worth of data and is released in the 
Fall of the calendar year following the crash data year of interest 
(i.e., 2003 FARS Annual Report File data were released in Fall 2004); 
finally, the Final Report File represents a full year's worth of data 
but additional data related to the crashes in the file are added. The 
Final Report File is released in the Fall of the second calendar year 
following the crash data year of interest (i.e., 2003 FARS Final Report 
File data were released in Fall 2005).
    Since the issuance of the 2005 rule, NHTSA has released the final 
versions of the 2003 and 2004 FARS data files. While the numbers of 
fatigue-coded fatal large truck crashes were revised minimally upward 
in both years (as would be expected moving from Early Assessment and 
Annual Report files to Final Report Files), the percent of these 
crashes where the large truck driver was coded as fatigued (1.7 percent 
in CY2003 and 1.5 percent in CY2004) did not change. See Table 1.

[[Page 71259]]



           Table 1.--Fatal and Fatigue-Related Fatal Crashes Involving Large Trucks, by Calendar Year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Fatigue-
                                                             Fatigue-   coded large    Large truck   Large truck
                                              Total large  coded large  truck fatal   vehicle miles  fatal crash
                    Year                      truck fatal     truck     crashes, as     traveled     rate*  (per
                                                crashes      crashes     percent of       (VMT)      100 million
                                                                           total       (millions)        VMT)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000........................................        4,573           99          2.2         205,520         2.23
2001........................................        4,451           65          1.5         209,032         2.13
2002........................................        4,224           70          1.7         214,603         1.97
2003........................................        4,335           74          1.7         217,917         1.99
2004........................................        4,478           66          1.5         220,811         2.03
2005........................................        4,551           82          1.8         222,836         2.04
2006........................................        4,321           69          1.6      ** 223,282        1.94
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatigue-related large truck crashes are defined as those where the large truck driver was coded as fatigued at
  the time of the crash.
* Large Truck Fatal Crash Rate is defined as the number of fatal large truck crashes per 100 million large truck
  vehicle miles traveled.
** 2006 Large Truck Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) Projection based on 2006 FHWA Total VMT projection.
A large truck is defined as a truck with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) greater than 10,000 pounds
  (includes medium and heavy trucks).
Source: FMCSA Analysis of Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), NHTSA.

    The FARS data for calendar years 2000 through 2006 (where all but 
the 2006 file have been finalized by NHTSA) show that the percent of 
fatigue-coded large truck crashes fluctuated from a high of 2.2 percent 
in 2000 to a low of 1.5 percent in 2001 and 2004. In the 3 years since 
the 2003 HOS rule has been in effect, the number of fatigue-related 
large truck crashes as a percent of all large truck fatal crashes each 
year has remained relatively stable. And although the coding of driver 
fatigue at the time of a crash may be under-reported in some cases 
(given the difficulty in verifying fatigue-related crashes), there is 
no reason to believe that this under-reporting varied from year to year 
during this period. From these data sets, FMCSA determined that the 
2005 rule, including the 11-hour limit and 34-hour restart provisions, 
has not had a negative impact on safety; overall large truck safety has 
not been compromised by the 11-hour limit or the 34-hour restart.
    Also, more broadly, FARS and General Estimates System\3\ (GES) data 
indicate that the total number of large truck fatalities fell 
significantly between 2005 and 2006 (by 4.7 percent), while large truck 
injuries fell by 7 percent. In calendar year 2000 large truck 
fatalities totaled 5,282 and injuries totaled 140,000. In contrast, in 
calendar year 2006 large truck fatalities dropped to 4,995 (or a 
decrease of 5.4 percent), while large truck injuries fell to 106,000 (a 
decrease of 24 percent). Using 2006 vehicle miles traveled (VMT) 
forecast data from the Federal Highway Administration and applying it 
to large trucks, the large truck fatal crash rate in 2006 is estimated 
to have decreased to 1.94 fatal crashes per 100 million large truck 
VMT, from 2.23 fatal crashes per 100 million large truck VMT in 2000, 
for a reduction of 13 percent over the last seven year period (see 
Table 1). The 1.94 fatal crashes per 100 million large truck VMT 
represents the lowest large-truck fatal crash rate recorded since the 
U.S. Department of Transportation began collecting data in 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ General Estimates System is a nationally representative 
sample of motor vehicle crash data that are produced annually by 
NHTSA and used in traffic safety analyses by NHTSA as well as other 
DOT agencies. For more information, see http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-30/ncsa/GES.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is particularly relevant for analyzing the effect of the new 
rules, and the 34-hour restart provision in particular, to examine the 
crash profile of combination unit trucks (CUTs), because they have 
average vehicle weights greater than 26,000 pounds and are the 
principal heavy trucks used in the long-haul operations covered by 
today's 11-hour and 34-hour restart interim rules. In addition, drivers 
of CUTs are most likely to be involved in a fatal large truck crash.\4\ 
Data from the 2002 Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (VIUS) of the 
Department of Commerce's Census Bureau indicate that the primary range 
of operations for 29 percent of heavy vehicles were trips of greater 
than 200 miles, compared to only 12 percent of medium and light-duty 
trucks (with average vehicle weights of 10,001 to 26,000 pounds). In 
addition, FMCSA's examination of the records of duty status of over-
the-road and local drivers reviewed as part of its 2005 Field Survey 
found that 247 of 421 (or 59 percent) of the over-the-road drivers used 
the restart provision at least once, while 57 of 125 (or 46 percent) of 
local drivers did so. In 2006, CUTs were involved in a total of 3,194 
fatal crashes. This total of CUT-involved fatal crashes is the lowest 
since 1995. Applying Federal Highway Administration projections for VMT 
in 2006 to CUTs, the fatal crash rate for 2006 for combination unit 
trucks equaled 2.22 per 100 million VMT, which is the lowest CUT fatal 
crash rate since records began being collected in 1975. In addition, 
according to NHTSA's GES data, the CUT injury-crash rate in 2006 was 
27.5 per 100 million VMT, and the property-damage-only (PDO) crash rate 
was 99.1 per 100 million VMT. Both the injury crash rate and the PDO 
crash rate for CUTs in 2006 were also the lowest since records began 
being collected in 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Source Trucks involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Such data, in conjunction with other data presented elsewhere in 
this IFR, indicate clearly that the overall safety performance of the 
U.S. motor carrier industry has been maintained since implementation of 
the 2003/2005 HOS rules.

Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) Data

    The Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) data file, another 
data set the Agency relies on to evaluate and make determinations 
regarding the HOS rule, combines large truck fatal crash data obtained 
annually from NHTSA's FARS with additional data items collected by the 
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI). The 
UMTRI collects the additional data items through telephone interviews 
with truck drivers, carriers, or investigating officers after fatal 
crashes. UMTRI combines vehicle, crash, and occupant records from FARS 
with information obtained through TIFA, such as the physical 
configuration of the large truck, the motor carrier's operating 
authority, and the hour of daily driving at the time of the crash.

[[Page 71260]]

    TIFA and FARS variables of particular interest include whether the 
large truck driver was coded as being fatigued at the time of the 
crash, the time of day, the intended trip distance, and hours driving 
since the last mandatory off-duty period (a minimum of 8 hours in the 
case of data through calendar year 2003 and 10 hours in the case of 
calendar year 2004 and 2005 data).
    TIFA data used in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA) for the 2005 
HOS rule were for the years 1991 through 2002 (the most recent data 
available when the Agency published its 2005 rule). The sample size of 
this file represents more than 50,000 medium/heavy trucks involved in 
fatal crashes in the U.S., of which approximately 1,000 involved large 
trucks where the truck driver was fatigued. TIFA data for this period 
indicated that there were 94 vehicles involved in fatal crashes in the 
11th hour of driving, of which 9 were coded as fatigue-related. This 
represents 94 instances in which the vehicle was being operated in the 
11th hour following only 8 consecutive hours off duty, a violation 
under the rules in effect unless the driver was operating in intrastate 
commerce under State rules or under the adverse driving conditions 
exception.
    The TIFA data covering calendar years 2003 through 2005 were not 
available for analysis at the time the Agency published the 2005 HOS 
rule, but these new data are illustrative, particularly with regard to 
the downward trend in the number of large trucks involved in fatigue-
related fatal crashes each year after the Agency published the 2003 HOS 
rule (see Table 2).

   Table 2.--Large Trucks Involved in Fatal and Fatigue-Related Fatal
          Crashes in the 11th Hour of Driving, by Calendar Year
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Fatigue-
                                                   coded       Fatigue-
       Calendar year  (CY)            Fatal        (large      coded as
                                     crashes       truck      percent of
                                                  driver)       total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991-2002........................           94            9          9.6
2003.............................           13            1          7.7
2004.............................           16            0          0.0
2005.............................           13            1         7.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA), 1991-2005.

    Specifically, in CY2003, 13 large trucks were involved in fatal 
crashes where the large truck driver was operating in the 11th hour of 
driving, but in only one of those crashes was the truck driver coded as 
being fatigued. In CY2004, the first year under the new HOS rule, a 
total of 16 large trucks were involved in fatal highway crashes in the 
11th hour. This total is an increase of three over the 13 large trucks 
involved in fatal crashes in the 11th hour of driving in 2003, when 
driving in the 11th hour was illegal for most drivers. However, in 2004 
no large trucks were involved in fatigue-related fatal crashes in the 
11th driving hour. The 2005 TIFA data show 13 large trucks involved in 
fatal crashes while the truck driver was in the 11th hour of driving. 
In only one of those crashes was the truck driver coded as fatigued. 
The 2004 and 2005 TIFA data represent an improvement over the pre-2003 
period, in terms of the percentage of large truck drivers operating in 
the 11th hour who were coded as fatigued at the time of the crash.

Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI) Studies

    In 2005, FMCSA contracted with the Virginia Tech Transportation 
Institute (VTTI) to analyze data on crash risk during the 10th and 11th 
hour of driving as an adjunct to a large on-the-road driving study VTTI 
was conducting under an FMCSA and NHTSA joint initiative. This study 
offered an opportunity to analyze empirical data obtained under the 
2003 HOS rule. The primary goal was to determine the effect, if any, of 
the 11th hour of driving on driver performance and drowsiness. This 
study did not include all drivers who participated in VTTI's large on-
the-road driving study; only data collected through May 1, 2005 were 
available and used in the analysis published with the 2005 HOS rule 
(August 2005). This study, however, did involve 82 drivers working for 
three trucking companies who had driven approximately 1.69 million 
miles, under the 2003 HOS rule. [Hanowski, R.J., et al. (2005)]
    In the analysis filed with the 2005 HOS rule, the researchers found 
no statistically significant difference in the number of critical 
incidents between the 10th and 11th hours of driving [Hanowski, R.J., 
et al. (2005), p. 9]. The study defined critical incidents as crashes, 
near crashes (where a rapid evasive maneuver is needed to avoid a 
crash), and crash-relevant conflicts (which require a crash-avoidance 
maneuver less severe than a near-crash, but more severe than normal 
driving). When the occurrence of critical incidents is used as a 
surrogate for driver performance decrements, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the 10th and 11th hour of driving. The 
VTTI study team meticulously examined video for each critical incident 
to detect driver drowsiness i.e., slow eyelid closure--a validated 
measure of drowsiness. VTTI concluded that when a critical incident 
occurred, drivers were not measurably drowsier in the 11th than the 
10th hour of driving. These results may be related to another finding, 
showing that drivers appear to be getting more sleep under the 2003 
rule than they did when the minimum off-duty period was only 8 hours. 
Compared to four sleep studies conducted under the pre-2003 rules, the 
Hanowski study found that drivers operating under the 2003 rule are 
obtaining on average over one hour of additional sleep per day [Id, p. 
8].
    In 2007, American Trucking Research Institute (ATRI), affiliated 
with the ATA, contracted with VTTI to complete the analysis with all 
drivers whose data was collected as part of the Drowsy Driver Warning 
System Field Operational Test. This analysis included data for an 
additional 16 drivers or a total of 98 drivers (for a total of over 2 
million miles of driving data) and the initial study's results and 
conclusions still hold; namely, that there was no statistically 
significant difference in the number of critical incidents occurring in 
the 10th versus the 11th hours of driving [Hanowski, R.J., et al. 
(2007)]. A copy of this VTTI analysis was submitted by ATRI to FMCSA 
and placed in the docket for this IFR.
    Additionally in 2007, FMCSA contracted with VTTI to expand the 
analysis on all 98 drivers to examine

[[Page 71261]]

critical incidence in 1st through the 11th hour driving for all drivers 
and for those drivers who drove a total of 11 hours. For this analysis, 
all critical incidents (crashes, near-crashes, crash relevant 
conflicts) were grouped by driving hour. An analysis of the odds ratios 
was calculated to estimate the relative risk of increased driving hours 
on critical incident occurrence. Each hour that a driver drove became a 
trip and was used to calculate the relative frequency of critical 
incidents. Figure 1 shows the preliminary findings (final results due 
by December 31, 2007) for the number of trips that drivers drove over 
the course of the Field Operational Test. VTTI used the number of trips 
shown in Figure 1 to assess the relative frequency of critical incident 
occurrence by hour of driving and these results are shown in Figure 2. 
While the data show a slightly elevated risk of critical incidents in 
the 1st hour of driving there was no discernable trend for driving 
hours two through eleven. VTTI examined the odds ratios to estimate the 
relative risk and determined that there was no statistically 
significant difference in the risk of a critical incident between hours 
2 through 11 [Hanowski, R.J., et al. (2007)]. This result also held for 
drivers who drove an entire 11 hour period. A copy of this VTTI 
analysis is in the docket for this IFR. These findings are very similar 
to the findings of the Driver Fatigue and Alertness Study. O'Neill 
stated that ``simple time-on-task is not a uniformly effective 
determiner of performance. Factors such as time-of-day (and its 
relation to circadian cycle) and rest break schedule are so influential 
that other factors customarily associated with performance 
deterioration over time are dwarfed'' [O'Neill, T.R. et al, (1999) p. 
40]. Wylie concluded that ``the strongest and most consistent factor 
influencing driver fatigue and alertness in this study was time-of-
day'' [Wylie, C.D. (1998) p. ES-8].
    Again, the findings from these three VTTI studies should not be 
surprising; they were consistent with the research from Wylie's Driver 
Fatigue and Alertness Study, which at the time of its publication was 
the largest on-the-road driver fatigue study. These VTTI studies showed 
that time-on-task or the number of hours driven is not a good predictor 
of driving degradation. There was no increased risk of critical 
incidents (crashes, near-crashes, crash relevant conflicts) of driving 
in the 11th verses the 10th hour of driving.

[[Page 71262]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR17DE07.009

Hours of Service Compliance Rates (2003 vs. 2006)

    In addition to examining large truck crash data, FMCSA also 
examined motor carrier compliance rates with the HOS regulations over 
time via roadside inspection data collected and reported by States to 
FMCSA. Specifically, to examine changes in compliance rates with 49 CFR 
part 395 regulations before and after implementation of the HOS rules, 
FMCSA examined differences between CY2003 (the calendar year before 
implementation of the latest HOS rule) and CY2006 (the calendar year 
during which full implementation of the latest HOS rules would be 
reasonably expected and the latest full year of data available). 
Results, as seen in Table 3, indicate that the total number of driver 
inspections with HOS violations increased by 3 percent over this period 
(from 513,393 to 526,992). However, the total number of driver 
inspections conducted in CY2006 actually increased 8 percent from 
CY2003. As such, the total HOS violation rate (i.e., those driver 
inspections with at least one HOS violation divided by total number of 
driver inspections in that year) decreased from 17.4 percent in 2003 to 
only 16.5 percent in 2006.

   Table 3.--Driver Inspections With HOS Violations, Number and Percent Change, Calendar Year 2003 and CY2006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               CY2003                  CY2006            Growth
                                                      ------------------------------------------------    rate
            Part 395 (HOS) violation type                                                             ----------
                                                          Number    Percent *     Number    Percent *   Percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Driver Inspections.............................    2,958,598         NA    3,191,358         NA          8
Total Number of Inspections With HOS Violations......      513,393  .........      526,992  .........          3

[[Page 71263]]

 
10 or 11 Hour Rule...................................       63,773         12       55,268         10        -13
15 or 14 Hour Rule...................................       12,905          3       90,489         17        601
60 or 70 Hour Rule...................................       18,363          4        8,144          2        -56
No Log...............................................       46,379          9       43,926          8         -5
False Log (Out-Of-Service) Violation.................       22,501          4       25,149          5         12
False Log (Non-Out-Of-Service) Violation.............       13,465          3       11,390          2        -15
Form & Manner Violation..............................      162,701         32      157,007         30         -3
Log Not Current......................................      243,831         48      237,498         45         -3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Percentage calculations for individual violations will add to more than 100 percent, as two separate HOS
  violations may be cited during a single inspection. As such, there is potential double counting, in that the
  single inspection is counted within both violation rows.
Driver Inspections defined as Level 1, 2, or 3 Level Inspection according to Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
  (CVSA) Commercial Driver Inspection Types.
Source: FMCSA Motor Carrier Management Information System, Snapshot October 2, 2007.

    Inspections with violations of driving-time limits decreased by 13 
percent during this time period. Inspections with violations of the 60-
/70-hour rule decreased by approximately 56 percent over this period, 
as one would expect, given the availability of the 34-hour restart 
provision. In fact, six of the eight specific HOS violations cited at 
the roadside during this period decreased and only two increased. As 
for violations of the daily on-duty (14/15 hour) regulation and logbook 
falsifications, roadside inspection officials indicate that those 
citations increased mainly because inspectors can spot violations much 
more easily under the 2005 rule than they could under the pre-2003 HOS 
rule (which allowed for an extendable daily on-duty period via breaks). 
Under the 14-hour rule, safety inspectors need only identify the start 
of the workday and count to the 14th hour, unless the driver has a 
qualifying sleeper berth period of at least 8 but less than 10 hours. 
By contrast, under the former 15-hour rule, all miscellaneous off-duty 
periods had to be considered to potentially extend the window; this 
includes making a determination whether the period satisfied the 
requirements to be counted as off duty. The above data show overall 
improvements in compliance with the HOS regulations and provides 
additional evidence that overall safety performance has not been 
compromised by the 2003 and 2005 HOS rules.

2006 American Transportation Research Institute Safety Study

    In 2006, ATRI designed a research study to provide empirical data 
on the safety impacts of the HOS rule. The ATRI study examined 
aggregated collision and driver injury data from motor carriers before 
and after implementation of the 2003 HOS rule. The study was 
significant because it involved 23 medium-to-large trucking fleets, 
roughly 100,000 commercial drivers and more than 10 billion vehicle 
miles of travel each year. The study population was comprised of ATA 
members and the fleets represented in the study included both for-hire 
and private fleets, as well as those operating in the truckload (TL) 
and less-than-truckload (LTL) segments. The participating carriers from 
the TL and LTL segments represented 16 and 15 percent, respectively, of 
all total industry activity in those segments. The study's final 
report, issued March 2006, indicates that the vast majority of trucks 
examined in the study were heavy trucks, or tractor-trailer combination 
units (those units with gross vehicle weight ratings above 26,000 
pounds). Weighted results (i.e., based on averages of crashes and 
injuries divided by mileage for participating fleets) showed consistent 
and meaningful reductions in crash rates from before to after the 2003 
rule became effective in January 2004. Specifically, the study found 
statistically significant reductions in the overall collision rate per 
million VMT (-3.7 percent), as well as reductions in the preventable 
collision rate (-4.8 percent), the driver injury rate (-12.6 percent), 
and the collision-related injury rate (-7.6 percent). Weighted averages 
were used in the study, meaning each fleet's contribution to the total 
rate was proportional to its mileage, and the study primarily examined 
rates, since those allow researchers to normalize any change in the 
number of large truck crashes by the total vehicle miles driven in 
those years. Further, these results are consistent with the trends in 
the FARS data described above.
    Data from the ATRI safety study further support the position that 
overall safety of the motor carrier industry has been maintained since 
the 2003 and 2005 HOS rules became effective.

Carrier Safety Data Filed With ATA Motion

    In addition to the data sets and studies discussed above, ATA filed 
a series of affidavits or declarations with the Court on September 6, 
2007, with its motion for a stay of the Court's mandate. In those 
documents, ATA highlighted some of the recent safety experiences of its 
member trucking companies that have operated both before and after the 
new HOS rules. Although these affidavits are not necessarily a 
statistically representative sample of the effects of the new 
rulemakings on safety, their company experiences are consistent with 
the statistical results described above, and do represent some of the 
largest and most expansive trucking operations in the United States. 
Copies of the ATA motion and the complete affidavits and declarations 
of its member trucking companies that ATA included with its motion can 
be found in the docket referenced at the beginning of this notice. 
Schneider National Inc., the eighth largest for-hire trucking company 
in the United States based on revenues, operates approximately 12,000 
over-the-road tractors and directly or indirectly employs more than 
15,000 commercial drivers. According to Donald Osterberg,\5\ Vice 
President of Safety and Driver Training, ``in almost every category 
assessed, Schneider [has] experienced improved safety performance under 
the current HOS

[[Page 71264]]

rules (as compared with 2003 * * *). With regard to accidents that we 
describe as ``Ultra Major'' because they have potential liability 
exposure in excess of $250,000, our 2006 numbers were down 41.67% from 
our 2003 experience. Similarly, in 2006, our potential fatigue related 
crashes were down 27.39% as compared with 2003 * * *. Our fatigue 
related crashes as a percentage of total preventable crashes were down 
17.85% in 2006 as compared with 2003. Our lost time injuries per 10,000 
loads was down 24.14% in 2006 as compared with 2003 * * *. Our Ultra 
Major frequency per MM [million miles] was down 35.77% in 2006 as 
compared with 2003. Our fatigue related major crashes per MM was down 
20.05% in 2006 as compared with 2003. And our preventable potential 
fatigue related crashes was down 9.55% in 2006 as compared with 2003.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ See Tab I of the ATA Motion's Addendum to read Mr. 
Osterberg's declaration. It is in the docket referenced at the 
beginning of this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Greer Woodruff,\6\ Senior Vice President for Safety and 
Security of J.B. Hunt, the tenth largest for-hire trucking company in 
2006 based on revenues, stated:

    \6\ See Tab M of the ATA Motion's Addendum to read Mr. 
Woodruff's affidavit. It is in the docket referenced at the 
beginning of this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the three full years the new hours of service regulations 
have been in place (2004, 2005, and 2006), J.B. Hunt has seen a 4% 
decline in its preventable DOT recordable accident rate * * *. In 
addition, many accident types that could be fatigue related have 
seen a marked decline in a comparison of the same time frames: 
Jacknife--down 61.76%; Ran Traffic Control--down 24.53%; Rollaway--
down 50%; and Roll Over--down 8.94%. Similarly, J.B. Hunt has seen a 
significant reduction in driver out-of-service rates related to 
hours of service in the comparative periods, an average 9.3% drop.

    There were many additional affidavits from safety managers of large 
U.S.-based trucking companies who attested to the same positive impact 
on crash rates since the new HOS rules became effective. These 
statements are also generally consistent with FARS, TIFA, and other 
data analyzed by FMCSA, and all serve to consistently indicate that the 
operating environment since January 2004 under the new HOS rules is 
generally as safe or safer than the conditions before implementation of 
the 2003 rule.

Operational Data on 11-Hour Limit and 34-Hour Restart

    To better understand how the motor carrier industry has implemented 
the 2005 HOS rule and to get a current update on the use of various 
provisions, FMCSA compiled and reviewed several new data sets on the 
industry's current use of the 34-hour restart provision and the 11th 
hour of driving, and on average weekly hours worked after 
implementation of the 2005 rule. Data compiled or reviewed were 
obtained from: (1) The 2005 and 2007 FMCSA Field Surveys; (2) ATA's 
operations survey of its members in 2007; and (3) industry operations 
data filed in the D.C. Circuit by ATA in 2007.

2005 and 2007 FMCSA Field Data Collection Efforts

    In October 2007, FMCSA initiated a data collection effort by its 
field staff in connection with compliance reviews \7\ and safety audits 
\8\ to assess the specific operational ways the motor carrier industry 
has implemented and used the 2003/2005 HOS rule. The data collected 
were based upon the drivers' records of duty status or time records, 
and included the period April 2007 through November 2007. (Motor 
carriers are only required to maintain records of duty status for six 
months.) The data show that drivers are using the 11\th\ hour of 
driving time somewhat more often than in the comparable 2005 survey, 
but few are using the full 11 hours of driving time and none are 
utilizing the maximum driving and on-duty time allowed by the rule. In 
addition, most drivers are taking restart periods that far exceed the 
34-hour minimum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ A compliance review is an in-depth review of a motor 
carrier's compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations (49 CFR parts 380 to 399) and Hazardous Materials 
Regulations (49 CFR parts 100 to 180), as applicable. Motor carriers 
are selected for a compliance review based upon poor safety 
performance or receipt of a non-frivolous complaint, or in follow-up 
to previous compliance/enforcement actions.
    \8\ A safety audit, on the other hand, is a review of the 
carrier's safety-management practices and controls and is conducted 
within the first 18 months of the motor carrier beginning interstate 
operations. The safety audit is used to both educate the carrier and 
gather data to evaluate and determine whether the carrier has in 
place basic safety management controls to ensure safe operation of 
CMVs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The survey results are based upon data collected from a cross-
section of industry in compliance reviews and safety audits; driver 
records from both private and for-hire motor carriers were included, as 
well as truckload and less-than-truckload carriers. A similar effort 
was undertaken in late 2004 and early 2005 and discussed in the 2005 
HOS rule. A copy of the 2005 and the 2007 FMCSA field data collection 
reports are in the docket referenced at the beginning of this notice.
    The most recent project was conducted in conjunction with normal 
motor carrier review activities during the period of October 22, 2007, 
to November 16, 2007, and where appropriate, results from the 2007 
effort were compared to FMCSA's 2005 Field Survey results. To ensure 
the quality of the data collected, the Agency excluded drivers who were 
found to have falsified their records.
    Overall, daily driving, weekly on-duty, and restart period data 
were collected from 1035 drivers operating for 337 motor carriers. The 
majority of the enforcement actions reviewed (70 percent) as part of 
this data collection effort consisted of compliance reviews; while 30 
percent involved a safety audit. By comparison, in 2005, 81 percent of 
the activity involved a compliance review, with 19 percent representing 
safety audits. Of the carriers surveyed in the most recent effort, 90 
percent were classified as for-hire motor carriers, while 10 percent 
were private carriers. In the 2005 effort, of the 269 motor carriers 
reviewed, 85 percent were for-hire carriers.
    Of the drivers surveyed in 2007, 86 percent operated primarily 
beyond a 100 air-mile radius during the period reviewed, while 14 
percent primarily operated within a 100 air-mile radius. By comparison, 
in 2005 approximately 80 percent of drivers reviewed were classified as 
over-the-road OTR drivers. It should be noted that in the 2005 effort, 
an over-the-road driver was defined as a driver who did not return to 
the terminal (work-reporting location) or home nightly. The definitions 
were changed slightly in 2007 to ``within'' and ``beyond'' a 100 air-
mile radius to allow for a more explicitly defined difference between 
driver types. This made it easier for FMCSA investigators to catalogue 
drivers in one of two groups, and FMCSA Field managers believed the 
change in definitions would not significantly impact the data obtained 
in each of the two efforts.
    Results: The data collected in the 2007 effort revealed the 
following:
    Restart Period. Of the 1035 drivers included in the data 
collection, 869 drivers (84 percent) had at least one continuous off-
duty period equal to or greater than 34 hours in length during the 
typical work week. Of the 542 drivers included in the 2005 survey, 393 
(or 73 percent) of all drivers surveyed took at least one restart 
period during the period evaluated.
    Looking at the length of all the restart periods recorded in the 
2007 survey (1,925), 8 percent were exactly 34 hours, while 5 percent 
were between 34-36 hours, 22 percent were between 36 and 44 hours, and 
65 percent exceeded 44 hours. The 2005 survey results were fairly 
similar, in that 5 percent of restart periods were exactly 34 hours, 6 
percent were between 34-36 hours, 22 percent

[[Page 71265]]

were between 36 and 44 hours, and 68 percent exceeded 44 hours, 
although it should be noted that the 2007 data indicates that 8 percent 
of periods are exactly 34 hours duration (versus 5 percent in 2005).
    In 2007, FMCSA added a new variable to the data collection effort; 
specifically, the day of week that the restart period began. The 
distribution was as follows: 16 percent occurred on Monday, 10 percent 
on Tuesday, 10 percent on Wednesday, 11 percent on Thursday, 23 percent 
on Friday, 18 percent on Saturday, and 12 percent on Sunday. Thus, the 
2007 data revealed that 53 percent of the restarts began between Friday 
and Sunday. Of these restart periods of 72 hours or less (or what is 
typically considered a ``true'' restart), the average number of hours 
each restart period is 49 hours. In other words, while the restart 
provision is being used by drivers, the average restart period is far 
longer than 34 hours.
    11th Hour Driving. Of the 16,676 driving periods \9\ reviewed in 
the 2007 effort, 27 percent involved the 11th hour of driving, while 4 
percent involved driving beyond the 11th hour (in the last case, the 
daily driving hour limits either do not apply (e.g., drivers operating 
in intrastate commerce under State rules) or the drivers were in 
violation of the rule). In the 2005 effort, FMCSA found that 
approximately 17 percent of driving periods involved the 11th hour, 
while 4 percent of driving periods exceeded the 11th hour of driving.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ A driving period for this study was any work period after 
the driver had 10 or more consecutive hours off duty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Looking just at the driving periods of the ``beyond 100 air-mile'' 
drivers in the 2007 survey, FMCSA found that 27 percent of these 
driving periods involved the 11th hour of driving, with 4 percent 
involved driving beyond the 11th hour. The 2005 results showed that 23 
percent of the driving periods of over-the-road drivers exceeded 10 
hours.
    The percentage of daily driving periods involving the 11th hour for 
the ``within 100 air mile'' drivers in the 2007 survey equaled 25 
percent, with another 10 percent operating beyond the 11th hour, 
leading FMCSA to conclude that this sample of ``within 100 air mile'' 
drivers may not be representative of short-haul drivers in the industry 
overall.
    Results from the 2007 FMCSA Field Survey are generally consistent 
with results from the 2005 effort, although driving in the 11th hour is 
somewhat higher in 2007 then in 2005 (i.e., 27 percent versus 17 
percent). However, this is to be expected as the provision remains in 
place and available for use by industry over a longer time period.

ATA Operational Usage Survey of Members

    ATA conducted a survey of its members in August 2007, requesting 
data on usage of two important provisions of the 2003/2005 HOS rule; 
namely, the availability of the 11th driving hour and the restart 
provision. A copy of the ATA survey is in the docket referenced at the 
beginning of this notice. Data compiled for the study was for the month 
of June 2007. Information was gathered from 69 motor carriers, 
representing several industry segments, most frequently the truckload 
and less-than-truckload segments. The number of drivers represented by 
these companies total approximately 234,000, or roughly 8 percent of 
the 3 million professional truck drivers that were estimated to be 
operating in the 2005 HOS regulatory impact analysis. The survey sample 
was considered to be quite large. The survey asked about usage of the 
11th hour of driving by participating companies. Companies surveyed 
indicated that 46 percent of their drivers were using the 11th driving 
hour, and that the 11th driving hour was used an average of 8.42 times 
during the (30-day) month of June. To examine the number of daily trips 
by all drivers in the month of June that utilized the 11th hour of 
driving, we multiplied the 46 percent by 8.42 and arrived at an average 
daily use of the 11th driving hour by all drivers of 3.87 (or roughly 
4) times per month. Dividing this result by 30 days in the month of 
June indicates that on average, 13 percent of daily trips utilized the 
11th hour. Alternatively, one could divide by 22 working days in the 
month (i.e., assuming four 2-day weekend breaks during the month), 
which would indicate the 11th driving hour is used in 18 percent of 
daily driving trips.
    For validation purposes, FMCSA compared the ATA results to those 
generated by the Agency in its regulatory impact analysis for the 2005 
HOS rule. These results are generally consistent with the estimates 
derived from operational modeling conducted by FMCSA for the 2005 HOS 
regulatory impact analysis, which had estimated that 55 percent of 
commercial drivers used the 11th hour of driving in 28 percent of their 
daily on-duty periods, yielding an average use of the 11th driving hour 
in approximately 15 percent of trips.\10\ Additionally, data from the 
2005 FMCSA Field Survey indicated that the 11th driving hour was used 
in 16.2 percent of daily on-duty periods, while the FMCSA's 2007 Field 
Survey data revealed that 27 percent of daily on duty periods recorded 
by drivers utilized the 11th hour of driving. Data from Schneider 
National, Inc. indicated that the 11th hour was used in only 10.7 
percent of daily on-duty periods. Compared with other estimates 
regarding use of the 11th driving hour, FMCSA finds the latest ATA 
results are generally consistent with earlier findings and reveal that 
the 11th hour is being used by commercial drivers for operational 
flexibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ In its regulatory impact analysis accompanying the 2005 HOS 
Rule, and as part of a broader sensitivity analysis, FMCSA also 
assumed higher usage levels of the 11th driving hour to determine 
the impact of its assumptions on the cost-benefit analysis results. 
Regardless of the assumptions made regarding usage of the 11th hour 
of driving, FMCSA found that eliminating the 11th hour driving 
provision was not cost beneficial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding usage of the 34-hour restart, ATA survey respondents 
indicated that 65 percent of their drivers utilized the provision, and 
those that did, used it an average of 3.41 times per month. In its 2005 
Field Survey data, FMCSA found that 73 percent of drivers used the 
restart provision at least once a week. It its 2007 Field Survey, FMCSA 
indicated that 90 percent of drivers included in the data collection 
had taken at least one extended off duty (restart) period of at least 
34 hours, with the vast majority of drivers taking many more than the 
minimum 34 hours. In data collected prior to the 2005 rule, the OOIDA 
reported that almost 90 percent of drivers surveyed used the restart 
provision at least some of the time.\11\ In a survey of private fleets 
in 2004, Stephen Burks reported that drivers for private carriers used 
the restart provision in 61 percent of their runs.\12\ Depending on 
which specific source of data is used, the most recently published 
information regarding use of the restart provision is generally 
consistent with other information filed by researchers, associations, 
and others shortly before implementation of the 2005 HOS rule. The most 
recently published information regarding use of the restart provision 
indicates that industry is using the restart provision to provide 
operational flexibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ John H. Siebert, ``A Survey of Owner-Operators and Company 
Drivers on their Use of Three New `Hours of Service Features,' '' 
OOIDA Foundation, September 15, 2004.
    \12\ Stephen V. Burks, A Survey of Private Fleets on their Use 
of Three New `Hours of Service Features,' '' September 15, 2004.

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[[Page 71266]]

Carrier Information Filed With ATA Motion

    Mr. Greer Woodruff,\13\ Senior Vice President of J.B. Hunt, stated 
in an affidavit filed with ATA's Motion for Stay with the D.C. Circuit, 
that ``In terms of usage, J.B. Hunt drivers engaged in nationwide 
truckload operations on average use the 11th hour or some portion of it 
about 10.8% of their daily driving days (approximately 3 times per 
month). When used, the operations within the 11th hour averaged 
approximately 40 minutes. While this number is relatively modest, the 
importance of the availability of the 11th hour for scheduling purposes 
cannot be overstated.'' Mr. Tom Anderson,\14\ Director of Safety and 
Training for Interstate Distributor Company (IDC), a large truckload 
carrier based in Tacoma, Washington, attested to similar usage of the 
11th driving when he filed his declaration. In a random audit of 300 
company drivers, Mr. Anderson states that his drivers used the 11th 
driving hour only 3.1 to 3.7 times per month, or that consistent with 
J.B. Hunt's usage of the provision and other estimates mentioned 
earlier in this section. Also, Mr. Woodruff of J.B. Hunt states that, 
``The 11th hour has allowed J.B. Hunt and our drivers to more 
efficiently use their daily drive time with only a modest increase 
(about 1.8%) in average daily driving hours and with less concern about 
an hours-of-service violation or being stranded in an inappropriate 
location.'' The information submitted by Mr. Woodruff regarding use of 
the 11th driving hour is consistent with estimates from other sources 
and those used in the 2005 RIA for the HOS rule, as discussed in 
earlier sections of this preamble. All of these data indicate that the 
11th driving hour in particular is an important provision to the 
industry in terms of allowing drivers to maintain operational 
flexibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ See Tab M of the ATA Motion's Addendum to read Mr. 
Woodruff's affidavit. It is in the docket referenced at the 
beginning of this notice.
    \14\ See Tab B of the ATA Motion's Addendum to read Mr. 
Anderson's affidavit. It is in the docket referenced at the 
beginning of this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

FMCSA Decision to Re-Adopt the 11-Hour Limit and 34-Hour Restart

    FMCSA concludes it is necessary to re-adopt the 11-hour driving 
limit and 34-hour restart provisions to avoid significant and costly 
disruption of existing industry practices while ensuring that the 
actions and underlying safety analysis are available for comments from 
all interested parties before issuing a final rule. The Agency made 
this decision based on its evaluation of new safety and operational 
data, additional analysis and modeling of the relationship between 
hours of driving and fatigue-related large truck crashes, discussion of 
the concept of cumulative fatigue in the context of driving activity, 
and the collection and evaluation of new data on the benefits and costs 
of the 11-hour driving limit and the 34-hour restart provisions, and 
the affidavits and declarations from some of America's largest trucking 
companies.

G. Regulatory Analyses and Notices

    Administrative Procedure Act. The FMCSA has determined that it has 
good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) to adopt this interim final rule 
without prior notice and opportunity for comment and under 5 U.S.C. 
553(d) to make the IFR final less than 30 days after publication. 
Specifically, the agency finds that notice and comment are both 
``impracticable'' and ``contrary to the public interest'' pursuant to 
Sec.  553(b). In order to avoid the huge administrative and operational 
burden that would be imposed on State enforcement agencies and motor 
carriers and drivers by the issuance of the Court's mandate at the end 
of December, this rule must be issued without normal notice and comment 
procedures. In addition, the variety of State HOS standards that would 
exist in the absence of this IFR, along with the influx of the 106,000 
additional drivers that FMCSA estimates will be needed to handle 
current freight volume, could offset safety gains made since 2003 (as 
identified in section F of this IFR), which would obviously be contrary 
to the public interest.
    The 2005 rule includes a provision stating that ``[a]ny regulations 
on hours of service of drivers in effect before April 28, 2003, which 
were amended or replaced by the final rule adopted on April 28, 2003 
[69 FR 22456] are rescinded and not in effect'' (Sec.  395.0). Because 
the D.C. Circuit did not address the meaning of this provision, either 
in OOIDA v. FMCSA or in its order responding to FMCSA's support of 
ATA's motion for a stay, the interaction between Sec.  395.0 and the 
law of the Circuit has created significant doubt whether any daily 
driving limit would exist when the Court's mandate issues. The Agency 
must now adopt an IFR to forestall the confusion and uncertainty that 
would otherwise occur within the motor carrier industry, interfering 
with efforts to restore an orderly HOS regime.
    There are precedents in the D.C. Circuit for the proposition that 
vacatur of a rule leaves a vacuum which the Agency must fill. There are 
other precedents holding that vacatur automatically restores the prior 
rule, if any. It is therefore unclear--absent an IFR--whether there 
would be any daily driving limit in effect when the Court's mandate 
issues, since Sec.  395.0 rescinded all pre-2003 daily driving limits, 
or whether the limit would be 10 hours. (The 34-hour restart provision 
would necessarily disappear upon issuance of the Court's mandate 
because there was no restart rule in effect before April 28, 2003, that 
could be rescinded by Sec.  395.0 or restored by the Court's decision.) 
The problem is further complicated by the fact that, after the D.C. 
Circuit vacated the entire 2003 rule [Public Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 
1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004)], Congress restored the vacated rule until FMCSA 
issued a new rule addressing the issues raised by the Court's 2004 
decision, or September 30, 2005, whichever occurred first. [Section 
7(f) of the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part V, 
Public Law 108-310, 118 Stat. 1144, at 1154.] The meaning of the D.C. 
Circuit precedents restoring a prior rule upon vacatur of a challenged 
provision is unclear when, as here, the daily driving limit immediately 
preceding the 11-hour limit adopted by FMCSA in 2005 and vacated in 
2007, was the same 11-hour limit (restored by the Surface 
Transportation Extension Act).
    FMCSA has therefore determined that it would be contrary to the 
public interest not to issue an IFR that forestalls the confusion 
attendant upon issuance of the Court's mandate and establishes clearly 
the HOS rules drivers and motor carriers must follow.
    Neither FMCSA and its State enforcement partners nor the motor 
carrier industry could adapt quickly enough to a 1-hour reduction in 
driving time and elimination of the 34-hour restart at the end of the 
stay granted by the Court to ensure orderly enforcement and compliance. 
Both the enforcement community and the regulated entities need a 
substantial amount of time to come to terms with such significant 
changes in the HOS rules, especially changes that make enforcement more 
complex and compliance more expensive.
    Furthermore, after committing substantial resources to reviewing 
recent safety data following the Court's September 28 stay, FMCSA has 
become convinced that reversion to a prior regulatory regime (and 
possibly no regulation at all) would likely offset some of the large-
truck safety gains made on America's highways since 2003 and that an 
IFR is needed to preserve

[[Page 71267]]

the current rules while seeking public comment.
    Millions of CMV drivers are subject to FMCSA's HOS rules. Because 
the Agency's enforcement staff is relatively small, adequate 
enforcement of the rules requires partnership with State officials 
through the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) [49 CFR 
part 350]. FMCSA provides annual MCSAP grants to States that agree to 
adopt and enforce as State laws or regulations, motor carrier safety 
regulations which are compatible with the FMCSRs. For State safety 
regulations applicable to CMVs operating in interstate commerce, 
``compatible'' regulations must be identical to, or have the same 
effect as, the FMCSRs. All of the States, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories accept MCSAP funds and enforce 
compatible laws or regulations, including hours-of-service rules. The 
States have approximately 10,000 officers available for enforcement of 
State safety regulations compatible with the FMCSRs. These officers 
account for 95% of FMCSA's available enforcement resources; they 
conduct 96% (3.1 million) of the roadside inspections per year.
    MCSAP grantees use different methods of adopting compatible laws 
and regulations: Of the 50 States and the District of Columbia, 23 
jurisdictions automatically adopt any FMCSA safety rule as a State 
regulation, 22 use an administrative process, and 6 require action by 
the State legislature. In order to accommodate these various adoption 
methods, 49 CFR 350.331(d) of the MCSAP rules allow States 3 full years 
after the effective date of an FMCSA to rule to adopt a compatible 
State rule. States typically adopt safety-related rules as soon as 
possible, but adoption is not simultaneous among the States.
    When FMCSA promulgated a new hours-of-service rule on April 23, 
2003, it adopted a compliance date of January 4, 2004, more than 8 
months after its publication. More than 9,000 State enforcement 
officers were trained on the requirements of the new hours-of-service 
rule between October and the end of December 2003, either by FMCSA 
directly or by State personnel trained by FMCSA. States amended their 
operations manuals and enforcement guidelines to implement the new 
rules. Similarly, FMCSA and the States reprogrammed computers as 
necessary to ensure that hand-held devices used at roadside and office 
systems tracked the new HOS rules.
    The same process would be needed to prepare for enforcement of an 
HOS rule with a 10-hour driving limit and without 34-hour restart 
provision. States that use administrative or legislative processes to 
adopt safety regulations compatible with Federal regulations would 
require an amount of time similar to that required to adopt new hours-
of-service regulations. Additionally, all of the officers trained on 
the 11-hour driving limit and the 34-hour restart provision in the fall 
and early winter of 2003 would have to be re-trained on the previous 
rules. Experienced officers may be able to adapt to the previous rules 
without much difficulty, but newly hired officers who have never worked 
with the previous regulatory regime would require full-scale training. 
State agencies would have to amend, print, and distribute manuals and 
enforcement guidelines before re-training could begin. Computers--both 
the hand-held devices often used at roadside and the larger machines 
used by the central office of the enforcement agency--would have to be 
re-programmed.
    Enforcement would suffer during the transition period. Re-training 
would take officers away from their safety activities at roadside. 
Officers would need to work overtime to maintain the same level of 
enforcement, or those activities would have to be reduced for a time, 
with the result that unsafe motor carriers and drivers would have a 
better chance of escaping detection.
    If the provisions of the pre-2003 hours-of-service rules were 
reinstated after the stay expires, nationwide enforcement would be far 
from uniform. Some States would automatically adopt the Federal rule 
(but even their officers would require re-training before enforcement 
could begin), while others would continue to operate under the 2005 
rule until the State legislature acted or an administrative process was 
completed. The resulting nationwide patchwork of regulations would 
render effective enforcement problematic.
    In view of the legal challenges to Federal hours-of-service rules 
in the last few years, States may be less inclined to adopt the latest 
Federal rule quickly, preferring to wait and see whether further 
changes are made that would affect their training and enforcement. The 
pattern of State hours-of-service regulations could therefore change 
from month to month, and might remain inconsistent for up to three full 
years as allowed by 49 CFR 350.331(d). The patchwork of regulations 
would create uncertainty about the HOS standard applicable during a 
trip. In fact, a driver could be subject to several different State 
rules in the course of a few hours. Adding to the confusion is the fact 
that FMCSA would have to evaluate driver HOS records under the rules 
mandated by the Court's decision during compliance reviews of motor 
carriers, while driver HOS records would be evaluated under State 
regulations at roadside inspections in States that do not immediately 
conform their rules to the Federal standard.
    The extent to which the 11-hour driving limit and the 34-hour 
restart are being used varies widely among industry segments, motor 
carriers, and individual drivers, but the sudden loss of these 
provisions would have a noticeable effect on many carriers and drivers 
and a substantial impact on some. We estimated that the loss of the 11-
hour driving limit and the 34-hour restart would cost the industry 
about $2.1 billion per year, of which $1.6 billion would be 
attributable to the 34-hour restart and $500 million to the 11th hour 
of driving. See RIA in the docket for more details. By subtracting the 
estimated $125 million of safety benefits, the net annual cost to the 
industry would be approximately $2 billion. This cost is due to a 7 
percent reduction in labor productivity for motor carriers due to loss 
of the 11th driving hour and the 34-hour restart provision. In the 
absence of an IFR, all motor carriers would have to revise their 
operational procedures immediately and many would have to purchase new 
equipment and hire more drivers (FMCSA estimates 106,000 additional 
drivers in the RIA), a significant burden in a huge and diverse 
industry. This would imply that the 106,000 additional drivers would 
cause additional congestion on America's highways.
    In an affidavit filed with the D.C. Circuit with ATA's motion for 
stay of the mandate in OOIDA v. FMCSA, the Senior Vice President of 
Corporate Safety and Security for J.B. Hunt, the 11th largest for-hire 
motor carrier in the industry in 2006, estimated that it would take his 
company ``a minimum of 6 months * * * to make a proper transition to an 
hours of service regulation that does not include the 11 and 34 hour 
provisions, including time to undertake computer programming changes, 
system testing, engineering design and simulations, education of 
shippers/receivers, training of over 13,500 drivers and 2,000 non-
driver personnel, hiring of additional drivers and the acquisition of 
additional equipment'' (Greer Woodruff,\15\ September 4, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See Tab M of the ATA Motion's Addendum to read Mr. 
Woodruff's affidavit. It is in the docket referenced at the 
beginning of this notice.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 71268]]

    The Executive Vice President of PeopleNet, which offers trucking 
customers an electronic system for maintaining and tracking driver 
logs, also filed an affidavit with the ATA petition. He reported that, 
``[e]ven with the leading edge technology platform that PeopleNet 
manages and the patented, Over-The-Air-Programming technology that 
allows for expedient deployment of code to all Onboard users, it would 
take approximately four to six months to design, test, and roll-out new 
software that is fully compliant with the elimination of the 34-hour 
restart provision and the eleven hour permitted driving time and 
provides the driver with the needed compliance assistance provided 
today'' (Brian McLaughlin,\16\ September 6, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ See Tab G of the ATA Motion's Addendum to read Mr. 
McLaughlin's declaration. It is in the docket referenced at the 
beginning of this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Old Dominion Freight Lines, which redesigned its operations to 
better utilize the rules adopted in 2003, reported that elimination of 
the 34-hour restart for its pickup and delivery drivers could lead to 
``increased labor needs of 20% or in Old Dominion's case require the 
recruiting, hiring and training of over 600 drivers. In our industry 
the safety record of new drivers in their first year of work is not as 
good as that of experienced drivers. In 2006, Old Dominion had 1,971 
accidents. Drivers in their first year made up 12% of the driver 
workforce, yet they had 526 or 27% of the total accidents'' (Affidavit, 
Brian J. Stoddard,\17\ August 31, 2007). The Frozen Food Express Group 
(FFEG) made the same point: ``FFEG's experience shows that drivers in 
their first year of driving are about 3 times more likely than a 
veteran driver to be involved in an accident'' (Affidavit, David 
Hedgepeth,\18\ September 4, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ See Tab K of the ATA Motion's Addendum to read Mr. 
Stoddard's affidavit. It is in the docket referenced at the 
beginning of this notice.
    \18\ See Tab E of the ATA Motion's Addendum to read Mr. 
Hedgepeth's affidavit. It is in the docket referenced at the 
beginning of this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The transportation manager for Cemex, the largest cement 
manufacturer in North America, reported that its drivers use the 34-
hour restart to ``re-set'' their clocks during bad weather, when 
concrete cannot be poured. ``Because the elimination of the 34-hour 
restart provision would curtail the flexibility that Cemex needs to 
supply its customers, Cemex would need to hire additional truck drivers 
if that provision were eliminated. It is very difficult to find good, 
qualified drivers, and Cemex would not be the only company competing 
for these limited driver resources. * * * The third-party carriers that 
Cemex uses to ship some of its cement would also be affected by the 34-
hour restart provision. Those carriers would be competing with Cemex to 
hire additional drivers'' (Affidavit, George Caine,\19\ September 5, 
2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See Tab D of the ATA Motion's Addendum to read Mr. Caine's 
declaration. It is in the docket referenced at the beginning of this 
notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FMCSA believes that the problems described by J.B. Hunt, PeopleNet, 
Old Dominion, and Cemex would affect most motor carriers, in varying 
degree. All carriers would need to retrain drivers and support 
personnel if the driving time-limit were immediately reduced to 10 
hours and the 34-hour restart were eliminated. Technological changes 
would be more burdensome for carriers that have invested heavily in 
computer-based management, tracking and communications systems. The 
need for new drivers and vehicles to handle the existing workload would 
depend on the extent to which a carrier and its drivers had utilized 
the 11-hour driving limit and the 34-hour restart. Despite 
uncertainties, FMCSA believes that all of these challenges would occur 
and that they would be seriously disruptive if they converged at the 
end of the 90-day stay granted by the Court.
    As demonstrated elsewhere in the preamble, this rule fully 
addresses the legal shortcomings identified in OOIDA v. FMCSA. Because 
the Court did not vacate the 11-hour driving limit or the 34-hour 
restart for reasons related to safety, but only because of procedural 
flaws, FMCSA's resolution of those flaws in this rule, combined with 
the impracticability of immediately establishing, enforcing, and 
complying with a new regulatory regime upon expiration of the Court's 
90-day stay, compels the conclusion that the Agency has good cause to 
issue this rule without prior notice and comment. Motor carriers that 
need more drivers to compensate for reduced driving time may not be 
able to find them, and even if new drivers are located, their 
inexperience may cause additional crashes and offset gains made in 
highway safety since 2003. The crash and compliance data that has 
become available since the 2005 HOS rule was issued show that 
operational safety under the 2003/2005 rules have not been degraded and 
in some cases, data indicate improvement. Furthermore, the degree of 
disruption to the motor carrier industry caused by a sudden, major 
regulatory change could be serious enough to interfere with the timely 
delivery of some products. That risk is greater today than at any time 
in the past because of the widespread use in the American economy of 
``just-in-time'' delivery as a method of reducing the overhead costs 
associated with warehousing. Disruptions in the supply chain caused by 
truckers' inability immediately to comply with a new HOS rule, to say 
nothing of an increase in crashes and congestion associated with 
106,000 inexperienced drivers hired to satisfy a new HOS rule, would be 
contrary to the public interest, especially when the economy is already 
fragile due to the decline in housing starts and the financial pressure 
caused by non-performing subprime mortgages.
    The disruption to enforcement, operations, and compliance that 
justify an IFR also provide good cause to make the IFR final upon 
publication, before the end of the 90-day stay.
Congressional Review Act
    Because FMCSA has determined that it has good cause under 5 U.S.C. 
553(b) to adopt this rule without prior notice and opportunity for 
comment, the 60-day delay required by the Congressional Review Act 
before a major rule can become effective [see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(3)] is 
not applicable and this rule can take effect on a date determined by 
the Agency [see 5 U.S.C. 808(2)]. FMCSA has established December 27, 
2007, as the effective date of this rule.
Executive Order 12866
    The FMCSA has determined that this action is an economically 
significant regulatory action within the meaning of Executive Order 
12866, This interim rule reinstates those provisions vacated by the 
Court as of December 27, 2007. The Agency has prepared a regulatory 
impact analysis analyzing the interim rule. A copy of the regulatory 
analysis document is included in the docket referenced at the beginning 
of this notice. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has reviewed 
this document.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), as amended by the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 
110 Stat. 857), FMCSA is not required to prepare a final regulatory 
flexibility analysis under 5 U.S.C. 604(a) for this interim final rule 
because the Agency has not issued a notice of proposed rulemaking prior 
to this action. However, FMCSA believes the RFA impacts of this IFR 
were adequately described by the 2005 final rule.

[[Page 71269]]

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    This IFR will not impose an unfunded Federal mandate, as defined by 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1532, et seq.), that 
will result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, 
in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $128.1 million or more 
in any one year.
Paperwork Reduction Act
    This final rule does not alter the existing information collection 
requests for HOS recordkeeping.
National Environmental Policy Act
    FMCSA has prepared an environmental assessment (EA) in accordance 
with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 
4321, et seq., as amended), the FMCSA's NEPA Implementing Procedures 
and Policy for Considering Environmental Impacts (FMCSA Order 
5610.1),\20\ the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations (CEQ) 
regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508), the DOT Order 
5610.C (September 18, 1979, as amended on July 13, 1982 and July 30, 
1985), entitled ``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts,'' 
and other pertinent environmental regulations, Executive Orders, 
statutes, and laws for consideration of environmental impacts of FMCSA 
actions. The Agency relies on all of the authorities noted above to 
ensure that it actively incorporates environmental considerations into 
informed decisionmaking on all of its actions, including rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ FMCSA's environmental procedures were published on March 1, 
2004 (69 FR 9680), FMCSA Order 5610.1, National Environmental Policy 
Act Implementing Procedures and Policy for Considering Environmental 
Impacts, and effective on March 30, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As shown in the Environmental Assessment that accompanies this IFR, 
none of the alternatives considered would have a significant adverse 
impact on the human environment. Subsequently, FMCSA has determined 
that this IFR will not significantly affect the quality of the human 
environment and that a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement is 
not required. The EA for this IFR, as well as the Agency's finding of 
no significant impact (FONSI), are contained in the docket referenced 
at the beginning of this notice.
Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
    This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and 
criteria contained in Executive Order 13132. The FMCSA has determined 
this rule does not have a substantial direct effect on States, nor 
would it limit the policymaking discretion of the States. Nothing in 
this document preempts any State law or regulation.
Executive Order 12372 (Intergovernmental Review)
    The regulations implementing Executive Order 12372 regarding 
intergovernmental consultation on Federal programs and activities do 
not apply to this program.
Executive Order 12630 (Taking of Private Property)
    This rule will not effect a taking of private property or otherwise 
have taking implications under Executive Order 12630, Governmental 
Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property 
Rights.
Executive Order 12988
    This regulation meets the applicable standards set forth in 
sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988 Civil Justice 
Reform.
List of References
    Most of the research studies cited in this interim rule are 
included in the List of References in the 2005 final rule (70 FR 49978, 
at 50067). Copies or abstracts of the 2005 referenced studies, as well 
as newer research studies published after the 2005 rule, new safety and 
operational data, affidavits and declaration of trucking company 
executives, and the Regulatory Impact Analysis cited in this interim 
rule are in the docket referenced at the beginning of this notice.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 385

    Administrative practice and procedure, Highway safety, Motor 
carriers, Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

49 CFR Part 395

    Highway safety, Motor carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

0
In consideration of the foregoing, FMCSA is amending 49 CFR parts 385 
and 395 as follows.

PART 385--SAFETY FITNESS PROCEDURES

0
1. The authority citation for part 385 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 113, 504, 521(b), 5105(e), 5109, 5113, 
13901-13905, 31136, 31144, 31148, and 31502; Sec. 350 of Pub. L. 
107-87; and 49 CFR 1.73.

0
2. In Appendix B to part 385--
0
a. Amend section II by removing paragraph (c);
0
b. Amend section VII by removing the entries for Sec. Sec.  
395.3(a)(1), 395.3(c)(1), and 395.3 (c)(2);
0
c. Amend section II by adding paragraph (c);
0
d. Amend section VII by adding entries for Sec. Sec.  395.3(a)(1), 
Sec.  395.3(c)(1), and (c)(2) to read as follows:

Appendix B to Part 385--Explanation of Safety Rating Process

* * * * *

II. Converting CR Information Into a Safety Rating

* * * * *
    (c) Critical regulations are those identified as such where 
noncompliance relates to management and/or operational controls. 
These are indicative of breakdowns in a carrier's management 
controls. An example of a critical regulation is Sec.  395.3(a)(1), 
requiring or permitting a property-carrying commercial motor vehicle 
driver to drive more than 11 hours.
* * * * *

VII. List of Acute and Critical Regulations

* * * * *
    Sec.  395.3(a)(1) Requiring or permitting a property-carrying 
commercial motor vehicle driver to drive more than 11 hours 
(critical).
* * * * *
    Sec.  395.3(c)(1) Requiring or permitting a property-carrying 
commercial motor vehicle driver to restart a period of 7 consecutive 
days without taking an off-duty period of 34 or more consecutive 
hours (critical).
    Sec.  395.3(c)(2) Requiring or permitting a property-carrying 
commercial motor vehicle driver to restart a period of 8 consecutive 
days without taking an off-duty period of 34 or more consecutive 
hours (critical).
* * * * *

PART 395--HOURS OF SERVICE OF DRIVERS

0
3. The authority citation for part 395 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 504, 14122, 31133, 31136, 31502; Sec. 229, 
Pub. L. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748; Sec. 113, Pub. L. 103-311, 108 
Stat. 1673, 1676; and 49 CFR 1.73.

0
4. In Sec.  395.1--
0
a. Remove paragraphs (e)(1)(iv)(A), (e)(2)(v), (g)(1)(i)(B), 
(g)(1)(ii)(B), (g)(2)(ii), and (o)(3).
0
b. Add paragraphs (e)(1)(iv)(A), (e)(2)(v), (g)(1)(i)(B), 
(g)(1)(ii)(B), (g)(2)(ii), and (o)(3) to read as follows:


Sec.  395.1  Scope of rules in this part.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (iv)(A) A property-carrying commercial motor vehicle driver does 
not exceed 11 hours maximum driving

[[Page 71270]]

time following 10 consecutive hours off-duty; or
* * * * *
    (2) * * *
    (v) The driver does not drive more than 11 hours following at least 
10 consecutive hours off-duty;
* * * * *
    (g) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) * * *
    (B) May not drive more than 11 hours following one of the 10-hour 
off-duty periods specified in paragraph (g)(1)(i)(A)(1) through (4) of 
this section; and
* * * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (B) Calculation of the 11-hour driving limit includes all driving 
time; compliance must be re-calculated from the end of the first of the 
two periods used to comply with paragraph (g)(1)(ii)(A) of this 
section.
* * * * *
    (2) * * *
    (ii) The driving time in the period immediately before and after 
each rest period, when added together, does not exceed 11 hours;
* * * * *
    (o) * * *
    (3) The driver has not taken this exemption within the previous 6 
consecutive days, except when the driver has begun a new 7- or 8-
consecutive day period with the beginning of any off-duty period of 34 
or more consecutive hours as allowed by Sec.  395.3(c).
* * * * *

0
5. In Sec.  395.3--
0
a. Remove paragraphs (a)(1) and (c).
0
b. Add paragraphs (a)(1) and (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  395.3  Maximum driving time for property-carrying vehicles.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (1) More than 11 cumulative hours following 10 consecutive hours 
off-duty;
* * * * *
    (c)(1) Any period of 7 consecutive days may end with the beginning 
of any off-duty period of 34 or more consecutive hours; or
    (2) Any period of 8 consecutive days may end with the beginning of 
any off-duty period of 34 or more consecutive hours.

    Dated: December 10, 2007.
John H. Hill,
Administrator.
 [FR Doc. E7-24238 Filed 12-14-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-EX-P