

the market structure, and its views of the nature of the case).

Court approval of a consent decree requires a standard more flexible and less strict than that appropriate to court adoption of a litigated decree following a finding of liability. “[A] proposed decree must be approved even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own, as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is ‘within the reaches of public interest.’” *United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting *United States v. Gillette Co.*, 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)), *aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States*, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); *see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd.*, 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving the consent decree even though the court would have imposed a greater remedy). To meet this standard, the United States “need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17.

Moreover, the Court’s role under the APPA is limited to reviewing the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the Court to “construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree against that case.” *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1459. Because the “court’s authority to review the decree depends entirely on the government’s exercising its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place,” it follows that “the court is only authorized to review the decree itself,” and not to “effectively redraft the complaint” to inquire into other matters that the United States did not pursue. *Id.* at 1459–60. As this court recently confirmed in *SBC Communications*, courts “cannot look beyond the complaint in making the public interest determination unless the complaint is drafted so narrowly as to make a mockery of judicial power.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.

In its 2004 amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees in antitrust enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the

court to permit anyone to intervene.” 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). This instruction explicitly writes into the statute the standard intended by the Congress that enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator Tunney then explained: “[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the consent decree process.” 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Senator Tunney). Rather, the procedure for the public interest determination is left to the discretion of the court, with the recognition that the court’s “scope of review remains sharply proscribed by precedent and the nature of Tunney Act proceedings.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11. <sup>5</sup>

**VIII. Determinative Documents**

There are no determinative materials or documents within the meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in formulating the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: November 13, 2007.  
Respectfully submitted,  
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**DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

**Drug Enforcement Administration**

**Manufacturer of Controlled Substances; Notice of Registration**

By Notice dated August 16, 2007, and published in the **Federal Register** on August 27, 2007 (72 FR 49018), Boehringer Ingelheim Chemicals, Inc., 2820 N. Normandy Drive, Petersburg, Virginia 23805, made application by renewal to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to be registered as a bulk manufacturer of the basic classes of controlled substances listed in schedules I and II:

Drug	Schedule
Tetrahydrocannabinols (7370) .....	I
Amphetamine (1100) .....	II
Methylphenidate (1724) .....	II
Methadone (9250) .....	II

be meaningfully evaluated simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments, that is the approach that should be utilized.”); *United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc.*, 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (“Absent a showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge its duty, the Court, in making its public interest

Drug	Schedule
Methadone Intermediate (9254) ...	II
Dextropropoxyphene, bulk (non-dosage forms) (9273).	II
Fentanyl (9801) .....	II

The company plans to manufacture the listed controlled substances in bulk for sale to its customers for formulation into finished pharmaceuticals.

No comments or objections have been received. DEA has considered the factors in 21 U.S.C. 823(a) and determined that the registration of Boehringer Ingelheim Chemicals, Inc. to manufacture the listed basic classes of controlled substances is consistent with the public interest at this time. DEA has investigated Boehringer Ingelheim Chemicals, Inc. to ensure that the company’s registration is consistent with the public interest. The investigation has included inspection and testing of the company’s physical security systems, verification of the company’s compliance with state and local laws, and a review of the company’s background and history. Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823, and in accordance with 21 CFR 1301.33, the above named company is granted registration as a bulk manufacturer of the basic classes of controlled substances listed.

Dated: November 26, 2007.  
**Joseph T. Rannazzisi,**  
*Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of*  
*Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement*  
*Administration.*

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**DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

**Drug Enforcement Administration**

**Manufacturer of Controlled Substances; Notice of Registration**

By Notice dated August 16, 2007, and published in the **Federal Register** on August 28, 2007, (72 FR 49315–49316), Cerilliant Corporation, 811 Paloma Drive, Suite A, Round Rock, Texas 78664, made application by renewal to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to be registered as a bulk manufacturer of the basic classes of controlled substances listed in schedules I and II:

finding, should\* \* \* carefully consider the explanations of the government in the competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the circumstances.”)

<sup>5</sup> See *United States v. Enova Corp.*, 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the “Tunney Act expressly allows the court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the competitive impact statement and response to comments alone”); S. Rep. No. 93-298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1973) (“Where the public interest can