[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 208 (Monday, October 29, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61186-61188]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-21212]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-528; 50-529, 50-530; EA-07-162]
In the Matter of Arizona Public Service Company; Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station; Confirmatory Order Modifying License
(Effective Immediately)
I
Arizona Public Service Company (APS) (Licensee) is the holder of
reactor operating licenses, License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74, issued
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission), pursuant to
10 CFR Part 50, on June 6, 1985, April 24, 1986, and November 25, 1987.
The licenses authorize the operation of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
Station (PVNGS) in accordance with conditions specified therein. The
facility is located on the Licensee's site in Buckeye, Arizona. This
Confirmatory Order is the result of an agreement reached during an
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session conducted on
August 27, 2007.
II
On November 20, 2006, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) began
an investigation (OI Case No. 4-2007-009) at PVNGS. As a result of the
staff's review of the information, the NRC was concerned that a senior
reactor operator (SRO), stationed as a reactor operator, appeared to
have engaged in deliberate misconduct. Specifically, on November 8,
2006, the SRO had mistakenly entered an incorrect blowdown constant
into the plant computer and subsequently attempted to conceal the
mistake by falsifying the blowdown record. The NRC's preliminary
findings were discussed in a letter to APS dated July 12, 2007. That
letter identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9 that was being
considered for escalated enforcement action, and identified the NRC's
concern that the SRO actions may have involved willfulness in the form
of deliberate misconduct. A predecisional enforcement conference had
been scheduled to discuss the apparent violation. However, prior to the
conference, APS requested ADR in an attempt to resolve the issue. ADR
is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving
conflict outside of court using a neutral third party. The technique
that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation.
On August 27, 2007, the NRC and APS met in an ADR session mediated
by a professional mediator, arranged through Cornell University's
Institute on Conflict Resolution. At the conclusion of the ADR session,
APS and the NRC did reach an Agreement in Principle. This Confirmatory
Order is issued pursuant to the agreement reached during the ADR
process.
III
During that ADR session, a preliminary settlement agreement was
reached. Pursuant to the NRC's Alternative Dispute Resolution program
(ADR), the following are the terms and conditions agreed upon in
principle by APS and the NRC relating to the issues described in the
NRC's letter to APS dated July 12, 2007.
Whereas, APS and the NRC agree that there were two issues: (1) A
licensed operator failed to self-report an error he made in entering
data into a plant computer, and subsequently he attempted to conceal
his error, and (2) a failure by APS to promptly notify other licensees
of a potential access authorization issue with respect to this
individual, in violation of NRC requirements;
Whereas, the actions of this licensed operator, though
unacceptable, were of very low significance from a nuclear safety
perspective;
Whereas, the actions of this licensed operator were identified by
APS and APS promptly informed the NRC;
Whereas the access authorization issue is of very low safety
significance;
Whereas, APS has completed corrective actions to address the issues
described in the July 12, 2007, letter issued by the NRC to APS,
including actions to correct the initial error made by the plant
licensed operator, to reduce the likelihood of similar errors in the
future, to improve Independent Verifications, to further improve the
safety culture in the plant Operations Department, and to improve APS'
processes for ensuring that pertinent information regarding personnel
access authorization is appropriately communicated to other nuclear
power plant licensees; and
Whereas, these terms and conditions shall not be binding on either
party until memorialized in a confirmatory order issued by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to APS relating to this matter.
APS planned to complete additional corrective and improvement
actions with respect to these issues, and agrees to take the following
actions, which will be included in a Confirmatory Order from the NRC to
APS:
1. APS will develop training on these issues, using a case study.
The training will focus on the importance of self-reporting errors, the
importance of performing good independent verifications, and deterring
individuals from concealing mistakes. APS will provide this training to
its Operations Department within 6 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order.
2. APS will perform assessments of its independent verification
processes in the Operations and Maintenance Departments. The
assessments will be completed within 12 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, and applicable actions resulting from the
assessment will be tracked for completion. In addition, within this
same time period, APS will incorporate in a Quality Assurance (QA)
audit plan a follow-up assessment to ensure the actions to improve the
independent verification processes were effective.
3. Within 12 months of the date of this Confirmatory Order, APS
will provide training on both issues identified above to its leaders
and managers. The intent of this training will be to focus leaders and
managers on the importance of balancing accountability with encouraging
workers to self-report errors and on the importance of communicating
this with their workers, and on ensuring that potential access
authorization issues are promptly addressed.
4. Within 12 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
utilize the case study identified in Item 3 in evaluating its training
for new leaders with a goal towards ensuring that new leaders are
sensitized to balancing accountability with encouraging workers to
self-report errors, on the importance of communicating this with their
workers, and on ensuring that potential access authorization issues are
promptly addressed.
[[Page 61187]]
5. Within 6 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
conduct a follow-up safety culture review of its Operations Department,
in order to determine the effectiveness of its actions to improve the
safety culture in the Operations Department, and applicable actions
resulting from the review will be tracked for completion.
6. Within 30 days of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
provide the NRC with written communication regarding the weaknesses
found in its process for identifying potential access authorization
issues to other licensees through the Personnel Access Data System
(PADS). APS will describe its corrective actions in this letter, and
will send the letter to the Document Control Desk with a copy to the
Regional Administrator, NRC RIV and to the Resident Inspector at the
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
7. Within 6 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
develop a generic communication for the industry in the form of an
Operating Experience report regarding weaknesses it found in its
process for informing other licensees of potential access authorization
issues concerning individuals who resign from the plant before any
disciplinary action is taken against them.
The NRC agrees not to pursue any further enforcement action in
connection with the issues described in the NRC's July 12, 2007, letter
to APS, including the access authorization issue described in that
letter, and will not count these matters as previous enforcement for
the purposes of assessing potential future enforcement action civil
penalty assessments in accordance with section VI.C of the Enforcement
Policy.
The NRC agrees to provide APS with 48 hours notice prior to
issuance of the Confirmatory Order described in this agreement.
On October 17, 2007, APS consented to issuing this Order with the
commitments, as described in section V below. APS further agreed that
this Order is to be affective upon issuance and that it has waived its
right to a hearing.
IV
Since APS has agreed to take additional actions to address NRC
concerns, as set forth in section III above, the NRC has concluded that
its concerns can be resolved through issuance of this Order.
I find that the Licensee's commitments as set forth in section V
are acceptable and necessary and conclude that with these commitments
the public health and safety are reasonably assured. In view of the
foregoing, I have determined that public health and safety require that
the Licensee's commitments be confirmed by this Order. Based on the
above and the Licensee's consent, this Order is immediately effective
upon issuance.
V
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 104, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182, and
186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Commission's
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, and 10 CFR Part 50, It is hereby ordered,
effective immediately, that license Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 are
modified as follows:
1. APS will develop training on the issues described in the
apparent violation identified in the NRC's letter to APS dated July 12,
2007, using a case study. The training will focus on the importance of
self-reporting errors, the importance of performing good independent
verifications, and deterring individuals from concealing mistakes. APS
will provide this training to its Operations Department (permanent
employees and contractors scheduled to work in the Operations
Department for 1-year or more) within 6 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order.
2. APS will perform assessments of its independent verification
processes in the Operations and Maintenance Departments. The
assessments will be completed within 12 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, and applicable actions resulting from the
assessment will be tracked for completion. In addition, within this
same time period, APS will incorporate in a QA audit plan a follow-up
assessment to ensure the actions to improve the independent
verification processes were effective.
3. Within 12 months of the date of this Confirmatory Order, APS
will provide training to its leaders and managers on the two issues in
this case: (1) A licensed operator failed to self-report an error he
made in entering data into a plant computer, and subsequently he
attempted to conceal his error, and (2) a failure by APS to promptly
notify other licensees of a potential access authorization issue with
respect to this individual, in violation of NRC requirements. The
intent of this training will be to focus leaders and managers on the
importance of balancing accountability with encouraging workers to
self-report errors and on the importance of communicating this with
their workers, and on ensuring that potential access authorization
issues are promptly addressed.
4. Within 12 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
utilize the case study identified in Item 3 in evaluating its training
for new leaders with a goal towards ensuring that new leaders are
sensitized to balancing accountability with encouraging workers to
self-report errors, on the importance of communicating this with their
workers, and on ensuring that potential access authorization issues are
promptly addressed.
5. Within 6 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
conduct a follow-up safety culture review of its Operations Department,
in order to determine the effectiveness of its actions to improve the
safety culture in the Operations Department, and applicable actions
resulting from the review will be tracked for completion.
6. Within 30 days of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
provide the NRC with written communication regarding the weaknesses
found in its process for identifying potential access authorization
issues to other licensees through the Personnel Access Data System
(PADS). APS will describe its corrective actions in this letter, and
will send the letter to the Document Control Desk with a copy to the
Regional Administrator, NRC RIV, and to the Resident Inspector at
PVNGS.
7. Within 6 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
develop a generic communication for the industry in the form of an
Operating Experience report regarding weaknesses it found in its
process for informing other licensees of potential access authorization
issues concerning individuals who resign from the plant before any
disciplinary action is taken against them.
The Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV may, in writing, relax or
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee
of good cause.
VI
Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other
than APS, may request a hearing within 20 days of its issuance. Where
good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time
to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made in
writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of good cause
for the extension. Any request for a hearing shall be submitted to the
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Copies also shall be
sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
[[Page 61188]]
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, to the
Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at
the same address, to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV, 611
Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011, and to APS.
Because of the possible disruptions in delivery of mail to United
States Government offices, it is requested that answers and requests
for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of the Commission either by
means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to
[email protected] and also to the Office of the General Counsel
either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail
to [email protected]. If such a person requests a hearing, that
person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his
interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the
criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309 (d) and (f).
If a hearing is requested by a person whose interest is adversely
affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and
place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered
at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory Order should be
sustained.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in section V above shall be final 20 days from the date of
this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of
time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions
specified in section V shall be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received. An answer or a request for
hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this order.
Dated this 19th day of October 2007.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Elmo E. Collins,
Regional Administrator.
[FR Doc. E7-21212 Filed 10-26-07; 8:45 am]
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