[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 192 (Thursday, October 4, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 56798-56801]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-19663]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-286]


Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, 
LLC, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.; Revision to Existing 
Exemptions

1.0 Background

    Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO or the licensee) is the 
holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-64, which authorizes 
operation of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). The 
license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to 
all rules, regulations, and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC or the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of a pressurized-water reactor located in 
Westchester County, New York.

2.0 Request/Action

    Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, 
Sec.  50.48, requires that nuclear power plants that were licensed 
before January 1, 1979, of which IP3 is one, must satisfy the 
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. Subsection 
III.G.2 addresses fire protection features for ensuring that one of the 
redundant trains necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown 
conditions remains free of fire damage in the event of a fire. 
Subsection III.G.2.c provides use of a 1-hour fire barrier, in addition 
to installed fire detection and automatic fire suppression in the area, 
as one means for complying with this fire protection requirement.
    In an NRC letter and safety evaluation (SE) dated February 2, 1984, 
the NRC granted the licensee exemptions from the requirements of 
Appendix R, Section III.G.2, for Fire Area ETN-4 (Fire Zones 7A, 60A 
and 73A) to the extent that redundant safe-shutdown trains are not 
separated by more than 20 feet without intervening combustibles or fire 
hazards, and that redundant safe-shutdown trains are not separated by 
1-hour rated fire barrier in an area protected by automatic fire 
detection and suppression systems. The exemption was based on the 
minimum of 12' spatial separation between the redundant trains, minimal 
fire hazards in the area, the use of asbestos-jacketed flame-retardant 
cables, and the installed automatic fire detection and cable tray 
suppression systems.
    Following a comprehensive reassessment of the IP3 Appendix R 
compliance basis, the licensee identified the need for additional 
separation measures and installed 1-hour rated fire wraps on several 
redundant safe-shutdown raceways in Fire Area ETN-4 (Fire Zones 7A, 60A 
and 73A). By SE dated January 7, 1987, the NRC accepted the use of 1-
hour rated fire barriers in the above fire area and confirmed continued 
validity of the exemption granted by the February 2, 1984 SE. IP3 used 
the Hemyc fire barrier system to provide the 1-hour rated fire 
barriers. In the January 7, 1987 SE, the NRC also approved an exemption 
from Appendix R, Section III.G.2, separation requirements for Fire Area 
PAB-2 (Fire Zone 1) to the extent that redundant safe-shutdown trains 
are not separated by more than 20 feet without intervening combustibles 
or fire hazards, and that an automatic suppression system has not been 
provided. The basis for this exemption included the partial spatial 
separation between the redundant safe-shutdown trains, the low fire 
loading in the area, and the existing fire protection features 
including an automatic fire detection system, manual hose stations and 
portable extinguishers, a partial-height non-combustible barrier 
designed to protect redundant equipment against radiant heat from a 
fire, and a 1-hour rated Hemyc cable wrap around the normal power feed 
to the redundant Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump 33.
    Testing by the NRC in 2005 identified Hemyc electrical raceway fire 
barrier system (ERFBS) as a potential nonconforming barrier, 
potentially not capable of providing a 1-hour fire rating, and 
Information Notice (IN) 2005-07, ``Results of HEMYC Electrical Raceway 
Fire Barrier System Full Scale Fire Testing,'' and Generic Letter (GL) 
2006-03, ``Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier 
Configurations,'' were issued to licensees to inform them of the issue 
and to collect information regarding Hemyc fire barrier installations. 
In response to GL 2006-03, ENO informed the NRC that they had declared 
the Hemyc ERFBS at IP3 inoperable and implemented temporary 
compensatory measures including an hourly fire watch and verification 
that fire detection systems are operable in the affected fire areas 
until compliance is restored for the Hemyc ERFBS. In a letter dated 
July 24, 2006, ENO stated they would modify the installed Hemyc ERFBS 
based on the test results. This would provide at least a 24-minute 
rated fire barrier for cable tray configurations, and a 30-minute 
rating for conduit and box configurations, between redundant trains of 
safe-shutdown equipment and cables, which is less than the previously 
approved 1-hour fire barrier. ENO asserted that in light of the minimal 
fire hazards and the existing fire protection features in the affected 
fire areas, this configuration continues to satisfy the basis for an 
exemption in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12.
    In summary, by letter dated July 24, 2006, and supplemental letters 
dated April 30, May 23, and August 16, 2007, responding to the NRC 
staff's request for additional information, ENO submitted a request for 
revision of existing exemptions for the Upper and Lower Electrical 
Tunnels (Fire Area ETN-4, Fire Zones 7A and 60A, respectively), and the 
Upper Penetration Area (Fire Area ETN-4, Fire Zone 73A), to the extent 
that 24-minute rated fire barriers are used to protect redundant safe-
shutdown trains located in the above fire areas in lieu of the 
previously

[[Page 56799]]

approved 1-hour rated fire barriers per the January 7, 1987 SE. For the 
41' Elevation CCW Pump Area (Fire Area PAB-2, Fire Zone 1) ENO is 
requesting a revision of the existing exemptions to the extent that a 
30-minute rated fire barrier is provided to protect redundant safe 
shutdown trains located in the same fire area.

3.0 Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when (1) the exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) when special circumstances are present. One of these special 
circumstances, described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), is that the 
application of the regulation is not necessary to achieve the 
underlying purpose of the rule.
    The underlying purpose of Subsection III.G.2 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 
R, is to ensure that one of the redundant trains necessary to achieve 
and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire damage in the 
event of a fire. The provisions of III.G.2.c through the use of a 1-
hour fire barrier with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression 
system is one acceptable way to comply with this fire protection 
requirement.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's evaluation in support of the 
subject exemption revision request for a 24-minute rated fire barrier 
for ETN-4, and 30-minute rated fire barrier for PAB-2, in lieu of a 1-
hour rated barrier, and concluded that given the existing fire 
protection features in the affected fire zones, ENO continues to meet 
the underlying purpose of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Subsection 
III.G.2 for the cable tray, conduit and junction box configurations. 
The following technical evaluation provides the basis for this 
conclusion.

3.1 Fire Hazards

    The licensee stated that the fire hazards and ignition sources in 
both Fire Areas ETN-4 and PAB-2 remain materially unchanged from those 
described in the SEs dated February 2, 1984, and January 7, 1987. For 
Fire Area ETN-4, the ignition sources consist of limited transient 
combustibles (in all fire zones), and several instrument cabinets and a 
3kVA 480V/120V instrument power transformer in Fire Zone 73A. The 
current IP3 Fire Hazard Analysis calculated the fire severity in Fire 
Area ETN-4 to be less than 60 minutes, with asbestos-jacketed flame-
retardant cable insulation being the predominant combustible. The 
licensee states that the asbestos-jacketed cable would not constitute a 
significant component of the fuel source due to the flame-retardant 
nature of the cable.
    Based on a November 22, 1982, letter that included results of 
testing of asbestos-jacked cable, NRC staff concludes that the ignition 
sources in the area are unlikely to cause fire propagation along the 
cables to a significant degree, and therefore, it is reasonable to 
exclude the asbestos-jacketed cable from being considered a hazard 
within the area.
    For the 41' Elevation CCW Pump Area (PAB-2, Fire Zone 1), the 
current IP3 Fire Hazard Analysis indicated a fire severity of less than 
10 minutes. Combustibles are predominantly attributed to the CCW pump 
bearing lubricating oil and transient materials.

3.2 Rated Fire Wraps

    The licensee has performed an engineering evaluation to compare the 
details of the NRC-sponsored Hemyc fire test configurations as reported 
in NRC IN 2005-07, ``Results of Hemyc Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier 
System Full Scale Fire Testing,'' with the details of the installed 
Hemyc ERFBS at IP3. The evaluation established that the configurations 
are comparable in most cases. Where differences were noted, minor 
enhancements to the ERFBS supports and installation of additional over-
banding on certain enclosures will be performed to upgrade the 
configurations. Based on these upgrades, the licensee expected the 
Hemyc ERFBS at IP3 to provide at least 24 minutes of protection for 
cable tray configuration, and 30 minutes for conduit and box-type 
configurations, as demonstrated by comparison to relevant NRC-tested 
configurations. The following are comparisons between the IP3 Hemyc 
installations and NRC-sponsored test configurations:
4-Inch Conduit Configuration
    The Hemyc-wrapped 4-Inch Conduit Configuration installed in Fire 
Area ETN-4 (Fire Zones 60A and 73A) and Fire Area PAB-2 (Fire Zone 1) 
is comparable to Configuration 1A in NRC Test 1. These are 4 
conduits protected by a direct-attached 2-thick Hemyc 
blanket wrap. Tests performed by both NRC and industry indicated that 
this configuration provides at least 30 minutes of protection from an 
exposed fire using the American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM) standard E-119 time-temperature profile.
Box-Type Configuration
    The Hemyc-wrapped Box-Type Configuration installed in Fire Area 
ETN-4 (Fire Zone 73A) is comparable to Configuration 2G in NRC Test 2, 
except for the lack of the stainless steel over-banding. These 
enclosures are protected by a direct-attached 2-thick Hemyc 
blanket wrap. Both NRC and industry-sponsored tests indicated that box-
type configurations provided at least 30 minutes of thermal protection 
when tested in accordance with ASTM E-119. However, to more closely 
reflect Configuration 2G, the licensee is committed to install over-
banding on the Box-Type Configuration at IP3.
Cable Tray Configuration
    The Hemyc-wrapped Cable Tray Configuration installed in Fire Area 
ETN-4 (Fire Zones 7A and 73A) is comparable to Configuration 2B and 2D 
of NRC Test 2. These cable trays are protected by a 1-1/2-
thick Hemyc blanket wrap with a nominal 2 air gap between 
the protected cable tray and the blanket. Fire tests conducted by both 
NRC and industry indicated that these Hemyc-wrapped cable tray 
configurations will provide at least 24 minutes of thermal protection 
in accordance with the ASTM E-119 time-temperature profile.
    Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has 
adequately demonstrated a 30-minute rated fire wrap for the 4-Inch 
Conduit Configuration and Box-Type Configuration. The Cable Tray 
Configuration has been adequately demonstrated to provide a 24-minute 
rated fire wrap.

3.3 Existing Fire Protection Features

    Fire Area ETN-4 contains the Upper and Lower Electrical Tunnels 
(Fire Zones 7A and 60A, respectively) and the Upper Penetration Area 
(Fire Zone 73A). This area is separated from other plant areas by 3-
hour rated fire barriers. Automatic fire detection systems and 
automatic cable tray fire suppression systems are installed in the 
area. Manual fire suppression features including accessible fire hose 
stations and portable fire extinguishers are also provided.
    Fire Area PAB-2 contains the 41' Elevation CCW Pump Area (Fire Zone 
1). This fire area is separated from other fire areas by 3-hour rated 
fire barriers. There is a portion of open grating from this area to the 
55' elevation above. However, the open grating is located approximately 
9 feet to the east of the CCW pumps; therefore, there is no potential 
for combustible liquids to drip

[[Page 56800]]

directly onto the CCW pumps area. Furthermore, the area on the 55' 
elevation only houses components such as the CCW heat exchangers, boric 
acid transfer pump, air receivers, and various compressed air and gas 
tanks that normally contain minimal combustible liquids. Automatic fire 
detection systems and manual fire suppression features in the form of 
accessible fire hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are 
provided in this fire zone. In addition, a 7' partial height, 
noncombustible barrier is installed around the redundant 33 CCW Pump to 
shield this pump from radiant heat in the event of a fire in the other 
CCW pumps area.

3.4 Enhanced Administrative Controls of Hot Work and Transient 
Combustibles

    The licensee stated that administrative controls of hot work and 
transient combustibles have improved since the previous exemptions. IP3 
administrative procedures now designated Fire Areas ETN-4 and PAB-2 as 
``Level 2'' combustible control areas, which constrain transient 
combustibles to ``moderate'' quantities as follows:
    [squ] 100 pounds of fire retardant treated lumber, or
    [squ] 25 pounds of loose ordinary combustibles or plastics, or
    [squ] 5 gallons of combustible liquids stored in approved 
containers, or
    [squ] One pint of flammable liquids stored in approved containers, 
or
    [squ] One 20 ounce flammable aerosol can.

Any planned introduction of transient combustibles that is more than 
the allowable amount will require prior review and approval by a Fire 
Protection Engineer. In addition, any planned hot work in Fire Areas 
ETN-4 and PAB-2 will also require prior review and approval by a Fire 
Protection Engineer. The review will determine if additional protective 
or compensatory measures is required.

3.5 Evaluation

    10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section II states that a licensee's 
fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth 
(DID) to fire protection with the following objectives:
    1. To prevent fires from starting,
    2. To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires 
that do occur, and
    3. To provide protection for structures, systems, and components 
important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by 
the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of 
the plant.
    The NRC staff has evaluated the elements of DID used for fire 
protection at IP3, applicable to the fire zones under review. The staff 
was concerned about the introduction of additional ignition sources and 
transient combustibles into the affected areas. However, the concern is 
addressed by existing administrative controls at IP3 which effectively 
limit transient combustibles to a level that would not significantly 
challenge the existing fire protection features in the affected areas. 
The administrative control procedures at IP3 ensure that transient 
combustibles, which may exceed the allowable limit, will not be 
introduced into the affected fire zones without prior evaluation by a 
qualified Fire Protection Engineer, and without appropriate additional 
compensatory measures. The three CCW pumps make up the ignition sources 
in the 41' Elevation CCW Pump Area (Fire Zone 1). Each of these pumps 
contain a small amount of lubricating oil, with a combined fire 
severity of less than 10 minutes. As such, a significant fire is not 
expected to develop in this fire zone. The Upper Electrical Tunnel, 
Fire Zone 60A, contains no fixed ignition sources, and the combustible 
load consists of primarily asbestos-jacketed cables. Therefore, based 
upon consideration of the limited fire ignition sources and fire 
hazards in the affected areas, and the existing administrative controls 
of hot works and transient combustibles at IP3, the staff concludes 
that objective one of DID is adequately met.
    Based on the evaluation of fire detection and suppression systems 
provided in the affected fire zones, the NRC staff determined that any 
postulated fire is expected to be promptly detected by the available 
automatic fire detection systems in Fire Area ETN-4 (Fire Zone 60A) and 
Fire Area PAB-2 (Fire Zone 1). Fire Zone 60A is provided with an 
automatic cable tray fire suppression system, as well as manual 
suppression equipment. Fire Zone 1 is provided with manual fire 
suppression only. The available fire detection and suppression 
equipment in these fire zones ensure that a postulated fire will not be 
left unchallenged. In addition, since Fire Zone 1 and 60A contain low 
combustible loading, the NRC staff concluded that the reduction in the 
level of DID due to the lack of an areawide automatic fire suppression 
system in these fire zones does not affect the prompt detection and 
suppression capability of DID objective 2.
    With the proposed additional protection of electrical raceway 
supports and installation of over-banding on Hemyc box configurations, 
the modified fire barrier configurations are expected to afford at 
least 24 minutes for cable tray configurations and 30 minutes of 
protection for conduit and box configurations. Since the Hemyc ERFBS is 
expected to provide only 24 or 30 minutes of protection for redundant 
components and cables in the event of a fire, the NRC staff was 
concerned about the fire loading in Fire Area ETN-4 (Fire Zone 60A). 
However, in light of the properties of the asbestos-jacketed cables and 
the installed fire detection and automatic and manual suppression 
systems in the area, the staff determined that a credible fire in Fire 
Zone 60A will be limited in severity and would not challenge the 24- or 
30-minute barriers. For Fire Area PAB-2 (Fire Zone 1), the NRC staff 
also concluded that the 30-minute fire barrier rating is adequate in 
protecting the redundant safe shutdown equipment due to the lack of 
significant combustible loading in the area, the partial fire wall 
which localizes a postulated fire from affecting redundant equipment, 
and the available fire detection and manual suppression systems.
    Based on the limited ignition sources and administrative controls 
satisfying DID objective 1, in conjunction with installed fire 
detection and suppression features which adequately satisfy DID 
objective 2, the NRC staff concluded that the minimal combustibles in 
the areas and existing active/passive fire protection features can 
compensate for the reduction in DID of objectives 3 and would not 
impact IP3 post-fire safe-shutdown capability.

3.6 Authorized by Law

    This exemption would allow use of a fire barrier expected to 
provide less than 1 hour of fire protection. As stated in Section 3.0 
above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant exemptions from the 
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC staff has determined that 
granting of the licensee's proposed exemption will not result in a 
violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 
Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by 
law.

3.7 No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    The underlying purpose of Subsection III.G.2 of 10 CFR Part 50, 
Appendix R, is to ensure that one of the redundant trains necessary to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of

[[Page 56801]]

fire damage in the event of a fire. Based on the existing fire 
barriers, fire detectors, automatic and manual fire suppression 
equipment, administrative controls, the fire hazard analysis, the Hemyc 
configuration, and the absence of significant combustible loads and 
ignition sources, the NRC staff judges that application of Subsection 
III.G.2 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, for these Fire Areas is not 
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of this regulation. No new 
accident precursors are created by allowing use of a fire barrier 
expected to provide less than 1 hour of fire protection and the 
probability of postulated accidents is not increased. Similarly, the 
consequences of postulated accidents are not increased. Therefore, 
there is no undue risk (since risk is probability multiplied by 
consequences) to public health and safety.

3.8 Consistent With Common Defense and Security

    The proposed exemption would allow use of a fire barrier expected 
to provide less than 1 hour of fire protection based on the existing 
fire barriers, fire detectors, automatic and manual fire suppression 
equipment, administrative controls, the fire hazard analysis, the Hemyc 
configuration, and the absence of significant combustible loads and 
ignition sources. This change to the plant requirements for the 
specific configuration in this fire zone has no relation to security 
issues. Therefore, the common defense and security is not impacted by 
this exemption.

3.9 Special Circumstances

    One of the special circumstances, described in 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii), is that the application of the regulation is not 
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying 
purpose of Subsection III.G.2 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, is to 
ensure that one of the redundant trains necessary to achieve and 
maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire damage in the 
event of a fire. For Fire Area ETN-4 (Fire Zones 7A, 60A, and 73A) and 
Fire Area PAB-2 (Fire Zone 1), the NRC staff finds that the existing 
configuration described herein will ensure that a redundant train 
necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown of the plant will 
remain free of fire damage in the event of a fire in these fire zones. 
Based upon consideration of the information in the licensee's Fire 
Hazards Analysis, administrative controls for transient combustibles 
and ignition sources, previously-granted exemptions for this fire zone, 
and the considerations noted above, the NRC staff concludes that this 
exemption meets the underlying purpose of the rule.

4.0 Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. In addition, a special circumstance is present 
such that the application of the regulation in these particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants ENO an exemption from the 
requirement of Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, for Fire 
Area ETN-4 (Fire Zones 7A, 60A, and 73A) and Fire Area PAB-2 (Fire Zone 
1) at IP3, provided that the existing Hemyc ERFBS in these areas are 
modified to achieve at least a 24-minute fire resistance rating for 
cable tray configuration and 30-minute fire resistance rating for 
conduits and box configurations, consistent with the licensees 
comparison to the NRC's tested configurations as documented in Entergy 
Engineering Report IP-RPT-06-00062, Revision 0, ``Comparison of IP3 
Hemyc Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System to NRC Hemyc Fire Test 
Results,'' which meet ASTM-E-119 temperature rise acceptance criteria. 
The modifications, as committed in Entergy Letter NL-07-061, dated May 
23, 2007, will include:

    Complete modification (including supporting engineering 
evaluation) to install stainless steel over-banding (as described), 
additional protection of the electrical raceway supports, and 
protection of certain metallic penetration items, associated with 
the existing Hemyc ERFBS located outside containment at Indian Point 
3. [This is a clarification of commitment 3 (licensee reference 
number COM-07-00034) made in Entergy Letter NL-06-060 dated June 8, 
2006.]

    The licensee is also committed to keep fire protection compensatory 
measures in place at IP3 until the aforementioned modifications are 
completed. The scheduled completion date of these modifications is 
December 1, 2008. The acceptance of this exemption is also based on the 
licensee's stated availability of administrative control procedures 
that control hot work and limit transient combustibles in the affected 
areas.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (72 FR 55254).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of September 2007.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Catherine Haney,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E7-19663 Filed 10-3-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P