[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 175 (Tuesday, September 11, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51807-51811]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-17840]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Amended Record of Decision: Storage of Surplus Plutonium 
Materials at the Savannah River Site

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Amended Record of Decision.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is amending the Record of 
Decision (ROD) for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons--Usable 
Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-
0229, 1996; Storage and Disposition PEIS). Specifically, DOE has 
decided to take the actions necessary to transfer approximately 2,511 
additional 3013-compliant packages \1\ containing surplus non-pit 
weapons-usable plutonium metals and oxides to the Savannah River Site 
(SRS), near Aiken, South Carolina. Approximately 2,300 containers will 
be transferred from the Hanford Site (Hanford) near Richland, 
Washington; 115 containers will be transferred from the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California; and 96 containers 
will be transferred from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in 
New Mexico. All 3013 containers will be shipped inside Type B shipping 
packages (e.g., 9975 packages) in Safe Secure Transports (SSTs). In 
addition, DOE could transfer the equivalent of about one thousand 3013 
containers, in the form of unirradiated fuel assemblies originally 
intended for the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) at Hanford, and 
miscellaneous fuel pins that that were not put into fuel assemblies, to 
the SRS.\2\ At a lower priority and only if adequate storage space is 
available, DOE will transfer approximately five hundred additional 3013 
containers from LLNL and LANL to provide operational flexibility in the 
laboratories and to alleviate the demands there on storage capacity 
needed to support nuclear weapons research missions. Surplus plutonium 
in 3013-compliant containers will be stored in the K-Area Material 
Storage (KAMS) facility and FFTF fuel will be stored in the K-Area 
complex.
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    \1\ A container that complies with DOE-STD-3013, Stabilization, 
Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials.
    \2\ The use of FFTF and the unirradiated fuel currently at 
Hanford is being considered in conjunction with the evaluation of 
reasonable alternatives in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GNEP) Programmatic EIS. The planned shipment of the FFTF 
unirradiated fuel to SRS is scheduled for the second half of Fiscal 
Year 2009. If FFTF is still being considered as part of GNEP 
following completion of the PEIS (expected in 2008), DOE may choose 
not to ship the unirradiated FFTF fuel to SRS.
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    This action will consolidate storage of surplus, non-pit weapons-
usable plutonium from Hanford, LANL, and LLNL at SRS, pending 
disposition.\3\ DOE has prepared a Supplement Analysis (SA), Storage of 
Surplus Plutonium Materials at the Savannah River Site (DOE/EIS-0229-
SA-4, August 2007), in accordance with DOE National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) regulations (10 CFR 1021.314) to determine whether 
consolidated storage of this plutonium is a substantial change to the 
proposed action or whether there are significant new circumstances or 
information relevant to environmental concerns such that a supplemental 
EIS or a new EIS would be needed. Based on the SA, DOE has determined 
that no further review under NEPA is required.
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    \3\ Based on DOE's current surplus plutonium disposition plans, 
DOE expects to disposition the surplus plutonium stored in KAMs in 
less than 20 years. DOE has analyzed the potential environmental 
impacts of storage of such plutonium in KAMs for up to 50 years.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Copies of NEPA documents related to 
this decision, including this Amended ROD, are available on DOE's NEPA 
Web site at: http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa. To request copies of these 
documents, please contact: The Center for Environmental Management 
Information, P.O. Box 23769, Washington, DC 202-586-3769, Telephone: 
800-736-3282 (in Washington, DC: 202-863-5084).
    For further information concerning the storage of surplus, non-pit 
plutonium at the SRS, contact: Andrew R. Grainger, NEPA Compliance 
Officer, Savannah River Operations Office, U.S. Department of Energy, 
P.O. Box B, Aiken, South Carolina 29802, Telephone: (803) 952-8001, E-
mail: [email protected].
    For information on DOE's NEPA process, contact: Ms. Carol M. 
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance, GC-20, U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 
20585-0119, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    At the end of the Cold War, the United States declared large 
quantities of plutonium and uranium surplus to the defense needs of the 
nation. At that time, materials were in various forms and various 
stages of the material manufacturing and weapons fabrication processes 
and located at several weapons complex sites that DOE had operated in 
the preceding decades. DOE began the process of placing these materials 
in safe, stable configurations suitable for storage until disposition 
strategies could be developed and implemented. Through a series of 
decisions supported by appropriate NEPA analyses, DOE has decided to 
store surplus, non-pit, weapons-usable

[[Page 51808]]

plutonium materials at SRS facilities pending disposition. DOE's 
Supplement Analysis, Storage of Surplus Plutonium Materials at the 
Savannah River Site, (DOE/EIS-0229-SA-4, August 2007), describes the 
NEPA reviews and DOE's decisions regarding transportation and storage 
of plutonium materials. Prior NEPA reviews and accompanying decisions 
that are directly related to today's decision are described in the 
following paragraphs.
    In an April 19, 2002 (67 FR 19432), Amended Record of Decision 
(ROD), DOE announced its decision to immediately consolidate long-term 
storage in the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility at SRS of 
surplus, non-pit plutonium from the Rocky Flats Environmental 
Technology Site (RFETS). In addition, DOE noted that cancellation of 
the then-planned immobilization facility for surplus plutonium 
disposition and the selection of the long-term storage alternative at 
SRS removed the basis for the contingency contained in previous RODs 
(which conditioned transport of surplus, non-pit plutonium from RFETS 
to SRS on the selection of SRS as the site for the immobilization 
facilities), and amended those RODs accordingly. DOE also stated that 
long-term storage of surplus plutonium and the ultimate disposition of 
that plutonium were separate actions, and that combining long-term 
storage and disposition was not required to implement either decision, 
and served no significant programmatic objective. Transfer of plutonium 
materials from RFETS to SRS was completed in 2003 and these materials 
are stored in 3013 containers inside 9975 shipping packages in the KAMS 
facility. In the 2002 Amended ROD, DOE left unchanged it's prior 
decision to store surplus, non-pit plutonium at Hanford, Idaho National 
Laboratory (INL), and LANL, pending disposition (or movement to lag 
storage at the disposition facility).\4\
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    \4\ DOE indicated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD (DOE, 
1997) that 0.3 metric tons of plutonium stored at LLNL was primarily 
research and development and operational feedstock material not 
surplus to government needs, and that the material would continue to 
be stored for use at LLNL. DOE has since determined that there is no 
programmatic need for this material, and that transferring the 
material to SRS for long-term storage would reduce surveillance 
costs at LLNL. In 1999, DOE determined that 3 to 4 metric tons of 
plutonium material will be retained at the Idaho National Laboratory 
for potential future use.
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    Following the events of September 11, 2001, DOE revised the threat 
criteria and the postulated capabilities of those who might perpetrate 
acts of violence against DOE assets. As a result of this new threat 
guidance, DOE determined that the consolidation of plutonium at SRS 
into one location--KAMS--and enhancement of the security of that 
location, would provide the most advantageous means to meet this 
challenge and assure the safety and security of the stored material. 
Therefore, DOE cancelled a project to install stored surveillance and 
stabilization capability to ensure compliance with DOE-STD-3013 in F-
Area and decided to construct the K-Area Interim Surveillance (KIS) 
project and the Container Surveillance and Storage Capability (CSSC) 
project in the K-Area complex. DOE prepared an environmental 
assessment, Safeguards and Security Upgrades for Storage of Plutonium 
Materials at the Savannah River Site (DOE/EA-1538, December 2005) and 
issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) in December of 2005, 
to address the impacts of these and related security projects. The EA 
addressed surplus plutonium materials in the SRS inventory as of 
December 2005. The KIS Project, which became operational in June 2007, 
and the CSSC project, which is currently scheduled for operations in 
2010, will provide surveillance and stabilization capability and 
capacity for storage of 3013 containers outside of KAMS (but in the K-
Area complex) adequate to support the surveillance program required by 
DOE-STD-3013.
    Decision: Consistent with DOE's prior decision to reduce over time 
the number of locations where the various forms of plutonium are 
stored, DOE has decided to consolidate storage of surplus, non-pit, 
weapons-usable plutonium from Hanford, LANL, and LLNL at SRS, pending 
disposition. Following appropriate congressional notification, in 
accordance with section 3155 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2002 (Pub. L. 107-107), DOE will transfer, over a 
period of about two to three years, approximately 2,511 additional 
3013-compliant packages \5\ containing plutonium metals and oxides to 
SRS. Approximately 2,300 containers will be transferred from Hanford, 
115 containers will be transferred from LLNL, and 96 containers will be 
transferred from LANL. All 3013 containers will be shipped inside Type 
B shipping packages (e.g., 9975 packages) in Safe Secure Transports 
(SSTs). All containers will be certified compliant with DOE-STD-3013 
and Department of Transportation requirements prior to shipment, and 
DOE will acquire and obtain certification of additional shipping 
containers, if needed.
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    \5\ A 3013 container has a maximum capacity of about 4.4 
kilograms of plutonium. However, few containers have the maximum 
amount of plutonium.
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    In addition, DOE could transfer the equivalent of about one 
thousand 3013 containers, in the form of unirradiated fuel assemblies 
and miscellaneous fuel pins originally intended for the Fast Flux Test 
Facility (FFTF) at Hanford, to the SRS.\6\ This material will be 
shipped in Type B shipping packages, in SSTs, and stored in the K-Area 
Complex in the Type B shipping packages, pending disposition. DOE will 
monitor the condition of the shipping packages while in storage to 
insure their integrity, including inspection of seals to monitor for 
corrosion or leakage. DOE will continue to store RFETS and SRS surplus, 
non-pit plutonium in approximately 2,800 containers inside Type B 
shipping packages at SRS. Storage will be in compliance with applicable 
Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) and Safety Analysis Reports 
(SARs), and the total mass of stored plutonium will be significantly 
less than 15 metric tons. DOE has previously evaluated storage of non-
pit surplus plutonium from RFETS and other DOE sites, as needed, in 
KAMS (Supplement Analysis for Storing Plutonium in the Actinide 
Packaging and Storage Facility and the Building K-105 at the Savannah 
River Site. (DOE/EIS-0229-SA-1, July 1998).
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    \6\ See footnote 2.
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    In addition, DOE will transfer approximately five hundred 3013 
containers from LLNL and LANL to remove surplus inventory, provide 
operational flexibility, and to alleviate the demands there on storage 
capacity needed to support nuclear weapons research missions. This 
transfer will take place only if storage space is available in KAMS. 
Space is limited by the number of storage positions allowed in 
recognition of the spacing requirements dictated by the TSRs and SARs. 
DOE could increase the number of storage spaces by modifying the 
storage configuration after review, and revision as necessary, of the 
safety authorization basis.
    DOE will use the KAMS facility for consolidated storage. Nearby 
areas of the K-Area complex, where the KIS is and CSSC will be located, 
will be used for surveillance and restabilization activities. Storage 
spaces necessary to support surveillance activities are available in 
the K-Area complex. Unirradiated FFTF fuel will also be stored in the 
K-Area complex.
    Basis for Decision: DOE's decision to consolidate surplus plutonium 
at SRS will reduce the number of sites with

[[Page 51809]]

special nuclear material; enhance the security of these materials; 
reduce the risk plutonium poses to the public and environment; reduce 
or avoid the costs associated with plutonium storage, surveillance and 
monitoring, and security at multiple sites; and relocate the material 
to DOE's planned site for surplus plutonium disposition. Plutonium 
consolidation has been encouraged by independent reviews of DOE's 
activities, including the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its 
July 2005 report entitled Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to 
Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium (GAO-05-665) and recently 
by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). In its June 26, 
2007, report to Congress, the DNFSB stated: ``The Board believes 
consolidation of excess plutonium into a single, robust facility 
suitable for extended retrievable storage is logical from a safety 
perspective. DOE should aggressively pursue consolidation of its excess 
plutonium.'' Furthermore, transferring within the next two to three 
years all the surplus plutonium currently at Hanford to SRS would 
enhance security and avoid the expenditure of about $200 million for 
security upgrades to be compliant with DOE's 2005 Design Basis Threat 
(DBT) guidance, as well as tens of millions of dollars more each year 
for security and monitoring to continue storing the material at 
Hanford.
    Separately from the consolidation and storage activities DOE is 
announcing today, DOE is preparing a Supplemental Environmental Impact 
Statement for Surplus Plutonium Disposition at the Savannah River Site 
to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of alternative methods 
to disposition surplus, non-pit plutonium materials. The action 
alternatives identified in the Notice of Intent (72 FR 14543; March 28, 
2007) for this Supplemental EIS involve: (1) A glass can-in-canister 
approach that would be installed in K-Area; (2) a ceramic can-in-
canister approach that would be installed in K-Area; and (3) the Mixed 
Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, currently under construction at 
SRS. In conjunction with any of these alternatives, DOE would utilize 
the existing H-Canyon and Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for 
the disposition of up to about four metric tons of surplus, non-pit 
plutonium materials. DOE's selection of one or more of these 
alternatives would ensure that surplus, weapons-usable plutonium that 
is currently at SRS, or that would be shipped to SRS as a result of the 
actions evaluated in this SA, would be placed in a form that would 
facilitate a disposition path out of South Carolina.
    Supplement Analysis: DOE prepared a Supplement Analysis (Storage of 
Surplus Plutonium Materials at the Savannah River Site, (DOE/EIS-0229-
SA-4, August 2007) to determine if consolidating storage at SRS of 
surplus, non-pit, weapons-usable plutonium from Hanford, LLNL, and LANL 
represented new circumstances or information requiring preparation of a 
supplemental EIS or a new EIS. The environmental impacts discussed in 
the SA are described in the following paragraphs.

Transportation

    DOE will ship plutonium materials compliant with the DOE-STD-3013 
in 3013 packages inside Type B shipping containers (e.g., 9975 
containers) from Hanford, LLNL, and LANL to KAMS at SRS using SSTs. DOE 
will ship unirradiated FFTF fuel from Hanford to SRS in Type B shipping 
packages (e.g., the Hanford Un-irradiated Fuel Package) in SSTs. At 
KAMS, the 9975 containers will be received and stored; the 3013 
packages will not be removed from the 9975 shipping containers. The 
Type B shipping packages containing the unirradiated FFTF fuel will be 
stored in the K-Area complex at SRS.
    DOE previously evaluated the impacts of transporting 17 metric tons 
of non-pit, surplus plutonium to SRS in the Surplus Plutonium 
Disposition (SPD) EIS (DOE/EIS-0283, 1999), which addressed 
alternatives for disposition and was tiered from the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS. In the SPD EIS Alternative 3, DOE analyzed the 
transportation of surplus pit and non-pit plutonium to SRS. Table L-1 
of the SPD EIS summarized the material shipments; included were surplus 
non-pit weapons-usable plutonium materials from Hanford, LLNL, LANL, 
RFETS, and INL (Argonne National Laboratory--West). The Hanford 
material specifically included FFTF fuel pins and assemblies. 
Alternative 3 included shipment of a greater quantity of surplus, non-
pit plutonium materials to SRS than does the consolidation decision DOE 
is announcing today.
    In the SPD EIS, DOE estimated that normal (incident-free) 
transportation operations could result in 0.024 latent cancer 
fatalities (LCF) among transportation workers and 0.034 LCF in the 
total affected population over the duration of the transportation 
activities. In preparing the SPD EIS, DOE used a dose conversion factor 
of 5 x 10-\4\ deaths per rem of dose to the affected 
population. Currently, DOE recommends a dose conversion factor of 6 x 
10-\4\ deaths per rem. Using the currently recommended dose 
conversion factor, the estimated risk would be about 0.029 LCF among 
transport workers and about 0.041 LCF in the total affected population. 
In addition, DOE estimated that 0.019 nonradiological fatalities could 
occur as a result of vehicular emissions. DOE also estimated the 
impacts of accident scenarios, and in all cases the risk of a fatality 
is less than one. No accidents occurred during shipment of the RFETS 
plutonium to the SRS.
    DOE has analyzed the impacts of transporting plutonium from 
Hanford, LLNL, and LANL (as well as INL and RFETS) to SRS in the SPD 
EIS. That analysis assumed that surplus non-pit plutonium would be 
transported in Type B containers in SSTs, just as DOE will do for the 
consolidation action announced today. DOE will make all shipments in 
shipping packages with current certificates, consistent with Department 
of Transportation requirements and DOE's prior NEPA reviews. The 
transportation required to implement this action is a subset of the 
transportation activities evaluated in the SPD EIS.

Storage

    The KAMS facility requires no physical modification to accommodate 
the proposed storage of surplus, non-pit, weapons-usable plutonium from 
Hanford, LLNL, and LANL. The environmental impacts of storage of 
fissile material at SRS were presented in the Interim Management of 
Nuclear Materials EIS (DOE/EIS-0220, October 1995) and the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS. These two EISs contain calculated annual impacts 
presented over specific time periods. DOE also evaluated storage of 
surplus plutonium materials from RFETS and other sites, as needed, in 
3013 containers inside Type B shipping containers in KAMS, and 
concluded that KAMS storage for up to 50 years did not represent 
significant new information relevant to environmental concerns, and 
that additional NEPA review was not required (DOE/EIS-0229-SA-01, 
1998). The consolidated storage action DOE is announcing today involves 
the same forms of surplus plutonium and the same shipping and storage 
containers (which would be certified Type B containers), as DOE has 
previously analyzed.
    DOE has initiated two projects to provide the stored plutonium 
surveillance and restabilization capability required as part of the 
monitoring program that is an integral

[[Page 51810]]

part of DOE-STD-3013. The KIS project, which became operational in June 
2007, provides limited, temporary surveillance capability until the 
CSSC project is completed. Current plans call for the CSSC to be 
operational in 2010. DOE completed an EA (DOE/EA-1538, December 2005) 
evaluating the impacts of construction and operation of KIS and CSSC in 
the K-Area complex (near but not in KAMS), and related security 
upgrades in K-Area. Storage space adequate for the needs of the KIS and 
CSSC surveillance activities are provided outside of KAMS and a limited 
number of 3013 containers will be temporarily stored without Type B 
shipping containers when CSSC becomes operational. DOE evaluated the 
impacts of these actions in the EA, and determined the impacts would 
not be significant (Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), (DOE/EA-
1538, December 2005). While the inventory in KAMS will increase as a 
result of the transfer and storage of surplus non-pit plutonium from 
Hanford, LLNL, and LANL, the number of 3013 containers stored outside 
of KAMS, or undergoing surveillance activities requiring opening of the 
cans, will not increase. The number of cans undergoing surveillance 
activities is limited by the facility safety analysis and technical 
safety requirements, and neither would change as a result of storing 
more material in KAMS. Therefore, DOE's action is not different in 
regard to surveillance actions than those DOE has previously evaluated 
and found to be insignificant.
    DOE has found no anomalous conditions in either the 3013 containers 
or the stored plutonium material in the DOE-STD-3013 surveillance 
program. Similarly, performance of the Type B shipping containers has 
been as expected, with no instances of unacceptable performance. The K-
Area Structural Assessment Program, mentioned in the 2002 ROD, has not 
revealed any condition or degradation that would affect the structural 
integrity of the facility.
    Unirradiated fuel from the FFTF facility at Hanford will be stored 
in Type B shipping packages in the K-Area transfer bay in the K-Area 
complex. Storage of FFTF fuel in Type B shipping containers in the K-
Area transfer bay will provide a level of safety equivalent to that 
resulting from storage of plutonium in 3013 containers inside 9975 
shipping packages in KAMS. In addition, DOE evaluated the storage of 
irradiated tritium-producing burnable absorber rods in Type B shipping 
containers (the same configuration for the storage of FFTF fuel) in the 
K-Area transfer bay (DOE/EA-1528, Storage of Tritium-Producing Burnable 
Absorber Rods in K-Area Transfer Bay at SRS, June 2005) and found the 
environmental impacts to be insignificant (FONSI, DOE/EA-1528, June 
2005).

Intentional Destructive Acts

    DOE provides substantial safeguards and security measures for both 
transportation and storage of plutonium. Safeguards and security are 
designed to prevent theft or diversion of materials, and to prevent 
exposure of workers and the public to radiation from the material 
during transportation and storage. DOE recognizes that an attack 
against surplus plutonium cargo may cause very undesirable 
consequences, such as release of radionuclides into the environment.
    Following the events of September 11, 2001, DOE is continuing to 
consider and implement measures to minimize the risk and consequences 
of potential terrorist attacks on DOE facilities and activities. DOE 
conducts vulnerability assessments and risk analyses in accordance with 
DOE Order 470.3A, Design Basis Threat Policy and DOE Order 470.4A, 
Safeguards and Security Program. The safeguards applied to protecting 
the K-Area complex involve a dynamic process of enhancement to meet 
threats, and those safeguards will evolve over time. It is not possible 
to predict whether intentional destructive acts would occur at these 
locations, or the nature or types of attacks. Nevertheless, DOE has 
evaluated security scenarios involving malevolent or terrorist acts in 
an effort to assess potential vulnerabilities and identify improvements 
to security procedures and response measures. The physical security 
protection strategy is based on a graded and layered approach supported 
by a guard force trained to detect, deter, and neutralize adversary 
activities. Facilities are protected by staffed and automated access 
control systems, barriers, surveillance systems and intrusion detection 
systems.
    Plutonium materials intended for consolidated storage would be 
received and stored in the K-Area Complex. DOE evaluated accident 
scenarios during storage of plutonium materials in the Interim 
Management of Nuclear Materials EIS (DOE/EIS-0220, October 1995). DOE 
finds that the accident impacts are representative of the potential 
impacts of intentional destructive acts against the facilities proposed 
for consolidated storage, particularly in light of the robust nature of 
the facilities themselves and the improved security and response 
measures that have been put in place in recent years.
    In the SPD EIS, DOE evaluated the impacts of a severe accident 
while transporting plutonium oxide material in Type B shipping 
containers in Safe Secure Transports (SSTs). The hypothetical accidents 
modeled for the impact assessment involve either a long-term fire or 
tremendous impact of crushing forces. In the case of crushing forces, a 
fire would have to be burning in order to spread the plutonium as 
modeled. These accidents were assumed to cause a ground-level release 
of 10 percent of the radioactive material in the SST. These accidents 
fall within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's severity Category VIII, 
with an accident frequency in rural areas of about 1 x 
10-\7\ per year (once in 10 million years). DOE estimated 
that if such an accident were to occur in an urban area as many as 114 
cancer fatalities could result. In addition, the accident itself would 
cause a number of non-radiological fatalities, depending upon the 
specific circumstances.
    In reviewing the nature and consequences of the accident scenarios 
described in the SPD EIS, DOE finds that the consequences bound the 
consequences of a hypothetical terrorist attack on an SST carrying 
surplus non-pit plutonium. Because of the robust nature of the Type B 
containers and the SSTs, and because shipments are protected, DOE finds 
it unlikely that an attack could generate the forces required to 
release as much material as postulated for a severe accident. 
Therefore, DOE expects the potential consequences of a terrorist attack 
on a shipment of surplus, non-pit plutonium to be equal to or less than 
those of a severe accident.

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Report to Congress

    In December 2003, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 
(DNFSB) issued a Report to Congress on Plutonium Storage at the 
Department of Energy's Savannah River Site. The DNFSB is an independent 
Federal agency chartered by Congress to provide recommendations to the 
Department of Energy on the safety of defense nuclear facilities. The 
Board's report contains proposals for enhancing the safety, 
reliability, and functionality of plutonium storage at SRS; one 
proposal concerns KAMS and four concern F-Area. However, subsequent to 
issuance of the Board's report, DOE decided to utilize only KAMS and 
the K-Area complex for storage of plutonium and for future 
stabilization and packaging operations, and to deinventory F-Area of 
all plutonium prior to the end of 2006.

[[Page 51811]]

    With respect to KAMS, the Board proposed that fire protection 
systems be installed and that unnecessary combustibles be eliminated. 
In response to this proposal, the Department determined that fire 
suppression equipment would be installed in the Neutron Multiplicity 
Counting Room of KAMS, fire detection equipment would be installed 
throughout KAMS, and the cable combustible load in the actuator tower 
above KAMS would be removed. DOE completed removal of the actuator 
tower cables in August 2006. DOE plans to begin installation of a fire 
detection system in KAMS in 2007 and complete it in 2008. DOE also 
plans to begin installation of a fire suppression system in the Neutron 
Multiplicity Counting Room in 2008 and complete the installation in 
2009.
    In addition, the fire protection posture designed into KAMS was to 
minimize both transient and fixed combustibles within the facility such 
that the remaining worst possible fire could not cause a release of 
plutonium. The walls separating the KAMS facility from the remainder of 
the K-Reactor building were fabricated into a two-hour fire boundary. 
Combustibles outside the facility fire boundaries were minimized, 
contained, or mitigated to ensure the KAMS facility fire boundaries 
were rated longer than any credible fire would burn.
    Supplement Analysis Conclusion And Determination: DOE has fully 
evaluated transportation of surplus, non-pit plutonium materials for 
SRS and storage at SRS of such materials from Hanford and LANL in the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS and SPD EIS. The action announced today, 
consolidated storage of surplus, non-pit plutonium materials at SRS, 
including transportation of the materials to SRS, is addressed in the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS, the SPD EIS, and other NEPA reviews 
addressed above. DOE evaluated the potential impacts of conducting 
plutonium surveillance and stabilization activities required by DOE-
STD-3013 in the Environmental Assessment for the Safeguards and 
Security Upgrades for Storage of Plutonium Materials at the Savannah 
River Site, and found the impacts to be insignificant. Some of these 
documents are now 10 or more years old. However, DOE has reviewed the 
analyses and assumptions relevant to the potential environmental 
impacts of the actions described herein and found any changes to be 
insignificant.
    DOE's 2007 SA shows that the potential environmental impacts 
associated with the further consolidation of surplus non-pit, weapons-
usable plutonium from Hanford, LLNL and LANL would not be a significant 
change from the potential environmental impacts associated with the 
alternatives analyzed in previous NEPA reviews. DOE is not proposing a 
substantial change that is relevant to environmental concerns. No 
significant new circumstances or information bearing on the proposed 
action and relevant to environmental concerns are presented by the 
proposed consolidation of plutonium storage. Therefore, DOE does not 
need to conduct additional NEPA review prior to transferring surplus 
non-pit plutonium materials from Hanford, LLNL, and LANL to SRS for 
consolidated storage pending disposition, as described above.

    Issued in Washington, DC, this 5th day of September, 2007.
James A. Rispoli,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
 [FR Doc. E7-17840 Filed 9-10-07; 8:45 am]
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