[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 175 (Tuesday, September 11, 2007)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 51719-51722]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-17831]


 ========================================================================
 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
 
 ========================================================================
 

  Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 11, 2007 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 51719]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-29172; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-285-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Fokker Model F27 Mark 050, 200, 300, 
400, 500, 600, and 700 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory 
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation 
authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe 
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 
condition as:

    Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in 
flight * * * and on ground, * * * Special Federal Aviation 
Regulation 88 (SFAR88) * * * required a safety review of the 
aircraft Fuel Tank System * * *. Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are 
items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to 
have failure mode(s) associated with an `unsafe condition' * * *. 
These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable 
probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or 
practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' 
requirements.

The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the 
unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by October 11, 
2007.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     DOT Docket Web Site: Go to http://dms.dot.gov and follow 
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the 
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 
docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any 
comments received, and other information. The street address for the 
Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES 
section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after 
receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 
227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2007-
29172; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-285-AD'' at the beginning of your 
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
this proposed AD based on those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will 
also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical 
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA 
Airworthiness Directive 2006-0207, dated July 12, 2006, and EASA 
Airworthiness Directive 2006-0209, dated July 12, 2006 (corrected 
September 1, 2006) (referred to after this as ``the MCAI''), to correct 
an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

    Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in 
flight * * * and on ground, the FAA published Special Federal 
Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR 88) in June 2001. SFAR 88 required a 
safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System to determine that the 
design meets the requirements of FAR (Federal Aviation Regulation) 
Sec.  25.901 and Sec.  25.981(a) and (b).
    A similar regulation has been recommended by the JAA (Joint 
Aviation Authorities) to the European National Aviation Authorities 
in JAA letter 04/00/02/07/03-L024 of 3 February 2003. The review was 
requested to be mandated by NAA's (National Aviation Authorities) 
using JAR (Joint Aviation Regulation) Sec.  25.901(c), Sec.  
25.1309.
    In August 2005 EASA published a policy statement on the process 
for developing instructions for maintenance and inspection of Fuel 
Tank System ignition source prevention (EASA D 2005/CPRO, http://www.easa.eu.int/home/cert_policy_statements_en.html) that also 
included the EASA expectations with regard to compliance times of 
the corrective actions on the unsafe and the not unsafe part of the 
harmonised design review results. On a global scale the TC (type 
certificate) holders committed themselves to the EASA published 
compliance dates (see EASA policy statement). The EASA policy 
statement has been revised in March 2006: the date of 31-12-2005 for 
the unsafe related actions has now been set at 01-07-2006.
    Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems 
safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) 
associated with an ``unsafe condition'' as defined in FAA's memo 
2003-112-15 ``SFAR 88--Mandatory Action Decision Criteria''. These 
are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable 
probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or 
practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' 
requirements.
    This EASA Airworthiness Directive mandates the Fuel System 
Airworthiness Limitations, comprising maintenance/inspection tasks 
and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) for 
the type of aircraft, that resulted from the design reviews and the 
JAA recommendation

[[Page 51720]]

and EASA policy statement mentioned above.

The corrective action includes revising the Airworthiness Limitations 
Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate 
new limitations for fuel tank systems. You may obtain further 
information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.
    The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel 
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the 
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes 
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for 
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a 
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, 
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' 
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards 
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule 
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' 
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
    Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., 
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders 
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition 
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design 
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for 
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to 
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance 
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety 
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to 
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary 
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
    In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four 
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel 
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of 
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable 
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address 
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in 
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure 
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included 
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for 
further action.
    The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that 
is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European 
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation 
regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed 
to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory 
standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that 
all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport 
category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against 
explosion risks.
    We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are 
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel 
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result 
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

    Fokker Services B.V. has issued Service Bulletin F27/28-070, dated 
June 30, 2006; and 50/60 Fuel Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI) and 
Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) Report SE-
671, Issue 1, dated January 31, 2006. The actions described in this 
service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition 
identified in the MCAI.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant 
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have 
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service 
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we 
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition 
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same 
type design.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are 
highlighted in a Note within the proposed AD.

Costs of Compliance

    Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD 
would affect about 24 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that 
it would take about 1 work-hour per product to comply with the basic 
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per 
work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed 
AD on U.S. operators to be $1,920, or $80 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed 
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

[[Page 51721]]

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Fokker Services B.V.: Docket No. FAA-2007-29172; Directorate 
Identifier 2006-NM-285-AD.

Comments Due Date

    (a) We must receive comments by October 11, 2007.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Fokker Model F27 Mark 050 airplanes, all 
serial numbers; and Fokker F27 Mark 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, and 700 
airplanes, serial numbers 10102 through 10692; certificated in any 
category.

    Note 1: This AD requires revisions to certain operator 
maintenance documents to include new inspections. Compliance with 
these inspections is required by 14 CFR 91.403(c). For airplanes 
that have been previously modified, altered, or repaired in the 
areas addressed by these inspections, the operator may not be able 
to accomplish the inspections described in the revisions. In this 
situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must 
request approval for an alternative method of compliance according 
to paragraph (g) of this AD. The request should include a 
description of changes to the required inspections that will ensure 
the continued operational safety of the airplane.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:
    Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in 
flight * * * and on ground, the FAA published Special Federal 
Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR 88) in June 2001. SFAR 88 required a 
safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System to determine that the 
design meets the requirements of FAR (Federal Aviation Regulation) 
Sec.  25.901 and Sec.  25.981(a) and (b).
    A similar regulation has been recommended by the JAA (Joint 
Aviation Authorities) to the European National Aviation Authorities 
in JAA letter 04/00/02/07/03-L024 of 3 February 2003. The review was 
requested to be mandated by NAA's (National Aviation Authorities) 
using JAR (Joint Aviation Regulation) Sec.  25.901(c), Sec.  
25.1309.
    In August 2005 EASA published a policy statement on the process 
for developing instructions for maintenance and inspection of Fuel 
Tank System ignition source prevention (EASA D 2005/CPRO, http://www.easa.eu.int/home/cert_policy_statements_en.html) that also 
included the EASA expectations with regard to compliance times of 
the corrective actions on the unsafe and the not unsafe part of the 
harmonised design review results. On a global scale the TC (type 
certificate) holders committed themselves to the EASA published 
compliance dates (see EASA policy statement). The EASA policy 
statement has been revised in March 2006: The date of 31-12-2005 for 
the unsafe related actions has now been set at 01-07-2006.
    Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems 
safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) 
associated with an `unsafe condition' as defined in FAA's memo 2003-
112-15 `SFAR 88--Mandatory Action Decision Criteria'. These are 
identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable 
probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or 
practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' 
requirements.
    This EASA Airworthiness Directive mandates the Fuel System 
Airworthiness Limitations, comprising maintenance/inspection tasks 
and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) for 
the type of aircraft, that resulted from the design reviews and the 
JAA recommendation and EASA policy statement mentioned above.

The corrective action includes revising the Airworthiness 
Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
to incorporate new limitations for fuel tank systems.

Actions and Compliance

    (f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
    (1) Within 3 months after the effective date of this AD, revise 
the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness to incorporate Fokker 50/60 Fuel 
Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI) and Critical Design 
Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) Report SE-671, Issue 1, 
dated January 31, 2006; or Fokker Service Bulletin F27/28-070, dated 
June 30, 2006; as applicable. For all tasks identified in Report SE-
671 or Service Bulletin F27/28-070, the initial compliance times are 
as specified in Table 1 or Table 2 of this AD, as applicable. The 
repetitive inspections must be accomplished thereafter at the 
intervals specified in Report SE-671 or Service Bulletin F27/28-070, 
as applicable, except as provided by paragraph (f)(3) of this AD.

 Table 1.--Initial Compliance Times for ALS Revision for Model F27 Mark
                              050 Airplanes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                For--                            The later of--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task 280000-01.......................  102 months after the effective of
                                        this AD; or 102 months after the
                                        date of issuance of the original
                                        Dutch standard airworthiness
                                        certificate or the date of
                                        issuance of the original Dutch
                                        export certificate of
                                        airworthiness.
Task 280000-02.......................  30 months after the effective of
                                        this AD; or 30 months after the
                                        date of issuance of the original
                                        Dutch standard airworthiness
                                        certificate or the date of
                                        issuance of the original Dutch
                                        export certificate of
                                        airworthiness.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


 Table 2.--Initial Compliance Times for ALS Revision for Model F27 Mark
               200, 300, 400, 500, 600, and 700 Airplanes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                For--                            The later of--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Task 280000-01.......................  78 months after the effective of
                                        this AD; or 78 months after the
                                        date of issuance of the original
                                        Dutch standard airworthiness
                                        certificate or the date of
                                        issuance of the original Dutch
                                        export certificate of
                                        airworthiness.
Task 280000-02.......................  18 months after the effective of
                                        this AD; or 18 months after the
                                        date of issuance of the original
                                        Dutch standard airworthiness
                                        certificate or the date of
                                        issuance of the original Dutch
                                        export certificate of
                                        airworthiness.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 51722]]

    (2) Within 3 months after the effective date of this AD, revise 
the ALS of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to 
incorporate the CDCCLs as defined in Fokker 50/60 Fuel Airworthiness 
Limitations Items (ALI) and Critical Design Configuration Control 
Limitations (CDCCL) Report SE-671, Issue 1, dated January 31, 2006; 
or Fokker Service Bulletin F27/28-070, dated June 30, 2006; as 
applicable.
    (3) Where Fokker 50/60 Fuel Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI) 
and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) Report 
SE-671, Issue 1, dated January 31, 2006; or Fokker Service Bulletin 
F27/28-070, dated June 30, 2006; as applicable; allow for 
exceptional short-term extensions, an exception is acceptable to the 
FAA if it is approved by the appropriate principal inspector in the 
FAA Flight Standards Certificate Holding District Office.
    (4) Except as provided by paragraph (g)(1) of this AD: After 
accomplishing the actions specified in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) 
of this AD, no alternative inspection, inspection intervals, or 
CDCCLs may be used.

FAA AD Differences

    Note 2: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information 
as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, has the authority to approve 
AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 
39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone 
(425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC 
on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office 
(FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
    (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in 
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information 
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.

Related Information

    (h) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness Directive 2006-0207, dated 
July 12, 2006; EASA Airworthiness Directive 2006-0209, dated July 
12, 2006 (corrected September 1, 2006); Fokker 50/60 Fuel 
Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI) and Critical Design 
Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) Report SE-671, Issue 1, 
dated January 31, 2006; and Fokker Service Bulletin F27/28-070, 
dated June 30, 2006; for related information.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 31, 2007.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. E7-17831 Filed 9-10-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P