[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 175 (Tuesday, September 11, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51898-51901]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-17811]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Safety Advisory 2007-03

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory; Railroad Bridge Safety--Explanation 
and Amplification of FRA's ``Statement of Agency Policy on the Safety 
of Railroad Bridges.''

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2007-03 recommending that 
owners of track carried on one or more railroad bridges adopt safety 
practices to prevent the deterioration of railroad bridges and reduce 
the risk of casualties from train derailments caused by structural 
failures of such bridges.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gordon A. Davids, P.E., Bridge 
Engineer, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 1120 Vermont 
Ave., NW., RRS-15, Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-
493-6320); or Sarah Grimmer, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, 
FRA, 1120 Vermont Ave., NW., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590 
(telephone 202-493-6390).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FRA published its ``Statement of Agency 
Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges'' (``Policy'') on August 30, 
2000 (65 FR 52667). The Policy Statement, included in the Federal Track 
Safety Standards (Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 213) as 
Appendix C, includes non-regulatory guidelines based on good practices 
which were prevalent in the railroad industry at the time the Policy 
was issued.
    FRA has examined reports from January 1, 1982 through December 31, 
2006 of 52 train accidents caused by the catastrophic structural 
failure of railroad bridges, an average of two per year. During that 
twenty-five year period, two people were injured and no fatalities were 
attributed to structural bridge failure. In addition, since the 
examination of those reports in April of 2006, FRA has learned of four 
instances where lack of adherence to the guidelines in the Bridge 
Safety Policy resulted in trains operating over structural deficiencies 
in steel bridges that could very easily have resulted in serious train 
accidents. It should be noted that FRA uses the term ``catastrophic 
failure'' to describe an incident in which a bridge collapses or 
directly causes a train accident. A simple ``bridge failure'' is a 
situation in which a bridge is no longer capable of safely performing 
its intended function.
    During the past sixteen months, three train accidents occurred due 
to catastrophic structural failures of bridges, all of which were 
timber trestles. The most recent bridge-related train accident occurred 
on the M&B Railroad near Myrtlewood, Alabama, where a train of solid-
fuel rocket motors derailed when a timber trestle railroad bridge 
collapsed under the train. Several cars, including one car carrying a 
rocket motor, rolled onto their sides and six persons were injured. FRA 
has also recently evaluated the bridge management practices of several 
small railroads, and found that some had no bridge management or 
inspection programs whatsoever.
    FRA therefore issues this non-regulatory Safety Advisory to 
supplement and re-emphasize the

[[Page 51899]]

provisions of the Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges. FRA 
recognizes the potential impact of regulations related to structural 
integrity of railroad bridges. However, should these serious incidents 
and failures continue and FRA determines that the responsible track 
owners are not conforming to accepted engineering principles and 
procedures, including those outlined herein and in the Bridge Safety 
Policy, FRA might have to change course and develop a regulatory 
approach.

FRA Bridge Safety Evaluations

    FRA has been evaluating bridge management practices on a 
representative sampling of the Nation's railroads, including class I, 
II and III freight railroads, and passenger carriers. The evaluations 
generally compare a railroad's program with the guidelines in the FRA 
Bridge Safety Policy, and include observations of individual bridges to 
determine their general condition, as well as the accuracy of the 
railroad's inspection reports.
    Most large railroads generally conform to the FRA guidelines, but 
FRA has discovered instances where management had not adequately 
evaluated or addressed critical items delineated in railroad bridge 
inspection reports before they developed into critical failures or 
near-failures. Many of the smaller railroads evaluated also conformed 
generally to the guidelines, but a considerable number either fell 
short by a large degree, or showed absolutely no evidence of bridge 
inspection, management or maintenance.

This Safety Advisory

    As serious gaps exist between the FRA Bridge Safety Guidelines and 
the actual practices on many railroads, and because FRA has discovered 
some extremely serious hazards as a result, FRA is issuing this Safety 
Advisory. Its purpose is to explain and amplify the provisions of the 
Bridge Safety Guidelines, and to discuss and make recommendations 
concerning some points in addition to the guidelines that FRA has 
determined are critical to bridge safety.

Conformance with the FRA Bridge Safety Guidelines

    Certain provisions of the FRA Bridge Safety Guidelines are critical 
from the standpoint of immediate safety to the development and 
implementation of a railroad's bridge management program. These points 
are reiterated and expanded below.

Responsibility for the Safety of Railroad Bridges

    FRA has specified that the owner of the track carried by a bridge 
is responsible for the safety of trains that operate over that track, 
and therefore the track owner must know that the track is being 
adequately supported by the bridge. Even though the Guidelines are 
published as an appendix in the Federal Track Safety Standards for 
convenience, that does not imply that the track owner need only assure 
compliance with the minimum requirements of the Track Standards. Track 
conditions that are well within the limits of the Track Standards might 
also be valid indications of imminent bridge failure.
    The owner of the track supported by a bridge is fully responsible 
for the safety of trains that operate over that bridge, regardless of 
any agreements, or division of ownership or maintenance expense, to the 
contrary. The track owner must be able to control, and restrict if 
necessary, the movement of trains on any segment of its track, 
including the track on a bridge.

Capacity of Railroad Bridges, and Bridge Loads

    The capacity of a bridge, and the actual loads that it carries, are 
so interrelated that they must be considered together.
    The load a bridge carries directly affects its serviceable life and 
safety. These loads, and various external influences, impose forces on 
the various components of the bridge. These components, in turn, are 
each capable of carrying a certain level of forces without failing or 
rapidly deteriorating.
    Every properly designed railroad bridge is configured and 
proportioned so that it will safely handle the forces developed by a 
certain train load, together with effects associated with that load. 
That load, termed the ``design load,'' is the general basis for 
determining the safe capacity of a bridge. The design load is, most 
typically, a series of wheel loads of defined weight, with spacings 
between every pair of wheels of a defined distance. The bridge must 
also be capable of carrying its own weight, the weight of other objects 
permanently attached to the bridge, such as signals and pipes, and 
other external forces, such as wind and stream flow.
    An engineer determining the capacity of a bridge, a process termed 
``rating,'' is fortunate if the original design documents of the bridge 
are available, together with documentation of repairs, modifications 
and inspections. In that case, the design load can be compared with the 
original dimensions of the bridge and its components, including 
inspection records that indicate the actual condition of the 
components, and the bridge can be given a rating in terms of a common 
standard series of train loads. Absent the design documents for a 
bridge, an engineer should make a detailed inspection of every member 
of the bridge to record its actual dimensions, material, and condition.
    Every train moving over a bridge causes forces to be developed in 
the components of the bridge. The magnitude of those forces in each 
component are determined by the weight carried on each wheel, the 
spacing of the wheels within the train, and associated effects, such as 
impact, rocking, and lateral forces. The effect of the actual load on a 
bridge can be associated with the effect of the rated load, and an 
engineer can determine if the proposed or actual loads are within the 
limits of the rated load, given any operating conditions placed on an 
actual load.
    Several critical points are associated with making a proper 
determination of bridge capacities and loads. At a minimum, each track 
owner should take the following actions:
    1. Ensure that a professional engineer competent in the field of 
railroad bridge engineering, or someone under his or her supervision, 
determines bridge capacity;
    2. Maintain a record of the safe capacity of every bridge which 
carries its track;
    3. Enforce a procedure that will ensure that its bridges are not 
loaded beyond their capacities; and
    4. Ensure that regular comprehensive inspections are conducted.
    Bridge ratings will change with time, and will seldom improve. 
Regular comprehensive inspections are vital to maintaining valid bridge 
ratings and to performing timely bridge maintenance and repairs.
    The rating of timber trestles is a less exact process than the 
rating of steel and concrete bridges. Timber bridge components can vary 
widely in their composition, quality and condition. The inherent 
redundancy in timber trestles will partly compensate for a single sub-
standard component, but the good parts which pick up more than their 
share of load from the weak member will degrade at a more rapid rate. 
It is essential that a weak timber member be repaired or replaced in a 
reasonable time; however, while it is still in place in the bridge, it 
and its surrounding members should be given extra attention with more 
frequent, detailed inspections.

[[Page 51900]]

Bridge Inspection

    Railroad bridges are subjected to train loads and associated 
effects, as noted above. In addition, they are subjected to both 
natural and non-natural effects. Natural effects include decay, 
corrosion, deterioration of concrete and masonry, thermal expansion and 
contraction, freezing and thawing of water, floods, and growth of 
vegetation. Non-natural effects include impacts from vehicles and 
vessels, train derailments, vandalism and fires. All of these effects 
can severely and rapidly degrade the capacity of a bridge to safely 
carry its railroad traffic.
    Railroad bridges also support much heavier loads in relation to 
their own weight (ratio of live load to dead load) than do highway 
bridges. All of these factors have led to a standard practice in the 
railroad industry to inspect each bridge carrying railroad tracks at a 
frequency of not less than once per year.
    Bridge inspection, unlike the inspection of track, equipment and 
other railroad property, is a multi-level process. The inspector is a 
technician who should be able to reach all parts of the bridge to be 
inspected, detect indications of deterioration or other problems on the 
bridge, and accurately record and report them. Most railroad bridge 
inspection programs employ inspectors with these qualifications, but 
those inspectors are not expected to be able to perform the engineering 
calculations necessary to determine the safe capacity of a bridge. That 
function is performed by a competent engineer, working from basic 
design and historical records of the bridge and the reports of the 
inspector-technicians.
    While the engineer needs complete and accurate information on the 
condition of the bridge from the inspector, the inspector can provide a 
much more comprehensive inspection if the engineer provides information 
back regarding any critical points or components on the bridge that 
might call for more intensive investigation or specialized inspection 
techniques. These items might be discovered in the bridge design 
documents, especially the so-called ``stress sheets,'' or by review of 
certain types of connections that have been prone to trouble on other 
bridges. This type of two-way communication can prove invaluable.

Protection of Train Operations

    FRA did not address the issue of protection of train operations 
from potentially hazardous bridge conditions in the guidelines because 
FRA did not find it to be a problem at the time. Since then, however, 
FRA has discovered several instances where a person who was not fully 
qualified to determine the safety of a bridge was dispatched to resolve 
a report of trouble, and that person approved the bridge for continued 
service based on the criteria in the Federal Track Safety Standards, 
rather than a structural evaluation of the bridge. In a typical case, a 
track owner would have a railroad track inspector investigate a report 
from a train crew of rough track on a bridge. It is possible that 
during such an investigation, even a diligent track inspector would 
fail to find a deviation from the requirements of the Track Safety 
Standards for the class of track on the bridge, or, in the alternative, 
would find that the track could be brought into compliance with a 
temporary speed restriction. In this situation, it is likely that, 
after possibly placing a speed restriction, he would have returned the 
bridge to service while the structural condition that caused the track 
anomaly still existed. Without further attention, the anomaly would 
continue to deteriorate, until the bridge actually failed under load.
    Recommended Action: FRA makes the following specific 
recommendations to owners of railroad track carried on one or more 
bridges, in order to prevent the deterioration of railroad bridges and 
reduce the risk of human casualties, environmental damage and 
disruption to the Nation's transportation system that would result from 
a catastrophic bridge failure.
    (1) Inventory of Railroad Bridges. Every owner of track carried on 
one or more bridges should maintain an accurate inventory of those 
bridges. The inventory, or ``bridge list,'' should identify the 
location of the bridge, its configuration, type of construction, number 
of spans, span lengths, and all other information necessary to provide 
for management of the bridges.
    (2) Regular Comprehensive Inspections. Every owner of track carried 
on a bridge should ensure that regular comprehensive inspections are 
conducted, as these are vital to maintaining valid bridge ratings and 
to performing timely bridge maintenance and repairs.
    (3) Determination of Railroad Bridge Capacities and Loads. Several 
critical points are associated with making a proper determination of 
bridge capacities and loads. At a minimum, each track owner should take 
the following actions:
    (a) Ensure that a professional engineer competent in the field of 
railroad bridge engineering, or someone under his or her supervision, 
determines bridge capacity;
    (b) Maintain a record of the safe capacity of every bridge which 
carries its track; and
    (c) Enforce a procedure that will ensure that its bridges are not 
loaded beyond their capacities.
    (4) Railroad Bridge Inspection Procedures and Recordkeeping.
    (a) Inspection frequency. Every bridge which carries railroad 
traffic should be inspected at least once per year. The level of detail 
and the inspection procedure should be appropriate to the configuration 
of the bridge, conditions found during previous inspections, and the 
nature of the railroad traffic moved over the bridge (car weights, 
train frequency and length, levels of passenger and hazardous materials 
traffic, and vulnerability of the bridge to damage).
    (b) Inspection records. Every bridge inspection should be recorded, 
and the record of the inspection be available to the engineer who is 
responsible for the integrity of the bridge. The inspection record 
should show the date on which the inspection was actually performed, 
the precise identification of the bridge inspected, the items inspected 
and the condition of those items. Any inspection item that is found by 
the inspector to be a potential problem should be described in a 
narrative.
    Many different systems are used to ascribe condition values to 
bridges and their components, but care should be taken that the 
inspection reports do not simply generate a number but, instead, an 
accurate description of the condition of the bridge components. It is 
appropriate to use a valuation system that serves to identify 
individual inspection reports that should be reviewed by the engineer 
or other engineering managers.
    (c) Prescribing inspection procedures. The engineer responsible for 
the safety of a group of railroad bridges should prescribe the 
inspection procedures for those bridges. Bridges of a common 
configuration and no exceptional conditions may be considered as a 
group for a common procedure, but uncommon bridges, those with critical 
components and bridges which indicate possible deterioration that could 
affect their continued safety should be noted to the inspector. The 
inspector should be advised of any particular items of concern on the 
bridge, and any specific inspection procedure (frequency, detail and 
method) that is necessary to maintain the safety of the bridge.
    (d) Review of inspection reports by a competent engineer. Bridge 
inspection reports should be reviewed by an engineer who is competent 
in the field of railroad bridge engineering. The

[[Page 51901]]

engineer should determine whether the bridges are being inspected 
according to the applicable procedure and frequency, and will review 
any items noted by the inspector as exceptions. Often, the individual 
exceptions would not indicate a serious problem with a bridge, but when 
considered together by an engineer, they would show a more serious 
problem developing on the bridge.
    (5) Protection of Train Operations. A bridge owner should designate 
qualified bridge inspectors or maintenance personnel to authorize the 
operation of trains on bridges following repairs, damage or indications 
of potential structural problems. Only a qualified person should be 
permitted to authorize train operation after such an occurrence.

Implementation of the FRA Bridge Safety Program

    FRA has been conducting evaluations of railroad bridge management 
programs since the 1980's, before the Bridge Safety Policy was first 
issued. The Policy indicates that its guidelines will be the basis for 
FRA's evaluation of bridge management. This Safety Advisory essentially 
amplifies and clarifies the criteria included in the Policy guidelines. 
The recommendations included in this Safety Advisory will be reviewed 
by FRA personnel when conducting evaluations of railroad bridge 
management. The same criteria, together with other risk factors, will 
be considered by FRA when selecting small railroads for further 
evaluation. FRA will maintain on-going evaluations on the larger 
railroads and passenger carriers.
    FRA has been able to adhere to its policy of not issuing specific 
regulations governing bridge management, bridge conditions and bridge 
capacities. If the continuing evaluations show that the railroad 
industry is essentially adhering to the principles of good engineering 
and the provisions of this Safety Advisory, and also provided that no 
significant train accidents are caused by the structural failure of a 
railroad bridge, FRA intends to continue with this non-regulatory 
policy.
    Owners of track carried on one or more railroad bridges are 
encouraged to voluntarily take action in accordance with these 
recommendations. If circumstances so warrant, FRA reserves the 
authority to take other corrective action, including: issuing an 
emergency order to restrict operations over a railroad bridge if 
necessary to protect public safety, modifying this Safety Advisory 
2007-03, issuing additional safety advisories, taking regulatory 
action, or taking other appropriate action necessary to ensure the 
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 4, 2007.
Jo Strang,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
 [FR Doc. E7-17811 Filed 9-10-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P