[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 163 (Thursday, August 23, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48272-48285]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-16677]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC-07-73-A (Auction 73); DA 07-3415; AU Docket No. 07-157]


Auction of 700 MHz Band License Scheduled for January 16, 2008; 
Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 73

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of certain 700 MHz band 
licenses scheduled to commence on January 16, 2008 (Auction 73). This 
document also seeks comments on competitive bidding procedures for 
Auction 73.

DATES: Comments are due on or before August 31, 2007, and reply 
comments are due on or before September 7, 2007.

ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments must be identified by AU Docket 
No. 07-157; DA 07-3415. The Bureau requests that a copy of all comments 
and reply comments be submitted electronically to the following 
address: [email protected]. In addition, comments and reply comments 
may be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Federal Communications Commission's Web site: http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request 
reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language 
interpreters, CART, etc.) by e-mail: [email protected] or phone: 202-418-
0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.
     Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must 
file an original and four copies of each filing. Filings can be sent by 
hand or messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by 
first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail (although the Bureau 
continues to experience delays in receiving U.S. Postal Service mail). 
All filings must be addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Attn: WTB/
ASAD, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
     The Commission's contractor will receive hand-delivered or 
messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary at 236 
Massachusetts Avenue, NE., Suite 110, Washington, DC 20002. The filing 
hours at this location are 8 a.m. to 7 p.m. Eastern Time (ET). All hand 
deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. 
Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail 
and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton Drive, Capitol 
Heights, MD 20743.
     U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority 
mail should be addressed to 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554.

[[Page 48273]]


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 
Auctions and Spectrum Access Division: For auctions legal questions: 
Erik Salovaara or Scott MacKoul at (202) 418-0660. For general auction 
questions: Jeff Crooks at (202) 418-0660 or Lisa Stover at (717) 338-
2888. Mobility Division: For service rules questions: Erin McGrath 
(legal) or Keith Harper (technical) at (202) 418-0620.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction 73 Comment 
Public Notice released on August 17, 2007. The complete text of the 
Auction 73 Comment Public Notice, including attachments, and related 
Commission documents, are available for public inspection and copying 
from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. ET Monday through Thursday or from 8 a.m. to 
11:30 a.m. ET on Fridays in the FCC Reference Information Center, 
Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. 
The Auction 73 Comment Public Notice, including attachments, and 
related Commission documents also may be purchased from the 
Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. 
(BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 
20554, telephone 202-488-5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, or you may 
contact BCPI at its Web site: http://www.BCPIWEB.com. When ordering 
documents from BCPI, please provide the appropriate FCC document 
number, for example, DA 07-3415. The Auction 73 Comment Public Notice 
and related documents also are available on the Internet at the 
Commission's Web site: http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/73/.

I. Introduction and Summary

    1. The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau) announces an 
auction of 1,099 licenses in the 698-806 MHz band (700 MHz Band). A 
complete list of licenses available is included as Attachment A of the 
Auction 73 Comment Public Notice. This auction, which is designated as 
Auction 73, is scheduled to commence on January 16, 2008.
    2. In prior proceedings, the Commission considered the 700 MHz Band 
in two parts, 698-746 MHz (Lower 700 MHz Band) and 746-806 MHz (Upper 
700 MHz Band). The Lower 700 MHz Band was divided into blocks A through 
E, and the Upper 700 MHz Band was divided into blocks A through D. The 
Commission previously assigned licenses for blocks C and D in the Lower 
700 MHz Band and for blocks A and B in the Upper 700 MHz Band. 
Consequently, the remaining blocks to be licensed are the Lower 700 MHz 
Band A, B, and E Blocks, and the Upper 700 MHz Band C and D Blocks. As 
the letters identifying the blocks remaining to be licensed in the 
Lower and Upper 700 MHz Bands do not overlap, the Auction 73 Comment 
Public Notice refers to these blocks to be licensed as the A, B, E, C 
and D Blocks, without repeating the Lower 700 MHz Band and Upper 700 
MHz Band designation.
    3. Pursuant to governing statutes and Commission rules, the 
Commission will announce final procedures for Auction 73 after 
considering comment provided in response to the Auction 73 Comment 
Public Notice. In Auction 73, the Commission will make available 176 
licenses over Economic Areas (EAs) in the A Block, 734 licenses over 
Cellular Market Areas (CMAs) in the B Block, 176 licenses over EAs in 
the E Block, 12 licenses over Regional Economic Area Groupings (REAGs) 
in the C Block, and one nationwide license, to be used as part of the 
700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, in the D Block. The Bureau seeks 
comment on detailed procedures for Auction 73, including, among other 
things, procedures for: (1) Anonymous bidding, to enhance competition 
by safeguarding against potential anti-competitive auction strategies; 
(2) applicants trying to combine multiple C Block licenses to place 
bids on packages of those licenses; (3) block-specific aggregate 
reserve prices, to help assure that the public recovers a portion of 
the licenses' value; and (4) offering licenses for the relevant 
block(s) in a prompt subsequent auction in the event auction results do 
not satisfy applicable reserve prices.
    4. The Commission is offering the licenses in Auction 73 consistent 
with the requirements of the Digital Television Transition and Public 
Safety Act of 2005 (DTV Act). Pursuant to the DTV Act the Commission 
must conduct the auction of licenses for recovered analog spectrum by 
commencing the bidding not later than January 28, 2008.

II. Background

    5. The Commission recently released the 700 MHz Second Report and 
Order, FCC 07-132, released August 6, 2007, in which it revised rules 
governing licenses in the 700 MHz Band and made certain determinations 
regarding the auction of 700 MHz Band licenses. Parties responding to 
this Public Notice should be familiar with the details of the 700 MHz 
Second Report and Order. The Bureau now proposes and seeks comment on 
detailed procedures to implement the Commission's determinations and 
generally enable the conduct of Auction 73.
    6. Anonymous Bidding. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, the 
Commission found that the public interest would be served if the 
auction for new 700 MHz Band licenses is conducted using anonymous (or 
limited information) bidding procedures, regardless of any pre-auction 
measurement of likely auction competition. Such information procedures 
are intended to reduce the potential for anti-competitive bidding 
behavior, including bidding activity that aims to prevent the entry of 
new competitors. Having made this determination, the Commission 
directed the Bureau to propose and seek comment on more detailed 
procedures for employing anonymous bidding for the upcoming auction. 
Accordingly, the Bureau seeks comment on anonymous bidding procedures 
for Auction 73.
    7. Package Bidding for C Block Licenses But Not for A, B, D, and E 
Block Licenses. The Commission also determined in the 700 MHz Second 
Report and Order that providing for package bidding for C Block 
licenses in Auction 73 would serve the public interest. The Commission 
found that package bidding for these licenses should facilitate the 
entry of entities seeking to create a nationwide footprint and whose 
business plans require the economies of scale that only can be obtained 
with nationwide operation. The Commission directed the Bureau to 
propose and seek comment on detailed procedures for implementing 
package bidding for the C Block licenses and not for licenses in the 
other blocks to be auctioned.
    8. Block-Specific Aggregate Reserve Prices for Auction 73. The 
Commission also decided to provide for aggregate reserve prices for 
licenses authorizing the use of each block of the 700 MHz Band. The 
Commission concluded that, consistent with its statutory mandate, 
disclosed reserve prices would promote the recovery of a portion of the 
value of the public spectrum resource. The Commission directed the 
Bureau to adopt aggregate reserve prices reflecting the potential 
market value of this spectrum based on a variety of factors including, 
but not limited to, the characteristics of this band and the auction 
prices of other recently auctioned licenses, such as licenses for 
Advanced Wireless Services in the 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz bands 
(AWS-1). Accordingly, the Bureau proposes to adopt the following block-
specific aggregate reserve prices: Block A, $1.807380 billion; Block B, 
$1.374426 billion; Block C, $4.637854 billion; Block D, $1.330000 
billion; Block E, $0.903690 billion. Further, the

[[Page 48274]]

Bureau proposes that if the sum of the provisionally winning gross bids 
for the licenses in a block does not satisfy the relevant aggregate 
reserve price, none of the relevant licenses for the particular block 
will be assigned based on the auction results.
    9. Prompt Subsequent Auction, if Necessary, of Alternative 
Licenses. The Commission, moreover, decided that if licenses initially 
offered for the A, B, C, or E Blocks are not assigned because the 
auction results do not satisfy the applicable aggregate reserve 
price(s) for those licenses, the Commission promptly will offer 
alternative licenses for those blocks. More specifically, the 
Commission will offer licenses for the A, B, and E Blocks subject to 
alternative performance requirements. With respect to the C Block, the 
Commission will offer alternative licenses without the open platform 
conditions and based on different geographic areas and spectrum 
bandwidth. If the D Block license is not assigned because the auction 
results do not satisfy the D Block reserve price, the Commission may 
re-offer that license subject to the same rules or reconsider the 
applicable rules. Consistent with the Commission's direction, the 
Bureau will permit only qualified bidders in the initial auction to 
participate in the subsequent auction and proposes to use the same 
auction design, including an aggregate reserve price for each block 
that matches the applicable initial reserve price, insofar as possible.

III. Licenses To Be Offered in Auction 73

    10. Auction 73 includes a total of 1,099 licenses: 176 in the A 
Block, 734 in the B Block, 176 in the E Block, 12 in the C Block, and 1 
in the D Block.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Frequencies
            Block                    (MHz)           Bandwidth         Pairing         Area type       Licenses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 A...........................  698-704, 728-734  12 MHz..........  2 x 6 MHz......  EA.............          176
B............................  704-710, 734-740  12 MHz..........  2 x 6 MHz......  CMA............          734
E............................  722-728.........  6 MHz...........  unpaired.......  EA.............          176
C............................  746-757, 776-787  22 MHz..........  2 x 11 MHz.....  REAG...........           12
D............................  758-763, 788-793  10 MHz..........  2 x 5 MHz......  Nationwide.....            1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The D Block is subject to conditions respecting a public/private 
partnership license.
    11. Predefined Packages of C Block Licenses. As directed by the 
Commission's recent decision in the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 
the Bureau proposes detailed procedures that will enable bidders to 
place bids on all individual licenses and on certain predefined 
packages of C Block licenses. More specifically, the Bureau proposes to 
enable bidders to place individual bids on the 12 REAG licenses and 
package bids on the following combinations of C Block REAG licenses: 
REAGs 1-8, comprising the 50 United States; REAGs 9 and 11, comprising 
the United States Pacific territories; and REAGs 10 and 12, comprising 
Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Gulf of Mexico.
    12. Incumbents. A number of incumbent broadcasters are licensed and 
operating on these frequencies (TV Channels 52-53, 56-58, 60-62, and 
65-67) and adjacent channels. In accordance with the Commission's 
rules, 700 MHz Band licensees must protect analog TV incumbents from 
harmful interference through February 17, 2009, the end of the DTV 
transition period. These limitations may restrict the ability of such 
geographic area licensees to use certain portions of the 
electromagnetic spectrum or provide service to some parts of their 
geographic license areas.
    13. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, the Commission 
grandfathered an incumbent Guard Band B Block licensee in Major 
Economic Areas (MEAs) 21 and 39 at 761-763 MHz and 791-793 MHz of the D 
Block. The new D Block licensee will be authorized on a secondary basis 
in these markets, and it may not cause interference to the primary 
operations of the grandfathered licensee. If the grandfathered 
licensee, or a successor or assignee, cancels either of the 
grandfathered licenses, or if either license cancels automatically, is 
terminated by the Commission, or expires, then the licensed geographic 
area will revert to the D Block licensee automatically.

IV. Bureau Seeks Comment on Auction Procedures

    14. Section 309(j)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, requires the Commission to ensure that, in the scheduling of 
any competitive bidding under this subsection, an adequate period is 
allowed before issuance of bidding rules, to permit notice and comment 
on proposed auction procedures. Consistent with the provisions of 
section 309(j)(3) and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate 
time to familiarize themselves with the specific rules that will govern 
the day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission directed the 
Bureau, under its existing delegated authority, to seek comment on a 
variety of auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each 
auction. The Bureau therefore seeks comment on the following issues 
relating to Auction 73.

A. Auction Design

i. Anonymous Bidding
    15. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, the Commission 
concluded that anonymous bidding procedures, which withhold from public 
release until after the auction closes any information that may 
indicate specific applicants' interests in the auction, including 
information such as their license selections and bidding activity, 
should be implemented in the upcoming auction of new 700 MHz Band 
licenses regardless of whether the auction meets a pre-auction 
assessment of likely competition. The Commission concluded that such 
procedures will serve the public interest by reducing the potential for 
anti-competitive bidding behavior, including bidding activity that aims 
to prevent the entry of new competitors.
    16. In light of these conclusions, for Auction 73 the Bureau 
proposes to withhold, until after the close of bidding, public release 
of: (1) Bidders' license selections on their short-form applications 
(FCC Form 175); (2) the amounts of bidders' upfront payments and 
bidding eligibility; and (3) information that may reveal the identities 
of bidders placing bids and taking other bidding-related actions. For 
example, the Bureau proposes to withhold the identities of bidders 
placing specific bids or withdrawals and the net bid amounts, although 
the Bureau will disclose after the close of each round the amount of 
every bid placed and whether a bid amount was withdrawn. The Bureau 
proposes to provide individual bidders with additional information 
about their own bids. In contrast to procedures implemented for 
anonymous bidding in past auctions, and consistent with the 700 MHz 
Second Report and Order, the Bureau will withhold this information 
irrespective of any pre-auction

[[Page 48275]]

measurement of likely auction competition. Accordingly, the Bureau 
proposes to withhold the amount of bidders' upfront payments and 
bidding eligibility until after the close of bidding. Bidders will be 
able to view their own level of eligibility, before and during the 
auction, through the Commission's Integrated Spectrum Auction System 
(ISAS or FCC Auction System). Moreover, bidders will be made aware of 
other bidders with whom they will not be permitted to discuss bidding 
strategies for the purpose of complying with the Commission's anti-
collusion rules. Specifically, the Bureau will notify separately each 
applicant with short-form applications for participation in a pending 
auction, including but not limited to Auction 73, whether applicants in 
Auction 73 have applied for licenses in any of the same geographic 
areas as that applicant.
    17. In the event that licenses initially offered for any of the 700 
MHz Band spectrum blocks are not assigned because the auction results 
do not satisfy the applicable reserve price and the Commission conducts 
a prompt subsequent auction of licenses for the relevant block(s), the 
Commission proposes generally to withhold the information described 
herein on bidder license selection and eligibility and information that 
may reveal the identities of bidders placing bids for both auctions 
until after the close of bidding in the second auction. Thus, if the 
initial auction results satisfy aggregate reserve prices with respect 
to licenses in some but not all blocks, the Commission proposes, except 
for the D Block, to withhold information on the winning bidders for 
licenses in the relevant block(s) as well as information on bidder 
license selections and eligibility and information that may reveal the 
identities of bidders placing bids and taking other bidding-related 
actions on licenses in all blocks until after the close of bidding in 
both auctions. Because bidding on the 700 MHz Band licenses is 
interrelated, the purpose for which the Bureau imposes anonymous 
bidding procedures in the first place--to make signaling and other 
anti-competitive bidding behavior less likely to be successful--will 
continue to be served by not making such information public until after 
the close of bidding on all of the licenses. For the D Block, however, 
the Bureau proposes, instead of withholding all information, to make 
public before the close of bidding in a second auction only such 
information as may be necessary to proceed with promptly facilitating 
the D Block winner's obligations to negotiate a Network Sharing 
Agreement with the national Public Safety Broadband Licensee in the 
adjacent spectrum block, in the event there is a winning bidder for the 
D Block license in the initial auction. The Bureau seeks comment on 
these details regarding its proposal for implementation of anonymous 
bidding in Auction 73, and on alternative proposals for the specific 
procedures to implement anonymous bidding.
ii. SMR Auction With Package Bidding on C Block Licenses
    18. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, the Commission directed 
the Bureau to propose detailed auction procedures that would permit the 
license-by-license bidding of the FCC's standard simultaneous multiple 
round (SMR) auction format for the A, B, D, and E Block licenses, while 
enabling package bidding for C Block licenses. Accordingly, the Bureau 
proposes to conduct Auction 73 using an SMR auction design with 
hierarchical package bidding (HPB) for the C Block licenses. The Bureau 
has developed software for an auction format (SMR-HPB) that permits 
license-by-license bidding as well as limited package bidding using HPB 
on predetermined packages of specified licenses. Under this proposal, 
HPB will be available for 12 licenses in the C Block, and license-by-
license bidding without package bids will be available for the 1,087 
licenses in the other available blocks. In this SMR-HPB auction format 
the Bureau proposes for the C Block licenses certain procedures that 
differ from standard SMR procedures, while retaining the standard SMR 
procedures for all of the other licenses to be offered. The Bureau 
seeks comment on the details of the proposed SMR-HPB format, keeping in 
mind the Commission's goal of facilitating the entry of a new 
nationwide competitor with sufficient bandwidth to offer a range of 
advanced wireless services, without causing undue difficulty for 
bidders that are not interested in a nationwide license.
    19. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, the Commission also 
provided that the Bureau may conduct an auction without package bidding 
for the C Block licenses in the event that currently unforeseen 
difficulties make it impracticable to implement package bidding. In the 
event that package bidding cannot be implemented for Auction 73, the 
Bureau proposes to conduct the auction using standard SMR procedures 
for all of the licenses, including the C Block licenses as well as the 
A, B, D, and E Block licenses.
a. Previous Commission Package Bidding Designs
    20. The Bureau's proposed SMR-HPB auction design further develops 
and modifies prior package bidding designs for the Commission's 
spectrum license auctions. Unlike previous designs that allowed bidders 
to create their own packages of any or all of the licenses in the 
auction, SMR-HPB allows a form of package bidding only on predetermined 
packages of specified licenses, while using SMR procedures for licenses 
not subject to package bidding. The Commission first proposed a simple 
form of package bidding in 2000, in connection with procedures for a 
planned auction of licenses in the Upper 700 MHz Band (Auction 31). 
These package bidding procedures were modified in 2002 when Auction 31 
was scheduled to begin on June 19, 2002. After Auction 31 was postponed 
consistent with the Auction Reform Act of 2002, the Commission further 
modified its package bidding design. This package bidding design was 
used for an auction of narrowband Personal Communication Services 
licenses (Auction 51) in September 2003. Following Auction 51, the 
Commission continued to consider alternative package bidding auction 
formats and developed a particular SMR auction format with package 
bidding (SMR-PB). In 2006, the Commission sought comment on whether to 
use SMR-PB and/or SMR for Auction 66, and decided to use its SMR 
auction format without package bidding for all of the licenses in that 
auction. In 2005 and 2006 the Commission conducted experimental 
economic testing of the SMR-PB format.
    21. The Commission has received considerable feedback on auction 
design from potential bidders and other members of the public, 
including comments submitted in the 700 MHz proceeding. Also, in 2007 
the Commission did further experimental economic testing on alternative 
package bidding designs. Furthermore, there has been a significant 
amount of recent academic research and economic experiments on auction 
designs that incorporate package bidding in various ways. Taking into 
consideration Commission experience and input from the public, the 
Commission now seeks comment on using the following SMR-HPB format for 
Auction 73.
b. SMR-HPB Auction Format
    22. As in the Commission's non-package bidding SMR auctions, the 
proposed SMR-HPB auction format offers all licenses for sale

[[Page 48276]]

simultaneously, with bid amounts generally ascending over a series of 
bidding rounds. SMR-HPB allows bids on all individual licenses and on 
certain predefined packages of specified licenses. In Auction 73, not 
all licenses will be included in packages: The Commission will offer 
package bidding only on the C Block licenses. Bidding on licenses in 
other blocks will be on a license-by-license basis only, as in SMR. A 
bidder may bid on, and potentially win, any number of licenses and/or 
packages. Typically, bidding remains open on all licenses until bidding 
stops on every license, based on the applicable stopping rule.
    23. With respect to licenses offered subject to HPB, bidders may 
not create their own packages. The predefined packages are determined 
by the Commission according to a hierarchical structure. The initial 
level consists of individual licenses, and the next level consists of 
non-overlapping packages of those licenses, such that a given license 
is included only once in each level. The winning set of bids may 
consist of bids from various levels, as long as each license is 
included in only one winning bid.
    24. For Auction 73, the Bureau proposes to accept individual bids 
on C Block licenses for REAGs 1-12 (Level 1) and package bids on 
certain combinations of C Block REAG licenses (Level 2). Thus, the 
initial level will be the twelve individual REAG licenses, and the 
second level will consist of packages of REAGs 1-8 (the 50 United 
States), REAGs 10 and 12 (Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the 
Gulf of Mexico, or Atlantic), and REAGs 9 and 11 (the U.S. Pacific 
territories, or Pacific). The Bureau proposes a package of REAGs 
covering the 50 states consistent with the Commission's determination 
that the Bureau should implement a package bidding auction design to 
facilitate the entry of a new nationwide competitor in the C Block. The 
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal, including comments suggesting 
alternative levels or alternative ways of packaging licenses within 
levels.
    25. After each round, the FCC determines the combination of package 
and/or single license bids that yields the highest gross amount, and 
those bids become provisionally winning. For licenses that are not 
subject to package bidding, the FCC Auction System will consider the 
bids placed in the round and the provisionally winning bids from the 
previous round; the highest bid on each license will become that 
round's provisionally winning bid. For licenses subject to package 
bidding, when determining provisionally winning bids, the FCC Auction 
System will consider each bidder's highest bid on each license or 
package placed up to that point in the auction, regardless of whether 
the bids were provisionally winning after the rounds in which they were 
placed. Considering these bids from previous rounds makes it possible 
for new bids on individual licenses to combine with other bids in order 
to compete with bids on packages. The provisionally winning bids are 
determined by comparing aggregate gross bid amounts, at each level, for 
various combinations of package and individual license bids.

B. Auction Structure

i. Round Structure
    26. Auction 73 will consist of sequential bidding rounds. The 
initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public notice to be 
released at least one week before the start of the auction.
    27. The Commission will conduct Auction 73 over the Internet, and 
telephonic bidding will be available as well. The toll-free telephone 
number for the Auction Bidder Line will be provided to qualified 
bidders.
    28. The Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to change the 
bidding schedule in order to foster an auction pace that reasonably 
balances speed with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust 
their bidding strategies. Under this proposal, the Bureau may change 
the amount of time for bidding rounds, the amount of time between 
rounds, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding 
activity and other factors. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal. 
Commenters may wish to address the role of the bidding schedule in 
managing the pace of the auction and the tradeoffs in managing auction 
pace by bidding schedule changes, by changing the activity requirements 
or bid amount parameters, or by using other means.
ii. Stopping Rule
    29. The Bureau has discretion to establish stopping rules before or 
during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction within 
a reasonable time. For Auction 73, the Bureau proposes to employ a 
simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping rule means 
that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding closes 
simultaneously on all licenses. More specifically, bidding will close 
simultaneously on all licenses and packages after the first round in 
which no bidder submits any new bids, applies a proactive waiver, or 
withdraws any provisionally winning bids. Thus, unless the Bureau 
announces alternative stopping procedures, bidding will remain open on 
all licenses until bidding stops on every license, regardless of 
whether bids are placed on individual licenses or packages of licenses. 
Consequently, it is not possible to determine in advance how long the 
auction will last.
    30. Further, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to 
exercise any of the following options during Auction 73: (a) Use a 
modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The modified 
stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses after the first 
round in which no bidder applies a waiver, withdraws a provisionally 
winning bid, or places any new bids on any license or package for which 
it is not the provisionally winning bidder. Thus, absent any other 
bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license or a package 
of licenses for which it is the provisionally winning bidder would not 
keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. When 
commenting on this proposal, commenters should address whether this 
modified stopping rule should apply across licenses and packages of 
those licenses. For example, should the auction close if the only bid 
placed is a new bid on a license that is part of a package upon which 
that same bidder holds the provisionally winning bid? Commenters should 
also address whether this modified stopping rule should apply only 
after applicable reserve prices have been met; (b) declare that the 
auction will end after a specified number of additional rounds (special 
stopping rule). If the Bureau invokes this special stopping rule, it 
will accept bids in the specified final round(s) after which the 
auction will close; and (c) keep the auction open even if no bidder 
places any new bids, applies a waiver, or withdraws any provisionally 
winning bids. In this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder 
had applied a waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as 
usual, and a bidder with insufficient activity will either lose bidding 
eligibility or use a waiver.
    31. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain 
circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding unusually 
slowly or quickly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it 
appears likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable 
period of time or will close prematurely, e.g., before bidders have had 
an adequate opportunity to satisfy any applicable reserve prices. 
Before

[[Page 48277]]

exercising certain of these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt to 
change the pace of the auction by, for example, changing the number of 
bidding rounds per day and/or changing minimum acceptable bids. The 
Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to exercise any of these 
options with or without prior announcement during the auction. The 
Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
iii. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
    32. For Auction 73, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice or 
by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, or 
cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical 
obstacle, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an auction 
security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other reason 
that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In 
such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the 
auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the 
auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its 
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend 
the auction. The Bureau emphasizes that exercise of this authority is 
solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended 
to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply 
their activity rule waivers. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

C. Bidding Procedures

 i. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
    33. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine 
an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned. A 
bidder's upfront payment is a refundable deposit to establish 
eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront payments related to the 
licenses for specific spectrum subject to auction protect against 
frivolous or insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source 
of funds from which to collect payments owed at the close of the 
auction. With these guidelines in mind, the Bureau proposes to 
calculate upfront payments on a license-by-license basis using a method 
that considers the likely relative demand for the licenses, taking into 
account, among other factors, the population within the license area, 
the bandwidth covered by the license, whether the license includes 
rural areas, and whether a license for the exact same area was unsold 
in Auction 66. Specifically, the Bureau proposes to calculate upfront 
payments as follows: (1) For licenses covering CMAs in the 50 states in 
which the licenses offered in Auction 66 were sold, $0.05 per MHz per 
population (MHz-pop) for Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) licenses 
and $0.03/MHz-pop for Rural Service Area (RSA) licenses; (2) for 
licenses covering EAs in the 50 states in which the corresponding 
licenses in both EA blocks offered in Auction 66 were sold, the sum of 
$0.05/MHz-pop for counties contained within an MSA and $0.03/MHz-pop 
for counties contained within an RSA; (3) for licenses covering REAGs 
in the 50 states in which the corresponding licenses in all three REAG 
blocks offered in Auction 66 were sold, the sum of $0.05/MHz-pop for 
counties contained within an MSA and $0.03/MHz-pop for counties 
contained within an RSA; (4) for licenses covering geographic areas for 
which an Auction 66 license was unsold, $0.01/MHz-pop; (5) for licenses 
covering the Gulf of Mexico, $1,000 per MHz; and (6) for all remaining 
licenses, $0.01/MHz-pop. For all licenses, the results of the 
calculations are subject to a minimum of $500 per license and are 
rounded using the Bureau's standard rounding procedure. The proposed 
number of bidding units for each license and associated upfront payment 
amounts are listed in Attachment A of the Auction 73 Comment Public 
Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
    34. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront 
payment submitted by a bidder will determine the bidder's initial 
bidding eligibility in bidding units. The Bureau proposes that each 
license be assigned a specific number of bidding units equal to the 
upfront payment listed in Attachment A of the Auction 73 Comment Public 
Notice, on a bidding unit per dollar basis. For a package, the Bureau 
proposes to calculate the bidding units by adding together the bidding 
units of the individual licenses that make up the package. The number 
of bidding units for a given license is fixed and does not change 
during the auction as prices change. A bidder's upfront payment is not 
attributed to specific licenses or packages. Rather, a bidder may place 
bids on any of the licenses it selected on its application to 
participate in the auction as long as the total number of bidding units 
associated with those licenses does not exceed its current eligibility. 
Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction; it can only remain 
the same or decrease.
    35. In the proposed SMR-HPB auction format, a bidder may place bids 
on any combination of licenses and packages of licenses as long as the 
total number of bidding units associated with the licenses does not 
exceed the bidder's current eligibility. Therefore, applicants 
interested in bidding only on individual licenses should determine the 
total number of bidding units associated with licenses they wish to bid 
on or have included in provisionally winning bids in any single round, 
and submit an upfront payment amount covering that total number of 
bidding units. Applicants interested in bidding on packages should 
determine their upfront payment by calculating the sum of bidding units 
associated with each discrete license they wish to include in new bids 
(package or individual bids) or have included in provisionally winning 
bids in any single round. The bidding units associated with a given 
license, even if the license is included in more than one bid, will be 
counted only once per bidder per round. Hence, if a bidder has enough 
eligibility to bid on certain licenses, it can place bids on the 
licenses individually and on packages containing the licenses without 
needing additional eligibility. For example, if licenses A, B, and C 
each have 10,000 bidding units, and a bidder wishes in a single round 
to be able to bid on licenses A, B, and C individually and on packages 
AB and ABC, the bidder needs 30,000 bidding units of eligibility.
 ii. Activity Rule
    36. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively 
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction 
before participating.
    37. In the proposed SMR-HPB format, as well as in an SMR format, 
bidders are required to be active on a specific percentage of their 
current bidding eligibility during each round of the auction. Failure 
to maintain the requisite activity level will result in the use of an 
activity rule waiver, if any remain, or a reduction in the bidder's 
eligibility, possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder's ability to 
place additional bids in the auction.
    38. The Bureau proposes to divide the auction into at least two 
stages, each characterized by a different activity requirement. The 
auction will start in Stage One. The Bureau proposes to advance the 
auction to the next stage by announcement during the auction. In 
exercising this discretion, the Bureau will consider a variety of 
measures of auction activity, including but not limited to the 
percentage of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there 
are new bids, the number of new bids, and the increase in revenue. The

[[Page 48278]]

Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
    39. Commenters that believe these activity rules should be modified 
should explain their reasoning and comment on the desirability of an 
alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims 
with analyses and suggested alternative activity rules. Additionally, 
commenters may wish to address the role of activity rules in managing 
the pace of the auction and the tradeoffs in managing auction pace by 
bidding schedule changes, by changing the activity requirements or bid 
amount parameters, or by using other means.
    40. In SMR and SMR-HPB, a bidder's activity in a round will be the 
sum of the bidding units associated with any licenses covered by new 
and provisionally winning bids. In SMR-HPB, the bidding units 
associated with a given license will be counted only once in a bidder's 
activity calculation for the round, even if the bidder places multiple 
bids including the license. For example, consider two licenses, A and 
B, each having 10,000 bidding units. Assuming a bidder bids on license 
A as well as the package AB in a given round, the bidder's activity 
would be 20,000 bidding units, calculated as the sum of the bidding 
units of licenses A and B. Note that the bidding units for license A 
are not counted twice.
    41. The Bureau proposes the following activity requirements, while 
noting again that the Bureau retains the discretion to change stages 
unilaterally by announcement during the auction. Stage One: In each 
round of the first stage of the auction, a bidder desiring to maintain 
its current bidding eligibility is required to be active on licenses 
representing at least 80 percent of its current bidding eligibility. 
Failure to maintain the required activity level will result in the use 
of an activity rule waiver or a reduction in the bidder's bidding 
eligibility for the next round of bidding. During Stage One, a bidder's 
reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by 
multiplying the bidder's current round activity by five-fourths (\5/
4\). Stage Two: In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to 
maintain its current bidding eligibility is required to be active on 95 
percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the 
required activity level will result in the use of an activity rule 
waiver or a reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility for the next 
round of bidding. During Stage Two, a bidder's reduced eligibility for 
the next round will be calculated by multiplying the bidder's current 
round activity by twenty-nineteenths (\20/19\).
    42. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the activity 
requirements during the auction. For example, the Bureau could decide 
to add an additional stage with a higher activity requirement, not to 
transition to Stage Two if it believes the auction is progressing 
satisfactorily under the Stage One activity requirement, or to 
transition to Stage Two with an activity requirement that is higher or 
lower than the 95 percent proposed herein. If the Bureau exercises this 
discretion, it will alert bidders by announcement in the FCC Auction 
System.
 iii. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility
    43. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's 
eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round being 
below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies to an 
entire round of bidding, not to particular licenses. Activity rule 
waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a 
mechanism for bidders to avoid the loss of bidding eligibility in the 
event that exigent circumstances prevent them from bidding in a 
particular round.
    44. The FCC Auction System assumes that a bidder not meeting the 
activity requirement would prefer to apply an activity rule waiver (if 
available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system 
will automatically apply a waiver at the end of any bidding round in 
which a bidder's activity level is below the minimum required unless 
(1) The bidder has no activity rule waivers remaining; or (2) the 
bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing 
eligibility, thereby meeting the activity requirement. If a bidder has 
no waivers remaining and does not satisfy the required activity level, 
its eligibility will be permanently reduced, possibly curtailing or 
eliminating the bidder's ability to place additional bids in the 
auction.
    45. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its 
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the 
bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism 
during the bidding round by using the reduce eligibility function in 
the FCC Auction System. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is 
permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the 
activity rule. Reducing eligibility is an irreversible action. Once 
eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to regain 
its lost bidding eligibility, even if the round has not yet closed.
    46. Under the proposed simultaneous stopping rule, a bidder may 
apply an activity rule waiver proactively as a means to keep the 
auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder proactively applies an 
activity rule waiver (using the apply waiver function in the FCC 
Auction System) during a bidding round in which no bids are placed or 
withdrawn, the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility 
will be preserved. An automatic waiver applied by the FCC Auction 
System in a round in which there are no new bids, withdrawals, or 
proactive waivers will not keep the auction open. A bidder cannot apply 
a proactive waiver after bidding in a round, and applying a proactive 
waiver will preclude a bidder from placing any bids in that round. 
Applying a waiver is irreversible; once a proactive waiver is 
submitted, that waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if the round has not 
yet closed.
    47. Consistent with recent auctions of commercial wireless 
spectrum, the Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction 73 be 
provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used as set forth 
herein at the bidder's discretion during the course of the auction. The 
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
 iv. Reserve Prices or Minimum Opening Bids
a. Reserve Prices
    48. In the  700 MHz Second Report and Order, the Commission 
concluded that establishing separate aggregate reserve prices for all 
the licenses in each block of the 700 MHz Band spectrum to be offered 
in Auction 73 will serve the public interest. More specifically, the 
Commission directed the Bureau to adopt and publicly disclose block-
specific aggregate reserve prices, pursuant to its existing delegated 
authority and the regular pre-auction process and consistent with the 
Commission's conclusions in the  700 MHz Second Report and Order. The 
Bureau proposes that the sum of the provisionally winning gross bids 
for all licenses in each block must equal or exceed the disclosed 
aggregate reserve price for the block before the Commission will assign 
licenses in that block. For reasons discussed herein, the Bureau 
proposes to adopt the following block-specific aggregate reserve prices 
to be used pursuant to this proposal: Block A, $1.807380 billion; Block 
B, $1.374426 billion; Block C, $4.637854 billion; Block D, $1.330000 
billion; Block E, $0.903690 billion. The Bureau seeks comment on all 
aspects of this proposal, as well as comment on other proposals for 
implementing the

[[Page 48279]]

Commission's direction in the  700 MHz Second Report and Order.
    49. Background. Section 309(j) calls upon the Commission to 
prescribe methods for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a 
minimum opening bid amount when FCC licenses are subject to auction, 
unless the Commission determines that a reserve price or minimum 
opening bid amount is not in the public interest. Consistent with this 
mandate, the Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on the 
use of a minimum opening bid amount and/or reserve price prior to the 
start of each auction. If a reserve price is adopted, it may be 
disclosed or undisclosed.
    50. The Commission is statutorily obliged to consider and balance a 
variety of public interests and objectives when establishing service 
rules and licensing procedures with respect to the public spectrum 
resource. These objectives include promoting recovery for the public of 
a portion of the value of that resource. In the  700 MHz Second Report 
and Order, the Commission adopted innovative provisions with respect to 
licenses in each separate block of the 700 MHz Band, including 
provisions establishing a public/private partnership with respect to 
the D Block license, open platform requirements for licenses in the C 
Block, and geographic performance requirements with respect to licenses 
in the A, B, and E Blocks. To address the possibility that various 
factors, including but not limited to the innovative service rules 
adopted for 700 MHz Band licenses, might impact the recovery of a 
portion of the value of the public spectrum resource, the Commission 
concluded that the public interest requires that the auction of the 
licenses be subject to certain reserve prices.
    51. The Commission further recognized that, given the array of 
different conditions imposed on the licenses for different blocks, 
bidders may place sufficient value on licenses in a particular block to 
satisfy a reserve applicable to that block even though interest in 
licenses in another block may be too low to satisfy the latter block's 
aggregate reserve. The Commission therefore concluded that block-
specific aggregate reserve prices should be used and directed the 
Bureau to adopt auction procedures that will enable licensing of 
specific blocks provided that the auction results satisfy the block-
specific reserve prices. In this regard, the Commission expressly noted 
that under procedures typical of Commission auctions, a bidder would be 
able to raise its own provisionally winning bid(s) to attempt to 
satisfy the reserve price for licenses in any spectrum block.
    52. The Commission concluded that, in order to recover an 
appropriate portion of the value of the public spectrum resource, the 
block-specific aggregate reserve prices should reflect current 
assessments of the potential market value of licenses for the 700 MHz 
Band. The Commission directed that this assessment be based on various 
factors including, but not limited to, the characteristics of this band 
and the value of other recently auctioned licenses, such as licenses 
for Advanced Wireless Services. The Commission reasoned that using AWS-
1 auction results might be an appropriate guide for setting block-
specific reserve prices reflecting a conservative estimate of final 
market value. For instance, spectrum in the 700 MHz Band possesses 
superior propagation characteristics to AWS-1 spectrum. In addition, as 
of February 18, 2009, the 700 MHz Band spectrum will be unencumbered, 
while full access to AWS-1 spectrum requires the relocation of both 
Government and commercial incumbent users. Thus, other factors aside, 
700 MHz Band licenses with comparable geographic service areas and 
bandwidth should have a higher market value than AWS-1 licenses.
    53. The Commission expressly noted that the detailed rules 
regarding the D Block license, the D Block licensee's required 
construction of a network to be shared by public safety service users, 
and the resulting limitations on the flexibility of the D Block 
licensee, should be given weight in assessing the D Block's potential 
market value. Based solely on geographic area and spectrum block size, 
AWS-1 auction results might suggest a D Block reserve price of $1.7 
billion. However, in light of the D Block license conditions essential 
to the public safety purpose of the public/private partnership, it 
might be appropriate to expect bidders to bid only about 75 percent to 
80 percent of such an amount, or about $1.33 billion. In addition, when 
determining relative valuation of other blocks, the Bureau should 
consider the relative valuation of differing blocks in the recent 
auction of AWS-1 licenses.
    54. Discussion. The Commission directed the Bureau to establish 
block-specific reserve prices by taking into account a conservative 
estimate of market value based on auction results for AWS-1 spectrum 
licenses, as noted herein and in the  700 MHz Second Report and Order, 
as well as various factors including, but not limited to, the 
characteristics of this band. Using AWS-1 auction results as a guide, 
the sum of block-specific reserves would amount to about $10.4 billion. 
The Commission also provided specific guidance in setting the reserve 
applicable to the D Block license, suggesting that an amount of 
approximately $1.33 billion would be appropriate. Consistent with the 
guidance of the Commission, the Bureau proposes the following block-
specific aggregate reserve prices for Auction 73: Block A, $1.807380 
billion; Block B, $1.374426 billion; Block C, $4.637854 billion; Block 
D, $1.330000 billion; Block E, $0.903690 billion. Together, these 
block-specific aggregate reserves sum to $10.053350 billion.
    55. As the Commission has already noted, the D Block reserve price 
of $1.33 billion is discounted from an amount based more closely on 
AWS-1 bids because of the unique service rules and related obligations 
imposed upon the D Block licensee. For the A, B, C, and E Blocks, the 
Bureau bases the reserve prices on the respective market value 
estimates using AWS-1 bids, adding one percent, and rounding to the 
nearest thousand dollars. Because of the value-enhancing propagation 
characteristics and relatively unencumbered nature of the 700 MHz Band 
spectrum, the Bureau believes these are conservative estimates. The 
Bureau seeks comment on these proposed reserve prices and specifically 
on whether any or all of them should be higher or lower than proposed 
here.
    56. The Bureau proposes to consider gross bid amounts rather than 
net bid amounts in determining whether the block-specific reserve 
prices have been met. Anonymous bidding procedures, which the Bureau 
proposes to apply in Auction 73 at Commission direction, preclude 
disclosing net bid amounts until after the close of bidding. Therefore, 
were the block-specific reserve prices to be set in net rather than 
gross terms, during the auction bidders and the public would be less 
able to monitor whether provisionally winning bids had met the 
applicable reserve prices.
b. Minimum Opening Bids
    57. In contrast to a reserve price, a minimum opening bid is the 
minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction below which no 
bids will be accepted. It is generally used to accelerate the 
competitive bidding process. Also, the auctioneer often has the 
discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount later in the 
auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the 
reserve price to be the same amount.

[[Page 48280]]

    58. In light of Section 309(j)'s requirement to prescribe methods 
for establishing reasonable minimum opening bid amounts for licenses 
subject to auction unless such bid amounts are not in the public 
interest, the Bureau proposes to establish minimum opening bid amounts 
for Auction 73. The Bureau believes a minimum opening bid amount, which 
has been used in other auctions, is an effective bidding tool for 
accelerating the competitive bidding process.
    59. Specifically, for Auction 73, the Bureau proposes to calculate 
minimum opening bid amounts on a license-by-license basis using a 
method that takes into consideration, among other factors, the winning 
bids for AWS-1 licenses in Auction 66. This approach for Auction 73 
minimum opening bid amounts draws on the Auction 66 prices that were 
bid on licenses for the exact same geographic areas. This approach 
makes it possible to establish somewhat higher minimum opening bids for 
licenses that may likely sell for relatively higher prices, thereby 
potentially reducing the number of bidding rounds necessary for 
licenses to reach their final auction prices. Specifically, the Bureau 
proposes to calculate minimum opening bid amounts as follows: (1) For 
licenses covering geographic areas in the 50 states for which all of 
the corresponding licenses offered in Auction 66 for the exact same 
geographic area were sold, 25 percent of the dollars per MHz per 
population (MHz-pop) of the net amounts of the Auction 66 winning bids 
for licenses covering the same geographic license area, subject to a 
minimum of $0.03/MHz-pop; (2) for licenses covering geographic areas 
for which a corresponding Auction 66 license was unsold, $0.01/MHz-pop; 
(3) for licenses covering the Gulf of Mexico, $1,000 per MHz; and (4) 
for all remaining licenses, $0.01/MHz-pop. For all licenses, the 
results of these calculations are subject to a minimum of $500 per 
license and are rounded using the Bureau's standard rounding procedure. 
The Bureau proposes to calculate the minimum opening bid for any 
package as the sum of the minimum opening bids for the licenses in the 
package. The proposed minimum opening bid amount for each license 
available in Auction 73 is set forth in Attachment A of the Auction 73 
Comment Public Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
    60. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bid amounts 
will result in unsold licenses or are not reasonable amounts, they 
should explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an 
alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims 
with valuation analyses and suggested amounts or formulas. In 
establishing minimum opening bid amounts, the Bureau particularly seeks 
comment on such factors as the amount of spectrum being auctioned, the 
availability of technology to provide service, the size of the service 
areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands and any other 
relevant factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of 
the licenses being auctioned. The Bureau also seeks comment on whether, 
consistent with section 309(j), the public interest would be served by 
having no minimum opening bid amounts or higher minimum opening bid 
amounts. Furthermore, commenters may wish to comment on whether, given 
the proposed block-specific aggregate reserve prices, it would be 
desirable to have different minimum opening bid formulas for different 
blocks. For example, higher minimum opening bids could reduce the 
number of rounds it takes for block-specific aggregate reserve prices 
to be met. Commenters may also wish to address the general role of 
minimum opening bids in managing the pace of the auction. Would it be 
preferable for auction pace to be controlled by minimum opening bids--
for example, by setting higher minimum opening bids to reduce the 
number of rounds it takes licenses to reach their final prices--or 
through other means such as changes to bidding schedules or activity 
requirements?
 v. Bid Amounts
    61. The Bureau proposes that, in each round, eligible bidders be 
able to place a bid on a given license or package using one or more 
pre-defined bid amounts. Under this proposal, the FCC Auction System 
interface will list the acceptable bid amounts for each license or 
package.
    62. Minimum Acceptable Bids. The first of the acceptable bid 
amounts is called the minimum acceptable bid amount. The minimum 
acceptable bid amount for a license will be equal to its minimum 
opening bid amount until there is a provisionally winning bid on the 
license or on a package that includes the license. The minimum 
acceptable bid amount for a package will be the sum of the minimum 
acceptable bid amounts for the licenses in the package. Minimum 
acceptable bids are calculated based on current price estimates and an 
activity-based formula.
    63. Current Price Estimates. After there is a provisionally winning 
bid covering a license, the FCC Auction System will determine a current 
price estimate (CPE) for each license in each round as a basis for 
calculating minimum acceptable bids. For non-C Block licenses the CPE 
is the provisionally winning bid amount, so that minimum acceptable 
bids are based on provisionally winning bid amounts, as in a standard 
SMR auction without package bidding. For licenses in the C Block 
subject to HPB, if a bid on an individual license is provisionally 
winning, the CPE for that license is the provisionally winning bid 
amount. If a package bid is provisionally winning, CPEs for individual 
licenses in the package are constructed by scaling up the bids on 
individual licenses so that the sum of the license CPEs equals the 
provisionally winning package bid. Bids are scaled up by adding shares 
to the highest bid received so far in the auction for each license in 
the package. These shares are proportional to the bidding units 
associated with each license relative to the total number of bidding 
units in the package. If, contrary to the proposal here, there are 
multiple levels of packages, license bids may need to have additional 
shares added in order to scale up to the package bids at higher levels 
of aggregation. The mechanism for determining CPEs in an SMR-HPB 
auction format is described in more detail in Attachment C of the 
Auction 73 Comment Public Notice.
    64. Activity-Based Formula. Once CPEs are calculated, minimum 
acceptable bids are then determined for each license as the amount of 
the CPE plus a percentage of the CPE. The percentage is calculated 
using the activity-based formula described herein. In general, the 
percentage will be higher when many bidders are bidding on a license, 
or on a package containing a license, than when few bidders are bidding 
on a license.
    65. The percentage of the provisionally winning bid used to 
establish the minimum acceptable bid amount is calculated based on an 
activity index at the end of each round. The activity index is a 
weighted average of (a) The number of distinct bidders placing a bid on 
the license, including package bids, in that round, and (b) the 
activity index from the prior round. Specifically, the activity index 
is equal to a weighting factor times the number of bidders placing a 
bid covering the license in the most recent bidding round plus one 
minus the weighting factor times the activity index from the prior 
round. The additional percentage is determined as one plus the activity 
index times a minimum percentage amount, with the result not to exceed 
a given maximum. The additional percentage is then multiplied by the

[[Page 48281]]

CPE amount to obtain the minimum acceptable bid for the next round. The 
Bureau proposes initially to set the weighting factor at 0.5, the 
minimum percentage at 0.1 (10%), and the maximum percentage at 0.2 
(20%). Hence, at these initial settings, the minimum acceptable bid for 
a license will be between ten percent and twenty percent higher than 
the CPE (which, for non-C Block licenses not subject to HPB, will equal 
the provisionally winning bid), depending upon the bidding activity 
covering the license. Equations and examples are shown in Attachment B 
of the Auction 73 Comment Public Notice.
    66. Additional Bid Amounts. Any additional bid amounts are 
calculated using the minimum acceptable bid amount and a bid increment 
percentage--more specifically, by multiplying the minimum acceptable 
bid by one plus successively higher multiples of the bid increment 
percentage. If, for example, the bid increment percentage is ten 
percent, the calculation of the first additional acceptable bid amount 
is (minimum acceptable bid amount) * (1 + 0.1), or (minimum acceptable 
bid amount) * 1.1; the second additional acceptable bid amount equals 
the minimum acceptable bid amount times one plus two times the bid 
increment percentage, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.2, etc. 
The Bureau will round the results of these calculations and the minimum 
acceptable bid calculations using the Bureau's standard rounding 
procedures. The Bureau proposes initially to set the bid increment 
percentage at 0.1.
    67. In the case of a license for which the provisionally winning 
bid has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal 
the second highest bid received for the license.
    68. For Auction 73, for non-C Block licenses, the Bureau proposes 
to begin the auction with one acceptable bid amount per license (the 
minimum acceptable bid amount). For C Block licenses subject to HPB, 
the Bureau proposes to begin the auction with three acceptable bid 
amounts per license (the minimum acceptable bid amount and two 
additional bid amounts) and one acceptable bid amount per package (the 
minimum acceptable bid amount and no additional bid amounts). While the 
Commission typically has provided for up to a total of nine acceptable 
bid amounts, the Bureau departs from past procedure because its 
experience indicates that other methods for controlling the pace of the 
auction (for example, changing the minimum and maximum percentages in 
the activity-based minimum acceptable bid formula described herein, or 
increasing the number of bidding rounds per day) are more effective in 
that regard.
    69. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum 
acceptable bid amounts, the additional bid amounts, the number of 
acceptable bid amounts, and the parameters of the formulas used to 
calculate minimum acceptable bid amounts and additional bid amounts if 
it determines that circumstances so dictate. Further, the Bureau 
retains the discretion to do so on a license-by-license and package-by-
package basis. The Bureau also retains the discretion to limit: (a) The 
amount by which a minimum acceptable bid for a license may increase 
compared with the corresponding provisionally winning bid, and (b) the 
amount by which an additional bid amount may increase compared with the 
immediately preceding acceptable bid amount. For example, the Bureau 
could set a $10 million limit on increases in minimum acceptable bid 
amounts over provisionally winning bids. Thus, if the activity-based 
formula calculates a minimum acceptable bid amount that is $20 million 
higher than the provisionally winning bid on a license, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount would instead be capped at $10 million above the 
provisionally winning bid. The Bureau seeks comment on the 
circumstances under which it should employ such a limit, factors the 
Bureau should consider when determining the dollar amount of the limit, 
and the tradeoffs in setting such a limit or changing parameters of the 
activity-based formula, such as changing the minimum percentage. If the 
Bureau exercises this discretion, it will alert bidders by announcement 
in the FCC Auction System.
    70. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals. If commenters 
disagree with the Bureau's proposal to begin the auction with one 
acceptable bid amount per most licenses and per package, they should 
suggest an alternative number of acceptable bid amounts to use at the 
beginning of the auction, an alternative number to use later in the 
auction, and whether the same number of bid amounts should be used for 
both licenses and packages. Commenters may wish to address the role of 
the minimum acceptable bids and the number of acceptable bid amounts in 
managing the pace of the auction and the tradeoffs in managing auction 
pace by bidding schedule changes, by changing the activity requirements 
or bid amount parameters, or by using other means. Given the proposed 
block-specific aggregate reserve prices, commenters may wish to address 
the desirability of setting bid amount parameters such that the reserve 
prices may be met more quickly, or whether it would be preferable to 
constrain bid amounts such that prices rise more slowly.
 vi. Provisionally Winning Bids
    71. After each round of bidding, the FCC Auction System determines 
which combination of bids together provides the greatest aggregate 
gross amount and is therefore provisionally winning. If the auction 
were to close at the end of that round, the provisionally winning bids 
would become final winning bids, provided that applicable reserve 
prices had been met. For the 1,087 licenses not subject to package 
bidding, the FCC Auction System determines a provisionally winning bid 
for each license based on the highest bid amount received for the 
license, taking into account the bids placed in the round and the 
provisionally winning bids from the previous round. For licenses in the 
C Block subject to HPB, the FCC Auction System will determine which 
combination of individual and package bids yields the highest aggregate 
gross bid amount, taking into consideration each bidder's highest bid 
on each license or package submitted up to that point in the auction. 
These bids become the provisionally winning bids for the round.
    72. In order to determine which combination of bids on licenses 
and/or packages yields the highest aggregate bid amount in a HPB 
auction, the FCC Auction System compares aggregate bid amounts across 
the various levels in a recursive process. It first compares, for each 
package in the second level, the sum of the highest individual license 
bids from the first level with the highest bids on packages in the 
second level containing those licenses. If the Bureau decides to 
include more than two levels, for each package in any subsequent level, 
the FCC Auction System would compare the highest bid on the package 
with the highest combination of bids from previous levels corresponding 
to licenses in that package. Those bids that generate the maximum total 
bid amounts become provisionally winning. Attachment C of the Auction 
73 Comment Public Notice provides additional detail on this procedure.
    73. For licenses subject to package bidding in SMR-HPB, the FCC 
Auction System considers each bidder's highest bid on each license or 
package when determining the provisionally winning bids. Consequently, 
for licenses in the C Block, an individual license or package bid that 
does not become a provisionally winning bid at the conclusion of the 
round in which it was placed may

[[Page 48282]]

become a provisionally winning bid at the conclusion of a subsequent 
round. This may occur even if the bidder does not have the bidding 
eligibility to cover the newly-provisionally winning bid. This 
contrasts with the SMR procedure used for licenses not subject to 
package bidding, in which only provisionally winning bids from the 
previous round and bids placed during the round are considered when 
determining provisionally winning bids.
    74. The Bureau proposes procedures to permit bidders on C Block 
licenses or packages to drop from consideration a limited number of 
non-provisionally winning bids on such licenses and/or packages. 
However, provisionally winning bids for licenses subject to package 
bidding cannot be withdrawn, as discussed herein.
    75. If more than one set of bids generates the same highest 
aggregate gross bid amount (i.e., the sets of bids are tied), the FCC 
Auction System will break ties randomly. Specifically, the FCC Auction 
System will assign a random number to each license in each bid upon 
submission. In the event of ties among bids that generate the highest 
aggregate gross bid amount, the set of bids with the highest sum of 
random numbers becomes provisionally winning. Bidders, regardless of 
whether they hold a provisionally winning bid, can submit higher bids 
in subsequent rounds. However, if the auction were to end with no other 
bids being placed, the winning bidders would be those that placed the 
provisionally winning bids.
    76. The set of provisionally winning bids is determined after every 
round in which new bids are submitted or provisionally winning bids are 
withdrawn, if applicable. As stated herein, the provisionally winning 
bids at the end of the auction become winning bids provided that 
applicable reserve prices have been met.
 vii. Bid Removal
    77. Before the close of a bidding round, a bidder has the option of 
removing any bid placed in that round. By removing bids a bidder may 
effectively unsubmit any bid placed within that round. Once a round 
closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. In contrast to the bid 
withdrawal provisions described herein, a bidder removing a bid placed 
in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal payment. The Bureau 
seeks comment on these bid removal procedures.
 viii. Bid Withdrawal and Dropped Bids
    78. Bid Withdrawals. The Commission has previously found that, in 
certain circumstances, allowing bid withdrawals facilitates efficient 
aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of backup strategies as 
information becomes available during the course of an auction. The 
Commission noted, however, that in some instances bidders may seek to 
withdraw bids for improper reasons and should, therefore, be subject to 
bid withdrawal payment provisions. Moreover, the Commission gave the 
Bureau discretion in managing the auction to limit the number of 
withdrawals to prevent any bidding abuses. The Commission stated that 
the Bureau should exercise its discretion, consider limiting the number 
of rounds in which bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent bidders from 
bidding on a particular market if the Bureau finds that a bidder is 
abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal procedures.
    79. Applying this reasoning to Auction 73, the Bureau proposes to 
allow a limited number of bid withdrawals under certain circumstances. 
Specifically, bidders will be allowed to withdraw their provisionally 
winning bids on licenses not subject to package bidding (i.e., all 
licenses except C Block), but in no more than two rounds of the 
auction. The two rounds in which a bidder may withdraw provisionally 
winning bids will be at the bidder's discretion. Otherwise, withdrawals 
must be in accordance with the Commission's rules. Under this proposal, 
there is no limit on the number of provisionally winning bids that a 
bidder may withdraw in either of the rounds in which it withdraws bids. 
After a provisionally winning bid for a license is withdrawn, the 
minimum acceptable bid for the license will be set to the next highest 
bid on the license, and the license will revert to the FCC (i.e., there 
will not be a provisionally winning bidder on the license).
    80. With respect to licenses subject to package bidding (i.e., the 
C Block), bidders have the option of placing bids on certain 
predetermined packages of licenses, thereby reducing their risk of 
winning some, but not all, of the licenses in those packages. While the 
predetermined packages may not coincide with the all or nothing 
aggregation needs of all bidders, the hierarchical packages should 
significantly reduce the overall exposure risk in the auction that 
bidders will win only some of the licenses in a desired set. Therefore, 
to the extent that package bids allow bidders to avoid such risk, 
withdrawals are less useful to bidders.
    81. At the same time, withdrawals by one bidder on licenses subject 
to package bidding can be more disruptive to the bidding strategies of 
others than withdrawals on licenses not subject to package bidding. 
Whether a bid on a license not subject to package bidding becomes 
provisionally winning depends only upon whether it is the highest bid 
submitted for the license and, in the case of ties, on its random 
number assignment. In contrast, whether a bid becomes provisionally 
winning on a license subject to package bidding depends in part upon 
the particular configuration of bids submitted by other bidders that 
cover the same license. Consequently, a withdrawn bid on a license 
subject to package bidding has the potential to alter the composition 
of the provisionally winning bids, and may adversely affect other 
bidders.
    82. Therefore, because the potential benefits to bidders from being 
able to withdraw bids are likely to be lower, and because the potential 
harms to other bidders from withdrawn bids are potentially much 
greater, the Bureau proposes to permit withdrawals only on licenses not 
subject to package bidding.
    83. Dropped Bids. With respect to the C Block licenses, since HPB 
considers bids made in previous rounds when determining provisionally 
winning bids, it is possible that a bid for a package or a license 
subject to package bidding can become provisionally winning many rounds 
after it was placed. These non-provisionally winning bids are useful to 
the auction since they enhance the ability of bidders interested in 
single licenses or smaller packages to combine their bids with the bids 
of others to compete with a large package bid, and they provide 
stability to the process for determining current price estimates. It 
may be the case, however, that a bidder wishes to focus on alternative 
licenses instead, and no longer wishes to win one of its previous bids. 
In order to allow bidders to opt out of non-provisionally winning 
considered bids that they no longer wish to win, the Bureau proposes 
that under HPB, for licenses subject to package bidding, bidders be 
allowed a limited number of opportunities to drop non-provisionally 
winning bids from further consideration in the auction.
    84. Eliminating non-provisionally winning bids from consideration 
may affect the current price estimates of other licenses, thereby 
affecting other bidders. This ability to affect the bids of other 
bidders may lead to undesirable strategic use of dropped bids. 
Therefore, the Bureau proposes to permit bidders to drop non-
provisionally winning bids on packages and on licenses subject to 
package bidding in no more than one round of the auction. To discourage 
bidders from dropping bids in order to

[[Page 48283]]

disadvantage their competitors the Bureau also proposes the following 
restrictions on the circumstances under which bids may be dropped and 
on the bidder's subsequent bidding activity: (1) A bidder that is a 
provisionally winning bidder on a package will not be permitted to drop 
bids on licenses or sub-packages that are included in the package; (2) 
a bidder that drops its bids on a license or package will not be 
permitted to submit further bids on that particular license or package 
during the auction; and (3) a bidder that drops its bids on a license 
or package will not be permitted to submit any bids on packages 
containing that license or package for the duration of the auction.
    85. No payments are associated with dropped bids. The round in 
which a bidder may drop non-provisionally winning bids from 
consideration will be at the bidder's discretion. The Bureau seeks 
comment on these proposals. The Bureau also seeks comment on the 
possibilities of not allowing dropped bids herein, of allowing dropped 
bids not subject to all the restrictions proposed, and of imposing 
other restrictions than those proposed herein.

D. Considerations Relating to Certain Post-Auction Payment Rules

 i. Apportioning Package Bids
    86. Given that the Commission has determined that package bidding 
will be used for the C Block licenses in Auction 73, the Bureau seeks 
comment on the appropriate mechanism for apportioning package bids 
among the individual licenses comprising the package. In package 
bidding, when a bidder places an all-or-nothing bid on a package of 
licenses, there will be no identifiable bid amounts on the individual 
licenses that comprise the package. However, the Commission's 
competitive bidding rules and procedures assume that the amount of each 
bid on an individual license always is known. For example, rules for 
calculating the amount of small business, new entrant, or tribal land 
bidding credits presume that the winning bid on the license is known. 
Similarly, in determining the amount of a default or withdrawal 
payment, which involves a comparison between the withdrawing or 
defaulting bidder's bid and a subsequent bid, the rules assume that 
there are bid amounts for individual licenses. Accordingly, the 
Commission recently adopted a new rule providing that, in advance of 
each auction with package bidding, the Commission shall establish a 
methodology for determining how to estimate the price or bid on an 
individual license included in a package of licenses.
    87. The Bureau proposes to apportion package bids when regulatory 
calculations require individual license bid amounts by dividing the 
package bid amount among the licenses comprising the package in 
proportion to the number of bidding units for each license. 
Alternatively, the Bureau proposes to use the final round CPEs for each 
license to apportion package bids. The Bureau seeks comment on these 
proposals.
ii. Interim Withdrawal Payment Percentage
    88. The Bureau seeks comment on the appropriate percentage of a 
withdrawn bid that should be assessed as an interim withdrawal payment, 
in the event that a final withdrawal payment cannot be determined at 
the close of the auction. In general, the Commission's rules provide 
that a bidder that withdraws a bid during an auction is subject to a 
withdrawal payment equal to the difference between the amount of the 
withdrawn bid and the amount of the winning bid in the same or a 
subsequent auction. However, if a license for which a bid has been 
withdrawn does not receive a subsequent higher bid or winning bid in 
the same auction, the final withdrawal payment cannot be calculated 
until a corresponding license receives a higher bid or winning bid in a 
subsequent auction. When that final payment cannot yet be calculated, 
the bidder responsible for the withdrawn bid is assessed an interim bid 
withdrawal payment, which will be applied toward any final bid 
withdrawal payment that is ultimately assessed.
    89. The Commission recently amended its rules to provide that in 
advance of the auction, the Commission shall establish a percentage 
between three percent and twenty percent of the withdrawn bid to be 
assessed as an interim bid withdrawal payment. When it adopted the new 
rule, the Commission indicated that it would consider the nature of the 
service and the inventory of the licenses being offered when 
determining the level of the interim withdrawal payment in a particular 
auction.
    90. Auction 73 will offer licenses under several different 
geographic licensing schemes and bandwidth sizes, and bidders may have 
a legitimate interest in using withdrawals to facilitate their efforts 
to aggregate licenses across potentially substitutable blocks of 
licenses not subject to package bidding. The Bureau also believes that 
the likely significant bid amounts for licenses in this auction (and 
resulting absolute value of withdrawal payments) will in themselves 
serve as a deterrent to unnecessary withdrawals. Therefore, the Bureau 
does not propose to set the interim bid withdrawal payment at the 
maximum rate of twenty percent. At the same time, the Bureau believes 
that a rate above the minimum three percent will help deter undesirable 
strategic use of withdrawals. Specifically, the Bureau proposes to 
establish an interim bid withdrawal payment of ten percent of the 
withdrawn bid in Auction 73. This proposal, moreover, is consistent 
with bid withdrawal payment percentages adopted in recent auctions for 
wireless licenses. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
iii. Additional Default Payment Percentage
    91. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the 
close of an auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment 
within the prescribed period of time, fails to submit a timely long-
form application, fails to make full payment, or is otherwise 
disqualified) is liable for a default payment under section 
1.2104(g)(2) of the Commission's rules. This payment consists of a 
deficiency payment, equal to the difference between the amount of the 
bidder's bid and the amount of the winning bid the next time a license 
covering the same spectrum is won in an auction, plus an additional 
payment equal to a percentage of the defaulter's bid or of the 
subsequent winning bid, whichever is less. Until recently this 
additional payment for non-combinatorial auctions has been set at three 
percent of the defaulter's bid or of the subsequent winning bid, 
whichever is less.
    92. The percentage of the bid that a defaulting bidder must pay in 
addition to the deficiency will depend on the auction format ultimately 
chosen for a particular auction. In non-package auctions, the amount 
can range from three percent up to a maximum of twenty percent, 
established in advance of the auction and based on the nature of the 
service and the inventory of the licenses being offered. In auctions 
with package bidding, the additional payment is set, pursuant to 
section 1.2104(g)(2)(ii), at 25 percent of the applicable bid. This 
higher level reflects the fact that a defaulted winning bid in an 
auction with package bidding may have affected which other bids were 
winning.
    93. The Bureau proposes to establish an additional default payment 
of fifteen percent with respect to bids on licenses in Blocks A, B, D, 
and E, which are not

[[Page 48284]]

subject to package bidding. As previously noted by the Commission, 
defaults weaken the integrity of the auction process and impede the 
deployment of service to the public, and an additional default payment 
of more than three percent will be more effective in deterring 
defaults. Moreover, the Bureau believes an additional default payment 
greater than ten percent, which the Commission has established in 
several recent auctions, is appropriate for Auction 73. Because no 
licenses in Blocks A, B, or E will be sold unless the aggregate reserve 
price for that block is met, bidders may have an additional incentive 
to bid on a license and later default (after determination that the 
reserve price has been met), in order to help ensure that the reserve 
price is met and other initial licenses in the block are assigned. The 
Bureau believes a higher additional default payment will help deter 
such behavior. With respect to the D Block, for which there is a single 
nationwide license which will not be assigned unless the D Block 
reserve price is met, a default by the winning bidder will delay the 
especially time-sensitive process of establishing a public-private 
partnership for the provision of public safety services. Given the 
unusually large public interest benefits of timely licensing the D 
Block, the Bureau proposes to deter defaults by imposing a higher 
additional default payment in that block as well. Accordingly, the 
Bureau proposes an additional default payment of fifteen percent on 
licenses in the A, B, D, and E Blocks. The Bureau seeks comment on this 
proposal.
    94. For licenses in the C Block, because they are subject to 
package bidding, the additional default payment will be the twenty-five 
percent as set forth in Section 1.2104(g)(2)(ii). This additional 
default payment will apply to all bids for packages and for licenses 
that are subject to package bidding.

V. Contingent Subsequent Auction

    95. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, the Commission 
concluded that if licenses for the A, B, C or E Blocks are not assigned 
because the auction results for the licenses as initially offered do 
not satisfy the applicable aggregate reserve price(s), the public 
interest will be served by offering alternative licenses for the 
relevant blocks as soon as possible after the initial auction. 
Similarly, if the license for the D Block is not assigned because the 
auction results do not satisfy the reserve price applicable to that 
license, the license for the D Block may be offered again in a prompt 
subsequent auction. As detailed in the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 
any alternative A, B and E Block licenses will be subject to 
alternative performance requirements. With respect to the C Block, any 
alternative licenses will be based on different geographic areas and 
spectrum bandwidth, as detailed herein. In addition, the alternative C 
Block licenses will not be subject to the open platform conditions 
applicable to the licenses initially offered for the C Block.
    96. The Commission directed the Bureau to permit only qualified 
bidders in the initial auction to participate in any contingent 
subsequent auction and to use the same auction design, including the 
applicable aggregate reserve price(s), insofar as possible. Pursuant to 
these directions, the Bureau proposes and seeks comment on the 
following procedures for a contingent subsequent auction. Except as 
detailed herein, the Bureau proposes to apply all of the procedures 
discussed herein for Auction 73 to such a subsequent auction.
    97. Licenses To Be Offered. Licenses in the A, B, D and E Block 
offered in any contingent subsequent auction will cover the same 
geographic areas and frequencies as such licenses offered in the 
initial auction. However, the alternative C Block will include C1 Block 
licenses offered in each of the 176 EAs and C2 Block licenses offered 
in each of the 12 REAGs. A complete list of alternative C Block 
licenses that would be offered in such an auction is included as 
Attachment D of the Auction 73 Comment Public Notice.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Frequencies
            Block                    (MHz)           Bandwidth         Pairing         Area Type       Licenses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C1...........................  746-752, 776-782  12 MHz..........  2 x 6 MHz......  EA.............          176
C2...........................  752-757, 782-787  10 MHz..........  2 x 5 MHz......  REAG...........           12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    98. Auction Design. If the subsequent auction offers only licenses 
not subject to package bidding in Auction 73, i.e., licenses for Blocks 
A, B, D, and/or E, the Bureau proposes to conduct the subsequent 
auction using the Commission's standard SMR auction design without 
package bidding. The procedures applicable to the auction will be the 
same as those discussed herein with respect to licenses for Blocks A, 
B, D and E in Auction 73, subject to the differences discussed herein.
    99. The Bureau is not certain that package bidding will be 
appropriate with respect to C1 and C2 Block licenses that may be 
available in a subsequent auction. The Bureau seeks comment on whether 
it should implement HPB for such alternative C Block licenses in a 
subsequent auction. If so, the Bureau seeks comments suggesting levels 
and ways of packaging licenses within levels using HPB or SMR-HPB 
auction formats, depending on whether the subsequent auction also 
includes licenses for Blocks A, B, D, and/or E.
    100. Aggregate Reserve Prices. As required by the Commission, the 
licenses in a subsequent auction will be subject to the same aggregate 
reserve price(s) applicable in the initial auction. In the 700 MHz 
Second Report and Order, the Commission noted that the Bureau has 
delegated authority to determine how to allocate the C Block reserve 
price upon auction of alternative licenses. Accordingly, the Bureau 
proposes to apply the C Block aggregate reserve price of $4.637854 
billion to all of the alternative C Block licenses. That is, the sum of 
the gross bid amounts on the C1 and C2 Block licenses must equal or 
exceed $4.637854 billion in order to meet the reserve price. The Bureau 
seeks comment on this proposal and on alternatives to this proposal. 
Commenters may wish to address whether, in the alternative, the C Block 
reserve price should be split between the C1 and C2 Blocks based on 
their respective bandwidths (e.g., $2.529739 billion and $2.108115 
billion for the C1 and C2 Blocks, respectively) or by other measures.
    101. Pre-Auction Application Process. As noted herein, the 
Commission has directed that only applicants found qualified to bid in 
Auction 73 may be eligible to bid in any contingent subsequent auction. 
The Bureau proposes that the subsequent public notice announcing the 
close of Auction 73 also will announce the auction number of the 
contingent subsequent auction and the deadline for pre-auction 
submissions in connection with any contingent subsequent auction. That 
public notice will specify the licenses that will be offered in the 
subsequent auction, the deadline by which qualified bidders must select 
licenses to be offered in order to be eligible to bid on those 
licenses, and the deadline by

[[Page 48285]]

which such bidders must submit upfront payments to purchase bidding 
eligibility in the subsequent auction. The Bureau proposes that the 
public notice will provide that the deadline for selecting alternative 
licenses will be 10 business days from the date of the public notice 
and the deadline for submitting upfront payments will be 10 business 
days from the date of the selection deadline. This will enable bidding 
on the alternative licenses to begin less than two months after the 
public notice announcing the close of Auction 73. The Bureau seeks 
comment on this proposal.
    102. Effective Period for Anti-Collusion Rule. In the 700 MHz 
Second Report and Order, the Commission directed the Bureau to adopt 
any procedures that may enhance the effectiveness of an auction of 
licenses in Auction 73 or any subsequent contingent auction. In part, 
the Commission found that the Commission's anti-collusion rule should 
treat Auction 73 and any such subsequent auction as a single auction, 
given the related nature of the auctions. Accordingly, the applicable 
down payment deadline marking the end of the anti-collusion period for 
Auction 73 and any subsequent auction shall be the down payment 
deadline established following the close of the subsequent auction.
    103. Minimum Opening Bids. For a contingent subsequent auction, the 
Bureau proposes to calculate minimum opening bid amounts on a license-
by-license basis using the same approach as described herein that draws 
on the Auction 66 prices that were bid on licenses for the exact same 
geographic areas. The proposed minimum opening bid amounts for the C1 
and C2 Block licenses that would be available in a contingent 
subsequent auction are set forth in Attachment D of the Auction 73 
Comment Public Notice. For any licenses in other blocks offered in the 
same subsequent auction, the Bureau proposes the same minimum opening 
bid amounts set forth in Attachment A of the Auction 73 Comment Public 
Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals and other possible 
amounts for minimum opening bids. If commenters believe that these 
minimum opening bid amounts will result in unsold licenses or are not 
reasonable amounts, they should explain why this is so, and comment on 
the desirability of an alternative approach. Commenters are advised to 
support their claims with valuation analyses and suggested amounts or 
formulas. The change of conditions with respect to any licenses for the 
A, B, C and E Blocks to be offered in a subsequent auction should 
increase the value of the licenses and may support higher minimum 
opening bids. In addition, the bidding in the initial auction may 
provide further information regarding the appropriate level of minimum 
opening bids. If the Bureau modifies the minimum opening bids, it will 
announce the new minimum opening bids in the same public notice 
announcing pre-auction procedures.
    104. Additional Procedures. The Commission also directed the 
Wireless Bureau to consider what procedures may be appropriate to deter 
bidders from actions that might thwart the assignment of licenses in 
either auction. The Bureau proposes that otherwise eligible bidders 
will be denied bidding eligibility in a subsequent auction in the event 
that they default on any winning bids in the initial auction. The 
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal, as well as comment on any other 
proposals that may enhance the effectiveness of the auction of licenses 
in Auction 73 or any contingent subsequent auction.

VI. Deadlines and Filing Procedures

    105. Comments are due on or before August 31, 2007, and reply 
comments are due on or before September 7, 2007. All filings related to 
the auction of 700 MHz spectrum licenses should refer to AU Docket No. 
07-157. Comments may be submitted using the Commission's Electronic 
Comment Filing System (ECFS) or by filing paper copies. The Bureau 
strongly encourages interested parties to file comments electronically, 
and requests submission of a copy via the Auction 73 e-mail box 
([email protected]).
    106. This proceeding has been designated as a permit-but-disclose 
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons 
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda 
summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance 
of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects 
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and 
arguments presented is generally required. Other rules pertaining to 
oral and written ex parte presentations in permit-but-disclose 
proceedings are set forth in section 1.1206(b) of the Commission's 
rules.

Federal Communications Commission.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
 [FR Doc. E7-16677 Filed 8-20-07; 11:58 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P