[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 163 (Thursday, August 23, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 48320-48345]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-15985]
[[Page 48319]]
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Part II
Department of Homeland Security
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Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
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19 CFR Parts 4 and 122; 6 CFR Part 5
Advance Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Member Manifests
for Commercial Aircraft and Vessels; Final Rule
Privacy Act of 1974: Customs and Border Protection Advanced Passenger
Information System of Records; Notice
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Advanced Passenger
Information System; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 163 / Thursday, August 23, 2007 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 48320]]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
19 CFR Parts 4 and 122
[USCBP-2005-0003; CBP Dec. 07-64]
RIN 1651-AA62
Advance Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Member
Manifests for Commercial Aircraft and Vessels
AGENCY: Customs and Border Protection, DHS.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This rule adopts as final, with the modifications set forth in
this document, proposed amendments to Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) regulations concerning electronic manifest transmission
requirements relative to travelers (passengers, crew members, and, in
some instances, non-crew members) onboard international commercial
flights and voyages arriving in and departing from the United States.
The rule is designed to enhance national security and the level of
security provided under the regulations for the commercial air and sea
travel industries, and consequently increase national security in
general. The rule also implements the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, which requires that electronic manifest
information for passengers onboard commercial aircraft arriving in and
departing from the United States, and passengers and crew onboard
arriving and departing commercial vessels (with certain exceptions), be
vetted by DHS against a government-established and maintained terrorist
watch list prior to departure of the aircraft or vessel.
Under this final rule, there are three options for air carriers to
transmit manifest data for aircraft departing from or en route to the
United States: Transmission of passenger manifests in batch form by an
interactive method no later than 30 minutes prior to the securing of
the aircraft doors (APIS 30); transmission of individual passenger
manifest information as each passenger checks in for the flight, up to,
but no later than, the time the flight crew secures the aircraft doors
(APIS interactive Quick Query or AQQ); and transmission of passenger
manifests in batch form by a non-interactive method no later than 30
minutes prior to the securing of the aircraft doors (APIS 30 ``non-
interactive'').
For sea travel, CBP will require vessel carriers to transmit
passenger and crew manifests for vessels departing from the United
States no later than 60 minutes prior to departure. For vessels
departing from foreign ports destined to arrive at a U.S. port, CBP is
retaining the current requirement to transmit passenger and crew
arrival manifest data at least 24 hours and up to 96 hours prior to the
vessel's entry at the U.S. port of arrival.
DATES: Effective Date: February 19, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Neumann, Program Manager,
Office of Field Operations, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
(202-344-2605).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Acronyms and Abbreviations
The following acronyms and abbreviations are used throughout this
document:
APIS: The Advance Passenger Information System; the electronic
data interchange system approved by CBP for air carrier
transmissions (to CBP) of electronic passenger, crew member, and
non-crew member manifest data.
APIS 30: This refers to the two electronic batch passenger
manifest transmission options available to air carriers under this
final rule, one of which is interactive and the other of which is
not; both are so named because the batch passenger manifest must be
transmitted under either option no later than 30 minutes prior to
the securing of the aircraft (defined below).
APIS 60: This refers to the two electronic batch passenger
manifest transmission options proposed in the NPRM, one of which was
interactive and the other of which was not; both were so named
because it was proposed (but not adopted in this final rule) that
the batch passenger manifest be transmitted under either option no
later than 60 minutes prior to the aircraft's push-back from the
gate. This term can also apply to the transmission process for
commercial vessels departing from the United States, provided for in
this final rule to require passenger and crew manifest transmissions
60 minutes prior to departure.
AQQ: APIS Quick Query, an interactive electronic transmission
functionality for transmitting required individual passenger
manifest data to CBP through APIS.
ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act (2001).
CBP: Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
DHS: Department of Homeland Security.
eAPIS: CBP Internet functionality for air carriers making
required APIS transmissions to CBP.
eNOA/D: Refers to U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Internet functionality
available to vessel carriers for making required APIS transmissions
to CBP and required Notice of Arrival transmissions to the USCG.
EBSVERA: Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002.
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service.
IRTPA: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004.
OCS: Outer Continental Shelf (of the United States).
OMB: Office of Management and Budget.
PIA: Privacy Impact Analysis.
SORN: System of Records Notice; a notice required to be
published in the Federal Register under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C.
552a) concerning a group of any records under the control of any
agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the
individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other
identifying particular assigned to the individual.
TRIP: Travelers Redress Inquiry Program; a DHS program for
individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding
difficulties they experienced during their travel screening at
transportation hubs.
TSA: Transportation Security Administration, DHS.
TSC: Terrorist Screening Center, Department of Justice.
UN/EDIFACT: United Nations Electronic Data Interchange For
Administration, Commerce, and Trade.
USCG: U.S. Coast Guard, DHS.
US/EDIFACT: United States Electronic Data Interchange For
Administration, Commerce, and Trade.
Table of Contents
The SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this final rule sets forth
the basis, purpose, and particulars of this rulemaking and is organized
as follows:
I. Background and Purpose
A. Advance Passenger Information System (APIS)
B. Rationale for Change
1. Continued Threat of Terrorist Attacks Affecting Commercial
Travel
2. IRTPA
II. Discussion of the Final Rule
A. Air Carrier Requirements
1. Change Regarding Definition of ``Departure'' for Aircraft
2. Manifest Transmission Options
B. Vessel Requirements
III. Discussion of Comments
A. Comments Pertaining to the Proposed Rule
1. General Comments
2. Comments Beyond the Scope
3. Comments by (or on Behalf of) Air Carriers
4. Comments by (or on Behalf of) Vessel Carriers and Outer
Continental Shelf Operators
B. Comments Pertaining to the Regulatory Assessment
IV. Conclusion and Summary of Changes Made to the APIS Regulations
by This Final Rule
V. Regulatory Analyses
A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review)
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
F. National Environmental Policy Act
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
[[Page 48321]]
H. Signing Authority
I. Privacy Statement
I. Background and Purpose
On July 14, 2006, CBP published a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM or proposed rule) in the Federal Register (71 FR 40035) proposing
amendments to CBP regulations concerning the advance electronic
transmission of passenger manifests for commercial aircraft arriving in
and departing from the United States, and of passenger and crew
manifests for commercial vessels departing from the United States. The
proposed rule also solicited public comments. An economic analysis of
the rule was made available to the public at http://www.regulations.gov
(under docket number USCBP-2005-0003). This final rule discusses the
comments received by CBP on the proposed rule and adopts the proposed
amendments as final, with the modifications explained further below.
A. Advance Passenger Information System
The Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) is a widely-
utilized electronic data interchange system approved by CBP. APIS is
used by international commercial air and vessel carriers to transmit
electronically to CBP certain data on passengers and crew members. APIS
often will be referred to as ``the CBP system'' in this document to
reflect transmissions of information to and from CBP.
APIS was developed by the former U.S. Customs Service (Customs) in
1988, in cooperation with the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) and the airline industry. As a voluntary program, APIS
was widely used, making it nearly an industry standard. After a period
of voluntary participation, the Federal government implemented
requirements governing the advance electronic transmission of passenger
and crew member manifests for commercial aircraft and commercial
vessels in accordance with several statutory mandates. These mandates
include, but are not limited to: Section 115 of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Public Law 107-71, 115 Stat. 597;
49 U.S.C. 44909 (applicable to passenger and crew manifests for flights
arriving in the United States); section 402 of the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVERA), Public Law 107-
173, 116 Stat. 543; 8 U.S.C. 1221 (applicable to passenger and crew
manifests for flights and vessels arriving in and departing from the
United States); and CBP's general statutory authority under 19 U.S.C.
1431 and 1644a (requiring manifests for vessels and aircraft).
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) also regulates the
security of, among others, certain U.S. aircraft operators (49 CFR part
1544) and foreign air carriers (49 CFR parts 1546 and 1550) that
conduct passenger and all-cargo operations to, from, within, and
overflying the United States. In addition to these regulations, TSA has
implemented detailed security requirements tailored for specific
sectors of the transportation industry that are implemented through
security programs, Security Directives (SDs), \1\ and Emergency
Amendments (EAs). See, e.g., 49 CFR 1544.305, 1546.105, 1550.5. Under
certain SDs and EAs now in effect, TSA requires the advance submission
of crew member and non-crew member manifest information for certain
flights operating to, from, continuing within, and overflying the
United States.
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\1\ Security programs, SDs and EAs generally contain sensitive
security information under 49 CFR 1520.5(b)(2) and thus are not
disclosed to the general public.
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A more detailed description of the legal authorities for DHS to
collect advance passenger manifest information is set forth in a final
rule issued by CBP on April 7, 2005 (70 FR 17820) (the 2005 APIS Final
Rule), establishing CBP's current APIS regulations. See 19 CFR 4.7b,
4.64, 122.49a-122.49c, 122.75a, and 122.75b. The 2005 APIS Final Rule
also amended the APIS regulations to incorporate the requirement
pertaining to electronic manifest transmissions for passengers and crew
onboard vessels and aircraft arriving in and departing from the United
States (8 CFR 231.1 and 231.2, respectively). See also 8 CFR 217.7
(pertaining to the electronic data transmission requirement and the
Visa Waiver Program).
Under APIS, CBP requires air carriers and vessel carriers to
collect and transmit information that consists primarily of information
that appears on the biographical data page of travel documents, such as
passports issued by governments worldwide. Many APIS data elements
(such as name, date of birth, gender, country of citizenship, passport
or other travel document information) routinely have been collected
over the years by a country's government, when a traveler seeks entry
into that country, by requiring the traveler to present a government-
issued travel document containing that information. Today, CBP uses
this biographical data to perform enforcement and security queries
against various multi-agency law enforcement and terrorist databases in
connection with, as appropriate, international commercial flights to,
from, continuing within, and overflying the United States and
international commercial vessel voyages to and from the United States.
For commercial air travel, CBP currently requires air carriers to
electronically transmit passenger arrival manifests to CBP no later
than 15 minutes after the aircraft's departure from any place outside
the United States (Sec. 122.49a(b)(2)), and passenger departure
manifests no later than 15 minutes prior to departure of the aircraft
from the United States (Sec. 122.75a(b)(2)). Manifests for crew
members on passenger and all-cargo flights and non-crew members on all-
cargo flights must be electronically transmitted to CBP no later than
60 minutes prior to the departure of any covered flight to, continuing
within, or overflying the United States (Sec. 122.49b(b)(2)), and no
later than 60 minutes prior to the departure of any covered flight from
the United States (Sec. 122.75b(b)(2)).
For commercial sea travel, CBP currently requires vessel carriers
to electronically transmit arrival passenger and crew member manifests
at least 24 hours (for voyages of fewer than 24 hours), and up to 96
hours (for voyages of 96 or more hours), prior to the vessel's entry at
a U.S. port or place of destination, depending on the length of the
voyage (for voyages of 24, but less than 96 hours, transmission must be
prior to departure of the vessel from any place outside the United
States). See Sec. 4.7b(b)(2). A vessel carrier also must
electronically transmit passenger and crew member departure manifests
to CBP no later than 15 minutes prior to the vessel's departure from
the United States. See Sec. 4.64(b)(2).
CBP currently requires that manifest information for passengers,
crew members, and non-crew members, as appropriate, be electronically
transmitted for these aircraft and vessel arrivals and departures, and
for crew and non-crew member manifest information for flights
continuing within and overflying the United States. These regulations
serve to provide the nation, the carrier industries, and the
international traveling public, with additional security from the
threat of terrorism.
[[Page 48322]]
B. Rationale for Change
1. Continued Threat of Terrorist Attacks Affecting Commercial Travel
DHS's primary impetus for this rulemaking initiative is to respond
to the continuing terrorist threat facing the United States, the
international trade and transportation industries, and the
international traveling public. The proposed rule referenced several
terrorist incidents to demonstrate the longstanding and continued
nature of the threat, including terrorist hijackings of commercial
aircraft in the 1970s, the thwarted plot to explode 12 commercial
airliners over a 48-hour period in 1996, instances where credible
intelligence resulted in numerous flight delays and cancellations
during the 2003 holiday season, and repeated intelligence-generated
security alerts, including an alert identifying a threat to Washington,
DC, and New York City leading up to the 2004 Presidential election. The
NPRM also mentioned past terrorist attacks against passenger vessels to
demonstrate the wide range of possible targets that may be chosen by
terrorists. Terrorist attacks on rail systems in Madrid and London in
2004 and 2005, further demonstrate the continued threat of terrorism to
commercial travel. More recently, in August 2006, shortly after the
July 14, 2006, publication of the proposed rule, U.S. and British law
enforcement and intelligence agencies exposed a terrorist bomb plot in
England involving a threat to several U.S.-bound flights by London-
based terrorists intending to use common liquid materials to construct
a bomb onboard aircraft. These incidents underscore the need to
continue to review and revise travel and transportation-related
security programs and systems. And terrorists threaten not only human
life, but the economic well-being of the commercial air and vessel
carrier industries--industries of great importance to the United States
and world economies.
The current system--which requires transmission of information only
after departure for flights en route to the United States--has resulted
in costs to industry. Several times since Fall 2004, identification of
a high-risk passenger by DHS after departure of an aircraft en route to
the United States has resulted in the diversion of the aircraft to a
different U.S. port, or a ``turnback'' to the port of departure. While
necessary to safeguard both national security and the passengers on an
aircraft or vessel, these measures are costly to the affected carriers.
To address these legitimate threats of terrorism and enhance
national security, DHS and the air and vessel carrier industries, under
the governing statutes and regulations, are required to take steps to
alleviate the risks and protect these vital industries and the public.
2. IRTPA
On December 17, 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Public Law 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, was
enacted. Sections 4012 and 4071 of IRTPA require DHS to issue a notice
of proposed rulemaking to establish procedures to allow for pre-
departure vetting of passengers onboard aircraft, and passengers and
crew onboard vessels, bound for and departing from the United States.
IRTPA's goal is ensuring that potential terrorists are targeted prior
to departure of the aircraft or vessel.
Congress, in enacting IRTPA, expressly recognized the need to fully
perform vetting of manifest information prior to the departure of
commercial aircraft and vessels traveling to and from the United
States. Section 4012(a)(2) of IRTPA directs DHS to issue a rule
providing for the collection of passenger information from
international flights to or from the United States and comparison of
such information by DHS with a consolidated terrorist watch list
maintained by the Federal government before departure of the aircraft.
Section 4071(1) of IRTPA requires DHS to compare vessel passenger and
crew information with information from the consolidated terrorist watch
list before departure of a vessel bound for or departing from the
United States. In accordance with IRTPA, DHS will use the consolidated
terrorist watch list of known and suspected terrorists maintained by
the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
to vet passengers and crew members traveling on flights to and from the
United States and on vessels departing from the United States.
The IRTPA mandates that DHS collect manifest information in
sufficient time to ensure that the Federal government can perform
security analysis and take appropriate action prior to the departure of
aircraft and vessels. To meet this requirement, CBP must amend its
current APIS regulations. Accordingly, CBP, under this final rule, will
collect and vet required APIS data before passengers board aircraft
bound for or departing from the United States. For sea travel, CBP will
collect and vet passenger and crew data earlier than is permitted under
existing regulations for vessels departing from the United States, in
order to increase our ability to detect high-risk persons before they
can perpetrate a terrorist act.
Security is an ongoing process. Through this final rule, CBP
establishes new requirements for the pre-departure transmission of
traveler and crew data. These requirements will serve as a layer of
protection against high-risk travelers while facilitating lawful
travel.
II. Discussion of the Final Rule
On July 14, 2006, CBP published its NPRM in the Federal Register
(71 FR 40035) proposing to amend APIS regulations concerning aircraft
bound for and departing from the United States and vessels departing
from the United States. The preamble of the proposed rule sets forth
various discussions regarding the proposed amendments, the background
and purpose thereof, and the proposed manifest data transmission and
security vetting process. DHS recommends reading that publication for a
more detailed discussion and description of the proposed amendments.
A. Air Carrier Requirements
1. Change Regarding Definition of ``Departure'' for Aircraft
In the NPRM, CBP proposed to change the definition of ``departure''
of an aircraft from ``wheels-up,'' (e.g. the moment the landing gear is
retracted into the aircraft immediately after takeoff and the aircraft
is en route directly to its destination) to ``push back'' (e.g. the
moment the aircraft leaves the gate). This definition is important
because a carrier's obligation to transmit data to CBP has been tied to
departure.
CBP initially believed that redefining ``departure'' as noted
above, and instituting earlier manifest transmission time requirements
tied to that definition, would resolve these problems and provide
sufficient time for effective vetting of aircraft passengers prior to
departure. Thus, CBP proposed that ``departure'' for aircraft should be
defined to occur the moment the aircraft pushes back from the gate, a
point in the process closely proximate to the moment when the doors are
closed on the aircraft. CBP subsequently determined, however, that some
flights covered by the APIS regulations never ``push back'' from a gate
prior to departure. Therefore, CBP is not redefining ``departure'' in
this final rule; instead, CBP is adopting ``securing of the aircraft,''
or the moment the aircraft's doors are closed and secured for flight,
as the touchstone for transmitting information to CBP. See Sec.
122.49a(a).
[[Page 48323]]
2. Manifest Transmission Options
The proposed rule explains some of the security risks of high-risk
and potentially high-risk passengers boarding an aircraft before they
have been fully vetted. Such a passenger might have the opportunity to
plant or retrieve a disassembled improvised explosive device or other
weapon, the detonation of which could have grave consequences in loss
of life, damage to aircraft and airport infrastructure, and economic
harm to the airline industry and the U.S. and world economies in
general. Once on board, a terrorist or terrorists could attempt to
hijack or otherwise take over the aircraft with potentially devastating
effect. To address this risk, the NPRM proposed a system that would
enable CBP to prevent the boarding of a high-risk passenger, while
providing options for air carriers to transmit manifest information in
a manner suited to their operations.
The NPRM proposed three options for transmitting required manifest
data, two that employ an interactive process and one employing a non-
interactive process: (1) Transmitting complete manifests in batch form
no later than 60 minutes prior to departure of the aircraft (APIS
interactive batch or APIS 60); (2) transmitting passenger data as each
passenger checks in for the flight, up to but no later than 15 minutes
prior to departure (APIS interactive Quick Query or AQQ); and (3)
transmitting passenger manifests in batch form no later than 60 minutes
prior to departure by means of a non-interactive method (APIS 60 ``non-
interactive'').\2\ These three options remain in the final rule with
modification concerning the timing of transmissions. CBP has changed
the timing for transmission of passenger data to require transmission
of APIS batch submissions--both interactive and non-interactive--no
later than 30 minutes prior to the securing of the aircraft doors, and
the transmission of data by APIS AQQ up until the time the aircraft
doors are secured by flight crew. (Accordingly, APIS 60 is now referred
to as APIS 30 for both interactive and non-interactive batch options).
CBP determined that the change from 60 minutes to 30 is possible as a
result of system improvements developed during the period of heightened
alert after the August 2006 failed London bombing plot.
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\2\ As discussed in the proposed rule, carriers might elect not
to employ an interactive method because of the cost of modifying
their transmission systems or because their particular operations
are not well suited to interactive communication. Such carriers are
typically unscheduled air carrier operators, such as seasonal
charters, air taxis, and air ambulances, that currently employ eAPIS
(Internet method) for manifest data transmission.)
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Although the APIS regulations, under this final rule, will require
transmission of passenger manifest data for air carriers no later than
30 minutes before securing the aircraft's doors for batch
transmissions, and up to the time the aircraft's doors are secured for
AQQ transmissions, CBP also encourages air carriers to transmit
manifest information, if available, as soon as possible and up to 72
hours before the scheduled flight. While this early transmission is not
mandatory under this final rule, early transmission would provide
greater flexibility to CBP in vetting the information. This timing also
is consistent with the timing under consideration by TSA in the
development of its Secure Flight program. At their discretion, carriers
could begin making transmissions up to 72 hours prior to scheduled
departure under this final rule, which would--if the 72-hour
requirement in the Secure Flight rule becomes final--allow carriers to
avoid making a second set of system adjustments to comply with the
Secure Flight program's second phase pertaining to international
flights. Advance transmissions will enable earlier vetting by CBP and
earlier issuance of boarding passes by carriers if warranted by vetting
results, relieving the pressure that a high volume of later-transmitted
data could have on the carriers' operations. DHS believes that earlier
transmissions, though not required, would be to the carriers' advantage
and encourages carriers to adopt it as a best business practice. TSA
has published a proposed rule for the Secure Flight program in this
edition of the Federal Register.
The two interactive transmission options allow carriers to
electronically receive return messages from CBP in real time. This is
an improvement over the current APIS manifest transmission process, in
which CBP's communications with carriers are by telephone or email.
These real-time return messages can be sent to the carrier within
seconds (in AQQ) or within a minute or two (in batch transmission) of
the CBP system's receipt of passenger manifests or passenger manifest
data. Under the AQQ option, return messages may be received at the
carrier's check-in counter.
Either interactive option will require a modification to a
participating carrier's electronic transmission system. Therefore,
before commencing operation of the interactive system and transmitting
manifest information in accordance with either interactive option, a
carrier must be certified by CBP, i.e., CBP will test the carrier's
system and certify it as presently capable of operating as required.
(CBP notes that in the event of a system outage, carriers would use an
alternative communication procedure, regardless of which manifest
transmission option the carrier employed.)
Under this final rule, carriers choosing not to employ one of the
interactive transmission options will transmit passenger manifests in
batch form no later than 30 minutes prior to securing the doors by
means of a non-interactive method. This option is now referred to as
the ``APIS 30 non-interactive'' option. Because these carriers do not
have to modify their transmission systems, they will not require CBP
certification.
The interactive options are likely to be adopted by large carriers
and most of these carriers are expected to employ the AQQ option (or
both AQQ and APIS interactive batch).\3\ Small carriers that transport
significantly fewer international air passengers are likely to use the
APIS 30 non-interactive option.
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\3\ Large carriers are responsible for transporting over 95% of
all international air passengers involving arrivals at or departures
from a U.S. port.
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The manifest transmission and security vetting process set forth in
the NPRM has been modified in this final rule, in part to reflect a
more specific description of the various steps involved and to show
more precisely the roles of DHS's component agencies CBP and TSA, as
the government assumes the vetting function for APIS purposes
(currently performed by the air carriers). We note that the watch list
vetting process for international flights, in which CBP currently plays
a major role under existing APIS regulations, will be assumed
eventually by TSA, while, after this transition, CBP will continue to
require complete APIS transmissions by applicable deadlines to support
its traditional customs, immigration, and border enforcement/security
purposes. (TSA's role as a partner in this APIS process under this
final rule should not be confused with TSA's Secure Flight program, now
in development, for vetting domestic flights and for assuming, at a
later time, the vetting function for international flights.)
The APIS data transmission/security vetting process under this
final rule is a joint CBP/TSA operation, since it combines data
collection under the CBP APIS regulations through the CBP system;
initial, automatic vetting of data by the CBP system; and the further,
manual vetting by TSA analysts of data
[[Page 48324]]
related to passengers identified as high-risk (``not-cleared'') during
initial vetting. TSA is assisted in the further vetting process by the
TSC and, in some circumstances, by other Federal security/law
enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). The process involves the air carrier's transmission of passenger
APIS data to the CBP system no later than a specific deadline prior to
departure as specified in the final rule (but, as discussed above,
transmission of data as early as 72 hours prior to scheduled departure
is encouraged as a best business practice). The process also involves
initial, automated vetting of the data against the No-Fly and Selectee
watch lists by the CBP system, and a quick response by the CBP system,
sending the initial vetting result for each passenger to the carrier as
either a ``cleared, ``not-cleared,'' or ``selectee'' message. Together,
the No-Fly and Selectee watch lists contain data on known and suspected
terrorists, and persons involved in, and suspected of involvement in,
terrorist activities. Passenger data that matches or possibly matches
data on the No-Fly list will generate a ``not-cleared'' response from
the CBP system. An inadequate passenger record of transmitted APIS data
that cannot be properly vetted will also generate a ``not-cleared''
response. Passenger data that matches or possibly matches data on the
Selectee watch list will generate a ``selectee'' response from the CBP
system.
The message returned to the carrier by the CBP system, upon
completion of the initial vetting, determines what action the carrier
will take with respect to each passenger: the carrier will not issue a
boarding pass to, or board, any passenger generating a ``not-cleared''
instruction; the carrier will identify a ``selectee'' passenger for
secondary screening (typically, a further examination of the
passenger's person and/or baggage), in accordance with applicable TSA
requirements; and the carrier will be required to retransmit corrected
data or transmit new data relative to a passenger generating a ``not-
cleared'' instruction due to incomplete/inadequate data. A ``selectee''
passenger is issued a boarding pass with an instruction that secondary
screening is required.
CBP then forwards the data related to a passenger generating a
``not-cleared'' response to TSA for further analysis to confirm matches
and resolve false positives. At the same time, the carrier will
immediately contact TSA to seek resolution of the ``not-cleared''
message by providing additional information, if necessary. Where the
further vetting of ``not-cleared'' passengers results in such
passengers being cleared for boarding or in being identified instead as
``selectees,'' TSA will contact the carrier with appropriate
notification.
(a) Vetting Response Messages and Secondary Screening of ``Selectee''
Passengers
This final rule modifies the proposed rule to specify that a
``selectee'' vetting result also will be sent to the carriers by the
CBP system regardless of the transmission option chosen by the carrier
and that, in accordance with applicable TSA requirements, ``selectee''
passengers will be subject to secondary screening before entering the
secure area.
(b) Connecting Passengers
Unlike the proposed rule, the regulatory texts of this final rule
include a reference to connecting passengers with boarding passes whose
APIS data has not been collected by the responsible carrier and vetted
by the CBP system when they arrive at the connecting airport. The
applicable provisions of the regulation (the interactive batch and AQQ
provisions), as amended in this final rule, specify that carriers must
collect all required APIS data, at the gate or other suitable place,
and await appropriate vetting results (``cleared'' or ``selectee'')
before boarding these passengers (validation also occurs as carriers
will either swipe the travel document or personally observe it at the
gate). This is the only instance under the APIS process where a carrier
is allowed to issue a boarding pass to a passenger, or have a boarding
pass issued to a passenger by another carrier it has made arrangements
with concerning connecting passengers, for an APIS-covered flight
without first having received an appropriate vetting result for that
passenger.
Finally, where the interactive batch transmission option is
employed and connecting passengers with boarding passes arrive at the
gate (or other suitable location) within the 30-minute window, the
carrier is not required to wait 30 minutes from the time the data is
transmitted to secure the aircraft and depart, provided that
appropriate vetting results are received, and validation occurs, before
any connecting passenger is boarded.
(c) Effect of a ``Not-Cleared'' Instruction
In the NPRM, CBP proposed that a carrier using either of the batch
transmission options must not board a passenger subject to a ``not-
cleared'' vetting instruction. This final rule changes the requirement
to prohibit these carriers from issuing a boarding pass to such
passengers. This change merely brings the APIS regulation into
conformance with existing TSA requirements to which carriers are
already subject. CBP's proposed prohibition on issuing a boarding pass
to such passengers under the AQQ option also is adopted in the final
rule.
Also, the NPRM's regulatory text provides that a carrier is bound
by a ``not-cleared'' instruction, even when the further vetting process
has not been concluded before departure. While this specific language
does not appear in the regulatory texts of this final rule, the rule
makes clear that a carrier may not issue a boarding pass to, or board,
a ``not-cleared'' passenger unless such passenger is cleared to board
during further vetting and the carrier has received that further
vetting result (either a ``cleared'' or ``selectee'' instruction).
(d) ``Acknowledgement'' Requirement
CBP initially proposed that a carrier using the AQQ option must
contact CBP to acknowledge receipt of a ``not-cleared'' instruction.
This step in the process has been determined to present an unnecessary
burden on the electronic transmission/communication process.
Accordingly, CBP has removed this requirement from the final rule.
(e) ``Resolution Contact'' Requirement
In the NPRM, CBP proposed that a carrier using the AQQ transmission
option, at its discretion, could seek resolution of a ``not-cleared''
instruction by providing additional information about a ``not-cleared''
passenger to assist in the further vetting of that passenger. This
final rule makes this resolution contact mandatory for all carriers
regardless of the transmission option chosen and specifies that the
carrier must contact TSA for this purpose.
(f) Close-Out Message
CBP proposed that carriers, regardless of the transmission option
chosen, would send to CBP, no later than 30 minutes after departure, a
unique identifier for each passenger that checked-in for, but did not
board, the flight for any reason (referred to as a close-out message).
This final rule changes the close-out message requirement by applying
it only to the interactive transmission options (batch and AQQ),
specifying that transmission must be no later than 30 minutes after the
securing of the aircraft, and clarifying that the carrier may identify
passengers who did not board the aircraft in the close-out message by
[[Page 48325]]
specific passenger data (such as, and typically, by use of a
passenger's name).
B. Vessel Requirements
As explained in the NPRM, and mentioned previously in this final
rule, CBP determined that the appropriate level of security for vessels
departing from the United States is to prevent such a departure with a
high-risk passenger or crew member onboard (a known or suspected
terrorist identified by vetting against the terrorist watch list). This
determination was based on CBP's recognition that the commercial vessel
travel industry operates in a vastly different manner than does the air
travel industry. Commercial vessel carriers typically allow boarding
several hours (usually three to six hours) prior to departure. (CBP
also notes that the definition of ``departure'' for commercial vessels
is found in 19 CFR 4.0(g) and, for APIS purposes, is regarded to mean
the moment when the vessel, with all passengers and/or cargo onboard,
leaves the dock directly en route to its foreign destination.) Thus,
unlike the commercial air travel environment, a manifest transmission
requirement designed to prevent the possibility of a high-risk vessel-
boarding likely would require extraordinary adjustments to the
carriers' operations and have a significant impact on passengers. This
would frustrate CBP's intent, and the purpose of various requirements
governing Federal rulemaking, to achieve the agency's goal (enhanced
security) without imposing an unreasonable burden on affected parties.
Thus, CBP proposed that vessel carriers transmit passenger and crew
manifests for vessels departing from the United States no later than 60
minutes prior to departure. This timing requirement will remain the
same in this final rule. This change will achieve the level of security
sought by CBP for these vessels and thereby meet the purposes of the
governing statutes, including the pre-departure vetting mandate of
IRTPA. CBP noted in the NPRM that the electronic system for
transmission of required vessel manifest data (arrival and departure)
is now the (Internet-based) eNOA/D system of the U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG). This is not an interactive system; so, unlike air carriers
operating under the APIS 30 interactive or AQQ options, vessel carriers
would not have to obtain system certification.
After transmission of the manifest data, the initial automated
vetting process, which will involve vetting against the same terrorist
watch list used for aircraft passenger vetting, CBP will issue a ``not-
cleared'' instruction for matches, possible matches, and incomplete/
inadequate passenger records or crew data. Passengers or crew who are
not matched by CBP will generate ``cleared'' messages. Carriers will be
able to prevent the boarding of ``not-cleared'' persons if such persons
have not already boarded (due to the very early boarding allowed). CBP
notes that a ``not-cleared'' message returned to the carrier by CBP for
an inadequate record would instruct the carrier to retransmit complete/
corrected data.
CBP proposed that, during further vetting (which is the same
process as described previously for air carriers), passengers and crew
for whom ``not-cleared'' instructions were generated during the initial
automated vetting procedure would be either confirmed as high-risks or
resolved and cleared. The proposed rule pointed out that the current
requirement for batch manifest transmission--no later than 15 minutes
prior to a vessel's departure from a U.S. port--does not provide enough
time to fully vet passengers or crew members or allow, where necessary,
for the removal of a confirmed high-risk passenger or crew member from
a vessel prior to departure. The APIS 60 procedure implemented under
this final rule will provide CBP the time it needs, in the great
majority of cases, to fully vet ``not-cleared'' passengers and crew
members and to remove those confirmed as high-risk from the vessel
prior to departure, thereby achieving the appropriate level of security
sought by CBP. CBP does not guarantee these results in every instance
and much depends on the carriers' procedures for locating and de-
boarding identified high-risk travelers.
For vessels departing from foreign ports destined to arrive at a
U.S. port, CBP is retaining the current requirement to transmit
passenger and crew arrival manifest data at least 24 hours and up to 96
hours prior to a vessel's entry at the U.S. port of arrival. This
requirement is consistent with the USCG's ``Notice of Arrival'' (NOA)
requirements. (Under 33 CFR 160.212, arriving vessel carriers transmit
manifest data to the USCG to meet its NOA requirement. The data is then
forwarded to CBP, permitting additional compliance with CBP's APIS
requirement with the one carrier transmission.) Moreover, the threat
posed by a high-risk passenger or crew member once onboard a vessel is
different to some extent from that posed by a high-risk passenger
onboard an aircraft. A hijacked vessel's movements over the water and
its range of available targets could be more readily contained than
those of an aircraft, thus reducing the opportunity for a terrorist to
use the vessel as a weapon against a U.S. port or another vessel.
III. Discussion of Comments
The NPRM requested comments, to be submitted on or before August
14, 2006, regarding the proposed amendments and its accompanying
economic evaluation. The comment period was extended to October 12,
2006, by notice published in the Federal Register (71 FR 43681) on
August 2, 2006. A total of 54 comments were received. CBP responds to
the comments below, first to those pertaining to the proposed
amendments, and second, to those pertaining to the economic evaluation.
A. Comments Pertaining to the Proposed Regulation
1. General Comments
Comment: Five commenters requested an extension of the public
comment period for the NPRM.
Response: CBP extended the comment period an additional 60 days (to
October 12, 2006) in a notice published in the Federal Register (71 FR
43681) on August 2, 2006.
Comment: One commenter expressed general disagreement with the
proposed rule without noting specific issues. Several commenters
generally supported the NPRM. Two commenters expressed support for the
interactive APIS process. Another commenter expressed support for CBP's
assuming responsibility for watch list screening and removing this
responsibility from the carriers.
Response: CBP appreciates the supportive comments and is unable to
respond to non-specific disagreements.
Comment: One commenter expressed appreciation for CBP continuing to
provide the eAPIS transmission method for those carriers that cannot
implement the interactive APIS transmission options.
Response: CBP appreciates this comment and notes that it is working
to establish a Web interface that will greatly improve the speed and
security of APIS transmissions via eAPIS.
Comment: Three commenters urged that dialogue continue between CBP
and the airline industry prior to publication of the final rule. One
commenter stated that CBP should launch an aggressive outreach campaign
to inform the public of the new requirements. This commenter also asked
that CBP assemble an advisory group comprised of air carrier and CBP
representatives to examine emerging operational issues regarding
implementation of a final rule.
Response: CBP has worked extensively with the carriers and their
[[Page 48326]]
representatives throughout this rulemaking process and is committed to
continue that work to successfully and efficiently implement this final
rule. This communication between CBP and the industry serves the
essential purpose of an advisory group. CBP is committed to a robust
public outreach effort so that impacts of the final rule are minimized
and understood by the traveling public.
Comment: Numerous commenters stated that the proposed
implementation date for the final rule should be extended beyond 180
days. Alternatives suggested included 300 days, one year, 18 months,
and two years following publication of the final rule. Eight commenters
requested that CBP refrain from implementing the final rule until the
APIS program has been coordinated with TSA's Secure Flight program. Two
commenters suggested a phased approach to implementation of the rule
for the airline industry. One commenter asked that carriers be exempt
from employing interim transmission methods until certified by CBP to
use AQQ.
Response: CBP does not agree with these comments to prolong
implementation of the final rule. As was recently evidenced by the
increased security alert for flights departing from the United Kingdom,
there is, and continues to be, a real threat to the aviation industry.
CBP has been directly engaged with the air carrier industry in the
continued development of the pre-departure APIS process, and many air
carriers are taking steps to design their internal and external (third-
party) interface processes. CBP continues to work with the air carrier
industry to implement the pre-departure vetting of passengers. Carriers
that cannot transition their systems to implement either of the
proposed interactive options within the 180-day time frame will have to
employ the non-interactive batch transmission option after the delay
period's expiration. During the interim period, after publication of
the final rule and before expiration of the delay period, carriers will
be allowed to transmit manifest data by an available non-interactive
method. CBP will eventually discontinue email transmissions by
carriers, but eAPIS will continue to be available to carriers for
manifest transmissions.
Regarding coordination with the Secure Flight program, the APIS
pre-departure requirements under this final rule will likely be
effective prior to implementation of the Secure Flight program, which
remains in development at TSA. CBP, and TSA, however, have worked to
make programming changes required for APIS compliance compatible, to
the extent possible, with those that are anticipated to be required
under Secure Flight. For example, under the process to be implemented
under this final rule, CBP is encouraging, but not requiring under the
rule, carriers to make transmissions of data as early as 72 hours prior
to scheduled departure for early security vetting and early issuance of
boarding passes if warranted, a feature expected to be part of the TSA
Secure Flight program in some form. DHS encourages carriers to adopt
early transmissions as a best business practice. The CBP system will be
able to receive manifest data transmitted early, and CBP will perform
early vetting of this data if transmitted. CBP also is encouraging, but
not requiring, that carriers include in their transmissions redress
numbers issued by TSA (or any other unique passenger number approved by
DHS for the purpose) to facilitate identification of passengers on a
TSA cleared list (of passengers who have requested redress respecting a
previous false positive vetting result) that will be checked in the
vetting process.
Comment: One commenter stated that the NPRM, if adopted, would
infringe on First Amendment rights because the rule restricts free
movement of people into the United States.
Response: CBP does not agree that the changes made in this final
rule will restrict the free movement of people arriving in and
departing from the United States. Requiring carriers to submit
passenger information in accordance with current APIS regulations and
the amendments of this final rule, which affect the timing of data
transmission and process, does not deny or impede the ability of people
to travel to and from the United States. These regulations, as amended
by this final rule, are within CBP's authority pursuant to the Aviation
Transportation Security Act of 2001, the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, and the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. As stated by CBP in the 2005 APIS
Final Rule (70 FR 17828), the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
the right to travel abroad is not an absolute right and that ``no
government interest is more compelling than the security of the
Nation.'' Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). The Supreme Court
also has stated that the government may place reasonable restrictions
on the right to travel in order to protect this compelling interest.
See id. (reminding that the ``right'' of international travel can be
regulated within the bounds of due process); see also Eunique v.
Powell, 302 F. 3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fernandez, J.); Hutchins v.
District of Columbia, 188 F. 3d 531, 537 (DC Cir. 1999).
In addition, a ``Civil Liberties Costs and Benefits'' analysis was
included in the 2005 APIS Final Rule (70 FR 17847), and it concluded
that the non-quantified benefits (enhanced security, increased travel)
exceed the non-quantified costs (the collection of personal data that
would, to some extent, deter persons from traveling) flowing from the
rule. This final rule does not affect the collection of data
provisions. This final rule affects only the time requirements for
transmission of that data and the process by which it is collected and
transmitted to the CBP system and the system communicates with the
carriers to report security vetting results. CBP, without agreeing that
the rule's changes impose an additional cost on travelers, submits that
any increase in the deterrent impact on prospective legitimate
travelers that these changes might cause would be negligible, since
carriers already require international passengers to arrive at the
airport early and passengers will still be able to benefit from early
check-in processes. This negligible increase in non-quantifiable costs,
if there is one, should be weighed against the likely increase in the
non-quantifiable benefits that will derive from the timing and process
changes made in this final rule: an enhanced aviation security process,
with a greater ability to prevent a terrorist incident, and the
resultant possible increase in passengers who appreciate a safer air
travel environment. In the 2005 APIS Final Rule, CBP stated that the
regulation then published was designed to enhance the ability to
travel, not to restrict it. CBP believes that the security enhancement
achieved in this final rule published today will likewise further
enhance, rather than impair, the public's ability and willingness to
travel.
Comment: One commenter asked how and when the public would be
notified of the finalization of the rule.
Response: The publication of this final rule in the Federal
Register is notification that the rule has been adopted as final and
will become effective on February 19, 2008.
2. Comments Beyond the Scope of the Rule
Comment: Eight commenters submitted several comments on the AQQ
Interactive User Guide.
Response: Comments on the user guide (now known as the
``Consolidated User Guide'') are beyond the scope of this rule. The
APIS regulation, unlike
[[Page 48327]]
the guide, is not designed to provide detailed and comprehensive
technical specifications, guidance, or instructions for operation of
the electronic transmission system. An updated guide is currently in
preparation.
Comment: Four commenters stated that the Form I-94 Arrival/
Departure Record should be eliminated. One commenter stated that the
Form I-418 Passenger List-Crew List should be eliminated, and another
recommended that the general customs declaration (CF 6059B) be
eliminated.
Response: Comments on the Form I-94, Form I-418, and the general
customs declaration are beyond the scope of this rule.
Comment: One commenter stated that the planned PASS card should be
accepted in the air travel environment.
Response: Comments on the PASS card, the State Department's
proposed passport card for travel to the United States from within the
Western Hemisphere, are beyond the scope of this rule.
Comment: One commenter stated that the transit without visa (TWOV)
program should be reinstated.
Response: Comments on the currently suspended TWOV program, which
allowed passengers from certain designated countries to transit through
the United States without a visa, are beyond the scope of this rule.
Comment: One commenter stated that International Air Transport
Association (IATA) should develop a standard for transmission and
sharing of AQQ messages between air carriers.
Response: The decision to share APIS data between air carriers is
outside the purview of CBP's authority and beyond the scope of this
rule. While data-sharing agreements between carriers are business
decisions unique to each carrier or carrier alliance, CBP acknowledges
that such agreements would enhance the APIS data transmission/security
clearance process, particularly with respect to connecting passengers.
Comment: Two commenters stated that air cargo manifests could not
be submitted 60 minutes prior to departure without seriously disrupting
cargo operations on small carriers.
Response: CBP notes that this rule does not change any requirements
for submitting cargo manifests for aircraft or vessels. The rule is
narrowly applicable to passenger manifests for flights arriving in and
departing from the United States and passenger and crew manifests for
vessels departing from the United States. Comments on other sections of
the CBP regulations or any other provisions of the current APIS
regulations are beyond the scope of this rule.
Comment: Six commenters requested that the final rule require air
carriers to transmit to CBP only the APIS data elements that are
obtainable from the machine-readable zone of the travel document
presented by the passenger.
Response: The NPRM did not propose changes to the required data
elements under the APIS regulations; rather, the NPRM is limited to
proposed changes in the timing and manner of submission of this
information to CBP. Therefore, comments regarding required APIS data
elements are beyond the scope of this rule, although CBP, in this
document, encourages, but does not require, carriers to include in
their transmission of manifests or manifest data passenger redress
numbers issued by TSA (or another unique identifier approved by DHS for
the purpose) to facilitate resolution of possible matches.
Comment: One commenter asked if the proposed change regarding
vessel carrier transmission of passenger and crew manifests no later
than 60 minutes prior to departure would be applicable for vessels
departing from foreign ports bound for the United States. This same
commenter asked if APIS data could be transmitted 10 minutes prior to
departure. Another commenter asked if a final rule would affect pre-
clearance processing for voyages beginning in Canada and bound for the
United States.
Response: As set forth in the NPRM, the proposed change to a 60-
minute prior to departure requirement is applicable only for vessels
departing from the United States, not for vessels departing from a
foreign port bound for the United States. Comments on the vessel
arrival scenario are beyond the scope of this rule. CBP nonetheless
notes that for arriving vessels, CBP is retaining the requirement to
transmit passenger and crew manifest data at least 24 hours and up to
96 hours prior to a vessel entering the U.S. port of arrival.
Comment: Two commenters stated that the rulings and regulations
governing the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) should be completely reworked in conjunction with the USCG.
Response: Changes to the regulations and agency rulings pertaining
to OCS activities and the definition of the EEZ are beyond the scope of
this rule.
3. Comments From (or on Behalf of) Air Carriers
Comment: One commenter requested that CBP clarify in the
regulations that air carriers alone supply APIS data and be liable for
its accuracy.
Response: Under the current APIS regulations (Sec. Sec.
122.49a(b)(1) and 122.75a(b)(1)), commercial air carriers are
responsible for transmitting APIS manifest data. In addition, the
current regulations require the carriers to compare the travel document
presented by a passenger with the information it is sending to CBP for
the purpose of ensuring, to the extent possible in the circumstances,
that the information is correct, the document appears to be valid for
travel, and the person presenting the document is the one to whom it
was issued (Sec. Sec. 122.49a(d) and 122.75a(d)). The final rule does
not change these provisions.
Comment: One commenter asked that flights of less than one hour be
exempt from the rule, that flights between the United States and
territories in the Caribbean be exempt, and that carriers should be
able to submit a request for exemptions on certain routes. Another
commenter asked that passengers on flights chartered by the Department
of Defense (DOD) be exempt from the rule.
Response: CBP does not agree with these comments, and the final
rule's amendments will not include exemptions for the circumstances,
routes, or passengers described. However, the transmission of APIS data
is not required for flights between the United States and U.S.
territories and possessions. It also is noted that the APIS manifest
transmission requirement does not apply to active duty U.S. military
personnel traveling as passengers on DOD commercial chartered aircraft.
See Sec. Sec. 122.49a(c) and 122.75a(c).
Comment: Three commenters requested that carriers operating flights
from pre-clearance locations be exempt from APIS transmission
requirements for passengers that have been processed at those locations
prior to entering the United States. One commenter contended that
requiring APIS transmissions for these flights would be redundant.
Response: CBP disagrees with these comments. The amendments of the
final rule apply to flights from pre-clearance locations. Currently,
carriers departing from pre-clearance locations are required to ensure
that passengers are vetted for APIS purposes. Under this final rule,
carriers are required to collect and transmit all required APIS data
elements in accordance with applicable provisions (for either the batch
or the AQQ process), including the timing of manifest transmission and
others explained further in this section.
[[Page 48328]]
Comment: One commenter requested that the email system currently
employed to transmit APIS batch manifests be maintained until the new
interactive capabilities proposed are in place.
Response: CBP has established a web application, eAPIS, which will
allow submitters to upload batch manifests in lieu of an email
communication. Furthermore, CBP is developing a web service through
eAPIS that will afford a more automated process for manifest
submissions. CBP is expecting to discontinue email transmission for
APIS manifests in 2007, at which time email users can adopt the eAPIS
transmission process.
Comment: Four commenters inquired about the responsibility, under a
final rule, for vetting passengers against the terrorist watch list.
One commenter asked for clarification on the management of the list.
Two commenters asked if carriers would be responsible for checking air
carrier employees against the list. Three commenters requested
confirmation that, under the proposed AQQ option, the government will
perform terrorist watch list vetting for the domestic portion of an
international itinerary. One commenter asked for AQQ to be available to
vet airline crew.
Response: Under the manifest transmission/security vetting process
as implemented under this final rule, the government will perform No-
Fly and Selectee watch list vetting of passengers traveling on
international flights to and from the United States and of passengers
and crew traveling on international voyages departing from the United
States (use of the No-Fly list not being limited to aircraft vetting).
The carriers will be relieved of that responsibility upon the effective
date of this rule, but only with respect to those flights and voyages
subject to the APIS provisions of the CBP regulations. As the
government is assuming the vetting responsibility for APIS purposes,
carrier management of these watch lists (No-Fly and Selectee) for APIS
purposes is beyond the scope of the rule. However, carriers remain
subject to any applicable TSA requirements to check pertinent watch
lists, such as a watch list for vetting carrier employees; management
of such watch lists also is beyond the scope of this rule.
As noted previously, CBP is designing its systems to align, to the
extent possible, international APIS security vetting requirements and
process with TSA's anticipated domestic Secure Flight program security
vetting requirements and process.
Regarding the vetting of domestic flights, the APIS regulations
cover international flights (i.e., flights to and from the United
States and, relative to aircraft crew and non-crew members only,
flights continuing within (after arrival from a foreign port) and over-
flying the United States). Therefore, the APIS regulations do not cover
the domestic portion of an international flight from one U.S. port to
another before departure to a foreign port, and this final rule does
not concern the vetting of flights continuing within the United States,
a domestic leg, as APIS data is required only for crew and non-crew,
not passengers, on those flights.
Finally, the amendments of the final rule do not affect the APIS
regulations concerning air carrier manifest transmissions for crew and
non-crew members; the AQQ process is for passenger manifest data
transmission. Under applicable APIS regulations, the carrier must
transmit crew manifests no later than 60 minutes prior to departure
(wheels-up) (Sec. Sec. 122.49b and 122.75b).
Comment: Numerous comments concerned the definition of
``departure'' for aircraft. Fourteen commenters stated that the
definition of departure should remain ``wheels-up,'' as set forth in
the current regulation. One commenter agreed with the definition of
departure as ``push-back from the gate.'' A few commenters pointed out
that not all carrier operations involve aircraft pushing back from a
gate.
Response: CBP has reconsidered the matter and is retaining the
current definition of departure (wheels-up) in the regulation. However,
since the commenters' objection to the proposed definition change
relates to the timing of manifest transmissions, CBP notes additionally
that such transmissions under the final rule will be tied to the moment
the aircraft's doors are closed and secured for flight (referred to as
the ``securing of the aircraft''), a time closely proximate to push-
back from the gate but applicable to all aircraft, including smaller
carriers whose operations do not involve a departure gate.
Consequently, the final rule will not revise the definition of
``departure'' as proposed but will add the definition of ``securing the
aircraft.'' See Sec. 122.49a(a).
Thus, as explained in further detail in comment responses below
dealing with the proposed rule's manifest transmission time
requirements, the final rule will require batch passenger arrival and
departure manifest transmissions no later than 30 minutes prior to the
securing of the aircraft. For the AQQ arrival and departure scenarios,
passenger manifest data transmissions are allowed up to the securing of
the aircraft. The retained definition of ``departure'' as wheels-up
continues to apply to transmissions of crew and non-crew manifests.
Comment: Numerous comments concerned the NPRM's 60-minute APIS
batch transmission option. Many commenters suggested that the proposed
requirement to transmit batch information 60 minutes prior to departure
(push-back) be reduced to something less than 60 minutes, stating
primarily that manifests may not be complete at 60 minutes out and that
this option places an unreasonable burden on carrier operations. One
commenter stated that this option would be especially burdensome where
passengers already have undergone a security background check.
Recommendations for an alternative time requirement included 30 minutes
and 15 minutes prior to departure, maintaining the current regulation's
requirements (15 minutes after wheels-up departure for arriving flights
and no later than 15 minutes prior to wheels-up departure for departing
flights), and requiring transmission when a flight is downloaded to the
carrier's departure control system.
Response: Based on lessons learned during the aftermath of the
exposed bomb plot in London, and the consequent technical and
operational adjustments made in the manifest transmission and security
vetting processes during that time which allowed CBP to complete the
process more quickly, CBP has determined that the proposed 60-minute
time requirement can be reduced without sacrificing security
effectiveness (a CBP-imposed pre-condition to any reduction). Thus, for
batch manifest transmissions, for flights en route to (arriving
flights) and departing from (departing flights) the United States, CBP
is modifying the proposal in the final rule to provide that carriers
must transmit batch passenger manifests no later than 30 minutes prior
to the securing of the aircraft. See Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(2) and
122.75a(b)(2) and the immediately previous comment and response
regarding the definition of ``departure'' for aircraft.
This manifest transmission timing change allows carriers to make
transmissions later in the process (aircraft loading/boarding/departure
process) than was proposed in the NPRM, and therefore calls upon
carriers to take into consideration that the carrier may not receive
the results of vetting information transmitted to CBP close to the 30-
minute deadline prior to the aircraft's scheduled departure. This could
cause aircraft departure delays or
[[Page 48329]]
departures that leave behind one or more customers (passengers
generating ``not-cleared'' initial vetting responses) who are not
permitted to board the aircraft because of a not-cleared response or
inability to complete screening. While CBP believes that 30 minutes is
sufficient time for completion of the full vetting process most of the
time, it cannot guarantee this result in every instance. Carriers also
should consider that under current TSA requirements and this final
rule, carriers must contact TSA to seek resolution of ``not-cleared''
vetting results. Transmitting manifests as late as 30 minutes prior to
securing the aircraft will leave little time for this required task.
CBP, therefore, encourages air carriers to submit manifest information
as early as possible to ensure timely completion of vetting prior to
the aircraft's scheduled departure.
CBP expects that carriers will exercise sound business judgment
regarding when to transmit manifests. Sound judgment that lessens risk
will have a positive impact on the process, making it more effective
for all concerned. In this regard, the final rule also makes clear that
multiple batch transmissions are permitted and that a carrier may
employ both the APIS batch process for early transmissions and the AQQ
process for transmissions within the 30-minute window.
In addition, carriers have requested that CBP allow manifest data
transmissions as early as 72 hours prior to departure. CBP agrees that
such early transmissions, which DHS encourages carriers to adopt as a
best business practice, would generate early vetting results, subject
to later validation by the carrier (swiping of passport or other travel
document or examination of document by carrier personnel), and allow
early issuance of boarding passes, resulting in fewer passengers to be
vetted within the 30-minute window and a reduced risk of passengers
missing their flights while further vetting is conducted. With respect
to early transmissions, as noted previously, TSA is developing the
Secure Flight program to be administered and enforced by TSA and is
preparing a proposed rule for implementation of the program that may
mandate carrier transmission of certain data pertaining to passengers
as early as 72 hours prior to scheduled departure for security vetting
purposes. With the best interest of the traveling public and the
industry in mind, DHS encourages carriers to begin development of a
process for making early transmissions to enhance later alignment
between the APIS and Secure Flight programs; once Secure Flight is
operational, TSA will eventually assume the complete terrorist vetting
function for both international and domestic flights, while, after this
transition, CBP will continue to require complete APIS transmissions by
applicable deadlines for purposes of its traditional customs,
immigration, and border enforcement/security functions. DHS is
committed to working with the carriers to ensure that any processes
developed include carrier input and take into consideration the
important interests of the public and the carrier industry. CBP notes
that it has dedicated a team of officers (operating over the past two
years) to work with various carriers, carrier industry partners, and
TSA in the development of coordinated processes that will benefit all
parties.
CBP acknowledges that some carriers, typically smaller carriers
that employ the batch transmission process (either interactive or non-
interactive), may not be able to make early transmissions. CBP is
confident that the transmission/security vetting process will work
adequately for these carriers most of the time and that the intended
security goals will be achieved.
Further to the matter of security effectiveness, CBP has determined
that the batch transmission provisions of the APIS regulation should
mirror current TSA requirements that prohibit carriers from issuing
boarding passes to passengers who have not been either ``cleared'' for
boarding or designated as ``selectees;'' thus, the batch transmission
provisions of the final rule are modified accordingly to require that
carriers must not issue boarding passes to passengers generating a
``not-cleared'' vetting response (the converse being that carriers may
issue boarding passes only to ``cleared'' and ``selectee'' passengers).
See Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(A) and (B) and 122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(A)
and (B). The NPRM proposed that carriers using either of the batch
manifest transmission options preclude a passenger from boarding the
aircraft, without prohibiting issuance of the boarding pass, if not
cleared by the CBP system. This change merely brings the APIS
regulation into conformance with existing TSA requirements to which
carriers are already subject.
Finally, regarding passengers who have already undergone a security
background check, presumably conducted by an air carrier or by another
private entity on the carrier's behalf, CBP cannot accept a carrier's
privately conducted background investigation in lieu of the vetting of
APIS data against government established and maintained watch lists.
Comment: Fourteen commenters stated that the proposed requirement
that carriers must transmit APIS passenger data via the AQQ process by
15 minutes prior to aircraft departure (push-back) is unnecessary as
long as the passengers receive security clearance prior to boarding the
aircraft.
Response: Under the proposed rule, carriers using AQQ would be
required to transmit individual passenger data up to, but no later
than, 15 minutes prior to departure (push-back) and to not issue a
boarding pass to any passenger not cleared by the CBP system. The final
rule retains the latter requirement prohibiting issuance of the
boarding pass; this prohibition mirrors current TSA requirements that
prohibit carriers from issuing boarding passes to passengers until the
passenger names have been compared against the applicable terrorist
watch lists and cleared for boarding. However, CBP agrees with the
commenters that the 15-minute transmission deadline is unnecessary
because air carriers are prohibited from issuing a boarding pass until
the passenger is cleared and the AQQ process is capable of producing an
initial vetting response within seconds of the transmission of data to
the CBP system. Therefore, CBP is eliminating the proposed 15-minute
time frame from the final rule's AQQ provision; the final rule permits
carriers using AQQ to transmit APIS data up to the securing of the
aircraft, i.e., the moment at which the aircraft's doors are closed and
secured for flight. See Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(2) and 122.75a(b)(2)
below. DHS has determined that this procedure still accomplishes its
security goal to keep high-risk passengers from boarding an aircraft
and to prevent the baggage of such passengers from being loaded onto
the aircraft.
CBP again notes that this transmission time change for the AQQ
process calls upon the carriers to take into consideration the risk
associated with late transmissions (those made just before or otherwise
too close to the deadline for completion of further vetting of ``not-
cleared'' passengers) and to exercise sound business judgment to avoid
having to face a choice between delayed aircraft departures or
departures that leave behind one or more customers (passengers
generating ``not-cleared'' vetting responses) who were not permitted to
board the aircraft.
Transmissions of data as early as 72 hours prior to scheduled
departure, which carriers have requested and CBP encourages as a best
business practice, would generate early vetting results, subject to
later validation by the carrier (swiping of passport or other travel
[[Page 48330]]
document or examination of document by carrier personnel), fewer
passengers to be vetted later in the process, and a reduced risk of
passengers missing their flights while further vetting is conducted.
CBP encourages carriers to begin development of a process for making
early transmissions to enhance later alignment between the APIS and
Secure Flight programs. Once Secure Flight becomes operational, TSA
will eventually assume the complete pre-departure terrorist vetting
function for both international and domestic flights, while, after this
transition, CBP will continue to require complete APIS transmissions by
applicable deadlines for purposes of its traditional customs,
immigration, and border enforcement/security functions.
Comment: Eight commenters asked about the steps or processes that
would follow a carrier's receipt of a ``not-cleared'' message from CBP.
One commenter stated that passengers receiving an initial ``not-
cleared'' message must be processed promptly. Another stated that
``false positives'' must be minimized. A third commenter stated that
most passengers generating ``not-cleared'' messages are innocent.
Response: Under the final rule's (interactive and non-interactive)
batch manifest transmission and AQQ transmission options, a carrier may
not issue a boarding pass to a passenger whose data generates a ``not-
cleared'' response from the CBP system. Put another way, a carrier must
not issue a boarding pass to a passenger unless it receives a
``cleared'' or ``selectee'' vetting response from the CBP system. In
the latter instance, a ``selectee'' passenger may board the aircraft
after successfully undergoing secondary screening (such as searching a
passenger's baggage or person manually or otherwise), in accordance
with applicable TSA requirements.
Additionally, the carrier may not load onto the aircraft, or must
remove if already loaded, the baggage of a ``not-cleared'' passenger. A
carrier may not, under any circumstances, transport baggage belonging
to a passenger who has not been cleared. A carrier must contact TSA to
seek resolution of ``not-cleared'' responses by providing additional
information about the ``not-cleared'' passenger, if necessary (meaning
if TSA requires additional information that the carrier can provide to
complete further vetting). A requirement to acknowledge receipt of a
``not-cleared'' response by sending a return message to the CBP system
was proposed for the AQQ option. CBP has decided to delete that step
from the process in this final rule. The ``resolution contact''
requirement, which was discretionary in the NPRM for the AQQ option but
is now mandatory for all transmission options, has been modified to
mirror existing TSA requirements. While these changes regarding the
resolution contact requirement (making it mandatory and also applicable
to interactive and non-interactive batch users) represent a change from
what was proposed, the final rule merely conforms the APIS regulation
with the existing TSA requirements to which carriers are already
subject. See Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(A), (B), and (C) and
122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(A), (B), and (C).
In addition, TSA will contact the carrier to clear a ``not-
cleared'' passenger for boarding, or to downgrade such a passenger to
``selectee'' status, should the clearance or downgrade be warranted by
the results of the further vetting analysis. However, should there be
insufficient time to complete further vetting, the carrier is bound by
the ``not-cleared'' instruction. Carriers are expected to exercise
sound business judgment in implementing the steps or processes needed
to ensure compliance with the amendments of this final rule and
applicable TSA requirements regarding ``not-cleared'' passengers and
their baggage. TSA will not contact the carrier to confirm a ``not-
cleared'' vetting result (but will be able to inform the carrier about
the status of a ``not-cleared'' passenger during the resolution
communication).
CBP assures the commenters that steps are being taken to minimize
false positives, but notes that these can never be eliminated entirely.
The further vetting process and the requirement that carriers contact
TSA to resolve a ``not-cleared'' vetting response are two measures
designed to clear false positives. CBP also will have real-time access
to the list maintained by TSA of people who have obtained redress
through TSA's redress process; an automated check against the list
could clear a passenger initially identified as ``not-cleared'' and
preempt the CBP system from issuing the ``not-cleared'' instruction.
The TSA redress list will be used to check every passenger who
generates a ``not-cleared'' response during initial vetting, whether or
not the ``not-cleared'' passenger has a redress number. Redress numbers
are issued by TSA to passengers who request redress for a false
positive vetting result. CBP strongly encourages (but is not requiring
under this final rule) carriers to transmit redress numbers (or any
other unique identifier approved by DHS for that purpose) within their
APIS transmissions if such numbers are available. DHS has recently
published a notice announcing a department-wide redress policy that
will be applicable to pre-departure passenger vetting as well as other
watch list vetting activities (http://www.dhs.gov/trip). DHS's
``Traveler Redress Inquiry Program'' (TRIP) is a voluntary program that
provides a one-stop mechanism to request redress for passengers who
believe that they were erroneously denied or delayed boarding due to
DHS security screening, denied or delayed entry into or departure from
the United States at a port of entry, or identified for secondary
screening. TRIP will provide traveler redress intake and processing
support while working with relevant DHS components to review and
respond to requests for redress. TRIP applies also to screening at
seaports.
Finally, regarding false positives, CBP recommends that carriers
minimize instances of manifest data transmissions too close to the
transmission deadline (30 minutes prior to securing the aircraft or,
for AQQ users, the securing of the aircraft) to allow for completion of
the further vetting process. As stated previously, CBP believes that 30
minutes is sufficient time to complete the vetting process in most
cases for batch transmissions but is unable to guarantee that result in
every instance. The CBP system may not be able to complete further
vetting when AQQ users transmit data too close in time to the securing
of the aircraft.
Comment: Four commenters asked if a carrier would be required to
wait 60 minutes before departing where there was a passenger change
subsequent to the carrier's submission of an eAPIS report.
Response: Under the final rule, if a carrier using eAPIS (Internet
process) or any batch manifest transmission process requiring
transmission no later than 30 minutes prior to securing the aircraft
has a passenger change subsequent to making a batch transmission, the
carrier will be required to transmit the change no later than 30
minutes prior to securing the aircraft (updating a passenger manifest
prior to the deadline is permitted). Should a ``cleared'' response be
received for that passenger within that 30-minute window, the carrier
could then issue the boarding pass and board the cleared passenger; the
aircraft could depart without waiting for the 30-minute window to
elapse.
Comment: Six commenters requested that carriers be able to select
the method of APIS transmission (batch or AQQ) on a per-flight basis to
allow for situations where AQQ is not practical.
[[Page 48331]]
Response: A carrier may utilize either or both of the options on a
per-flight or per-manifest basis according to the carrier's operational
needs. CBP recognizes that some carriers may want to employ the batch
process for early transmissions and then change to individual
passenger, AQQ transmission within the 30-minute window. Any
combination is acceptable, provided that the time and other
requirements for each option are met.
Comment: Ten commenters expressed concerns regarding the proposed
rule's requirement that carriers making transmissions under the AQQ
option are precluded from issuing boarding passes to passengers until
they are cleared by the CBP system.
Response: As mentioned (and cited) previously, current TSA
requirements preclude carriers from issuing a boarding pass for any
travelers who are not cleared against the No-Fly terrorist watch list.
Thus, for originating passengers boarding flights en route to or
departing from the United States, the AQQ vetting process under the
final rule (as well as the final rule's batch transmission options)
mirrors the current process with which the carriers already comply. DHS
has determined that this is the most effective way, under either the
batch or AQQ transmission processes, to ensure that passengers who are
not cleared by CBP are prevented from posing a threat to the aircraft.
Comment: One commenter stated that, under the AQQ process, the
initial vetting response must be sent immediately if it is to be
awaited by the carrier as each passenger checks in.
Response: Regarding the initial (automated) vetting response under
AQQ, CBP agrees with the commenters and assures carriers that the AQQ
process will provide a ``real-time'' vetting result, which normally
will be sent within seconds of receipt of the data.
Comment: One commenter requested that CBP eliminate the requirement
to return a message to CBP confirming the receipt of a ``not-cleared''
message.
Response: CBP has removed the ``acknowledgement'' requirement from
the regulatory texts in this final rule. CBP's technical experts
recommended removal due to the burden on the electronic transmission/
communication process. See amended Sec. 122.49a(b)(ii)(B).
Comment: Nine commenters stated that through-checked passengers in
transit (connecting passengers) will be negatively affected by the
proposed rule's AQQ requirement that APIS information be sent at check-
in. Another commenter stated that CBP should eliminate provisional
boarding passes as discussed in the NPRM regarding connecting
passengers.
Response: CBP understands that, under some circumstances,
connecting passengers may be disadvantaged to some extent under the
rule as proposed and adopted; however, CBP has designed the process to
minimize occurrences of delayed or missed flights. The comments pertain
to a circumstance where connecting passengers arrive at the airport
(from which the APIS-regulated connecting flight departs directly to or
from the United States), already in possession of boarding passes for
that flight, despite the fact that the APIS-responsible carrier has not
collected required APIS data for those passengers and they have not yet
been cleared by the CBP system. This circumstance contrasts with the
ordinary AQQ transmission/security vetting procedure (applicable to
originating passengers), as proposed in the NPRM, where the carrier
transmits passenger data to the CBP system as passengers check in, and
the CBP system responds in seconds with a vetting result. Under the
proposed AQQ provision, vetting by the CBP system and the system's
return of a ``cleared'' response to the carrier precede issuance of a
boarding pass.
In the NPRM, CBP explained that it would consider boarding passes
issued to connecting passengers in the described circumstance as
provisional. Carriers would be required to obtain required data from
these passengers, in a manner compatible with their procedures/
operations, and transmit such data to the CBP system as required under
the regulation. Thus, under the final rule, a carrier must provide APIS
data upon the connecting passengers' arrival at the gate, or some other
suitable place designated by the carrier, so long as either a
``cleared'' or ``selectee'' message is received prior to boarding the
passengers. (As the carrier receives from the CBP system a ``cleared''
or ``selectee'' response for a connecting passenger, it may then board
that passenger.) The applicable AQQ provision of the regulation is
modified to clarify this procedure for connecting passengers with
previously issued boarding passes, and the procedure has been added to
the interactive batch transmission provision. See Sec. Sec.
122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(B) and (C) and 122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(B) and (C). CBP
notes that this procedure would not apply for connecting passengers who
do not yet have boarding passes for the APIS-regulated flight to or
from the United States. These passengers would have to report to the
carrier's check-in/reservation counter (or other suitable location of
the carrier's choosing) for collection of APIS data and issuance of
boarding passes. Also, the non-interactive batch transmission option,
employed by carriers that are not likely to have connecting flight
operations, does not provide for this procedure to collect and transmit
passenger data at the gate for connecting passengers. Any such
passengers will have to follow the instructions of the carrier (such
as, perhaps, reporting to the carrier's check-in/reservation counter).
The provisional boarding pass concept is also applied to any
instance where a carrier issues a boarding pass before validating the
APIS data, i.e., before the passenger's passport or other travel
document is swiped through a machine reader for verification or the
travel document data is manually verified by carrier personnel. Until
this is done, the carrier may not allow the passenger to board the
aircraft. If the air carrier determines during validation that a
passenger's data is different from what was used to obtain the boarding
pass, the newly presented data must be transmitted to the CBP system
for vetting and clearance.
Comment: One commenter asked why any passengers would be delayed
and have to be rerouted if the carrier is using AQQ. Another commenter
asked for clarification of why, in some instances, CBP would not be
able to complete the vetting analysis and clear a passenger prior to
departure (push-back).
Response: Under the AQQ process, a ``not-cleared'' response will be
provided to the carrier within seconds of transmission of data, but the
resolution of a ``not-cleared'' result will require further review of
the data to confirm the result or identify a false positive. This will
take additional time but could lead to a ``not-cleared'' passenger
being cleared for issuance of a boarding pass (possibly as a
``selectee'') in time to make the flight. In the simple case, the
vetting result will be produced more quickly than it will in a more
complex case. Thus, where the carrier transmits manifest data to the
CBP system shortly before the securing of the aircraft, there may not
be sufficient time to obtain a further vetting result for a passenger
generating a ``not-cleared'' response during the initial vetting
process. (This also could happen with batch transmissions, although to
a lesser degree of likelihood (compared to a last-minute AQQ
transmission) because the deadline for batch transmissions is 30
minutes prior to the securing of the aircraft.) The carrier thus may
face a choice between delaying the flight or
[[Page 48332]]
departing without the ``not-cleared'' passenger. (Such a passenger
could be rebooked but only if cleared during further vetting.) It is
expected that carriers will exercise sound business judgment in their
manifest data transmission process and take this situation into account
(for both batch and AQQ transmissions).
Comment: Seven commenters requested that carriers should be able to
make AQQ APIS transmissions and obtain passenger clearances well in
advance of departure (push-back), with some recommending as much as
four days in advance.
Response: CBP agrees that carriers should be able to make APIS
manifest data transmissions well in advance of the APIS regulations'
transmission time frames and notes that nothing in the regulations
precludes a carrier from doing so. As noted in a previous comment
response, the CBP system has the ability to accept certain passenger
data up to 72 hours in advance, including APIS data. Such very early
transmissions would be more likely under either of the batch
transmission options, as AQQ transmissions are more likely to occur in
closer proximity to the time or day of the flight. However, as
mentioned previously, any early ``cleared'' vetting result obtained in
this process is considered provisional by CBP until the passport or
other travel document is validated, either by the swiping of the travel
document's machine-readable zone or through manual verification by the
carrier. Successful validation by the carrier of any passenger holding
a provisional boarding pass as herein described (i.e., based on early
data transmission and early receipt of a ``cleared'' response) requires
that the APIS passenger data checked during validation be identical to
the passenger data transmitted early to obtain the boarding pass. Where
the data transmitted differs from data presented at validation, the
carrier must transmit the new data and obtain vetting clearance on that
data. Until that occurs, the carrier may not allow the passenger to
board.
As stated in a previous comment response, CBP encourages carriers
to develop a process for making early transmissions.
Comment: One commenter asked for clarification on the check-in
process when some passengers use kiosks or remote check-in (Internet),
or when check-in occurs days in advance of arrival in the United
States. Three commenters stated that the final rule must accommodate
self-service check-in schemes.
Response: The check-in process begins when the passenger initiates
a request for a boarding pass to a flight directly bound for or
departing from the United States and can occur at the airport check-in
counter, an airport kiosk, or an online Web site within 24 hours of
scheduled departure; carriers can issue boarding passes no earlier than
24 hours prior to scheduled departure and only to passengers who have
been cleared by the CBP system. The final rule does not preclude
passengers from continuing to use any of these check-in processes.
However, regardless of the manner by which the passenger checks in, the
carrier's obligation under the final rule is to transmit manifests
containing required data (batch process), or transmit required manifest
data for individual passengers (AQQ), by the required time, obtain a
``cleared'' result from the CBP system before issuing a boarding pass
to passengers, and to validate the passenger's data before boarding if
validation did not occur previously. The carriers are expected to
exercise their sound business judgment to meet these requirements in a
manner that best suits their operations and avoids departure delays or
other problems. Carriers must continue to comply with TSA requirements
as well.
Comment: Several comments concerned the close-out message that the
proposed rule would require air carriers to transmit no later than 30
minutes after the securing of the aircraft. One commenter asked if the
final rule will require air carriers to send the names of passengers
who were previously cleared but were then off-loaded as a result of
extenuating circumstances. Four commenters requested clarification
regarding the use of a unique identifier for passengers. Two commenters
suggested that the regulation be amended to provide the carriers the
option of sending either a close-out message listing passengers who did
not board the aircraft or a cancellation message for each individual
passenger not boarded. Three commenters indicated their preference for
sending a cancellation message, stating that there is no need for
departure close-out messages. One commenter requested that a close-out
message be transmitted 45 minutes after departure (push-back) rather
than 30 minutes as proposed. One commenter asked if a carrier using
eAPIS would have to submit a final passenger manifest (close-out
message).
Response: Under the final rule, an air carrier using one of the
interactive options must send a close-out message identifying
passengers who were previously cleared for the flight by the CBP system
but then, for any reason, did not board the aircraft and make the
flight (i.e., were not onboard the airborne aircraft). In the close-out
message, the carrier may report, by use of a unique identifier or
specific passenger data (such as full name), either all the passengers
boarded and making the flight or only the checked-in passengers who did
not board and make the flight. The final rule amends the applicable
texts to clarify this option. See Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(B) and
(C) and 122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(B) and (C) of this rule. CBP uses the unique
identifier or personal data contained in the close-out message to
manage the dynamic building of an APIS manifest. The designation of the
unique identifier is within the sole discretion of the carrier. The
close-out message will not contain any new information, even where
passenger data (name) is used instead of a unique identifier. CBP
recognizes that carriers using eAPIS will not be able to transmit a
unique identifier and thus has amended the non-interactive batch
transmission provision of the rule to remove this requirement. See
Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(A) and 122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(A).
CBP disagrees that the close-out message is unnecessary, as the
close-out message provides pieces of information that a cancellation
message does not, including the individual passengers onboard the
aircraft and the total passengers onboard the aircraft. Therefore,
under the final rule, a carrier may choose either message for notifying
the CBP system that a passenger did not board an aircraft, provided
that a carrier sending a cancellation message for that purpose also
sends a close-out message for the flight. Also, CBP disagrees that the
proposed timing of the close-out message should be changed. The time
frames set forth in the final rule ensure that close-out messages are
received and processed for short-duration flights prior to their
arrival in the United States.
A carrier will not be in compliance with the regulation should a
flight arrive in the United States with a passenger onboard who is not
on the flight manifest or without a passenger onboard who is on the
flight manifest. The close-out message will be similarly evaluated for
accuracy, and the carrier will be found in non-compliance for
inaccuracies of this kind. The same applies for flights departing from
the United States upon their arrival at the foreign port of
destination.
Comment: One commenter asked if a carrier would be able to delete a
[[Page 48333]]
passenger from a manifest submitted early.
Response: At this time, a carrier cannot delete a passenger from a
manifest previously submitted through eAPIS.
Comment: Three commenters asked if an on-demand or charter air
carrier would be required to receive an ``all clear'' message from CBP
prior to departure. One of these commenters asked how this message
would be communicated and whether CBP will issue a ``not-cleared''
message to a third-party provider. Another of these commenters asked if
the eAPIS process would accept a separate point of contact for each
manifest submitted.
Response: Regarding vetting result messages using the non-
interactive batch process (eAPIS), a confirmation message will be
returned to the sender, provided that the sender's address is recorded
with the CBP system. The CBP system will provide only the status of
``not-cleared'' and ``selectee'' passengers; ``cleared'' passenger
results will not be indicated. The absence of a ``not-cleared'' message
in the confirmation response, therefore, should be interpreted as a
``cleared'' message for all passengers, and the carrier would be free
to depart with all passengers onboard. A ``selectee'' response would
require the carrier or TSA (or, in some circumstances, an appropriate
foreign authority) to subject the passenger to secondary screening,
under applicable TSA requirements, but normally would not impede
departure. The person identified as the primary point of contact in a
carrier's eAPIS account will receive the message confirmation for each
manifest that is submitted. CBP is currently exploring the possibility
of enhancing the capability for eAPIS to allow for multiple points of
contact to receive confirmations.
Comment: Five commenters stated that CBP should bear the costs of
rerouting a passenger if CBP is the party responsible for delaying the
passenger.
Response: CBP disagrees. TSA will review and conduct further
analysis of ``not-cleared'' results to identify false positives and
then use the CBP system to notify the carrier of the disposition. TSA
cannot control the time required to resolve ``not-cleared'' messages,
and that time will vary. CBP acknowledges that determining check-in
times is a business decision that the air carrier industry has very
clearly asked to be left free to make. However, CBP cannot guarantee
that ``not-cleared'' messages relative to passenger data transmitted as
late as 30 minutes prior to securing the aircraft (APIS batch
transmission) or just prior to securing the aircraft (AQQ
transmissions) will be resolved in time to allow these travelers to
make their intended flights. As the timing of check-in and manifest or
manifest data transmissions is largely in the control of carriers, CBP
will not be responsible for incurring the costs of these business
decisions. For this reason, CBP encourages carriers to transmit data
for as many passengers as possible as early as practicable.
Comment: Seven commenters asked what the back-up system would be in
case of communications or system downtime.
Response: If a carrier or the CBP system experiences difficulties
that impede the carrier's efforts to transmit manifests, the carrier's
Principal Security Officer (PSO) or Operations Control Center (OCC)
should contact the TSA Office of Intelligence to receive further
instructions. Under no circumstances is a carrier permitted to issue
boarding passes to or board passengers who have not been properly
vetted and cleared for boarding (upon generating either a ``cleared''
or ``selectee'' vetting response). System outages will be discussed in
detail in CBP's updated user guide currently in preparation.
Comment: One commenter stated that CBP should ensure that all
arrangements have been made with foreign law enforcement officials to
ensure that personnel are available to deal with passengers denied
clearance. Five commenters stated that air carrier personnel should not
be primarily responsible for what they perceive as law enforcement
activities.
Response: Air carrier personnel will not be responsible to perform
law enforcement activities under the final rule. Multiple U.S.
Government agencies are continuing to coordinate with international law
enforcement officials to ensure that travelers identified on government
(terrorist) watch lists are handled expeditiously and with minimal
impact on the carrier or the traveling public. Under current
regulations and this final rule, carriers are responsible for
validating passenger data (confirming that the passenger is the person
identified in the travel document presented and that the travel
document data matches the data that the carrier transmitted to the CBP
system for that passenger) and for ensuring that any passenger
generating a ``not-cleared'' message is not permitted to board an
aircraft (which is achieved under this final rule by precluding
issuance of a boarding pass to such a passenger).
Comment: Two commenters asked if, under the final rule, air
carriers would submit crew manifests separately from passenger
manifests.
Response: Under the current APIS regulations, transmissions under
UN/EDIFACT (United Nations/Electrical Data Interchange for
Administration, Commerce, and Trade) for passengers and crew may be
included in a single manifest. The final rule does not change that
practice. However, under current regulations and this final rule, there
are different transmission time requirements for passenger and crew
manifests. Thus, because the APIS regulations currently require (and
this final rule does not change) transmission of crew (or non-crew)
manifests no later than 60 minutes prior to departure (wheels-up)
(Sec. Sec. 122.49b and 122.75b) and passenger manifests no later than
30 minutes prior to the securing of the aircraft, the carrier must be
mindful of these different time frames if transmitting a combined
manifest (containing both passengers and crew). It is noted that the
APIS AQQ transmission option under this final rule is for passengers
only, and these transmissions are permitted up to the securing of the
aircraft. Any carrier that employs AQQ must submit a crew manifest no
later than 60 minutes prior to departure.
Comment: Regarding the NPRM's proposed limit of the size of AQQ
passenger record transmissions to ten passengers, one commenter asked
that the limit be increased to twenty and another suggested fifty. One
commenter stated that there should be no limit.
Response: While the NPRM's background explanation appeared to limit
the size of AQQ passenger record transmissions, the final rule does not
address this matter. Information on the number of passengers that may
be contained in one message transmission is more appropriately covered
in the user guide (an update of which is currently in preparation).
Comment: Three commenters sought reassurance that the matching
algorithms used for passenger vetting are robustly designed and tested.
Response: CBP assures the commenters that the name-matching
algorithms are routinely tested and calibrated to ensure that they are
robust without generating an unmanageable workload in positive hits
(``not-cleared'' results) for either the government or the carriers.
Comment: One commenter stated that a passenger whose APIS data is
insufficient for clearance purposes should be treated as a
``selectee.''
Response: CBP disagrees with this comment. A ``selectee'' vetting
result does not preclude the carrier from
[[Page 48334]]
issuing a boarding pass to the ``selectee'' passenger. Since the actual
vetting status (or security risk level) of a passenger whose data is
incomplete or inadequate remains unknown, treating such a passenger as
a ``selectee,'' and thus allowing him to board the aircraft, would
constitute a security liability. Therefore, the vetting process under
the final rule will ensure that such a ``not-cleared'' passenger is
prevented from boarding an aircraft (by precluding issuance of a
boarding pass) until a vetting result can be obtained.
Comment: One commenter requested that air carriers be able to use,
for employing the proposed APIS 60 or AQQ interactive manifest
transmission options, any software previously certified by CBP without
having to seek additional certification.
Response: CBP notes that previously authorized software is
acceptable for air carrier use without additional authorization;
however, for the new interactive realm of communication, CBP will
require appropriate testing to ensure proper connectivity between CBP
and the transmitter before that software can be utilized. This testing
and CBP's acknowledgement that the carrier's system is ``interactive
capable'' are referred to as ``certification'' in the final rule. CBP
notes that carriers not opting for interactive transmission do not
require CBP certification.
Comment: Two commenters asked if APIS requirements would be
applicable in emergency situations.
Response: The final rule does not change current regulations
regarding APIS manifest transmission requirements in emergency
situations. Under the current regulations, an aircraft not destined to
the United States but diverted there due to an emergency must transmit
a passenger manifest no later than 30 minutes prior to the aircraft's
arrival at the U.S. port. For a vessel similarly diverted to a U.S.
port, the passenger manifest is required prior to the vessel's entry
into that port. Both provisions allow that in cases of non-compliance
due to an emergency, CBP will take into consideration that the carrier
was not equipped to make the APIS transmission (where that is the case)
and the circumstances of the emergency situation. See Sec. Sec.
4.7b(b)(2)(i)(D) and 122.49a(b)(2)(iii).
Comment: One commenter asked whether there would be a trial period
to correct systems discrepancies prior to implementation of the
interactive transmission systems provided for under the proposed rule.
Response: The final rule will be effective 180 days following its
publication in the Federal Register. During this 180-day period,
carriers will have the opportunity to test their systems with CBP and
work cooperatively to correct system discrepancies.
4. Comments From (and on Behalf of) Vessel Carriers and Carriers
Operating Within the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
Comment: Two commenters asked for clarification on how the rule
would affect operations on and movements on the OCS, and three
commenters requested that carrier operations involving the transport of
OCS employees be exempt from the rule. Two commenters asked if there
are APIS reporting requirements for foreign and U.S. personnel (U.S.
citizens) who arrive in the United States from a location on the OCS
that is considered a U.S. port or place.
Response: Through this final rule, CBP does not intend to change
the regime created by existing statutes, regulations, and rulings
pertaining to OCS issues. The final rule applies to vessel movements
from a U.S. port or place bound for a place on the OCS that is
considered ``outside the United States'' (as opposed to a place (e.g.,
a vessel, rig, or platform) considered a U.S. point by virtue of its
attachment to the OCS) under existing statutory authority, and to
vessel movements from such a place on the OCS to a U.S. port or place.
CBP notes that the final rule applies to similar air carrier movements.
In addition, data must be transmitted for all persons, i.e., all
travelers (crew members, workers, and others) regardless of citizenship
or status under immigration laws, onboard OCS operating vessels and
aircraft subject to the APIS regulations. Finally, carriers arriving
from a U.S. port or place (on the OCS or not) into another U.S. port or
place (on the OCS or not) are not required by CBP to transmit APIS
data.
Comment: Two commenters asked if the terms ``foreign area'' used
for aircraft and ``foreign port or place'' used for vessels are
synonymous for the purposes of transmitting APIS data relative to
carriers operating on the OCS.
Response: CBP notes that the term ``foreign area'' is not used in
Sec. Sec. 122.49a, 122.49b, 122.75a, or 122.75b pertaining to aircraft
arrivals in and departures from the United States; nor does the term
``foreign port or place'' appear in Sec. Sec. 4.7b or 4.64 pertaining
respectively to vessel arrivals in and departures from the United
States. As mentioned previously, the final rule applies to vessel and
air carrier movements from a U.S. port or place bound for a place on
the OCS that is considered ``outside the United States'' under existing
provisions and rules, and to vessel and air carrier movements from such
a place on the OCS to a U.S. port or place. However, CBP again notes
that there are existing statutory and regulatory provisions, as well as
agency rulings, concerning the OCS that provide clarification of this
and other issues.
Comment: One commenter asked if vessel carriers would still be able
to send updated APIS data no later than 12 hours after departure. One
commenter asked if an update could be submitted in the event of a crew
change-over.
Response: The final rule does not change the provisions pertaining
to amendments to crew manifests. Therefore, vessel operators will still
be able to send amendments after submission of the APIS crew manifest
up to 12 hours after departure, as provided in Sec. 4.7b(b)(2)(ii)
pertaining to vessel arrivals and Sec. 4.64(b)(2)(ii) pertaining to
vessel departures. Passenger manifests, however, cannot be amended.
Comment: Two commenters stated that cruise lines should be able to
transmit only the names of cruise passengers compiled during booking to
meet the requirements of this rule.
Response: CBP disagrees. The eNOA/D submission portal managed by
USCG, through which APIS manifest data are transmitted for both
arriving and departing vessels, requires that all required data
elements be transmitted for each passenger, not merely the names. A
vessel carrier may, however, transmit the required data elements in
Sec. 4.64(b)(3)(i) through (x) for any portion of the passengers or
crew in advance of the transmission deadline, provided that this
transmission is followed by timely transmission of a final, complete,
and validated manifest (through eNOA/D) no later than 60 minutes prior
to departure from the U.S. port.
Comment: One commenter asked if a cruise carrier's receipt of a
``not-cleared'' message from CBP would result in the ship not being
allowed to depart on time.
Response: Under the final rule, a cruise ship cannot depart with a
passenger onboard whose data has generated a ``not-cleared'' message.
Because cruise ships allow passengers to board early (as much as five
or six hours early), CBP cannot guarantee that a ``not-cleared''
message will be sent to the carrier before the ``not-cleared''
passenger has boarded (as the passenger could be boarded before the
data is transmitted to the CBP system for vetting). Where such a
passenger has
[[Page 48335]]
boarded the vessel, the carrier must locate and remove him and his
baggage from the vessel. CBP believes that the 60-minute transmission
requirement is sufficient time to fully vet passengers and crew and
allow the carrier to remove a person generating a ``not-cleared''
response; however, CBP cannot guarantee that result in every instance.
Where the full vetting process (initial and further vetting, both of
which are performed by CBP for commercial vessels) has not been
completed prior to scheduled departure, a carrier has the choice to
either delay departure and await the results of further vetting or
depart on time after removing the ``not-cleared'' passenger in question
(and his baggage) from the vessel. Although a business decision,
carriers can review their business process to determine the potential
benefits related to early transmission of APIS data, which may afford
more time for security vetting.
Comment: One commenter requested clarification on how CBP would
transmit a ``not-cleared'' message for a crewmember to a vessel
operator.
Response: CBP currently generates an APIS confirmation message for
vessels transmitting manifests through the eNOA/D portal. The
confirmation message, which is sent to the reporting party shown in the
manifest, will contain the ``not-cleared'' message for the relevant
crew member.
Comment: One commenter requested that reporting requirements for
CBP and the USCG regulations be reconciled so that a carrier is able to
file a single departure report.
Response: Under its current reporting requirements, USCG does not
require notices of departure (departures from the United States) except
in certain, limited situations (such as vessels with hazardous cargo).
USCG is planning to amend its regulations to generally require a notice
of departure. CBP will continue to work with the USCG to ensure that
carriers are not subject to duplicative reporting requirements, just as
was done for arriving vessels.
Comment: Two commenters requested that the proposed 60-minute prior
to departure requirement be amended, stating that it is too burdensome
for cruise lines to meet. One commenter stated that the 60-minute
requirement is unworkable for operations on the OCS.
Response: CBP disagrees. Nothing in the final rule precludes a
vessel carrier from transmitting available APIS data in advance of the
60-minute deadline for manifest transmissions. Early transmission and
vetting of passenger and crew member data will facilitate and enhance
the effectiveness of the process. Even where a carrier waits until 60
minutes prior to departure to transmit a single, complete manifest, the
60-minute window is expected to provide, in most instances, sufficient
time for CBP to identify and notify the carrier of any ``not-cleared''
vetting results and to complete vetting, and for the carrier to locate
and remove from the vessel the passengers and/or crew members who
generated the ``not-cleared'' responses (along with their baggage). A
shorter time for completion of the process would risk failure to
achieve the desired security goal (preventing vessel departures with a
high-risk passenger or crew member onboard) and would increase the risk
of a delayed departure.
CBP believes that carriers operating on the OCS will be able to
comply with the 60-minute requirement without an unacceptable impact on
their operations.
Comment: One commenter requested that cruise lines be permitted to
implement AQQ.
Response: CBP and USCG will continue working to develop manifest
transmission methods that do not impose duplicative submission
requirements on vessel carriers; this will include exploring with
vessel carriers the feasibility of developing an interactive procedure
for these carriers.
Comment: One commenter asked whether transmission of APIS data is
required for voyages between two U.S. ports.
Response: Carriers are not required to transmit APIS data for
voyages between two U.S. ports.
Comment: One commenter asked if a vessel carrier would be required
to sit at the dock for 60 minutes following submission of APIS data
awaiting clearance to depart (from a U.S. port).
Response: Under the final rule, the APIS transmission must occur no
later than 60 minutes prior to the intended vessel departure. A
confirmation message will be sent to the reporting party shown in the
manifest. If the confirmation message clears all crewmembers and
passengers on board, the vessel can depart regardless of whether the
full 60-minute window has elapsed. If the confirmation message includes
a ``not-cleared'' result, the carrier may wait until further vetting
can be completed. If the further vetting result clears the ``not-
cleared'' traveler within the 60-minute window, the carrier is free to
depart.
B. Comments Pertaining to the Regulatory Assessment
A ``Regulatory Assessment'' of the proposed APIS rule was posted on
the CBP Web page and in the Federal Docket Management System with the
NPRM. The following are comments received on that analysis and CBP's
responses to those comments:
Comment: Two commenters stated that a satisfactory assessment of
costs and benefits cannot be made until the system and procedures have
been fully tested.
Response: Executive Order 12866 and OMB Circular A-4 require that
an agency conduct an economic analysis for all significant regulatory
actions, as defined under section 3(f) of that Executive Order. This
analysis must contain an identification of the regulatory baseline as
well as the anticipated costs and benefits of the rule on relevant
stakeholders. The analysis prepared for the NPRM was reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Comment: One commenter argued that the costs estimated for
passengers and air carriers relative to prohibiting boarding within 15
minutes of departure are too low and provided its own analysis. The
commenter noted that air carriers, not the commenter, would have to
provide the data necessary to reassess the economic impacts.
Response: CBP appreciates this comment and the detail that
accompanied the estimate provided in the comment. However, the
commenter presented an estimate that was overly pessimistic and
represented an absolute ``worst-case'' scenario that would rarely, if
ever, be realized.
Comment: Five commenters stated that the estimated delay of 4 hours
for passengers who would not make their flights was too low.
Response: CBP notes that a sensitivity analysis was conducted that
estimated the costs to passengers of an eight-hour delay. This analysis
has been retained in the final ``Regulatory Assessment'' available in
the public docket for this rule in addition to an analysis of a 24-hour
delay.
Comment: One commenter stated that the estimated annual two percent
increase in international air passengers was ``pessimistic'' and
underestimated overall costs for the industry.
Response: CBP agrees with this comment. The ``Regulatory
Assessment'' has been modified to account for a five percent (5%)
annual increase in international air passengers.
Comment: One commenter stated that the percentage of passengers who
would miss their connecting flights under the AQQ option with the 15-
minute transmission deadline should be closer to two percent (2%)
rather than the 0.5 percent estimated in the ``Regulatory Assessment,''
based on limited testing
[[Page 48336]]
the commenter has conducted. Another commenter stated that the 0.5
percent estimate is too low.
Response: CBP appreciates the information provided by the
commenters. CBP notes that under the final rule, carriers will be able
to transmit APIS data using the AQQ option up to the time when the
carrier secures the aircraft, rather than 15 minutes prior to
departure. This modification should help connecting passengers make
their intended flights and minimize delay. Thus, CBP has retained the
0.5 percent estimate to account for those few passengers that may still
miss their connecting flights under the revised AQQ transmission
requirements in the final rule.
Comment: One commenter stated that the ``Regulatory Assessment''
does not account for investments that airports will have to make to
cope with earlier arrivals and extended checking delays.
Response: This comment is accurate. However, it is virtually
impossible to estimate the changes that would occur in airports
throughout the world as a result of this final rule. This is because
CBP does not know how many airports, if any, may reconfigure ticketing
and waiting areas, the number of carriers that will use the batch APIS
transmission method versus the AQQ transmission method (which should
result in fewer delays to passengers), the number of international
passengers that would be affected in each airport, and daily peaks in
passenger volume that may affect possible ``crowding'' in the ticketing
area and other areas of the airport. While CBP cannot quantify these
potential impacts on airports, they are important to note, and a
qualitative discussion of these impacts is included in the final
``Regulatory Assessment.''
Comment: One commenter stated that the ``Regulatory Assessment''
does not account for international passengers who are making connecting
flights in the United States.
Response: CBP disagrees with this comment. The percentage estimated
in the ``Regulatory Assessment'' reflects international passengers
connecting on flights made in both foreign and U.S. airports.
Comment: Two commenters stated that the hourly cost for a delay is
closer to $10,000 than to the $3,400 estimated in the ``Regulatory
Assessment.'' Another commenter stated that the hourly cost for a delay
is closer to $17,000.
Response: CBP appreciates these comments and has revised the hourly
cost of delay using an estimate of $15,000.
Comment: One commenter stated that the offshore industry would
experience hours of delay as a result of the rule and this was not
accounted for in the ``Regulatory Assessment.''
Response: CBP acknowledges that costs to the offshore industry of
delay were not included in the ``Regulatory Assessment.'' This is
because vessel operators do not board passengers and crew as air
carriers do and should not experience delays as a result of this rule.
As stated elsewhere, if the confirmation message received from CBP
clears all crewmembers and passengers on board, the vessel can depart
regardless of whether the full 60-minute window has elapsed.
Furthermore, nothing in the regulation as proposed or finalized
precludes a carrier from transmitting available APIS data well in
advance of the 60-minute manifest transmission deadline.
Comment: One commenter stated that small carriers were much more
likely to experience delays than large carriers.
Response: CBP disagrees with this comment. As stated in the
``Regulatory Assessment,'' while large air carriers have connecting
flights where affected passengers could face short layover times, small
air carriers operate predominantly on charter schedules and make point-
to-point trips without connecting flights. With respect to originating
passengers, CBP expects that some of them will need to modify their
behavior by arriving at the airport earlier than they customarily do.
Occasionally, a passenger may not make a flight as a result of the
rule, but the percentage is expected to be much lower than for
passengers on large carriers. Furthermore, as discussed elsewhere, the
transmission time for small carriers has been modified from 60 minutes
prior to departure (meaning push-back from the gate) to 30 minutes
prior to securing the aircraft. Should a ``cleared'' response be
received within that 30-minute window, the carrier may board the
cleared passengers and depart.
Comment: Two commenters stated that the cost estimated for ticket-
agent time due to delay is too low because it does not include the
costs for rerouting a passenger and arranging compensation for the
passenger (hotel, meals).
Response: CBP did include the agent time required to reroute a
passenger on either the same carrier or another carrier in estimating
this cost. However, the 15-minute time estimated does not account for
the agent arranging compensatory accommodations for a passenger in the
event of a lengthy delay. CBP has included a sensitivity analysis in
the final ``Regulatory Assessment'' that estimates the cost of 1 hour
of combined ticket-agent time to accommodate a passenger's delay.
Comment: One commenter stated that under the ``No Action''
alternative, the statement that this allowed high-risk passengers to
board aircraft is misleading, arguing that their carrier has never had
an aircraft turned back or diverted.
Response: While CBP commends the commenter's record, it is clear
that under the status quo, high-risk passengers are able to board
aircraft bound for the United States. Many such instances were
described in the preamble to the proposed rule and in the ``Regulatory
Assessment.''
Comment: One commenter stated that privacy issues must be studied
in depth and be transparent. One commenter stated that the current
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is no longer valid because the rule
presents an entirely new use of data.
Response: The privacy impacts of collecting APIS data have been
studied in depth, and both a PIA and a System of Records Notice (SORN)
will be published in conjunction with this final rule. Both the SORN
and PIA have been reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in concurrence with this final rule.
Comment: One commenter stated that the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(RFA) analysis erroneously omitted costs to passengers.
Response: CBP disagrees with this comment. An individual is not a
small entity under the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
IV. Conclusion and Summary of Changes Made to the APIS Regulations by
This Final Rule
Based on the comments received, and CBP's further consideration of
the matter, CBP concludes that the proposed amendments, with the
modifications discussed in the comment reponses above (and included in
Section VI of this document), should be adopted as final to enhance
national security by providing a heightened level of security for the
commercial air and vessel travel industries. Achieving the level of
security ensured under the regulatory amendments set forth in this rule
(see ``Changes Made to the APIS Regulation by this Final Rule'' section
below) places DHS in a better position to: (1) Fully vet, as
appropriate, passenger and crew member information prior to departure
as required by IRTPA; (2) effectively coordinate with carrier personnel
and domestic or, where appropriate, foreign government authorities in
order to take appropriate action warranted by the threat; (3) more
[[Page 48337]]
effectively prevent an identified high-risk traveler (known or
suspected terrorist) from becoming a threat to passengers, crew,
aircraft, vessels, or the public; and (4) thereby ensure that the
electronic data transmission and vetting process required under the CBP
APIS regulations comports to a greater extent with the purposes of
ATSA, EBSVERA, and IRTPA.
This final rule amends certain sections of the CBP APIS regulations
to provide the following changes to the electronic passenger manifest
transmission process applicable to arriving and departing commercial
aircraft (see Sec. Sec. 122.49a and 122.75a, respectively) and to the
passenger and crew member manifest transmission process for departing
commercial vessels (see Sec. 4.64):
1. The NPRM proposed that the current APIS regulation's definition
of ``departure'' for aircraft en route to, departing from, continuing
within, and overflying the United States (for purposes of Sec. Sec.
122.49a, 122.49b, 122.49c, 122.75a, and 122.75b) be amended to provide
that departure occurs at the moment the aircraft is pushed back from
the gate. As explained in the ``Comments'' section, CBP is not pursuing
this proposed change, and the final rule retains the current
regulation's definition of ``departure'' as ``wheels-up.'' See Sec.
122.49a(a). However, for purposes of establishing a (relatively) fixed
moment for calibrating the timing of manifest transmissions, CBP has
determined to use the moment at which the aircraft's doors are closed
and secured for flight (referred to as ``the securing of the
aircraft''). This action (securing of the aircraft) occurs for all
flights and applies to all aircraft, including those that do not push
back from a gate. Consequently, the final rule amends Sec. 122.49a(a)
by adding the definition for ``securing the aircraft.'' The current
regulation's definition of ``departure'' (wheels-up) will continue to
apply to manifest transmissions for crew and non-crew, and the
definition of ``securing the aircraft'' will not apply to these
provisions.
2. For flights en route to and departing from the United States,
air carriers will have discretion to choose one of three options for
transmitting passenger manifests to the CBP system, as follows: (a)
Transmitting batch passenger manifests to the CBP system by means of a
non-interactive transmission system no later than 30 minutes prior to
the securing of the aircraft (the APIS-30 non-interactive option); (b)
transmitting batch passenger manifests via a CBP-certified electronic
data interchange system with interactive communication capability no
later than 30 minutes prior to the securing of the aircraft (the APIS-
30 interactive option); and (c) transmitting, via a CBP-certified
electronic data interchange system with interactive communication
capability, passenger manifest data relative to each passenger in real
time, i.e., as each passenger checks in for the flight, up to the
moment of the securing of the aircraft (the AQQ option). See Sec. Sec.
122.49a(b)(1) (ii)(A), (B), and (C); 122.49a(b)(2)(i)(A) and (B);
122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(A), (B), and (C); and 122.75a(b)(2)(i)(A) and (B).
Though not explicit in the texts, DHS is taking over, from the
carriers, the responsibility to perform watch list vetting. Under the
process implemented with this final rule, DHS (i.e., CBP and TSA, as
explained in this document) will perform the pre-departure vetting of
passenger and crew manifest data for APIS purposes. The air carriers
will no longer perform this function with respect to flights subject to
the APIS regulations.
3. An air carrier opting to employ one of the interactive
electronic transmission options (see 2(b) and (c) above) must obtain
CBP certification of its interactive system. Certification is conferred
by CBP upon testing of the carrier's system and confirmation that it is
capable of functioning as configured for the interactive option chosen
(or both options if both chosen). These air carriers may not transmit
manifests interactively until certified. See Sec. Sec.
122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(E) and 122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(E).
4. The final rule makes clear that a carrier may be certified to
make both interactive batch and AQQ transmissions, for the same or
different flights. See Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(D) and
122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(D).
5. Air carriers that do not choose an interactive option for
transmitting passenger manifests (see 2(a) above) will continue to make
transmissions via a non-interactive system. Certification is not
required, and CBP will communicate with these carriers by a non-
interactive means. See Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(A) and
122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(A).
6. The final rule makes clear that a carrier, at its discretion,
may make more than one batch transmission. See Sec. Sec.
122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(A) and (B) and 122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(A) and (B). The
current regulation does not preclude this practice, but appears to
contemplate that only one manifest is transmitted. Any single batch
transmission covering all passengers checked in for the flight must be
transmitted by the required time (no later than 30 minutes prior to the
securing of the aircraft) and must contain all required data elements
for the passengers it covers. Multiple batch transmissions must,
together, cover all passengers checked in for the flight and
individually contain all required data elements. Carriers employing
this practice are not precluded from transmitting a batch manifest that
covers passengers included on a previously transmitted manifest.
7. Upon the effective date of this final rule, any carrier
certified by CBP will be cleared to transmit manifests via one or both
of the interactive transmission options. CBP will allow a certified
carrier to transmit manifests or manifest data by interactive means
prior to the effective date of this rule. Upon the effective date,
carriers not certified by CBP will be required to transmit batch
passenger manifests no later than 30 minutes prior to the securing of
the aircraft via a non-interactive transmission method. Once any of
these latter carriers subsequently obtains certification, they may
commence transmissions via the interactive transmission option chosen.
(See the DATES section of this final rule document.)
8. Upon receipt of a batch passenger manifest from a carrier using
the interactive batch transmission option or an individual passenger's
manifest data from a carrier employing AQQ, the CBP system will conduct
an automated vetting procedure and will send to the carrier, by
interactive means, a ``cleared,'' ``not-cleared,'' or ``selectee''
message (instruction or response). A ``not-cleared'' response will be
sent relative to any passenger warranting further security analysis (as
an exact match to data contained in the No-Fly terrorist watch list, a
possible match, or an inadequate record that cannot be vetted). A
passenger identified as a ``selectee'' will be so designated by the
carrier and subject to secondary screening, in accordance with
applicable TSA requirements. See Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(1)(ii) and
122.75a(b)(1)(ii).
The same procedure applies to carriers using the non-interactive
batch transmission option, except that the CBP system does not send
``cleared'' messages to these carriers; CBP sends a confirmation
message with any ``not-cleared'' and ``selectee'' vetting results
indicated. Where all passengers are cleared, the confirmation message
will be without vetting results, thereby indicating that the carrier
can issue boarding passes and the passengers are cleared for departure.
9. Regardless of the manifest transmission option employed (APIS-30
non-interactive, APIS-30 interactive, or
[[Page 48338]]
AQQ), a carrier will not issue a boarding pass to any passenger subject
to a ``not-cleared'' instruction issued by the CBP system during
initial vetting, will not load onto the aircraft such passenger's
baggage, and will remove such passenger's baggage if already loaded.
See Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(A), (B), and (C) and
122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(A), (B), and (C). The carrier must not transport the
baggage of a ``not-cleared'' passenger unless he is later (during
further vetting) cleared and boarded. The carrier will issue a boarding
pass to a ``selectee'' passenger with an instruction that secondary
screening is required.
10. Regardless of the transmission option employed, a carrier must,
in accordance with TSA requirements, contact TSA for the purpose of
resolving a ``not-cleared'' instruction by providing, if necessary, any
available relevant information, such as a physical description. See
Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(A), (B), and (C) and 122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(A),
(B), and (C).
11. Regardless of the transmission option employed by a carrier,
any passenger subject to a ``not-cleared'' initial vetting response
will be subject to further vetting, and TSA will notify the carrier
that the passenger has been cleared or downgraded to ``selectee''
status if warranted by the results of the additional security analysis.
Carriers will not be notified by CBP messaging where further vetting
confirms a ``not-cleared'' instruction (see Sec. Sec.
122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(A), (B), and (C) and 122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(A), (B), and
(C)), but CBP will inform the carrier in accordance with the resolution
process mentioned immediately above.
12. A carrier employing one or both of the interactive transmission
options (batch or AQQ) will transmit to the CBP system, no later than
30 minutes after the securing of the aircraft, a unique identifier or
specific passenger data (typically a name) for any passenger that
checked in for the flight but was not boarded for any reason. See
Sec. Sec. 122.49a(b)(1)(ii)(B) and (C) and 122.75a(b)(1)(ii)(B) and
(C). These carriers may so identify only those passengers who checked
in but did not board the flight or all passengers that were checked in
and boarded the flight. A carrier using the non-interactive
transmission option (eAPIS normally) is not required to send a close-
out message.
13. Vessel carriers must transmit passenger and crew manifests for
vessels departing from the United States no later than 60 minutes prior
to departure. See Sec. 4.64(b)(2)(i). While the APIS regulation
concerning vessels departing from the United States is not further
amended, the APIS manifest transmission and vetting process for these
vessels is similar to that for aircraft to the following extent: the
vessel carrier may transmit multiple batch manifests; the CBP system
will conduct the vetting of manifest data in a two-stage process; the
CBP system will send to the carrier ``cleared'' and ``not-cleared''
instructions to the carrier after initial automated vetting; the data
for all ``not-cleared'' passengers and crew members is subject to the
further vetting process; CBP will contact the carrier where the results
of further vetting clear an initially ``not-cleared'' passenger or crew
member for boarding. A carrier also must not allow a vessel to depart
with a ``not-cleared'' passenger or crew member, or his baggage or
belongings, on board.
V. Regulatory Requirements
A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review)
This rule is considered to be an economically significant
regulatory action under Executive Order 12866 because it may result in
the expenditure of over $100 million in any one year. Accordingly, this
rule has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
The following summary presents the costs and benefits of the rule plus
a range of alternatives considered. The complete ``Regulatory
Assessment'' can be found in the docket for this rulemaking (http://www.regulations.gov; see also http://www.cbp.gov).
Summary
Air carriers and air passengers will be the parties primarily
affected by the rule. For the 30-minute option, costs will be driven by
the number of air travelers that will need to arrive at their
originating airports earlier and the number of air travelers who miss
connecting flights and require rerouting as a result. For AQQ, costs
will be driven by implementation expenses, data transmission costs, and
a small number of air travelers who miss connecting flights.
CBP estimates a range of costs in this analysis. For the high end
of the range, we assume that passengers will provide APIS data upon
check-in for their flights and that all carriers will transmit that
data, as an entire passenger and crew manifest, to CBP at least 30
minutes prior to the securing of the aircraft. We estimate that this
will result in 1 percent of passengers on large carriers and 0 percent
of passengers on small carriers missing connecting flights and needing
to be rerouted, with an average delay of 4 hours. We also estimate that
5 percent of originating passengers will need to arrive 15 minutes
earlier than usual in order to make their flights. For the low end of
the range, we assume that all large air carriers will implement AQQ to
transmit information on individual passengers as each check in. We
estimate that this will drive down the percentage of passengers
requiring rerouting on large carriers, attributable to this rulemaking,
to 0.5 percent. The percentage on small carriers remains 0 percent
because we assume that small carriers will not implement AQQ; rather,
they will continue to submit manifests at least 30 minutes prior to the
securing of the aircraft through eAPIS, CBP's web-based application for
small carriers. Thus, costs for small air carriers are the same
regardless of the regulatory option considered.
The endpoints of our range are presented below. As shown, the
present value (PV) costs of the rule are estimated to range from $827
million to $1.2 billion over the 10 years of the analysis (2006-2016,
2005 dollars, 7 percent discount rate).
Costs of the Final Rule
[$millions, 2006-2016, 2005 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High estimate (30-minute option) Low estimate (APIS quick query
--------------------------------------- option)
--------------------------------------
Large Small Total Large Small
carriers carriers carriers carriers Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First-Year Costs (2006)........... $116 $1 $117 $184 $1 $185
Average Recurring Costs........... 150 2 152 92 2 94
10-Year PV Costs (7%)............. 1,168 14 1,182 813 14 827
[[Page 48339]]
10-Year PV Costs (3%)............. 1,413 17 1,430 959 17 976
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We quantify four categories of benefits, or costs that could be
avoided, under the final rule: costs for conducting interviews with
identified high-risk individuals, costs for deporting a percentage of
these individuals, costs of delaying a high-risk aircraft at an airport
(either at the origination or destination airport), and costs of
rerouting aircraft if high-risk individuals are identified after
takeoff. The average recurring benefits of the rule are an estimated
$14 million per year. Over the 10-year period of analysis, PV benefits
are an estimated $105 million at a 7 percent discount rate ($128
million at a 3 percent discount rate).
The primary impetus of this rule, however, is the security benefit
afforded by a more timely submission of APIS information. Ideally, the
quantification and monetization of the beneficial security effects of
this regulation would involve two steps. First, we would estimate the
reduction in the probability of a successful terrorist attack resulting
from implementation of the regulation and the consequences of the
avoided event (collectively, the risk associated with a potential
terrorist attack). Then we would identify individuals' willingness to
pay for this incremental risk reduction and multiply it by the
population experiencing the benefit. Both of these steps, however, rely
on key data that are not available for this rule.
In light of these limitations, we conduct a ``breakeven'' analysis
to determine what change in the reduction of risk would be necessary in
order for the benefits of the rule to exceed the costs. Because the
types of attack that would be prevented by this regulation are not
entirely understood, we present a range of potential losses that are
driven by casualty estimates and asset destruction. We use two
estimates of a Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) to represent an
individual's willingness to pay to avoid a fatality onboard an
aircraft, based on economic studies of the value individuals place on
small changes in risk: $3 million per VSL and $6 million per VSL.
Additionally, we present three attack scenarios. Scenario 1 explores a
situation where only individuals are lost (no destruction of physical
property). Scenario 2 explores a situation where individuals are lost
and the aircraft is destroyed. Scenario 3 explores a situation where
individuals are lost and substantial destruction of physical capital is
incurred.
We subtract the annualized benefits of the rule (7 percent discount
rate over 10 years) from the annualized costs (high and low estimates)
and divide these net costs by the value of casualty and property losses
avoided to calculate an annual risk reduction range that would be
required for the benefits of the rule to at least equal the costs.
The annual risk reductions required for the rule to breakeven are
presented below for the three attack scenarios, the two estimates of
VSL, and a range of casualties. As shown, depending on the attack
scenario, the VSL, and the casualty level, risk would have to be
reduced 0.2 (Scenario 3, 3,000 casualties avoided) to 44.2 percent
(Scenario 1, 100 casualties avoided) in order for the rule to
breakeven.
Annual Risk Reduction Required (%) for Net Costs to Equal Benefits
[Annualized at 7 percent over 10 years]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scenario 3:
loss of life
Scenario 1: Scenario 2: and
Casualties avoided loss of life loss of life catastrophic
only and aircraft loss of
property
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$3M VSL:
100......................................................... 30.4-44.2 29.2-42.5 0.4-0.6
250......................................................... 12.2-17.7 12.0-17.4 0.4-0.6
500......................................................... 6.1-8.8 6.0-8.8 0.4-0.6
1,000....................................................... 3.0-4.4 3.0-4.4 0.4-0.5
3,000....................................................... 1.0-1.5 1.0-1.5 0.3-0.4
$6M VSL:
100......................................................... 15.2-22.1 14.9-21.7 0.4-0.6
250......................................................... 6.1-8.8 6.0-8.8 0.4-0.6
500......................................................... 3.0-4.4 3.0-4.4 0.4-0.5
1,000....................................................... 1.5-2.2 1.5-2.2 0.3-0.5
3,000....................................................... 0.5-0.7 0.5-0.7 0.2-0.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
See the ``Regulatory Assessment'' at http://www.regulations.gov or
http://www.cbp.gov for details of these calculations.
Regulatory Alternatives
CBP considered a number of regulatory alternatives to the rule.
Complete details regarding the costs and benefits of these alternatives
can be found in the ``Regulatory Assessment'' available in the docket
for this rule (http://www.regulations.gov; see also http://www.cbp.gov). The following is a summary of these alternatives:
[[Page 48340]]
(1) Do not promulgate any further manifest transmission
requirements (No Action)--the baseline case where carriers would
continue to submit APIS manifests for arriving aircraft passengers 15
minutes after departure and, for departing aircraft passengers, 15
minutes prior to departure. There are no additional costs or benefits
associated with this alternative. High-risk passengers would continue
to board aircraft both destined to and departing from the United
States, and instances of such aircraft departing with a high-risk
passenger onboard would continue. As explained previously in this
document, these results are inconsistent with the protective security
objectives and/or mandates of ATSA, EBSVERA, and IRTPA. Because this is
the status quo, and therefore has no additional costs or benefits, it
is not analyzed further.
(2) A 30-minute transmission requirement and implementation of
AQQ--this is the final rule, discussed earlier in this document, which
generally requires carriers to either submit batch manifests 30 minutes
prior to the securing of the aircraft or, if implementing AQQ, transmit
manifest data for each passenger as he checks in for the flight, up to
the securing of the aircraft. If flying on a carrier using AQQ,
individuals would be queried while they checked in and would be
prevented (denied a boarding pass) from continuing to check in or
having their bags checked if not cleared by CBP. If flying on a carrier
using the APIS 30 batch manifest transmission option, individuals not
cleared by CBP would not be issued a boarding pass. High-risk
individuals would thus not enter passenger screening or the departure
gate area.
First-year costs are $118-185 million, average recurring costs are
$94-152 million per year, and 10-year present value costs are $827
million-1.2 billion (7 percent discount rate) and $976 million-1.4
billion (3 percent discount rate).
(3) A 60-minute transmission requirement--this is the rule as
proposed, without the AQQ option. Carriers would submit their manifests
in their entirety at least 60 minutes prior to departure. CBP assumes
that 2 percent of passengers on large carriers and 0.25 percent of
passengers on small carriers will be delayed an average of 4 hours and
will need to be rerouted. CBP also assumes that 15 percent of
passengers would need to arrive at their originating airport an average
of 15 minutes earlier than normal to make their flights. Benefits will
include interview costs avoided, deportation costs avoided, delay costs
avoided, and diversion costs avoided, as well as the non-quantified
security benefits that are the impetus for this rule.
Based on comments to the proposed rule, and reconsideration of the
matter by CBP in light of lessons learned during the manifest
transmission and security vetting process developed after the exposed
bomb plot in the United Kingdom last summer, this alternative was
rejected as unnecessarily burdensome for air carriers. CBP now believes
that a 30-minute transmission requirement provides greater flexibility
for air carriers while still providing the level of security sought for
this rule.
First-year costs are $265 million, average recurring costs are $343
million per year, and 10-year present value costs are $2.7 billion (7
percent discount rate) and $3.2 billion (3 percent discount rate).
Benefits are higher than the No Action alternative because the
high-risk individual will be identified prior to boarding. In addition
to this security benefit, there is an estimated $14 million in costs
avoided annually.
(4) A 120-minute transmission requirement--his rule would require
carriers to submit manifests 120 minutes prior to departure. The costs
would be higher than under the final rule because originating
passengers, not just connecting passengers, would now be affected.
High-risk passengers would be prevented from boarding aircraft. CBP
would be able to more easily coordinate and plan a response to a hit on
the watch lists well before the boarding process began.
This alternative would be quite disruptive because even though
passengers and carriers would have the predictability of a pre-
determined transmission time, passenger check-in at the original
departure airport would be greatly affected. Instead of passengers
checking in 2 hours prior to departure, carriers would have to advise
passengers to arrive even earlier to assure timely manifest
transmission.
We assume that 20 percent of passengers on large carriers and 5
percent of passengers on small carriers will be delayed an average of 6
hours and will need to be rerouted. We assume that 30 percent of
passengers would need to arrive at the airport 1 hour earlier than
previously. First-year costs are $3.4 billion, average recurring costs
are $4.3 billion per year, and 10-year present value costs are $33.8
billion (7 percent discount rate) and $40.8 billion (3 percent discount
rate).
Benefits are higher than the No Action alternative because a high-
risk individual would be prevented from boarding or departing on an
aircraft destined to or departing from the United States. Benefits are
slightly higher than under the final rule because in some instances,
the high-risk passenger's baggage would not reach the aircraft.
Otherwise, the results achieved do not change appreciably given the
extra time. Nonetheless, this procedure would be consistent with the
protective security purposes of ATSA, EBSVERA, and IRTPA.
The following table summarizes the costs and benefits of the
regulatory alternatives:
Comparison of Costs and Benefits of the Rule and Regulatory Alternatives
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final rule
---------------------------------------- 60-minute APIS 120-minute APIS
30-minute option AQQ option
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First-year costs................ $118 million...... $185 million...... $265 million...... $3.4 billion.
Average recurring costs......... $152 million...... $94 million....... $343 million...... $4.3 billion.
10-year PV costs (7%)........... $1.2 billion...... $827 million...... $2.7 billion...... $33.8 billion.
10-year PV costs (3%)........... $1.4 billion...... $976 million...... $3.2 billion...... $40.8 billion.
Average cost per passenger...... $0.36-$1.55....... $0.36-$1.03....... $1.37-$3.45....... $17.39-$43.81.
Benefits comparison to No Action Higher (risk Higher (risk Higher (risk Higher (risk
identified prior identified prior identified prior identified prior
to boarding). to boarding). to boarding). to boarding).
Benefits comparison to Final .................. .................. Comparable Comparable
Rule. (security (security
benefits + $14 benefits + $14
million in costs million in costs
avoided annually). avoided
annually).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 48341]]
Accounting Statement
As required by OMB Circular A-4 (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/index.html), DHS (through CBP) has
prepared an accounting statement showing the classification of the
expenditures associated with this rule. The table provides our best
estimate of the dollar amount of these costs and benefits, expressed in
2005 dollars, at three percent and seven percent discount rates. We
estimate that the cost of this rule will be approximately $126.8
million annualized (7 percent discount rate) and approximately $126.2
million annualized (3 percent discount rate). Quantified benefits are
$14.9 million annualized (7 percent discount rate) and $15.0 million
annualized (3 percent discount rate). The non-quantified benefits are
enhanced security.
Accounting Statement: Classification of Expenditures, 2006 Through 2016
(2005 Dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% discount rate 7% discount rate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COSTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized monetized costs...... $126.2 million.... $126.8 million.
Annualized quantified, but un- None.............. None.
monetized costs.
Qualitative (un-quantified) None.............. None.
costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BENEFITS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized monetized benefits... $15.0 million..... $14.9 million.
Annualized quantified, but un- None.............. None.
monetized costs.
Qualitative (un-quantified) Enhanced security. Enhanced security.
costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12866, this
regulation was reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
We have examined the impacts of this rule on small entities as
required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A small entity may be a
small business (defined as any independently owned and operated
business not dominant in its field that qualifies as a small business
per the Small Business Act); a small not-for-profit organization; or a
small governmental jurisdiction (locality with fewer than 50,000
people).
CBP has identified 773 small U.S. air carriers that could be
affected by the rule. CBP does not expect these carriers to experience
great economic impacts as a result of the rule. Small carriers do not
need to modify their reservation systems, their transmission methods,
nor do they have many connecting passengers that may miss their flights
and require rerouting. CBP estimates that, at most, 5 percent of
passengers on small carriers will be affected by this rule annually. In
the 2005 APIS Rule, we estimated that small carriers transport an
average of 300 passengers annually. As calculated in the ``Regulatory
Assessment,'' the total cost of delay per passenger is $118.97, and
only $4.57 of this is incurred by the air carrier. Initial analysis for
the proposed rule estimated the impacts of a 60-minute prior to
departure transmission requirement. Now that the transmission
requirement has changed for this final rule to 30-minutes prior to the
securing of the aircraft, we estimate there will be no direct impacts
to small carriers. The costs of arriving earlier than customary are
incurred only by the passenger.
We conclude, therefore, that this rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The complete analysis of impacts to small entities is available on
the CBP Web site at: http://www.regulations.gov; see also http://www.cbp.gov.
C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA),
enacted as Public Law 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal
agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment
of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency
rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year.
Section 204(a) of the UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal
agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by
elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and tribal
governments on a ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A
``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the UMRA is any
provision in a Federal agency regulation that will impose an
enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one
year. Section 203 of the UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section
204(a), provides that, before establishing any regulatory requirements
that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the
agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides
for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for
meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development
of regulatory proposals.
This final rule would not impose any cost on small governments or
significantly or uniquely affect small governments. However, as stated
in the ``Executive Order 12866'' section of this document, CBP has
determined that the rule would result in the expenditure by the private
sector of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any
one year and thus would constitute a significant regulatory action.
Consequently, the provisions of this rule constitute a private sector
mandate under the UMRA. CBP's analysis of the cost impact on affected
businesses, summarized in the ``Executive Order 12866'' section of this
document and available for review by accessing http://www.regulations.gov; see also http://www.cbp.gov, is incorporated here
by reference as the assessment required under Title II of the UMRA.
D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
This final rule would not have substantial direct effects on the
States, on the relationship between the National Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive
Order 13132, it is determined that this rule does not have sufficient
Federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism
summary impact statement.
[[Page 48342]]
E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
This rule meets the applicable standards set forth in sections 3(a)
and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988. That Executive Order requires
agencies to conduct reviews, before proposing legislation or
promulgating regulations, to determine the impact of those proposals on
civil justice and potential issues for litigation. The Order requires
that agencies make reasonable efforts to ensure that a regulation
clearly identifies preemptive effects, effects on existing Federal laws
and regulations, any retroactive effects of the proposal, and other
matters. CBP has determined that this regulation meets the requirements
of Executive Order 12988 because it does not involve retroactive
effects, preemptive effects, or other matters addressed in the Order.
F. National Environmental Policy Act
CBP has evaluated this rule for purposes of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.). CBP
has determined that an environmental statement is not required, since
this action is non-invasive and there is no potential impact of any
kind. Record of this determination has been placed in the rulemaking
docket.
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
In connection with the final rule published by DHS/CBP in April
2005, and discussed in this rule, a Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
analysis was set forth concerning the information collection involved
under that rule (see OMB No. 1651-0088). The analysis pertained to the
information collection contained in 19 CFR 4.7b, 4.64, 122.49a,
122.49b, 122.49c, 122.75a, and 122.75b. The final rule published today,
which amends the regulation as amended by the April 2005 final rule,
affects only the timing and manner of the submission of the information
already required under the regulation. The collection of information in
this document is contained in 19 CFR 4.64, 122.49a, and 122.75a. An
Information Collection Report reflecting a change in the collection
burden due to this final rule has been submitted to OMB for review, in
accordance with the PRA, under OMB 1651-0088.
An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required
to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of
information displays a valid control number.
Estimated annual reporting and/or recordkeeping burden: 30,669
hours.
Estimated average annual burden per respondent/recordkeeper: 129
minutes.
Estimated number of respondents and/or recordkeepers: 14,265.
Estimated annual frequency of responses: 129.
H. Signing Authority
This amendment to the regulations is being issued in accordance
with 19 CFR 0.2(a) pertaining to the authority of the Secretary of
Homeland Security (or his delegate) to prescribe regulations not
related to customs revenue functions.
I. Privacy Statement
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) was published in the Federal
Register (70 FR 17857) in conjunction with the April 7, 2005, APIS
Final Rule (70 FR 17820). To address the changes made in this final
rule, DHS is publishing an update to the APIS PIA on its Web site. DHS
is preparing a separate SORN for APIS for publication in conjunction
with this final rule.
List of Subjects
19 CFR Part 4
Aliens, Customs duties and inspection, Immigration, Maritime
carriers, Passenger vessels, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Vessels.
19 CFR Part 122
Air carriers, Aircraft, Airports, Air transportation, Commercial
aircraft, Customs duties and inspection, Entry procedure, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
Amendments to the Regulations
0
For the reasons stated in the preamble, parts 4 and 122 of the CBP
regulations (19 CFR parts 4 and 122) are amended as follows:
PART 4--VESSELS IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRADES
0
1. The general authority citation for part 4 and the specific authority
citation for section 4.64 continue to read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 19 U.S.C. 66, 1431, 1433, 1434, 1624;
2071 note; 46 U.S.C. 6015.
* * * * *
Section 4.64 also issued under 8 U.S.C. 1221;
* * * * *
Sec. 4.64 [Amended]
0
2. Section 4.64 is amended by, in paragraph (b)(2)(i), removing the
words ``no later than 15 minutes'' and replacing them with the words
``no later than 60 minutes''.
PART 122--AIR COMMERCE REGULATIONS
0
3. The general authority citation for part 122 and the specific
authority citations for sections 122.49a and 122.75a continue to read
as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 19 U.S.C. 58b, 66, 1431, 1433, 1436,
1448, 1459, 1590, 1594, 1623, 1624, 1644, 1644a, 2071 note.
Section 122.49a also issued under 8 U.S.C. 1221, 19 U.S.C. 1431,
49 U.S.C. 44909.
* * * * *
Section 122.75a also issued under 8 U.S.C. 1221, 19 U.S.C. 1431.
* * * * *
0
4. Section 122.49a is amended by, in paragraph (a), adding in
appropriate alphabetical order the definition of ``securing the
aircraft'' and by revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2), such addition
and revisions to read as follows:
Sec. 122.49a Electronic manifest requirement for passengers onboard
commercial aircraft arriving in the United States.
(a) * * *
Securing the aircraft. ``Securing the aircraft'' means the moment
the aircraft's doors are closed and secured for flight.
* * * * *
(b) Electronic arrival manifest. (1) General. (i) Basic
requirement. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, an
appropriate official of each commercial aircraft (carrier) arriving in
the United States from any place outside the United States must
transmit to the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS; referred to
in this section as the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) system), the
electronic data interchange system approved by CBP for such
transmissions, an electronic passenger arrival manifest covering all
passengers checked in for the flight. A passenger manifest must be
transmitted separately from a crew member manifest required under Sec.
122.49b if transmission is in U.S. EDIFACT format. The passenger
manifest must be transmitted to the CBP system at the place and time
specified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, in the manner set forth
under paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section.
(ii) Transmission of manifests. A carrier required to make
passenger arrival manifest transmissions to the CBP system under
paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section must make the required
transmissions, covering all passengers checked in for the flight, in
accordance with either paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A), (B), (C), or (D) of
this section, as follows:
(A) Non-interactive batch transmission option. A carrier that
[[Page 48343]]
chooses not to transmit required passenger manifests by means of a CBP-
certified interactive electronic transmission system under paragraph
(b)(1)(ii)(B), (C), or (D) of this section must make batch manifest
transmissions in accordance with this paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A) by means
of a non-interactive electronic transmission system approved by CBP.
The carrier may make a single, complete batch manifest transmission
containing the data required under paragraph (b)(3) of this section for
all passengers checked in for the flight or two or more partial batch
manifest transmissions, each containing the required data for the
identified passengers and which together cover all passengers checked
in for the flight. After receipt of the manifest information, the CBP
system will perform an initial security vetting of the data and send to
the carrier by a non-interactive transmission method a ``not-cleared''
instruction for passengers identified as requiring additional security
analysis and a ``selectee'' instruction for passengers requiring
secondary screening (e.g., additional examination of the person and/or
his baggage) under applicable Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) requirements. The carrier must designate as a ``selectee'' any
passenger so identified during initial security vetting, in accordance
with applicable TSA requirements. The carrier must not issue a boarding
pass to, or load the baggage of, any passenger subject to a ``not-
cleared'' instruction and must contact TSA to seek resolution of the
``not-cleared'' instruction by providing, if necessary, additional
relevant information relative to the ``not-cleared'' passenger. TSA
will notify the carrier if the ``not-cleared'' passenger is cleared for
boarding or downgraded to ``selectee'' status based on the additional
security analysis.
(B) Interactive batch transmission option. A carrier, upon
obtaining CBP certification, in accordance with paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(E)
of this section, may make manifest transmissions by means of an
interactive electronic transmission system configured for batch
transmission of data and receipt from the CBP system of appropriate
messages. A carrier operating under this paragraph must make
transmissions by transmitting a single, complete batch manifest
containing the data required under paragraph (b)(3) of this section for
all passengers checked in for the flight or two or more partial batch
manifests, each containing the required data for the identified
passengers and which together cover all passengers checked in for the
flight. In the case of connecting passengers arriving at the connecting
airport already in possession of boarding passes for a U.S.-bound
flight whose data have not been collected by the carrier, the carrier
must transmit all required manifest data for these passengers when they
arrive at the gate, or some other suitable place designated by the
carrier, for the flight. After receipt of the manifest information, the
CBP system will perform an initial security vetting of the data and
send to the carrier by interactive electronic transmission, as
appropriate, a ``cleared'' instruction for passengers not matching
against the watch list, a ``not-cleared'' instruction for passengers
identified as requiring additional security analysis, and a
``selectee'' instruction for passengers who require secondary screening
(e.g., additional examination of the person and/or his baggage) under
applicable TSA requirements. The carrier must designate as a
``selectee'' any passenger so identified during initial security
vetting, in accordance with applicable TSA requirements. The carrier
must not issue a boarding pass to, or load the baggage of, any
passenger subject to a ``not-cleared'' instruction and, in the case of
connecting passengers (as described in this paragraph), the carrier
must not board or load the baggage of any such passenger until the CBP
system returns a ``cleared'' or ``selectee'' response for that
passenger. Where a ``selectee'' instruction is received for a
connecting passenger, the carrier must ensure that such passenger
undergoes secondary screening before boarding. The carrier must seek
resolution of a ``not-cleared'' instruction by contacting TSA and
providing, if necessary, additional relevant information relative to
the ``not-cleared'' passenger. Upon completion of the additional
security analysis, TSA will notify the carrier if a ``not-cleared''
passenger is cleared for boarding or downgraded to ``selectee'' status
based on the additional security analysis. No later than 30 minutes
after the securing of the aircraft, the carrier must transmit to the
CBP system a message reporting any passengers who checked in but were
not onboard the flight. The message must identify the passengers by a
unique identifier selected or devised by the carrier or by specific
passenger data (e.g., name) and may contain the unique identifiers or
data for all passengers onboard the flight or for only those passengers
who checked in but were not onboard the flight.
(C) Interactive individual passenger information transmission
option. A carrier, upon obtaining CBP certification, in accordance with
paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(E) of this section, may make manifest
transmissions by means of an interactive electronic transmission system
configured for transmitting individual passenger data for each
passenger and for receiving from the CBP system appropriate messages. A
carrier operating under this paragraph must make such transmissions as
individual passengers check in for the flight or, in the case of
connecting passengers arriving at the connecting airport already in
possession of boarding passes for a U.S.-bound flight whose data have
not been collected by the carrier, as these connecting passengers
arrive at the gate, or some other suitable place designated by the
carrier, for the flight. With each transmission of manifest information
by the carrier, the CBP system will perform an initial security vetting
of the data and send to the carrier by interactive electronic
transmission, as appropriate, a ``cleared'' instruction for passengers
not matching against the watch list, a ``not-cleared'' instruction for
passengers identified as requiring additional security analysis, and a
``selectee'' instruction for passengers requiring secondary screening
(e.g., additional examination of the person and/or his baggage) under
applicable TSA requirements. The carrier must designate as a
``selectee'' any passenger so identified during initial security
vetting, in accordance with applicable TSA requirements. The carrier
must not issue a boarding pass to, or load the baggage of, any
passenger subject to a ``not-cleared'' instruction and, in the case of
connecting passengers (as described in this paragraph), must not board
or load the baggage of any such passenger until the CBP system returns
a ``cleared'' or ``selectee'' response for that passenger. Where a
``selectee'' instruction is received by the carrier for a connecting
passenger, the carrier must ensure that secondary screening of the
passenger is conducted before boarding. The carrier must seek
resolution of a ``not-cleared'' instruction by contacting TSA and
providing, if necessary, additional relevant information relative to
the ``not-cleared'' passenger. Upon completion of the additional
security analysis, TSA will notify the carrier if a ``not-cleared''
passenger is cleared for boarding or downgraded to ``selectee'' status
based on the additional security analysis. No later than 30 minutes
after the securing of the aircraft, the carrier must transmit to the
CBP system a message reporting any passengers who checked in but were
not onboard the
[[Page 48344]]
flight. The message must identify the passengers by a unique identifier
selected or devised by the carrier or by specific passenger data (name)
and may contain the unique identifiers or data for all passengers
onboard the flight or for only those passengers who checked in but were
not onboard the flight.
(D) Combined use of interactive methods. If certified to do so, a
carrier may make transmissions under both paragraphs (b)(1)(ii)(B) and
(C) of this section for a particular flight or for different flights.
(E) Certification. Before making any required manifest
transmissions under paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(B) or (C) of this section, a
carrier must subject its electronic transmission system to CBP testing,
and CBP must certify that the carrier's system is then presently
capable of interactively communicating with the CBP system for
effective transmission of manifest data and receipt of appropriate
messages in accordance with those paragraphs.
(2) Place and time for submission. The appropriate official
specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section (carrier) must
transmit the arrival manifest or manifest data as required under
paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii) of this section to the CBP system (CBP
Data Center, CBP Headquarters), in accordance with the following:
(i) For manifests transmitted under paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A) or (B)
of this section, no later than 30 minutes prior to the securing of the
aircraft;
(ii) For manifest information transmitted under paragraph
(b)(1)(ii)(C) of this section, no later than the securing of the
aircraft;
(iii) For flights not originally destined to the United States but
diverted to a U.S. port due to an emergency, no later than 30 minutes
prior to arrival; in cases of non-compliance, CBP will take into
consideration whether the carrier was equipped to make the transmission
and the circumstances of the emergency situation; and
(iv) For an aircraft operating as an air ambulance in service of a
medical emergency, no later than 30 minutes prior to arrival; in cases
of non-compliance, CBP will take into consideration whether the carrier
was equipped to make the transmission and the circumstances of the
emergency situation.
* * * * *
0
5. Section 122.75a is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2),
to read as follows:
Sec. 122.75a Electronic manifest requirements for passengers onboard
commercial aircraft departing from the United States.
* * * * *
(b) Electronic departure manifest. (1) General. (i) Basic
requirement. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, an
appropriate official of each commercial aircraft (carrier) departing
from the United States en route to any port or place outside the United
States must transmit to the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS;
referred to in this section as the Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
system), the electronic data interchange system approved by CBP for
such transmissions, an electronic passenger departure manifest covering
all passengers checked in for the flight. A passenger manifest must be
transmitted separately from a crew member manifest required under Sec.
122.75b if transmission is in U.S. EDIFACT format. The passenger
manifest must be transmitted to the CBP system at the place and time
specified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, in the manner set forth
under paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section.
(ii) Transmission of manifests. A carrier required to make
passenger departure manifest transmissions to the CBP system under
paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section must make the required
transmissions covering all passengers checked in for the flight in
accordance with either paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A), (B), (C), or (D) of
this section, as follows:
(A) Non-interactive batch transmission option. A carrier that
chooses not to transmit required passenger manifests by means of a CBP-
certified interactive electronic transmission system under paragraph
(b)(1)(ii)(B), (C), or (D) of this section must make batch manifest
transmissions in accordance with this paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A) by means
of a non-interactive electronic transmission system approved by CBP.
The carrier may make a single, complete batch manifest transmission
containing the data required under paragraph (b)(3) of this section for
all passengers checked in for the flight or two or more partial batch
manifest transmissions, each containing the required data for the
identified passengers and which together cover all passengers checked
in for the flight. After receipt of the manifest information, the CBP
system will perform an initial security vetting of the data and send to
the carrier by a non-interactive transmission method a ``not-cleared''
instruction for passengers identified as requiring additional security
analysis and a ``selectee'' instruction for passengers requiring
secondary screening (e.g., additional examination of the person and/or
his baggage) under applicable Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) requirements. The carrier must designate as a ``selectee'' any
passenger so identified during initial security vetting, in accordance
with applicable TSA requirements. The carrier must not issue a boarding
pass to, or load the baggage of, any passenger subject to the ``not-
cleared'' instruction and must contact the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to seek resolution of the ``not-cleared''
instruction by providing, if necessary, additional relevant information
relative to the ``not-cleared'' passenger. TSA will notify the carrier
if a ``not-cleared'' passenger is cleared for boarding or downgraded to
``selectee'' status based on the additional security analysis.
(B) Interactive batch transmission option. A carrier, upon
obtaining CBP certification, in accordance with paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(E)
of this section, may make manifest transmissions by means of an
interactive electronic transmission system configured for batch
transmission of data and receipt from the CBP system of appropriate
messages. A carrier operating under this paragraph must make manifest
transmissions by transmitting a single, complete batch manifest
containing the data required under paragraph (b)(3) of this section for
all passengers checked in for the flight or two or more partial batch
manifests, each containing the required data for the identified
passengers and which together cover all passengers checked in for the
flight. In the case of connecting passengers arriving at the connecting
airport already in possession of boarding passes for a flight departing
from the United States whose data have not been collected by the
carrier, the carrier must transmit required manifest data for these
passengers when they arrive at the gate, or some other suitable place
designated by the carrier, for the flight. After receipt of the
manifest information, the CBP system will perform an initial security
vetting of the data and send to the carrier by interactive electronic
transmission, as appropriate, a ``cleared'' instruction for passengers
not matching against the watch list, a ``not-cleared'' instruction for
passengers identified as requiring additional security analysis, and a
``selectee'' instruction for passengers who require secondary screening
(e.g., additional examination of the person and/or his baggage) under
applicable TSA requirements. The carrier must designate as a
``selectee'' any passenger
[[Page 48345]]
so identified during initial security vetting, in accordance with
applicable TSA requirements. The carrier must not issue a boarding pass
to, or load the baggage of, any passenger subject to a ``not-cleared''
instruction and, in the case of connecting passengers (as described in
this paragraph), the carrier must not board or load the baggage of any
such passenger until the CBP system returns a ``cleared'' or
``selectee'' response for that passenger. Where a ``selectee''
instruction is received for a connecting passenger, the carrier must
ensure that such passenger undergoes secondary screening before
boarding. The carrier must seek resolution of a ``not-cleared''
instruction by contacting TSA and providing, if necessary, additional
relevant information relative to the ``not-cleared'' passenger. Upon
completion of the additional security analysis, TSA will notify the
carrier if a ``not-cleared'' passenger is cleared for boarding or
downgraded to ``selectee'' status based on the additional security
analysis. No later than 30 minutes after the securing of the aircraft,
the carrier must transmit to the CBP system a message reporting any
passengers who checked in but were not onboard the flight. The message
must identify the passengers by a unique identifier selected or devised
by the carrier or by specific passenger data (name) and may contain the
unique identifiers or data for all passengers onboard the flight or for
only those passengers who checked in but were not onboard the flight.
(C) Interactive individual passenger information transmission
option. A carrier, upon obtaining CBP certification, in accordance with
paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(E) of this section, may make manifest
transmissions by means of an interactive electronic transmission system
configured for transmitting individual passenger data for each
passenger and for receiving from the CBP system appropriate messages. A
carrier operating under this paragraph must make such transmissions as
individual passengers check in for the flight or, in the case of
connecting passengers arriving at the connecting airport already in
possession of boarding passes for a flight departing from the United
States whose data have not been collected by the carrier, as these
connecting passengers arrive at the gate, or some other suitable place
designated by the carrier for the flight. With each transmission of
manifest information by the carrier, the CBP system will perform an
initial security vetting of the data and send to the carrier by
interactive electronic transmission, as appropriate, a ``cleared''
instruction for passengers not matching against the watch list, a
``not-cleared'' instruction for passengers identified during initial
security vetting as requiring additional security analysis, and a
``selectee'' instruction for passengers requiring secondary screening
(e.g., additional examination of the person and/or his baggage) under
applicable TSA requirements. The carrier must designate as a
``selectee'' any passenger so identified during initial security
vetting, in accordance with applicable TSA requirements. The carrier
must not issue a boarding pass to, or load the baggage of, any
passenger subject to a ``not-cleared'' instruction and, in the case of
connecting passengers (as described in this paragraph), must not board
or load the baggage of any such passenger until the CBP system returns
a ``cleared'' or ``selectee'' response for that passenger. Where a
``selectee'' instruction is received for a connecting passenger, the
carrier must ensure that such passenger undergoes secondary screening
before boarding. The carrier must seek resolution of a ``not-cleared''
instruction by contacting TSA and providing, if necessary, additional
relevant information relative to the ``not-cleared'' passenger. Upon
completion of the additional security analysis, TSA will notify the
carrier if a ``not-cleared'' passenger is cleared for boarding or
downgraded to ``selectee'' status based on the additional security
analysis. No later than 30 minutes after the securing of the aircraft,
the carrier must transmit to the CBP system a message reporting any
passengers who checked in but were not onboard the flight. The message
must identify the passengers by a unique identifier selected or devised
by the carrier or by specific passenger data (name) and may contain the
unique identifiers or data for all passengers onboard the flight or for
only those passengers who checked in but were not onboard the flight.
(D) Combined use of interactive methods. If certified to do so, a
carrier may make transmissions under both paragraphs (b)(1)(ii)(B) and
(C) of this section for a particular flight or for different flights.
(E) Certification. Before making any required manifest
transmissions under paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(B) or (C) of this section, a
carrier must subject its electronic transmission system to CBP testing,
and CBP must certify that the carrier's system is then presently
capable of interactively communicating with the CBP system for
effective transmission of manifest data and receipt of appropriate
messages under those paragraphs.
(2) Place and time for submission. The appropriate official
specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section (carrier) must
transmit the departure manifest or manifest data as required under
paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii) of this section to the CBP system (CBP
Data Center, CBP Headquarters), in accordance with the following:
(i) For manifests transmitted under paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A) and (B)
of this section, no later than 30 minutes prior to the securing of the
aircraft;
(ii) For manifest information transmitted under paragraph
(b)(1)(ii)(C) of this section, no later than the securing of the
aircraft; and
(iii) For an aircraft operating as an air ambulance in service of a
medical emergency, no later than 30 minutes after departure.
* * * * *
W. Ralph Basham,
Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection.
Approved:
Michael Chertoff,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E7-15985 Filed 8-22-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-14-P