[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 161 (Tuesday, August 21, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 46668-46670]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-16463]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-346, 50-440, 50-334, and 50-412; License Nos. NPF-3,
NPF-58, DPR-66 and NPF-73; EA 07-199]
In the Matter of FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Davis-
Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; Beaver Valley Power Station, Units
1 and 2; Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately)
I
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC or licensee) is the
holder of four NRC Facility Operating Licenses issued by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR
Part 50, which authorizes the operation of the specifically-named
facilities in accordance with the conditions specified in each license.
License No. NPF-3 was issued on April 22, 1977, to operate the Davis-
Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. License No. NPF-58 was issued
on November 13, 1986, to operate the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit
No. 1. License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73 to operate the Beaver Valley
Power Station, Units 1 and 2, were issued on July 2, 1976, and August
14, 1987, respectively. Davis-Besse is located near Toledo, Ohio; Perry
is located near Painesville, Ohio; and Beaver Valley is located near
McCandless, Pennsylvania.
II
The events leading up to this Confirmatory Order date back several
years. In 2005, the NRC took enforcement action against FENOC, imposing
a $5,450,000 civil penalty for regulatory violations associated with
the 2002 reactor pressure vessel head degradation event at the Davis-
Besse Plant. In response to that event, FENOC performed root cause
evaluations. Among other things, FENOC's root cause reports determined
that the reactor pressure vessel head degradation was the result of
ongoing and undetected Control Rod Drive Mechanism nozzle leakage that
had lasted more than four years.
In February 2007, the licensee informed the NRC that Davis-Besse
was initiating a condition report based on information contained in a
letter received from Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL). The
NEIL letter referenced a new analysis that FENOC had commissioned of
the Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event. The new
analysis, submitted to NEIL as expert testimony in an insurance
arbitration on December 18, 2006, was performed by Exponent Failure
Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporation (Exponent) and
concluded that the time period between the beginning of substantial
leakage from the reactor pressure vessel head nozzle and the
development of the large cavity next to the nozzle may have been as
short as four months.
On April 2, 2007, after several conference calls with the licensee
and Exponent to assess whether the Exponent Report raised any immediate
safety concerns (it did not), the NRC requested FENOC to respond in
writing to four questions regarding information and conclusions
presented in the Exponent Report. Among other things, the NRC's request
for information asked FENOC to ``discuss any differences between the
Exponent Report information and conclusions drawn therein, and
information previously provided in the Root Cause Analysis Report and
Licensee Event Report for the Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head
wastage event.''
In its May 2, 2007, response to the NRC's request for information,
FENOC stated that it ``ha[d] not specifically evaluated all of the
assumptions used by Exponent'' but nevertheless concluded that the
Exponent Report ``more accurately characterizes the time line of the
reactor head degradation event based on [Exponent's] use of more
recently available test data in conjunction with detailed analytical
modeling.'' FENOC's response did not include a detailed discussion of
the differences between the operational experience data and the
Exponent Report assumptions.
Consequently, on May 14, 2007, the NRC issued FENOC a Demand for
Information (DFI) pursuant to 10 CFR 2.204 to determine whether further
enforcement action was necessary to provide reasonable assurance that
FENOC would continue to operate its licensed facilities in accordance
with the terms of its licenses and the Commission's regulations. The
DFI required FENOC to provide a detailed discussion of the process used
to determine if the Exponent Report assumptions, analyses, conclusions,
or other related information should have been reported to the NRC in a
more prompt manner; a detailed discussion of the differences in
assumptions, analyses, conclusions, and other related information of
the Exponent Report and technical and programmatic root cause reports
developed in 2002; and a position on whether FENOC endorsed the
conclusions of a second contractor report prepared in connection with
the NEIL insurance arbitration.
FENOC responded to the DFI in writing on June 13, 2007. In that
response, FENOC stated that its May 2, 2007, response ``was primarily
focused on the detailed analytical studies that form the basis for the
Exponent Report's time line for the crack growth and wastage phenomenon
* * * and was not a comprehensive review of the differences between our
root cause reports and the Exponent Report.'' According to the June 13
response, FENOC ``continues to believe'' that its earlier root cause
reports ``provide a comprehensive explanation of the progression and
causal factors of the Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head
degradation event and, hence, contain the most appropriate information
to have used in development and implementation of corrective actions to
prevent recurrence.'' FENOC's June 13, 2007, response further
acknowledged that it ``should have communicated more effectively
internally and more promptly with the NRC'' about the Exponent Report,
and included commitments to implement corrective actions in those
areas.
On June 27, 2007, the NRC held a public meeting with FENOC to
discuss the DFI response. During the meeting, the NRC questioned the
corporate safety culture at FirstEnergy and whether FENOC had changed
its position
[[Page 46669]]
regarding the root causes of the Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel
head degradation event. The NRC further questioned why FENOC had not
immediately shared the Exponent Report with the NRC, given the
importance of its subject matter and potential safety significance. The
NRC also sought clarification regarding the licensee's proposed
corrective actions and FENOC agreed to provide clarification in a
supplemental DFI response.
On July 16, 2007, FENOC provided the NRC its supplemental response
to the DFI, which elaborated on the commitments and corrective actions
discussed at the public meeting. In general, FENOC's commitments and
corrective actions are designed to prevent recurrence of the events
that culminated in the issuance of the NRC's Demand for Information.
Specifically, FENOC's commitments are designed to ensure that
information of potential regulatory significance is recognized by FENOC
and FirstEnergy employees and communicated to the NRC in a timely and
effective manner.
In the short term, FENOC has implemented interim corrective actions
to prevent recurrence of the events that culminated in the issuance of
the NRC's Demand for Information. Specifically, FENOC has developed
criteria to be used in determining whether documents developed in
support of commercial matters, including the pending insurance
arbitration with NEIL, contain information of potential regulatory
interest to the NRC. FENOC's interim actions will remain in place until
the procedural changes required by this Confirmatory Order are
implemented.
III
On August 14, 2007, the Licensee consented to the issuance of this
Order to confirm the commitments described in section IV below. The
Licensee further agreed that this Order is effective upon issuance and
has waived its right to a hearing.
I find that the commitments set forth in Section IV are acceptable
and necessary and conclude that with these commitments the public
health and safety are reasonably assured. In view of the foregoing, I
have determined that public health, safety, and interest require that
the Licensee's commitments be confirmed by this Order. Based on the
above and the Licensee's consent, this Order is immediately effective
upon issuance.
IV
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104b, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, it is hereby ordered,
effective immediately, that the licensee shall implement the following:
1. The Licensee shall conduct regulatory sensitivity training for
selected FENOC and non-FENOC FirstEnergy employees to ensure those
employees identify and communicate information that has the potential
for regulatory impact either at FENOC sites or within the nuclear
industry to the NRC. At least 30 days prior to conducting the training,
the Licensee shall submit by letter to the Director, NRC Office of
Enforcement, a description of (1) the population to be trained, (2) the
planned training methodology and materials, and (3) the training
objectives. The Licensee shall complete its regulatory sensitivity
training no later than November 30, 2007, and within 60 days following
completion shall inform the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, by
letter.
2. The Licensee shall conduct effectiveness reviews to determine if
an appropriate level of regulatory sensitivity is evident among
FirstEnergy employees including those who received regulatory
sensitivity training. The first effectiveness review shall be conducted
in January 2008 by an external consultant. A follow-up effectiveness
review shall be conducted in January 2009. At least 45 days prior to
starting each external effectiveness review, the Licensee shall inform,
by letter, the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, of the identity of
its external consultant, the qualifications of its external consultant,
and the scope and depth of its plan for assessing effectiveness. Within
60 days following completion of each external effectiveness review, the
Licensee shall inform, by letter, the Director, NRC Office of
Enforcement, of a summary of the results of the review and a
description of any actions taken or planned in response to those
results.
3. The Licensee shall develop a formal process to review technical
reports prepared as part of a commercial matter. The process shall
provide criteria for the Licensee to use in determining whether a
report has the potential for regulatory implications, or impact on
nuclear safety either at FENOC sites or within the nuclear industry.
The Licensee shall implement the process no later than December 14,
2007, and within 30 days following implementation shall submit a
description of the process by letter to the Director, NRC Office of
Enforcement.
4. The Licensee shall assess its Regulatory Communications policy
and make process changes to its NRC Correspondence procedure to ensure
specific questions are asked during the process relative to the
experience gained from efforts to respond to the NRC's May 14, 2007,
Demand for Information. The Licensee shall complete any revisions to
its NRC Correspondence procedure or Regulatory Communications policy no
later than December 14, 2007, and within 30 days following completion
shall submit a description of the policy and procedure changes, if any,
or the basis for the determination that such revisions were not
necessary, by letter to the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement.
5. The Licensee shall provide an Operating Experience (OE) document
to the nuclear industry through the industry's established OE process.
The document shall discuss the issues surrounding the NRC's May 14,
2007, Demand for Information, including the review of technical reports
prepared as part of a commercial matter. The OE document shall be
provided to the nuclear industry, and to the Director, NRC Office of
Enforcement, within 30 days of the date of this Order.
6. The Licensee shall complete a root cause evaluation of the
events that culminated in the issuance of the NRC's May 14, 2007,
Demand for Information. The licensee shall make the root cause
evaluation available for review by NRC inspectors and summarize the
results of the evaluation in a letter to the Director, NRC Office of
Enforcement, no later than December 14, 2007. The Licensee's letter to
the NRC shall document the results of an assessment as to whether the
results of the root cause evaluation reflect a need for any corrective
actions different from or in addition to the requirements of this
Confirmatory Order.
7. The Licensee shall maintain the interim corrective actions,
discussed, in part, in Section II of this Order and implemented as a
result of the events leading up to the issuance of the NRC's May 14,
2007, DFI, until the procedural changes described in paragraphs 3 and 4
of Section IV of this Confirmatory Order are implemented.
The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee
of good cause.
V
Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other
than the Licensee, may request a hearing within 20 days of its
issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to
extending the time to request a
[[Page 46670]]
hearing. A request for extension of time in which to request a hearing
must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and must include a
statement of good cause for the extension. Any request for a hearing
shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
commission, ATTN: Chief, Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff,
Washington, DC 20555. Copies of the hearing request shall also be sent
to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for
Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, to the
Regional Administrator for NRC Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle,
IL 60532-4351, to the Regional Administrator for NRC Region I, 475
Allendale Road, King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415, and to the Licensee. It
is requested that requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary
of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-
1101 or by e-mail to [email protected] and also to the Office of
the General Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-
415-3725 or by e-mail to [email protected]. If a person other than
the licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with
particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by
this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d)
and (f).
If a hearing is requested by a person whose interest is adversely
affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and
place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered
at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory Order should be
sustained. In the absence of any request for hearing, or written
approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the
provisions specified in section IV above shall be final 20 days from
the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in section IV shall be final when the extension
expires if a hearing request has not been received. A request for
hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this order.
Dated this 15th day of August 2007.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Cynthia A. Carpenter,
Director, Office of Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E7-16463 Filed 8-20-07; 8:45 am]
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