[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 157 (Wednesday, August 15, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 45629-45636]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-16063]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 121

[Docket No. FAA-2005-22449; Amendment No. 121-334]
RIN 2120-AI16


Flightdeck Door Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting Systems

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule amends Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
regulations by requiring operators of passenger-carrying transport 
category airplanes used in domestic, flag, and supplemental operations 
to have a means for flightcrew to visually monitor the door area 
outside the flightdeck. This means will allow the flightcrew to 
identify persons requesting entry into the flightdeck and detect 
suspicious behavior or potential threats. This final rule also amends 
FAA regulations to require that, for operations requiring the presence 
of flight attendants, the flight attendants have a means to discreetly 
notify the flightcrew of suspicious activity or security breaches in 
the cabin. This final rule addresses standards adopted by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) following the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

DATES: Effective October 15, 2007.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe Keenan, Air Transportation 
Division, Flight Standards Service, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8166, facsimile (202) 267-
9579, e-mail: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    (3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's web page at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
    You can also get a copy by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this 
rulemaking.
    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments 
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit 
http://dms.dot.gov.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for 
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations 
within its jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a 
question regarding this document, you may contact the person listed 
under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out more about 
SBREFA on the Internet at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/ sbre--act/.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting 
safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing:
     Minimum standards required in the interest of safety for 
the design and performance of aircraft, and;
     Regulations for other practices, methods, and procedures 
the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and 
national security.
    This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it 
prescribes:
     New standards for the safe operation of transport category 
airplanes, and;
     Practices, methods, and procedures that the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.

Background

    Following the terrorists' acts on September 11, 2001, the Office of 
the Secretary of Transportation, Congress, and the FAA took several 
long term actions to prevent hijackings on passenger-carrying airplanes 
used in air carrier service. As part of those actions, the FAA 
published the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), ``Flightdeck Door 
Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting Systems'' (70 FR 55492; September 
21, 2005). That NPRM proposed requiring operators of passenger-carrying 
transport category airplanes used in domestic, flag, and supplemental 
operations to have a means for flightcrew to visually monitor the door 
area outside the flightdeck. The NPRM also proposed that, for 
operations requiring the presence of flight attendants, flight 
attendants have a means to discreetly notify the flightcrew of 
suspicious activity or security breaches in the cabin. The proposed 
changes addressed standards adopted by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
    Before issuing the NPRM, the FAA participated in the rapid response 
teams (RRTs) created by the Secretary of Transportation to develop 
recommendations for improving security within the national aviation 
system. One team was tasked with developing recommendations to improve 
security at the nation's airports; the other team was tasked with 
developing recommendations for aircraft integrity and security, with a 
specific focus on cockpit access.
    Members of the aircraft integrity and security RRT included 
representatives from American Airlines, the Boeing Company, the 
Association of Flight Attendants, and the Air Line Pilots Association. 
Members of the Department of Transportation and the FAA supported the 
security RRT. In addition to regular team meetings, this RRT met with 
representatives from the airline operators, pilot and flight attendant 
associations, and parts manufacturers. The security RRT also received 
numerous recommendations from the public as the result of an e-mail 
address on the FAA Web site.
    On October 1, 2001, the RRT for aircraft integrity and security 
presented its final report to the Secretary of Transportation. The 
report made 17 recommendations. One recommendation recognized the need 
for reinforced flightdeck doors and severe limitations on flightdeck 
entry. Anticipating the new severe limitations on flightdeck entry, the 
RRT made several recommendations for flightdeck access. These included:
     Flight attendants must have a method for immediate 
notification to

[[Page 45630]]

the flightcrew during a suspected threat in the cabin.
     The flightcrew needs the capability to monitor the area 
outside the flightdeck door.
    On November 19, 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) (Public Law 107-71). Section 104(b) 
of the ATSA states that the FAA Administrator may develop and implement 
methods--

    (1) To use video monitors or other devices to alert pilots in 
the flight deck to activity in the cabin, except that use of such 
monitors or devices shall be subject to nondisclosure requirements 
applicable to cockpit video records under [49 U.S.C. Sec.  1114(c)], 
* * * and
    (3) To revise the procedures by which cabin crews of aircraft 
can notify flight deck crews of security breaches and other 
emergencies, including providing for the installation of switches or 
other devices or methods in an aircraft cabin to enable flight crews 
to discreetly notify the pilots in the case of a security breach 
occurring in the cabin.

    The NPRM responded to the RRT's findings and to the legislation 
passed by Congress.

Summary of NPRM

    The FAA proposed to add the new paragraph (k) to Sec.  121.313. 
This requirement would apply to all passenger-carrying airplanes that 
must have a lockable flightdeck door pursuant to 14 CFR 121.313(f). 
Operators of these airplanes must be able to monitor the area outside 
the flightdeck door from the flightdeck. This measure would provide the 
means to allow the flightcrew to identify persons requesting entry and 
to detect suspicious behavior and potential threats.
    The FAA proposed to add the new Sec.  121.582 that would require 
all passenger-carrying airplanes required to have a lockable flightdeck 
door to have an approved means by which the cabin crew can discreetly 
notify the flightcrew in the event of suspicious activity or security 
breaches in the cabin.
    The FAA also proposed to add the new Sec.  121.584. This would 
prohibit unlocking or opening the flightdeck door unless a person 
authorized to be on the flightdeck uses an approved audio procedure and 
an approved visual device to verify that: (1) The area outside the 
flightdeck door is secure; and (2) if someone outside the flightdeck 
door is seeking to have the flightdeck door opened, that person is not 
under duress.

Summary of the Comments

    The FAA received 88 comments. Of these comments, 45 stated strong 
support for the rule; only 5 opposed the rule. Of the 45 stating strong 
support for the rule, 6 commenters seemed to support the rule because 
they thought a video camera was the only means to comply with the 
requirement to monitor the flightdeck door. They may not have supported 
the proposal had they realized that video is not the only means to 
satisfy the requirement. The remaining comments did not directly 
express support for or opposition to the rule. Many comments included 
suggested changes, as discussed below.

I. Discussion of the Final Rule

A. Means of Monitoring the Area Outside the Flightdeck

    The final rule sets a performance standard whereby air carriers 
must choose a method of compliance to view the area outside the 
flightdeck door. The performance standard may be met using a video 
monitoring device, a peephole or viewport, or other viewing device. The 
method of compliance must include procedures and training in existing 
part 121 requirements for unlocking the flightdeck door and operating 
all of the associated equipment for use in operations.
    Several commenters including Boeing, Coalition of Airline Pilots 
Associations (CAPA), Association of Professional Flight Attendants 
(APFA), the Regional Airline Association (RAA), the Air Transport 
Association (ATA), and the Allied Pilots Association (APA) supported 
the use of current technology and procedures. The APA and CAPA stated 
that in the few cases when there is a need to open the flightdeck door, 
established procedures allow safe and secure passage from the 
flightdeck. Those procedures have stood the test of time and have a 
credible record of effectiveness. The RAA noted that nearly all their 
members presently use the peephole/audio method of confirming that the 
area outside the flightdeck door is secure before opening the door 
during flight. They saw no additional security benefit to using a video 
camera system over using their current peephole system to monitor the 
area outside the flightdeck door. The APFA and Boeing supported a 
viewing device in the flightdeck door that allows for the door and 
forward cabin to be monitored.
    Several of the commenters thought that the FAA had proposed to 
require the use of video cameras to monitor the area outside the flight 
deck door and require wireless devices for discreet communication 
between cabin crewmembers and flight crewmembers. In particular, the 
Air Crash Victims Families Group and Families of September 11 expressed 
support for a requirement to install video cameras to monitor the area 
outside of the flight deck door. They also supported requiring wireless 
devices by the cabin crew to alert the flightdeck crew of a potential 
problem.
    The FAA developed this rule over a period of years following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, taking into consideration 
recommendations concerning flightdeck security and crew communications. 
While this action promulgates regulations for added protection of the 
flightcrew compartment, most part 121 air carriers already have 
procedures in place that perform this function. This rule allows U. S. 
air carriers options to meet requirements while remaining flexible in 
their methods. This flexibility provides an additional level of 
security to the public because air carriers will use different methods 
to provide flight deck security and crew communication. Different 
methods of compliance will make attempts to breach security more 
difficult because multiple systems will be more difficult to monitor 
and defeat.
    Two commenters, former Congressman Bob Barr and the American 
Conservative Union, opposed the rule because of safety-related concerns 
resulting from increased pilot workload to monitor video cameras. The 
FAA does not believe that monitoring the area outside of the flightdeck 
door by the flightcrew will distract pilots or add a significant burden 
if video cameras are used. While air carriers may choose approved video 
cameras, a FAA-approved procedure-based approach (using procedures and 
hardware already installed, such as a peephole) is another option. 
Accordingly, pilots will not have to continuously monitor a video 
camera, they need only monitor the flightdeck door area when someone 
seeks access to the flightdeck or when notified by a flight attendant.
    Former Congressman Bob Barr and the American Conservative Union 
also expressed concerns about passenger privacy in the cabin. The FAA 
is not imposing any requirement to monitor passengers beyond the area 
outside of the flight deck door. To the extent that a passenger is in 
the flightdeck door area, the FAA has a security interest in monitoring 
that passenger's activities.

B. Means of Notifying the Flightcrew

    Several commenters, including Capitol Electronics, Inc., expressed 
concern over the interphone system and its inability to be used 
discreetly. They stated that the interphone is an obvious piece of 
equipment, could be compromised, and would be difficult to

[[Page 45631]]

use without arousing suspicion. They noted that when passengers or 
equipment (such as beverage carts) are in the aisles, the crew could 
find it difficult to reach the interphone quickly. These commenters 
stressed that a wireless system is the only discreet means for the 
cabin crew to notify the flightdeck of a problem.
    The FAA notes that the interphone system is not intended to be an 
encrypted or a secure communication means, rather it is a way for all 
crewmembers to be able to communicate among themselves throughout the 
passenger cabin and the flightdeck. Nevertheless, if a crewmember uses 
the existing technology of the interphone system while adhering to the 
air carrier's communication procedures, discreet communication may be 
maintained. Conversations between crewmembers on the interphone are 
generally not broadcast over the aircraft's public address system and 
the system has the ability for all crewmembers to participate on the 
call, as company procedures may dictate. The ability of the crewmembers 
to communicate discreetly in many instances currently exists, primarily 
by following the operator's procedures.
    Some commenters, including the Professional Flight Attendants 
Association and the Association of Professional Flight Attendants, 
recommended that flight attendants carry or have in their possession a 
wireless device to contact the flightdeck. Some suggested the flight 
attendant carry a wireless device in a pocket or around the neck.
    The FAA does not believe requiring flight attendants to carry or 
have in their possession a wireless device to contact the flight deck 
is a good idea. A wireless device that is carried on the person (in a 
pocket or around the neck) may be problematic because an attacker could 
threaten or assault the flight attendant in order to obtain the 
wireless device and then use the device fraudulently to gain access to 
the flightdeck. Additionally, devices carried by an individual are 
subject to events that may be beyond the control of the air carrier. An 
entire security system could be compromised if a device in the personal 
possession of a flight attendant is lost or stolen.
    Additionally, the cost to supply a wireless device to each flight 
attendant could be an unreasonable burden, as there are approximately 
130,600 part 121 flight attendants. While the wireless communication 
device is an option for discreet communication, wireless communication 
is not the only available option. This rule is permissive in the sense 
that an air carrier may elect to use a sophisticated (for example, 
wireless) communication method, but this rule does not impose a new 
requirement for such devices.
    In the NPRM, the FAA suggested that the evacuation system could be 
used as a compliant communication method. As noted by the Association 
of Professional Flight Attendants, not all aircraft have an emergency 
evacuation system available.

C. Entry to the Flightdeck

    This regulation states that no person may unlock or open the 
flightdeck door unless a person authorized to be on the flightdeck uses 
an approved audio procedure and an approved visual device to verify 
that a person seeking entry to the flightdeck is not under duress.\1\ 
The FAA has made a technical correction to Sec.  121.584. We state that 
the requirements of the entire paragaph (a) must be satisfactorily 
accomplished before the crew member in charge on the flightdeck will 
authorize unlocking and opening the door.
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    \1\ Use of the word ``approved'' is a common term used in FAA 
regulations. Unless otherwise specified, it means approved by the 
Administrator. The approval for the audio and visual procedures is 
accomplished by letter from the Principal Operations Inspector for 
the air carrier. The approval for the viewing device was 
accomplished by the FAA's Aircraft Certification Office as part of 
the Supplemental Type Certificate issued for the design changes for 
the flightcrew compartment door.
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    Bosch Security Systems, CAPA, and the APA recommended that the FAA 
require installation of a secondary barrier, in addition to the 
flightdeck door, on all airplanes that are used in operations affected 
by this rule. Requiring installation of a secondary barrier would mean 
reconfiguring each airplane affected. Such an operation would require a 
major effort that is outside of the scope of this rulemaking and is 
therefore not adopted.
    The International Brotherhood of Teamsters requested the FAA define 
``the area outside the flightdeck door.'' Such a definition would vary 
depending upon the configuration differences among airplanes. There are 
many areas adjacent to flightdeck doors where an intruder could hide. 
This fact tends to validate the importance of the audio check from 
inside the flightdeck with a crewmember in the cabin prior to opening 
the flightdeck door.
    Boeing requested the FAA change the requirement to confirm that a 
person seeking flightdeck access is not under duress. They noted that 
``duress'' may take the form of both visible and non-visible actions. 
They further stated that there is ``no definable or verifiable means of 
compliance for this as a requirement.'' Boeing suggests changing the 
requirement that a crewmember evaluate whether a person is under 
duress, to simply require identification of a person seeking access to 
the flightdeck. FAA rules already require any person seeking flightdeck 
access to be identified before admittance. Section 121.587(b) limits 
persons on the flightdeck to those eligible under Sec.  121.547. In 
addition, air carriers already have procedures in place regarding how 
and when to open a flightdeck door. The concept of determining whether 
someone is under duress is already applied in current procedures and 
appears to be readily understood. Air carriers should use the FAA-
approved procedures already in place to determine whether someone is 
under duress. Because duress remains a threat not fully accommodated by 
the existing requirement that the person seeking access to the 
flightdeck is authorized to enter, the requirement to check that a 
person is not under duress remains unchanged.
    Boeing also commented on the proposed requirement for both an audio 
and a visual check before opening the flightdeck door. They stated that 
most operators have adopted a visual procedure using the door peephole 
or an installed flightdeck entry visual surveillance system. Boeing 
made the assumption that use of the cabin interphone system is required 
to meet the audio procedure requirement. Boeing suggested revising the 
rule to require ``an approved procedure and approved visual device,'' 
which does not include a requirement for an audio check. Boeing stated 
that most major airlines are using a visual procedure/device, but not 
an audio procedure. It maintained that a robust visual device and an 
approved procedure to verify that the area around the flightdeck door 
is secure will satisfy the intent of the rule. It also claimed that 
requiring both a visual and an audio procedure could create an 
undesirable operational impact on the flightdeck. This could occur if 
the interphone equipment was not easily accessible to the person making 
a visual check of the door area. It did not state the basis for this 
observation. The FAA has determined that both a visual and audio check 
is required to provide an appropriate amount of security prior to 
opening the flightdeck door. Neither check alone provides adequate 
security. A video camera system may not provide complete coverage of 
the area outside of the flightdeck door or confirm that any

[[Page 45632]]

lavatory in that area is unoccupied. An audio check with a crewmember 
in the cabin that has verified that the area is clear is required. 
Likewise, it would be very difficult to determine if a person seeking 
access to the flightdeck was under duress without an audio as well as a 
visual check. An air carrier's procedures for opening the flightdeck 
door are already required to include both checks. Therefore, the 
requirement for both an audio and visual check remains unchanged from 
current practice.
    Boeing requested the FAA change the requirement in Sec.  
121.584(a)(2) concerning authorization to unlock the flightdeck door 
from ``the crewmember in charge'' to ``an authorized crewmember.'' 
Boeing stated its concern that the phrase ``the crewmember in charge'' 
can be interpreted always to require the pilot-in-command (PIC) to 
authorize unlocking and opening of the flightdeck door. While the FAA 
agrees with Boeing's interpretation of the proposed requirement, it 
does not share Boeing's apparent concern. Section 91.3(a) states, ``The 
pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the 
final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.'' While the PIC 
may delegate functions to other crewmembers, the PIC remains 
responsible for the outcome of those functions. An air carrier's 
approved procedures are required to address opening of the flightdeck 
door while flight crewmembers leave or return to the pilot's 
compartment. While functions, such as unlocking and opening the 
flightdeck door may be delegated, the responsibility for such action 
rests with the PIC. Therefore, the requirement for ``the crewmember in 
charge'' remains unchanged.
    Aircraft Operators should be aware that the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) is reviewing the procedures that are in use for 
ingress and egress through the flight deck door during flight, and is 
considering additional procedures that may be necessary to address 
security concerns. TSA will coordinate with the FAA during the 
development of any proposed additional requirements.

D. International Standards

    As stated in the NPRM, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) adopted standards on March 15, 2002 that require 
installing flightdeck doors, locking and unlocking such doors, 
monitoring the area on the passenger side of the flightdeck door, and 
discreetly notifying the flightcrew in the event of security breaches 
in the cabin. The standards are located in ICAO Annex 6, Part 1, 
Chapter 13, provision 13.2, which state:

    13.2.1 In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew 
compartment door, this door shall be capable of being locked, and 
means shall be provided by which cabin crew can discreetly notify 
the flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security 
breaches in the cabin.
    13.2.2 From 1 November 2003, all passenger-carrying airplanes of 
a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 45500 kg or with a 
passenger seating capacity greater than 60 shall be equipped with an 
approved flight crew compartment door that is designed to resist 
penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to resist 
forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. This door shall be 
capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot's station.
    13.2.3 In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew 
compartment door in accordance with 13.2.2:
    (a) This door shall be closed and locked from the time all 
external doors are closed following embarkation until any such door 
is opened for disembarkation, except when necessary to permit access 
and egress by authorized persons; and
    (b) Means shall be provided for monitoring from either pilot's 
station the entire door area outside the flight crew compartment to 
identify persons requesting entry and to detect suspicious behavior 
or potential threat.

    In the NPRM, the FAA identified three areas where the proposed rule 
did not appear to meet ICAO standards. We stated in the NPRM:
     The proposal in this action will not be implemented before 
the November 1, 2003 ICAO deadline.
     Any passenger-carrying airplanes operated under parts 91, 
125, and 135 including international commercial air transport 
operations with a maximum certificated takeoff mass in excess of 45500 
kg or with a seating capacity of greater than 60 (as ICAO requires), 
are not covered by this proposed rule.
     The proposed rule will permit an alternative means to 
monitor the area outside the flightdeck door from the flightdeck side 
of the door, instead of from either pilot station, as ICAO requires.
    L-3 Communications and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
state that the rule falls well short of ICAO standards and ATSA 
requirements because the viewport option and existing interphone 
systems do not adequately address ICAO requirements. L-3 Communications 
expresses support for cameras and wireless devices in meeting these 
requirements.
    The International Air Transport Association (IATA) commented that 
it is concerned that the United States (U.S.) will continue to have 
differences with the ICAO standard. IATA is concerned that other 
national authorities may take a different view on the applicable ICAO 
standards. They ask that the FAA work with its international partners. 
Several commenters, including Delta Airlines, the Transport Workers 
Union of America, the CAPA, the Air Transport Association, and the APA 
generally agree with the FAA that the new rule meets the intent of ICAO 
standards addressing flightdeck security. ICAO implementation guidance 
provides for a procedural-based approach.
    Upon further review of the ICAO standards associated guidance and 
FAA actions, we have determined that only one of three perceived 
differences remains. First, concerning the ICAO implementation date, 
the FAA discovered that if an ICAO member country has policies in place 
before the implementation date for the ICAO standard, the member 
country is considered to be in compliance with the ICAO standard. The 
FAA published Notice N8400.51, Procedures for Opening, Closing, and 
Locking of Flightcrew Compartment Doors before November 1, 2003. This 
notice addresses air carrier procedures to open the flightdeck door 
during flight operations and addresses the intent of the ICAO standards 
for monitoring the area outside the flightdeck door. In accordance with 
ICAO guidance, the FAA met the intent of the standard before the ICAO 
implementation date of November 1, 2003.
    Second, the FAA has met the intent of the ICAO requirement to 
monitor from either pilot's station the entire door area outside the 
flight crew compartment. ICAO guidance permits operators to use 
different methods to monitor the area outside the flightdeck door. The 
monitoring does not have to take place from ``either pilot's station,'' 
as a plain reading of the ICAO standard indicates. According to ICAO, 
use of a spyhole or peephole would satisfy the requirement to monitor 
the area outside the flightdeck door. Since this final rule adopts a 
performance standard that contemplates the type of system that ICAO 
states is sufficient to meet the ICAO standard, the FAA determines no 
difference exists.
    Finally, the ICAO standard is applicable to passenger-carrying 
airplanes based on weight or seating capacity. The FAA regulations 
differ from the ICAO standard regarding applicability. As explained in 
the NPRM, ICAO provisions apply to passenger-carrying airplanes of a 
maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 45,500 kg or with a 
passenger seating capacity greater than 60. The

[[Page 45633]]

FAA standard applies to all part 121 operations. U.S. aviation 
regulations governing airplanes operated under parts 91, 125, and 135 
may be within the weight and passenger seating capacity required by the 
ICAO standard; however, airplanes operating under these parts are not 
specifically required to have a flightdeck door. We therefore find it 
impractical to impose a viewing requirement on airplanes operating 
under these parts. We also find it impracticable to impose a 
communication procedure requirement when there is no way to prevent 
access to the flightdeck.
    We will carefully monitor these types of operations and if it 
becomes a matter of concern in the future, we will consider adopting 
the ICAO standard, based on weight, instead of by operating rule. In 
addition, if an air carrier is subject to the ICAO requirement (or 
foreign regulations) because of weight or seating capacity but not 
subject to FAA requirements, the FAA will, upon request, work with any 
operator to consider any approvals necessary to satisfy requirements by 
another civil aviation authority that an operator have approved 
procedures in place. We do not believe there will be any need to 
provide accommodation for the ICAO requirement on monitoring the area 
outside the flightdeck because we believe all of the reinforced 
flightdeck doors are already outfitted with a peephole.
    The Association of European Airlines states that any final rule on 
flightdeck door monitoring and crew discreet alerting should not apply 
to non-U.S. operators to the United States. This rule does not apply to 
non-U.S. operators, including those operating under part 129. These 
operations are covered by adequate regional and international rules and 
standards.

E. Compliance Dates

    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to give part 121 passenger-carrying 
operators not already in compliance with the rule, two years to install 
a monitoring device to meet the proposed performance standard on the 
existing fleet. We also proposed a 180-day compliance date for the 
discreet communications procedure.
    Several individual commenters, including the Air Transport 
Association, expressed concerns about compliance dates. These comments 
all stated that the compliance period was too short. Some expressed 
concern with the immediate effective date for operations of airplanes 
that already have a means to monitor the flightdeck door area, required 
by Sec.  121.584(b). ATA expressed concern that two years would not be 
enough time to install a video surveillance system. ATA recommended a 
five- or six-year interval.
    After further review, the FAA has determined that every part 121 
passenger-carrying operator should already have a means to monitor the 
flightdeck door area. The FAA learned from flightdeck door 
manufacturers that every reinforced flightdeck door that meets the 
requirements of section 25.795 (required for passenger-carrying 
operations in part 121) has a peephole that meets the requirements of 
this rule. As a result of this information, the FAA has determined that 
there should be no retrofit of airplanes operated by part 121 carriers. 
Accordingly, the FAA has decided against adopting a two-year compliance 
period in proposed section 121.584(b). If a part 121 passenger-carrying 
operator does not have a means to monitor the flightdeck door area, the 
operator can: (1) Operate without opening the flightdeck door until the 
airplane is retrofitted; or (2) seek relief by applying to the FAA for 
exemption from this rule.
    As discussed above, we are issuing this final rule with a reduced 
compliance period. The NPRM proposed to give operators that do not have 
a means to view the area outside the flightdeck door two years to 
install such a means. The FAA proposed to require operators that have a 
means to monitor the area outside the flightdeck door to comply on the 
effective date of the final rule. After review of the comments to the 
NPRM and FAA actions regarding reinforced doors, we decided to change 
the compliance date for all affected parts to 60 days.
    First, air carriers conducting passenger-carrying operations under 
part 121 were required to install a reinforced door by April 9, 2003. 
The FAA concluded, by review of supplemental type certificates, that no 
airplanes operating passenger-carrying service under part 121 have a 
flightdeck door without a means to monitor the area outside the 
flightdeck door. Second, no commenter specifically stated that they 
were currently not in compliance with the rule. The only comment 
relevant to this inquiry was from ATA, which stated that if an operator 
chose to install video, it would take more than two years to do so.
    Similarly, the FAA confirmed that part 121 passenger-carrying 
operators should already have an approved means in place for a cabin 
crew to discreetly notify the flightcrew in the event of suspicious 
activity or security breaches in the cabin. Therefore, the FAA removed 
the 180-day compliance date from Sec.  121.582. The compliance period 
for the entire rule is now 60 days.
    The FAA is limiting the compliance period without providing an 
opportunity for prior public notice and comment as is normally required 
by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 5 U.S.C. 553. The APA 
authorizes agencies to dispense with certain notice and comment 
procedures if the agency finds good cause that notice and public 
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B). The FAA finds good cause 
for shortening the compliance period in this final rule because it 
would be contrary to the public interest not to do so. A two-year 
compliance period is contrary to the public interest because we 
determined that every operator already has equipment installed to 
comply with this rule. The only outstanding compliance concern could be 
that some operators need to develop and implement procedures to monitor 
the area outside the flightdeck (for example, by looking through the 
peephole) before opening the flightdeck door. Therefore, the FAA is 
allowing a 60-day compliance period, so any operator that must adopt 
procedures will have time to do so.

F. Miscellaneous Issues

    Several commenters, including the CAPA and Air Line Pilots 
Association International, recommended the FAA include all-cargo 
operations in this rule. These commenters noted that cargo operations 
should be as safe and secure as passenger operations. They recommended 
the FAA require installation of a secure flightdeck door on part 121 
cargo airlines.
    While all-cargo operators may implement the requirements of this 
rule, they are not specifically required to do so. All-cargo flights 
carry only those individuals allowed under 14 CFR 121.583; all 
individuals carried on cargo flights are screened through TSA approved 
procedures. The general traveling public is not allowed onboard these 
flights. ICAO standards in this area reflect this awareness in that 
they apply only to passenger-carrying operations. In keeping with ICAO 
standards and security requirements, the FAA developed a performance-
based approach for operations conducted under the passenger-carrying 
requirements of part 121. The FAA and TSA believe that security 
measures in place to protect the flightdecks of all-cargo operations 
are adequate for those operations, considering the small number of 
persons allowed onboard for those flights. Therefore, the FAA does

[[Page 45634]]

not apply this rule to all-cargo operations.
    Several commenters, including the Air Transport International, 
L.L.C., expressed concerns about the rule's applicability to part 121 
operations. They stated the rule should not apply to Combi-configured 
aircraft that mainly transport cargo. While these aircraft can 
transport up to 32 passengers, the commenters believe they have 
sufficient security measures in place to prevent anyone from gaining 
access to the flightdeck. The FAA notes that the requirements of this 
rule apply to passenger-carrying operations conducted under part 121. 
When operations are conducted that are subject to the passenger-
carrying requirements of part 121, including flights carrying 
passengers and cargo, those operations must also meet the requirements 
of this rule.
    Several commenters, including the Transport Workers Union of 
America and the Association of Professional Flight Attendants, refer to 
the ``lessons learned'' from the Operation Atlas exercise. The FAA was 
not a participant in this exercise to measure response and recovery 
efforts. Comments about the Operation Atlas exercise are outside of the 
scope of this rulemaking activity.
    US Airways requested clarification on use of Minimum Equipment 
Lists (MEL) with regard to the equipment required by this rule. Since 
this is a rule of general applicability it does not impact an 
individual operator's MEL. Each individual MEL is developed by the 
operator and approved by its Principal Operations Inspector. Pertinent 
MEL relief is provided through the Master Minimum Equipment List 
(MMEL). Development of the MMEL is beyond the scope of this rule, 
especially because this rule is a performance standard. Since this rule 
does not require any new equipment, each air carrier should refer to 
its already established MEL and question its POI for further 
information.

II. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)), the FAA has determined that there are no requirements for 
information collection associated with this rule.

Economic Assessment, Regulatory Flexibility Determination, Trade Impact 
Assessment, and Unfunded Mandate Assessment

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency 
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires 
agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small 
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits 
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to 
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. 
standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider international 
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S. 
standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 
104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, 
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a 
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of 
1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of 
the economic impacts of this final rule.
    Department of Transportation Order DOT 2100.5 prescribes policies 
and procedures for simplification, analysis, and review of regulations. 
If the expected cost impact is so minimal that a proposed or final rule 
does not warrant a full evaluation, this order permits that a statement 
to that effect and the basis for it be included in the preamble if a 
full regulatory evaluation of the cost and benefits is not prepared. 
Such a determination has been made for this final rule. The reasoning 
for this determination follows:
    Every reinforced cockpit door has a peephole, which meets the final 
rule requirement to visually identify anyone attempting to enter the 
flightdeck. Operators can comply by developing appropriate procedures. 
Most operators have already developed these procedures and we 
determined that there will be minimal expense to the operators that 
still need to develop them to meet the requirement.
    Further, the final rule requirement that the crew members be able 
to alert the flightdeck of any cabin problems can also be met by a 
variety of measures such as special signals through the interphone 
system or modifications of existing crew notification devices or 
procedures. We also determined that there will be minimal expense to 
the operators to implement these measures.
    In the NPRM, we had estimated the costs of operators installing 
video camera surveillance systems. As the final rule does not require 
such a system, the costs for an operator that chooses to install such a 
system are not a cost of compliance with the final rule. We received 
several comments on our estimated costs and these can be reviewed in 
the docket for this rulemaking.
    In general, we believe these comments support the estimates in the 
NPRM after taking into account the experience of the commenters in 
installing such systems. While Boeing's estimate was significantly 
higher than ours, its system is far more sophisticated than any video 
system designed to minimally meet the performance standard. Since all 
of the costs are associated with a monitoring system that is not 
required by the rule and is redundant to existing, compliant systems 
already aboard all affected aircraft, we are not discussing the 
comments further.
    The rule is one of a series of rulemaking actions aimed at 
preventing or deterring an occurrence similar to the September 11 
terrorist attacks. It is designed to ensure that pilots do not open the 
flightdeck door and admit a potential hijacker because the pilots will 
be able to recognize who is trying to gain entry. It is also designed 
to alert the pilots to problems in the cabin through the crew discreet 
monitoring system and allow them to take the appropriate actions.
    This rule responds to the interest of the U.S. Congress as 
specified in the ATSA and to the ICAO flightdeck surveillance 
requirement for international travel airplanes with more than 60 seats. 
We conclude that the benefits of this final rule will exceed the 
minimal costs.
    The FAA has, therefore, determined that this final rule is a 
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866, and is ``significant'' as defined in DOT's 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA) 
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall 
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable 
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale 
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions 
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required 
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain 
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given 
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide-range of small entities,

[[Page 45635]]

including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small 
governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must 
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
    However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the 
agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not 
required. The certification must include a statement providing the 
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    Due to its minimal costs, the final rule will have a minor effect 
upon small businesses. We also received no comments from the public on 
the economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities. We are 
sensitive to the needs of small businesses and thus have found a 
minimal cost solution that meets our security needs.
    Therefore, as the FAA Administrator, I certify that this rule will 
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.

Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing any standards or engaging in related 
activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of 
the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are 
not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires 
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that 
they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed the 
potential effect of this final rule and has determined that it will 
have only a domestic impact and, therefore, no affect on international 
trade.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(adjusted annually for inflation with the base year 1995) in any one 
year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by 
the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant 
regulatory action.'' The FAA currently uses an inflation-adjusted value 
of $128.1 million in lieu of $100 million.
    This final rule does not contain such a mandate.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this 
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the 
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government, and therefore does not have federalism implications.

Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska

    Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 
3213) requires the FAA, when modifying its regulations in a manner 
affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to 
which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation, 
and to establish appropriate regulatory distinctions. In the NPRM, we 
requested comments on whether the proposed rule should apply 
differently to intrastate operations in Alaska. We did not receive any 
comments, and we have determined, based on the administrative record of 
this rulemaking, that there is no need to make any regulatory 
distinctions applicable to intrastate aviation in Alaska.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically 
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy 
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has 
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical 
exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no extraordinary 
circumstances.

Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or 
Use

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211, 
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We have determined that it is not 
a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order because it is 
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, 
and it is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the 
supply, distribution, or use of energy.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

The Amendment

0
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration 
amends 14 CFR chapter I as follows:

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 121 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 44701-
44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 46105.


0
2. Section 121.313 is amended by adding paragraph (k) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  121.313  Miscellaneous equipment.

* * * * *
    (k) Except for all-cargo operations as defined in Sec.  119.3 of 
this chapter, for all passenger-carrying airplanes that require a 
lockable flightdeck door in accordance with paragraph (f) of this 
section, a means to monitor from the flightdeck side of the door the 
area outside the flightdeck door to identify persons requesting entry 
and to detect suspicious behavior and potential threats.

0
3. Add Sec.  121.582 as follows:


Sec.  121.582  Means to discreetly notify a flightcrew.

    Except for all-cargo operations as defined in Sec.  119.3 of this 
chapter, after October 15, 2007, for all passenger carrying airplanes 
that require a lockable flightdeck door in accordance with Sec.  
121.313(f), the certificate holder must have an approved means by which 
the cabin crew can discreetly notify the flightcrew in the event of 
suspicious activity or security breaches in the cabin.

0
4. Add Sec.  121.584 as follows:


Sec.  121.584  Requirement to view the area outside the flightdeck 
door.

    From the time the airplane moves in order to initiate a flight 
segment through the end of that flight segment, no person may unlock or 
open the flightdeck door unless:
    (a) A person authorized to be on the flightdeck uses an approved 
audio procedure and an approved visual device to verify that:
    (1) The area outside the flightdeck door is secure, and;
    (2) If someone outside the flightdeck is seeking to have the 
flightdeck door opened, that person is not under duress, and;

[[Page 45636]]

    (b) After the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section have 
been satisfactorily accomplished, the crewmember in charge on the 
flightdeck authorizes the door to be unlocked and open.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on August 6, 2007.
Marion C. Blakey,
Administrator.
 [FR Doc. E7-16063 Filed 8-14-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P