[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 146 (Tuesday, July 31, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41744-41747]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-14708]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. PL07-2-000]


Composition of Proxy Groups for Determining Gas and Oil Pipeline 
Return on Equity

July 19, 2007.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed Policy Statement.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is proposing to 
modify its current policy regarding the composition of proxy groups 
used to determine return on equity for natural gas and oil pipelines 
under the Discounted Cash Flow Methodology. Under the proposed policy 
statement, the Commission would permit Master Limited Partnerships 
(MLPs) to be included in the proxy group, subject to certain 
conditions. The Commission proposes to leave to individual cases the 
determination of the specific MLPs to be included in the proxy group 
used to determine return on equity in that case.

DATES: Initial comments are due August 30, 2007. Reply comments are due 
August 30, 2007.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified in Docket No. PL07-2-
000, by any of the following methods:
    1. Agency Web Site: http://www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts 
most standard word processing formats and commentors may attach 
additional filed with supporting information in certain other file 
formats. Commentors filing electronically do not need to make a paper 
filing.
    2. Mail/Hand Delivery: Commentors unable to file comments 
electronically must mail or hand-deliver an original and 14 copies of 
their comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of the 
Secretary, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John M. Robinson, Office of the 
General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First 
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, 202-502-6808, 
[email protected].

Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman; Suedeen G. 
Kelly, Marc Spitzer, Philip D. Moeller, and Jon Wellinghoff.

    1. In this proposed Policy Statement, the Commission is proposing 
to update its standards concerning the composition of the proxy groups 
used to decide the return on equity (ROE) of natural gas and oil 
pipelines. Firms engaged in the pipeline business are increasingly 
organized as master limited partnerships (MLPs). Therefore, the 
Commission proposes to modify its current policy regarding the 
composition of proxy groups to allow MLPs to be included in the proxy 
group. This proposed Policy Statement explains the standards that the 
Commission would require to be met in order for an MLP to be included 
in the proxy group. The Commission proposes to apply its final Policy 
Statement to all gas and oil pipeline rate cases that have not 
completed the hearing phase as of the date the Commission issues its 
final Policy Statement. The Commission intends to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether to apply the final Policy Statement in cases that 
have completed the hearing phase. Finally, the Commission is requesting 
comments on this proposed Policy Statement. Initial comments are due 30 
days after publication of this order in the Federal Register, with 
reply comments due 50 days after publication in the Federal Register.

I. Background

    2. Since the 1980s, the Commission has used a Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) model to develop a range of returns earned on investments in 
companies with corresponding risks for determining the ROE for natural 
gas and oil pipelines. The DCF model was originally developed as a 
method for investors to estimate the value of securities, including 
common stocks. It is based on ``the premise that a stock is worth the 
present value of its future cash flows, discounted at a market rate 
commensurate with the stock's risk.'' \1\ Unlike investors, the 
Commission uses the DCF model to determine the ROE to be included in 
the pipeline's rates, rather than to estimate a stock's value. 
Therefore, the Commission solves the DCF formula for the discount rate, 
which represents the rate of return that an investor requires in order 
to invest in a firm. Under the resulting DCF formula, ROE equals 
current dividend yield (dividends divided by share price) plus the 
projected future growth rate of dividends.
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    \1\ Ozark Gas Transmission System, 68 FERC ] 61,032 at 61,104, 
n. 16 (1994).
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    3. The Commission uses a two-step procedure for determining the 
constant growth of dividends: averaging short-term and long-term growth 
estimates.\2\ Security analysts' five-year forecasts for each company 
in the proxy group, as published by Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (IBES), are used for determining growth for the short term; 
long-term growth is based on forecasts of long-term growth of the 
economy as a whole, as reflected in the Gross Domestic Product. The 
short-term forecast receives a \2/3\ weighting and the long-term 
forecast receives a \1/3\ weighting in calculating the growth rate in 
the DCF model.\3\
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    \2\ Northwest Pipeline Co., 71 FERC ] 61,309 at 61,989-92 (1995) 
(Opinion No. 396), 76 FERC ] 61,068 (1996) (Opinion No. 396-A), 79 
FERC ] 61,309 (1997) (Opinion No. 396-B), reh'g denied, 81 FERC ] 
61,036 (1997) (Opinion No. 396-C); Williston Basin Interstate 
Pipeline Co., 79 FERC ] 61,311, order on reh'g, 81 FERC ] 61,033 
(1997), aff'd in relevant part, Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline 
Co., 165 F.3d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williston Basin).
    \3\ The Commission presumes that existing pipelines fall within 
a broad range of average risk, and thus generally sets pipelines' 
return at the median of the range. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line 
Corp., 84 FERC ] 61,084 at 61,423-4 (1998) Opinion No. 414-A, reh'g, 
85 FERC ] 61,323 (1998) (Opinion No. 414-B), aff'd North Carolina 
Utilities Commission v. FERC, 340 U.S. App. D.C. 183 (D.C. Cir) 
(unpublished opinion).
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    4. Most gas pipelines are wholly-owned subsidiaries and their 
common stock is not publicly traded, and this is also true for some 
jurisdictional oil pipelines. Therefore, the Commission uses a proxy 
group of firms with corresponding risks to set a range of reasonable 
returns for both natural gas and oil pipelines. The Commission then 
assigns the pipeline a rate within that range or zone, to reflect 
specific risks of that pipeline as compared to the proxy group 
companies.\4\
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    \4\ Williston Basin at 57 (citation omitted).
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    5. The Commission historically required that each company included 
in the proxy group satisfy the following three standards.\5\ First, the 
company's stock must be publicly traded. Second, the company must be 
recognized as a natural gas or oil pipeline company and its stock must 
be recognized and tracked by an investment information service such as 
Value Line. Third, pipeline operations must constitute a high 
proportion of the company's business. Until the Commission's 2003 
decision in Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co.,\6\ the third 
standard could only be satisfied if a company's pipeline business 
accounted for, on average, at least 50 percent of a company's assets or 
operating income over the most recent three-year period.
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    \5\ Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 90 FERC ] 61,279 at 
61,933 (2000).
    \6 \ Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Company, 104 FERC ] 
61,036 at P 35, n. 46 (2003).

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[[Page 41745]]

    6. As a result of mergers, acquisitions, and other changes in the 
natural gas industry, fewer and fewer interstate natural gas companies 
have satisfied the third requirement. Thus, in Williston, the 
Commission relaxed this requirement for the natural gas proxy group. 
Instead, the Commission approved a pipeline's proposal to use a proxy 
group based on the corporations listed in the Value Line Investment 
Survey's list of diversified natural gas firms that own Commission-
regulated natural gas pipelines, without regard to what portion of the 
company's business comprises pipeline operations.
    7. In HIOS \7\ and Kern River, the only fully litigated section 4 
rate cases decided since Williston, the Commission again drew the proxy 
group companies from the same Value Line list. When those cases were 
litigated, there were six such companies: Kinder Morgan Inc., the 
Williams Companies (Williams), El Paso Natural Gas Company (El Paso), 
Equitable Resources, Inc., Questar Corporation, and National Fuel Gas 
Corporation. The Commission excluded Williams and El Paso on the ground 
that their financial difficulties had lowered their ROEs to a level 
only slightly above the level of public utility debt, and the 
Commission stated that investors cannot be expected to purchase stock 
if lower risk debt has essentially the same return. This left a four-
company proxy group, three of whose members derived more revenue from 
the distribution business, rather than the pipeline business. In Kern 
River, the Commission adjusted the pipeline's return on equity 50 basis 
points above the median in order to account for the generally higher 
risk profile of natural gas pipeline operations as compared to 
distribution operations.
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    \7\ High Island Offshore System, L.L.C., 110 FERC ] 61,043, 
reh'g denied, 112 FERC ] 61,050 (2005), appeal pending.
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    8. In both Kern River and HIOS, the Commission rejected pipeline 
proposals to include MLPs in the proxy group. The pipelines contended 
that MLPs have a much higher percentage of their business devoted to 
pipeline operations, than most of the corporations that the Commission 
currently includes in the proxy group.
    9. Unlike corporations, MLPs generally distribute most available 
cash flow to the general and limited partners in the form of quarterly 
distributions. Most MLP agreements define ``available cash flow'' as 
(1) Net income (gross revenues minus operating expenses) plus (2) 
depreciation and amortization, minus (3) capital investments the 
partnership must make to maintain its current asset base and cash flow 
stream.\8\ Depreciation and amortization may be considered a part of 
``available cash flow,'' because depreciation is an accounting charge 
against current income, rather than an actual cash expense. As a 
result, the MLP's cash distributions normally include not only the net 
income component of ``available cash flow,'' but also the depreciation 
component. This means that, in contrast to a corporation's dividends, 
an MLP's cash distributions generally exceed the MLP's reported 
earnings. Moreover, because of their high cash distributions, MLPs 
usually finance capital investments required to significantly expand 
operations or to make acquisitions through debt or by issuing 
additional units rather than through retained cash, although the 
general partner has the discretion to do so.
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    \8\ The definition of available cash may also net out short term 
working capital borrowings, the repayment of capital expenditures, 
and other internal items.
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    10. In rejecting the pipelines' proposals in HIOS and Kern River to 
include MLPs in the proxy group, the Commission made clear that it was 
not making a generic finding that MLPs cannot be considered for 
inclusion in the proxy group if a proper evidentiary showing is 
made.\9\ However, the Commission pointed out that data concerning 
dividends paid by the proxy group members is a key component in any DCF 
analysis, and expressed concern that an MLP's cash distributions to its 
unit holders may not be comparable to the corporate dividends the 
Commission uses in its DCF analysis. In Kern River, the Commission 
explained its concern as follows:
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    \9\ Kern River Gas Transmission Company, 117 FERC ] 61,077 
(2006) (Opinion No. 486) at P 147, reh'g pending.
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    Corporations pay dividends in order to distribute a share of their 
earnings to stockholders. As such, dividends do not include any return 
of invested capital to the stockholders. Rather, dividends represent 
solely a return on invested capital. Put another way, dividends 
represent profit that the stockholder is making on its investment. 
Moreover, corporations typically reinvest some earnings to provide for 
future growth of earnings and thus dividends. Since the return on 
equity which the Commission awards in a rate case is intended to permit 
the pipeline's investors to earn a profit on their investment and 
provides funds to finance future growth, the use of dividends in the 
DCF analysis is entirely consistent with the purpose for which the 
Commission uses that analysis. By contrast, as Kern River concedes, the 
cash distributions of the MLPs it seeks to add to the proxy group in 
this case include a return of invested capital through an allocation of 
the partnership's net income. While the level of an MLP's cash 
distributions may be a significant factor in the unit holder's decision 
to invest in the MLP, the Commission uses the DCF analysis solely to 
determine the pipeline's return on equity. The Commission provides for 
the return of invested capital through a separate depreciation 
allowance. For this reason, to the extent an MLP's distributions 
include a significant return of invested capital, a DCF analysis based 
on those distributions, without any adjustment, will tend to overstate 
the estimated return on equity, because the `dividend' would be 
inflated by cash flow representing return of equity, thereby 
overstating the earnings the dividend stream purports to reflect.\10\
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    \10\ Id. at P 149-50.
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    11. The Commission stated that it could nevertheless consider 
including MLPs in the proxy group in a future case, if the pipeline 
presented evidence addressing these concerns. The order suggested that 
such evidence might include some method of adjusting the MLPs' 
distributions to make them comparable to dividends, a showing that the 
higher ``dividend'' yield of the MLP was offset by a lower long-term 
growth projection, or some other explanation why distributions in 
excess of earnings do not distort the DCF results for the MLP in 
question. However, the Commission concluded that Kern River had not 
presented sufficient evidence to address these issues, and that the 
record in that case did not support including MLPs in the proxy group.
    12. In addition, Kern River pointed out that the traditional DCF 
model only incorporates growth resulting from the reinvestment of 
earnings, not growth arising from external sources of capital.\11\ 
Therefore, the Commission stated that if growth forecasted for an MLP 
comes from external capital, it is necessary either (1) to explain why 
the external sources of capital do not distort the DCF results for that 
MLP or (2) propose an adjustment to the DCF analysis to eliminate any 
distortion. The Commission's orders in HIOS reached the same 
conclusions.
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    \11\ Id. at P 152.
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    13. In some oil pipeline rate cases decided before HIOS and Kern 
River, the Commission included MLPs in the proxy group used to 
determine oil pipeline return on equity on the ground that there were 
no corporations available for use in the oil proxy

[[Page 41746]]

group.\12\ In those cases, no party raised any issue concerning the 
comparability of an MLP's cash distribution to a corporation's 
dividend. However, that issue did arise in the first oil pipeline case 
decided after HIOS and Kern River, involving SFPP's Sepulveda Line.\13\ 
The Commission approved inclusion of MLPs in the proxy group in that 
case on the grounds that the MLPs in question had not made 
distributions in excess of earnings. The Sepulveda Line order therefore 
analyzed the five MLPs that have been used to determine SFPP's ROE: 
Buckeye Partners, L.P., Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., Enron Gas 
Liquids (Enron),\14\ TEPPCO Partners, L.P., and Kaneb Partners, L.P. 
(later Valero Partners), now NuStar Energy, L.P. The order reviewed 
each entity for the year 1996 and the previous four years, and held 
that four of the firms had had income (earnings) in excess of 
distributions and that their incomes (earnings) were stable over that 
period with minor exceptions. The order found these facts sufficient to 
address the concerns expressed in HIOS and Kern River. The fifth firm, 
Enron, had distributions in excess of income (earnings) in four of the 
five years. While the Commission did not preclude use of such MLPs, 
Enron did not meet the HIOS test and was excluded as unrepresentative.
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    \12\ SFPP, L .P., 86 FERC ] 61,022 at 61,099 (1999).
    \13\ SFPP, L.P., 117 FERC ] 61,285 (2006) (SFPP Sepulveda 
order), rehearing pending.
    \14\ Enron Gas Liquids was not affiliated with Enron, Inc. at 
that time, but was a former affiliate that was spun off in the early 
1990's.
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II. Discussion

    14. As discussed below, the Commission proposes to permit inclusion 
of MLPs in a proxy group. However, the Commission proposes to cap the 
``dividend'' used in the DCF analysis at the pipeline's reported 
earnings, thus adjusting the amount of the distribution to be included 
in the DCF model. The Commission would leave to individual cases the 
determination of which MLPs and corporations should actually be 
included in the natural gas or oil proxy group. However, participants 
in these cases should include as much information as possible regarding 
the business profile of the firms they propose to include in the proxy 
group, for example, based on gross income, net income, or assets.
    15. The Supreme Court has stated that ``the return to the equity 
owner should be commensurate with the return on investments in other 
enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should 
be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the 
enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.'' \15\ 
The Commission is concerned that its current approach to determining 
the composition of the proxy group for determining gas and oil pipeline 
return on equity is, or will, require the use of firms which are less 
and less representative of either natural gas or oil pipeline business 
risk.
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    \15\ FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Bluefield 
Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 
(1923).
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    16. As has been discussed, there are fewer and fewer publicly 
traded diversified natural gas corporations that have interstate gas 
pipelines as their predominant business line, whether this is measured 
on a revenue, income, or asset basis. As such, there are fewer 
diversified natural gas companies available for inclusion in a natural 
gas pipeline proxy group which may reasonably be considered 
representative of the risk profile of a natural gas pipeline firm. 
Moreover, at this point the only publicly traded oil pipeline firms are 
controlled by MLPs, which makes the issue of a representative proxy 
group more acute.
    17. Cost of service ratemaking requires that the firms in the proxy 
group be of comparable risk to the firm whose equity cost of capital is 
at issue in a particular rate proceeding. If the proxy group is less 
than clearly representative, this may require the Commission to adjust 
for the difference in risk by adjusting the equity cost-of-capital, a 
difficult undertaking requiring detailed support from the contending 
parties and detailed case-by-case analysis by the Commission. Expanding 
a proxy group to include MLPs whose business is more narrowly focused 
on pipeline activities would help ameliorate this problem. Thus, 
including MLP natural gas pipelines in the equity proxy group should 
reduce the need to make adjustments since the proxy group is more 
likely to contain firms that are representative of the regulated firm 
whose rates are at issue. Including MLPs will also recognize the trend 
to greater use of MLPs in the natural gas pipeline industry and address 
the reality of the oil pipeline industry structure.
    18. The Commission's primary concern about including MLPs in the 
proxy group has arisen from the interaction between use of the DCF 
analysis to determine return on capital while relying on a depreciation 
allowance for return of capital. The Commission permits a pipeline to 
recover through its rates both a return on equity and a return of 
invested capital. The Commission uses the DCF analysis solely to 
determine the return on equity component of the cost-of-service. The 
Commission provides for the return of invested capital through a 
separate depreciation allowance. Given the purpose for which the 
Commission uses the DCF analysis, the cash flows included in that 
analysis must be limited to cash flows which may reasonably be 
considered to reflect a return on equity. Such cash flows include that 
portion of an MLP's cash distribution derived from net income, or 
earnings.
    19. To the extent an MLP makes distributions in excess of earnings, 
it is able to do so because partnership agreements define ``cash 
available for distribution'' to include depreciation. This enables the 
MLP to make cash distributions that include return of equity, in 
addition to return on equity. However, because the Commission includes 
a separate depreciation allowance in the pipeline's cost-of-service, a 
DCF analysis including cash flows attributable to depreciation would 
permit the pipeline to double recover its depreciation expense, once 
through the depreciation allowance and once through an inflated ROE. 
Adjusting an MLP's cash distribution to exclude that portion of the 
distribution in excess of earnings addresses this problem.
    20. The Commission recognizes that it raised several concerns in 
Kern River as to whether adjusting the MLP's cash distribution down to 
the level of its earnings would be sufficient to eliminate the 
distorting effects of including MLPs in the proxy group. The Commission 
pointed out that corporations generally do not pay out all of their 
earnings in dividends, but retain some earnings in order to generate 
future growth. The Commission also suggested that the DCF model is 
premised on growth in dividends deriving from reinvestment of current 
earnings, and does not incorporate growth from external sources, such 
as issuing debt or additional stock.
    21. The Commission believes that these concerns should not render 
unreliable a DCF analysis using the adjusted MLP results. The market 
data for the MLPs used in the DCF analysis should itself correct for 
any distortions remaining after the adjustment to the cash distribution 
described above. For example, the IBES growth projections represent an 
average of the growth projections by professionals whose business is to 
advise investors.\16\ The level of an MLP's cash distributions as

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compared to its earnings is a matter of public record and thus known to 
the security analysts making the growth forecasts used by IBES. 
Therefore, the security analysts must be presumed to take those 
distributions into account in making their growth forecasts for the 
MLP. To the extent an MLP's relatively high cash distributions reduce 
its growth prospects that should be reflected in a lower growth 
forecast, which would offset the MLP's higher ``dividend'' yield.
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    \16\ Opinion No. 414-B, 85 FERC at 62,268-70.
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    22. In order to test the validity of this assumption, the 
Commission reviewed the most recent IBES growth forecasts for five 
diversified energy companies and six MLPs in the natural gas business. 
The average IBES forecast for the corporations is 9 percent, while the 
average IBES forecast for the MLPs is 6.17 percent, or nearly 300 basis 
points lower.\17\ Thus, the security analysts do project lower growth 
rates for the MLPs than for the corporations.
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    \17\ The IBES forecasts were prepared as of May 31, 2007 
applying the current DCF model for the corporate sample and using 
distributions capped at earnings for the MLPs. Thus the short term 
growth rates for the five diversified gas corporations were: (1) 
National Fuel Gas Corporation, 5 percent; (2) Questar Corporation, 9 
percent; (3) Oneok, Inc., 9 percent; (4) Equitable Resources Inc., 
10 percent; and (5) Williams Companies, 12 percent. The short term 
growth rates for the six gas MLPs were: (1) Oneok Partners, L.P., 5 
percent; (2) TEPPCO Partners, L.P., 5 percent; (3) TC Pipelines, 
L.P., 5 percent; (4) Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, L.P., 7 percent, 
(5) Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 7 percent, and (6) 
Enterprise Products Partners, L.P., 8 percent.
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    23. In addition, the fact MLPs may rely upon external borrowings 
and/or equity issuances to generate growth is not a reason to exclude 
them from the proxy group. Most pipelines organized as corporations 
also use external borrowings and to some extent equity issuances. To 
the extent that gas or oil pipelines are controlled by diversified 
energy companies with unregulated assets (either federal or state), the 
financial practices may be the same, although perhaps not as highly 
leveraged, and the results are likewise reflected in the IBES 
projections. A prudent investor deciding whether to invest in a 
security will reasonably consider all factors relevant to assessing the 
value of that security. The potential effect of future borrowings or 
equity issuances on share values of either MLPs or corporations is one 
such factor. Since a DCF analysis is a method for investors to estimate 
the value of securities, it follows that such an analysis may 
reasonably take into account potential growth from external capital.
    24. The Commission does, however, recognize that an MLP's lack of 
retained earnings may render cash distributions at their current level 
unsustainable, and thus still unsuitable for inclusion in the DCF 
analysis. Therefore, the Commission intends to require participants 
proposing to include MLPs in the proxy group to provide a multi-year 
analysis of past earnings. An analysis showing that the MLP does have 
stable earnings would support a finding that the cash to be included in 
the DCF calculation is likely to be available for distribution, thus 
replicating the requirement of the corporate model of a stable 
dividend.

III. Procedure for Comments

    25. The Commission invites interested persons to submit written 
comments on its proposed policy to permit the inclusion of MLPs in the 
proxy group to be used to determine the equity cost of capital of 
natural gas and oil pipelines. The comments may include alternative 
proposals for determining a representative proxy group given that (1) 
Few natural gas companies meet the Commission's traditional standards 
for inclusion in the proxy group, and (2) the only publicly traded oil 
pipeline firms available for inclusion in the proxy group are 
controlled by MLPs. Comments may also address the analysis advanced in 
this proposed policy statement, alternative methods for adjusting the 
amount of the MLP's distribution to be included the DCF analysis, and 
the relevance of the stability of MLP earnings.
    26. Comments are due 30 days from the date of publication in the 
Federal Register and reply comments are due 50 days from the date of 
publication in the Federal Register. Comments must refer to Docket No. 
PL07-2-000, and must include the commentor's name, the organization it 
represents, if applicable, and its address. To facilitate the 
Commission's review of the comments, commentors are requested to 
provide an executive summary of their position. Additional issues the 
commentors wish to raise should be identified separately. The 
commentors should double space their comments.
    27. Comments may be filed on paper or electronically via the 
eFiling link on the Commission's Web site at: http://www.ferc.gov. The 
Commission accepts most standard word processing formats and commentors 
may attach additional files with supporting information in certain 
other file formats. Commentors filing electronically do not need to 
make a paper filing. Commentors that are not able to file comments 
electronically must send an original and 14 copies of their comments 
to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of the Secretary, 888 
First Street, NE., Washington DC 20426.
    28. All comments will be placed in the Commission's public files 
and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the 
Document Availability section below. Commentors are not required to 
serve copies of their comments on other commentors.

IV. Document Availability

    29. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the 
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
Internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and 
in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours 
(8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A, 
Washington, DC 20426.
    30. From the Commission's Home Page on the Internet, this 
information is available in the Commission's document management 
system, e-Library. The full text of this document is available on 
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or 
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket 
number (excluding the last three digits) in the docket number field.
    31. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's 
website during normal business hours. For assistance, please contact 
the Commission's Online Support at 1-866-208-3676 (toll free) or 202-
502-6652 (e-mail at: [email protected] or the Public Reference 
Room at 202-502-8371, TTY 202-502-8659 (e-mail at: 
[email protected]).

    By the Commission.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
 [FR Doc. E7-14708 Filed 7-30-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P