[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 132 (Wednesday, July 11, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 37655-37673]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-13488]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 12

[EB Docket No. 06-119; WC Docket No. 06-63; FCC 07-107]


Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission or FCC) directs the Public Safety and Homeland Security 
(PSHSB) to implement several of the recommendations made by the 
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Networks (Katrina Panel). The Commission also adopts 
rules requiring some communications providers to have emergency/back-up 
power and to conduct analyses and submit reports on the redundancy and 
resiliency of their 911 and E911 networks. Finally, the Commission 
extended limited regulatory relief from Section 272 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, accorded last year by the 
Wireline Competition Bureau (WCB).

DATES: Effective August 10, 2007, except for Sec.  12.3 which contains 
information collection requirements that have not been approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The Commission will publish a 
document in the Federal Register announcing the effective date of this 
section. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce 
paperwork burdens, invites the general public to comment on the 
information collection requirements contained in this document as 
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. 
Public and agency comments are due September 10, 2007.

ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, SW., 
Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. You may submit your Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA) comments by electronic mail or U.S. mail. To submit 
your PRA comments by electronic mail, send comments to: [email protected]. To 
submit your PRA comments by U.S. mail, mark them to the attention of 
Judith B. Herman and address them to the Federal Communications 
Commission, Room 1-C804, 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jean Ann Collins, Deputy Chief, 
Communications Systems Analysis Division, Public Safety and Homeland 
Security Bureau, Federal Communications Commission at (202) 418-2792. 
For additional information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act 
information collection requirements contained in this document, send an 
e-mail to [email protected] or contact Judith B. Herman at (202) 418-0214.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission further orders the PSHSB to 
report to it on PSHSB's efforts three months from the date of release 
of this Order and nine months from the date of release of this Order. 
This is a summary of the Commission's Order in EB Docket No. 06-119 and 
WC Docket No. 06-63, FCC 07-107, adopted May 31, 2007, and released 
June 8, 2007. The complete text of this document is available for 
inspection and copying during normal business hours in the FCC 
Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room 
CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. This document may also be purchased from 
the Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc., 
in person at 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, 
via telephone at (202) 488-5300, via facsimile at (202) 488-5563, or 
via e-mail at [email protected]. Alternative formats (computer diskette, 
large print, audio cassette, and Braille) are available to persons with 
disabilities by sending an e-mail to [email protected] or calling the 
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530, TTY (202) 
418-0432. This document is also available on the Commission's Web site 
at http://www.fcc.gov.

Synopsis of the Order

Preparation for Disasters

    1. Readiness Checklists. The Katrina Panel recommended that the 
Commission work with and encourage each industry sector, through their 
organizations or associations, to develop and publicize sector-specific 
readiness recommendations. This recommendation further stated that 
``such a checklist should be based upon relevant industry best 
practices as set forth by groups such as the Media Security and 
Reliability Council (``MSRC'') and the Network Reliability and 
Interoperability Council (``NRIC''). The Katrina Panel also stated that 
such checklists should include: (i) Developing and implementing 
business continuity plans; (ii) conducting exercises to evaluate 
business continuity plans and train personnel; (iii) developing and 
practicing a communications plan to identify ``key players'' and 
multiple means of contacting them; and (iv) routinely archiving 
critical system backups and providing for their storage in ``secure 
off-site'' facilities.
    2. Commenters generally supported the creation of voluntary sector-
based readiness checklists with input from industry. Some commenters 
specifically encouraged development by industry trade associations with 
encouragement from the Commission. In fact, one such readiness 
checklist has already been developed for the telecommunications 
industry by the Alliance for Telecommunication Industry Solutions 
(``ATIS'') Network Reliability Steering Committee (``NRSC'').
    3. Testimony before the Katrina Panel revealed that industry 
sectors had not adequately prepared for a disaster of Hurricane 
Katrina's magnitude. We find that implementation of the Panel's 
recommendations in this area will improve the security and reliability 
of the Nation's communications infrastructure. Hence, we direct the 
Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau to work with the industry to 
develop voluntary industry-sector readiness checklists to ensure that 
industry is better prepared for future disasters and emergencies, 
including an influenza pandemic. MSRC and NRIC best practices and other 
materials should serve as a foundation for developing these checklists. 
To ensure that the checklists take into account the needs of different 
types of companies, we direct the Bureau to reach out to a variety of 
trade organizations including those representing small communications 
companies. The Bureau should also publicize and

[[Page 37656]]

promote implementation of the readiness checklists once developed, for 
example, by placing the readiness checklists on the Bureau's Web site 
and encouraging use of these checklists at summits and conferences.
    4. Awareness Program on Alternative Technologies. In the Notice, we 
sought comment on the Katrina Panel's recommendation that we act to 
enhance the public safety community's awareness of non-traditional 
emergency alternative technologies that might be of value as back-up 
communications systems in a crisis. In particular, the Panel mentioned 
satellite systems and two-way paging systems as especially resilient to 
disaster. Other technologies, such as WiFi and WiMAX, were cited for 
their ability to restore service rapidly. In addition to a lack of 
knowledge about these alternatives, the Panel described the need that 
members of the public safety community be trained in their use prior to 
disasters. The Katrina Panel suggested that the lack of such training 
may have contributed to these technologies being overlooked during 
Katrina, and such training would have to occur prior to a crisis since 
the days following such an event are consumed with far more pressing 
issues.
    5. Commenting parties favored the Katrina Panel's recommendation 
that the Commission work to enhance the public safety community's 
awareness of alternative communications technologies. Many emphasized 
the importance of satellite technologies, with most of these commenters 
stressing the need for training in alternative technologies before 
disaster strikes. Motorola also emphasizes that ``* * * these important 
technologies will be of little help unless public safety trains on them 
frequently.'' SIA and USA Mobility suggested that the Commission 
improve awareness through a combination of fact sheets and web site 
distribution of relevant information about alternative technologies. 
Several commenters suggested that the public safety community be 
educated about the applicability of amateur radio in a crisis. MAET 
observed that digital television datacasting is an alternative 
technology that should not be overlooked for emergency communications.
    6. The Commission agrees that improving the public safety 
community's knowledge of, and training in, alternative technologies 
would improve preparedness for future crises. We direct PSHSB to 
develop and implement an awareness program to educate public safety 
agencies about alternative technologies and to encourage agencies to 
provide regular training on any alternative technologies to be used. 
The program could include: (i) Web pages describing alternative 
technologies and how they work; (ii) hosting summits and conferences 
that include discussion of alternative technologies; (iii) educating 
public safety agencies about alternative technologies at events 
sponsored by third parties; and (iv) making staff available to provide 
advice to public safety agencies on issues regarding specific 
technologies. Commenters have suggested a number of technologies be 
included in this program, including two-way paging, satellite, IP-based 
systems, WiFi and WiMAX. We agree that these technologies as well as 
others to be determined by PSHSB should be included.
    7. Outreach Program for Emergency Medical and Other Communities. 
The Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission work to assist the 
emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency and 
effectiveness of their emergency communications systems. Specifically, 
the Katrina Panel stated that the Commission should: (i) Educate the 
emergency medical community about emergency communications and help to 
coordinate this sector's emergency communications efforts; (ii) work 
with Congress and other appropriate federal departments and agencies to 
ensure emergency medical personnel are treated as public safety 
personnel under the Stafford Act; and (iii) support the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to make emergency medical 
providers eligible for funding for emergency communications equipment 
under the State Homeland Security Grant Program. In the Notice, we also 
sought comment on whether and how the Commission can assist 
organizations whose primary business is not communications (e.g. 
hospitals, nursing homes, day care facilities) with developing 
communications plans for an emergency. Commenters generally support 
these recommendations.
    8. The PSHSB provides guidance and assistance to state and local 
governments, health care providers and law enforcement agencies on the 
use of Land Mobile Radio (LMR) equipment and systems, licensing 
requirements, and spectrum and frequency use for public safety 
emergency communications. The PSHSB continues to provide assistance to 
various stakeholder groups in their efforts to ensure that they have 
operable, reliable, resilient and redundant emergency communications 
systems in place. In 2006, several state and regional hospital 
associations ran on-line articles describing the Commission's expanded 
outreach to the health care sector regarding emergency communications, 
noting that the PSHSB is committed to working closely with the nation's 
health care providers to further strengthen emergency response 
capabilities and preparedness. The Commission has also conducted 
outreach to encourage the emergency medical community and others to 
enroll in priority communications service programs.
    9. We direct PSHSB to continue these efforts, including its 
coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in 
the area of health care emergency preparedness as it relates to 
communications. PSHSB should continue to educate and encourage the 
ability of health care providers to employ a plurality of 
communications systems (e.g., land mobile relay systems, satellite 
communications, and/or high frequency communications) on premises, 
outside of their facility, and facility-to-facility. PSHSB should also 
work with DHS and other federal agencies to ensure emergency medical 
personnel are treated as public safety personnel under the Stafford 
Act. This recommendation is critical because the medical sector will be 
supporting first responders and potential disaster victims.
    10. We further direct PSHSB to work with the Nation's health care, 
education and business communities to include, in their business 
continuity planning, robust emergency communication plans that ensure 
that these entities will be able to function during emergencies such as 
an influenza pandemic. Such emergencies could result in sudden and 
significant shortages of personnel, changes in communications traffic, 
possible disruptions to communications networks (i.e., due to increased 
telecommuting by the nation's workforce and society in general during 
an influenza pandemic), and lack of manpower to immediately repair 
affected communications networks. PSHSB has already begun efforts to 
establish a new federal advisory committee that will replace NRIC and 
MSRC and will address, inter alia, communications issues related to an 
influenza pandemic. PSHSB has also started to assemble information 
regarding pandemic influenza to place on its Web site. We direct PSHSB 
to continue with these efforts. In particular, PSHSB should update its 
Web site as soon as possible to include information that addresses 
pandemic influenza and how to prepare communications systems for such 
an emergency. The Web site should include links to other relevant

[[Page 37657]]

government Web sites, such as http://www.pandemicflu.gov.
    11. Monitoring of Situational Awareness During Disasters. The 
Katrina Panel observed that there was often a lack of clarity about 
which federal agency was responsible for collecting outage information 
and that competing requests for such information at the federal, state 
and local levels was distracting to restoration efforts and added to 
confusion about agency roles. In the Notice, we sought comment on the 
Katrina Panel's recommendation that the Commission coordinate all 
federal outage and infrastructure reporting requirements in times of 
crisis, functioning as a single repository and contact with consistent 
data collection procedures. We asked parties to comment on the 
appropriate content of such emergency outage reports, their format, 
frequency, distribution and related issues. We also asked parties to 
comment on whether additional safeguards should be put into effect to 
address the potential disclosure of commercially sensitive information 
to avoid potential harm to communications providers or others.
    12. The vast majority of commenting parties agreed with the Katrina 
Panel's recommendation that the Commission serve as a single repository 
for outage information and implement appropriate safeguards to protect 
sensitive information that would be provided in such instances. DHS 
agrees that a central repository for network outage information during 
a disaster is necessary and suggests that a rulemaking is necessary to 
facilitate outage reporting to such a repository to improve NS/EP 
programs. The National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) supports the Panel's recommendation to the extent 
that it does not include Federal communications system outages and 
suggests that the outage database be maintained by the Commission 
representative to the Joint Field Office (JFO). Several commenting 
parties urged the Commission to ensure that the data collection effort 
is coordinated with the National Communications System (NCS) and the 
National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC) and conducted 
in a way that does not alter the NCC's role as the ``primary entity in 
the federal government for coordinating communications network recovery 
and information sharing among affected industry members.'' Commenting 
parties urged the Commission to implement the steps necessary to 
protect network outage information from unauthorized disclosure. 
Commenters also encouraged the Commission to work proactively with 
state and local entities on a process to share outage information that 
preserves appropriate confidentiality safeguards, thereby minimizing 
duplicative requests for such information from different sources. 
Others encouraged the Commission to work with industry prior to the 
onset of a disaster to select data fields that are necessary to support 
emergency management and systems that facilitate data collection, and 
asserted that the decisions about what data to collect should be 
balanced against the burden that it would impose on communications 
providers that are actively engaged in restoration efforts. SIA 
suggested that reporting entities maintain a method of submitting 
outage data to the Commission during a disaster even if their primary 
reporting facility is impaired and urges the Commission to encourage 
the use of satellite technology for this purpose. NENA suggests that 
the Commission conduct detailed analyses of the 911 outage data that it 
routinely collects pursuant to part 4 and ``* * * work with appropriate 
entities to mitigate these conditions where appropriate.''
    13. We agree with the Katrina Panel that the Commission should 
serve as the central point of contact for communications outage 
information during major events and should provide access to this 
information to other agencies. The Commission has extensive experience 
in this area both through its collection of outage information pursuant 
to part 4 of the Commission's rules (outage reporting requirements) and 
from its efforts to collect situational awareness information from 
licensees in the aftermath of the 2005 hurricanes. Moreover, we note 
that, prior to the Katrina Panel's Report, PSHSB staff had already 
begun working with the communications industry and the NCS on ways to 
streamline the process used to collect situational awareness 
information from FCC licensees during emergencies. Indeed, PSHSB is now 
in the late stages of developing a system and process for collection of 
this information. Under the process contemplated by the PSHSB staff, 
communications companies serving areas affected by disasters could 
voluntarily submit information regarding, inter alia, the status of 
their operations, the status of their restoration efforts, their power 
status (i.e., are they operating based on commercial power, a generator 
or battery power) and their use of fuel. The information submitted 
would be accorded confidential treatment, and would be shared with NCS 
on a confidential basis. This information would allow the Commission 
and other governmental agencies to not only track the status of 
communications companies' operations in the aftermath of a disaster, 
but also their restoration status. The information could also be used 
to determine communications companies' needs (e.g., generator, fuel).
    14. We direct PSHSB to continue working with NCS and the 
communications industry, including the broadcast and cable industries, 
to resolve any outstanding issues in order to facilitate the activation 
of the system as soon as possible. The Bureau should also work to 
obtain any necessary regulatory approvals for collection of this 
information as soon as possible. Finally, we direct the Bureau to work 
with the communications industry, NCS and state government agencies to 
address whether information submitted by the industry should be shared 
with state governments.
    15. We decline to initiate a rulemaking at this time to make the 
outage reporting process mandatory. The voluntary process that was put 
in place during Katrina provided the necessary information on a timely 
basis. Furthermore, a mandatory process would be less flexible and 
would not adapt well to the unique needs of a particular crisis. For 
these reasons we find that a voluntary situational awareness process is 
more effective during disasters. Finally, we note that PSHSB currently 
conducts the analyses of 911 outage data recommended by NENA, including 
coordination with appropriate entities and industry bodies to 
effectuate improvements in 911 reliability where appropriate.
    16. Automatic Special Temporary Authority and Waiver Relief. The 
Notice sought comment on the Katrina Panel's recommendation that the 
Commission establish a prioritized system by which affected parties 
could automatically be granted waivers of certain regulatory 
requirements, or be granted automatic Special Temporary Authority (STA) 
in a particular geographic area if the President declares that area to 
be a ``disaster area.'' The Katrina Panel stated that, as a condition 
of such waivers or STAs, the Commission could require verbal or written 
notification to Commission staff contemporaneously with activation or 
promptly after the fact. The Katrina Panel also recommended that the 
Commission examine expanding the on-line filing opportunities for STA 
requests. In this recommendation, the Katrina Panel also included a 
list of ``possible rule waivers and STAs to study for this treatment.'' 
For the reasons indicated below, we

[[Page 37658]]

have concluded not to automate the waiver and STA process.
    17. Although most commenters supported this recommendation, few 
commented on how such an automatic waiver/STA process would work or be 
structured. Further, no commenter asserted that the manner in which the 
Commission expedited the grant of waivers and STAs during the 2005 
hurricanes was not effective. We believe that, on balance, public 
safety would be better served by an expedited review, rather than a 
fully automated system. Although we wish to relieve all licensees of 
unnecessary regulatory burdens during an emergency, we are concerned 
that a general policy of allowing the automatic grant of STAs and 
waivers of operational requirements could have serious consequences.
    18. For example, without minimal Commission review, an automatic 
STA could allow operations of a new facility using spectrum already in 
use by an essential communications provider and thereby inadvertently 
cause essential communications to fail. We believe that it would be far 
easier, and more consistent with public safety to grant expedited 
review of an STA application than to try to undo an automatic STA once 
operations have begun. Further, the declaration of a ``presidential 
disaster area'' does not appear to be a sufficient basis, by itself, to 
grant an STA or waiver, whether automatically or otherwise. For 
example, there could be instances where the communications 
infrastructure in a Presidentially declared disaster area remains 
intact. In such a case, an STA or waiver may be unwarranted. On the 
other hand, there may be situations where there is damage to a 
telecommunications carrier's infrastructure in an area that is never 
declared a disaster area. Thus, an automatic STA or waiver process 
based on a Presidentially declared disaster area could be overinclusive 
in some cases and underinclusive in others. For the same reason we 
disagree that the triggering by a licensee of its emergency plan 
generally should act as a trigger for automatic STAs or waivers. There 
may also be legal impediments to automatic STAs for Title III 
authorizations under Sections 308(a) and 309(f) of the Communications 
Act. Finally, we agree with NTIA that, in an emergency, the close 
coordination that is required between the Commission and NTIA regarding 
the use of shared Federal/non-Federal bands and shared spectrum 
management responsibilities precludes a fully automated waiver/STA 
process. Accordingly, we conclude that some level of Commission review 
is necessary during an emergency to ensure that STAs or waivers are 
properly granted.
    19. We believe, at this time, the best approach would be to use an 
expedited process for acting on requests for STAs, waivers and other 
regulatory relief based on the particular circumstances of the disaster 
at hand. An expedited process would allow the Commission to ensure that 
there is a link between the relief being requested and the emergency at 
issue. During Hurricane Katrina, the Commission publicized its 
procedures for seeking regulatory relief, granted some relief on its 
own motion and otherwise processed requests for relief on an expedited 
basis. Many of these requests were processed within four hours and all 
were processed within 24 hours. Additionally, Commission rules permit 
the suspension or waiver of rule requirements on its own motion, STA 
requests by telephone during emergencies and the grant of station 
licenses, modification, renewal or STAs without the filing of formal 
applications in certain emergency situations. Other rules provide 
additional flexibility for licensees to adjust operations during 
emergency situations. Therefore, the Commission has procedures in place 
to ensure that waivers and STAs are promptly reviewed and granted 
during an emergency. Accordingly, we direct PSHSB to work with other 
Bureaus and Offices, as necessary, to publicize emergency-related rules 
and procedures prior to disaster. This could be done by, among other 
things, providing relevant information on PSHSB's Web site as well as 
through outreach programs directed at public safety agencies and the 
industry.
    20. Other Pre-Positioning Recommendations From Commenters. Several 
commenters submitted additional suggestions for improving network 
resiliency and redundancy.
    21. Permanent Relief from InterLATA Restrictions. BellSouth 
recommends that the Commission grant the Bell Operating Companies 
(BOCs) permanent relief from interLATA boundary restrictions. It argues 
that such action would enhance network resiliency and redundancy. The 
BOCs have already raised the issue of relief from Section 272 and its 
implementing rules in a number of pending forbearance petitions and 
waiver requests. Accordingly, we will consider this issue in those 
proceedings as appropriate.
    22. One Year Section 272 Relief. Last year, WCB granted a one-year 
Special Temporary Authority from enforcement of Section 272 and its 
implementing rules to BOCs in order to allow them to share non-public, 
BOC network information with their Section 272 and other affiliates to 
engage in disaster planning. In addition, WCB granted Verizon a one-
year waiver of part 64 requirements to allow Verizon to engage in 
disaster planning with its former GTE company affiliates. The relief 
for disaster planning ends April 20, 2007 for AT&T and June 9, 2007 for 
BellSouth, Qwest and Verizon. Verizon and BellSouth argue that the 
Commission should reconsider the one-year limitation of this relief or 
change its rules so that an STA or waiver is not necessary. Verizon, 
for example, states that it will need to conduct disaster planning well 
beyond June 2007 to prepare for, among other things, next summer's 
hurricane season.
    23. In light of the upcoming hurricane season and the separate 
tornadoes that recently struck parts of Kansas and Alabama, we grant an 
extension of the regulatory relief granted by WCB last year to AT&T, 
Qwest and Verizon for a period of one-year from the date the 
originally-granted relief is due to expire. Specifically, we grant 
AT&T, Verizon and Qwest a one-year STA and waiver of Section 272 of the 
Act and the Commission's accounting and non-accounting structural 
separation safeguards. We also extend for an additional year, a waiver 
previously issued to Verizon to engage in integrated disaster recovery 
planning with its former GTE affiliates. Under the STA and waiver, 
AT&T, Qwest and Verizon will continue to be permitted to share non-
public BOC network information with its Section 272 affiliates (as well 
as other affiliates that adhere to the Section 272-like safeguards), as 
necessary to engage in integrated disaster planning.
    24. We find that an extension of the regulatory relief previously 
accorded these carriers serves the public interest. The unique 
circumstances of a hurricane, tornado or other disaster warrant a 
deviation from Section 272 and the accompanying rules, and such 
deviation will better serve the public interest in a time of emergency. 
This relief will allow AT&T, Verizon and Qwest to continue to develop 
risk mitigation strategies and contingency plans that will reduce the 
likelihood and duration of any service outage and will permit these 
carriers' networks to continue to operate in the event a ``choke 
point'' is compromised.

Recovery Coordination

    25. Credentialing Guidelines. In the Notice, we sought comment on 
the Katrina Panel's recommendation that the Commission work with other 
appropriate federal departments and agencies and the communications

[[Page 37659]]

industry to promptly develop national credentialing requirements and 
process guidelines to enable communications infrastructure providers 
and their contracted workers access to affected areas after a disaster. 
The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committees (NSTAC) made similar recommendations to the President last 
year. The Panel advocated, however, expanding the NSTAC's credentialing 
recommendations to include repair workers of all communications 
infrastructure (e.g., wireline, wireless, Wireless Internet Service 
Providers (WISPs), cable, broadcasting, and satellite). Further, the 
Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission work with the 
communications industry to develop an appropriate basic NIMS training 
course for communications repair workers that can be completed online 
as a requirement for credentialing. Additionally, the Katrina Panel 
recommended that the Commission should: (i) Encourage states to develop 
and implement a credentialing program consistent with NSTAC guidelines 
as promptly as possible and encourage appropriate communications 
industry members to secure any necessary credentialing; (ii) encourage 
states to recognize and accept credentials issued by other states; and 
(iii) encourage, but not require, each regional, state and local EOC or 
JFO to develop credentialing requirements and procedures, consistent 
with any national credentialing guidelines, for purposes of allowing 
communications infrastructure providers, their contracted workers and 
private security teams, if any, access to the affected areas post-
disaster.
    26. Most commenters generally supported credentialing 
communications personnel to access affected areas post-disaster. Many 
stressed that credentialing recommendations should apply to all 
communications providers, including their contracted workers. In fact, 
DHS noted that it is making significant efforts to advance the 
implementation of a national standard for the credentialing of 
telecommunications repair workers. Commenters were split regarding 
whether NIMS training should be required as a requirement for 
credentialing.
    27. The Commission's experience with Hurricane Katrina and the 
record in this proceeding reveal that access to affected areas post-
disaster was one of the most critical issues for the communications 
industry. As the National Response Plan makes clear, DHS has primary 
responsibility to coordinate federal incident management activities, 
including disaster site access and credentialing, for all emergency 
personnel. As such DHS, rather than the FCC, has jurisdiction and 
authority to adopt credentialing guidelines that apply to the 
communications industry.
    28. DHS and the states have taken a number of steps to develop 
credentialing guidelines that would allow communications providers 
access to disaster areas. For example, DHS/NCS worked with the State of 
Georgia and BellSouth to develop a pilot access program focused on 
priority access for critical response personnel, including 
telecommunications, which resulted in the publication of a Georgia 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for emergency access. This SOP has 
been distributed as suggested protocol to all 50 states and the 
territories. DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is also 
working on an access pilot program to give telecommunication repair 
crews better access to disaster areas and is aggregating documentation 
for emergency personnel nationwide into a National Emergency Responder 
Credentialing Program that DHS/FEMA expects to make operational this 
year.
    29. PSHSB staff is already working with DHS to help ensure that any 
credentialing program would encompass critical communications 
infrastructure repair crews and their contracting support staff and to 
support coordination with regional, state and local officials regarding 
the development of consistent credentialing programs for communications 
providers. We believe the issue of whether to require NIMS training as 
a requirement for credentialing is best addressed by DHS/NCS and 
regional, state and local authorities as they develop their 
credentialing programs. We agree with DHS's assertion that the 
Commission's credentialing efforts should complement, not supersede or 
duplicate, those of DHS/NCS. We direct PSHSB to continue to work with 
DHS and the states on these efforts.
    30. Emergency Responder Status for Communications Infrastructure 
Providers. In the Notice, we sought comment on the Katrina Panel's 
recommendations that the Commission work with Congress and appropriate 
federal departments and agencies to afford all communications 
infrastructure providers, including wireline, wireless, WISPs, 
satellite, cable and broadcast infrastructure providers and their 
contracted workers emergency responder status under the Stafford Act 
and to incorporate this designation into the National Response Plan 
(``NRP'') and state and local emergency response plans. Most commenters 
supported this recommendation and stressed that the emergency responder 
status should be afforded to all communications service providers.
    31. Section 607 of the recently enacted Warning, Alert and Response 
Network Act (WARN Act) amended the Stafford Act to add the term 
``essential service provider'' which includes entities that provide 
telecommunications service. This section of the WARN Act also states 
that, unless exceptional circumstances apply, in an emergency or major 
disaster, the head of a Federal agency, to the greatest extent 
practicable, shall not deny or impede access to the disaster site to an 
essential service provider whose access is necessary to restore and 
repair an essential service and shall not impede the restoration or 
repair of telecommunications services. We direct PSHSB to work with 
DHS, and all other relevant federal, state, tribal and local government 
agencies, to facilitate: (i) Access to disaster areas for 
communications provider personnel so that recovery efforts can be 
expedited; and (ii) the incorporation into the NRP and state, tribal 
and local emergency response plans of the designation of 
telecommunications service providers as ``essential service 
providers.'' PSHSB should also encourage DHS to seek Congressional 
action, if necessary, to ensure that the term ``essential service 
provider'' includes all communications service providers.
    32. Utilization of State/Regional Coordination Bodies. The Katrina 
Panel recommended that the Commission work with state and local 
governments and the communications industry (including wireline, 
wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting) to better utilize 
the coordinating capabilities at regional, state and local Emergency 
Operations Centers (EOCs), as well as the Joint Field Office (JFO). In 
particular, the Panel recommended that the Commission encourage, but 
not require, each regional, state and local EOC and JFO to: (i) 
Facilitate coordination between communications infrastructure providers 
and state and local emergency preparedness officials (such as the state 
EOC) in the state or region at the EOC or JFO; (ii) develop and 
facilitate inclusion in state emergency preparedness plans, where 
appropriate, one or more clearly identified post-disaster coordination 
areas for communications infrastructure providers, their contracted 
workers, and private security teams to gather post-disaster where 
credentialing, security, escorts and further coordination can be

[[Page 37660]]

achieved; and (iii) share information and coordinate resources to 
facilitate repair of key communications infrastructure post-disaster.
    33. Commenters generally support the recommendation that the 
Commission work with state and local governments and the communications 
industry to better facilitate coordination between emergency responders 
and the communications infrastructure providers. In its comments CTIA 
recommended that the Commission work with Federal, state and local 
governments to create a process to establish embarkation points for 
communications recovery efforts in the wake of a disaster. DHS agrees 
that it would be advantageous to engage the EOCs and JFOs in support of 
greater communications crisis preparedness and more effective response 
planning. DHS asserts, however, that it would be more appropriate, and 
consistent with mission responsibilities and existing relationships 
between the entities, for such activities to be coordinated jointly by 
NCS and DHS/FEMA in the first instance rather than by the FCC. Cingular 
asserts that the Commission should urge states to refrain from imposing 
emergency preparedness requirements on the industry. Cingular states 
that the adoption of state specific requirements, while well intended, 
hinder recovery efforts by eliminating flexibility and creating a 
patchwork of inconsistent requirements that carriers must follow.
    34. These recommendations generally fall under the jurisdiction of 
the NCS which, as the coordinator and primary agency for ESF 2 
(Communications) of the NRP, performs these functions. The Commission 
supports these efforts in its role as an ESF 2 support agency. 
ESF 2 coordinates Federal actions for the restoration of the 
telecommunications infrastructure and ensures the provision of Federal 
communications support to Federal, state, tribal, local and private 
sector response during an Incident of National Significance. NCS 
assists in the coordination of planning and provision of emergency 
preparedness communications for the Federal government under all 
circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery and 
reconstitution. The Commission and other government agencies such as 
FEMA have also taken a number of steps in this area. The Commission 
reached out to its licensees to determine their status and needs and 
provided the collected information to the NCS. The Commission then 
helped coordinate ESF 2 response efforts to aid the 
Commission's licensees (e.g., arranged for helicopter overflights, fuel 
shipments, access, curfew and airport information). The Commission is 
also working with DHS/NCS to encourage regional, state and local EOCs 
and/or JFOs to identify post-disaster coordination areas for 
communications providers and their contract workers and to create a 
process to establish embarkation points for communications recovery 
efforts. For example, the Commission assisted DHS with developing 
proposals making federal property available as a staging area for 
communications infrastructure providers under the Stafford Act.
    35. We direct PSHSB to continue to work with DHS, state, tribal and 
local governments and the communications industry on these issues. 
However, we decline to take action to urge the states to refrain from 
imposing emergency preparedness requirements on the communications 
industry as Cingular advocates.
    36. Priority Utility Restoration for Communications Providers. In 
its report, the Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission 
encourage, but not require, each regional, state and local EOC and JFO 
to facilitate electric and other utilities' maintenance of priority 
lists that include commercial communications providers for commercial 
power restoration. The Katrina Panel stated that power restoration 
activities should be coordinated with communications restoration. The 
majority of commenters support this recommendation.
    37. Other agencies, such as DHS, the Department of Energy, and 
state agencies, have primary jurisdiction and authority over this 
matter. Loss of power is a critical failure that DHS/NCS is aware of 
and focused on. For example, NCS coordinates priority lists with the 
agencies responsible for NRP's Emergency Support Function 12--
Energy. The communications sector is number two on the ESF 12 
priority lists. NCS also has tools that can identify communication 
sites. The agencies responsible for ESF 12 have tools that can 
locate energy sites near communications providers and determine whether 
there have been critical failures. Coordination of these priority lists 
between Emergency Support Functions 2 and 12 is ongoing. We direct 
PSHSB to support DHS/NCS and the other agencies addressing this issue 
in their efforts to ensure priority power and other relevant utility 
restoration for commercial communications providers during and after 
disasters.
    38. Expanding and Publicizing Priority Communications Service 
Programs. The Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission work with 
the NCS to promote the use of existing priority communications 
services, such as Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP), Government 
Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and Wireless Priority 
Service (WPS), to all eligible entities, particularly eligible 
government, public safety, emergency medical community, and critical 
industry groups. Further, the Katrina Panel stated that the Commission 
should work with NCS to clarify whether broadcast, WISP, satellite, and 
cable company repair crews are currently eligible for GETS and WPS and, 
if so, should also promote the availability of those priority services 
to those entities. The Katrina Panel also recommended that the 
Commission work with NCS and industry to establish and promote best 
practices to ensure that all WPS, GETS, and TSP subscribers are 
properly trained in how to use these services. Finally, the Katrina 
Panel recommended that the Commission work with NCS to explore whether 
it is technically and financially feasible for WPS calls to 
automatically receive GETS treatment when they reach landline 
facilities, thus avoiding the need for a WPS caller to also enter GETS 
information.
    39. DHS fully supports the Katrina Panel's recommendation that the 
Commission work with NCS to promote wider use of GETS, WPS and TSP 
programs among government, public safety, and critical industry groups. 
Broadcasters that provided comments support granting broadcasters 
access to GETS and WPS. Other commenters state that promotion of these 
programs must be coordinated with industry to ensure that providers can 
absorb additional demands placed on their networks through increased 
participation in the programs.
    40. PSHSB staff members are actively engaged in priority services 
outreach. For example, PSHSB staff recently worked with the NCS TSP 
Program Office, various telecommunications carriers, and the State of 
New York to enroll over 2,000 circuits into the TSP program. 
Additionally, PSHSB staff is closely coordinating with the HHS to 
increase awareness among health care providers, particularly hospitals, 
about the benefits of enrollment and participation in federal priority 
service programs. This initiative includes expanded outreach in the 
health care sector and with state health departments to increase their 
understanding of TSP, GETS and WPS during and in the aftermath of a 
natural disaster or other emergency, such as an influenza pandemic. HHS 
is considering options

[[Page 37661]]

to better incorporate support for these federal priority service 
programs into their emergency preparedness funding streams. The 
Commission is also working with hospital associations to educate the 
medical community about priority communications services. In addition, 
PSHSB is working with NCS to enhance WPS and resolve the issue of 
whether it is feasible for WPS calls to automatically receive GETS 
treatment when they reach landline facilities.
    41. We direct PSHSB to continue to work with DHS, including the NCS 
Committee of Principal's Priority Services Working Group (PSWG), to 
promote the priority communications services to all eligible entities, 
particularly eligible government, public safety, emergency medical 
community, and critical industry groups, including repair crews which 
could qualify under the eligibility criteria for both WPS and GETS 
under the category of disaster recovery. PSHSB should work with DHS to 
ensure that communications systems' capabilities are not overwhelmed by 
increased demands placed on networks by increased participation in 
these programs. We also direct PSHSB to support the creation and 
promotion of best practices to ensure proper training in how to use 
these services. Finally, we direct PSHSB to continue working with DHS 
and NCS's PSWG to enhance WPS and resolve the issue of whether it is 
feasible for WPS calls to automatically receive GETS treatment when 
they reach landline facilities.
    42. Broadening NCC to Include All Communications Infrastructure 
Sectors. The Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission work with 
the NCS to broaden the membership of the NCC to include adequate 
representation of all types of communications systems, including 
broadcast, cable, satellite and other new technologies, as appropriate. 
The NCC is a government and industry organization within DHS/NCS. It 
functions at the operational level and assists in initiating, 
coordinating, restoring and reconstituting national security and 
emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications services or 
facilities under all conditions of crises and disasters.
    43. In January 2000, the NCC was designated an Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center (ISAC) for Telecommunications in accordance with 
Presidential Decision Directive 63. The NCC-ISAC facilitates the 
exchange among government and industry participants regarding 
vulnerability, threat, intrusion, and anomaly information affecting the 
telecommunications infrastructure. Since its creation, the NCC has 
coordinated the restoration and provisioning of national security and 
emergency preparedness telecommunication services and facilities during 
natural disasters and armed conflicts. The NCC leverages its unique 
joint government/industry structure and all-hazard emergency response 
capabilities to coordinate the initiation, restoration, and 
reconstitution of United States government national security and 
emergency preparedness telecommunications services both nationally and 
internationally.
    44. DHS fully supports the Katrina Panel's recommendation that the 
Commission work with NCS to broaden the membership of the NCC. DHS 
states that NCS is already working with the members of industry to 
explore expansion of NCC membership and would welcome the Commission's 
engagement in this area. Several additional commenters support this 
recommendation.
    45. In coordination with DHS/NCS, PSHSB is currently engaged in 
efforts to make the NCC more of an overall communications information 
sharing and analysis center instead of one focused solely on 
telecommunications. The Commission is working with communications trade 
groups and broadcasters, among others, to encourage them to consider 
NCC membership. Recently, a fiber optic provider the Commission 
introduced to the NCC signed up for membership as did APCO, COMPTEL, 
Global Crossing, and Cox Cable. We direct PSHSB to continue its efforts 
in this area.
    46. Web site for Emergency Coordination. The Katrina Panel 
recommended that the Commission create a Web site identifying the key 
state emergency management contacts, particularly for communications 
coordinating bodies, and post-disaster coordination areas for 
communications providers. Some commenters support the proposal that the 
Commission create a disaster response Web site for communications 
providers; other commenters state that this function is best suited for 
other agencies, such as FEMA or DHS.
    47. FEMA and many states already have publicly available 
information identifying key state emergency management contacts. FEMA's 
Web site has a compilation of state emergency contacts (http://www.fema.gov/about/contact/statedr.shtm) and the NCC Web site (http://www.ncs.gov/ncc) has links to federal agencies. Accordingly, we do not 
believe it is necessary for the Commission to create a similar Web 
site.
    48. To facilitate access to this information by communications 
companies, we direct PSHSB to coordinate with FEMA to provide updated 
links to the relevant state emergency contact information contained on 
the FEMA Web site. Specifically, PSHSB should create a link on its Web 
site to FEMA's listing of state emergency contact information.
    49. FCC Web site for Emergency Response Team Information. The 
Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission create a Web site to 
publicize the Commission's emergency response team's contact 
information and procedures for facilitating disaster response and 
outage recovery. Commenters unanimously support the Katrina Panel's 
recommendation. Commenters contend that the Commission should maximize 
existing resources by developing and posting on the Commission's Web 
site the Commission's emergency response team's contact information and 
procedures.
    50. We agree that a Web site providing emergency contact 
information, procedures for facilitating disaster response and outage 
recovery, and procedures for obtaining regulatory relief during 
emergencies would be helpful. We direct PSHSB to work with other 
Bureaus and Offices, as appropriate, to do so.
    51. Other Recovery Coordination Recommendations. Commenters 
submitted the following suggestions for improving the recovery 
coordination process:
    52. Expedited Importation of Essential Communications Technology. 
Iridium Satellite LLC suggests that the Commission work with other 
federal agencies to establish a system that facilitates the delivery of 
replacement infrastructure and equipment during a disaster. 
Additionally, Inmarsat asserts that, as part of creating redundancy, 
the federal government should recognize the importance of, and 
encourage the building of, mobile units that can be deployed as needed 
to any given disaster zone to assist in rapid restoration of vital 
communications using Mobile Satellite Service. These functions are 
covered by ESF 2. The Commission is already working with other 
agencies to support these functions and will continue to coordinate 
with DHS/NCS and other agencies regarding these matters. Inmarsat also 
asserts that the Commission should work with U.S. Customs to ensure 
that bottlenecks do not slow the importation of essential 
communications technology in the aftermath of a disaster. Inmarsat and

[[Page 37662]]

other satellite operators apparently experienced a sharp rise in demand 
after Hurricane Katrina that could not be met by the existing stock of 
satellite terminals in the U.S. We direct PSHSB to coordinate with DHS/
NCS, U.S. Customs and other appropriate agencies to develop a 
systematic approach toward the importation of communications equipment 
needed for disaster response in the wake of disasters.
    53. Real Time Tracking of Progress and Shared Experiences. 
Champaign Urbana Wireless Network, The Texas ISP Association, The 
Association for Community Networking, and Acorn Active Media (CUWN, et 
al.) suggest that the Commission provide a means by which 
communications responders could record their progress, share 
experiences in real time and avoid accidental conflicts. This function 
is primarily a responsibility of DHS/NCS under ESF 2 and PSHSB 
should continue to coordinate with DHS/NCS regarding these matters.

First Responder Communications

    54. Emergency Restoration Supply Cache and Alternative Inventory. 
To facilitate the restoration of public safety communications, the 
Panel recommended that the Commission: (i) Support the ongoing efforts 
of the NCC to develop and maintain a database of state and local public 
safety system information, including frequency usage, to allow for more 
efficient spectrum sharing, rapid on-site frequency coordination, and 
emergency provision of supplemental equipment in the event of system 
failures; (ii) support the efforts of the NCC to develop an inventory 
of available communications assets (including local, state, federal 
civilian and military) that can be rapidly deployed in the event of a 
catastrophic event and work with the NCC and the appropriate agencies 
to educate key state and local emergency response personnel on the 
availability of these assets and how to request them; and (iii) 
coordinate with the NCS/NCC to assure that, immediately following any 
large disaster, there is an efficient means by which federal, state and 
local officials can identify and locate private sector communications 
assets that can be made rapidly available to first responders and 
relief organizations. The Katrina Panel noted that one means by which 
to identify and locate private sector communications assets would be a 
Web site maintained by either the FCC or NCC through which the private 
sector could register available assets along with product information 
and stated that such a Web site should be designed with a special area 
for registering available equipment to assist persons with disabilities 
in their communications needs.
    55. Support NCC Efforts to Develop a Database of State and Local 
Public Safety System Information. PSHSB has already provided support 
for the NCC's ongoing efforts to develop and maintain a database of 
state and local public safety system information. With assistance from 
PSHSB, the NCC has developed a public safety first responder frequency 
sharing guide. PSHSB consulted private frequency coordinators and 
collected and coordinated information from them for this effort. 
Additionally, although it was only developed for the states affected by 
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA recently developed a Gulf Coast communications 
plan for use during emergencies that identifies all public safety 
equipment and spectrum currently in use.
    56. Coordinate with NCC to Facilitate the Availability of 
Communications Assets for First Responders Post-Disaster. The 
Commission already coordinates with the NCS/NCC to assure that, 
following any large disaster, there is an efficient means by which 
federal, state and local officials can identify and locate private 
sector communications assets that can be made rapidly available to 
first responders and relief organizations. PSHSB has been providing a 
supporting role to FEMA on this issue. For example, per FEMA's request, 
PSHSB recently set up a meeting between FEMA and communications 
industry representatives to discuss, among other things, contingency 
contracts for equipment and the identification of equipment that can be 
airlifted through the Department of Defense. PSHSB already supports the 
efforts of the NCC to develop an inventory of available communications 
assets, in 2006 the NCS began development of an inventory database of 
government and industry assets. This inventory database of available 
government and industry communications assets developed by NCC and 
available to ESF 2 addresses this recommendation. Regarding a 
Web site, a function already exists whereby industry can report their 
available assets directly to the NCC.
    57. We direct PSHSB to continue to work with DHS, NCS, NCC, FEMA, 
state governments, and industry on these issues. We also direct PSHSB 
to continue to work with NCC to address the Katrina Panel 
recommendation regarding the identification of private sector 
communications assets, including specifically identifying equipment 
available to assist persons with disabilities in their communications 
needs.
    58. Equipment Cache. Another Katrina Panel recommendation intended 
to facilitate the restoration of public safety communications includes 
that the Commission encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain 
and maintain, including through arrangements with the private sector, a 
cache of equipment components that would be needed to immediately 
restore existing public safety communications within hours of a 
disaster. The Katrina Panel stated that the cache should: (i) Include 
the necessary equipment to quickly restore communications capabilities 
on all relevant mutual aid channels; (ii) be maintained as a regional 
or state-wide resource, and located in areas protected from disaster 
impacts; and (iii) be included as an element of the NRP. Further, the 
Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission encourage state and local 
jurisdictions to utilize the cache through training exercises on a 
regular basis.
    59. In its comments, DHS stated that it has reservations about the 
recommendation concerning the stockpiling of equipment. DHS noted that 
already limited budgets do not provide funding to procure additional 
equipment and, in many cases, the redundant equipment for network 
restoration is often unavailable because the systems at issue are 
legacy systems that are obsolete and no longer supported by 
manufacturers. We agree. The Commission is reluctant to encourage state 
and local jurisdictions to maintain such a cache of equipment unless 
funding for such an effort has been specifically identified. Many local 
jurisdictions do not have the requisite funds for this effort. Although 
some states have such equipment under ``mutual aid agreements,'' most 
states do not have funds for equipment not in use; their funds are used 
for equipment intended for immediate use. Further, there are already a 
number of training exercises for responders. For example, there are 
regional annual training exercises held to demonstrate equipment in a 
disaster and to show options for restoration.
    60. Facilitating First Responder Communications Capabilities. To 
facilitate interoperability among first responder communications, the 
Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission: (i) Maintain the 
schedule for commencing commercial spectrum auctions by January 28, 
2008 to fully fund the $1 billion public safety interoperability 
program, consistent with recent legislation; (ii) work with NTIA and 
DHS to establish appropriate

[[Page 37663]]

criteria for the distribution of the $1 billion in a manner that best 
promotes interoperability with the 700 MHz band--among other things, 
such criteria should mandate that any radios purchased with grant 
monies must be capable of operating on 700 MHz and 800 MHz channels 
established for mutual aid and interoperability voice communications; 
(iii) encourage the expeditious development of regional plans for the 
use of 700 MHz systems and move promptly to review and approve such 
plans; (iv) expeditiously approve any requests by broadcasters to 
terminate analog service in the 700 MHz band before the end of the 
digital television transition in 2009 in order to allow public safety 
users immediate access to this spectrum; (v) work with the NTIA and DHS 
to develop strategies and policies to expedite allowing Federal 
(including the military), state and local agencies to share spectrum 
for emergency response purposes, particularly the Federal incident 
response channels and channels established for mutual aid and 
interoperability; and (vi) publicize interoperability successes and/or 
best practices by public safety entities to serve as models to further 
interoperability.
    61. Schedule for 700 MHz Spectrum Auction. We agree that the 
Commission should, consistent with recent legislation, maintain the 
schedule for commencing commercial spectrum auctions in the 700 MHz 
bands by January 28, 2008. Accordingly, the Commission should proceed 
with current plans for developing auction rules and procedures, 
including the conclusion of a pending rulemaking addressing the 
commercial 700 MHz spectrum. The Commission will commence auction of 
this spectrum in a manner consistent with the Digital Television 
Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005.
    62. Criteria for the Distribution of the $1 Billion Public Safety 
Interoperability Program. We direct PSHSB to offer to work with NTIA 
and DHS, as appropriate, to establish criteria for the distribution of 
the $1 billion interoperability fund in a manner that best promotes 
interoperability with the 700 MHz band. No commenter opposed the idea 
of the FCC offering to work with NTIA and DHS in this regard. Although 
the statute places responsibility for implementing this grant program 
upon NTIA and DHS, the Commission could provide helpful input. We 
believe, however, that such funds should not be limited to the 700 MHz 
and 800 MHz bands and that the PSHSB should encourage NTIA and DHS to 
explore ways to use IP technology to facilitate interoperability with 
VHF and UHF. An IP-based approach would allow legacy systems to evolve 
into a broadband communications system. Additionally, any action 
relating to the 700 MHz band should include consideration of DHS' 
concern that the Katrina Panel's recommendations are focused only on 
state and local communications with little standardization across 
regions and, therefore, fail to address the need to incorporate federal 
coordination with state and local first responders into the solution.
    63. Expeditious Development, Review and Approval of Regional Plans. 
We direct PSHSB to encourage, as part of their outreach efforts, the 
expeditious development of regional plans for use of 700 MHz systems 
and to promptly review and, where possible, approve such plans when 
submitted. This received strong support in the record. PSHSB should 
initiate outreach efforts to encourage states, tribal governments and 
localities to participate in the regional planning processes. PSHSB can 
work with regional planning committees in their efforts to develop 
regional plans and coordinate their plans with adjacent regions.
    64. Requests by Broadcasters to Terminate Analog Service in the 700 
MHz Band. Although we understand the importance of ensuring access to 
this spectrum by public safety agencies as quickly as possible, we must 
balance this goal with the need to protect consumers who could 
potentially lose service if they have not yet obtained digital 
televisions or converters. Accordingly, although we will endeavor to 
process requests from broadcasters to terminate analog service as 
quickly as possible, we will continue to review such requests pursuant 
to the policies previously adopted in Upper 700 MHz Memorandum Opinion 
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
    65. Sharing of Spectrum. We agree that implementation of the 
recommendation that the Commission work with NTIA and DHS to develop 
strategies and policies to expedite allowing Federal, state and local 
agencies to share spectrum for emergency response purposes would serve 
the public interest. We direct PSHSB, together with the Office of 
Engineering and Technology, to work with NTIA and DHS on this issue. 
There is record support for the Commission working with NTIA and DHS to 
allow Federal and non-Federal spectrum sharing for emergency response 
purposes, both in spectrum allocated for Federal and non-Federal uses. 
NTIA states in its comments that it and the Interdepartment Radio 
Advisory Committee (``IRAC'') already are considering a proposal to 
revise current rules to allow more flexible use by state and local 
governments, and to simplify the regulations governing the use of 
Federal interoperability channels. The Commission should assist in 
these ongoing efforts in the IRAC and its subcommittees and should 
consider other possible solutions for making spectrum available for 
shared use by federal, state, tribal and local agencies for emergency 
response purposes.
    66. Publicizing Interoperability Successes and Best Practices. We 
direct PSHSB to work with other federal agencies, the public safety 
community and the industry, as appropriate, to develop best practices 
to promote interoperability. In addition, PSHSB should encourage public 
safety organizations to provide interoperability success stories and 
make this information available on its Web site.
    67. Resiliency and Restoration of E-911 Infrastructure and PSAPs. 
In order to ensure a more robust 911 and E-911 service, the Katrina 
Panel recommended that the Commission encourage the implementation of 
the following three best practices issued by the Network Reliability 
and Interoperability Council (NRIC):
    (1) Service providers and network operators should consider placing 
and maintaining 911 circuits over diverse interoffice transport 
facilities (e.g., geographically diverse facility routes, automatically 
invoked standby routing, diverse digital cross-connect system services, 
self-healing fiber ring topologies, or any combination thereof).
    (2) Network operators, service providers, equipment suppliers and 
public safety authorities should establish alternative methods of 
communication for critical personnel.
    (3) Service providers, network operators and property managers 
should ensure availability of emergency/backup power (e.g., batteries, 
generators, fuel cells) to maintain critical communications services 
during times of commercial power failures, including natural and 
manmade occurrences (e.g., earthquakes, floods, fires, power brown/
blackouts, terrorism). The emergency/backup power generators should be 
located onsite, when appropriate.
    68. We agree that PSHSB should be proactive in encouraging 
implementation of the first two of these NRIC recommendations, for 
example, through additional outreach efforts which could include, inter 
alia, NRIC best practice outreach efforts, promoting industry 
guidelines on its Web site, and

[[Page 37664]]

working with FEMA to educate PSAP managers in disaster management, PSAP 
rerouting, and the National Incident Management System. This is 
consistent with the recommendations of both NRIC and the Katrina Panel 
that these best practices be encouraged, but not required. No 
commenters asserted that there is a need to make these best practices 
mandatory at this time. Additionally, there may be legitimate concerns 
that implementation of diverse 911 circuits would be cost-prohibitive 
in certain cases.
    69. NENA recommends that ``the FCC or the state commissions, as 
appropriate, require all telephone central offices to have an emergency 
back-up power source.'' St. Tammany's Parish Communications District 1 
emphasizes the need for wireline providers to have backup procedures in 
place. Several commenters supported this voluntary best practice and 
indicated that they have backup power available at their facilities. 
For example, AT&T agrees that it is important to have backup power to 
ensure the continued operation of the nation's 911 system during 
disasters and states that it looks forward to helping implement the 
Katrina Panel's recommendation that the Commission encourage the 
implementation of the NRIC backup power best practice. AT&T reported 
that all of its central offices are equipped with backup batteries and/
or diesel generators. Verizon also stated that every critical component 
in its networks is protected by automatic power back-up systems.
    70. We agree with NENA's and St. Tammany Parish's suggestion and 
find that adoption of this requirement serves the public interest. 
Accordingly, pursuant to our authority under Section 1 of the 
Communications Act, as amended, we will require all local exchange 
carriers (LECs), including incumbent LECs (ILECs) and competitive LECs 
(CLECs), as well as commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) providers to 
have an emergency back-up power source for all assets that are normally 
powered from local AC commercial power including those inside central 
offices, cell sites, remote switches and digital loop carrier system 
remote terminals. LECs and CMRS providers should maintain emergency 
back-up power for a minimum of 24 hours for assets inside central 
offices and eight hours for cell sites, remote switches and digital 
loop carrier system remote terminals that normally are powered from 
local AC commercial power.
    71. Our expectation is that this requirement will not create an 
undue burden since several reported in their comments that they already 
maintain emergency back-up power. We realize, however, that this 
requirement may present a financial burden to some small carriers. 
Accordingly, we will not impose this requirement on LECs (including 
both ILECs and CLECs) that meet the definition of a Class B company as 
set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of the Commission's rules. We will 
also not apply this requirement to non-nationwide CMRS providers with 
no more than 500,000 subscribers.
    72. The Commission finds that PSHSB should be proactive in 
encouraging implementation, by all other communications providers, of 
the third NRIC recommendation set forth above, which states that 
communications service providers, network operators and property 
managers should ensure the availability of emergency/backup power.
    73. The Katrina Panel also recommended that the Commission 
encourage the implementation of an NRIC best practice that states that 
network operators should consider deploying dual active 911 selective 
router architectures to enable circuits from the caller's serving end 
office to be split between two selective routers in order to eliminate 
single points of failure. This NRIC best practice further states that 
diversity should also be considered on interoffice transport facilities 
connecting each 911 selective router to the PSAP serving end office. 
Some commenters asserted that selective routers represent technology 
whose time has passed. NENA contends that deployment of a dual 
selective router at this point should be done only if particular 
circumstances strongly favor such an approach.
    74. PSHSB should neither encourage nor mandate implementation of 
this NRIC best practice. We agree with the many commenters who 
advocated that public safety communications planning, including the 911 
infrastructure, instead should move to incorporate IP-based 
technologies. This will enable the public safety community to focus on 
future needs rather than requiring more from legacy systems, offer more 
redundancy and flexibility, and contribute greatly to improving 
compatibility between public safety systems that operate using 
different proprietary standards.
    75. Grant Eligibility. We agree with the recommendation of the 
Katrina Panel that the FCC urge federal grant programs to permit state 
or local 911 commissions or emergency communications districts that 
provide 911 or public safety communications services to be eligible to 
apply for 911 enhancement and communications enhancement/
interoperability grants. This recommendation also received strong 
support from APCO and NENA. We, therefore, direct PSHSB to consult with 
DHS and administrators of other applicable federal grant programs to 
explore this possibility. We caution, however, that PSHSB refrain from 
advocating any particular funding approach for state, tribal or local 
911 commissions. Our goal is to support state, tribal and local 911 
commissions in their efforts to enhance the redundancy, 
interoperability, and resiliency of their operations.
    76. Secondary Back-Up PSAPS. The Katrina Panel also stated that the 
Commission should recommend the designation of a secondary back-up PSAP 
that is more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the primary and 
secondary PSAPs are disabled. Most commenters, including APCO and NENA, 
did not support this recommendation. APCO asserts that PSAPs 200 miles 
away would have difficulties with dispatch and that a better approach 
would be to have ``mirrored'' telephone central offices at remote 
locations. We decline to implement this Katrina Panel recommendation. 
Use of back-up PSAPs should be based on capabilities, common 
vulnerabilities and technical capabilities, not an arbitrary distance. 
Geographic remoteness is only one consideration; other considerations 
include the probability of disaster affecting both PSAPs, size of the 
PSAPs, the level of technology used at both PSAPs, radio 
interoperability, availability of operating support systems, and 
logistics for transporting and staffing PSAP personnel familiar with 
the geographic area covered by the disaster.
    77. Other Recommendations Regarding First Responder Communications. 
Various commenters submitted additional recommendations for addressing 
first responder communications issues. We will address those issues 
below.
    78. Relocation of Existing Licensees on Interoperability Channels. 
The Tennessee Statewide Interoperability Executive (the Tennessee SIEC) 
asserts that the Commission should move existing licensees on the VHF 
and UHF interoperability channels so that such channels are available 
for interoperability usage and do not have to compete with 
grandfathered dispatch operations or secondary telemetry, etc. The 
Tennessee SIEC also suggested that the Commission eliminate licensing 
of

[[Page 37665]]

the interoperability channels for any purpose other than 
interoperability.
    79. When the Commission designated the VHF and UHF interoperability 
channels, it sought to balance the need for improved interoperability 
capabilities below 512 MHz with the need to minimize the impact on 
incumbent licensees. The Commission therefore ``grandfathered'' 
incumbent licensees on a secondary basis only to interoperability 
communication rather than ordering them to vacate the channels or use 
them exclusively for interoperability purposes. With regard to new 
licenses, the rules provide that these frequencies will be available 
primarily for interoperability-only communications. We decline to amend 
our rules at this time to move existing licensees on the VHF and UHF 
interoperability channels. Instead, we find that a prudent approach 
would be first to consult with public safety coordinators. Accordingly, 
we direct PSHSB to consult the public safety frequency coordinator 
community through the Public Safety Communications Council to determine 
the extent of the problem, if any, and whether moving grandfathered 
licensees at this time would be feasible, and if so, how.
    80. Use of a Standard Continuous Tone Coded Squelch System. The 
Tennessee SEIC suggested that the Commission mandate the use of a 
standard Continuous Tone Coded Squelch System (``CTCSS'') to promote 
interoperability and minimize disruption at a disaster scene. We 
decline to initiate a rulemaking to implement Tennessee SEIC's 
suggestion at this time. The Commission has designated 5 VHF 
frequencies and 4 UHF channel pairs for interoperability use 
nationwide. Generally, VHF and UHF analog public safety radios include 
the CTCSS feature. Each radio ``listens'' for CTCSS tones transmitted 
by base stations, mobiles, or portables. If the tone is present, the 
user hears the communications directed to him/her, but other 
transmissions on the same frequency using a different CTCSS tone (or 
lacking a tone) are muted (squelched). Because these frequencies also 
have grandfathered, non-interoperable licensees, mandated use of a 
standard CTCSS on these channels would exclude (i.e., tune out) these 
incumbents. Use of different tone coded squelch frequencies on the 
interoperability channels could prohibit units from different 
jurisdictions from communicating at the scene of a disaster, which 
undermines the purpose of interoperability. Mandating a common CTCSS 
tone could impose unwarranted economic burdens by requiring the 
purchase of additional equipment or modification of existing equipment 
to employ such a tone. A mandated, common CTCSS also could adversely 
impact grandfathered licensees operating on the VHF and UHF 
interoperability channels.
    81. There is not enough information in the record to recommend a 
rulemaking at this point. However, it would be prudent to consult with 
the public safety frequency coordinators to ascertain the scope of the 
problem and determine whether Commission action is warranted. We 
therefore direct PSHSB to consult with public safety frequency 
coordinators and ask them to study this proposal and provide further 
input to the Commission.
    82. Statewide Channels. The Tennessee SIEC advocates that, in order 
to help states keep their statewide channels clear, the Commission 
should allow state agencies to provide FCC designated frequency 
coordinators with a list of FCC designated ``Statewide'' channels for 
protection within 35 to 50 miles of the state border depending upon 
terrain protection. We direct PSHSB to consult with public safety 
coordinators on the problem of keeping statewide channels clear.
    83. Licensees Adjacent to Interoperability Channels. The Tennessee 
SIEC also advocates that the Commission mandate that the wideband 
licensees adjacent to the VHF/UHF interoperability channels move to 
narrowband emission to minimize interference to interoperability 
channels. We note our rules already require that this be done. 
Accordingly, no further action is necessary at this time.
    84. Designation of 155.370 MHz as a Nationwide Inter-agency 
Channel. The Tennessee SIEC also advocates that the Commission 
designate 155.370 MHz as a nationwide inter-agency channel and 
implement a CTCSS tone to minimize interference. We refrain, at this 
time, from initiating a rulemaking to amend our rules to designate 
155.370 MHz as an inter-agency channel nationwide and implement a CTCSS 
tone to minimize interference. Designating this public safety frequency 
as an inter-agency channel nationwide may have a significant impact on 
existing incumbents on this frequency and adjacent channel incumbents. 
Overcoming interference concerns, particularly since VHF spectrum is 
traditionally congested, may prove challenging. The potential impact on 
existing licensees, including increased equipment costs, outweighs any 
benefits of designating a sixth VHF frequency for interoperability. We 
also note that the existing nationwide inter-agency channels were 
recommended by the four public safety coordinators and were adopted by 
the Commission partly because these were the ``least licensed.''
    85. Common Nomenclature. The Tennessee Statewide Interoperability 
Executive and others recommend that the Commission mandate a common 
nomenclature for the designated interoperability channels and require 
each state to have a functional Statewide Interoperability Executive 
Council. These issues were raised in the 7th NPRM in WT Docket No. 96-
86 and we will address them in that proceeding.
    86. Mutual Aid Channels. The Tennessee SIEC also stated that the 
Commission should encourage public safety frequency coordinators to 
keep designated Fire mutual aid channels (i.e. 154.265, 154.280, 
154.295 MHz) and their narrowband counterparts and the National Law 
Enforcement Channel (i.e. 155.475 MHz) for mutual aid only. We refrain 
from concluding that the Commission should encourage public safety 
frequency coordinators to keep designated mutual aid channels for aid 
only, until the Commission can engage the public safety frequency 
coordinator community further on this issue. These frequencies have 
special limitations that make them available for specified mutual aid 
purposes, but the Tennessee SIEC suggests that the public safety 
frequency coordinators currently approve the use of these frequencies 
for non-mutual aid purposes. In order to evaluate the merits of this 
proposal, the Commission should consult with the public safety 
frequency coordinator community through the Public Safety 
Communications Council. Accordingly, we direct PSHSB to engage in such 
consultation and provide a recommendation on this issue.
    87. 911 Analysis. NENA asserts that the Commission should require 
all 911 system service providers (SSPs) to analyze and provide detailed 
information on the redundancy, resiliency, and dependability of 911 
networks and to provide detailed information to the Commission on areas 
where these issues are treated in the network and areas where there are 
gaps. NENA states that all 9-1-1 SSPs should be required to submit a 
plan to the Commission outlining this information and steps they intend 
to take to ensure diversity and dependability in the network, including 
any plans they have to migrate their network to an IP-based platform 
that will enable the migration from the existing 911 system to next 
generation 911 architecture. NENA also

[[Page 37666]]

argues that these plans should be made available to leading public 
safety organizations.
    88. AT&T asserts that NENA's proposal is misdirected because it is 
the PSAP, not the service provider, that must determine the best way to 
mitigate single points of failure within its 911 network in a cost 
effective manner. Similarly, the United States Telecom Association (US 
Telecom) argues that ILECs do not own 911 networks, but merely provide 
inputs for them and should not, therefore, be required to report to the 
Commission regarding the dependability of these networks. U.S. Telecom 
argues that ILECs do not need to be burdened with additional reporting 
requirements and regulatory mandates, but rather need flexibility to 
create redundancies in their networks not mandates requiring them to do 
so where it is unnecessary. AT&T also asserts that the NENA fails to 
explain how the Commission could make use of such detailed information 
in any manner that does not duplicate how 911 service providers already 
interact with PSAPs and state regulatory authorities. AT&T and U.S. 
Telecom assert that requiring the unnecessary further dissemination of 
this information could have serious adverse consequences for service 
providers, for whom those proprietary data have substantial competitive 
value, and for the general public if that information is compromised 
and comes into possession of persons and groups with criminal 
intentions.
    89. We agree that the Commission should require the analysis of 911 
and E911 networks and the submission of reports regarding the status of 
these networks. Although NENA's proposal appears to be limited to 911 
SSPs, which are typically incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs), we 
believe that, with the exceptions described below, this requirement 
should apply all LECs, including ILECs and CLECs, CMRS providers 
required to comply with the wireless 911 rules and interconnected Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service providers. It is critical that 
Americans have access to a resilient and reliable 911 system 
irrespective of the technology used to provide the service. Therefore, 
we will require LECs, including both ILECs and CLECs, CMRS providers 
required to comply with the wireless 911 rules and interconnected VoIP 
service providers analyze and provide detailed reports on the 
redundancy, resiliency, and dependability of their 911 and E911 
networks and systems. Where relevant, the reports should include steps 
the service provider intends to take to ensure diversity and 
dependability in the network and/or system, including any plans they 
have to migrate their network to a next generation IP-based E911 
platform. This requirement will serve the public interest and further 
the Commission's statutory mandate to promote the safety of life and 
property through the use of wire and radio communication.
    90. We are mindful that this requirement may cause a financial 
burden to certain small carriers. Accordingly, we will not impose this 
reporting requirement on LECs, including ILECs and CLECs, that meet the 
definition of a Class B company set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of the 
Commission's rules. We will also not impose this reporting requirement 
on Tier III CMRS carriers. Interconnected VoIP service providers will 
be exempt from this requirement if their annual revenues fall below the 
revenue threshold established pursuant to Section 32.11 of the 
Commission's rules. NENA recommends that these reports be shared with 
``leading public safety organizations.'' Although we believe there is 
some benefit to sharing these reports with certain public safety 
organizations, we also understand that these reports will likely 
contain competitive and other information that should be accorded 
confidential treatment under our rules. To balance these concerns, we 
will share these reports with NENA, APCO, and The National Association 
of State 9-1-1 Administrators, the public safety organizations that 
previously have been provided copies of 911-related reports, but only 
pursuant to a protective order consistent with the model protective 
order previously adopted by the Commission. We delegate authority to 
PSHSB to issue such protective orders.
    91. AT&T and U.S. Telecom argue that this should not be the duty of 
SSPs which are typically ILECs, suggesting that PSAPs are better 
situated to perform such an analysis. PSAPs know whether they have 
alternative facilities into their buildings and whether they have 
backup/alternative PSAP sites. However, carriers, not PSAPs, know about 
the selective routers, the routing between selective routers and the 
central offices from which customers may call, and the diversity in the 
interoffice facilities between the selective router and the central 
office serving the PSAP. PSAPs should know whether they ordered 
facility diversity, but they do not have insight regarding how, or even 
if, this was provisioned. U.S. Telecom also argued that ILECs should 
not be subject to mandates requiring them to create redundancies in 
their networks; however, the rule we adopt requires only an analysis 
and report, it does not require carriers to create additional network 
redundancies.
    92. Accordingly, pursuant to our authority under Section 403 of the 
Communications Act, as amended, we will require LECs, CMRS providers 
required to comply with the wireless 911 rules and interconnected VoIP 
service providers, except those exempted above, to conduct an analysis 
of the resiliency and reliability of their 911 networks or systems and 
to submit a report to the Commission. We delegate to PSHSB the 
authority to implement and activate a process through which these 
reports will be submitted, including the authority to establish the 
specific data that will be required from each category of 
communications provider. We also direct PSHSB to make efforts to ensure 
that carriers subject to state regulations requiring the reporting of 
similar information are afforded the opportunity to meet this 
requirement by submitting the state report. The report will be due 120 
days from the date that the Commission or its staff announces 
activation of the 911 network and system reporting process.
    93. We also note that NRIC VII developed best practices that could 
address this issue. Accordingly, we direct PSHSB to continue to 
encourage industry to implement NRIC's best practices in this area, to 
continue to encourage industry to develop best practices in this area 
specific to their locale, and to continue to work to see that such 
recommendations, and any resulting adopted best practices, are made 
available on the Commission's Web site.
    94. Two-Way Paging Initiative. Commenters recommended that the 
Commission permit the use of 900 MHz B/ILT pool of spectrum for two-way 
paging systems either owned by public safety users or dedicated to the 
provision of emergency communications. We direct PSHSB, in coordination 
with WTB, to consider this issue and to determine what action, if any, 
should be implemented.
    95. McVey Petition for Rulemaking. In his comments, W. Lee McVey 
requests that the Commission initiate a rulemaking to create a new 
radio service in the 148-150 MHz band ``to facilitate interoperability 
between different first responders during and following a national 
emergency.'' We note that the 148-149.9 band is allocated on a primary 
basis for federal Fixed, Mobile and Mobile Satellite (Earth-to-Space) 
service and the 149-150.05 MHz segment is allocated on a co-primary 
basis for federal and non-federal Mobile

[[Page 37667]]

Satellite (Earth-to-space) and Radio navigation Satellite Services, and 
that the petition does not address this use nor does it explain what 
rules would be necessary to govern access to this spectrum. Given the 
potential impact of McVey's proposal to spectrum allocated for federal 
use, we direct PSHSB, together with OET, to seek feedback from NTIA on 
this petition. Upon receiving such feedback, we direct PSHSB and OET to 
make a determination on the appropriate action to be taken on this 
petition.

Emergency Communications to the Public

    96. Revitalize and Publicize the Emergency Alert System. The 
Katrina Panel suggests a number of recommendations to revitalize and 
publicize the existing Emergency Alert System (``EAS''). To facilitate 
and complement the use of the existing EAS, the Katrina Panel 
recommends that the Commission should: (a) Educate state and local 
officials about EAS, its benefits, and how it can be best utilized; (b) 
develop a program for educating the public about the EAS and promote 
community awareness of potential mechanisms for accessing those alerts 
sent during power outages or broadcast transmission failures; (c) move 
expeditiously to complete its proceeding to explore the technical and 
financial viability of expanding the EAS to other technologies, such as 
wireless services and the Internet, recognizing that changes to 
communications networks and equipment take time to implement; (d) 
consistent with proposed legislation, work with Congress and other 
appropriate federal departments and agencies to explore the technical 
and financial viability of establishing a comprehensive national 
warning system that complements existing systems and allows local 
officials to increase the penetration of warnings to the public as well 
as target, when necessary, alerts to a particular area; (e) work with 
the DHS and other appropriate federal agencies on pilot programs that 
would allow more immediate evaluation and testing of new notification 
technologies; and (f) work with the Department of Commerce to expand 
the distribution of certain critical non-weather emergency warnings 
over National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather 
radios to supplement the EAS.
    97. We agree that we should encourage state, tribal and local 
governments to use EAS as a mechanism to deliver emergency alerts. 
Accordingly, we direct PSHSB to engage in outreach efforts to educate 
state, tribal and local governments about the EAS. In addition, we 
direct PSHSB to take steps to educate the public about EAS. We also 
note that PSHSB has coordinated with DHS on EAS issues, including 
issues related to the development of a state-of-the-art public alert 
and warning system. We direct PSHSB to continue those efforts.
    98. Finally, on the issue of expanding the scope of EAS to include 
new technologies, as the Katrina Panel acknowledges, this issue is 
already the subject of our ongoing EAS rulemaking proceeding. In 
addition, pursuant to the recently enacted WARN Act, the Commission 
established an advisory committee--the Commercial Mobile Service Alert 
Advisory Committee--to develop and recommend technical standards and 
protocols by which commercial mobile service (CMS) providers may 
voluntarily transmit emergency alerts. The Committee has a diverse 
membership, including over forty representatives from the wireless and 
broadcast industries, public safety, equipment manufacturers, 
organizations representing people with disabilities and the elderly, 
FEMA and NOAA. Thus far, the Committee has held three full Committee 
meetings and a number of informal working group meetings. The 
Commission expects that the Committee will meet its statutory deadline 
of submitting recommendations to the Commission by October 12, 2007.
    99. Ensuring that People with Disabilities and Non-English Speaking 
Persons Receive Alerts. The Katrina Panel recommended that the 
Commission promptly find a mechanism to resolve technical and financial 
hurdles in the EAS system to ensure that non-English speaking people or 
people with disabilities have access to public warnings, if readily 
achievable. The Panel also recommended that the Commission work with 
trade associations and the disability community to create and publicize 
best practices for serving persons with disabilities and non-English-
speaking Americans and encourage state and local government agencies 
that provide emergency information to take steps to make this 
information accessible to persons with disabilities and non-English 
speaking Americans.
    100. We note that the issue of making EAS alerts accessible to 
people with disabilities and to those who do not speak English is 
already the subject of the EAS rulemaking proceeding. Moreover, the 
Commercial Mobile Service Alert Advisory Committee will consider these 
issues in the context of wireless carriers' participation in emergency 
alerts. On the broader issue of ensuring that emergency information 
reaches people with disabilities and non-English speaking Americans, we 
direct PSHSB, along with Consumer & Government Affairs Bureau (CGB) as 
appropriate, to work with the industry, state, tribal and local 
governments and organizations representing people with disability and 
non-English speaking persons on these issues.
    101. Ensuring Consistent and Reliable Emergency Information Through 
a Consolidated and Coordinated Public Information Program. The Katrina 
Panel recommended that public information functions should be 
coordinated and integrated across jurisdictions and across functional 
agencies, among federal state, local and tribal partners, and with 
private sector and non-governmental organizations. The Panel 
recommended that the Commission work with involved parties to 
facilitate the integration of media representatives into the 
development of disaster communications plans (Emergency Support 
Function 2). The Panel also urged the designation of a public 
information officer at each Emergency Operations Center to handle media 
and public inquiries, emergency public information and warning, and 
other functions. The Panel advocates the formation of a Joint 
Information Center (``JIC'') during large scale disasters. The JIC 
would collocate representatives from federal, regional, state, local 
and/or tribal EOCs responsible for primary incident coordination 
responsibilities. The JIC would provide a mechanism to integrate public 
information activities from various jurisdictions and organizations and 
would include media operations.
    102. We believe this issue is thoroughly addressed by the National 
Response Plan under Emergency Support Function 15--External 
Affairs and the Public Affairs Support Annex. ESF 15 ensures 
that sufficient federal assets are deployed to the field during a 
potential or actual Incident of National Significance to provide 
accurate, coordinated, and timely information to government, media, the 
private section and the local populace. This provides the resource 
support and mechanisms to implement the NRP Incident Communications 
Emergency Policy and Procedures described in the NRP Public Affairs 
Support Annex. The NRP Public Support Annex describes the interagency 
policies and procedures used to rapidly mobilize federal assets to 
prepare and deliver coordinated and sustained messages to the public in 
response to Incidents of National

[[Page 37668]]

significance and other major domestic emergencies. In addition, the NRP 
Public Affairs Support Annex specifically addresses the formation of 
JICs.
    103. The Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission should work 
with federal, state, and local agencies to ensure consistent and 
reliable emergency information through a consolidated and coordinated 
public information program. We note that state, tribal and local 
officials play a key role in forming messages as they are sent to the 
public. Nonetheless, we direct PSHSB to continue to work with DHS and 
state, tribal and local governments on the consolidation and 
coordination of public information as part of its supporting role under 
the NRP's ESF 15 and the Public Affairs Annex.

Other Recommendations

    104. Amateur Initiatives. Several amateur radio operators 
recommended changes to part 97 of the Commission's rules which govern 
amateur radio. Many of the changes have already been implemented and 
thus require no further action. For example, the Commission recently 
eliminated Morse Code proficiency as a license qualification 
requirement, an action supported by several commenters in this 
proceeding. The Commission also previously decided to phase out RACES 
station licenses, making proposed changes to rules relevant to these 
licenses moot. Finally, the Commission previously clarified that part 
97 does not prohibit amateur radio operators who are emergency 
personnel engaged in disaster relief from using their amateur radio 
bands while in a paid duty status. We also note that several 
recommendations made by amateur radio operators remain pending before 
the Commission and, accordingly, we take no action on those in this 
proceeding. We do note that the amateur radio community played an 
important role in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and other 
disasters. Accordingly, we order PSHSB to include the amateur radio 
community in its outreach efforts.
    105. Low Power Broadcast Service Initiatives. Prometheus Radio 
Project and Amherst Alliance submitted a number of recommendations 
regarding the Low Power FM service as well as other low power broadcast 
services. Specifically, these commenters recommended that the 
Commission: (i) Remind Congress that it has previously recommended that 
the statutory restrictions on adjacent channel spacing of Low Power FM 
stations should be repealed; (ii) open a filing window for 10 watt LPFM 
license applications; (iii) establish 250 watt LPFM stations; and (iv) 
establish Low Power AM stations; and (v) resolve the LPFM rulemaking 
proceeding. We will refer these issues to the Media Bureau for handling 
as appropriate.
    106. Modification of ``Substantial Service'' Policies for NPCS 
Channels. The American Association of Paging Carriers (AAPC) asserts 
that the Commission should ``modify its `substantial service' policies 
governing part 24 NPCS channels so that licensees leasing, 
disaggregating or partitioning NPCS spectrum for use by two-way paging 
systems for emergency communications, including leasing, disaggregating 
or partitioning spectrum for `back haul' channels that can be paired 
with traditional 929/931 MHz paging channels, also will be deemed to be 
providing `substantial service' on the spectrum retained by the NPCS 
licensee.'' Because this issue relates to general construction policy, 
we will refer this issue to the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau for 
appropriate handling.
    107. Designation of 700 MHz Spectrum for Critical Infrastructure. 
Some commenters recommend that the Commission designate a portion of 
the 700 MHz band for use by critical infrastructure industry use. We 
will address this issue in the context of our 700 MHz proceedings.
    108. CALEA Exemption for Temporary Ad Hoc Networks. Champaign 
Urbana Wireless Network et al. asks that the Commission clarify that 
volunteers who build ad hoc networks in response to an emergency need 
not comply with CALEA. They state that, in response to Hurricane 
Katrina, volunteers created numerous wireless networks to provide 
needed Internet connectivity for Red Cross shelters and others in areas 
where Katrina destroyed or substantially degraded existing 
infrastructure. On completing construction of these ad hoc networks, 
the volunteers turned these networks over to local operators and move 
on to help others.
    109. Champaign Urbana et al states that many of these ad hoc 
networks remained in operation for months and may still remain in 
operation today. They state that volunteers who generally did not 
maintain contact or provide any services for these networks once they 
turn them over to local operators. They state that these volunteers are 
not telecommunications carriers to whom CALEA generally applies and 
that these volunteers do not provide these services for hire. In 
addition, they state that these volunteers do not fall under the 
``substantial replacement provision'' of the Act.
    110. They request that the Commission establish a blanket waiver 
for ad hoc wireless networks created in response to a state of 
emergency; and that any liability that might arise for failure to 
comply with CALEA if the networks remain in operation after the 
emergency would not lie with those who created the network so long as 
they turned control over the network to others. To the extent the 
Commission determines that these volunteers are subject to CALEA, 
Champaign Urbana et al requests that the Commission provide a general 
waiver pursuant to its authority to exempt any ``class or category of 
telecommunications carrier.''
    111. We do not have sufficient information in the record to justify 
grant of a blanket waiver as Champaign Urbana suggests. First it is not 
clear whether Champaign Urbana's request is for a blanket waiver of ad 
hoc temporary networks in all cases of emergencies, including those 
involving terrorist attacks. If so, such a waiver could actually impede 
law enforcement and thus hinder the purposes of CALEA. Moreover, we 
note that CALEA exemptions may only be granted after formal 
consultation with the U.S. Attorney General and that the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (which formally has been designated by the Attorney 
General to handle CALEA obligations) has previously opposed granting 
blanket CALEA exemptions. For these reasons, we decline to issue a 
blanket waiver for these types of networks. Rather, we think the 
appropriate approach would be to review requests for exemptions of 
these types of networks (and the volunteers who construct them) on a 
case-by-case basis.
    112. Closed Captioning and Telecommunications Relay Service Issues. 
Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing (TDI) recommends 
that: (i) Broadcasters establish contracts or cooperative agreements 
among captioning providers to ensure that broadcasts can be captioned 
in the event of emergencies regardless of the emergency's location; 
(ii) captioning services personnel should be designated as essential 
personnel; (iii) the Commission require all Telecommunications Relay 
Service (``TRS'') providers to have back-up power ready to operate for 
a minimum of 72 hours; (iv) the Commission should require that all TRS 
providers have contingency plans for transfer of calls from TRS centers 
that may be unable to operate due to catastrophic damage or 
overwhelming volume of calls from

[[Page 37669]]

other centers; and (v) all TRS personnel should be deemed essential 
personnel during emergencies.
    113. We direct CGB to consider these issues in an appropriate 
proceeding. In this regard, we note that, on December 29, 2006, the 
Commission released a Public Notice that provides steps that video 
programming distributors may take to obtain closed captioning services 
quickly in the event of an emergency. With respect to TDI items (2) and 
(5), we note that the FCC has no jurisdiction over who is declared an 
``essential service provider,'' nonetheless we will direct PSHSB to 
work with DHS on this issue.
    114. The American Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD) 
suggests that the Commission consider encouraging IP Relay and Video 
Relay Service (VRS) providers to develop solutions for handling 
emergency calls through TRS. This issue was raised in the November 30, 
2005 VRS 9-1-1 NPRM, has been the subject of an E9-1-1 Disability 
Access Summit held at the Commission on November 15, 2006, and is 
pending before the Commission. CGB's Disability Rights Office and PSHSB 
will continue to work with the disability community and Internet-based 
TRS providers on these issues.

I. Procedural Matters

A. Final Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis

    115. This document contains new information collection 
requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to 
reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public, the Office of 
Management and Budget and other Federal agencies to comment on the 
information collection requirements contained in this Order, as 
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. 
Public and agency comments are due September 10, 2007. In addition, 
pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 
107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we previously sought specific 
comment on how the Commission might ``further reduce the information 
collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 
employees.'' In this present document, we have assessed the effects of 
requiring the analysis of 911 and E911 networks and the submission of a 
report on the resiliency and reliability of those networks, by LECs, 
CMRS providers required to comply with the wireless 911 rules, and 
interconnected VoIP service providers. We have specifically exempt LECs 
that meet the definition of a Class B company set forth in Section 
32.11(b)(2) of our rules, Tier III CMRS carriers, and interconnected 
VoIP service providers with annual revenues below the revenue threshold 
established pursuant to Section 32.11 of our rules from these 
requirements. We find that this imposes minimal regulation on small 
entities to the extent consistent with our goal of advancing our public 
safety mission.

B. Report to Congress

    116. The Commission will send a copy of this Order in a report to 
be sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant 
to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

II. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    117. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended (RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was 
incorporated in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in EB Docket No. 06-
119. The Commission sought written public comment on the proposals in 
this docket, including comment on the IRFA. This Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the RFA.

Need for, and Objectives of, the Rules

    118. In the Order, we adopt a rule that requires local exchange 
carriers (LECs), other than those that meet the definition of a Class B 
company as set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of the Commission's rules, 
and commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) providers, other than non-
nationwide CMRS providers with no more than 500,000 subscribers, to 
have an emergency backup power source for all assets that are normally 
powered from local AC commercial power, including those inside central 
offices, cell sites, remote switches and digital loop carrier system 
remote terminals. We also adopt a rule that requires the analysis of 
911 and E911 networks and systems and detailed reporting to the 
Commission of the redundancy, resiliency and reliability of those 
networks and systems by: (1) LECs, including incumbent LECs (ILECs) and 
competitive LECs (CLECs); (2) commercial wirelesss service providers 
required to comply with the wireless 911 rules set forth in Section 
20.18 of the Commission's rules; and (3) interconnected Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) service providers. LECs that meet the 
definition of a Class B company set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of the 
Commission's rules, non-nationwide commercial mobile radio service 
providers with no more than 500,000 subscribers at the end of 2001, and 
interconnected VoIP service providers with annual revenues below the 
revenue threshold established pursuant to Section 32.11 of the 
Commission's rules are exempt from this rule.
    119. These rules, which are part of a broader initiative taken with 
this Order to implement several of the recommendations made by the 
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Networks (Katrina Panel), will promote communications 
readiness and preparedness for future natural disasters and other 
emergencies. The measures taken today will also facilitate more 
effective and efficient recovery efforts in the wake of such events. 
These actions will advance efforts to save lives and protect property 
in the event of a natural disaster or other emergency.

Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response to 
the IRFA

    120. No comments specifically addressed the IRFA.

Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the 
Rules Will Apply

    121. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, 
where feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may 
be affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the 
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small 
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental 
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same 
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business 
Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) Is independently 
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and 
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business 
Administration (SBA).
    122. Nationwide, there are a total of approximately 22.4 million 
small businesses, according to SBA data. A ``small organization'' is 
generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is independently owned 
and operated and is not dominant in its field.'' Nationwide, as of 
2002, there were approximately 1.6 million small organizations. The 
term ``small governmental jurisdiction'' is defined generally as 
``governments of cities, towns, townships, villages, school districts, 
or special districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.'' 
Census Bureau data for 2002 indicate that there were 87,525 local 
governmental jurisdictions in the

[[Page 37670]]

United States. We estimate that, of this total, 84,377 entities were 
``small governmental jurisdictions.'' Thus, we estimate that most 
governmental jurisdictions are small.
    123. In the following paragraphs, the Commission further describes 
and estimates the number of small entity licensees that may be affected 
by the rules the Commission adopts in this Order. The rule changes 
affect LECs, including both incumbent LECs (ILECS) and competitive LECs 
(CLECs), CMRS providers, and interconnected VoIP service providers.
    124. Since the Order applies to multiple services, this FRFA 
analyzes the number of small entities affected on a service-by-service 
basis. In the case of CMRS providers, when identifying small entities 
that could be affected by the Commission's new rules, this FRFA 
provides information that describes auctions results, including the 
number of small entities that were winning bidders. However, the number 
of winning bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an 
auction does not necessarily reflect the total number of small entities 
currently in a particular service. The Commission does not generally 
require that licensees later provide business size information, except 
in the context of an assignment or a transfer of control application 
that involves unjust enrichment issues.
    125. Cellular Licensees. The SBA has developed a small business 
size standard for small businesses in the category ``Cellular and Other 
Wireless Telecommunications.'' Under that SBA category, a business is 
small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. For the census category of 
``Cellular and Other Wireless Telecommunications,'' Census Bureau data 
for 2002 show that there were 1,397 firms in this category that 
operated for the entire year. Of this total, 1,378 firms had employment 
of 999 or fewer employees, and 19 firms had employment of 1,000 
employees or more. Thus, under this category and size standard, the 
majority of firms can be considered small.
    126. Broadband Personal Communications Service. The broadband 
Personal Communications Service (PCS) spectrum is divided into six 
frequency blocks designated A through F, and the Commission has held 
auctions for each block. The Commission has created a small business 
size standard for Blocks C and F as an entity that has average gross 
revenues of less than $40 million in the three previous calendar years. 
For Block F, an additional small business size standard for ``very 
small business'' was added and is defined as an entity that, together 
with its affiliates, has average gross revenues of not more than $15 
million for the preceding three calendar years. These small business 
size standards, in the context of broadband PCS auctions, have been 
approved by the SBA. No small businesses within the SBA-approved small 
business size standards bid successfully for licenses in Blocks A and 
B. There were 90 winning bidders that qualified as small entities in 
the C Block auctions. A total of 93 ``small'' and ``very small'' 
business bidders won approximately 40 percent of the 1,479 licenses for 
Blocks D, E, and F. On March 23, 1999, the Commission reauctioned 155 
C, D, E, and F Block licenses; there were 113 small business winning 
bidders. On January 26, 2001, the Commission completed the auction of 
422 C and F PCS licenses in Auction 35. Of the 35 winning bidders in 
this auction, 29 qualified as ``small'' or ``very small'' businesses. 
Subsequent events concerning Auction 35, including judicial and agency 
determinations, resulted in a total of 163 C and F Block licenses being 
available for grant.
    127. Specialized Mobile Radio. The Commission awards ``small 
entity'' bidding credits in auctions for Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) 
geographic area licenses in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands to firms that 
had revenues of no more than $15 million in each of the three previous 
calendar years. The Commission awards ``very small entity'' bidding 
credits to firms that had revenues of no more than $3 million in each 
of the three previous calendar years. The SBA has approved these small 
business size standards for the 900 MHz Service. The Commission has 
held auctions for geographic area licenses in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz 
bands. The 900 MHz SMR auction began on December 5, 1995, and closed on 
April 15, 1996. Sixty bidders claiming that they qualified as small 
businesses under the $15 million size standard won 263 geographic area 
licenses in the 900 MHz SMR band. The 800 MHz SMR auction for the upper 
200 channels began on October 28, 1997, and was completed on December 
8, 1997. Ten bidders claiming that they qualified as small businesses 
under the $15 million size standard won 38 geographic area licenses for 
the upper 200 channels in the 800 MHz SMR band. A second auction for 
the 800 MHz band was held on January 10, 2002 and closed on January 17, 
2002 and included 23 BEA licenses. One bidder claiming small business 
status won five licenses.
    128. The auction of the 1,050 800 MHz SMR geographic area licenses 
for the General Category channels began on August 16, 2000, and was 
completed on September 1, 2000. Eleven bidders won 108 geographic area 
licenses for the General Category channels in the 800 MHz SMR band 
qualified as small businesses under the $15 million size standard. In 
an auction completed on December 5, 2000, a total of 2,800 Economic 
Area licenses in the lower 80 channels of the 800 MHz SMR service were 
sold. Of the 22 winning bidders, 19 claimed ``small business'' status 
and won 129 licenses. Thus, combining all three auctions, 40 winning 
bidders for geographic licenses in the 800 MHz SMR band claimed status 
as small business.
    129. In addition, there are numerous incumbent site-by-site SMR 
licensees and licensees with extended implementation authorizations in 
the 800 and 900 MHz bands. The Commission does not know how many firms 
provide 800 MHz or 900 MHz geographic area SMR pursuant to extended 
implementation authorizations, nor how many of these providers have 
annual revenues of no more than $3 million or $15 million (the special 
small business size standards), or have no more than 1,500 employees 
(the generic SBA standard for wireless entities, discussed, supra). One 
firm has over $15 million in revenues. The Commission assumes, for 
purposes of this analysis, that all of the remaining existing extended 
implementation authorizations are held by small entities.
    130. Advanced Wireless Services. In the AWS-1 Report and Order, the 
Commission adopted rules that affect applicants who wish to provide 
service in the 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz bands. The AWS-1 Report 
and Order defines a ``small business'' as an entity with average annual 
gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $40 million, 
and a ``very small business'' as an entity with average annual gross 
revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $15 million. The 
AWS-1 Report and Order also provides small businesses with a bidding 
credit of 15 percent and very small businesses with a bidding credit of 
25 percent.
    131. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). As noted 
above, a ``small business'' under the RFA is one that, inter alia, 
meets the pertinent small business size standard (e.g., a telephone 
communications business having 1,500 or fewer employees), and ``is not 
dominant in its field of operation.'' The SBA's Office of Advocacy 
contends that, for RFA purposes, small incumbent LECs are not dominant 
in their field of operation because any such dominance is not

[[Page 37671]]

``national'' in scope. We have therefore included small incumbent local 
exchange carriers in this RFA analysis, although we emphasize that this 
RFA action has no effect on Commission analyses and determinations in 
other, non-RFA contexts. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has 
developed a small business size standard specifically for incumbent 
local exchange services. The appropriate size standard under SBA rules 
is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size 
standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. 
According to Commission data, 1,303 carriers have reported that they 
are engaged in the provision of incumbent local exchange services. Of 
these 1,303 carriers, an estimated 1,020 have 1,500 or fewer employees 
and 283 have more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, the Commission 
estimates that most providers of incumbent local exchange service are 
small businesses that may be affected by our proposed rules.
    132. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive LECs), 
Competitive Access Providers (CAPs), ``Shared-Tenant Service 
Providers,'' and ``Other Local Service Providers.'' Neither the 
Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard 
specifically for these service providers. The appropriate size standard 
under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. 
Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or 
fewer employees. According to Commission data, 769 carriers have 
reported that they are engaged in the provision of either competitive 
access provider services or competitive local exchange carrier 
services. Of these 769 carriers, an estimated 676 have 1,500 or fewer 
employees and 93 have more than 1,500 employees. In addition, 12 
carriers have reported that they are ``Shared-Tenant Service 
Providers,'' and all 12 are estimated to have 1,500 or fewer employees. 
In addition, 39 carriers have reported that they are ``Other Local 
Service Providers.'' Of the 39, an estimated 38 have 1,500 or fewer 
employees and one has more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, the 
Commission estimates that most providers of competitive local exchange 
service, competitive access providers, ``Shared-Tenant Service 
Providers,'' and ``Other Local Service Providers'' are small entities 
that may be affected by our proposed rules.
    133. Cable and Other Program Distribution. The Census Bureau 
defines this category as follows: ``This industry comprises 
establishments primarily engaged as third-party distribution systems 
for broadcast programming. The establishments of this industry deliver 
visual, aural, or textual programming received from cable networks, 
local television stations, or radio networks to consumers via cable or 
direct-to-home satellite systems on a subscription or fee basis. These 
establishments do not generally originate programming material.'' The 
SBA has developed a small business size standard for Cable and Other 
Program Distribution, which is: all such firms having $13.5 million or 
less in annual receipts. According to Census Bureau data for 2002, 
there were a total of 1,191 firms in this category that operated for 
the entire year. Of this total, 1,087 firms had annual receipts of 
under $10 million, and 43 firms had receipts of $10 million or more but 
less than $25 million. Thus, under this size standard, the majority of 
firms can be considered small.
    134. Cable Companies and Systems. The Commission has also developed 
its own small business size standards, for the purpose of cable rate 
regulation. Under the Commission's rules, a ``small cable company'' is 
one serving 400,000 or fewer subscribers, nationwide. Industry data 
indicate that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but eleven are 
small under this size standard. In addition, under the Commission's 
rules, a ``small system'' is a cable system serving 15,000 or fewer 
subscribers. Industry data indicate that, of 7,208 systems nationwide, 
6,139 systems have under 10,000 subscribers, and an additional 379 
systems have 10,000-19,999 subscribers. Thus, under this second size 
standard, most cable systems are small.
    135. Cable System Operators. The Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, also contains a size standard for small cable system 
operators, which is ``a cable operator that, directly or through an 
affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than 1 percent of all 
subscribers in the United States and is not affiliated with any entity 
or entities whose gross annual revenues in the aggregate exceed 
$250,000,000.'' The Commission has determined that an operator serving 
fewer than 677,000 subscribers shall be deemed a small operator, if its 
annual revenues, when combined with the total annual revenues of all 
its affiliates, do not exceed $250 million in the aggregate. Industry 
data indicate that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but ten 
are small under this size standard. We note that the Commission neither 
requests nor collects information on whether cable system operators are 
affiliated with entities whose gross annual revenues exceed $250 
million, and therefore we are unable to estimate more accurately the 
number of cable system operators that would qualify as small under this 
size standard.
    136. Internet Service Providers. The SBA has developed a small 
business size standard for Internet Service Providers (ISPs). ISPs 
``provide clients access to the Internet and generally provide related 
services such as web hosting, web page designing, and hardware or 
software consulting related to Internet connectivity.'' Under the SBA 
size standard, such a business is small if it has average annual 
receipts of $23 million or less. According to Census Bureau data for 
2002, there were 2,529 firms in this category that operated for the 
entire year. Of these, 2,437 firms had annual receipts of under $10 
million, and an additional 47 firms had receipts of between $10 million 
and $24,999,999. Consequently, we estimate that the majority of these 
firms are small entities that may be affected by our action.
    137. Web Search Portals. Our action pertains to interconnected VoIP 
services, which could be provided by entities that provide other 
services such as e-mail, online gaming, web browsing, video 
conferencing, instant messaging, and other, similar IP-enabled 
services. The Commission has not adopted a size standard for entities 
that create or provide these types of services or applications. 
However, the Census Bureau has identified firms that ``operate web 
sites that use a search engine to generate and maintain extensive 
databases of Internet addresses and content in an easily searchable 
format. Web search portals often provide additional Internet services, 
such as e-mail, connections to other web sites, auctions, news, and 
other limited content, and serve as a home base for Internet users.'' 
The SBA has developed a small business size standard for this category; 
that size standard is $6.5 million or less in average annual receipts. 
According to Census Bureau data for 2002, there were 342 firms in this 
category that operated for the entire year. Of these, 303 had annual 
receipts of under $5 million, and an additional 15 firms had receipts 
of between $5 million and $9,999,999. Consequently, we estimate that 
the majority of these firms are small entities that may be affected by 
our action.

Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements for Small Entities

    138. 911 System Information Collection. The rules adopted in this 
Order require certain specified

[[Page 37672]]

communications providers to analyze their 911 and E911 networks and 
systems and provide one-time detailed reports to the Commission 
regarding the redundancy, resiliency and reliability of those networks 
and systems. The communications providers subject to this rule are: (1) 
LECs, including ILECs and CLECs; (2) commercial wirelesss service 
providers required to comply with the wireless 911 rules set forth in 
Section 20.18 of the Commission's rules; and (3) interconnected Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service providers. The Commission has 
delegated to the Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, the 
authority to implement and activate a process through which these 
reports will be submitted, including the authority to establish the 
specific data that will be required.
    139. The reports required by this Order will be filed one time only 
and are due 120 days from the date that the Commission or its staff 
announces activation of the 911 network and system reporting process. 
Since most companies can be expected to have knowledge of their network 
and/or system architecture, we estimate that for the great majority of 
entities the total time required to complete a filing with the 
Commission will be approximately eight to 24 hours, depending on the 
size and type of entity. In making our time estimate, we have taken 
into account that this report must be filed only once and that the 
report will likely be made electronically, through a ``fill in the 
blank'' template, thereby minimizing the burden on all reporting 
entities. Finally, in order to avoid imposing financial burden on small 
carriers, the Commission exempt the following from this rule: (1) LECs 
that meet the definition of a Class B company set forth in Section 
32.11(b)(2) of the Commission's rules; (2) non-nationwide commercial 
mobile radio service providers with no more than 500,000 subscribers at 
the end of 2001; and (3) interconnected VoIP service providers with 
annual revenues below the revenue threshold established pursuant to 
Section 32.11 of the Commission's rules.
    140. Back-Up Power Supply. The Order also adopts a rule that 
requires LECs and CMRS providers to have an emergency back-up power 
source for all assets that are normally powered from local AC 
commercial power, including those inside central offices, cell sites, 
remote switches and digital loop carrier system remote terminals. The 
rule adopted provides that LECs and CMRS providers should maintain 
emergency back-up power for a minimum of 24 hours for assets inside 
central offices and eight hours for cell sites, remote switches and 
digital loop carrier system remote terminals that normally are powered 
from local AC commercial power. Our expectation is that this 
requirement will not create an undue burden since several 
communications providers reported in their comments that they already 
maintain emergency back-up power. Additionally, LECs that meet the 
definition of a Class B company as set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of 
the Commission's rules and non-nationwide CMRS providers with no more 
than 500,000 subscribers are exempt from this rule.

Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    141. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant 
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach, 
which may include (among others) the following four alternatives: (1) 
The establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; 
(3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an 
exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small 
entities.
    142. 911 System Information Collection. In order to minimize any 
adverse impact of the 911 system information collection on small 
entities, we have exempted LECs (both ILECs and CLECs) that meet the 
definition of a Class B company that is set forth in Section 
32.11(b)(2) of the Commission's rules. We will also not impose this 
reporting requirement on Tier III CMRS carriers. Finally, 
interconnected VoIP service providers will be exempt from this 
requirement if their annual revenues fall below the revenue threshold 
established pursuant to Section 32.11 of the Commission's rules.
    143. Back-Up Power Supply. We recognize that the provision of a 
backup power supply as directed by the rule adopted in this Order may 
be a significant financial hardship for certain small businesses. 
Accordingly, we will not impose this requirement on LECs (both ILECs 
and CLECs) that meet the definition of a Class B company as set forth 
in Section 32.11(b)(2) of the Commission's rules. We will also not 
apply this requirement to non-nationwide CMRS providers with no more 
than 500,000 subscribers.
    144. Report to Congress: The Commission will send a copy of the 
Order, including this FRFA, in a report to be sent to Congress pursuant 
to the Congressional Review Act. In addition, the Commission will send 
a copy of the Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the SBA. A copy of this present summarized Order and FRFA 
is also hereby published in the Federal Register.

III. Ordering Clauses

    145. Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i)-(k), 
4(o), 5(c), 201, 214(a), 218, 219, 271, 272, 301, 303(g), 303(j), 
303(r), 332, 403, 621(b)(3), and 621(d) of the Communications Act of 
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)-(k), 154(o), 155(c), 201, 
214(a), 218, 219, 271, 272, 301, 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 
541(b)(3), and 541(d), that the Order in EB Docket No. 06-119 and WC 
Docket No. 06-63 is adopted and that the Commission's Rules are amended 
as set forth in the rule changes. The rules adopted in this Order shall 
become effective August 10, 2007, except that the new information 
collection requirement will not become effective prior to OMB approval. 
The reports on the redundancy, resiliency and reliability of 911 and 
E911 networks are due 120 days from the date that the Commission or its 
staff announces activation of the OMB-approved reporting process.
    146. It is further ordered that the Commission's Public Safety and 
Homeland Security Bureau, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau and 
Office of Engineering and Technology take action as directed in this 
Order. The Commission's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau 
shall report to the Commission on its efforts three months from the 
date of release of this Order and nine months from the date of release 
of this Order.
    147. It is further ordered that the Special Temporary Authority and 
waiver of Section 272 of the Act and its implementing rules to allow 
AT&T, Verizon and Qwest to share non-public, Bell Operating Company 
(BOC) network information with their Section 272 and other affiliates, 
as necessary to engage in integrated disaster recovery planning, is 
extended to a one year period ending April 20, 2008 for AT&T and to 
June 9, 2008 for Verizon and Qwest, effective on the date of release of 
this Order.


[[Page 37673]]


Federal Communications Commission.
William F. Caton,
Deputy Secretary.

Final Rules

0
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications 
Commission amends 47 CFR chapter I by adding part 12 to read as 
follows:

PART 12--REDUNDANCY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

Sec.
12.1 Purpose.
12.2 Backup power.
12.3 911 and E911 analyses and reports.

    Authority: Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 5(c), 218, 219, 301, 
303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 621(b)(3), and 621(d) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 
154(j), 154(o), 155(c), 218, 219, 301, 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 
403, 621(b)(3), and 621(d), unless otherwise noted.


Sec.  12.1  Purpose.

    The rules in this part include requirements that will help ensure 
the resiliency, redundancy and reliability of communications systems, 
particularly 911 and E911 networks and/or systems.


Sec.  12.2  Backup power.

    Local exchange carriers (LECs), including incumbent LECS (ILECs) 
and competitive LECs (CLECs), and commercial mobile radio service 
(CMRS) providers must have an emergency backup power source for all 
assets that are normally powered from local AC commercial power, 
including those inside central offices, cell sites, remote switches and 
digital loop carrier system remote terminals. LECs and CMRS providers 
should maintain emergency back-up power for a minimum of 24 hours for 
assets inside central offices and eight hours for cell sites, remote 
switches and digital loop carrier system remote terminals that are 
normally powered from local AC commercial power. LECs that meet the 
definition of a Class B company as set forth in Sec.  32.11(b)(2) of 
the Commission's rules and non-nationwide CMRS providers with no more 
than 500,000 subscribers are exempt from this rule.


Sec.  12.3  911 and E911 analyses and reports.

    The following entities must analyze their 911 and E911 networks 
and/or systems and provide a detailed report to the Commission on the 
redundancy, resiliency, and reliability of those networks and/or 
systems: Local exchange carriers (LECs), including incumbent LECs 
(ILECS) and competitive LECs (CLECs); commercial mobile radio service 
providers required to comply with the wireless 911 rules set forth in 
Sec.  20.18 of this chapter; and interconnected Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) service providers. LECs that meet the definition of a 
Class B company set forth in Sec.  32.11(b)(2) of this chapter, non-
nationwide commercial mobile radio service providers with no more than 
500,000 subscribers at the end of 2001, and interconnected VoIP service 
providers with annual revenues below the revenue threshold established 
pursuant to Sec.  32.11 of this chapter are exempt from this rule.
    (a) The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) has the 
delegated authority to implement and activate a process through which 
these reports will be submitted, including the authority to establish 
the specific data that will be required. Where relevant, these reports 
should include descriptions of the steps the service providers intend 
to take to ensure diversity and dependability in their 911 and E911 
networks and/or systems, including any plans they have to migrate those 
networks and/or systems to a next generation Internet Protocol-based 
E911 platform.
    (b) These reports are due 120 days from the date that the 
Commission or its staff announces activation of the 911 network and 
system reporting process.
    (c) Reports filed under this Part will be presumed to be 
confidential. These reports will be shared with The National Emergency 
Number Association, The Association of Public Safety Communications 
Officials, and The National Association of State 9-1-1 Administrators 
only pursuant to a protective order. PSHSB has the delegated authority 
to issue such protective orders. All other access to these reports must 
be sought pursuant to procedures set forth in 47 CFR 0.461. Notice of 
any requests for inspection of these reports will be provided to the 
filers of the reports pursuant to 47 CFR 0.461(d)(3).
[FR Doc. E7-13488 Filed 7-10-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P