[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 106 (Monday, June 4, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30864-30870]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-10691]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[EA 07-019]


In the Matter of All Licensees Authorized To Manufacture or 
Initially Transfer Items Containing Radioactive Material for Sale or 
Distribution and Possess High-Risk Radioactive Material of Concern; 
Order Imposing Additional Security Measures (Effective Immediately)

I

    The Licensees identified in Attachment 1 \1\ to this Order hold 
licenses issued in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) or an Agreement 
State authorizing them to manufacture or initially transfer items 
containing radioactive material for sale or distribution. Commission 
regulations at 10 CFR 20.1801 or equivalent Agreement State regulations 
require Licensees to secure, from unauthorized removal or access, 
licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas. 
Commission regulations at 10 CFR 20.1802 or equivalent Agreement States 
regulations require Licensees to control and maintain constant 
surveillance of licensed material that is in a controlled or 
unrestricted area and that is not in storage.
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    \1\ Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and will not be 
released to the public.
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II

    On September 11, 2001, terrorists simultaneously attacked targets 
in New York, N.Y., and Washington, DC, utilizing large commercial 
aircraft as weapons. In response to the attacks and intelligence 
information subsequently obtained, the Commission issued a number of 
Safeguards and Threat Advisories to its Licensees in order to 
strengthen Licensees' capabilities and readiness to respond to a 
potential attack on a nuclear facility. The Commission has also 
communicated with other Federal, State and local government agencies 
and industry representatives to discuss and evaluate the current threat 
environment in order to assess the adequacy of security measures at 
licensed facilities. In addition, the Commission has been conducting a 
review of its safeguards and security programs and requirements.
    As a result of its consideration of current safeguards and license 
requirements, as well as a review of information provided by the 
intelligence community, the Commission has determined that certain 
additional security measures are required to be implemented by 
Licensees as prudent measures to address the current threat 
environment. Therefore, the Commission is imposing the requirements set 
forth in Attachment 2 \2\ on certain Manufacturing and Distribution 
licensees identified in Attachment 1 of this Order who currently 
possess, or have near term plans to possess, high-risk radioactive 
material of concern. These requirements, which supplement existing 
regulatory requirements, will provide the Commission with reasonable 
assurance that the public health and safety and common defense and 
security continue to be adequately protected in the current threat 
environment. Attachment 3 of this Order contains the requirements for 
fingerprinting and criminal history record checks for individuals when 
licensee's reviewing official is determining access to Safeguards 
Information or unescorted access to the radioactive materials. These 
requirements will remain in effect until the Commission determines 
otherwise.
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    \2\ Attachment 2 contains some requirements that are SAFEGUARDS 
INFORMATION, and cannot be released to the public, and have 
therefore been redacted. The remainder of the requirements contained 
in Attachment 2 that are not SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION will be released 
to the public.
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    The Commission recognizes that Licensees may have already initiated 
many measures set forth in Attachment 2 to this Order in response to 
previously issued advisories or on their own. It is also recognized 
that some measures may not be possible or necessary at some sites, or 
may need to be tailored to accommodate the Licensees' specific 
circumstances to achieve the intended objectives and avoid any 
unforeseen effect on the safe use and storage of the sealed sources. 
Although the additional security measures implemented by the Licensees 
in response to the Safeguards and Threat Advisories have been adequate 
to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health 
and safety, the Commission concludes that the security measures must be 
embodied in an Order consistent with the established regulatory 
framework. Furthermore, the Commission has determined that some of the 
security measures contained in Attachment 2 of this Order contain 
Safeguards Information and will not be released to the public as per 
the NRC's ``Order Imposing Requirements for the Protection of Certain 
Safeguards Information'' (EA-06-241 or EA-06-289

[[Page 30865]]

as applicable), regarding the protection of Safeguards Information. The 
Commission hereby provides notice that it intends to treat all 
violations of the requirements contained in Attachment 2 to the NRC's 
``Order Imposing Requirements for the Protection of Certain Safeguards 
Information'' (EA-06-241 or EA-06-289 as applicable), applicable to the 
handling and unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information as 
serious breaches of adequate protection of the public health and safety 
and the common defense and security of the United States. Access to 
Safeguards Information is limited to those persons who have established 
a need-to-know the information, are considered to be trustworthy and 
reliable, have been fingerprinted and undergone a Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal history records check 
in accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting and 
Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards 
Information'' (EA-06-242 or EA-06-290 as applicable). A need-to-know 
means a determination by a person having responsibility for protecting 
Safeguards Information that a proposed recipient's access to Safeguards 
Information is necessary in the performance of official, contractual, 
or licensee duties of employment. Individuals who have been 
fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by the 
reviewing official under the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting and 
Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards 
Information'' (EA-06-242 or EA-06-290 as applicable) do not need to be 
fingerprinted again for purposes of being considered for unescorted 
access.
    To provide assurance that Licensees are implementing prudent 
measures to achieve a consistent level of protection to address the 
current threat environment, Manufacturing and Distribution Licensees 
identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall implement the 
requirements identified in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order. In 
addition, pursuant 10 CFR 2.202, I find that in light of the common 
defense and security matters identified above, which warrant the 
issuance of this Order, the public health, safety and interest require 
that this Order be effective immediately.

III

    Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 147, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o, 
182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Part 30, and 10 CFR 
Part 32, It Is Hereby Ordered, effective immediately, that all 
licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this order shall comply with 
the requirements of this order as follows:
    A. The Licensee shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any 
Commission or Agreement State regulation or license to the contrary, 
comply with the requirements described in Attachments 2 and 3 to this 
Order. The Licensee shall immediately start implementation of the 
requirements in Attachments 2 and 3 to the Order and shall complete 
implementation by November 18, 2007, or the first day that 
radionuclides of concern at or above threshold limits (i.e., high-risk 
radioactive material), also identified in Attachment 2, are possessed, 
whichever is later.
    B.1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of 
this Order, notify the Commission, (1) if it is unable to comply with 
any of the requirements described in Attachments 2 or 3, (2) if 
compliance with any of the requirements is unnecessary in its specific 
circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the requirements 
would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any 
Commission or Agreement State regulation or its license. The 
notification shall provide the Licensee's justification for seeking 
relief from or variation of any specific requirement.
    2. If the Licensee considers that implementation of any of the 
requirements described in Attachments 2 or 3 to this Order would 
adversely impact safe operation of the facility, the Licensee must 
notify the Commission, within twenty (20) days of this Order, of the 
adverse safety impact, the basis for its determination that the 
requirement has an adverse safety impact, and either a proposal for 
achieving the same objectives specified in Attachments 2 or 3 
requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying the facility to 
address the adverse safety condition. If neither approach is 
appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to Condition B.1 
of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement with which it 
cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required in Condition 
B.1.
    C.1. In accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting 
and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to 
Safeguards Information'' (EA-06-242 or EA-06-290 as applicable), only 
the NRC-approved reviewing official shall review results from an FBI 
criminal history records check. The reviewing official shall determine 
whether an individual may have, or continue to have, unescorted access 
to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the quantities in 
Attachment 2 to this Order. Fingerprinting and the FBI identification 
and criminal history records check are not required for individuals 
exempted from fingerprinting requirements under 10 CFR 73.61 [72 FR 
4945 (February 2, 2007)]. In addition, individuals who have a favorably 
decided U.S. Government criminal history records check within the last 
five (5) years, or have an active federal security clearance (provided 
in each case that the appropriate documentation is made available to 
the Licensee's reviewing official), have satisfied the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 fingerprinting requirement and need not be fingerprinted 
again for purposes of being considered for unescorted access.
    2. No person may have access to Safeguards Information or 
unescorted access to radioactive materials if the NRC has determined, 
in accordance with its administrative review process based on 
fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records 
check, either that the person may not have access to Safeguards 
Information or that the person may not have unescorted access to a 
utilization facility or radioactive material or other property subject 
to regulation by the NRC.
    D. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with 
the procedures described in Attachment 3 to this Order. Individuals who 
have been fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by 
the reviewing official under Order EA-06-242 or EA-06-290 as 
applicable, do not need to be fingerprinted again for purposes of being 
considered for unescorted access.
    E. The Licensee may allow any individual who currently has 
unescorted access to radioactive materials, in accordance with this 
Order, to continue to have unescorted access without being 
fingerprinted, pending a decision by the reviewing official (based on 
fingerprinting, an FBI criminal history records check and a trustworthy 
and reliability determination) that the individual may continue to have 
unescorted access to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the 
quantities listed in Attachment 2. The licensee shall complete 
implementation of the requirements of Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order 
by November 18, 2007.
    F.1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of 
this Order, submit to the Commission a schedule for completion of each 
requirement described in Attachments 2 and 3.

[[Page 30866]]

    2. The Licensee shall report to the Commission when they have 
achieved full compliance with the requirements described in Attachments 
2 and 3.
    G. Notwithstanding any provisions of the Commission's or an 
Agreement State's regulations to the contrary, all measures implemented 
or actions taken in response to this Order shall be maintained until 
the Commission determines otherwise.
    Licensee responses to Conditions B.1, B.2, F.1, and F.2 above shall 
be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555. In addition, Licensee submittals that contain 
specific physical protection or security information considered to be 
Safeguards Information shall be put in a separate enclosure or 
attachment and, marked as ``SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION--MODIFIED HANDLING'' 
and mailed (no electronic transmittals i.e., no e-mail or FAX) to the 
NRC.
    The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind 
any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of good 
cause.

IV

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other 
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this 
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20) days 
of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration 
will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for 
extension of time in which to submit an answer or request a hearing 
must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Federal and State 
Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of 
good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order. 
Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in writing 
and under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the matters of 
fact and law on which the Licensee or other person adversely affected 
relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. 
Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the 
Secretary, Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, 
Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office 
of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the 
Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at 
the same address, and to the Licensee if the answer or hearing request 
is by a person other than the Licensee. Because of possible disruptions 
in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is 
requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the 
Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission 
to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to [email protected] and also to the 
Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission 
to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to [email protected]. If a person 
other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth 
with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely 
affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 
CFR 2.309(d).
    If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose 
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order 
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, 
the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order 
should be sustained.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition to 
demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move 
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the 
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate 
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, 
unfounded allegations, or error.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section III above shall be final twenty (20) days from the 
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an 
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the 
provisions specified in Section III shall be final when the extension 
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a 
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this 
order.

    Dated this 22nd day of May 2007.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Charles L. Miller,
Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental 
Management Programs.

Attachment 1: Service List of Materials Licensees--Redacted

Attachment 2: Additional Security Measures for Manufacturing and 
Distribution Materials Licensees (U)--(Revision 1)

    These Additional Security Measures (ASMs) and new requirements are 
established to delineate licensee responsibility in response to the 
current threat environment. The following security measures apply to 
Radioactive Material Manufacturing and Distribution Licensees who, at 
any given time, possess greater than or equal to the quantities of 
concern of radioactive material defined in Table 1 (unless the licensee 
documents the basis for concluding that radioactive material possessed 
cannot be easily aggregated into quantities in excess of the limits 
defined in Table 1). As with the additional security measures 
previously provided to other licensees who possess risk significant 
radioactive sources, these increased security measures and requirements 
address licensees who are authorized to possess high-activity 
radioactive material which poses a high risk to human health if not 
managed safely and securely.
    1. Establish a security zone (or zones). A security zone is an 
area, determined by the licensee, that provides for both isolation of 
radioactive material and access control.
    a. Only use and store the radioactive material within the 
established security zone(s); and
    b. The licensee shall demonstrate for each security zone, a means 
to deter, detect and delay any attempt of unauthorized access to 
licensed material. The security zone is not required to be the same as 
the restricted area or controlled area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or 
equivalent agreement state regulations; and
    c. Security zones can be permanent or temporary to meet transitory 
or intermittent business activities (such as during periods of 
maintenance, source delivery, source replacement, and temporary job 
sites.). Different isolation/access control measures may be used for 
periods during which the security zone is occupied versus unoccupied.
    2. Control access at all times to the security zone and limit 
admittance to those individuals who are approved and require access to 
perform their duties.
    3. Implement a system to monitor, detect, assess and respond to

[[Page 30867]]

unauthorized entries into or activities in the security zone.
    a. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed]
    b. Provide a positive measure to detect unauthorized removal of the 
radioactive material from the security zone; and
    c. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed]
    4. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed]
    5. Licensees shall document the basis for concluding that there is 
reasonable assurance that individuals granted access to safeguards 
information or unescorted access to the security zone are trustworthy 
and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk for malevolent 
use of the regulated material. ``Access'' means that an individual 
could exercise some physical control over the material or device 
containing radioactive material.
    a. The trustworthiness and reliability of individuals shall be 
determined based on a background investigation. The background 
investigation shall address at least the past 3 years and, as a 
minimum, include fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) criminal history check, verification of work or education 
references as appropriate to the length of employment, and confirmation 
of employment eligibility.
    b. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with 
the procedures described in Attachment 3 to this Order.
    c. A reviewing official that the licensee nominated and has been 
approved by the NRC, in accordance with NRC ``Order Imposing 
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for 
Access to Safeguards Information,'' is the only individual that may 
make trustworthiness and reliability determinations.
    d. Individuals for whom the licensee has not made a determination 
of trustworthiness and reliability, based on the appropriate background 
investigation above, shall be escorted within the security zone to 
prevent unauthorized access or actions to the licensed radioactive 
material. The licensee shall also ensure these individuals are clearly 
identifiable as needing an escort while in the security zone.
    6. Before transfer of radioactive materials that exceed the 
quantities in Table 1, Licensees shall:
    a. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed]
    b. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed]
    c. Assure that the material is shipped to an address authorized in 
the license and that the address is valid,
    d. Verify the address for deliveries to temporary job site, and
    e. Document the verification or validation process.
    7. For domestic highway and rail shipments of materials in 
quantities greater than or equal to the quantities in Table 1, per 
conveyance, the licensee shall:
    a. Only use carriers who:
    (1) Use established package tracking systems,
    (2) Implement methods to assure trustworthiness of drivers,
    (3) Maintain constant control and/or surveillance during transit, 
and
    (4) Have the capability for immediate communication to summon 
appropriate response or assistance.
    The licensee shall verify and document that the carrier employs the 
measures listed above.
    b. Coordinate departure and arrival times with the recipient.
    c. Immediately initiate an investigation with the carrier and 
intended recipient If the shipment does not arrive by close of business 
on the day of the previously coordinated arrival time. Not later than 
one hour after the time when, through the course of the investigation, 
it is determined the shipment has become lost or stolen, the licensee 
shall notify the appropriate local law enforcement agency, the NRC 
Operations Center at (301) 816-5100, and the appropriate Agreement 
State regulatory agency. If after 24 hours of initiating the 
investigation, the radioactive material cannot be located, it shall be 
presumed lost and the licensee shall immediately notify the NRC 
Operations Center and, for Agreement State licensees, the appropriate 
Agreement State regulatory agency.
    d. In addition to a and b above, for highway and rail shipments of 
material in quantities greater than or equal to 100 times the 
quantities in Table 1, per conveyance, the licensee shall implement the 
NRC Order for Additional Security Measures on the Transportation of 
Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern.
    8. For imports and exports of material in quantities greater than 
the quantities in Table 1, per conveyance, the licensee shall follow 
the requirements in the Final Rule 10 CFR Part 110, July 1, 2005, (70 
FR 37985 and 46066) Export and Import of Radioactive Materials: 
Security Policies.
    9. The licensee shall protect pre-planning, coordinating, and 
reporting information required by ASM 7 related to shipments of 
radioactive material, and the radioisotopes identified in Table 1 as 
sensitive information (proprietary business financial or confidential). 
Licensees shall restrict access to this information to those licensee 
and contractor personnel with a need to know. Licensees shall require 
all parties receiving this information to protect it similarly. 
Information may be transmitted either in writing or electronically and 
shall be marked as ``Security-Related Information--Withhold Under 10 
CFR 2.390.''
    10. The licensee shall maintain all documentation required by these 
ASMs for a period of not less than three (3) years after the document 
is superceded or no longer effective.

                                       Table 1.--Radionuclides of Concern
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                                                                                                   Quantity of
                  Radionuclide                            Quantity of concern \1\  (TBq)           concern \2\
                                                                                                       (Ci)
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Am-241..........................................  0.6..........................................             16
Am-241/BE.......................................  0.6..........................................             16
Cf-252..........................................  0.2..........................................              5.4
Cm-244..........................................  0.5..........................................             14
Co-60...........................................  0.3..........................................              8.1
Cs-137..........................................  1............................................             27
Gd-153..........................................  10...........................................            270
Ir-192..........................................  0.8..........................................             22
Pm-147..........................................  400..........................................         11,000

[[Page 30868]]

 
Pu-238..........................................  0.6..........................................             16
Pu-239/Be.......................................  0.6..........................................             16
Ra-226 \3\......................................  0.4..........................................             11
Se-75...........................................  2............................................             54
Sr-90 (Y-90)....................................  10...........................................            270
Tm-170..........................................  200..........................................          5,400
Yb-169..........................................  3............................................             81
Combinations of radioactive materials listed      See Footnote Below \5\ ......................
 above \4\.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The aggregate activity of multiple, collocated sources of the same radionuclide should be included when the
  total activity equals or exceeds the quantity of concern.
\2\ The primary values used for compliance with this Order are TBq. The curie (Ci) values are rounded to two
  significant figures for informational purposes only.
\3\ The Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, authorizes NRC to regulate Ra-226 and
  NRC is in the process of amending its regulations for discrete sources of Ra-226.
\4\ Radioactive materials are to be considered aggregated or collocated if breaching a common physical security
  barrier (e.g., a locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the radioactive material
  or devices containing the radioactive material.
\5\ If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the ratios of the activity of each source, i of
  radionuclide, n, A(i,n), to the quantity of concern for radionuclide n, Q(n), listed for that radionuclide
  equals or exceeds one. [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide A) -- (quantity of concern for
  radionuclide A)] + [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide B) -- (quantity of concern for radionuclide
  B)] + etc. . . . . >=1.

Guidance for Aggregation of Sources

    NRC supports the use of the International Atomic Energy 
Association's (IAEA) source categorization methodology as defined in 
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.9, ``Categorization of 
Radioactive Sources,'' (2005) (see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/ PDF/Pub1227--web.pdf) and as endorsed by the agency's 
Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, 
January 2004 (see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf). The Code defines a three-tiered source categorization 
scheme. Category 1 corresponds to the largest source strength (equal to 
or greater than 100 times the quantity of concern values listed in 
Table 1.) and Category 3, the smallest (equal or exceeding one-tenth 
the quantity of concern values listed in Table 1.). Additional security 
measures apply to sources that are equal to or greater than the 
quantity of concern values listed in Table 1, plus aggregations of 
smaller sources that are equal to or greater than the quantities in 
Table 1. Aggregation only applies to sources that are collocated.
    Licensees who possess individual sources in total quantities that 
equal or exceed the Table 1 quantities are required to implement 
additional security measures. Where there are many small (less than the 
quantity of concern values) collocated sources whose total aggregate 
activity equals or exceeds the Table 1 values, licensees are to 
implement additional security measures.
    Some source handling or storage activities may cover several 
buildings, or several locations within specific buildings. The question 
then becomes, ``When are sources considered collocated for purposes of 
aggregation?'' For purposes of the additional controls, sources are 
considered collocated if breaching a single barrier (e.g., a locked 
door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the 
sources. Sources behind an outer barrier should be aggregated 
separately from those behind an inner barrier (e.g., a locked source 
safe inside the locked storage room). However, if both barriers are 
simultaneously open, then all sources within these two barriers are 
considered to be collocated. This logic should be continued for other 
barriers within or behind the inner barrier.
    The following example illustrates the point: A lockable room has 
sources stored in it. Inside the lockable room, there are two shielded 
safes with additional sources in them. Inventories are as follows:
    The room has the following sources outside the safes: Cf-252, 0.12 
TBq (3.2 Ci); Co-60, 0.18 TBq (4.9 Ci), and Pu-238, 0.3 TBq (8.1 Ci). 
Application of the unity rule yields: (0.12--0.2) + (0.18--0.3) + 
(0.3--0.6) = 0.6 + 0.6 + 0.5 = 1.7. Therefore, the sources would 
require additional security measures.
    Shielded safe 1 has a 1.9 TBq (51 Ci) Cs-137 source and a 
0.8 TBq (22 Ci) Am-241 source. In this case, the sources would require 
additional security measures, regardless of location, because they each 
exceed the quantities in Table 1.
    Shielded safe 2 has two Ir-192 sources, each having an 
activity of 0.3 TBq (8.1 Ci). In this case, the sources would not 
require additional security measures while locked in the safe. The 
combined activity does not exceed the threshold quantity 0.8 TBq (22 
Ci).
    Because certain barriers may cease to exist during source handling 
operations (e.g., a storage location may be unlocked during periods of 
active source usage), licensees should, to the extent practicable, 
consider two modes of source usage--``operations'' (active source 
usage) and ``shutdown'' (source storage mode). Whichever mode results 
in the greatest inventory (considering barrier status) would require 
additional security measures for each location.
    Use the following method to determine which sources of radioactive 
material require implementation of the Additional Security Measures 
(ASMs):
     Include any single source equal to or greater than the 
quantity of concern in Table
     Include multiple collocated sources of the same 
radionuclide when the combined quantity equals or exceeds the quantity 
of concern
     For combinations of radionuclides, include multiple 
collocated sources of different radionuclides when the aggregate 
quantities satisfy the following unity rule: [(amount of radionuclide 
A)--(quantity of concern of radionuclide A)] + [(amount of radionuclide 
B)--(quantity of concern of radionuclide B)] + etc.....>=1

[[Page 30869]]

Attachment 3: Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal History 
Checks of Individuals When Licensee's Reviewing Official Is Determining 
Access to Safeguards Information or Unescorted Access to Radioactive 
Materials

General Requirements

    Licensees shall comply with the following requirements of this 
attachment.
    1. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment shall 
fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted access to 
safeguards information (SGI) or unescorted access to radioactive 
materials equal to, or greater than, the quantities listed in 
Attachment 2 to this Order. The Licensee shall review and use the 
information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
ensure that the provisions contained in this Order and this attachment 
are satisfied.
    2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the 
fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal 
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for revising 
the record or including an explanation in the record, as specified in 
the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' section of this 
attachment.
    3. Fingerprints for access to SGI or unescorted access need not be 
taken if an employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, 
manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting 
requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 for access to SGI or 10 CFR 73.61 for 
unescorted access, has a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal 
history check within the last five (5) years, or has an active federal 
security clearance. Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which 
granted the federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal history 
check must be provided for either of the latter two cases. The Licensee 
must retain this documentation for a period of three (3) years from the 
date the individual no longer requires access to SGI or unescorted 
access to radioactive materials associated with the Licensee's 
activities.
    4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this Order 
must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the FBI.
    5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the FBI 
and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and reliability 
requirements of this Order, in making a determination whether to grant, 
or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive 
materials.
    6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a 
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an 
individual's suitability for access to SGI or unescorted access to 
radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in 
Attachment 2 to this Order.
    7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination 
whether to grant, or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted 
access to radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities 
used in Attachment 2 to this Order.

Prohibitions

    A Licensee shall not base a final determination to deny an 
individual access to radioactive materials solely on the basis of 
information received from the FBI involving: an arrest more than one 
(1) year old for which there is no information of the disposition of 
the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an 
acquittal.
    A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal 
history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that would 
infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the Licensee use the 
information in any way which would discriminate among individuals on 
the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age.

Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks

    For the purpose of complying with this Order, Licensees shall, 
using an appropriate method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the NRC's 
Division of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one completed, 
legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where 
practicable, other fingerprint records for each individual seeking 
access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials equal to or 
greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 to this Order, to the 
Director of the Division of Facilities and Security, marked for the 
attention of the Division's Criminal History Check Section. Copies of 
these forms may be obtained by writing the Office of Information 
Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, by calling (301) 415-5877, or by e-mail to [email protected]. 
Practicable alternative formats are set forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The 
Licensee shall establish procedures to ensure that the quality of the 
fingerprints taken results in minimizing the rejection rate of 
fingerprint cards due to illegible or incomplete cards.
    The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for completeness. 
Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions or evident 
errors will be returned to the Licensee for corrections. The fee for 
processing fingerprint checks includes one re-submission if the initial 
submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions 
cannot be classified. The one free re-submission must have the FBI 
Transaction Control Number reflected on the re-submission. If 
additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as initial 
submittals and will require a second payment of the processing fee.
    Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application. 
Licensees shall submit payment with the application for processing 
fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, cashier's check, 
money order, or electronic payment, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.'' [For 
guidance on making electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security 
Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at (301) 415-7404]. 
Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable. The 
application fee (currently $27) is the sum of the user fee charged by 
the FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted 
by the NRC on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which 
covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of Licensee 
fingerprint submissions. The Commission will directly notify Licensees 
who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes.
    The Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data 
received from the FBI as a result of the Licensee's application(s) for 
criminal history checks, including the FBI fingerprint record.

Right To Correct and Complete Information

    Prior to any final adverse determination, the Licensee shall make 
available to the individual the contents of any criminal records 
obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete 
information. Written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this 
notification must be maintained by the Licensee for a period of one (1) 
year from the date of the notification.
    If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is 
incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct, 
or update the alleged

[[Page 30870]]

deficiency, or to explain any matter in the record, the individual may 
initiate challenge procedures. These procedures include either direct 
application by the individual challenging the record to the agency 
(i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed the questioned 
information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of 
any entry on the criminal history record to the Assistant Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, Washington, DC 
20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter 
case, the FBI forwards the challenge to the agency that submitted the 
data and requests that agency to verify or correct the challenged 
entry. Upon receipt of an official communication directly from the 
agency that contributed the original information, the FBI 
Identification Division makes any changes necessary in accordance with 
the information supplied by that agency. The Licensee must provide at 
least ten (10) days for an individual to initiate an action challenging 
the results of an FBI criminal history records check after the record 
is made available for his/her review. The Licensee may make a final 
determination on access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive 
materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 
to this Order based upon the criminal history record only upon receipt 
of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of the record. Upon a 
final adverse determination on access to SGI or unescorted access to 
radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in 
Attachment 2 to this Order, the Licensee shall provide the individual 
its documented basis for denial. Access to SGI or unescorted access to 
radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in 
Attachment 2 to this Order shall not be granted to an individual during 
the review process.

Protection of Information

    1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an 
individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a system 
of files and procedures for protecting the record and the personal 
information from unauthorized disclosure.
    2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal information 
collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual, 
his/her representative, or to those who have a need to access the 
information in performing assigned duties in the process of determining 
access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials equal to or 
greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 to this Order. No 
individual authorized to have access to the information may re-
disseminate the information to any other individual who does not have a 
need-to-know.
    3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a 
criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee if 
the Licensee holding the criminal history record receives the 
individual's written request to re-disseminate the information 
contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies 
information such as the individual's name, date of birth, social 
security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for 
identification purposes.
    4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained under 
this section, available for examination by an authorized representative 
of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws.
    5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history 
records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file has 
been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of employment 
or denial to access SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials 
equal to or greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 to this 
Order. After the required three (3) year period, these documents shall 
be destroyed by a method that will prevent reconstruction of the 
information in whole or in part.

 [FR Doc. E7-10691 Filed 6-1-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P