[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 99 (Wednesday, May 23, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 29004-29010]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-2563]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Availability of Model Safety Evaluation and Model 
License Amendment Request on Technical Specification Improvement 
Regarding Use of the Improved Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence for 
General Electric Boiling Water Reactors Using the Consolidated Line 
Item Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the U. S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model license amendment 
request (LAR), model safety evaluation (SE), and model proposed no 
significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination related to 
changes to Standard Technical Specification (STS) 3.1.6, ``Rod Pattern 
Control,'' and STS 3.3.2.1, ``Control Rod Block Instrumentation'' for 
NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434. The proposed changes would revise the 
Technical Specifications (TS) and Bases for STS 3.1.6, ``Rod Pattern 
Control,'' and STS 3.3.2.1, ``Control Rod Block Instrumentation'' to 
allow licensees to use an improved control rod banked position 
withdrawal sequence (BPWS) when performing a reactor shutdown. In 
addition, the proposed changes would add a footnote to Table 3.3.2.1-1, 
``Control Rod Block Instrumentation'' for NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434. 
The requirements for implementing the improved BPWS are described in 
General Electric Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDO-33091-A, Revision 
2, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' dated July 2004. 
The General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group (BWROG) 
participants in the Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) 
initially proposed these changes to the STS in TSTF-476, Revision 0, 
``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO-33091).'' TSTF-476, 
Revision 1 was submitted on January 9, 2007 and was later accepted by 
NRC. Hereafter, all references to TSTF-476 refer to TSTF-476, Revision 
1, unless otherwise noted. Technical

[[Page 29005]]

Specifications and Bases changes provided in TSTF-476 completely 
supersede the proposed Technical Specification changes included in 
NEDO-3309 1-A.
    The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently 
process amendments to incorporate these changes into plant-specific 
(TS) for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Licensees of 
nuclear power reactors to which the models apply can request amendments 
conforming to the models. In such a request, a licensee should confirm 
the applicability of the model LAR, model SE and NSHC determination to 
its plant.

DATES: The NRC staff issued a Federal Register Notice (71 FR 26118, May 
3, 2006) which provided for public comment a model SE, model LAR, and 
NSHC determination related to changes to STS 3.1.6, ``Rod Pattern 
Control,'' and STS 3.3.2.1, ``Control Rod Block Instrumentation'' for 
NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434. Similarly, the NRC staff herein provides a 
revised model SE, revised model LAR, and NSHC determination. The NRC 
staff can most efficiently consider applications based upon the model 
LAR, which references the Model SE, if the application is submitted 
within one year of this Federal Register Notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Timothy Kobetz, Mail Stop: O-12H2, 
Division Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone 301-415-1932.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process (CLIIP) for Adopting Standard Technical 
Specifications Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 
2000. The CLIIP is intended to improve the efficiency and transparency 
of NRC licensing processes. This is accomplished by processing proposed 
changes to the STS in a manner that supports subsequent license 
amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the 
public to comment on proposed changes to the STS following a 
preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change 
will likely be offered for adoption by licensees.
    The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments received 
for a proposed change to the STS and to either reconsider the change or 
proceed with announcing the availability of the change for proposed 
adoption by licensees. In several instances, the staff's evaluation did 
result in changes to the model LAR. Those licensees opting to apply for 
the subject change to TS are responsible for reviewing the staff's 
evaluation, referencing the applicable technical justifications, and 
providing any necessary plant-specific information. The model LAR shows 
licensees the expected level of detail that needs to be included in 
order to adopt TSTF-476, as well as guidelines for staff review. The 
NRC has established an internal review plan that designates the 
appropriate staff and approximate time lines to review plant-specific 
LARs that reference TSTF-476. Each amendment application made in 
response to the notice of availability will be processed and noticed in 
accordance with applicable NRC rules and procedures.
    This notice involves implementation of an improved BPWS, which 
allows licensees of General Electric BWRs to follow the improved BPWS 
when inserting control rods into the core during a reactor shutdown. By 
letter dated January 9, 2007, the BWROG proposed these changes for 
incorporation into the STS as TSTF-476. These changes are based on the 
NRC staff-approved LTR NEDO-33091-A, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod 
Insertion Process,'' dated July 2004, as approved by NRC in a SE dated 
June 16, 2004, accessible electronically from the Agency-wide Documents 
Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room 
on the Internet (ADAMS Accession No. ML041700479) at the NRC Web site 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have 
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents 
located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC Public Document Room Reference 
staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to 
[email protected].

Applicability

    These changes revise the Section 3.1.6 and Section 3.3.2.1 TS and 
Bases for NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434 (General Electric BWR/4 and BWR/6 
plants, respectively), and TS Table 3.3.2.1-1 for NUREG-1433 and NUREG-
1434.
    To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, 
the NRC staff requests each licensee applying for the changes addressed 
by TSTF-476 use the CLIIP to submit a LAR that adheres to the following 
model. Any deviations from the model LAR should be explained in the 
licensee's submittal. The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from 
requesting an alternative approach, proposing the changes without 
providing the information described in the eight model LAR conditions, 
or making the requested commitment. Variations from the approach 
recommended in this notice may, however, require additional review by 
the NRC staff and may increase the time and resources needed for the 
review. Significant variations from the approach, or inclusion of 
additional changes to the license, may result in staff rejection of the 
submittal. Instead, licensees desiring significant variations and/or 
additional changes should either submit a LAR that does not claim to 
adopt TSTF-476, or specifically state in their LAR that they are 
adopting TSTF-476 without using the CLIIP.

Public Notices

    In a notice in the Federal Register dated May 3, 2006 (71 FR 
26118), the staff requested comment on the use of the CLIIP to process 
requests to revise Section 3.1.6 and Section 3.3.2.1 TS and Bases and 
TS Table 3.3.2.1-1 for NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434, as discussed in TSTF-
476. In response to this notice, the staff received one set of comments 
(developed by the Technical Specifications Task Force and submitted in 
a letter dated May 31, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML061520129)). 
Specific comments on the model LAR were offered. These comments, along 
with the NRC staff's responses, are summarized and discussed below:
    1. Comment: In the Applicability Section of the Notice and the 
model application, the terms ``BWR/4'' and ``BWR/6'' are used 
incorrectly. These terms should be revised to NUREG-1433 and NUREG-
1434, respectively. The changes proposed are applicable to BWR/2-6 
plants, if they have adopted the standard banked position withdrawal 
sequence (BPWS). TSTF-476 proposes changes to the Improved Standard 
Technical Specifications (ISTS) included in NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434, 
which may be applied to any BWR type.
    Response: The staff agrees with this comment. References to BWR/4 
and BWR/6 have been replaced with NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434, 
respectively.
    2. Comment: The notice, the model application, and the model Safety 
Evaluation imply that a license amendment is needed for plants with 
Technical Specifications based on NUREG-1433 to adopt TSTF-476. This is 
not correct. No license amendment request is required to adopt the 
proposed Bases changes included in TSTF-476 and no Technical

[[Page 29006]]

Specification change is needed to adopt TSTF-476 for plants with 
Technical Specifications based on NUREG-1433. Bases changes are made 
using the licensee Technical Specification Bases Control Program.
    Response: The changes proposed by TSTF-476, Revision 0, for NUREG-
1433 (BWR/4) were only changes to the Bases sections. However, a 
revised TSTF-476 was submitted to the NRC on January 9, 2007. The 
revised version of TSTF-476 includes changes to the Technical 
Specifications and Bases sections for both NUREG-1433 (BWR/4) and 
NUREG-1434 (BWR/6). Therefore, licensees proposing to adopt TSTF-476 
are required to submit a license amendment request.
    3. Comment: In some BWR designs, the rod worth minimizers (RWMs) 
(e.g., NUMAC) cannot be reprogrammed to accept a new shutdown sequence. 
The notice should state that bypassing the RWM and entering the plant-
specific action equivalent to NUREG-1433 Specification 3.3.2.1, 
Required Action D. 1, for an inoperable RWM during shutdown (which 
requires the use of a second qualified person to verify rod movement in 
accordance with BPWS) is acceptable and would not be considered 
entering a Required Action for ``operational convenience'' as discussed 
in the LCO 3.0.2 Bases.
    Response: During the comment disposition process it became apparent 
that revisions to TSTF-476 would be necessary. The changes proposed in 
TSTF-476, Revision 0, included bases changes to both NUREG-1433 (BWR/4) 
and NUREG-1434 (BWR/6). In addition, a note was proposed to be added to 
TS Table 3.3.2.1-1 of NUREG-1434 to allow the rod pattern controller to 
be bypassed in Modes 1 and 2 so that the BPWS can be used. A similar 
note was not included in NUREG-1433 since some BWR/4 plants rod worth 
minimizer (RWM) can be reprogrammed to accommodate the BPWS. However, 
the RWM of some BWR/4 plants cannot be reprogrammed to accommodate the 
BPWS, and need a similar note to that proposed for the BWR/6 NUREG-
1434. Therefore, to be acceptable, a [bracketed] note similar to that 
proposed to be added to TS Table 3.3.2.1-1 of the BWR/6 NUREG-1434, was 
incorporated into TSTF-476, revision 1. A revised TSTF-476 was 
submitted to the NRC on January 9, 2007. The changes incorporated in 
the revised version of TSTF-476 include changes to the Technical 
Specifications and Bases sections that require the adopting licensee to 
submit a license amendment request.
    4. Comment: The notice should state that the Technical 
Specifications and Bases changes provided in TSTF-476 completely 
supersede the proposed Technical Specification changes included in 
NEDO-3309 1-A.
    Response: An appropriate statement has been added in this notice.
    5. Comment: Throughout the notice, the acronym BPWS is defined 
incorrectly. The term BPWS stands for ``Banked Position Withdrawal 
Sequence,'' not ``Bank Position Withdrawal Sequence.''
    Response: Appropriate corrections have been made throughout the 
notice and its attachments.
    6. Comment: Cover letter, 1st paragraph--The license amendment 
request will revise Table 3.3.2.1-1 only. The associated Bases changes 
will be made by the licensee upon implementation using the Technical 
Specifications Bases Control Program. This also affects Sections I and 
2 of Enclosure I.
    Response: The changes incorporated in TSTF-476 include changes to 
the Technical Specifications and Bases sections that are needed by the 
adopting licensee to submit a license amendment request. While the 
Bases remain subject to licensee control, a more timely review will be 
possible if the licensee requesting to adopt the changes includes 
Technical Specification Bases changes in its application.
    7. Comment: Cover letter, 3rd paragraph--Many licensees do not 
provide final Technical Specifications pages with the application. The 
final pages are provided only after NRC review has determined that no 
changes from the draft are required. Revised Bases pages are not 
required to be provided with an application. The Technical 
Specification Bases Control Program requires revised Bases pages to be 
provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).
    Response: While the Bases remain subject to licensee control, for 
this application the NRC staff plans to review marked-up Technical 
Specification and Technical Specification Bases pages, as well as pages 
that represent how the final Technical Specification and Technical 
Specification Bases pages will appear, in order to review a licensee's 
license amendment application in the most timely manner.
    8. Comment: Enclosure 1, Section 2.0, Proposed Changes, the first 
bullet should reference the Bases for Specification 3.1.6, not 3.6.1, 
if the discussion of specific Bases changes is retained in this 
section.
    Response: Appropriate corrections of the errors have been made to 
the model.
    9. Comment: Enclosure 1, Section 2.0, Proposed Changes, the second 
bullet should discuss the rod pattern controller, not the rod worth 
minimizer, if the discussion of specific Bases changes is retained in 
this section. In addition, both bypassing and reprogramming should be 
discussed.
    Response: TSTF-476, revision 0 called for changes to Technical 
Specification Section 3.3.2.1 Bases for NUREG-1434. TSTF-476, revision 
1 calls for changes to Technical Specification Section 3.3.2.1 Bases 
for both NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434. The specific equipment nomenclature 
differs between the two standards. The model has been updated using the 
bracketing convention to allow the selection of the appropriate 
equipment nomenclature by the licensee prior to amendment application.
    10. Comment: Enclosure 1, Section 5.1, the last sentence should be 
deleted. The NRC staff has already determined in the Safety Evaluation 
for NEDO-33091 for all BWRs that no single failure of the boiling water 
reactor mechanical or hydraulic system can cause a control rod to drop 
completely out of the reactor core during the shutdown process. It is 
unnecessary and a burden with no safety benefit to require individual 
licensees to verify the statement when it has been generically approved 
by the NRC for all BWRs.
    Response: The staff's approval and safety evaluation are predicated 
upon this determination, and the licensee's verification is deemed 
essential.
    11. Comment: In Enclosure 1, Section 5.1 and in the model Safety 
Evaluation, Section 3.0, commitment 1 should be deleted. For those 
plants with Technical Specifications based on NUREG-1434 which will be 
submitting a license amendment request to adopt TSTF-476, the proposed 
change to Table 3.3.2. 1-1 requires confirming control rod coupling 
integrity; therefore a separate commitment to do the same is not 
necessary.
    Response: This is a commitment to establish appropriate detailed 
operational procedures prior to implementation, and is deemed 
essential.
    12. Comment: Enclosure 1, Section 5. 1, and in the model Safety 
Evaluation, Section 3.0 commitment 2 should be deleted. This 
``commitment'' is a summary of the improved BPWS. The model amendment, 
the model Safety Evaluation, and the proposed Bases reference the NRC 
approved Topical Report as the basis for the improved BPWS sequence. It 
is unclear what is

[[Page 29007]]

required by this commitment that is not already required by adoption of 
the Technical Specifications and Bases. It is unnecessary to develop 
and track a separate regulatory commitment to do what is already 
required by the amendment and Topical Report.
    Response: This is a commitment to establish appropriate detailed 
operational procedures prior to implementation, and is deemed 
essential.
    13. Comment: Description--Amendment requests will only be submitted 
by licensees with Technical Specifications based on NUREG-1434. 
Therefore, delete references to NUREG-1433.
    Response: BWR/4 plants with a RWM that cannot be reprogrammed to 
accommodate the BPWS will need to amend their TS in order to adopt 
TSTF-476. Therefore, references to NUREG-1433 are not deleted.
    14. Comment: Description and Criterion I--The improved BPWS 
insertion process applies during reactor shutdowns. Delete the word 
``normal'' before shutdown. The term ``normal shutdown'' is not used in 
the model Safety Evaluation or Topical Report. The improved BPWS 
insertion process applies to all shutdowns as long as the conditions 
for use are met.
    Response: The word ``normal'' has been removed as a modifier for 
the term ``shutdown'' in applicable sections of the model.
    15. Comment: Criterion 2--Delete the phrase ``in the absence of 
other unrelated failures'' from the first sentence. Criterion 2 only 
evaluates the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
related to the proposed change, not other unrelated events.
    Response: The extraneous phrase has been removed from the model SE.
    For Inclusion on the Technical Specification Web Page the following 
example of an application was prepared by the NRC staff to facilitate 
the adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler 
TSTF-476, Revision 1 ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process 
(NEDO-33091).'' The model provides the expected level of detail and 
content for an application to adopt TSTF-476, Revision 1. Licensees 
remain responsible for ensuring that their actual application fulfills 
their administrative requirements as well as NRC regulations.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, 
Washington, DC 20555.

Subject: Plant Name, Docket No. 50-[xxx,] Re: Application for 
Technical Specification Improvement To Adopt TSTF-476, Revision 1, 
``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO-33091)

    Dear Sir or Madam: In accordance with the provisions of Section 
50.90 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 
[LICENSEE] is submitting a request for an amendment to the technical 
specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.].
    The proposed changes would revise Sections 3.1.6, ``Rod Pattern 
Control,'' and 3.3.2.1, ``Control Rod Block Instrumentation,'' to 
allow [PLANT NAME] to reference a new Banked Position Withdrawal 
Sequence (BPWS) shutdown sequence in the TS Bases. In addition, a 
footnote is added to Table 3.3.2.1-1, ``Control Rod Block 
Instrumentation.''
    The changes are consistent with NRC approved Industry Technical 
Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification 
Change Traveler, TSTF-476, Revision 1, Improved BPWS Control Rod 
Insertion Process (NEDO-33091).'' The availability of this TS 
improvement was announced in the Federal Register on [DATE] ([ FR ]) 
as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP).
    Enclosure 1 provides a description and assessment of the 
proposed changes, as well as confirmation of applicability. 
Enclosure 2 provides the existing TS pages and TS Bases marked-up to 
show the proposed changes. Enclosure 3 provides final TS pages and 
TS Bases pages.
    [LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed license amendment 
by [DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 
DAYS]. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, 
with enclosures, is being provided to the designated [STATE] 
Official.
    I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United 
States of America that I am authorized by [LICENSEE] to make this 
request and that the foregoing is true and correct. [Note that 
request may be notarized in lieu of using this oath or affirmation 
statement]. If you should have any questions regarding this 
submittal, please contact [ ].
 Sincerely,

Name, Title

    Enclosures:

1. Description and Assessment of Proposed Changes
2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes and Technical 
Specification Bases Changes
3. Final Technical Specification and Bases pages.
cc: NRR Project Manager, Regional Office, Resident Inspector, State 
Contact, ITSB Branch Chief.

1.0 Description

    This letter is a request to amend Operating License(s) [LICENSE 
NUMBER(S)] for [PLANT/UNIT NAME(S)].
    The proposed changes would revise the Bases sections of Technical 
Specification (TS) 3.1.6, ``Rod Pattern Control'', and 3.3.2.1, 
``Control Rod Block Instrumentation,'' along with TS Table 3.3.2.1-1, 
``Control Rod Block Instrumentation,'' to allow reference to an 
improved, optional Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) for use 
during reactor shutdown.
    The new BPWS is described in Topical Report NEDO-33091-A, Revision 
2, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' dated July 2004, 
and approved by the NRC by Safety Evaluation (SE) dated June 16, 2004 
(ADAMS ML041700479). Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) change 
traveler TSTF-476, Revision 1, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion 
Process (NEDO-33091)'' was announced for availability in the Federal 
Register on [DATE] as part of the consolidated line item improvement 
process (CLIIP).

2.0 Proposed Changes

    Consistent with NRC-approved TSTF-476, Revision 1, the proposed TS 
and Bases changes include:
     Revised TS Section 3.1.6 Bases to allow use of an optional 
BPWS during plant shutdown.
     Revised TS Section 3.3.2.1 Bases to allow reprogramming of 
the [rod worth minimizer/rod pattern controller] during the optional 
BPWS shutdown sequence.
     Revised TS Table 3.3.2.1-1, ``Control Rod Block 
Instrumentation,'' which adds a footnote that allows operators to 
bypass the [rod worth minimizer/rod pattern controller] if conditions 
for the optional BPWS shutdown process are satisfied.

3.0 Background

    The background for this application is as stated in the model SE in 
NRC's Notice of Availability published on [DATE ]([ ] FR [ ]), the NRC 
Notice for Comment published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]), and TSTF-476, 
Revision 1.

4.0 Technical Analysis

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, and the staff's 
SE dated June 16, 2004, as well as TSTF-476, Revision 1, and the model 
SE published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the CLIIP Notice for 
Comment. [LICENSEE] has applied the methodology in NEDO-33091-A, 
Revision 2 to the develop the proposed TS changes. [LICENSEE] has also 
concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-476, Revision 1 and 
the model SE prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to [PLANT, UNIT 
NOS.], and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes 
to the [PLANT] TS.

5.0 Regulatory Analysis

    A description of this proposed change and its relationship to 
applicable regulatory requirements and guidance

[[Page 29008]]

was provided in the NRC Notice of Availability published on [DATE] ([ ] 
FR [ ]), the NRC Notice for Comment published on May 3, 2006 (71 FR 
26118), and TSTF-476, Revision 1.

5.1 Regulatory Commitments

    As discussed in the model SE published in Federal Register on 
[DATE] for this technical specification improvement, the following 
plant-specific verifications/commitments were performed. The safety 
evaluation for NEDO-33091-A explained that the potential for the 
control rod drop accident (CRDA) will be eliminated by the following 
changes to the operational procedures, which [PLANT NAME] [has made/
will commit to make prior to implementation]:
    1. Before reducing power to the low power setpoint (LPSP), 
operators shall confirm control rod coupling integrity for all rods 
that are fully withdrawn. Control rods that have not been confirmed 
coupled and are in intermediate positions must be fully inserted prior 
to power reduction to the LPSP. No action is required for fully-
inserted control rods.
    If a shutdown is required and all rods, which are not confirmed 
coupled, cannot be fully inserted prior to the power dropping below the 
LPSP, then the original/standard BPWS must be adhered to. The original/
standard BPWS can be found in Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDO-
21231, ``Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence,'' January 1977, and is 
referred to in NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434.
    2. After reactor power drops below the LPSP, rods may be inserted 
from notch position 48 to notch position 00 without stopping at the 
intermediate positions. However, GE Nuclear Energy recommends that 
operators insert rods in the same order as specified for the original/
standard BPWS as much as is reasonably possible. If a plant is in the 
process of shutting down following improved BPWS with the power below 
the LPSP, no control rod shall be withdrawn unless the control rod 
pattern is in compliance with standard BPWS requirements.
    In addition to the procedure changes specified above, the staff 
previously concluded, based on its review of NEDO-33091-A, that no 
single failure of the boiling water reactor control rod drive (CRD) 
mechanical or hydraulic system can cause a control rod to drop 
completely out of the reactor core during the shutdown process. 
Therefore, the proper use of the improved BPWS will prevent a CRDA from 
occurring while power is below the LPSP. [LICENSEE] has verified, in 
accordance with NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, that no single failure of the 
boiling water reactor CRD mechanical or hydraulic system can cause a 
control rod to drop completely out of the reactor core during the 
shutdown process.

6.0 No Significant Hazards Consideration

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of 
the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the proposed determination 
presented in the notice is applicable to [PLANT] and the determination 
is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 
CFR 50.91(a).

7.0 Environmental Evaluation

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the environmental consideration included in 
the model SE published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the CLIIP. 
[LICENSEE] has concluded that the staff's findings presented therein 
are applicable to [PLANT] and the determination is hereby incorporated 
by reference for this application.

8.0 References

    Federal Register Notices:
    Notice for Comment published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ])
    Notice of Availability published on [DATE ] ([ ] FR [ ])

Model Safety Evaluation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Technical Specification Task Force TSTF-
476, Revision 1, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO-
33091)''

1.0 Introduction

    By letter dated [--------, 20--], [LICENSEE] (the licensee) 
proposed changes to the technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME]. 
The requested changes are the adoption of TSTF-476, Revision 1, 
``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO-33091-A),'' to the 
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Standard Technical Specifications (STS), 
which was proposed by the Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) by 
letter on January 9, 2007. This TSTF involves changes to NUREG-1433 and 
NUREG-1434 Section 3.1.6 ``Rod Pattern Control,'' Section 3.3.2.1 
``Control Rod Block Instrumentation,'' and Table 3.3.2.1-1. The 
proposed TSTF would allow the use of the improved banked position 
withdrawal sequence (BPWS) during shutdowns if the conditions of NEDO-
33091-A, Revision 2, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' 
dated July 2004, have been satisfied.

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

    The control rod drop accident (CRDA) is the design basis accident 
for the subject TS changes. In order to minimize the impact of a CRDA, 
the BPWS process was developed to minimize control rod reactivity worth 
for BWR plants. The proposed improved BPWS further simplifies the 
control rod insertion process, and in order to evaluate it, the staff 
followed the guidelines of Standard Review Plan Section 15.4.9, and 
referred to General Design Criterion (GDC) 28 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 
Part 50 as its regulatory requirement. GDC 28 states that the 
reactivity control systems shall be designed with appropriate limits on 
the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase to assure that the 
effects of postulated reactivity accidents can neither (1) result in 
damage to the reactor coolant pressure boundary greater than limited 
local yielding nor (2) sufficiently disturb the core, its support 
structures or other reactor pressure vessel internals to impair 
significantly the capability to cool the core.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

    In its safety evaluation for Licensing Topical Report NEDO-33091-A, 
``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,'' dated June 16, 2004, 
(ADAMS ML041700479) the staff determined that the methodology described 
in TSTF-476, Revision 1, to incorporate the improved BPWS into the STS, 
is acceptable.
    TSTF-476, Revision 1 states that the improved BPWS provides the 
following benefits: (1) Allows the plant to reach the all-rods-in 
condition prior to significant reactor cool down, which reduces the 
potential for re-criticality as the reactor cools down; (2) reduces the 
potential for an operator reactivity control error by reducing the 
total number of control rod manipulations; (3) minimizes the need for 
manual scrams during plant shutdowns, resulting in less wear on control 
rod drive (CRD) system components and CRD mechanisms; and, (4) 
eliminates unnecessary control rod manipulations at low power, 
resulting in less wear on reactor manual control and CRD system 
components.
    [PLANT NAME] has been approved to use the improved BPWS, and the 
potential for a CRDA with power below the low power setpoint (LPSP) has 
been eliminated. The safety evaluation for NEDO-33091-A explained that 
the potential for the CRDA will be eliminated by the following changes 
to operational procedures, which [PLANT

[[Page 29009]]

NAME] [has made/will commit to make prior to implementation]:
    1. Before reducing power to the LPSP, operators shall confirm 
control rod coupling integrity for all rods that are fully withdrawn. 
Control rods that have not been confirmed coupled and are in 
intermediate positions must be fully inserted prior to power reduction 
to the LPSP. No action is required for fully-inserted control rods.
    If a shutdown is required and all rods, which are not confirmed 
coupled, cannot be fully inserted prior to power dropping below the 
LPSP, then the original/standard BPWS must be adhered to.
    2. After reactor power drops below the LPSP, rods may be inserted 
from notch position 48 to notch position 00 without stopping at the 
intermediate positions. However, GE Nuclear Energy recommends that 
operators insert rods in the same order as specified for the original/
standard BPWS as much as reasonably possible. If a plant is in the 
process of shutting down following improved BPWS with the power below 
the LPSP, no control rod shall be withdrawn unless the control rod 
pattern is in compliance with standard BPWS requirements.
    In addition to the procedure changes specified above, the staff 
previously verified during its review of NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2 that 
no single failure of the boiling water reactor CRD mechanical or 
hydraulic system can cause a control rod to drop completely out of the 
reactor core during the shutdown process. Therefore, the proper use of 
the improved BPWS will prevent a CRDA from occurring while power is 
below the LPSP.
    The staff finds the proposed Technical Specification changes in 
[PLANT NAME's] amendment request properly incorporate the improved BPWS 
procedure into the STS, and that [PLANT NAME] accurately adopted the 
TSTF-476 changes. Therefore, the staff approves the [PLANT NAME] 
license amendment request to adopt TSTF-476, Revision 1.

4.0 State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [--------] 
State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. 
The State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--
with subsequent disposition by the staff].

5.0 Environmental Consideration

    The amendment[s] change[s] a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or surveillance 
requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves 
no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in 
the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that 
there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative 
occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a 
proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards 
consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding 
published [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]). Accordingly, the amendment meets the 
eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact 
statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection 
with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 Conclusion

    The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed 
above, that (1) There is reasonable assurance that the health and 
safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to 
the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Hardy, SRXB/DSSA, 301-415-4029.

Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    Description of Amendment Request: [Plant name] requests adoption of 
an approved change to the standard technical specifications (STS) for 
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Plants (NUREG-1433 & NUREG-1434) and plant 
specific technical specifications (TS), to allow the use of the 
improved banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) during shutdowns in 
accordance with NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod 
Insertion Process,'' dated July 2004. The changes are consistent with 
NRC approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 
Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-476, Revision 1.
    Basis for proposed no-significant-hazards-consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no-significant-hazards-consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed changes modify the TS to allow the use of the improved 
banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) during shutdowns if the 
conditions of NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod 
Insertion Process,'' July 2004, have been satisfied. The staff finds 
that the licensee's justifications to support the specific TS changes 
are consistent with the approved topical report and TSTF-476, Revision 
1. Since the change only involves changes in control rod sequencing, 
the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not 
significantly increased, if at all. The consequences of an accident 
after adopting TSTF-476 are no different than the consequences of an 
accident prior to adopting TSTF-476. Therefore, the consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated are not significantly affected by this 
change. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated

    The proposed change will not introduce new failure modes or effects 
and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an 
accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents 
previously evaluated. The control rod drop accident (CRDA) is the 
design basis accident for the subject TS changes. This change does not 
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an 
accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The proposed change, TSTF-476, Revision 1, incorporates the 
improved BPWS, previously approved in NEDO-33091-A, into the improved 
TS. The control rod drop accident (CRDA) is the design basis accident 
for the subject TS changes. In order to minimize the impact of a CRDA, 
the BPWS process was developed to minimize control rod reactivity worth 
for BWR plants. The proposed improved BPWS further simplifies the 
control rod insertion process, and in order to evaluate it, the staff 
followed the guidelines of Standard Review Plan Section 15.4.9, and 
referred to General Design Criterion 28 of

[[Page 29010]]

Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 as its regulatory requirement. The TSTF 
stated the improved BPWS provides the following benefits: (1) Allows 
the plant to reach the all-rods-in condition prior to significant 
reactor cool down, which reduces the potential for re-criticality as 
the reactor cools down; (2) reduces the potential for an operator 
reactivity control error by reducing the total number of control rod 
manipulations; (3) minimizes the need for manual scrams during plant 
shutdowns, resulting in less wear on control rod drive (CRD) system 
components and CRD mechanisms; and (4) eliminates unnecessary control 
rod manipulations at low power, resulting in less wear on reactor 
manual control and CRD system components. The addition of procedural 
requirements and verifications specified in NEDO-33091-A, along with 
the proper use of the BPWS will prevent a control rod drop accident 
(CRDA) from occurring while power is below the low power setpoint 
(LPSP). The net change to the margin of safety is insignificant. 
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    Based upon the above discussion of the amendment request, the 
requested change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of May 2007.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Timothy J. Kobetz,
 Branch Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection 
& Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 07-2563 Filed 5-22-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P