[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 97 (Monday, May 21, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 28525-28527]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-9715]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-346, 50-440, 50-334, and 50-412; License Nos. NPF-3, 
NPF-58, DPR-66, NPF-73; EA 07-123]


In the Matter of First Energy Nuclear Operating Company--Davis-
Besse Nuclear Power Plant, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, and Beaver Valley 
Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Demand for Information

I

    FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC or licensee) is the 
holder of four NRC Facility Operating Licenses issued by the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR 
part 50, which authorizes the operation of the specifically named 
facilities in accordance with the conditions specified in each license. 
License No. NPF-3 was issued on April 22, 1977, to operate the Davis-
Besse Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse). License No. NPF-58 was 
issued on November 13, 1986, to operate the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. 
Licenses No. DPR-66 and NPF-73 to operate the Beaver Valley Nuclear 
Plant, Units 1 and 2 were issued on July 2, 1976, and August 14,1987, 
respectively. The facilities are located on the licensee's properties 
near Toledo and Painesville, Ohio, for the Davis-Besse and Perry 
Plants, respectively, and near McCandless, Pennsylvania, for the Beaver 
Valley Nuclear Plant.

II

    On March 8, 2004, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to FENOC and 
approved restart of the Davis-Besse Plant following substantial 
licensee action to evaluate and develop appropriate corrective actions 
for the technical and programmatic issues that were associated with the 
2002 reactor pressure vessel head degradation event.
    On April 21, 2005, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation and 
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of 5,450,000 
dollars involving violations associated with the 2002 Davis-Besse 
reactor pressure vessel head degradation event and the root causes for 
the event. On September 14, 2005, FENOC responded to the Notice of 
Violation, paid the proposed civil penalty and addressed each of the 
violations cited. Its response also addressed FENOC's assessment of the 
root cause for each violation. On January 23, 2006, FENOC provided a 
supplemental reply to the Notice of Violation.
    FENOC obtained a report from its contractor, Exponent Failure 
Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporations (Exponent), dated 
December 2006, prepared in connection with its claim against Nuclear 
Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL), which included an updated analysis 
of the timeline and root cause for the 2002 Davis-Besse reactor 
pressure vessel head degradation event. A significant conclusion of 
this analysis was a determination by Exponent that the time period 
between the beginning of substantial leakage from the reactor pressure 
vessel head nozzle causing the development of the large cavity next to 
the nozzle may have been as short as four months. Previously, FENOC had 
conducted its own technical and programmatic root cause evaluations of 
the event and concluded that the reactor pressure vessel head cavity 
was the result of ongoing nozzle leakage which had gone undetected for 
more than four years. FENOC also obtained a second report, dated in 
December 2006, from

[[Page 28526]]

another contractor, entitled, ``Report on Reactor Pressure Vessel 
Wastage at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant.'' This second report 
included conclusions that appeared to be inconsistent with FENOC's 
previous communications with the NRC and the April 21, 2005, Notice of 
Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties associated with 
the 2002 Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel degradation event.
    In February 2007, NEIL sent to FENOC a letter identifying what NEIL 
believed to be potential safety concerns raised by the Exponent report 
conclusions. Upon receipt of the NEIL letter, the Davis-Besse plant 
staff generated a condition report in its corrective action program to 
document the issue.
    During March 2007, the NRC held several conference calls with the 
Davis-Besse staff to obtain additional information regarding the 
licensee's assessment of the concerns raised in the NEIL letter and to 
understand the licensee's planned actions to address the concerns.
    By letter dated April 2, 2007, the NRC requested the licensee to 
respond, in writing, to four questions regarding information and 
conclusions presented in the Exponent Report to assist the NRC in 
understanding the assumptions, analysis, and conclusions of the 
Exponent Report, and to confirm the information provided during the 
March 2007 conference calls.
    By letter dated May 2, 2007, FENOC provided a written response to 
the NRC's questions. In its response, FENOC stated, among other things, 
that the Exponent Report set forth an informed analysis that more 
accurately characterizes the timeline of the reactor head degradation 
event based upon the use of more recently available test data in 
conjunction with detailed analytical modeling. FENOC's response did not 
indicate whether it had completed a comprehensive review of the 
Exponent Report relative to its previous root cause reports.
    The information provided by the licensee regarding the foregoing 
did not provide the NRC with sufficient information to determine if 
FENOC had conducted a prompt and thorough review of the Exponent 
Report. In particular, the NRC needs additional information to 
determine whether FENOC conducted a timely and comprehensive analysis 
of the assumptions and conclusions of the Exponent Report to assess 
their accuracy relative to the technical and programmatic root cause 
reports previously developed by FENOC and an assessment of whether the 
NRC should have been notified regarding its conclusions. In addition, 
FENOC did not provide the NRC with sufficient information to determine 
if FENOC endorsed the conclusions of the second contractor report and, 
if so, the effect such positions may have regarding its earlier 
responses to the April 2005 enforcement actions.
    In light of the foregoing, further information is needed for the 
Commission to determine whether an Order or other action should be 
taken pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, to provide reasonable assurance that 
FENOC will continue to operate its licensed facilities in accordance 
with the terms of its licenses and the Commission's regulations; in 
particular, to assure that:
    1. FENOC demonstrates an appropriate focus, centered on the timely 
and critical evaluation of information developed internally by FENOC, 
by its contractors, and by industry sources which may affect safety 
assessments of its operating nuclear fleet;
    2. FENOC promptly communicates to the NRC all information that it 
develops, receives, or becomes aware of that has the potential to have 
a significant impact on public health and safety;
    3. FENOC has completed a comprehensive assessment of the 
assumptions and conclusions of the Exponent Report and has determined 
whether the assumptions and conclusions are consistent with the past 
operational experience at the Davis-Besse Plant, the assumptions of the 
previous technical and non-technical root cause reports developed by 
FENOC as a part of its assessment of the 2002 reactor pressure vessel 
head degradation event; and the corrective actions developed and 
implemented by FENOC and relied upon by the NRC as a basis for the 
restart of the Davis-Besse Plant.
    4. FENOC has completed a comprehensive assessment of the 
conclusions of its contractor's report, entitled, ``Report on Reactor 
Pressure Vessel Wastage at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant,'' and 
has determined whether the root cause reports and licensee event 
reports related to the 2002 reactor pressure vessel head degradation 
event and the responses to the NRC Notice of Violation and Proposed 
Imposition of Civil Penalties dated April 21, 2005, should be updated 
to ensure they are complete and accurate in all material respects.

III

    Accordingly, pursuant to sections 161c, 161o, 182 and 186 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations 
in 10 CFR 2.204 and 10 CFR 50.54(f), in order to determine whether your 
licenses should be modified, suspended or revoked, or other action 
should be taken, the licensee is required to submit to the Director, 
Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Assistant General Counsel for 
Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, to the 
Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, 2443 Warrenville, Road, Suite 
210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352 and to the Resident Inspectors, within 30 
days of the date of this Demand for Information the following 
information, in writing, and under oath or affirmation:
    A. A detailed discussion of the process used, the specific 
information evaluated, and the conclusions reached as a part of FENOC's 
assessment of the Exponent Report, upon receipt or subsequently, to 
determine if the Exponent Report assumptions, analyses, conclusions, or 
other related information, should have been reported to the NRC in a 
more prompt manner. Your response shall include sufficient information 
for the NRC to assess how FENOC evaluated the significant differences 
between the crack growth and leakage timelines developed in the 
Exponent Report and previous root cause reports.
    B. A detailed discussion of the differences in assumptions, 
analyses, conclusions, and other related information of the Exponent 
Report and previous technical and programmatic root cause reports, 
developed following the 2002 Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head 
degradation event. Your response shall address, among other matters you 
believe warranted, differences between the operational experience data, 
such as the origin and presence of boric acid deposits and corrosion 
products on air coolers, radiation filters, the reactor vessel head, 
and other components in the containment, and the Exponent Report 
assumptions for these items. Your response shall also indicate if 
differences in the Exponent Report assumptions, analyses, information, 
or conclusions and previous root cause reports demonstrate a need for 
any new or different corrective actions relative to the 2002 Davis-
Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event and related 
issues. Your response shall also address the impact on the continued 
effectiveness of your corrective actions.
    C. With regard to the ``Report on Reactor Pressure Vessel Wastage 
at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant,'' dated December 2006, indicate 
if

[[Page 28527]]

FENOC endorses the report's conclusions. If so, your response shall set 
forth your assessment of whether this position is in conflict with 
previous root cause and licensee event reports regarding the 2002 
Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event and FENOC's 
responses to the NRC Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of 
Civil Penalties, dated April 21, 2005. Your response shall also address 
the impact on the continued effectiveness of your corrective actions.
    After reviewing your response, the NRC will determine whether 
further action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory 
requirements.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Dated this 14th day of May, 2007.
Cynthia A. Carpenter,
Director, Office of Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E7-9715 Filed 5-18-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P