[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 59 (Wednesday, March 28, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14555-14572]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-5639]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[AU Docket No. 06-214; Report No. AUC-07-72-B (Auction No. 72); DA 07-
514]


Auction of Phase II 220 MHz Service Spectrum Scheduled for June 
20, 2007; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront 
Payments and Other Procedures for Auction No. 72

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This document announces the procedures and minimum opening 
bids for the upcoming auction of certain Phase II 220 MHz Service 
Spectrum (Auction No. 72). This document is intended to familiarize 
prospective bidders with the procedures and minimum opening bids for 
this auction.

DATES: Applications to participate in Phase II 220 MHz Service Spectrum 
Auction No. 72 must be filed before 6 p.m. ET on April 20, 2007. 
Bidding for Auction No. 72 is scheduled to begin on June 20, 2007.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 
Auctions Spectrum and Access Division: For legal questions: Howard 
Davenport at (202) 418-0660. For general auction questions: Debbie 
Smith or Barbara Sibert at (717) 338-2868.
    Mobility Division: For service rule questions: Allen Barna (legal) 
or Gary Devlin (technical) at (202) 418-0620. To request materials in 
accessible formats (Braille, large print, electronic files, audio 
format) for people with disabilities, send an e-mail to [email protected] 
or call the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 
or (202) 418-0432 (TTY).

[[Page 14556]]


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 72 
Procedures Public Notice released on February 26, 2007. The complete 
text of the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice, including 
attachments, as well as related Commission documents are available for 
public inspection and copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time 
(ET) Monday through Thursday or from 8 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on Friday at 
the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., 
Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. The Auction No. 72 Procedures 
Public Notice and related Commission documents may also be purchased 
from the Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, 
Inc. (BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, 
Washington, DC, 20554, telephone 202-488-5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, 
or Web site: http://www.BCPIWEB.com. When ordering documents from BCPI, 
please provide the appropriate FCC document number, for example, DA 07-
30 for the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice. The Auction No. 72 
Procedures Public Notice and related documents are also available on 
the Internet at the Commission's Web site: http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/72/.

I. General Information

A. Introduction

    1. The Commission announces the procedures and minimum opening bid 
amounts for the upcoming auction of Phase II 220 MHz Service licenses 
in the paired 220-222 MHz band scheduled to begin on June 20, 2007 
(Auction No. 72). On December 12, 2006, in accordance with Section 
309(j)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau) released a public notice seeking 
comment on reserve prices or minimum opening bid amounts and the 
procedures to be used in Auction No. 72. The Bureau received one 
comment and no reply comments in response to the Auction No. 72 Comment 
Public Notice, 71 FR 76332, December 20, 2006.
    2. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to include all 94 Phase II 220 MHz Service licenses in a single auction 
using the Commission's standard simultaneous multiple-round (SMR) 
auction format. The Bureau sought comment on the feasibility and 
desirability of allocating the Phase II 220 MHz Service licenses using 
the Commission's package bidding format (SMR-PB). Based on the record 
and the particular circumstances of the auction of Phase II 220 MHz 
Service licenses, the Bureau will include all 94 Phase II 220 MHz 
Service licenses in a single auction using the Commission's standard 
SMR format, as proposed. Package bidding will not be used in Auction 
No. 72.
    3. The Bureau also sought comment in the Auction No. 72 Comment 
Public Notice on whether to implement procedures that would limit the 
disclosure of certain information on bidder interests, and identities 
prior to the close of bidding. The Bureau asked commenters to indicate 
what factors weigh for or against limiting disclosure of bidder 
interests and identities, and whether the Commission should condition 
the use of any disclosure limits on a measure of competition in the 
auction.
    4. For Auction No. 72, the Bureau will determine the information 
procedures based primarily on the eligibility ratio, a measure of 
likely competition in the auction. The eligibility ratio is defined as 
the total number of bidding units of eligibility purchased by bidders 
through their upfront payments, divided by the total number of bidding 
units for the licenses in the auction. Specifically, if the eligibility 
ratio equals or exceeds three, the Bureau will not use the limited 
information procedures, since with sufficient likely competition, the 
anti-competitive behavior that limited information procedures aim to 
deter is unlikely to be successful. If the eligibility ratio is less 
than three, in general the Bureau will withhold certain information on 
bidder interests and bidder identities. However, if the eligibility 
ratio is less than three, the Commission reserves the discretion not to 
limit information on bidder interests and identities if circumstances 
indicate that limited information procedures would not be an effective 
tool for deterring anti-competitive behavior. Such circumstances would 
occur, for example, if only two applicants became qualified to 
participate in the bidding, since limited information procedures would 
be ineffective in preventing bidders from knowing the identity of the 
competing bidder.
    5. In the event that the conditions described above result in the 
use of procedures under which certain information is withheld, the 
Bureau will release: (1) Each bidder's eligibility and upfront payment 
made prior to the start of the auction; and (2) the amounts of all 
gross bids including the losing bids for each license after each round, 
but not the identities of the bidders placing the bids. The Bureau 
believes this provides bidders with information regarding license 
valuations without compromising the goal of reducing the potential for 
anti-competitive outcomes.
    6. Pursuant to these procedures, information on the license 
selections of auction applicants will be withheld at least until the 
upfront payment deadline has passed and the Commission determines the 
information procedures that will be used for the auction. Therefore, to 
enable applicants to comply with the Commission's anti-collusion rules, 
once the Bureau has conducted its initial review of applications to 
participate in Auction No. 72, each applicant will receive a letter 
that lists the other applicants in Auction No. 72 that have applied for 
licenses in any of the same geographic areas as the applicant.
 i. Background of Proceeding
    7. Licenses in the Phase II 220 MHz spectrum to be auctioned in 
Auction No. 72 have been offered previously in other auctions but were 
returned to the Commission as a result of license cancellation or 
termination. In March 1997, the Commission restructured the licensing 
framework that governs the 220 MHz Service. Site-specific licensing, 
used in the Phase I 220 MHz Service, was replaced with a geographic-
based system in the Phase II 220 MHz Service. This geographic-based 
licensing methodology is similar to that used in other commercial 
mobile radio services (CMRS). The Commission developed three types of 
geographic area licenses for the Phase II 220 MHz Service. The first 
type of license was based upon Economic Areas (EAs), developed by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. In 
addition, the Commission created three EA-type license areas to cover 
the following United States territories: American Samoa; the U.S. 
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico; and Guam and the Northern Mariana 
Islands. The second type of license, known as Economic Area Groupings 
(EAGs), included 6 groups of EAs, which collectively encompassed all of 
the EA and EA-type licenses. Finally, the Commission designed three 
nationwide licenses, each of which encompassed all six EAGs. Service 
and operational requirements for the Phase II 220 MHz Service are 
contained primarily in part 90 of the Commission's Rules, 47 CFR part 
90.
ii. Licenses To Be Auctioned
    8. Auction No. 72 will offer 94 licenses: 93 Economic Area (EA) 
licenses and one Economic Area Grouping (EAG) license.
    9. Certain licenses for Phase II 220 MHz Service in Auction No. 72 
are

[[Page 14557]]

available for only part of a market. In addition, one license available 
for only part of a market also covers less bandwidth. The licenses 
available in this auction are listed in Attachment A of the Auction No. 
72 Procedures Public Notice. The Phase II 220 MHz spectrum covered by 
this auction is only available to non-Government applicants.

B. Rules and Disclaimers

 i. Relevant Authority
    10. Prospective applicants must familiarize themselves thoroughly 
with the Commission's general competitive bidding rules set forth in 
Title 47 CFR including recent amendments and clarifications; rules 
relating to the Phase II 220 MHz Service contained in Title 47, part 90 
and rules relating to applications, practice and procedure contained in 
Title 47, part 1. Prospective applicants must also be thoroughly 
familiar with the procedures, terms and conditions (collectively, 
terms) contained in the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice and the 
Commission's decisions in proceedings regarding competitive bidding 
procedures, application requirements, and obligations of Commission 
licensees.
    11. The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders, 
and public notices are not negotiable. The Commission may amend or 
supplement the information contained in its public notices at any time, 
and will issue public notices to convey any new or supplemental 
information to applicants. It is the responsibility of all applicants 
to remain current with all Commission rules and with all public notices 
pertaining to this auction.
 ii. Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance With Antitrust Laws
    12. To ensure the competitiveness of the auction process Sec.  
1.2105(c) of the Commission's rules prohibit applicants competing for 
licenses in any of the same geographic license areas from communicating 
with each other about bids, bidding strategies, or settlements unless 
such applicants have identified each other on their short-form 
applications (FCC Forms 175) as parties with whom they have entered 
into agreements pursuant to Sec.  1.2105(a)(2)(viii). In Auction No. 
72, the rule would apply to any applicants for licenses in the same EA 
or EAG. The rule would also apply to applicants for licenses in 
overlapping EAs and the EAG. For example, assume that one applicant 
applies for an EAG license and a second applicant applies for an EA 
license covering any area within that EAG. The two entities will have 
applied for licenses covering the same geographic areas and would be 
precluded from communicating with each other under the rule. In 
addition, the rule would preclude applicants that apply to bid for all 
licenses from communicating with all other applicants. Thus, applicants 
that have applied for licenses covering the same markets (unless they 
have identified each other on their FCC Form 175 applications as 
parties with whom they have entered into agreements under Sec.  
1.2105(a)(2)(viii)) must affirmatively avoid all communications with or 
disclosures to each other that affect or have the potential to affect 
bids or bidding strategy, which may include communications regarding 
the post-auction market structure. This prohibition begins at the 
short-form application filing deadline and ends at the downpayment 
deadline after the auction. This prohibition applies to all applicants 
regardless of whether such applicants become qualified bidders or 
actually bid. Information concerning applicants' license selections 
will not be made public at least until the upfront payment deadline has 
passed and the Commission determines the information procedures that 
will be used for the auction. Therefore, the Commission will inform 
each applicant by letter of the identity of each of the other 
applicants that has applied for licenses covering any of the same 
geographic areas as the licenses that it has selected in its short-form 
application.
    13. For purposes of this prohibition Sec.  1.2105(c)(7)(i) defines 
applicant as including all officers and directors of the entity 
submitting a short-form application to participate in the auction, all 
controlling interests of that entity, as well as all holders of 
partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest 
amounting to 10 percent or more of the entity, or outstanding stock, or 
outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting a short-form 
application.
    14. Applicants for licenses for any of the same geographic license 
areas must not communicate directly or indirectly about bids or bidding 
strategy. Accordingly, such applicants are encouraged not to use the 
same individual as an authorized bidder. A violation of the anti-
collusion rule could occur if an individual acts as the authorized 
bidder for two or more competing applicants, and conveys information 
concerning the substance of bids or bidding strategies between such 
applicants. Also, if the authorized bidders are different individuals 
employed by the same organization (e.g., law firm or engineering firm 
or consulting firm), a violation similarly could occur. In such a case, 
at a minimum, applicants should certify on their applications that 
precautionary steps have been taken to prevent communication between 
authorized bidders and that applicants and their bidding agents will 
comply with the anti-collusion rule. A violation of the anti-collusion 
rule could occur in other contexts, such as an individual serving as an 
officer for two or more applicants. Moreover, the Commission has found 
a violation of the anti-collusion rule where a bidder used the 
Commission's bidding system to disclose its bidding strategy in a 
manner that explicitly invited other auction participants to cooperate 
and collaborate in specific markets, and has placed auction 
participants on notice that the use of its bidding system to disclose 
market information to competitors will not be tolerated and will 
subject bidders to sanctions. Bidders are cautioned that the Commission 
remains vigilant about prohibited communications taking place in other 
situations. For example, the Commission has warned that prohibited 
communications concerning bids and bidding strategies may include 
communications regarding capital calls or requests for additional funds 
in support of bids or bidding strategies to the extent such 
communications convey information concerning the bids and bidding 
strategies directly or indirectly. Applicants are hereby placed on 
notice that public disclosure of information relating to bidder 
interests and bidder identities that--although revealed prior to and 
during other Commission auctions--is confidential in this auction at 
the time of disclosure may violate the anti-collusion rule. Bidders 
should use caution in their dealings with other parties, such as 
members of the press, financial analysts, or others who might become a 
conduit for the communication of prohibited bidding information.
    15. The Commission's rules do not prohibit applicants from entering 
into otherwise lawful bidding agreements before filing their short-form 
applications, as long as they disclose the existence of the 
agreement(s) in their short-form application. If parties agree in 
principle on all material terms prior to the short-form filing 
deadline, each party to the agreement must identify the other party or 
parties to the agreement on its short-form application under Sec.  
1.2105(c), even if the agreement has not been reduced to writing. If 
the parties have not agreed in principle by the short-form filing 
deadline, they should not include the names of parties

[[Page 14558]]

to discussions on their applications, and they may not continue 
negotiations, discussions or communications with any other applicants 
after the short-form filing deadline.
    16. By electronically submitting its short-form application 
following the electronic filing procedures set forth in Attachment C to 
the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice, each applicant certifies 
its compliance with Sec.  1.2105(c). However, the Bureau cautions that 
merely filing a certifying statement as part of an application will not 
outweigh specific evidence that collusive behavior has occurred, nor 
will it preclude the initiation of an investigation when warranted. The 
Commission has stated that it intends to scrutinize carefully any 
instances in which bidding patterns suggest that collusion may be 
occurring. Any applicant found to have violated the anti-collusion rule 
may be subject to sanctions.
    17. Applicants are also reminded that, regardless of compliance 
with the Commission's rules, they remain subject to the antitrust laws, 
which are designed to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the 
marketplace. Compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
Commission's anti-collusion rule will not insulate a party from 
enforcement of the antitrust laws. For instance, a violation of the 
antitrust laws could arise out of actions taking place well before any 
party submits a short form application. The Commission has cited a 
number of examples of potentially anticompetitive actions that would be 
prohibited under antitrust laws: for example, actual or potential 
competitors may not agree to divide territories horizontally in order 
to minimize competition, regardless of whether they split a market in 
which they both do business, or whether they merely reserve one market 
for one and another for the other. Similarly, the Bureau has long 
reminded potential applicants and others that even where the applicant 
discloses parties with whom it has reached an agreement on the short-
form application, thereby permitting discussions with those parties, 
the applicant is nevertheless subject to existing antitrust laws. To 
the extent the Commission becomes aware of specific allegations that 
may give rise to violations of the federal antitrust laws, the 
Commission may refer such allegations to the United States Department 
of Justice for investigation. If an applicant is found to have violated 
the antitrust laws or the Commission's rules in connection with its 
participation in the competitive bidding process, it may be subject to 
forfeiture of its upfront payment, down payment, or full bid amount and 
may be prohibited from participating in future auctions, among other 
sanctions.
    18. Section 1.65 of the Commission's rules requires an applicant to 
maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its 
pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days of any 
substantial change that may be of decisional significance to that 
application. Thus Sec.  1.65 requires an auction applicant to notify 
the Commission of any substantial change to the information or 
certifications included in its pending short-form application. 
Applicants are therefore required by Sec.  1.65 to report to the 
Commission any communications they have made to or received from 
another applicant after the short-form filing deadline that affect or 
have the potential to affect bids or bidding strategy unless such 
communications are made to or received from parties to agreements 
identified under Sec.  1.2105(a)(2)(viii). In addition Sec.  
1.2105(c)(6) provides that any applicant that makes or receives a 
communication prohibited by Sec.  1.2105(c) must report such 
communication to the Commission in writing immediately, and in no case 
later than five business days after the communication occurs.
    19. Applicants that are winning bidders will be required to 
disclose in their long-form applications the specific terms, 
conditions, and parties involved in any bidding consortia, joint 
ventures, partnerships, and other arrangements entered into relating to 
the competitive bidding process.
    20. A summary listing of documents issued by the Commission and the 
Bureau addressing the application of the anti-collusion rule may be 
found in Attachment F of the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice.
 iii. Protection of Incumbent Operations
    21. Potential applicants are advised that there are a number of 
incumbent Phase I 220 MHz Service licensees already licensed and 
operating on frequencies between 220 and 222 MHz. Such Phase I 
incumbents must be protected from harmful interference by Phase II 220 
MHz Service licensees in accordance with the Commission's rules. These 
limitations may restrict the ability of Phase II geographic area 
licensees to use certain portions of the electromagnetic spectrum or 
provide service to certain areas in their geographic license areas.
a. International Coordination
    22. Potential bidders seeking licenses for geographic areas that 
are near the Canadian or Mexican borders should be aware that the use 
of some or all of the channels they acquire in the auction could be 
restricted by agreements with Canada or Mexico on the use of 220-222 
MHz spectrum in the border area.
b. Quiet Zones
    23. Phase II 220 MHz Service licensees must protect the radio quiet 
zones set forth in the Commission's rules. Licensees are cautioned that 
they must receive the appropriate approvals directly from the relevant 
quiet zone entity prior to operating within the areas described in the 
Commission's rules.
 iv. Due Diligence
    24. The Bureau cautions potential applicants formulating their 
bidding strategies to investigate and consider the extent to which 
Phase II 220 MHz frequencies are occupied. Applicants and their 
investors should also understand that Commission rules and requirements 
place limitations on the ability of Phase II 220 MHz Service licensees 
to use this spectrum. Incumbent Phase I 220 MHz Service operations in 
the 220-222 MHz band must be protected. These limitations may restrict 
the ability of Phase II 220 MHz Service geographic area licensees to 
use certain portions of the electromagnetic spectrum or provide service 
to certain areas in their geographic license areas. Bidders should 
become familiar with the status of these operations, applicable 
Commission rules, orders and any pending proceedings related to the 
service, in order to make reasoned, appropriate decisions about their 
participation in Auction No. 72 and their bidding strategy.
    25. Potential bidders are reminded that they are solely responsible 
for investigating and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors 
that may have a bearing on the value of the Phase II 220 MHz Service 
licenses in this auction. The FCC makes no representations or 
warranties about the use of this spectrum for particular services. 
Applicants should be aware that an FCC auction represents an 
opportunity to become an FCC licensee in the Phase II 220 MHz Service 
subject to certain conditions and regulations. An FCC auction does not 
constitute an endorsement by the FCC of any particular service, 
technology, or product, nor does an FCC license constitute a guarantee 
of business success. Applicants should perform

[[Page 14559]]

their individual due diligence before proceeding as they would with any 
new business venture.
    26. Potential bidders are strongly encouraged to conduct their own 
research prior to the beginning of bidding in Auction No. 72 in order 
to determine the existence of any pending administrative or judicial 
proceedings that might affect their decision regarding participation in 
the auction. Participants in Auction No. 72 are strongly encouraged to 
continue such research throughout the auction. In addition, potential 
bidders should perform technical analyses sufficient to assure 
themselves that, should they prevail in competitive bidding for a 
specific license, they will be able to build and operate facilities 
that will fully comply with the Commission's technical and legal 
requirements as well as other applicable federal, state and local laws.
    27. Applicants should also be aware that certain pending and future 
proceedings, including applications, including those for modification, 
petitions for rulemaking, requests for special temporary authority, 
waiver requests, petitions to deny, petitions for reconsideration, 
informal oppositions, and applications for review, before the 
Commission may relate to particular applicants or incumbent licensees 
or the licenses available in Auction No. 72. In addition, pending and 
future judicial proceedings may relate to particular applicants or 
incumbent licensees, or the licenses available in Auction No. 72. 
Prospective bidders are responsible for assessing the likelihood of the 
various possible outcomes, and considering their potential impact on 
spectrum licenses available in this auction.
    28. Applicants should perform due diligence to identify and 
consider all proceedings that may affect the spectrum licenses being 
auctioned and that could have an impact on the availability of spectrum 
for Auction No. 72. In addition, although the Commission may continue 
to act on various pending applications, informal objections, petitions, 
and other requests for Commission relief, some of these matters may not 
be resolved by the beginning of bidding in the auction.
    29. Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated 
risks and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such 
matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make 
use of licenses available in Auction No. 72.
    30. Applicants may use the Bureau's licensing databases at http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls to obtain information about incumbent licenses 
that may affect the availability of the spectrum for which licenses are 
offered in Auction No. 72.
    31. The Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding 
the accuracy or completeness of information in its databases or any 
third party databases, including, for example, court docketing systems. 
To the extent the Commission's databases may not include all 
information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant, applicants 
may obtain or verify such information from independent sources or 
assume the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said databases. 
Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations or guarantees 
regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that has been 
provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into its databases.
    32. Potential applicants are strongly encouraged to physically 
inspect any prospective sites located in, or near, the service area for 
which they plan to bid, and also to familiarize themselves with the 
environmental review obligations.
 v. Use of Integrated Spectrum Auction System
    33. The Commission will make available a browser-based bidding 
system to allow bidders to participate in Auction No. 72 over the 
Internet using the Commission's Integrated Spectrum Auction System 
(ISAS or FCC Auction System). The Commission makes no warranty 
whatsoever with respect to the FCC Auction System. In no event shall 
the Commission, or any of its officers, employees or agents, be liable 
for any damages whatsoever (including, but not limited to, loss of 
business profits, business interruption, loss of business information, 
or any other loss) arising out of or relating to the existence, 
furnishing, functioning or use of the FCC Auction System that is 
accessible to qualified bidders in connection with this auction. 
Moreover, no obligation or liability will arise out of the Commission's 
technical, programming or other advice or service provided in 
connection with the FCC Auction System.
 vi. Bidder Alerts
    34. As is the case with many business investment opportunities, 
some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use Auction No. 72 to 
deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Information about deceptive 
telemarketing investment schemes is available from the Commission as 
well as the FTC and SEC. Complaints about specific deceptive 
telemarketing investment schemes should be directed to the FTC, the 
SEC, or the National Fraud Information Center.
 vii. Environmental Review Requirements
    35. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules regarding 
implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act and other 
federal environmental statutes. The construction of a wireless antenna 
facility is a federal action and the licensee must comply with the 
Commission's environmental rules for each such facility. The 
Commission's environmental rules require, among other things, that the 
licensee consult with expert agencies having environmental 
responsibilities, including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
State Historic Preservation Office, the Army Corps of Engineers and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (through the local authority with 
jurisdiction over floodplains). In assessing the effect of facilities 
construction on historic properties, the licensee must follow the 
provisions of the Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the 
Section 106 National Historic Preservation Act Review Process. The 
licensee must prepare environmental assessments for facilities that may 
have a significant impact in or on wilderness areas, wildlife 
preserves, threatened or endangered species or designated critical 
habitats, historical or archaeological sites, Indian religious sites, 
floodplains, and surface features. The licensee also must prepare 
environmental assessments for facilities that include high intensity 
white lights in residential neighborhoods or excessive radio frequency 
emission.

C. Auction Specifics

 i. Auction Date
    36. Bidding in Auction No. 72 will begin on Wednesday, June 20, 
2007, as announced in the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice.
    37. In response to the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, a 
commenter seeks a delay of several months in the start of Auction No. 
72. The Bureau does not believe that it would be in the public interest 
to do so. The commenter argues for a delay to enable the Commission to 
complete the processing of applications for the assignment of certain 
220 MHz licenses to an affiliate of the commenter. Generally, the 
Commission has held that the existence of related pending proceedings 
is not a sufficient reason to delay an auction. Similarly, the 
Commission has observed that Section 309(j)(3)(E)(ii)'s statutory

[[Page 14560]]

requirement to provide prospective bidders with time to develop 
business plans and evaluate the availability of equipment does not 
require the Commission to postpone an auction until every external 
factor that might influence a bidder's business plan is resolved with 
absolute certainty. Further, the Bureau notes that the application 
identified by the commenter has been acted upon. The commenter provides 
no legal or policy reason, other than its concern about the processing 
of the identified assignment application, in support of its request for 
postponement. In furtherance of the statutory objectives underlying the 
Commission's auctions process, including promoting the rapid deployment 
of new technologies and services to the public, and enhancing economic 
opportunity and competition, the Bureau determined that the public 
interest would be served by proceeding with the auction as scheduled. 
The initial schedule for bidding will be announced by public notice at 
least one week before the start of the auction.
    38. Unless otherwise announced, bidding on all licenses will be 
conducted on each business day until bidding has stopped on all 
licenses.
 ii. Auction Title
    39. Auction No. 72--Phase II 220 MHz.
 iii. Bidding Methodology
    40. The bidding methodology for Auction No. 72 will be simultaneous 
multiple round bidding. The Commission will conduct this auction over 
the Internet using the FCC Auction System, and telephonic bidding will 
be available as well. Qualified bidders are permitted to bid 
electronically via the Internet or by telephone. All telephone calls 
are recorded.
 iv. Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines
    41. Dates and Deadlines

Auction Seminar: April 11, 2007.
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Opens: April 11, 
2007; 12 noon ET.
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Deadline: April 
20, 2007; prior to 6 p.m. ET.
Upfront Payments (via wire transfer): May 21, 2007; 6 p.m. ET.
Mock Auction: June 18, 2007.
Auction Begins: June 20, 2007.
 v. Requirements for Participation
    42. Those wishing to participate in the auction must: (1) Submit a 
short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6 p.m. 
Eastern Time (ET), April 20, 2007, following the electronic filing 
procedures set forth in Attachment C to the Auction No. 72 Procedures 
Public Notice; (2) submit a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC 
Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159) by 6 p.m. ET, May 21, 2007, 
following the procedures and instructions set forth in Attachment D to 
the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice; and (3) comply with all 
provisions outlined in the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice and 
applicable Commission rules. For example, the Phase II 220 MHz spectrum 
covered by this auction is only available to non-Government applicants 
under Sec.  90.721(b) of those rules, 47 CFR 90.721(b).

II. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Requirements

    43. Entities seeking licenses available in Auction No. 72 must file 
a short-form application electronically via the FCC Auction System 
prior to 6 p.m. ET on April 20, 2007, following the procedures 
prescribed in Attachment C to the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public 
Notice. If an applicant claims eligibility for a bidding credit, the 
information provided in its FCC Form 175 will be used in determining 
whether the applicant is eligible for the claimed bidding credit. 
Applicants bear full responsibility for submitting accurate, complete 
and timely short-form applications. All applicants must certify on 
their short-form applications under penalty of perjury that they are 
legally, technically, financially and otherwise qualified to hold a 
license. Applicants should read the instructions set forth in 
Attachment C to the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice carefully 
and should consult the Commission's rules to ensure that, in addition 
to the materials all the information that is required under the 
Commission's rules is included with their short-form applications.
    44. An entity may not submit more than one short-form application 
for a single auction. In the event that a party submits multiple short-
form applications, only one application will be accepted for filing.
    45. Applicants also should note that submission of a short-form 
application and any amendments thereto constitutes a representation by 
the certifying official that he or she is an authorized representative 
of the applicant, that he or she has read the form's instructions and 
certifications, and that the contents of the application, its 
certifications, and any attachments are true and correct. Applicants 
are not permitted to make major modifications to their applications; 
such impermissible changes include a change of the certifying official 
to the application. Submission of a false certification to the 
Commission may result in penalties, including monetary forfeitures, 
license forfeitures, ineligibility to participate in future auctions, 
and/or criminal prosecution.

A. Preferences for Small Businesses and Others

 i. Size Standards for Bidding Credits
    46. A bidding credit represents the amount by which a bidder's 
winning bid will be discounted. For Auction No. 72, bidding credits 
will be available to small businesses and very small businesses, and 
consortia thereof, as follows: (1) A bidder with attributed average 
annual gross revenues that exceed $3 million and do not exceed $15 
million for the preceding three years (small business) will receive a 
25 percent discount on its winning bid and (2) a bidder with attributed 
average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $3 million for the 
preceding three years (very small business) will receive a 35 percent 
discount on its winning bid.
    47. Bidding credits are not cumulative; a qualifying applicant 
receives either the 25 percent or 35 percent bidding credit on its 
winning bid, but not both.
    48. Every applicant that claims eligibility for a bidding credit as 
either a small business or a very small business, or a consortium of 
small businesses or very small businesses, will be required to provide 
information regarding revenues attributable to the applicant, its 
affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its 
controlling interests on its FCC Form 175 short-form application to 
establish that it satisfies the applicable eligibility requirement. 
Applicants claiming eligibility as a designated entity in Auction No. 
72 should review carefully the CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM, 71 
FR 6992, February 10, 2006, and the Designated Entity Second Report and 
Order, 71 FR 26245, May 5, 2006. In that connection, the Commission 
adopted rules governing eligibility for designated entity benefits in 
the Designated Entity Second Report and Order. The Commission's new 
rules regarding applicants seeking eligibility for designated entity 
benefits requires the disclosure of a list of all parties with which 
the applicant has entered into arrangements for the lease or resale 
including wholesale agreements of any of the capacity of any of the 
applicant's spectrum; and a list, separately and in the aggregate, of 
the gross revenues of entities with which the applicant has an

[[Page 14561]]

attributable material relationship, as defined in Sec.  
1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(B).
    49. The Commission has adopted a narrow exemption from the 
attribution rule for the officers and directors of a rural telephone 
cooperative pursuant to which the gross revenues of the affiliates of 
the cooperative's officers and directors are not attributed to the 
applicant. An applicant (or controlling interest) seeking to claim this 
exemption must include in its short-form application a certification 
that it is validly organized under the most closely applicable 
organizing statute for a cooperative, and that such organization is 
reflected in its articles of incorporation, by-laws, and/or other 
relevant organic documents. Applicants seeking to claim this exemption 
must meet all of the conditions specified in Sec.  1.2110(b)(3)(iii) of 
the Commission's rules. Additional guidance on completing the FCC Form 
175 to claim this exemption may be found in Attachment C to the 
Auctions No. 72 Procedures Public Notice.
 ii. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit
    50. To encourage the growth of wireless services in federally 
recognized tribal lands, the Commission has implemented a tribal lands 
bidding credit.
 iii. Installment Payments
    51. Installment payment plans will not be available in Auction No. 
72.

B. License Selection

    52. In Auction No. 72, applicants must select the licenses on which 
they want to bid from the Eligible Licenses list. In Auction No. 72, 
FCC Form 175 will include a filtering mechanism that allows an 
applicant to filter the available licenses. The applicant will make 
selections for one or more of the filter criteria and the system will 
produce a list of licenses satisfying the specified criteria. The 
applicant may select all the licenses in the customized list or select 
individual licenses from the list. Applicants also will be able to 
select licenses from one customized list and then create additional 
customized lists to select additional licenses. There will be no 
opportunity to change license selection after the short-form filing 
deadline. It is critically important that an applicant confirm its 
license selections before submitting its short-form application because 
the FCC Auction System will not accept bids on licenses that an 
applicant has not selected on its FCC Form 175.

C. Disclosure of Bidding Arrangements

    53. Applicants will be required to identify in their short-form 
applications all parties with whom they have entered into any 
agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind relating to the 
licenses being auctioned, including any agreements relating to post-
auction market structure. Applicants also will be required to certify 
under penalty of perjury in their short-form applications that they 
have not entered and will not enter into any explicit or implicit 
agreements, arrangements or understandings of any kind with any 
parties, other than those identified in the application, regarding the 
amount of their bids, bidding strategies, or the particular licenses on 
which they will or will not bid. If an applicant has had discussions, 
but has not reached a joint bidding agreement by the short-form 
application filing deadline, it would not include the names of parties 
to the discussions on its application and may not continue such 
discussions with any applicants after the deadline.
    54. After the filing of short-form applications, the Commission's 
rules do not prohibit a party holding a non-controlling, attributable 
interest in one applicant from acquiring an ownership interest in or 
entering into a joint bidding arrangement with other applicants 
provided that (i) the attributable interest holder certifies that it 
has not and will not communicate with any party concerning the bids or 
bidding strategies of more than one of the applicants in which it holds 
an attributable interest, or with which it has entered into a joint 
bidding arrangement; and (ii) the arrangements do not result in a 
change in control of any of the applicants. While the anti-collusion 
rules do not prohibit non-auction-related business negotiations among 
auction applicants, applicants are reminded that certain discussions or 
exchanges could touch upon impermissible subject matters because they 
may convey pricing information and bidding strategies. Further, as 
discussed above, compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
Commission's anti-collusion rule will not insulate a party from 
enforcement of the antitrust laws.

D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements

    55. All applicants must comply with the uniform part 1 ownership 
disclosure standards and provide information required by Sec. Sec.  
1.2105 and 1.2112 of the Commission's rules. Specifically, in 
completing the short-form application, applicants will be required to 
fully disclose information on the real party or parties-in-interest and 
ownership structure of the applicant. The ownership disclosure 
standards for the short form are prescribed in Sec. Sec.  1.2105 and 
1.2112 of the Commission's rules. Each applicant is responsible for 
information submitted in its short-form application being complete and 
accurate.
    56. An applicant's most current ownership information on file with 
the Commission, if in an electronic format compatible with the short-
form application (FCC Form 175) (such as information submitted in an 
on-line FCC Form 602 or in an FCC Form 175 filed for a previous auction 
using ISAS) will automatically be entered into the applicant's short-
form application. Applicants are responsible for ensuring that the 
information submitted in their FCC Form 175 for Auction No. 72 is 
complete and accurate. Accordingly, applicants should carefully review 
any information automatically entered to confirm that it is complete 
and accurate as of the deadline for filing the short-form application. 
Applicants can update any information that was entered automatically 
and needs to be changed directly in the short-form application.

E. Bidding Credit Revenue Disclosures

    57. To determine which applicants qualify for bidding credits as 
small businesses or very small businesses, the Commission considers the 
gross revenues of the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling 
interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests. Therefore, 
entities applying to bid as small businesses or very small businesses 
(or consortia of small businesses or very small businesses) will be 
required to disclose on their FCC Form 175 short-form applications the 
gross revenues of each of the following for the preceding three years: 
(1) The applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its controlling interests, 
and (4) the affiliates of its controlling interests. Certification that 
the average annual gross revenues of such entities and individuals for 
the preceding three years do not exceed the applicable limit is not 
sufficient. In order to comply with the Commission's disclosure 
requirements for bidding credit eligibility, an applicant must provide 
separately for itself, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and 
the affiliates of its controlling interests, the gross revenues for 
each of the preceding three years. If the applicant is applying as a 
consortium of small businesses or very small businesses, this 
information must be provided for each consortium member.

[[Page 14562]]

    58. Controlling interests of an applicant include individuals and 
entities with either de facto or de jure control of the applicant. 
Typically, ownership of at least 50.1 percent of an entity's voting 
stock evidences de jure control. De facto control is determined on a 
case-by-case basis. The following are some common indicia of de facto 
control: (1) The entity constitutes or appoints more than 50 percent of 
the board of directors or management committee; (2) the entity has 
authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire senior executives that 
control the day-to-day activities of the licensee and (3) the entity 
plays an integral role in management decisions.
    59. Officers and directors of an applicant are also considered to 
have controlling interest in the applicant. The Commission does not 
impose specific equity requirements on controlling interest holders. 
Once the principals or entities with a controlling interest are 
determined, only the revenues of those principals or entities, the 
affiliates of those principals or entities, and the applicant and its 
affiliates will be counted in determining small business eligibility.
    60. In recent years the Commission has made modifications to its 
rules governing the attribution of gross revenues for purposes of 
determining small business eligibility. These changes include exempting 
the gross revenues of the affiliates of a rural telephone cooperative's 
officers and directors from attribution to the applicant if certain 
specified conditions are met. The Commission has also clarified that, 
in calculating an applicant's gross revenues under the controlling 
interest standard, it will not attribute the personal net worth, 
including personal income, of its officers and directors to the 
applicant.
    61. A consortium of small businesses or very small businesses is a 
conglomerate organization composed of two or more entities, each of 
which individually satisfies the definition of a small business or very 
small business as those terms are defined in the service-specific 
rules. Thus, each member of a consortium of small or very small 
businesses that applies to participate in Auction No. 72 must 
individually meet the definition of small business or very small 
business adopted by the Commission for the Phase II 220 MHz Service. 
Each consortium member must disclose its gross revenues along with 
those of its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates 
of its controlling interests. Although the gross revenues of the 
consortium members will not be aggregated for purposes of determining 
the consortium's eligibility as a small business or very small 
business, this information must be provided to ensure that each 
individual consortium member qualifies for any bidding credit awarded 
to the consortium.

F. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters

    62. Each applicant must state under penalty of perjury on its 
short-form application whether or not the applicant, its affiliates, 
its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling 
interests, as defined by Sec.  1.2110, have ever been in default on any 
Commission licenses or have ever been delinquent on any non-tax debt 
owed to any Federal agency. In addition, each applicant must certify 
under penalty of perjury on its short-form application that as of the 
short-form filing deadline, the applicant, its affiliates, its 
controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests, 
as defined by Sec.  1.2110, are not in default on any payment for 
Commission licenses including down payments and that they are not 
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency. Prospective 
applicants are reminded that submission of a false certification to the 
Commission is a serious matter that may result in severe penalties, 
including monetary forfeitures, license revocations, exclusion from 
participation in future auctions, and/or criminal prosecution.
    63. Former defaulters--i.e., applicants, including any of their 
affiliates, any of their controlling interests, or any of the 
affiliates of their controlling interests, that in the past have 
defaulted on any Commission licenses or been delinquent on any non-tax 
debt owed to any Federal agency, but that have since remedied all such 
defaults and cured all of their outstanding non-tax delinquencies--are 
eligible to bid in Auction No. 72, provided that they are otherwise 
qualified. However, former defaulters are required to pay upfront 
payments that are fifty percent more than the normal upfront payment 
amounts.
    64. Current defaulters--i.e., applicants, including any of their 
affiliates, any of their controlling interests, or any of the 
affiliates of their controlling interests, that are in default on any 
payment for any Commission licenses including down payments or are 
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency as of the 
filing deadline for applications to participate in this auction--are 
not eligible to bid in Auction No. 72.
    65. Applicants are encouraged to review the Bureau's previous 
guidance on default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the 
context of the short-form application process. For example, it has been 
determined that to the extent that Commission rules permit late payment 
of regulatory or application fees accompanied by late fees, such debts 
will become delinquent for purposes of Sec. Sec.  1.2105(a) and 
1.2106(a) only after the expiration of a final payment deadline. 
Therefore, with respect to regulatory or application fees, the 
provisions of Sec. Sec.  1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a) regarding default and 
delinquency in connection with competitive bidding are limited to 
circumstances in which the relevant party has not complied with a final 
Commission payment deadline.
    66. The Commission considers outstanding debts owed to the United 
States Government, in any amount, to be a serious matter. The 
Commission adopted rules, including a provision referred to as the red 
light rule, that implement the Commission's obligations under the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act of 1996, which governs the collection of 
claims owed to the United States. Under the red light rule, the 
Commission will not process applications and other requests for 
benefits filed by parties that have outstanding debts owed to the 
Commission. In the same rulemaking order, the Commission explicitly 
declared, however, that the Commission's competitive bidding rules are 
not affected by the red light rule. As a consequence, the Commission's 
adoption of the red light rule does not alter the applicability of any 
of the Commission's competitive bidding rules, including the provisions 
and certifications of Sec. Sec.  1.2105 and 1.2106, with regard to 
current and former defaults or delinquencies. Applicants are reminded, 
however, that the Commission's Red Light Display System, which provides 
information regarding debts owed to the Commission, may not be 
determinative of an auction applicant's ability to comply with the 
default and delinquency disclosure requirements of Sec.  1.2105. Thus, 
while the red light rule ultimately may prevent the processing of long-
form applications by auction winners, an auction applicant's red light 
status is not necessarily determinative of its eligibility to 
participate in this auction or of its upfront payment obligation.
    67. Prospective applicants in Auction No. 72 should note that any 
long-form applications filed after the close of competitive bidding 
will be reviewed

[[Page 14563]]

for compliance with the Commission's red light rule, and such review 
may result in the dismissal of a winning bidder's long-form 
application.

G. Other Information

    68. Applicants owned by member of minority groups and/or women, as 
defined in Sec.  1.2110(c)(3), may identify themselves in filling out 
their short-form applications regarding this status. This applicant 
status information is collected for statistical purposes only and 
assists the Commission in monitoring the participation of designated 
entities in its auctions.

H. Minor Modifications to Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 175)

    69. As of the deadline for filing short-form applications (FCC 
Forms 175) prior to 6 p.m. ET on April 20, 2007, applicants are 
permitted to make only minor changes to their applications. Applicants 
are not permitted to make major modifications to their applications 
(e.g., change their license selections, change control of the 
applicant, change the certifying official, or change their size to 
claim eligibility for a higher bidding credit). Permissible minor 
changes include, for example, deletion and addition of authorized 
bidders (to a maximum of three) and revision of addresses and telephone 
numbers of the applicants and their contact persons.
    70. An applicant must make permissible minor changes to its short-
form application, as such changes are defined by Sec.  1.2105(b), 
electronically using the FCC Auction System. Applicants must click on 
the SUBMIT button in the FCC Auction System for the changes to be 
submitted and considered by the Commission. After the revised 
application has been submitted, a confirmation page will be displayed 
that states the submission time and date, along with a unique file 
number.
    71. In addition, during those periods outside of the initial and 
resubmission filing windows (i.e., when you cannot electronically 
update your FCC Form 175), an applicant should submit a letter briefly 
summarizing the changes and subsequently update their short-form 
applications in ISAS as soon as possible. Note: After the filing window 
has closed, the auction system will not permit applicants to make 
certain changes, such as legal classification and bidding credit. Any 
letter describing changes to an applicant's short-form application 
should be submitted by electronic mail to the following address: 
[email protected]
    72. Applicants must not submit application-specific material 
through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS).

I. Maintaining Current Information in Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 
175)

    73. Section 1.65 of the Commission's rules requires an applicant to 
maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its 
pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days of any 
substantial change that may be of decisional significance to that 
application. Changes that cause a loss of or reduction in eligibility 
for a bidding credit must be reported immediately. If an amendment 
reporting substantial changes is a major amendment as defined by Sec.  
1.2105, the major amendment will not be accepted and may result in the 
dismissal of the short-form application.
    74. After the short-form filing deadline, applicants may make only 
minor changes to their FCC Form 175 applications, for example, deletion 
and addition of authorized bidders (to a maximum of three). Applicants 
must click on the SUBMIT button in the FCC Auction System for the 
changes to be submitted and considered by the Commission. In addition, 
applicants must submit a letter, briefly summarizing the changes, by 
electronic mail at the following address: [email protected].
    75. Applicants must not submit application-specific material 
through ECFS into the record of the proceeding concerning Auction No. 
72 procedures.

III. Pre-Auction Procedures

A. Auction Seminar--April 11, 2007

    76. On Wednesday, April 11, 2007, the FCC will sponsor a free 
seminar for parties interested in participating in Auction No. 72 at 
the FCC headquarters, located at 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC. 
The seminar will provide attendees with information about pre-auction 
procedures, completing FCC Form 175, auction conduct, the FCC Auction 
System, auction rules, and the Phase II 220 MHz Service rules. The 
seminar will also provide an opportunity for prospective bidders to ask 
questions of FCC staff concerning the auction, auction procedures, 
filing requirements and other matters related to this auction.
    77. To register, please provide the information listed on 
Attachment B of the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice by fax, e-
mail or telephone to the FCC by Monday, April 9, 2007. The seminar is 
free of charge and for individuals who are unable to attend, an Audio/
Video webcast of this seminar will be available from the FCC's Auction 
No. 72 web page at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/72/.

B. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)--Due Prior to 6 p.m. ET on 
April 20, 2007

    78. In order to be eligible to bid in this auction, applicants must 
first follow the procedures set forth in Attachment C to the Auction 
No. 72 Procedures Public Notice to submit an FCC Form 175 application 
electronically via the FCC Auction System. This application must be 
received at the Commission prior to 6 p.m. ET on April 20, 2007. Late 
applications will not be accepted. There is no application fee required 
when filing an FCC Form 175. However, to be eligible to bid, an 
applicant must submit an upfront payment.
    79. Applications may generally be filed at any time beginning at 
noon ET on April 11, 2007, and the filing window will close prior to 6 
p.m. ET on April 20, 2007. Applicants are strongly encouraged to file 
early and are responsible for allowing adequate time for filing their 
applications. Applicants may update or amend their applications 
multiple times until the filing deadline on April 20, 2007.
    80. Applicants must always click on the SUBMIT button on the 
Certify & Submit screen of the electronic form to successfully submit 
or modify their FCC Form 175. Any form that is not submitted will not 
be reviewed by the FCC. Additional information about accessing, 
completing, and viewing the FCC Form 175 is included in Attachment C of 
the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice. FCC Auction Technical 
Support is available at (877) 480-3201, option nine; (202) 414-1250; or 
(202) 414-1255 (text telephone (TTY)); hours of service are Monday 
through Friday, from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. E.T. In order to provide better 
service to the public, all calls to Technical Support are recorded.

C. Application Processing and Minor Corrections

    81. After the deadline for filing the FCC Form 175 applications has 
passed, the FCC will process all timely submitted applications to 
determine which are acceptable for filing, and subsequently will issue 
a public notice identifying: (1) Those applications accepted for 
filing; (2) those applications rejected; and (3) those applications 
which have minor defects that may be corrected, and the deadline for 
resubmitting corrected applications.

[[Page 14564]]

    82. After the April 20, 2007, short-form filing deadline, 
applicants may make only minor corrections to their FCC Form 175 
applications. Applicants will not be permitted to make major 
modifications to their applications (e.g., change their license 
selections, change control of the applicant, change certifying 
official, or change their size to claim eligibility for a higher 
bidding credit).

D. Upfront Payments--Due May 21, 2007

    83. In order to be eligible to bid in the auction, applicants must 
submit an upfront payment accompanied by an FCC Remittance Advice Form 
(FCC Form 159). After completing the FCC Form 175, filers will have 
access to an electronic version of the FCC Form 159 that can be printed 
and sent by facsimile to Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, PA. All upfront 
payments must be received in the proper account at Mellon Bank by 6 
p.m. ET on May 21, 2007.
 i. Making Auction Payments by Wire Transfer
    84. Wire transfer payments must be received by 6 p.m. ET on May 21, 
2007. No other payment method is acceptable for this auction. To avoid 
untimely payments, applicants should discuss arrangements (including 
bank closing schedules) with their banker several days before they plan 
to make the wire transfer, and allow sufficient time for the transfer 
to be initiated and completed before the deadline.
    85. At least one hour before placing the order for the wire 
transfer (but on the same business day), applicants must send by 
facsimile a completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to Mellon Bank at 
(412) 209-6045. On the cover sheet of the facsimile, write Wire 
Transfer--Auction Payment for Auction No. 72. In order to meet the 
Commission's upfront payment deadline, an applicant's payment must be 
credited to the Commission's account before the deadline. Applicants 
are responsible for obtaining confirmation from their financial 
institution that Mellon Bank has timely received their upfront payment 
and deposited it in the proper account.
    86. Please note that: (1) All payments must be made in U.S. 
dollars; (2) all payments must be made by wire transfer; (3) upfront 
payments for Auction No. 72 go to a lockbox number different from the 
lockboxes used in previous FCC auctions, and different from the lockbox 
number to be used for post-auction payments; and (4) failure to deliver 
the upfront payment as instructed by the May 21, 2007, deadline, will 
result in dismissal of the application and disqualification from 
participation in the auction.
 ii. FCC Form 159
    87. A completed FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159, Revised 
2/03) must be sent by facsimile to Mellon Bank to accompany each 
upfront payment. Proper completion of FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) is 
critical to ensuring correct crediting of upfront payments. Detailed 
instructions for completion of FCC Form 159 are included in Attachment 
D of the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice. An electronic pre-
filled version of the FCC Form 159 is available after submitting the 
FCC Form 175. Payors using a pre-filled FCC Form 159 are responsible 
for ensuring that all of the information on the form, including payment 
amounts, is accurate. The FCC Form 159 can be completed electronically, 
but must be filed with Mellon Bank via facsimile.
 iii. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
    88. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that the amount of the upfront payment would determine a 
bidder's initial bidding eligibility, the maximum number of bidding 
units on which a bidder may place bids. In order to bid on a license, 
otherwise qualified bidders that selected that license on Form 175 must 
have a current eligibility level that meets or exceeds the number of 
bidding units assigned to that license. At a minimum, therefore, an 
applicant's total upfront payment must be enough to establish 
eligibility to bid on at least one of the licenses selected on its Form 
175, or else the applicant will not be eligible to participate in the 
auction. An applicant does not have to make an upfront payment to cover 
all licenses the applicant selected on its Form 175, but rather to 
cover the maximum number of bidding units that are associated with 
licenses on which the bidder wishes to place bids and hold 
provisionally winning bids at any given time.
    89. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to calculate upfront payments for Auction No. 72 on a license-
by-license basis using the following formulas:

EA Licenses: $500 per license.
EAG License: $0.01 * 0.15 MHz * License Area Population.

    The Bureau set forth the specific upfront payments and bidding 
units for each license in Attachment A of the Auction No. 72 Comment 
Public Notice and sought comment on this proposal. The Bureau received 
no comments in response to the proposed upfront payments. The specific 
upfront payments and bidding units for each license are set forth in 
Attachment A of the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice.
    90. Applicants must make upfront payments sufficient to obtain 
bidding eligibility on the licenses on which they will bid.
    91. In calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant should 
determine the maximum number of bidding units on which it may wish to 
be active (bid on or hold provisionally winning bids on) in any single 
round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering that number of 
bidding units. In order to make this calculation, an applicant should 
add together the upfront payments for all licenses on which it seeks to 
be active in any given round. Applicants should check their 
calculations carefully, as there is no provision for increasing a 
bidder's eligibility after the upfront payment deadline.
    92. Former defaulters should calculate their upfront payment for 
all licenses by multiplying the number of bidding units on which they 
wish to be active by 1.5. In order to calculate the number of bidding 
units to assign to former defaulters, the Commission will divide the 
upfront payment received by 1.5 and round the result up to the nearest 
bidding unit.
iv. Applicant's Wire Transfer Information for Purposes of Refunds of 
Upfront Payments
    93. To ensure that refunds of upfront payments are processed in an 
expeditious manner, the Commission is requesting that all pertinent 
information be supplied to the FCC. All refunds will be returned to the 
payer of record as identified on the FCC Form 159 unless the payer 
submits written authorization instructing otherwise.

E. Auction Registration

    94. Approximately ten days before the auction, the FCC will issue a 
public notice announcing all qualified bidders for the auction. 
Qualified bidders are those applicants whose FCC Form 175 applications 
have been accepted for filing and have timely submitted upfront 
payments sufficient to make them eligible to bid.
    95. All qualified bidders are automatically registered for the 
auction. Registration materials will be distributed prior to the 
auction by overnight mail. The mailing will be sent only to the contact 
person at the contact

[[Page 14565]]

address listed in the FCC Form 175 and will include the SecurID[supreg] 
tokens that will be required to place bids, the Integrated Spectrum 
Auction System (ISAS) Bidder's Guide, and the Auction Bidder Line phone 
number.
    96. Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration mailing 
will not be able to submit bids. Therefore, any qualified bidder that 
has not received this mailing by noon on Thursday, June 14, 2007, 
should call (717) 338-2868. Receipt of this registration mailing is 
critical to participating in the auction, and each applicant is 
responsible for ensuring it has received all of the registration 
material.
    97. In the event that SecurID[supreg] tokens are lost or damaged, 
only a person who has been designated as an authorized bidder, the 
contact person, or the certifying official on the applicant's short-
form application may request replacement registration material.

F. Remote Electronic Bidding

    98. The Commission will conduct this auction over the Internet, and 
telephonic bidding will be available as well. Qualified bidders are 
permitted to bid electronically and telephonically. Each applicant 
should indicate its bidding preference--electronic or telephonic--on 
the FCC Form 175. In either case, each authorized bidder must have its 
own SecurID[supreg] token, which the FCC will provide at no charge. 
Each applicant with one authorized bidder will be issued two 
SecurID[supreg] tokens, while applicants with two or three authorized 
bidders will be issued three tokens. For security purposes, the 
SecurID[supreg] tokens, the telephonic bidding telephone number, and 
the Integrated Spectrum Auction System (ISAS) Bidder's Guide are only 
mailed to the contact person at the contact address listed on the FCC 
Form 175.

G. Mock Auction--June 18, 2007

    99. All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a mock 
auction on Monday, June 18, 2007. The mock auction will enable 
applicants to become familiar with the FCC Auction System prior to the 
auction. Participation by all bidders is strongly recommended. Details 
will be announced by public notice.

IV. Auction Event

    100. The first round of bidding for Auction No. 72 will begin on 
Wednesday, June 20, 2007. The initial bidding schedule will be 
announced in a public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is to 
be released approximately 10 days before the start of the auction.

A. Auction Structure

 i. Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction
    101. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to auction all Phase II 220 MHz Service licenses in a single 
auction using the Commission's standard simultaneous multiple-round 
(SMR) auction format. This type of auction offers every license for bid 
at the same time and consists of successive bidding rounds in which 
eligible bidders may place bids on individual licenses. A bidder may 
bid on, and potentially win, any number of licenses. Typically, bidding 
remains open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license, 
unless a modified stopping rule is invoked.
    102. The Bureau also sought comment on using a simultaneous 
multiple-round with package bidding (SMR-PB) format for Auction No. 72. 
The Bureau does not believe that a package bidding format would 
significantly enhance the ability of bidders to create efficient 
aggregations of licenses in Auction No. 72. Therefore, the Bureau will 
not use an SMR-PB format for Auction No. 72.
    103. The Bureau concludes that the Bureau's standard SMR auction 
format will meet the needs of bidders in Auction No. 72, and the Bureau 
adopts the proposal to use a simultaneous multiple-round auction format 
without package bidding. Unless otherwise announced, bids will be 
accepted on all licenses in each round of the auction until bidding 
stops on every license. This approach, the Bureau believes, allows 
bidders to take advantage of synergies that exist among licenses.
ii. Information Available to Bidders Before and During the Auction
    104. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau sought 
comment on whether to implement procedures that prior to and during the 
auction would limit the disclosure of information on bidder interests 
and identities. The Bureau received no comments on this issue.
    105. For Auction No. 72, the Bureau will use limited information 
procedures if it appears likely that the competitiveness of the auction 
will be low, and if the Bureau believes that limited information 
procedures will be effective in making anti-competitive behavior less 
likely to be successful. Alternatively, if the Bureau determines that 
the auction is likely to be sufficiently competitive, and therefore, 
that the risk of successful collusion is low, the Bureau will not 
implement procedures that would limit the disclosure of information on 
bidder interests and identities before the close of bidding.
    106. Specifically, the Bureau will estimate the likely level of 
competition in the auction by considering the eligibility ratio, 
defined as the total number of bidding units of eligibility purchased 
by bidders through their upfront payments divided by the total number 
of bidding units for the licenses in the auction. If the eligibility 
ratio equals or exceeds three, the Bureau will not use limited 
information procedures. If the eligibility ratio is less than three, in 
general the Bureau will withhold certain information on bidder 
interests and bidder identities prior to and during the auction.
    107. However, if the eligibility ratio is less than three, the 
Bureau reserves the discretion not to use limited information 
procedures if circumstances indicate that limited information 
procedures would not be an effective tool for deterring anti-
competitive behavior. For example, if only two applicants become 
qualified to participate in the bidding, limited information procedures 
would be ineffective in preventing bidders from knowing the identity of 
the competing bidder and, therefore, limited information procedures 
would not serve to deter attempts at signaling and retaliatory bidding 
behavior. The Bureau anticipates announcing the information disclosure 
procedures to be used at or about the time that the Bureau releases a 
public notice announcing the applicants that are qualified to 
participate in the bidding.
    108. If the Commission determines that limited information 
procedures will be used, it will make available prior to the auction 
the total eligibility level for the auction as well as the eligibility 
of each bidder but will not identify bidders' license selections. After 
each round of bidding, the amounts of each bid placed will be made 
available, but not the identities of the bidders. This information will 
give bidders an indication of demand for the licenses, so that bidders 
and their investors will be able to assess whether their bids are 
likely to be consistent with the valuations of other bidders, allowing 
them to bid more confidently. In addition, after each round bidders 
logged in to the FCC Auction System will be able to see whether their 
own bids are provisionally winning.
    109. Other Issues. The Bureau does not believe that the information 
disclosure procedures established for this auction will interfere with 
the administration of or compliance with the Commission's anti-
collusion rule. Section 1.2105(c)(1) of the

[[Page 14566]]

Commission's rules provides that after the short-form application 
filing deadline, all applicants for licenses in any of the same 
geographic license areas are prohibited from disclosing to each other 
in any manner the substance of bids or bidding strategies until after 
the down payment deadline, subject to specified exceptions. When 
limited information procedures are not in effect for a particular 
auction, each applicant's selection of licenses has been publicly 
available through the Commission's on-line short-form application 
database. In Auction No. 72, however, the Commission will not disclose 
information regarding license selection at least until the upfront 
payment deadline has passed and the Commission determines the 
information disclosure procedures to be used for the auction. As in the 
past, the Commission will disclose the other portions of applicants' 
short-form applications, through its on-line database and certain 
application-based information through public notices. Thus, even 
without information regarding license selection, applicants would be 
able to comply with Sec.  1.2105(c) by not disclosing bids or bidding 
strategies to any other applicants in the auction. This approach, 
however, could inhibit otherwise lawful communications with applicants 
for licenses in other geographic license areas, which the Commission's 
rule permits. Consequently, the Bureau will notify separately each 
applicant with short-form applications to participate in a pending 
auction whether applicants in Auction No. 72 have applied for licenses 
in any of the same geographic areas as that applicant. Specifically, 
after the Bureau conducts its initial review of applications to 
participate in Auction No. 72, each applicant with a pending short-form 
application will receive a letter that lists the applicants in Auction 
No. 72 that have applied for licenses in any of the same geographic 
areas as the applicant. The list will identify the Auction No. 72 
applicant(s) by name but will not list the license selections of the 
Auction No. 72 applicant(s). As in past auctions, additional 
information regarding applicants in Auction No. 72 that is needed to 
comply with Sec.  1.2105(c), e.g., the identities of controlling 
interest in the applicant and ownership interests greater than ten 
percent, will be available through the publicly accessible on-line 
short-form application database.
iii. Eligibility and Activity Rules
    110. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder 
would determine the initial (maximum) eligibility (as measured in 
bidding units) for each bidder. The Bureau received no comments on this 
issue.
    111. The Commission will use upfront payments to determine initial 
(maximum) eligibility (as measured in bidding units) for Auction No. 
72. The amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder determines 
initial bidding eligibility, the maximum number of bidding units on 
which a bidder may be active. As noted earlier, each license is 
assigned a specific number of bidding units listed in Attachment A of 
the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public Notice. Bidding units for a given 
license do not change as prices rise during the auction. A bidder's 
upfront payment is not attributed to specific licenses. Rather, a 
bidder may place bids on any of the licenses selected on its FCC Form 
175 as long as the total number of bidding units associated with those 
licenses does not exceed its current eligibility. Eligibility cannot be 
increased during the auction; it can only remain the same or decrease. 
Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant must 
determine the maximum number of bidding units it may wish to bid on or 
hold provisionally winning bids on in any single round, and submit an 
upfront payment amount covering that total number of bidding units. The 
total upfront payment does not affect the total dollar amount a bidder 
may bid on any given license.
    112. In order to ensure that an auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively 
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction 
before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a specific 
percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of 
the auction.
    113. A bidder's activity level in a round is the sum of the bidding 
units associated with licenses on which the bidder is active. A bidder 
is considered active on a license in the current round if it is either 
the provisionally winning bidder at the end of the previous bidding 
round and does not withdraw the provisionally winning bid in the 
current round, or if it submits a bid in the current round. The minimum 
required activity is expressed as a percentage of the bidder's current 
eligibility, and increases by stage as the auction progresses. Because 
these procedures have proven successful in maintaining the pace of 
previous auctions, the Commission adopts them for Auction No. 72. 
Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will result in the use 
of an activity rule waiver, if any remain, or a reduction in the 
bidder's eligibility, possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder's 
ability to place bids in the auction.
 iv. Auction Stages
    114. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to conduct the auction in two stages and employ an activity 
rule. The Bureau further proposed that, in each round of Stage One, a 
bidder desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility would be 
required to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of 
its current bidding eligibility. Finally, the Bureau proposed that in 
each round of Stage Two, a bidder desiring to maintain its current 
bidding eligibility would be required to be active on at least 95 
percent of its current bidding eligibility. The Bureau received no 
comments on this proposal.
    115. The Commission adopts the Bureau's proposals for the activity 
rules and stages. The Bureau reserves the discretion to further alter 
the activity percentages before and/or during the auction.
    116. Stage One: During the first stage of the auction, a bidder 
desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility will be required 
to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its 
current bidding eligibility in each bidding round. Failure to maintain 
the required activity level will result in the use of an activity rule 
waiver or, if the bidder has no activity rule waivers remaining, a 
reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next round. During 
Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by 
multiplying the bidder's current round activity (the sum of bidding 
units of the bidder's provisionally winning bids and bids during the 
current round) by five-fourths (\5/4\).
    117. Stage Two: During the second stage of the auction, a bidder 
desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility is required to be 
active on 95 percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to 
maintain the required activity level will result in the use of an 
activity rule waiver or, if the bidder has no activity rule waivers 
remaining, a reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next 
round. During Stage Two, reduced eligibility for the next round will be 
calculated by multiplying the bidder's current round activity (the sum 
of bidding units of the bidder's provisionally winning bids and bids 
during the current round) by twenty-nineteenths (\20/19\).

[[Page 14567]]

    118. CAUTION: Since activity requirements increase in Stage Two, 
bidders must carefully check their activity during the first round 
following a stage transition to ensure that they are meeting the 
increased activity requirement. This is especially critical for bidders 
that have provisionally winning bids and do not plan to submit new 
bids. In past auctions, some bidders have inadvertently lost bidding 
eligibility or used an activity rule waiver because they did not re-
verify their activity status at stage transitions. Bidders may check 
their activity against the required activity level by logging into the 
FCC Auction System.
    119. Because the foregoing procedures have proven successful in 
maintaining the proper pace in previous auctions, the Bureau adopts 
them for Auction No. 72.
 v. Stage Transitions
    120. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that the auction would generally advance to the next stage 
(i.e., from Stage One to Stage Two) when the auction activity level, as 
measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving new provisionally 
winning bids, is approximately 20 percent or lower for three 
consecutive rounds of bidding. The Bureau further proposed that the 
Bureau would retain the discretion to change stages unilaterally by 
announcement during the auction. This determination, the Bureau 
proposed, would be based on a variety of measures of bidder activity, 
including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the 
percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there 
are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in 
revenue. The Bureau received no comments on this issue.
    121. The Bureau adopts this proposal. Thus, the auction will start 
in Stage One and will generally advance to Stage Two when, in each of 
three consecutive rounds of bidding, the provisionally winning bids 
have been placed on 20 percent or less of the licenses being auctioned 
(as measured in bidding units). In addition, the Bureau will retain the 
discretion to regulate the pace of the auction by announcement. This 
determination will be based on a variety of measures of bidder 
activity, including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, 
the percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which 
there are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase 
in revenue. The Bureau believes that these stage transition rules, 
having proven successful in prior auctions, are appropriate for use in 
Auction No. 72.
 vi. Activity Rule Waivers
    122. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that each bidder in the auction be provided with three 
activity rule waivers. The Bureau received no comments on this issue. 
Therefore, the Bureau adopts the proposal that each bidder be provided 
three activity rule waivers. The Bureau is satisfied that providing 
three waivers over the course of the auction will give bidders a 
sufficient number of waivers and flexibility, while also safeguarding 
the integrity of the auction.
    123. Bidders may use an activity rule waiver in any round during 
the course of the auction. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the 
bidder's current bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in 
the current round being below the required minimum activity level. An 
activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of bidding and not to a 
particular license. Activity rule waivers can be either applied 
proactively by the bidder (a proactive waiver) or applied automatically 
by the FCC Auction System (an automatic waiver) and are principally a 
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of bidding 
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from 
placing a bid in a particular round.
    124. The FCC Auction System assumes that bidders with insufficient 
activity would prefer to apply an activity rule waiver (if available) 
rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will 
automatically apply a waiver at the end of any bidding round where a 
bidder's activity level is below the minimum required unless: (1) There 
are no activity rule waivers available; or (2) the bidder overrides the 
automatic application of a waiver by reducing eligibility. If a bidder 
has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy the activity requirement, 
the FCC Auction System will permanently reduce the bidder's 
eligibility, possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder's ability to 
place additional bids in the auction.
    125. A bidder with insufficient activity that wants to reduce its 
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver must 
affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the 
bidding round by using the reduce eligibility function in the FCC 
Auction System. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is permanently 
reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the activity rules. 
Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to 
regain its lost bidding eligibility even if the round has not yet 
closed.
    126. Finally, a bidder may apply an activity rule waiver 
proactively as a means to keep the auction open without placing a bid. 
If a bidder proactively applies an activity waiver (using the apply 
waiver function in the FCC Auction System) during a bidding round in 
which no bids are placed or withdrawn, the auction will remain open and 
the bidder's eligibility will be preserved. However, an automatic 
waiver applied by the FCC Auction System in a round in which there are 
no new bids, withdrawals, or proactive waivers will not keep the 
auction open. A bidder cannot submit a proactive waiver after 
submitting a bid in a round, and submitting a proactive waiver will 
preclude a bidder from placing any bids in that round. Note: Applying a 
waiver is irreversible; once a proactive waiver is submitted that 
waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if the round has not yet closed.
 vii. Auction Stopping Rules
    127. For Auction No. 72, the Bureau proposed to employ a 
simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping rule means 
that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding closes 
simultaneously on all licenses. More specifically, bidding will close 
simultaneously on all licenses after the first round in which no bidder 
submits any new bids, applies a proactive waiver, or withdraws any 
provisionally winning bids.
    128. The Bureau also sought comment on a modified version of the 
simultaneous stopping rule (modified stopping rule). The modified 
stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses after the first 
round in which no bidder applies a proactive waiver, withdraws a 
provisionally winning bid, or places any new bids on any license on 
which it is not the provisionally winning bidder. Thus, absent any 
other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for 
which it is the provisionally winning bidder would not keep the auction 
open under this modified stopping rule.
    129. The Bureau further proposed retaining the discretion to keep 
the auction open even if no bidder places any new bids, applies a 
proactive waiver, or withdraws any provisionally winning bids in a 
round. In this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had 
applied a waiver. Thus, the activity rule will apply as usual, and a 
bidder with insufficient activity will either use an activity rule 
waiver (if it has any left) or lose bidding eligibility.

[[Page 14568]]

    130. In addition, the Bureau proposed that the Bureau reserve the 
right to declare that the auction will end after a specified number of 
additional rounds (special stopping rule). If the Bureau invokes this 
special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final 
round(s) and the auction will close.
    131. The Bureau proposed to exercise these options only in 
circumstances such as where the auction is proceeding very slowly, 
where there is minimal overall bidding activity or where it appears 
likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of 
time. The Bureau noted that before exercising these options, the Bureau 
is likely to attempt to increase the pace of the auction by, for 
example, increasing the number of bidding rounds per day, and/or 
changing the minimum acceptable bids.
    132. The Bureau believes that the proposed stopping rules are 
appropriate for Auction No. 72 because our experience in prior auctions 
demonstrates that these stopping rules balance interests of 
administrative efficiency and maximum bidder participation. The Bureau 
received no comments concerning the auction stopping rules. Therefore 
the Bureau adopts the proposals made in the Auction No. 72 Comment 
Public Notice. Auction No. 72 will begin under the simultaneous 
stopping rule approach, and the Bureau will retain the discretion to 
employ the other versions of the stopping rule. Moreover, the Bureau 
will retain the discretion to use the modified stopping rule with or 
without prior announcement during the auction.
 viii. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
    133. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that, by public notice or by announcement during the auction, 
the Bureau may delay, suspend, or cancel the auction in the event of 
natural disaster, technical obstacle, administrative or weather 
necessity, evidence of an auction security breach or unlawful bidding 
activity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and efficient 
conduct of competitive bidding. The Bureau received no comment on this 
issue.
    134. Because the Bureau's approach to notification of delay during 
an auction has proven effective in resolving exigent circumstances in 
previous auctions, the Bureau adopts the Bureau's proposed rules 
regarding auction delay, suspension, or cancellation. By public notice 
or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, 
or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical 
obstacle, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an auction 
security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other reason 
that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In 
such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the 
auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the 
auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its 
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend 
the auction. The Bureau emphasizes that exercise of this authority is 
solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended 
to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply 
their activity rule waivers.

B. Bidding Procedures

i. Round Structure
    135. The initial schedule of bidding rounds will be announced in 
the public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is released 
approximately 10 days before the start of the auction. Each bidding 
round is followed by the release of round results. Multiple bidding 
rounds may be conducted in a given day. Details regarding round results 
formats and locations will also be included in the qualified bidders 
public notice.
    136. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in 
order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the 
bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding 
strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for 
the bidding rounds, the amount of time between rounds, or the number of 
rounds per day, depending upon bidding activity and other factors.
ii. Reserve Price and Minimum Opening Bids
    137. Section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 
calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods by which a reasonable 
reserve price will be required or a minimum opening bid established 
when applications for FCC licenses are subject to auction (i.e., 
because they are mutually exclusive), unless the Commission determines 
that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is not in the public 
interest. Consistent with this mandate, the Commission directed the 
Bureau to seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid and/or 
reserve price prior to the start of each auction. Among other factors, 
the Bureau must consider the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels 
of incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service, the 
size of the geographic service areas, the extent of interference with 
other spectrum bands, and any other relevant factors that could have an 
impact on the spectrum being auctioned. The Commission concluded that 
the Bureau should have the discretion to employ either or both of these 
mechanisms for future auctions.
    138. The Bureau proposed in the Auction No. 72 Comment Public 
Notice to establish minimum opening bids for each license, while 
retaining discretion to lower the minimum opening bids. Specifically, 
for Auction No. 72, the Bureau proposed the following formulas for 
calculating license-by-license minimum opening bids:

EA Licenses: $500 per license.
EAG License: $0.01 * 0.15 MHz * License Area Population.
    139. The Bureau sought comment on this proposal and, in the 
alternative, whether, consistent with the Section 309(j), the public 
interest would be served by having no minimum opening bids. A commenter 
filed comments in which it sought a reduction in the minimum opening 
bids by 50 percent. The commenter argues that lowering minimum opening 
bids will increase the likelihood that these licenses will be sold at 
auction. The commenter notes that the auction will make available 
spectrum that licensees will seek to aggregate in order to satisfy a 
particular viable market opportunity. The commenter also contends that 
the licenses being offered in Auction No. 72 have low market value, and 
asserts that it does not know of market indications of higher values, 
or developments in the near term that would cause higher values.
    140. The Bureau continues to believe that the minimum opening bid 
amounts proposed in the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice are 
appropriate. The proposed minimum opening bid amounts better enable the 
Commission to meet the statutory objective of recovering for the public 
a portion of the value of the spectrum resource made available for 
commercial use. Moreover, the Bureau observed in the Auction No. 72 
Comment Public Notice that the proposed minimum opening bid of $500 
will not impede any party willing and able to offer wireless service to 
the public. The commenter offers little support for its contention that 
the licenses being offered have low market value.
    141. The Bureau believes that the minimum opening bids for this 
auction are reasonable. Accordingly, the Bureau will adopt the proposed 
minimum opening bid amounts and set the

[[Page 14569]]

minimum opening bids using the proposed formulas.
    142. The Commission did not receive any comments addressing its 
proposal that the Bureau retain the discretion to reduce minimum 
opening bid amounts. The Bureau adopts this proposal. The minimum 
opening bid amounts the Bureau adopts for Auction No. 72 are reducible 
at the discretion of the Bureau. The Bureau emphasizes, however, that 
such discretion will be exercised, if at all, sparingly and early in 
the auction, i.e., before bidders lose all activity waivers. During the 
course of the auction, the Bureau will not entertain requests to reduce 
the minimum opening bid amount on specific licenses. The Bureau notes 
that effectively the minimum opening bids operate as reserve prices.
    143. The specific minimum opening bid amounts for each license 
available in Auction No. 72 calculated pursuant to the procedure are 
set forth in Attachment A of the Auction No. 72 Procedures Public 
Notice.
iii. Bid Amounts
    144. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that in each round, eligible bidders be able to place a bid on 
a given license in any of nine different amounts. Under the proposal, 
the FCC Auction System interface will list the acceptable bid amounts 
for each license. The Bureau received no comment on this issue. Based 
on the Bureau's experience in prior auctions, the Bureau adopts its 
proposals for Auction No. 72.
    145. The first of the acceptable bid amounts is called the minimum 
acceptable bid amount. The minimum acceptable bid amount for a license 
will be equal to its minimum opening bid amount until there is a 
provisionally winning bid for the license. After there is a 
provisionally winning bid for a license, the minimum acceptable bid 
amount for that license will be equal to the amount of the 
provisionally winning bid plus a percentage of that bid amount 
calculated using the formula. In general, the percentage will be higher 
for a license receiving many bids than for a license receiving few 
bids. In the case of a license for which the provisionally winning bid 
has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal the 
second highest bid received for the license.
    146. The percentage of the provisionally winning bid used to 
establish the minimum acceptable bid amount (the additional percentage) 
is calculated at the end of each round, based on an activity index 
which is a weighted average of the number of bids in that round and the 
activity index from the prior round. Specifically, the activity index 
is equal to a weighting factor times the number of bids on the license 
in the most recent bidding round plus one minus the weighting factor 
times the activity index from the prior round. The additional 
percentage is determined as one plus the activity index times a minimum 
percentage amount, with the result not to exceed a given maximum. The 
additional percentage is then multiplied by the provisionally winning 
bid amount to obtain the minimum acceptable bid for the next round. The 
Commission will initially set the weighting factor at 0.5, the minimum 
percentage at 0.1 (10%), and the maximum percentage at 0.2 (20%). 
Hence, at these initial settings, the minimum acceptable bid for a 
license will be between 10% and 20% higher than the provisionally 
winning bid, depending upon the bidding activity for the license. 
Equations and examples are shown in Attachment E of the Auction No. 72 
Procedures Public Notice.
    147. The additional bid amounts are calculated using the minimum 
acceptable bid amount and a bid increment percentage. The first 
additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable bid 
amount times one plus the bid increment percentage, rounded. If, for 
example, the bid increment percentage is ten percent, the calculation 
is (minimum acceptable bid amount) * (1 + 0.1), rounded, or (minimum 
acceptable bid amount) * 1.1, rounded; the second additional acceptable 
bid amount equals the minimum acceptable bid amount times one plus two 
times the bid increment percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid 
amount) * 1.2, rounded; the third additional acceptable bid amount 
equals the minimum acceptable bid amount times one plus three times the 
bid increment percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 
1.3, rounded; etc. The Bureau will round the results of these 
calculations, as well as the calculations to determine the minimum 
acceptable bid amounts, using our standard rounding procedures. For 
Auction No. 72, the Bureau proposed to use a bid increment percentage 
of ten percent to calculate the additional acceptable bid amounts. The 
Bureau received no comment on this issue and will begin the auction 
with a bid increment percentage of ten percent and eight additional bid 
amounts.
    148. The Bureau did not receive any comments on its proposal. The 
Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum acceptable bid 
amounts, the minimum acceptable bid formula parameters, the bid 
increment percentage, and the number of acceptable bid amounts if it 
determines that circumstances so dictate. The Bureau will do so by 
announcement in the FCC Auction System during the auction if 
circumstances warrant.
 iv. Provisionally Winning Bids
    149. At the end of each bidding round, a provisionally winning bid 
will be determined based on the highest bid amount received for each 
license. A provisionally winning bid will remain the provisionally 
winning bid until there is a higher bid on the same license at the 
close of a subsequent round. Provisionally winning bids at the end of 
the auction become the winning bids. Bidders are reminded that 
provisionally winning bids count toward activity for purposes of the 
activity rule.
    150. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to use a random number generator to select a single 
provisionally winning bid in the event of identical high bid amounts 
being submitted on a license in a given round (i.e., tied bids). No 
comments were received on this proposal. Therefore, the Bureau adopts 
its proposal. A pseudo-random number generator based on the L'Ecuyer 
algorithms will be used to assign a random number to each bid. The tied 
bid with the highest random number wins the tiebreaker, and becomes the 
provisionally winning bid. The remaining eligible bidders, as well as 
the provisionally winning bidder, can submit higher bids in subsequent 
rounds. However, if the auction were to end with no other bids being 
placed, the winning bidder would be the one that placed the selected 
provisionally winning bid.
    151. During a round, a bidder may submit bids for as many licenses 
as it wishes (providing that it is eligible to bid), withdraw 
provisionally winning bids from previous rounds, remove bids placed in 
the current bidding round, or permanently reduce eligibility. Bidders 
also have the option of submitting and removing multiple bids and 
withdrawing multiple provisionally winning bids during a round. If a 
bidder submits multiple bids for a single license in the same round, 
the system takes the last bid entered as that bidder's bid for the 
round. Bidders should note that the bidding units associated with 
licenses for which the bidder has removed or withdrawn its bid do not 
count towards the bidder's current activity.
    152. All bidding will take place remotely either through the FCC

[[Page 14570]]

Auction System or by telephonic bidding. There will be no on-site 
bidding during Auction No. 72. Note that telephonic bid assistants are 
required to use a script when entering bids placed by telephone. 
Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow sufficient time to 
bid by placing their calls well in advance of the close of a round. The 
length of a call to place a telephonic bid may vary; please allow a 
minimum of ten minutes.
    153. A bidder's ability to bid on specific licenses is determined 
by two factors: (1) The licenses selected on the bidder's FCC Form 175 
and (2) the bidder's eligibility. The bid submission screens will allow 
bidders to submit bids on only those licenses the bidder selected on 
its FCC Form 175.
    154. In order to access the bidding function of the FCC Auction 
System, bidders must be logged in during the bidding round using the 
passcode generated by the SecurID[reg] token and a personal 
identification number (PIN) created by the bidder. Bidders are strongly 
encouraged to print a round summary for each round after they have 
completed all of their activity for that round.
    155. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on 
a given license in any of nine different amounts. For each license, the 
FCC Auction System will list the nine acceptable bid amounts in a drop-
down box. Bidders use the drop-down box to select from among the 
acceptable bid amounts. The FCC Auction System also includes an upload 
function that allows bidders to upload text files containing bid 
information.
    156. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount for that license will be equal to its minimum 
opening bid amount. Once there are bids on a license, minimum 
acceptable bids for a license will be determined.
    157. Finally, bidders are cautioned to select their bid amounts 
carefully because, as explained below, bidders that withdraw a 
provisionally winning bid from a previous round, even if the bid was 
mistakenly or erroneously made, are subject to bid withdrawal payments.
 v. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal
    158. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, the Commission 
proposed bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. With respect to bid 
withdrawals, the Commission proposed limiting each bidder to 
withdrawals in no more than two rounds during the course of the 
auction. The round in which withdrawals are used would be at each 
bidder's discretion. The Bureau received no comments on this issue. In 
previous auctions, the Bureau has detected bidder conduct that, 
arguably, may have constituted anti-competitive behavior through the 
use of bid withdrawals. While the Bureau continues to recognize the 
important role that bid withdrawals may play in an auction, i.e., 
reducing risk associated with efforts to secure various licenses in 
combination, the Bureau concludes that, for Auction No. 72, adoption of 
a limit on the use of withdrawals to two rounds per bidder is 
appropriate. By doing so the Bureau strikes a reasonable compromise 
that will allow bidders to use withdrawals. The Bureau based its 
decision on its experience with bid withdrawals in prior auctions, 
including PCS D, E and F block, 800 MHz SMR, and other auctions. The 
Bureau will therefore limit the number of rounds in which bidders may 
place withdrawals to two rounds, as previously proposed.
    159. Procedures. Before the close of a bidding round, a bidder has 
the option of removing any bids placed in that round. By using the 
remove bids function in the FCC Auction System, a bidder may 
effectively unsubmit any bid placed within that round. A bidder 
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal 
payments. Removing a bid will affect a bidder's activity for the round 
in which it is removed, i.e., a bid that is removed does not count 
toward bidding activity. These procedures will enhance bidder 
flexibility during the auction, and therefore the Bureau adopts them 
for Auction No. 72.
    160. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. 
However, in later rounds, a bidder may withdraw provisionally winning 
bids from previous rounds using the withdraw bids function in the FCC 
Auction System (assuming that the bidder has not already withdrawn bids 
in two previous rounds). A provisionally winning bidder that withdraws 
its provisionally winning bid from a previous round during the auction 
is subject to the bid withdrawal payments specified in 47 CFR .2104(g). 
Note: Once a withdrawal is submitted during a round, that withdrawal 
cannot be unsubmitted even if the round has not yet ended.
    161. The rounds in which a bidder may withdraw its bids will be at 
the bidder's discretion and there will be no limit on the number of 
bids that may be withdrawn in either of these rounds. Withdrawals 
during the auction will be subject to the bid withdrawal payments 
specified in Sec.  1.2104(g). Bidders should note that evidence of 
abuse of the Commission's bid withdrawal procedures could result in the 
denial of the ability to bid on a market.
    162. If a provisionally winning bid is withdrawn, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount will equal the amount of the second highest bid 
received for the license, which may be less than, or in the case of 
tied bids, equal to, the amount of the withdrawn bid. To set the 
additional bid amounts, the second highest bid amount also will be used 
in place of the provisionally winning bid in the formula used to 
calculate additional bid amounts. The Commission will serve as a place 
holder provisionally winning bidder on the license until a new bid is 
submitted on that license.
    163. Calculation of Bid Withdrawal Payment. Generally, the 
Commission imposes payments on bidders that withdraw high bids during 
the course of an auction. If a bidder withdraws its bid and there is no 
higher bid in the same or subsequent auction(s), the bidder that 
withdrew its bid is responsible for the difference between its 
withdrawn bid and the provisionally winning bid in the same or 
subsequent auction(s). In the case of multiple bid withdrawals on a 
single license, within the same or subsequent auctions(s), the payment 
for each bid withdrawal will be calculated based on the sequence of bid 
withdrawals and the amounts withdrawn. No withdrawal payment will be 
assessed for a withdrawn bid if either the subsequent winning bid or 
any subsequent intervening withdrawn bid, in either the same or 
subsequent auctions(s), equals or exceeds that withdrawn bid. Thus, a 
bidder that withdraws a bid will not be responsible for any withdrawal 
payments if there is a subsequent higher bid in the same or subsequent 
auction(s). This policy allows bidders most efficiently to allocate 
their resources as well as to evaluate their bidding strategies and 
business plans during an auction while, at the same time, maintaining 
the integrity of the auction process. The Bureau retains the discretion 
to scrutinize multiple bid withdrawals on a single license for evidence 
of anti-competitive strategic behavior and take appropriate action when 
deemed necessary.
    164. Section 1.2104(g)(1) of the rules sets forth the payment 
obligations of a bidder that withdraws a high bid on a license during 
the course of an auction, and provides for the assessment of interim 
bid withdrawal payments. In the Auction No. 72 Comment Public Notice, 
the Bureau proposed to establish the percentage at ten percent (10%) 
for the

[[Page 14571]]

Phase II 220 MHz Service auction and sought comment on the proposal.
    165. The Bureau received no comments on this issue and adopts its 
proposal. The Commission will assess an interim withdrawal payment 
equal to ten percent (10%) of the amount of the withdrawn bids. The ten 
percent (10%) interim payment will be applied toward any final bid 
withdrawal payment that will be assessed after subsequent auction of 
the license. Assessing an interim bid withdrawal payment ensures that 
the Commission receives a minimal withdrawal payment pending assessment 
of any final withdrawal payment. Section 1.2104(g) provides specific 
examples showing application of the bid withdrawal payment rule.
 vi. Round Results
    166. If limited information procedures described above are in 
effect, limited information about the results of a round will be made 
public after the conclusion of the round. Specifically, after a round 
closes, the Bureau will make available for each license, its current 
provisionally winning bid amount, the minimum acceptable bid amount for 
the following round, the amounts of all bids placed on the license 
during the round, and whether the license is FCC held. The reports will 
be publicly accessible. Moreover, after the auction, the Bureau will 
make available complete reports of all bids placed during each round of 
the auction, including bidder identities.
    167. If, however, limited information procedures are not used, more 
information will be provided after each round in the auction. Bids 
placed during a round, including bidder identities, will be made public 
at the conclusion of that round. Specifically, after a round closes, 
the Bureau will compile reports of all bids placed and which bidders 
made them, current provisionally winning bids, new minimum acceptable 
bid amounts, and bidder eligibility status (bidding eligibility and 
activity rule waivers) and will post the reports for public access.
 vii. Auction Announcements
    168. The Commission will use auction announcements to announce 
items such as schedule changes and stage transitions. All auction 
announcements will be available by clicking a link in the FCC Auction 
System.

V. Post-Auction Procedures

A. Down Payments

    169. After bidding has ended, the Commission will issue a public 
notice declaring the auction closed and identifying winning bidders, 
down payments and final payments due.
    170. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing 
notice, each winning bidder must submit sufficient funds (in addition 
to its upfront payment) to bring its total amount of money on deposit 
with the Commission for Auction No. 72 to 20 percent of the net amount 
of its winning bids (gross bids less any applicable small business or 
very small business bidding credits).

B. Final Payments

    171. Each winning bidder will be required to submit the balance of 
the net amount of its winning bids within 10 business days after the 
deadline for submitting down payments.

C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601)

    172. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing 
notice, winning bidders must electronically submit a properly completed 
long-form application (FCC Form 601) for each license won through 
Auction No. 72. Winning bidders that are small businesses or very small 
businesses must demonstrate their eligibility for a small business or 
very small business bidding credit. Further filing instructions will be 
provided to auction winners at the close of the auction.
    173. The CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order modifies the procedure by 
which a consortium that is a winning bidder in Auction No. 72 will 
apply for a license. In particular, (a) each member or group of members 
of a winning consortium seeking separate licenses will be required to 
file a separate long-form application for its respective license(s) 
and, in the case of a license to be partitioned or disaggregated, the 
member or group filing the applicable long-form application shall 
provide the parties' partitioning or disaggregation agreement in its 
long-form application; (b) two or more consortium members seeking to be 
licensed together shall first form a legal business entity; and (c) any 
such entity must meet the applicable eligibility requirements in our 
rules for small business status. Applicants applying as consortia 
should review the CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order in detail and monitor 
any relevant future proceedings to understand how the members of the 
consortia will apply for a license in the event they are winning 
bidders.

D. Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602)

    174. At the time it submits its long-form application (FCC Form 
601), each winning bidder also must comply with the ownership reporting 
requirements as set forth in Sec. Sec.  1.913, 1.919, and 1.2112 of the 
Commission's rules. Further instructions will be provided to winning 
bidders at the close of the auction.

E. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit

    175. A winning bidder that intends to use its license(s) to deploy 
facilities and provide services to federally recognized tribal lands 
that are unserved by any telecommunications carrier or that have a 
wireline penetration rate equal to or below 85 percent is eligible to 
receive a tribal lands bidding credit as set forth in 47 CFR 1.2107 and 
1.2110(f). A tribal land bidding credit is in addition to, and separate 
from, any other bidding credit for which a winning bidder may qualify.
    176. Unlike other bidding credits that are requested prior to the 
auction, a winning bidder applies for the tribal lands bidding credit 
after winning the auction when it files its long-form application (FCC 
Form 601). When initially filing the long-form application, the winning 
bidder will be required to advise the Commission whether it intends to 
seek a tribal lands bidding credit, for each license won in the 
auction, by checking the designated box(es). After stating its intent 
to seek a tribal lands bidding credit, the applicant will have 180 days 
from the close of the long-form filing window to amend its application 
to select the specific tribal lands to be served and provide the 
required tribal government certifications. Licensees receiving a tribal 
lands bidding credit are subject to performance criteria as set forth 
in Sec.  1.2110(f)(3)(vi).
    177. For additional information on the tribal lands bidding credit, 
including how the amount of the credit is calculated, applicants should 
review the Commission's rule making proceeding regarding tribal lands 
bidding credits and related public notices.

F. Default and Disqualification

    178. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the 
close of the auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment 
within the prescribed period of time, fails to submit a timely long-
form application, fails to make full payment, or is otherwise 
disqualified) will be subject to the payments described in Sec.  
1.2104(g)(2). The payments include both a deficiency payment, equal to 
the difference between the amount of the bidder's bid and the amount of 
the winning bid the next time a license covering the same spectrum is 
won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal to a percentage of 
the defaulter's bid or of the subsequent winning bid, whichever

[[Page 14572]]

is less. Pursuant to recent modifications to the rule governing default 
payments, the percentage of the applicable bid to be assessed as an 
additional payment for defaults in a particular auction is established 
in advance of the auction. Accordingly, in the Auction No. 72 Comment 
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to set the additional default 
payment for the auction of Phase II 220 MHz Service licenses at ten 
percent of the applicable bid. The Bureau sought comment on its 
proposal and no comments were received on this issue. The Bureau 
therefore adopts its proposal and sets the additional default payment 
for the auction of Phase II 220 MHz spectrum licenses at ten percent of 
the applicable bid.
    179. Finally, the Bureau notes that in the event of a default, the 
Commission may re-auction the license or offer it to the next highest 
bidder (in descending order) at its final bid amount. In addition, if a 
default or disqualification involves gross misconduct, 
misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant, the Commission may 
declare the applicant and its principals ineligible to bid in future 
auctions, and may take any other action that it deems necessary, 
including institution of proceedings to revoke any existing licenses 
held by the applicant.

G. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance

    180. All applicants that submit upfront payments but after the 
close of the auction are not winning bidders for a license in Auction 
No. 72 may be entitled to a refund of their remaining upfront payment 
balance after the conclusion of the auction. All refunds will be 
returned to the payer of record, as identified on the FCC Form 159, 
unless the payer submits written authorization instructing otherwise.
    181. Bidders that drop out of the auction completely may be 
eligible for a refund of their upfront payments before the close of the 
auction.
    182. Following the close of the auction, the Commission may refund 
upfront monies on deposit that exceed the required total payments owned 
by the winning bidders. Such refunds will be made to the payer of 
record as identified on the FCC Form 159, provided the necessary refund 
request and wire transfer instructions have been received.

Federal Communications Commission.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. E7-5639 Filed 3-27-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P