[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 48 (Tuesday, March 13, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 11381-11383]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-4517]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-302]


Florida Power and Light; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of 
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating 
License No. DPR-72 issued to Florida Power and Light (the licensee) for 
operation of the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR-
3) located in Citrus County, Florida.
    The proposed amendment would change the basis for protection of 
spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) in order to eliminate 
the Final Safety Analysis Report commitment for maintaining the SFP 
missile shields.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in 
accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required 
by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

    1. [The Proposed Change] Does Not Involve a Significant Increase 
in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated.
    The LAR [license amendment request] proposes to eliminate the 
commitment for maintaining the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) missile 
shields. Removal of the missile shields increases the probability of 
an accident (damaging fuel assemblies in the SFP), but the increase 
is not significant. Based on the Individual Plant Evaluation for 
External Events (IPEEE) for the Crystal River Nuclear Plant (CR-3), 
the frequency of a tornado, Class F1 or greater, that could create 
tornado missiles is 2.1 E-5/year and has a total 
probability of core damage of 9.2 E-8/year. This 
probability falls below the threshold of credible accidents.
    Fuel Handling Accidents (FHAs) are analyzed in Section 14.2.2.3 
of the CR-3 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The FHA outside the 
Reactor Building (RB) event is described as the dropping of a fuel 
assembly into the spent fuel storage pool that results in damage to 
a fuel assembly and the release of the gaseous fission products. The 
current FHA assumes all 208 fuel pins in the dropped assembly are 
damaged and the gas gap activity released. The results of that 
analysis demonstrate that the applicable dose acceptance criteria, 
10 CFR 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183, ``Alternative Radiological 
Source Terms for Evaluating

[[Page 11382]]

Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' are satisfied.
    An engineering evaluation performed for this proposed change has 
determined that with the credible tornado missiles, any impact that 
a missile would impart on a SFP storage rack, spent fuel assembly, 
or the SFP floor or walls would be enveloped by the fuel handling 
accident. Any interaction between a tornado missile and the new fuel 
stored in the new fuel storage vault would potentially result in 
significant damage to an assembly, but no significant offsite 
radiation would be released and no criticality concerns exist.
    Because neither the probability nor the consequences of a FHA 
are significantly increased, and because there are no radiological 
safety concerns with the new fuel storage, it is concluded that the 
LAR does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. [The Proposed Change] Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated.
    Onsite storage of spent fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pools 
is a normal activity for which CR-3 has been designed and licensed. 
As part of assuring that this normal activity can be performed 
without endangering the public health and safety, the ability of CR-
3 to safely accommodate different possible accidents in the spent 
fuel pools, such as dropping a fuel assembly or the misloading of a 
fuel assembly, have been analyzed with acceptable results. The 
interaction between a tornado missile and spent fuel in the SFP has 
a very low probability of occurrence, and the SFP storage racks and 
the normal water layer would provide significant protection to the 
fuel. The SFP integrity would not be compromised so there is not 
expected to be any significant loss of water above the fuel.
    Currently, the SFP missile shields are removed when refueling, 
maintenance, and other fuel and tool movement activities in the SFP 
are ongoing. Removing the requirement for missile shields does not 
introduce a new plant configuration that could introduce a new type 
of accident.
    Any interaction between a credible tornado missile and the new 
fuel stored in the new fuel storage vault is not considered an 
accident under the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 3, 
November 1978, ``Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis 
Reports for Nuclear Power Plants,'' as the rods are not irradiated 
and no significant radiation would be released in the event of a 
complete loss of assembly integrity. This event would have financial 
implications, but is not considered an accident under RG 1.70 
criteria.
    3. [The Proposed Change] Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in a Margin of Safety.
    The purpose of the missile shields is to prevent tornado 
missiles from damaging fuel and racks in the SFP. Although the 
missile shields provide a barrier, they are not alone in providing 
margin to the SFP to protect the public health and safety.
    The margin of safety for the SFP also includes the amount of 
water in the pool above the top of the fuel, the amount of soluble 
boron in the pool, the distance between assemblies, and the fixed 
neutron absorbers in the storage racks. These are design parameters 
that prevent inadvertent criticality as well as a significant 
release of radiation in the event of a dropped (damaged) fuel 
assembly. The elimination of the CR-3 commitment to maintain missile 
shields over the SFP during all times, when not working with the 
fuel or in the pool, will not have any significant impact on these 
parameters.
    As already noted in FSAR Section 9.3.2.6.1, a tornado directly 
over the SFP is not postulated to cause the loss of any significant 
amount of water in the SFP due to a 3 psi pressure drop caused by a 
tornado. A credible tornado missile that enters the SFP is expected 
to cause the loss of some pool inventory, but not a significant 
amount. The removal of the missile shields will therefore, not cause 
or allow a significant loss of pool inventory.
    Unless a significant volume of borated water is lost from the 
pool from either the tornado suction or the missile splash down, the 
boron concentration will not change significantly once refilled. 
Additionally, CR-3 takes credit for soluble boron only as margin to 
0.95 K effective for a misloaded fuel assembly. Subcriticality is 
maintained even with the SFP filled with un-borated water. The SFP 
storage racks are designed and constructed with the specific center 
to center distances between the cells (9.11 inch for Pool B and 10.5 
inch for Pool A). Any impact from a tornado missile may cause some 
local rack deformation, but is not expected to change cell spacing 
for any racks. This logic also holds for the neutron absorber in the 
SFP storage racks. There may be some local rack deformation, but no 
significant movement of the fixed poison is expected to occur.
    Therefore, a significant reduction in a margin of safety is not 
expected to occur from the permanent removal of the SFP missile 
shields.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The 
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the 
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day 
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, 
for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the 
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment 
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a 
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after 
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will 
occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rulemaking, 
Directives and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services, 
Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and 
page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also 
be delivered to Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. 
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 
O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the 
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of 
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person 
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to 
participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request 
for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a 
hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in 
accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic 
Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should 
consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the 
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 
F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly 
available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents 
Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room 
on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to 
intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a presiding

[[Page 11383]]

officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative 
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the 
request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative 
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following general requirements: (1) The name, address and telephone 
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the 
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the 
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the 
proceeding on the requestors/petitioner's interest. The petition must 
also identify the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor 
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
    Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for 
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner 
intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The 
petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific 
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the 
petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. 
The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine 
dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. 
Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the 
amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if 
proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner/requestor 
who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one 
contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If 
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no 
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment 
request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held 
would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
    Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be 
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding 
officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition, 
request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing 
of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii).
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the 
Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications 
Staff; (2) courier, express mail, and expedited delivery services: 
Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and 
Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of the 
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, [email protected]; 
or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: 
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, verification 
number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and 
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of 
the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and it is requested that copies be transmitted either by 
means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to 
[email protected]. A copy of the request for hearing and petition 
for leave to intervene should also be sent to David T. Conley, 
Associate General Counsel II--Legal Department, Progress Energy Service 
Company, LLC, Post Office Box 1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602, 
attorney for the licensee.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated February 8, 2007, which is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White 
Flint North, File Public Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 
floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be 
accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's 
(ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web 
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have 
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents 
located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by 
telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of March 2007.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Stewart N. Bailey,
 Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch II-2, Division of 
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 [FR Doc. E7-4517 Filed 3-12-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P