

of Federal Regulations to read as follows:

PART 627—TITLE IV CONSERVATORS, RECEIVERS, AND VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATIONS

1. The authority citation for part 627 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 4.2, 5.9, 5.10, 5.17, 5.51, 5.58, 5.61 of the Farm Credit Act (12 U.S.C. 2183, 2243, 2244, 2252, 2277a, 2277a-7, 2277a-10).

Subpart B—Receivers and Receiverships

2. Revise § 627.2750(h) to read as follows:

§ 627.2750 Priority of claims—banks.

* * * * *

(h) All claims of holders of consolidated and System-wide bonds and all claims of the other Farm Credit banks arising from their payments on consolidated and System-wide bonds pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 2155 or pursuant to an agreement among the banks to reallocate the payments, provided the agreement is in writing and approved by the Farm Credit Administration.

* * * * *

§ 627.2755 [Amended]

3. Amend § 627.2755(a) by removing the words “described in § 627.2745” in the last sentence.

Dated: March 7, 2007.

Roland E. Smith,

Secretary, Farm Credit Administration Board.

[FR Doc. E7-4427 Filed 3-9-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6705-01-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. NM362 Special Conditions No. 25-06-15-SC]

Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787-8 Airplane; Interaction of Systems And Structures, Electronic Flight Control System—Control Surface Awareness, High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection, Limit Engine Torque Loads for Sudden Engine Stoppage, and Design Roll Maneuver Requirement

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed special conditions.

SUMMARY: This notice proposes special conditions for the Boeing Model 787-8 airplane. This airplane will have novel

or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. These design features include electronic flight control systems and high bypass engines. These special conditions also pertain to the effects of such novel or unusual design features, such as effects on the structural performance of the airplane. Finally, these special conditions pertain to effects of certain conditions on these novel or unusual design features, such as the effects of high intensity radiated fields (HIRF). Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Boeing Model 787-8 airplanes.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before April 26, 2007.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposal may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Transport Airplane Directorate, Attention: Rules Docket (ANM-113), Docket No. NM362, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; or delivered in duplicate to the Transport Airplane Directorate at the above address. All comments must be marked Docket No. NM362. Comments may be inspected in the Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Meghan Gordon, FAA, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2138; facsimile (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We ask that you send us two copies of written comments.

We will file in the docket all comments we receive as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning these proposed special conditions. The docket is available for public inspection before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to review the docket in person, go to the address in the **ADDRESSES** section of this notice between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. We may change the proposed special conditions based on comments we receive.

If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the postcard and mail it back to you.

Background

On March 28, 2003, Boeing applied for an FAA type certificate for its new Boeing Model 787-8 passenger airplane. The Boeing Model 787-8 airplane will be an all-new, two-engine jet transport airplane with a two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 476,000 pounds, with a maximum passenger count of 381 passengers.

Type Certification Basis

Under provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Boeing must show that Boeing Model 787-8 airplanes (hereafter referred to as “the 787”) meet the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-117, except §§ 25.809(a) and 25.812, which will remain at Amendment 25-115. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the 787 because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under provisions of 14 CFR 21.16.

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the 787 must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of part 36. In addition, the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 92-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.”

Special conditions, as defined in § 11.19, are issued in accordance with § 11.38 and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with § 21.17(a)(2).

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of § 21.101.

Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design Features

The 787 will incorporate a number of novel or unusual design features. Because of rapid improvements in airplane technology, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for these design features. These proposed special conditions for the 787 contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Most of these proposed special conditions are identical or nearly identical to those previously required for type certification of the Model 777 series airplanes.

Most of these proposed special conditions were derived initially from standardized requirements developed by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), comprised of representatives of the FAA, Europe's Joint Aviation Authorities (now replaced by the European Aviation Safety Agency), and industry. In the case of some of these requirements, a draft notice of proposed rulemaking has been prepared but no final rule has yet been promulgated.

Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the 787 in the near future.

1. Interaction of Systems and Structures

The 787 is equipped with systems that affect the airplane's structural performance, either directly or as a result of failure or malfunction. That is, the airplane's systems affect how it responds in maneuver and gust conditions, and thereby affect its structural capability. These systems may also affect the aeroelastic stability of the airplane. Such systems represent a novel and unusual feature when compared to the technology envisioned in the current airworthiness standards. A special condition is needed to require consideration of the effects of systems on the structural capability and aeroelastic stability of the airplane, both in the normal and in the failed state.

This special condition requires that the airplane meet the structural requirements of subparts C and D of 14 CFR part 25 when the airplane systems are fully operative. The special condition also requires that the airplane meet these requirements considering failure conditions. In some cases, reduced margins are allowed for failure conditions based on system reliability.

2. Electronic Flight Control System: Control Surface Awareness

With a response-command type of flight control system and no direct coupling from cockpit controller to control surface, such as on the 787, the pilot is not aware of the actual surface deflection position during flight maneuvers. These features are novel and unusual when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. These special conditions are meant to contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. Some unusual flight conditions, arising from atmospheric conditions or airplane or engine failures or both, may result in full or nearly full surface deflection. Unless the flightcrew is made aware of excessive deflection or impending control surface deflection limiting, piloted or auto-flight system control of the airplane might be inadvertently continued in a way that would cause loss of control or other unsafe handling or performance characteristics.

These proposed special conditions require that suitable annunciation be provided to the flightcrew when a flight condition exists in which nearly full control surface deflection occurs. Suitability of such an annunciation must take into account that some pilot-demanded maneuvers, such as a rapid roll, are necessarily associated with intended full or nearly full control surface deflection. Simple alerting systems which would function in both intended or unexpected control-limiting situations must be properly balanced between providing needed crew awareness and avoiding nuisance warnings.

3. High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection

The 787 will use electrical and electronic systems which perform critical functions. These systems may be vulnerable to high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF) external to the airplane. There is no specific regulation that addresses requirements for protection of electrical and electronic systems from HIRF. Increased power levels from radio frequency transmitters and use of sensitive avionics /electronics and electrical systems to command and control the airplane have made it necessary to provide adequate protection.

To ensure that a level of safety is achieved that is equivalent to that

intended by the regulations incorporated by reference, the proposed special conditions are needed for the 787. These proposed special conditions require that avionics/electronics and electrical systems that perform critical functions be designed and installed to preclude component damage and interruption of function because of HIRF.

High-power radio frequency transmitters for radio, radar, television, and satellite communications can adversely affect operations of airplane electrical and electronic systems. Therefore, immunity of critical avionics/electronics and electrical systems to HIRF must be established. Based on surveys and analysis of existing HIRF emitters, adequate protection from HIRF exists if airplane system immunity is demonstrated when exposed to the HIRF environments in either paragraph (a) OR (b) below:

(a) A minimum environment of 100 volts rms (root-mean-square) per meter electric field strength from 10 KHz to 18 GHz.

(1) System elements and their associated wiring harnesses must be exposed to the environment without benefit of airframe shielding.

(2) Demonstration of this level of protection is established through system tests and analysis.

(b) An environment external to the airframe of the field strengths shown in the table below for the frequency ranges indicated. Immunity to both peak and average field strength components from the table must be demonstrated.

Frequency	Field strength (volts per meter)	
	Peak	Average
10 kHz–100 kHz	50	50
100 kHz–500 kHz	50	50
500 kHz–2 MHz	50	50
2 MHz–30 MHz	100	100
30 MHz–70 MHz	50	50
70 MHz–100 MHz	50	50
100 MHz–200 MHz	100	100
200 MHz–400 MHz	100	100
400 MHz–700 MHz	700	50
700 MHz–1 GHz	700	100
1 GHz–2 GHz	2000	200
2 GHz–4 GHz	3000	200
4 GHz–6 GHz	3000	200
6 GHz–8 GHz	1000	200
8 GHz–12 GHz	3000	300
12 GHz–18 GHz	2000	200
18 GHz–40 GHz	600	200

Field strengths are expressed in terms of peak root-mean-square (rms) values over the complete modulation period.

The environment levels identified above are the result of an FAA review of existing studies on the subject of HIRF and of the work of the

Electromagnetic Effects Harmonization Working Group of ARAC.

4. Limit Engine Torque Loads for Sudden Engine Stoppage

The 787 will have high-bypass engines with a chord-swept fan 112 inches in diameter. Engines of this size were not envisioned when § 25.361, pertaining to loads imposed by engine seizure, was adopted in 1965. Worst case engine seizure events become increasingly more severe with increasing engine size because of the higher inertia of the rotating components.

Section 25.361(b)(1) requires that for turbine engine installations, the engine mounts and the supporting structures must be designed to withstand a "limit engine torque load imposed by sudden engine stoppage due to malfunction or structural failure." Limit loads are expected to occur about once in the lifetime of any airplane. Section 25.305 requires that supporting structures be able to support limit loads without detrimental permanent deformation, meaning that supporting structures should remain serviceable after a limit load event.

Since adoption of § 25.361(b)(1), the size, configuration, and failure modes of jet engines have changed considerably. Current engines are much larger and are designed with large bypass fans. In the event of a structural failure, these engines are capable of producing much higher transient loads on the engine mounts and supporting structures.

As a result, modern high bypass engines are subject to certain rare-but-severe engine seizure events. Service history shows that such events occur far less frequently than limit load events. Although it is important for the airplane to be able to support such rare loads safely without failure, it is unrealistic to expect that no permanent deformation will occur.

Given this situation, ARAC has proposed a design standard for today's large engines. For the commonly-occurring deceleration events, the proposed standard requires engine mounts and structures to support maximum torques without detrimental permanent deformation. For the rare-but-severe engine seizure events such as loss of any fan, compressor, or turbine blade, the proposed standard requires engine mounts and structures to support maximum torques without failure, but allows for some deformation in the structure.

The FAA concludes that modern large engines, including those on the 787, are novel and unusual compared to those envisioned when § 25.361(b)(1) was

adopted and thus warrant a special condition. The proposed special condition contains design criteria recommended by ARAC. The ARAC proposal would revise the wording of § 25.361(b), including §§ 25.361(b)(1) and (b)(2), removing language pertaining to structural failures and moving it to a separate requirement that discusses the reduced factors of safety that apply to these failures.

5. Design Roll Maneuver Requirement

The 787 is equipped with an electronic flight control system that provides control of the aircraft through pilot inputs to the flight computer. Current part 25 airworthiness regulations account for "control laws," for which aileron deflection is proportional to control stick deflection. They do not address any nonlinearities¹ or other effects on aileron actuation that may be caused by electronic flight controls. Therefore, the FAA considers the flight control system to be a novel and unusual feature compared to those envisioned when current regulations were adopted. Since this type of system may affect flight loads, and therefore the structural capability of the airplane, special conditions are needed to address these effects.

This proposed special condition differs from current requirements in that it requires that the roll maneuver result from defined movements of the cockpit roll control as opposed to defined aileron deflections. Also, the proposed special condition requires an additional load condition at design maneuvering speed (V_A), in which the cockpit roll control is returned to neutral following the initial roll input.

This proposed special condition differs from similar special conditions applied to previous designs. This special condition is limited to the roll axis only, whereas previous special conditions also included pitch and yaw axes. A special condition is no longer needed for the yaw axis because § 25.351 was revised at Amendment 25-91 to take into account effects of an electronic flight control system. No special condition is needed for the pitch axis because the applicant's proposed methodology for the pitch maneuver takes into account effects of an electronic flight control system.

Applicability

As discussed above, these proposed special conditions are applicable to the 787. Should Boeing apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to

¹ A nonlinearity is a situation where output does not change in the same proportion as input.

include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these proposed special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features of the 787. It is not a rule of general applicability, and it affects only the applicant that applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for these Special Conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Proposed Special Conditions

Accordingly, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes the following special conditions as part of the type certification basis for the Boeing Model 787-8 airplane.

1. Interaction of Systems and Structures

The Boeing Model 787-8 airplane is equipped with systems which affect the airplane's structural performance either directly or as a result of failure or malfunction. The influence of these systems and their failure conditions must be taken into account when showing compliance with requirements of subparts C and D of part 25 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The following criteria must be used for showing compliance with this proposed special condition for airplanes equipped with flight control systems, autopilots, stability augmentation systems, load alleviation systems, flutter control systems, fuel management systems, and other systems that either directly or as a result of failure or malfunction affect structural performance. If this proposed special condition is used for other systems, it may be necessary to adapt the criteria to the specific system.

(a) The criteria defined here address only direct structural consequences of system responses and performances. They cannot be considered in isolation but should be included in the overall safety evaluation of the airplane. They may in some instances duplicate standards already established for this evaluation. These criteria are only applicable to structures whose failure could prevent continued safe flight and landing. Specific criteria defining acceptable limits on handling characteristics or stability requirements when operating in the system degraded

or inoperative mode are not provided in this special condition.

(b) Depending on the specific characteristics of the airplane, additional studies may be required that go beyond the criteria provided in this special condition in order to demonstrate capability of the airplane to meet other realistic conditions such as alternative gust conditions or maneuvers for an airplane equipped with a load alleviation system.

(c) The following definitions are applicable to this special condition.

(1) *Structural performance*: Capability of the airplane to meet the structural requirements of part 25.

(2) *Flight limitations*: Limitations that can be applied to the airplane flight conditions following an in-flight failure occurrence and that are included in the flight manual (speed limitations or avoidance of severe weather conditions, for example).

(3) *Operational limitations*: Limitations, including flight limitations, that can be applied to the airplane operating conditions before dispatch (fuel, payload, and master minimum equipment list limitations, for example).

(4) *Probabilistic terms*: Terms (probable, improbable, extremely improbable) used in this special condition which are the same as those probabilistic terms used in § 25.1309.

(5) *Failure condition*: Term that is the same as that used in § 25.1309. The term failure condition in this proposed

special condition, however, applies only to system failure conditions that affect structural performance of the airplane. Examples are system failure conditions that induce loads, change the response of the airplane to inputs such as gusts or pilot actions, or lower flutter margins.

Note: Although failure annunciation system reliability must be included in probability calculations for paragraph (f) of the proposed special condition, there is no specific reliability requirement for the annunciation system required in paragraph (g) of the proposed special condition.

(d) *General*. The following criteria will be used in determining the influence of a system and its failure conditions on the airplane structure.

(e) *System fully operative*. With the system fully operative, the following apply:

(1) Limit loads must be derived in all normal operating configurations of the system from all the limit conditions specified in subpart C of 14 CFR part 25 (or used in lieu of those specified in subpart C), taking into account any special behavior of such a system or associated functions or any effect on the structural performance of the airplane that may occur up to the limit loads. In particular, any significant degree of nonlinearity in rate of displacement of control surface or thresholds, or any other system nonlinearities, must be accounted for in a realistic or conservative way when deriving limit loads from limit conditions.

(2) The airplane must meet the strength requirements of part 25 for static strength and residual strength, using the specified factors to derive ultimate loads from the limit loads defined above. The effect of nonlinearities must be investigated beyond limit conditions to ensure the behavior of the system presents no anomaly compared to the behavior below limit conditions. However, conditions beyond limit conditions need not be considered if the applicant demonstrates that the airplane has design features that will not allow it to exceed those limit conditions.

(3) The airplane must meet the aeroelastic stability requirements of § 25.629.


(f) *System in the failure condition*. For any system failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable, the following apply:

(1) *Establishing loads at the time of failure*. Starting from 1-g level flight conditions, a realistic scenario, including pilot corrective actions, must be established to determine loads occurring at the time of failure and immediately after failure.

(i) For static strength substantiation, these loads, multiplied by an appropriate factor of safety related to probability of occurrence of the failure, are ultimate loads to be considered for design. The factor of safety (FS) is defined in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Factor of safety at the time of occurrence



(ii) For residual strength substantiation, the airplane must be able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in subparagraph (f)(1)(i) of these special conditions. For pressurized cabins, these loads must be combined with the normal operating differential pressure.

(iii) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to the speeds defined in § 25.629(b)(2). For failure conditions that result in speeds

beyond design cruise speed or design cruise mach number (V_C/M_C), freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown to increased speeds, so that the margins intended by § 25.629(b)(2) are maintained.

(iv) Failures of the system that result in forced structural vibrations (oscillatory failures) must not produce loads that could result in detrimental deformation of primary structure.

(2) *Establishing loads in the system failed state for the continuation of the flight*. For the continuation of flight of the airplane in the system failed state and considering any appropriate reconfiguration and flight limitations, the following apply:

(i) Loads derived from the following conditions (or used in lieu of the following conditions) at speeds up to V_C/M_C , or the speed limitation

prescribed for the remainder of the flight, must be determined:

(A) The limit symmetrical maneuvering conditions specified in § 25.331 and § 25.345.

(B) The limit gust and turbulence conditions specified in § 25.341 and § 25.345.

(C) The limit rolling conditions specified in § 25.349 and the limit unsymmetrical conditions specified in § 25.367 and § 25.427(b) and (c).


(D) The limit yaw maneuvering conditions specified in § 25.351.

(E) The limit ground loading conditions specified in § 25.473 and § 25.491.

(ii) For static strength substantiation, each part of the structure must be able to withstand the loads in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of the special condition multiplied by a factor of safety depending on the probability of being in this failure state. The factor of safety is defined in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Factor of safety for continuation of flight



$$Q_j = (T_j)(P_j)$$

Where:

T_j = Average time spent in failure condition j (in hours)

P_j = Probability of occurrence of failure mode j (per hour)

Note: If P_j is greater than 10^{-3} per flight hour then a 1.5 factor of safety must be applied to all limit load conditions specified in subpart C-Structure, of 14 CFR part 25.

(iii) For residual strength substantiation, the airplane must be able to withstand two-thirds of the ultimate loads defined in paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of the special condition. For pressurized cabins, these loads must be combined with the normal operating differential pressure.


(iv) If the loads induced by the failure condition have a significant effect on

fatigue or damage tolerance then the effects of these loads must be taken into account.

(v) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to a speed determined from Figure 3. Flutter clearance speeds V' and V'' may be based on the speed limitation specified for the remainder of the flight using the margins defined by § 25.629(b).

Figure 3

Clearance speed



V' = Clearance speed as defined by § 25.629(b)(2).

V'' = Clearance speed as defined by § 25.629(b)(1).

$$Q_j = (T_j)(P_j)$$

Where:

T_j = Average time spent in failure condition j (in hours)

P_j = Probability of occurrence of failure mode j (per hour)

Note: If P_j is greater than 10^{-3} per flight hour, then the flutter clearance speed must not be less than V'' .

(vi) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must also be shown up to V'

in Figure 3 above, for any probable system failure condition combined with any damage required or selected for investigation by § 25.571(b).

(3) Consideration of certain failure conditions may be required by other sections of 14 CFR part 25 regardless of calculated system reliability. Where

analysis shows the probability of these failure conditions to be less than 10⁻⁹, criteria other than those specified in this paragraph may be used for structural substantiation to show continued safe flight and landing.

(g) *Failure indications.* For system failure detection and indication, the following apply.

(1) The system must be checked for failure conditions, not extremely improbable, that degrade the structural capability of the airplane below the level required by part 25 or significantly reduce the reliability of the remaining system. As far as reasonably practicable, the flightcrew must be made aware of these failures before flight. Certain elements of the control system, such as mechanical and hydraulic components, may use special periodic inspections, and electronic components may use daily checks, instead of detection and indication systems to achieve the objective of this requirement. Such certification maintenance inspections or daily checks must be limited to components on which faults are not readily detectable by normal detection and indication systems and where service history shows that inspections will provide an adequate level of safety.

(2) The existence of any failure condition, not extremely improbable, during flight that could significantly affect the structural capability of the airplane and for which the associated reduction in airworthiness can be minimized by suitable flight limitations, must be signaled to the flightcrew. For example, failure conditions that result in a factor of safety between the airplane strength and the loads of subpart C below 1.25, or flutter margins below V'' , must be signaled to the crew during flight.

(h) *Dispatch with known failure conditions.* If the airplane is to be dispatched in a known system failure condition that affects structural performance, or affects the reliability of the remaining system to maintain structural performance, then the provisions of this special condition must be met, including the provisions of paragraph (e) for the dispatched condition, and paragraph (f) for subsequent failures. Expected operational limitations may be taken into account in establishing P_j as the probability of failure occurrence for determining the safety margin in Figure 1. Flight limitations and expected operational limitations may be taken into account in establishing Q_j as the combined probability of being in the dispatched failure condition and the subsequent failure condition for the safety margins in Figures 2 and 3. These

limitations must be such that the probability of being in this combined failure state and then subsequently encountering limit load conditions is extremely improbable. No reduction in these safety margins is allowed if the subsequent system failure rate is greater than 10⁻³ per hour.

2. Electronic Flight Control System: Control Surface Awareness

In addition to compliance with §§ 25.143, 25.671, and 25.672, the following special condition applies:

(a) The system design must ensure that the flightcrew is made suitably aware whenever the primary control means nears the limit of control authority. This indication should direct the pilot to take appropriate action to avoid the unsafe condition in accordance with appropriate airplane flight manual (AFM) instructions. Depending on the application, suitable annunciations may include cockpit control position, annunciator light, or surface position indicators. Furthermore, this requirement applies at limits of control authority, not necessarily at limits of any individual surface travel.

(b) Suitability of such a display or alerting must take into account that some pilot-demanded maneuvers are necessarily associated with intended full performance, which may require full surface deflection. Therefore, simple alerting systems, which would function in both intended or unexpected control-limiting situations, must be properly balanced between needed crew awareness and nuisance factors. A monitoring system which might compare airplane motion, surface deflection, and pilot demand could be useful for eliminating nuisance alerting.

3. High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection

(a) Protection from Unwanted Effects of High-intensity Radiated Fields. Each electrical and electronic system which performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operation and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high intensity radiated fields external to the airplane.

(b) For the purposes of these Special Conditions, the following definition applies: Critical Functions: Functions whose failure would contribute to or cause a failure condition that would prevent continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

4. Limit Engine Torque Loads for Sudden Engine Stoppage

In lieu of § 25.361(b) the following special condition is proposed:

(a) For turbine engine installations, the engine mounts, pylons, and adjacent supporting airframe structure must be designed to withstand 1g level flight loads acting simultaneously with the maximum limit torque loads imposed by each of the following:

(1) Sudden engine deceleration due to a malfunction which could result in a temporary loss of power or thrust.

(2) The maximum acceleration of the engine.

(b) For auxiliary power unit installations, the power unit mounts and adjacent supporting airframe structure must be designed to withstand 1g level flight loads acting simultaneously with the maximum limit torque loads imposed by each of the following:

(1) Sudden auxiliary power unit deceleration due to malfunction or structural failure.

(2) The maximum acceleration of the power unit.

(c) For engine supporting structure, an ultimate loading condition must be considered that combines 1g flight loads with the transient dynamic loads resulting from each of the following:

(1) Loss of any fan, compressor, or turbine blade.

(2) Where applicable to a specific engine design, any other engine structural failure that results in higher loads.

(d) The ultimate loads developed from the conditions specified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) are to be multiplied by a factor of 1.0 when applied to engine mounts and pylons and multiplied by a factor of 1.25 when applied to adjacent supporting airframe structure.

5. Design Roll Maneuver Requirement

In lieu of compliance to § 25.349(a), the following special conditions are proposed.

The following conditions, speeds, and cockpit roll control motions (except as the motions may be limited by pilot effort) must be considered in combination with an airplane load factor of zero and of two-thirds of the positive maneuvering factor used in design. In determining the resulting control surface deflections, the torsional flexibility of the wing must be considered in accordance with § 25.301(b):

(a) Conditions corresponding to steady rolling velocities must be investigated. In addition, conditions corresponding to maximum angular

acceleration must be investigated for airplanes with engines or other weight concentrations outboard of the fuselage. For the angular acceleration conditions, zero rolling velocity may be assumed in the absence of a rational time history investigation of the maneuver.

(b) At V_A , sudden movement of the cockpit roll control up to the limit is assumed. The position of the cockpit roll control must be maintained until a steady roll rate is achieved and then must be returned suddenly to the neutral position.

(c) At V_C , the cockpit roll control must be moved suddenly and maintained so as to achieve a roll rate not less than that obtained in paragraph (2).

(d) At V_D , the cockpit roll control must be moved suddenly and maintained so as to achieve a roll rate not less than one-third of that obtained in paragraph (2).

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 1, 2007.

Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E7-4306 Filed 3-9-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-27508; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-252-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER) ERJ 170 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as an obstruction at the cargo compartment fire extinguisher system drier metering unit (DME) inlet, affecting the system effectiveness and, consequently, making the fire extinguishing capability at those compartments inadequate should a fire

erupt. The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by April 11, 2007.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *DOT Docket Web Site:* Go to <http://dms.dot.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.
- *Mail:* Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
- *Hand Delivery:* Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://dms.dot.gov>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone (800) 647-5227) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1175; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Streamlined Issuance of AD

The FAA is implementing a new process for streamlining the issuance of ADs related to MCAI. This streamlined process will allow us to adopt MCAI safety requirements in a more efficient manner and will reduce safety risks to the public. This process continues to follow all FAA AD issuance processes to meet legal, economic, Administrative Procedure Act, and **Federal Register** requirements. We also continue to meet our technical decision-making responsibilities to identify and correct unsafe conditions on U.S.-certificated products.

This proposed AD references the MCAI and related service information that we considered in forming the

engineering basis to correct the unsafe condition. The proposed AD contains text copied from the MCAI and for this reason might not follow our plain language principles.

Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2007-27508; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-252-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://dms.dot.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

The Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC), which is the aviation authority for Brazil, has issued Brazilian Airworthiness Directive 2006-01-03, effective February 7, 2006 (referred to after this as "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states that it has been found the occurrence of one case of obstruction at the cargo compartment fire extinguisher system drier metering unit (DMU) inlet, affecting the system effectiveness and, consequently, making the fire extinguishing capability at those compartments inadequate should a fire erupt. The MCAI requires installation of a debris strainer at the DMU inlet. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

Relevant Service Information

EMBRAER has issued Service Bulletin 170-26-0002, dated November 11, 2005. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, they have notified us of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information