[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 28 (Monday, February 12, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6606-6609]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-2374]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-397]


Energy Northwest; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of 
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-21, issued to Energy Northwest (the licensee), for operation of the 
Columbia Generating Station located in Benton County, Washington.
    The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 
3.6.1.7, ``Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers,'' to allow a 
one-time extension to the current closure verification surveillance 
requirement (SR) for one of two

[[Page 6607]]

redundant disks in one of nine vacuum breakers until reliable position 
indication can be restored in the main control room during the next 
refueling outage (R-18). Verification of closure of each vacuum breaker 
disk is currently required every 14 days by SR 3.6.1.7.1. The licensee 
requested that the proposed change be considered on an exigent basis.
    The licensee stated that during the January 6, 2007, functional 
test of vacuum breaker CVB-V-1JK, one of the redundant disks in the 
vacuum breaker assembly did not meet the procedurally defined 
acceptance criteria for open or close due to an issue with position 
indication limit switches. This problem has resulted in unreliable 
position indication for closure of the rear disk of the vacuum breaker 
and requires an alternate method of closure verification be employed 
(i.e., a differential pressure test). Consistent with SR 3.6.1.7.1, 
this test must be performed every 14 days. However, performance of the 
alternate test creates an unnecessary increase in plant risk relative 
to other compensatory options.
    The proposed one-time change to TS 3.6.1.7 would revise SR 
3.6.1.7.1 by adding a note to provide an extension to the SR for the 
rear disk of vacuum breaker CVB-V-1JK. This extension would remain in 
effect until the end of R-18, currently scheduled to begin on May 12, 
2007.
    On January 6, 2007, during a functional test of vacuum breaker CVB-
V-1JK, the rear disk of the vacuum breaker did not meet the 
procedurally defined acceptance criteria for open or close due to an 
issue with the position indication limit switches. When CVB-V-1JK was 
cycled from the control room, the close position indication did not 
extinguish and prevented the open position indication from 
illuminating. The separate full open indication did illuminate, 
indicating that the rear disk opened as expected; however, the closure 
of the disk could not be confirmed using normal position indication.
    With unreliable position indication in the main control room for 
the rear disk of vacuum breaker CVB-1JK, the alternate method of 
closure verification using the differential pressure test is required. 
This test, as described in the TS Bases, involves establishing a 
differential pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber equal 
to, or in excess of, 0.5 pounds per square inch differential (psid) to 
verify that the disk being tested can maintain that differential for 60 
minutes. Current test procedures specify that a differential pressure 
of 0.7 to 0.75 psid be established between the drywell and suppression 
chamber. This value provides margin to accommodate minor internal 
drywell temperature changes during the testing. Maintaining a 
differential pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber is a 
positive indication that the vacuum breaker disk being tested is 
closed. This test was performed on the rear disk of vacuum breaker CVB-
V-1JK on January 8, 2007, and again on January 22, 2007, and confirmed 
that the disk was seated. The degraded limit switches and associated 
circuitry are located in the inerted wetwell and cannot be accessed to 
restore normal position indication in the control room for the rear 
disk of vacuum breaker CVB-V-1JK while at power. Therefore, continued 
compliance with SR 3.6.1.7.1 would require that this pressure test be 
performed every 14 days.
    The licensee stated that when performing the vacuum breaker closure 
differential pressure test, drywell pressure is increased from near 
atmospheric conditions to approximately 45 percent of the Drywell 
Pressure--High scram setpoint of 1.68 pounds per square inch gauge. 
Frequent differential pressure testing places the plant in a condition 
with degraded margin for a reactor scram. This increases the risk of an 
inadvertent reactor scram from a minor drywell pressure transient which 
may have been managed by the operator if it occurred at a normal 
drywell pressure and can unduly challenge plant safety systems and 
personnel. Furthermore, when performing the differential pressure test 
to verify continued closure of the rear disk of vacuum breaker CVB-V-
1JK, the front disk is required to be open for at least 60 minutes 
while the test is being performed which degrades the capability of the 
vacuum breaker assembly to prevent bypass leakage when required. As 
previously discussed, TS 3.6.1.7 recognizes this increase in plant risk 
by drawing a distinction between an actual communication path and a 
potential communication path in the derivation of entry conditions and 
required actions.
    The licensee concluded that a more appropriate method to maintain 
public health and safety is to ensure that both disks of vacuum breaker 
CVB-V-1JK continue to maintain their current closed position without a 
change of state. Operating in this configuration, both the front and 
rear disks of vacuum breaker CVB-V-1JK would conservatively not be 
credited to perform the open safety function and would be declared 
inoperable for opening. Both disks are currently closed and have been 
verified as such using the normal position indication in the control 
room for the front disk and by the differential pressure test for the 
rear disk. This configuration is currently allowed by TS 3.6.1.7, since 
only seven of nine vacuum breakers are required to be operable for 
opening while in Modes 1, 2, and 3. In addition, with vacuum breaker 
CVB-V-1JK declared inoperable for the open function, SR 3.6.1.7.2 would 
not be required to be performed and the breaker disks would not need to 
be cycled.
    Continued operation in this manner until the end of R-18 would 
ensure that plant risk is minimized but also requires an extension from 
the current 14-day interval of SR 3.6.1.7.1. The proposed change is 
necessary because continued performance of SR 3.6.1.7.1 for the rear 
disk of CVB-V-1JK results in putting the plant in a condition that 
unduly increases the risk of an inadvertent reactor scram challenging 
both plant systems and personnel. Failure to perform the differential 
pressure test required by SR 3.6.1.7.1 would result in a failed 
verification of the current closed state of these vacuum breakers. TS 
3.6.1.7 would then require placing the reactor in Mode 3 within the 
next 84 hours and Mode 4 in the following 24 hours and would also 
challenge plant system and personnel.
    The licensee states that it will continue to verify that the front 
disk of CVB-V-1JK and both disks of the other 8 vacuum breakers are 
closed every 14 days as required by SR 3.6.1.7.1. If reasonable 
evidence is discovered to conclude that the rear disk of vacuum breaker 
CVB-V-1JK may no longer be in a closed position, the licensee states 
that it will take compensatory measures to verify that this disk is 
closed within 72 hours or declare the disk not closed and enter the 
appropriate action statement. In the proposed note, evidence that the 
rear disk may no longer be in a closed position is defined as evidence 
that the front disk has opened or that the rear disk has experienced a 
differential pressure in the direction that could cause the disk to 
open.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under 
exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in

[[Page 6608]]

accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) Involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required 
by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    Proper functioning of the suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum 
breakers is required for accident mitigation. Failure of the vacuum 
breakers is not assumed as an accident initiator for any accident 
previously evaluated. Therefore, any potential failure of a vacuum 
breaker to perform when necessary will not affect the probability of 
an accident previously evaluated.
    During a LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident], the vacuum breakers 
are assumed to initially be closed to limit drywell-to-suppression 
chamber bypass leakage and must be capable of re-closing following a 
suppression pool swell event. The vacuum breakers open to prevent an 
excessive vacuum in the drywell. The proposed change will not affect 
the capability of the required vacuum breakers to perform their open 
and close safety functions since the change only affects position 
verification and high confidence is assured that the disk remains 
closed. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers are used to 
mitigate the potential consequences of an accident. The proposed 
change does not affect the capability of required vacuum breakers to 
perform their open and closed safety functions. Thus, the initial 
conditions assumed in the accident analysis are not affected. The 
proposed amendment does not involve a change to plant design and 
does not involve any new modes of operation or testing methods. 
Accordingly, the required vacuum breakers will continue to perform 
their accident mitigation safety functions as previously evaluated. 
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The extension of the closure verification surveillance interval 
for one of the two disks in a vacuum breaker for approximately 4 
months is not risk significant as all required safety functions will 
continue to be performed. The vacuum breakers are not modified by 
the proposed amendment. The accident analysis assumptions for the 
closed safety functions of the vacuum breakers are satisfied when at 
least one of the disks in each of the nine vacuum breaker lines are 
fully closed and capable of re-closing following a suppression pool 
swell. The additional disk in each line satisfies the single failure 
criterion. The open safety function of the vacuum breakers is 
satisfied when 6 of the 9 vacuum breaker assemblies open during a 
DBA [design basis accident]. The other vacuum breakers satisfy the 
single failure criterion and provide additional defense-in-depth. 
Since all of the vacuum breakers are considered to perform their 
close safety function and 8 of 9 would be available to perform their 
open safety function, the proposed change will not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 14 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 14-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 14-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance. The Commission expects that the need to 
take this action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rulemaking, 
Directives and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services, 
Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and 
page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also 
be delivered to Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. 
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public 
Document Room, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 
F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the 
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of 
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person 
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to 
participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request 
for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a 
hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in 
accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic 
Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of Orders'' in 10 CFR Part 2. 
Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which 
is available at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, 
Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the 
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing 
or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or a presiding officer designated by the Commission or by 
the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following general requirements: (1) The name, address and telephone 
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the 
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the 
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible

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effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the proceeding 
on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must also 
identify the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor seeks 
to have litigated at the proceeding.
    Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for 
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner 
intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The 
petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific 
sources and documents of which the petitioner/requestor is aware and on 
which the petitioner/requestor intends to rely to establish those facts 
or expert opinion. The petitioner/requestor must provide sufficient 
information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on 
a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to 
matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The 
contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner/
requestor to relief. A petitioner/requestor who fails to satisfy these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If 
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no 
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment 
request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held 
would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
    Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be 
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding 
officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition, 
request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing 
of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii).
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the 
Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications 
Staff; (2) courier, express mail, and expedited delivery services: 
Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and 
Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of the 
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, [email protected]; 
or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: 
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, verification 
number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and 
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of 
the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and it is requested that copies be transmitted either by 
means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to 
[email protected]. A copy of the request for hearing and petition 
for leave to intervene should also be sent to William A. Horin, Esq., 
Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006-3817, 
attorney for the licensee.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated February 2, 2007, which is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), 
located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available 
records will be accessible electronically from the Agencywide Documents 
Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room 
on the Internet at the NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. 
Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in 
accessing the documents located in ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR 
Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, or 301-415-4737, or by 
e-mail to [email protected].

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of February 2007.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carl F. Lyon,
Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch IV, Division of Operating 
Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E7-2374 Filed 2-9-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P