[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 28 (Monday, February 12, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6580-6595]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-2217]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket Nos. 02-09, 02-43]


Edmund Chein, M.D.; Revocation of Practitioner's Registration, 
Denial of Application for Exporter's Registration

Introduction and Procedural History

    This is a consolidated proceeding. On November 7, 2001, the then 
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, issued an Order 
to Show Cause and Notice of Immediate Suspension of the practitioner's 
Certificate of Registration, AC1643661, issued to Edmund Chein, M.D. 
(Respondent) of Palm Springs, California. The Notice of Immediate 
Suspension was based on the Administrator's preliminary conclusion that 
Respondent's continued registration constituted ``an imminent danger to 
the public health and safety because of the substantial likelihood that 
[Respondent would] continue exporting and diverting controlled 
substances.'' Order to Show Cause and Notice of Immediate Suspension at 
6 (2001 OSC). The Order further proposed to revoke Respondent's 
practitioner's registration and deny any pending applications for 
renewal of the registration on the ground that Respondent's continued 
registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. See id. at 
1; see also 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 824(a)(4).
    Subsequently, on May 24, 2002, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, 
Office of Diversion Control, issued an additional Order to Show Cause 
(hereinafter 2002 OSC) to Respondent. This Show Cause Order proposed to 
deny Respondent's pending application for a registration as an exporter 
on the ground that issuance of a registration would be inconsistent 
with the public interest. 2002 OSC at 1; see also 21 U.S.C. 958(c) 
&(d); id. 823(d).
    The 2001 OSC alleged that Respondent had purchased ``large amounts 
of anabolic steroids'' from a Mexican pharmacy and ``other illegitimate 
sources'' and had distributed these substances to individuals who did 
not have a legitimate medical need for them. 2001 OSC at 2. The OSC 
further alleged that on May 28, 1996, Federal agents executed a search 
warrant at Respondent's medical office and seized several vials of 
steroids for which there were no records. Id. The OSC further alleged 
that in June 1996, DEA obtained from Henry Schein, Inc., copies of 
invoices which documented that Respondent had purchased controlled 
substances on nine different occasions between January 1995 and May 
1996. Id. at 3. The OSC alleged that Respondent had failed to keep 
accurate records of the purchase, inventory, and dispensation of 
controlled substances. Id.
    The 2001 OSC next alleged that on January 31, 2001, DEA Diversion 
Investigators (DIs) went to Respondent's Palm Springs medical office, 
the Palm Springs Life Extension Institute (hereinafter PSLEI), to 
conduct an administrative inspection. Id. The OSC alleged that the 
invoices documenting the purchases of controlled substances were at an 
accounting firm and not at the office. Id. The 2001 OSC further alleged 
that ``none of [the] required controlled substance records were 
accessible,'' because the records were stored in a computer and none of 
the office personnel then present were capable of retrieving them. Id. 
The OSC thus alleged that Respondent had violated the Controlled 
Substance Act by failing ``to maintain in a readily available 
condition'' initial and biennial inventory records, purchase invoices, 
and dispensing records. Id.
    The 2001 OSC further alleged that on February 5, 2001, DEA 
personnel returned to Respondent's office and obtained an inventory of 
controlled substances that was dated February 5, 2001, dispensing 
records for the period July 1, 2000, through February 1, 2001, and 
invoices for purchases of controlled substances from Barnes Wholesale, 
Inc., for the period January 1, 1999, through February 4, 2001. Id. The 
OSC also alleged that the dispensing records showed that between July 
1, 2000, and February 5, 2001, Respondent dispensed anabolic steroids, 
a Schedule III controlled substance, and phentermine, a Schedule IV 
controlled substance, to persons in Korea, Belgium, Indonesia, Canada, 
Japan, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, Mexico, England, and Hong Kong. Id. 
at 3-4.
    More specifically, the OSC alleged that Respondent had made 328 
illegal exports comprised of 20 exports of phentermine 30 mg., 58 
exports of phentermine 15 mg., 73 exports of testosterone gel 8 mg., 12 
exports of testosterone gel 100 mg., 50 exports of testosterone 
estradiol gel 4 mg, 113 exports of Depo testosterone 200 mg., and two 
exports of testosterone 50 mg.

[[Page 6581]]

Id. at 4. The OSC alleged that these exports were illegal because 
Respondent was not registered as an exporter, see 21 U.S.C. 957(a), and 
had failed to file the necessary declarations. See id. section 953(e); 
see also 2001 OSC at 4. The OSC also alleged that Respondent had failed 
to maintain proper records of the exports. See 2001 OSC at 4.
    The 2001 OSC alleged that upon discovering the exports, a DI 
contacted Dr. Darryl Garber, an associate of Respondent, who informed 
the DI that Respondent's clinic had patient records for each recipient 
of the shipments, that some of the recipients were seen at the clinic 
and others were seen by video conferencing, and that the controlled 
substances were shipped by Federal Express. See id. The OSC alleged 
that the DI instructed Dr. Garber that the shipments ``violated the 
Controlled Substances Act and must be stopped immediately,'' and that 
the DI subsequently faxed Dr. Garber the applicable provisions of the 
United States Code. Id.
    The 2001 OSC next alleged that on August 23, 2001, DEA personnel 
visited the PSLEI and conducted a management conference with 
Respondent. Id. The OSC alleged that during this meeting, the DI told 
Respondent that the required records ``were not readily retrievable on 
the date of the inspection[ ] as required'' by Federal law and that 
Respondent acknowledged that he had discussed his non-compliance with 
Dr. Garber. Id. at 5. The OSC alleged that during the conference, 
Respondent admitted that based on the records provided to DEA in 
February 2001, he ``had at least 150 exporting violations already on 
record.'' Id. The OSC further alleged that Respondent admitted that he 
had ``continued to export controlled substances'' notwithstanding the 
March 2001 warning that the shipments were illegal, and that he would 
continue to do so until he ``received written instructions from DEA.'' 
Id. The OSC also alleged that when DEA personnel requested that 
Respondent produce his controlled substance shipping records, 
Respondent refused to do so and invoked the Fifth Amendment. Id.
    The 2001 OSC alleged that on various dates following the August 
23rd, 2001 meeting, DEA personnel faxed Respondent the applicable 
provisions of the United States Code and instructed him that he was not 
authorized to either export or import controlled substances and ``must 
immediately cease'' all such activity. Id. Based on the above 
allegations, the Administrator made the preliminary finding that 
Respondent was ``responsible for the diversion of large quantities of 
controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. 953, 957 and 958.'' Id. 
at 6. Concluding that there was a ``substantial likelihood that 
[Respondent would] continue exporting and diverting controlled 
substances,'' the Administrator ordered the immediate suspension of 
Respondent's practitioner's registration. Id.
    The 2002 OSC, which proposed the denial of Respondent's application 
for an exporter's registration, repeated many of the above allegations. 
In addition, the 2002 OSC alleged that on April 27, 2001, Respondent 
had applied for a registration as an exporter of Schedule III (non-
narcotic) and Schedule IV controlled substances and that DEA had 
received the application on May 7, 2001. 2002 OSC at 2. The OSC alleged 
that the ``application was not accepted for filing'' and that 
Respondent's filing fee had been refunded. Id. The OSC also alleged 
that on December 17, 2001, DEA received from Respondent an undated 
application for a registration to export controlled substances in 
Schedule III (non-narcotic) and Schedule IV. See id. at 3.
    The 2002 OSC further alleged that on March 13, 2002, DEA DIs 
executed an administrative inspection warrant at the PSLEI. See id. at 
3. The OSC alleged that during the inspection, the DIs seized samples 
of controlled substances for analysis and obtained copies of invoices, 
inventories, dispensing logs and patient records. Id. The OSC alleged 
that these records showed that notwithstanding the previous DEA 
warnings that his exports were illegal, Respondent had ``continued to 
dispense controlled substances * * * to overseas patients until 
November 14, 2001,'' the date he was served with the Notice of 
Immediate Suspension. Id. Finally, the OSC alleged that ``DEA reviewed 
the patient records of selected overseas patients and determined that 
[Respondent had] deviated from the appropriate standard of care for the 
dispensation of controlled substances.'' Id. The OSC thus concluded 
that Respondent had ``committed acts that would render the approval of 
[his] pending DEA export application to be inconsistent with the public 
interest.'' Id. at 3.
    Respondent timely requested a hearing on the allegations of each 
Show Cause Order; the cases were assigned to Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) Gail Randall. The hearing on the issues raised by the 2001 Show 
Cause Order was initially scheduled to begin on July 9, 2002, in 
Riverside, California. However, on June 6, 2002, the parties filed a 
joint motion to consolidate the cases and to continue the hearing. On 
June 13, 2002, the ALJ granted the motions. ALJ Decision at 2 (ALJ).
    The first stage of the hearing was held in Riverside, California, 
on January 28-31, and February 3-6, 2003. During this portion of the 
hearing, Respondent objected to DEA's proposed eliciting of testimony 
of an expert witness, Dr. Robert Zipser, on the issue of whether 
Respondent's dispensing practices were within the standard of care. 
Among other things, Respondent asserted that the proposed testimony 
related to an issue that was outside the subject matter jurisdiction of 
this Agency. While the ALJ overruled Respondent's objection, she 
granted Respondent leave to file an interlocutory appeal on the issue. 
The ALJ further barred Dr. Zipser from testifying about Respondent's 
dispensing practices until the interlocutory appeal was resolved.
    On June 23, 2003, the Acting Administrator denied Respondent's 
appeal. Thereafter, the second stage of the hearing was held in 
Arlington, Virginia, on September 9-10, 2003, and the final stage was 
held in Riverside on December 9 through 11, 2003.
    During the hearing, both parties called witnesses and introduced 
documentary evidence. Following the hearing, both parties submitted 
proposed findings, conclusion of law, and argument.
    On July 28, 2005, the ALJ issued her recommended decision. In that 
decision, the ALJ recommended that I revoke Respondent's practitioner's 
registration. ALJ at 82. The ALJ further recommended that I deny 
Respondent's application for an export registration. See id. Neither 
party filed exceptions.
    Thereafter, the ALJ forwarded the record to me for final agency 
action. On December 29, 2005, Respondent's counsel submitted a letter 
to me setting forth various ``issues for review, exception, appeal and 
judicial review,'' Resp. Ltr. at 1, and including as attachments copies 
of various filings and motions that were previously submitted during 
the course of this all too lengthy proceeding. To the extent 
Respondent's letter raises ``exceptions'' as that term is used in the 
Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. 557(c), it is out of 
time.\1\ See 21 CFR 1316.66(a) (requiring filing of exceptions 
``[w]ithin twenty days after the date upon which a party is served a 
copy of the report of the'' ALJ).
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    \1\ Respondent's letter does not specify which of the ALJ's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law he is excepting to. Nor does 
it provide ``a statement of supporting reasons for such exceptions, 
together with evidence of record * * * and citations of authorities 
relied upon.'' 21 CFR 1316.66(a).
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    Having carefully considered the record as a whole, I hereby issue 
this

[[Page 6582]]

final order. For the reasons set forth below, I concur with the ALJ's 
conclusion that Respondent's continued registration as a practitioner 
would be inconsistent with the public interest and therefore adopt the 
ALJ's recommendation that Respondent's registration should be revoked. 
I further concur with the ALJ's conclusion that granting Respondent's 
application for registration as an exporter would be inconsistent with 
the public interest and therefore adopt the ALJ's recommendation that 
the application be denied. I make the following findings.

Findings of Fact

    Respondent is a medical doctor and holds a license with the Medical 
Board of California. Gov. Exh. 3, at 1. Respondent graduated in 1980 
from the American University of the Caribbean School of Medicine and 
also holds a law degree. Id.; see also ALJ at 5. Respondent practices 
anti-aging medicine and is the owner of the Palm Springs Life Extension 
Institute (PSLEI). ALJ at 5-6.
    Respondent has developed a treatment protocol called Total Hormone 
Replacement Therapy and obtained various patents for it.\2\ See 
generally Resp. Exh. 1017. Respondent's practice involves using blood 
tests to determine the levels of various hormones in a person and 
prescribing various substances including hormones such as Human Growth 
Hormone and Estrogen to a patient based on the level of these hormones 
found in a healthy young adult. See generally id. Most significantly, 
as part of his treatment protocol, Respondent frequently prescribed and 
dispensed several controlled substances including testosterone in 
various formulations, a Schedule III anabolic steroid (see 21 CFR 
1308.13(f)), and phentermine, a Schedule IV stimulant. See 21 CFR 
1308.14(e). Respondent used the term ``adrenal extract'' for 
phentermine. See Gov. Exh. 117; Gov. Exh. 135.
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    \2\ To obtain a U.S. patent, Respondent was not required to 
demonstrate the safety or effectiveness of his protocol. See Gov. 
Exh. 138, at 4 (Manual of Patent Examining Procedure Sec.  2107.03).
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    Respondent holds a DEA Certificate of Registration as a 
practitioner, No. AC1643661, which authorizes him to dispense 
controlled substances in Schedules II, II-N, III, III-N, IV and V. Gov. 
Exh. 2. Respondent's registered location is 2825 Tahquitz Canyon 
Building A, Palm Springs, CA, 92262. Id.

The First Investigation

    Respondent first came to the attention of DEA in 1994, when a U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Special Agent (SA) contacted Robert 
Brasich, a Diversion Investigator assigned to the San Diego Field 
Division, seeking a person to assist in an undercover investigation of 
Respondent. Tr. 112. The FDA SA asked the DI whether he knew of any DEA 
SA who could pose as body builder and perform an undercover visit with 
Respondent. Id. at 118. The FDA SA told the DI that he had personally 
conducted an undercover meeting during which he told Respondent that he 
played rugby and wanted to increase his strength and endurance. Id. at 
120. At the end of the visit, Respondent's staff gave the FDA SA human 
growth hormone (HGH) and the FDA SA subsequently received shipments of 
HGH on several occasions.\3\ Id.; see also Gov. Exh. 35, at 23.
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    \3\ HGH is not a controlled substance. The facts surrounding 
this visit are related solely to provide context.
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    On October 17, 1994, another FDA SA also performed an undercover 
visit with Respondent. Id. at 24. This SA told Respondent that he had 
an injured disc, that he lifted weights, and that he wanted to increase 
his muscle mass, and that he had taken steroids previously ``but wanted 
a safer alternative.'' Id. at 25; see also Tr. at 121. According to an 
affidavit filed to obtain a search warrant, Respondent told the SA that 
``the problem with anabolic steroids in the past was their use without 
medical supervision, but they weren't bad if administered by a 
doctor.'' Gov. Ex. 35, at 25. At the end of the consultation, 
Respondent gave the SA prescriptions for various items including 
testosterone gel, a Schedule III controlled substance. Id. at 26. While 
Respondent obtained a blood sample, he issued the prescription for 
testosterone without obtaining the results. Id. at 26; see also Tr. at 
149.
    On March 17, 1995, a Customs SA performed an undercover visit with 
Respondent. The Customs SA told Respondent that he was a competitive 
powerlifter and used anadrol, an anabolic steroid, but that he wanted 
HGH because he had lost competitions ``to guys who [were] `on the 
juice.' '' Gov. Exh. 35, at 32. During the visit, Respondent told the 
SA that ``[a]fter 1990, the whole body-building industry had switched 
to natural testosterone, and the `new power lifting people use 
testosterone and HGH.' '' Id. Respondent also told the SA that the 
``most effective treatment for [his] goal would involve both [HGH] and 
natural testosterone administered through the skin by means of a patch 
or gel.'' Id. Respondent further told the SA that the ``testosterone 
would not show up in drug testing at competitions if [he] followed 
[Respondent's] instructions.'' Id. at 33. While Respondent drew blood 
from the SA during this visit to determine his testosterone and HGH 
levels, the results were not available by the end of the consultation. 
Id. at 33-34; see also Tr. at 149. Respondent nonetheless gave the SA 
prescriptions for various items including testosterone. Id. at 34.
    Moreover, Respondent gave the SA a letter entitled ``testosterone 
Replacement Therapy,'' which stated that the SA ``had been diagnosed 
with hypogonadism for which testosterone replacement therapy was 
required.'' Id. The letter further stated that all the testosterone 
prescriptions and refills would be filled by a pharmacy in Fairfax, 
Virginia, and that Respondent would send the SA's prescription directly 
to the pharmacy. Id. at 34-35.
    Finally, on July 20, 1995, a DEA SA conducted an undercover visit 
with Respondent. Id. The SA told Respondent that he was a powerlifter 
and was training to make the Olympic team. Id. Respondent told the SA 
that because he ``had not done a lot of steroids in the past,'' his 
``testosterone would be low which would provide a justification for 
prescribing testosterone.'' Id. at 36. Respondent drew blood from the 
SA, id. at 37, and told him that ``if the results came back low'' he 
would also ship him HGH. Id. at 36. Respondent also gave the SA ``a 
letter entitled `testosterone Replacement Therapy.' '' Id. at 37. The 
letter ``was identical in substance to the letter given to'' the 
Customs SA during the third undercover visit. Id. Thereafter, the same 
Fairfax, Virginia pharmacy mentioned in the letter Respondent gave the 
Customs SA sent 50 mg. of testosterone gel to the DEA SA. Id. at 38.
    Subsequently, on May 23, 1996, the FDA SA obtained a search warrant 
for the PSLEI. Id. at 2. Two DEA DIs participated in the execution of 
the search. Tr. at 130. During the search, controlled substances, which 
included testosterone gel, testosterone cypionate and nandrolone 
decanoate, were found on the premises. Id. at 132; Gov. Exh. 35, at 71. 
Moreover, while the CSA requires a registrant to maintain at his 
registered location purchase records, an inventory, and a dispensing 
log, see 21 CFR 1304.03 & 1304.04, no such records were found on the 
premises during the search. Tr. at 134. The investigation also 
determined that on numerous occasions between January 1, 1995, and June 
3, 1996, Respondent had purchased controlled substances including 
diazepam (Schedule IV) and various

[[Page 6583]]

anabolic steroids including deca-durabolin, nandrolone decanoate, and 
testosterone cypionate from Henry Schein, Inc. See Tr. 135, Gov. Exh. 
36.

The Second Investigation

    On June 29, 1998, the Medical Board of California initiated 
proceedings against Respondent which resulted in an administrative 
hearing before a state ALJ. Govt. Exh. 3, at 1; Gov. Exh. 125. In a 
decision dated December 27, 1999, the state ALJ issued a decision which 
proposed the revocation of Respondent's state medical license. Gov. 
Exh. 4, at 67. On January 19, 2000, the Medical Board's Division of 
Medical Quality entered an order adopting the ALJ's decision with an 
effective date of February 18, 2000.\4\ See id. at 32
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    \4\ Respondent, however, sought judicial review in the 
California state courts. On September 26, 2000, the Superior Court 
granted Respondent's petition in part and ordered the Medical Board 
to set aside its decision revoking Respondent's license and remanded 
the case for further proceedings; on November 9, 2000, a judgment to 
this effect was entered. See Gov. Exh. 4, at 25-26. On January 4, 
2001, the Medical Board subsequently vacated and set aside its 
decision. Id. at 1.
    Subsequently, on August 15, 2002, the Medical Board filed an 
additional accusation against Respondent which alleged thirteen 
grounds for discipline including incompetence, prescribing without 
medical indication, ``obtaining controlled substances by deceit, 
misrepresentation and subterfuge,'' ``dispensing controlled 
substances without proper privileges,'' and failing to maintain 
adequate controlled substance records. Govt. Exh. 124, at 18; see 
also id. at 10-11. This matter was still pending at the time the 
record closed. See ALJ at 15.
    Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), I take official notice of the fact 
that on September 22, 2005, Respondent entered into a Stipulation 
Settlement and Disciplinary Order with the State of California, 
which became effective on March 16, 2006. See In the Matter of the 
Accusation Against: Edmund Chein, M.D., File No. 19-2000-107723, 
Decision at 1, Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order at 14. I 
further note language in the stipulation asserting that it ``is 
intended to resolve'' not only California's disciplinary action but 
also ``any disciplinary action taken by another state or the federal 
government based on the conduct alleged in * * * In the Matter of 
Edmund Chein, M.D., Docket No. 02-9 and 02-43 pending before the 
United States Drug Enforcement Administration.'' Stipulated 
Settlement at 2-3. In accordance with the Administrative Procedure 
Act, publication of this order will be withheld for a fifteen day 
period in order to provide Respondent with ``an opportunity to show 
the contrary.'' 5 U.S.C. 556(e).
    The ALJ also found that on June 30, 1995, the Medical Board 
placed Respondent on probation for a three year period for false 
advertising and failing to obtain a fictitious name permit. See ALJ 
at 12-13.
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    On July 20, 2000, Respondent submitted an application to renew his 
practitioner's registration (DEA From 224a). Gov. Exh. 1, at 1. His 
California license having been revoked, Respondent gave the address of 
his proposed registered location as 201 South Main, Suite 900, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84111. Id. at 2; Gov. Exh. 18, at 1. Moreover, in 
response to a question on the application, Respondent indicated that 
his California license had been revoked but that his Utah license was 
``not affected.'' See Gov. Exh. 1, at 2.\5\ Because Respondent had 
indicated that California had revoked his license, the application was 
not automatically renewed but forwarded to the DEA Salt Lake City 
office and then to the DEA Riverside, California field office, for 
further investigation, where it was assigned to Diversion Investigator 
Doris DeSantis. Tr. at 216-17.
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    \5\ On March 5, 2001, DEA received from Respondent a letter 
which requested a modification of his registration back to 2825 
Tahquitz Canyon Way, Building A, Palm Springs, CA, 92262, because he 
had ``since * * * regained [his] California Medical License.'' Gov. 
Exh. 18.
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    No longer holding a valid California medical license, on or about 
February 16, 2000, Respondent sold the PSLEI to his sister Connie 
Chein, a board certified physician who practices obstetrics and 
gynecology in Beverly Hills, California. ALJ at 6-7. Dr. Connie Chein 
testified that she purchased PSLEI because under California law, ``you 
have to be a licensed physician to own a medical facility.'' Tr. 1087. 
The ALJ found that during this period, PSLEI was operated by Dr. Darryl 
Garber, an associate of Respondent. See ALJ at 13 (citing Tr. 1050). On 
or about December 20, 2000 (and following the Superior Court's granting 
of judgment setting aside the State Board's revocation order), Dr. 
Connie Chein sold the PSLEI back to Respondent. Id. at 7.\6\
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    \6\ Given the circumstances surrounding Respondent's sale of the 
clinic to his sister and her sale back to him, the transaction may 
well have been a sham. But the Government did not attempt to prove 
that it was.
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    Dr. Connie Chein holds a DEA Certificate of Registration as a 
practitioner, No. AC7093292, with a registered location in Beverly 
Hills, California. Gov. Exh. 43, at 8. On various occasions, PSLEI 
ordered controlled substances using Dr. Connie Chein's DEA 
registration. See Gov. Exh. 43, at 2-6; Gov. Exh. 17 (invoices ordering 
phentermine from Barnes Wholesale); Gov. Exh. 44(d), 44(g), 44(l), & 
45(a) (invoices for testosterone ordered from Amend Drug & Chemical 
Co., Inc.); Gov. Exh. 31 (Letter dated Dec. 17, 2001, from Marshall 
Gilbert, Administrator, PSLEI, to Spectrum Chemicals) (``Dr. Connie 
Chein is no longer with [PSLEI]. Dr. Darryl Garber is now in charge of 
ordering all controlled substance[s].'').
    During a December 13, 2001, interview with DEA Diversion 
Investigators (DIs) at which she was represented by counsel, Dr. Connie 
Chein stated that she never gave Respondent permission to use her DEA 
registration to order controlled substances for PSLEI. Gov. Exh. 28, at 
15. Moreover, Dr, Connie Chein stated that she never received 
controlled substances at her Beverly Hills registered location which 
were intended for PSLEI and was unaware of the fact that someone at 
PSLEI was using her DEA registration to order controlled substances for 
the clinic. Id. at 15-17, 19.
    At the hearing, Dr. Connie Chein testified that she never treated 
patients at PSLEI. Tr. 1092. When asked, however, as to whether she had 
ever prescribed or dispensed controlled substances for patients of the 
PSLEI, Dr. Connie Chein asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. Id. at 1093. Moreover, when asked whether she had 
ever ordered controlled substances for PSLEI, Dr. Connie Chein again 
invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 1094. Dr. Connie Chein 
also asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege when the Government 
attempted to question her regarding various invoices and purchase 
orders which used her DEA number and related documents. Tr. 1111-12; 
1116-19; 1121-36.
    The Government contends that notwithstanding Connie Chein's 
ownership, Respondent remained in charge of the Palm Springs Clinic 
during the period in which his state license was revoked. There is 
substantial evidence in the record that supports this contention.
    For example, on February 27, 2000, Respondent wrote an 
``Interoffice Memo'' directing the Oral/Growth Hormone Department to 
not ``ship any bottle to Japan, if the bottles do not appear clean to 
you, because the Japanese custom is extremely clean.'' Gov. Exh. 136, 
at 14. The memo further instructed that ``testosterone tubes frequently 
have adhesive that appears black to them'' and that ``it must be 
removed * * * before it can be shipped out.'' Id. The memo directed 
clinic employees to ``sign that you have read this letter/memo, and 
return it to my desk. From, Dr. Edmund Chein.'' Id. The memo also 
stated that if there were ``any questions about the quality or the 
product, you must let Charlie or Vanessa or me know, before'' shipping 
the products. Id. Respondent's secretary, who worked at PSLEI's Palm 
Springs, Cal. clinic, was Vanessa Koloen. Tr. 1331-36
    Thereafter, in an Interoffice Memo dated February 29, 2000, 
Respondent directed the Growth Hormone Department to ship phentermine 
to a patient in Japan. See Gov. 105, at 36.

[[Page 6584]]

Specifically, the Memo reads: ``Mandy, please ship one (1) bottle of 
phentermine to Ms. [K. H.] immediately.\7\ However, ship the oral 
hormone, phentermine to Yamamoto Medical Clinic, instead of to her home 
address.'' Id. Other documents in the record establish that Ms. Mandy 
Boriski was involved in the filling of orders for Respondent's patients 
and worked out of the Palm Springs, Cal. clinic. See Gov. Ex. 96, at 
32, 33, 34, 36, 38.
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    \7\ To protect patient privacy, patients will be referred to by 
their initials.
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    One of these documents is a July 14, 2000 memo from Ms. Boriski to 
Dr. S.K., a German patient. The memo, which used the clinic's Palm 
Springs, California address states: ``I have received your fax re: the 
order with the pharmacy. I am awaiting approval from Dr. Chein for me 
to send the prescriptions you requested. I apologize for the delay but 
I am unable to send anything without his approval.'' Gov. Exh. 96, at 
32 (emphasis added).
    The record also contains a December 13, 2000 e-mail from Bob Jones, 
a consultant and spokeperson for PSLEI to various employees of the 
Palms Springs location, which discussed missing testosterone shipments 
to a German citizen, R.D. The e-mail, which was copied to Respondent 
and his Secretary Vanessa Koloen, states: ``Per Dr. Chein please send 
duplicates of their last shipments of these items today.'' Gx. 107, at 
23. As these various documents indicate, Respondent was still the boss 
during the period in which his sister putatively owned the clinic and 
continued to direct the clinic's employees in the handling of 
controlled substances.
    It is acknowledged that during this period, Respondent sometimes 
used letterhead that referred to PSLEI's ``International Division'' and 
gave an address in Salt Lake City, Utah, and typically used a 
prescription form that included his Utah medical license number. But 
even if Respondent actually maintained a medical practice in Utah, his 
doing so does not exclude a finding that during this period, Respondent 
continued to direct his employees regarding the distribution of drugs 
from the clinic's Palm Springs, California location.\8\
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    \8\ Other documents support the conclusion that Respondent 
remained active in practicing medicine out of the Palm Springs, 
California location. On May 22, 2000, Respondent sent a letter by 
fax to Dr. S.K. Gov. Exh. 96, at 41. In this letter, Respondent 
advised Dr. S.K. that her mother was ``not too old for the program'' 
and that ``[s]he may want to be on the silver program, which is the 
basic hormone-balancing program without the growth hormone.'' Id. 
Significantly, while this document was not written on PSLEI's 
letterhead, Respondent used the clinic's Palm Springs fax number.
    The record also contains correspondence written by Respondent 
during this period on letterhead using the clinic's Palm Springs, 
Ca. address. See Gov. Exh. 94, at 8. In an October 6, 2000 letter, 
Respondent rendered medical advice to a Japanese clinic regarding 
patient M.I. See id. Subsequently, on October 13, 2000, Dr. Chein 
wrote this patient on PSLEI's Palm Springs, CA letterhead advising 
that there was a dispute between himself and the doctors at the 
Aoyama Medical Clinic. Id. at 6.
    Thereafter, on December 5, 2000, Respondent wrote a letter on 
the clinic's Palm Springs, Ca. letterhead notifying the patient that 
``starting from 9th November 2000 the relation between Aoyama Clinic 
and my Institute (Palm Springs Life Extension Institute, CA, U.S.A.) 
has come to an end.'' Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Respondent thus 
represented to others that he was the owner of the clinic during the 
period in which his sister putatively owned it. Moreover, the 
statement shows Respondent's continued involvement in the business 
affairs of the Palm Springs clinic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Indeed, in the case of patient N.K., a Japanese citizen, Respondent 
wrote a letter (dated October 11, 2000) to the patient on Palm Springs, 
California letterhead discussing the results of a ``hormonal screening 
panel test''; the letter also recommended that the patient take 
testosterone gel and Adrenal Extract (phentermine). Gov. Exh. 93, at 6. 
Respondent also prepared a form on ``Palm Spring Life Extension 
Institute, Utah'' letterhead, which prescribed numerous products 
including testosterone gel and phentermine (Adrenal Extract). Id. at 
13. Both documents were faxed on October 19, 2000, and bear initials 
showing that the same person faxed both documents. Compare id. at 6, 
with id. at 13. Subsequently, on November 22, 2000, the Palm Springs, 
California location dispensed testosterone gel to this patient. See 
Gov. Exh. 15, at 20.
    I further note that notwithstanding her putative ownership of the 
clinic, Respondent's sister could not provide DEA investigators with 
copies of the documents that transferred ownership. See ALJ at 20 (] 
74). Furthermore, Respondent's sister told DEA investigators that she 
had been out to the clinic's Palm Springs location once in five years. 
See id. The ALJ also found that Dr. Garber operated the clinic during 
this period. Id. at 13 (] 52). But during this period, Dr. Garber's 
registered location was at his residence and not at the clinic. Id. at 
21 (] 76). In any event, the ALJ's finding that Dr. Garber operated the 
clinic does not preclude the additional finding that Respondent 
continued to exercise control over the Palm Spring location's handling 
of controlled substances during the period in which his sister owned 
the clinic.
    The ALJ found that Respondent dispensed controlled substance from 
PSLEI while his California medical license was revoked. See ALJ at 13-
14, ] 52 (citing Tr. 827-29; Gov. Exh. 105, at 36, 45-46). I adopt this 
finding. As found above, a February 29, 2000 memo from Respondent 
directed an employee in the ``Growth Hormone Department'' to ``ship one 
(1) bottle of phentermine to [Ms. K. H., a Japanese patient] 
immediately.'' Gov. Exh. 105, at 36. See also id. at 45-46 (Feb. 29, 
2000 letter from Respondent to Ms. K. H.; ``due to your twenty pound 
weight gain, I will add phentermine adrenal hormone immediately.''). 
Moreover, as explained above, the evidence shows that Respondent 
dispensed testosterone Gel to patient N.K. from the Palm Springs 
location while his California medical license was revoked.
    The ALJ also found that ``on August 11, 2000, the Respondent, 
without a DEA registration entitling him to so act, sent controlled 
substances from PSLEI, International Division, in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
to Japan.'' See ALJ at 14, ] 53 (citing Gov. Exh. 105, at 39-42). I do 
not adopt this finding. While the documents which the ALJ relied on 
establish that HGH and ``oral hormones'' were to be shipped, they do 
not establish that the ``oral hormones'' included a controlled 
substance.
    The ALJ also made a finding that ``[s]ome of the shipments sent 
from PSLEI were mislabled to avoid disclosing that the package 
contained controlled substances.'' ALJ 57, ] 192. Relatedly, the 
Government argues that various documents ``reflect[ ] PSLEI's 
willingness to fraudulently misidentify shipments of drugs to mislead 
customs officials.'' Govt. Br. at 50, ] 98.
    The document cited by the ALJ does suggest that testosterone gel 
was labeled as `` `a Skin Cream' and as a `gift' for Customs purpose.'' 
Gov. Ex. 107, at 21. A subsequent e-mail, dated December 13, 2000, 
which was copied to Respondent, indicated that the substances had not 
been received and directed the Palm Springs staff to send a new 
shipment that day. Id. at 23. The e-mail further included ``guidelines 
for shipping to Germany'' from the patient's secretary, which stated 
that the goods should be declared as a ``sample'' with a value of ``$ 
5.00.'' Id. But while the invoice that accompanied the shipment 
declared its value at $5.00, it also clearly described the goods as 
``testosterone.'' Id. at 20. This document thus does not support the 
ALJ's finding.
    The Government also points to a September 8, 2000 fax from Ms. 
Boriski to a Belgian citizen informing him that his order for melatonin 
had been shipped and ``labeled as [a] Dietary supplement * * * per your 
request. I

[[Page 6585]]

hope this does eliminate any delay with customs.'' Gov. Ex. 91, at 22. 
However, melatonin is not a controlled substance and it is arguably 
accurate to describe it as a ``dietary supplement.'' Moreover, even if 
it was improper to declare it as a dietary supplement, this document 
does not establish that Respondent was aware of this practice, and a 
single document does not prove that it was the clinic's policy or 
practice to falsify customs declarations.
    Finally, the record contains a letter from Dr. S.K. ordering 
estradiol/testosterone creme and suggesting that ``it might be 
[declared as] a cosmetic product.'' Gov. Exh. 96, at 45a. The 
Government, however, produced no evidence showing that the clinic did, 
in fact, mislabel the shipment. Accordingly, the ALJ's finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence. See NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & 
Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (``Substantial evidence is more 
than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion of the 
existence of the fact to be established.'').

The DEA On-Site Inspections and Their Aftermath

    As stated above, because Respondent's state license had been 
revoked, DI DeSantis was assigned to conduct an investigation regarding 
his renewal application. On January 31, 2001, the DI went to the PSLEI 
in Palm Springs to interview Respondent and inspect his recordkeeping. 
Tr. 263; Gov. Exh. 5. Respondent was not present. Tr. 264. The DI met 
with Dr. Darryl Garber and presented him with a Notice of Inspection. 
Gov. Exh. 5.
    The DI asked to see various records including invoices for the 
purchase of controlled substances, inventories, and dispensing logs. 
Tr. 268-69. Dr. Garber told the DI that he could not provide the 
records because PSLEI had a new computer system and no one was present 
who could access the records. Id. at 269. One of PSLEI's employees told 
the DI that the invoices were not on-site but rather were at the office 
of its accountant. Id. at 273. The only records the DI received were 
two purchase orders but these had been generated by the PSLEI and were 
not the invoices provided by the distributor. See Gov. Exh.6; Tr. 274-
75. The purchase orders did, however, establish that the PSLEI had 
recently bought phentermine. See Gov. Exh.6.
    The DI told Dr. Garber that the clinic was in violation of the 
CSA's implementing regulations because the invoices were required to be 
kept on-site. Tr. 274-76. The DI also informed Dr. Garber that the 
clinic was in violation because the records were not readily 
retrievable for inspection and copying. Id. at 274.
    On February 5, 2001, the DI returned to the PSLEI to obtain the 
records that the clinic was required to maintain. Once again, 
Respondent was not present. Id. at 279. The DI again met with Dr. 
Garber and asked for the records. Id. Dr. Garber asked the DI to sit in 
the office while he retrieved the records. Id. The DI waited two to 
three hours while Dr. Garber printed out the records. Id. at 280.
    Dr. Garber provided the DI with a one page inventory report which 
was dated February 5, 2001. See Gov. Exh. 8. Dr. Garber also provided 
the DI with four invoices for phentermine. Tr. 331-33; Gov. Exh. 17(a)-
17(d). Although the DI had requested the invoices for all controlled 
substances purchased by the clinic, no invoices for the purchase of 
testosterone were provided. Tr. 334.
    Dr. Garber also provided the DI with a dispensing log for various 
controlled substances including testosterone gel, testosterone 
estradiol gel, Subligual testosterone, testosterone, and depo 
testosterone. See Gov. Exhs. 9-16; Tr. 284. Most of the dispensing 
logs, however, only covered the period from July 1, 2000, through 
February 5, 2001.\9\ See Gov. Exhs. 9-16. Moreover, none of the logs 
indicated the name of the physician who had authorized each dispensing. 
See id. The logs also included the names of numerous patients who 
resided in foreign countries including Belgium, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Spain, Switzerland, China (Hong Kong), Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, and Canada. See Gov. Exhs.10, 11, 12, 15, & 16. The Government 
subsequently compiled from these records a separate document which 
listed each dispensing. See Gov. Exh. 46. According to this document, 
the dispensing logs showed that Respondent's clinic exported controlled 
substances 317 times during the period from July 1, 2000, through 
February 5, 2001.\9\ See id.; see also ALJ at 57, ] 191. Neither 
Respondent nor Dr. Garber had an export registration as required under 
21 U.S.C. 957 & 958.\10\
    On March 9, 2001, DI DeSantis contacted Dr. Garber by telephone and 
told him that PSLEI must stop exporting controlled substances. Tr. 
1245. The DI also faxed to Dr. Garber various provisions of Federal law 
pertaining to the exporting of controlled substances including 21 
U.S.C. 953 & 960. Id.; see also Gov. Exh. 19. On the same day, Vanessa 
Koloen, a PSLEI employee, faxed to the DI copies of various documents 
including purchase orders and invoices related to the clinic's purchase 
of testosterone. See Gov. Exh. 20. The earliest documents were, 
however, dated November 20 & 21, 2000, see Gov. Exhs. 20(J) & 20(K), 
and the dispensing records indicated that testosterone had been 
dispensed before these dates. See, e.g., Gov. Exh. 15, at 21-26. Two 
other documents provided by PSLEI used Dr. Garber's residence as the 
billing and shipping address. See Gov. Exhs. 20(F) & 20(G). The 
remaining documents were for purchases that occurred in mid to late 
February 2001, following the DI's second visit. See Gov. Exhs. 20(a), 
20(b), 20(c), 20(d), 20(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ The dispensing log for phentermine 15 mg. covered the period 
from July 26, 1999, through February 1, 2001. See Gov. Exh. 10. This 
log, however, had no entries before August 22, 2000. See id. The 
dispensing log for Depo testosterone covered the period July 1, 
2000, through February 1, 2001. See Gov. Exh. 16.
    \10\ While Dr. Garber held a DEA practitioner's registration, at 
the time of the January 31 and February 5, 2001 visits, his 
registered location was his residence in Rancho Mirage, California. 
See ALJ at 21, ] 76. Dr. Garber did not change his registered 
location to the PSLEI until February 12, 2001, after the two visits. 
See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subsequently, on April 27, 2001, Respondent applied for a 
registration to export Schedule III Non-Narcotic and Schedule IV 
controlled substances. See Gov. Exh. 48, at 3-4. According to a date 
stamp, the application was received at DEA in May 7, 2001, and 
Respondent's credit card was charged on May 15, 2001. See id. at 3. The 
application, however, was never processed and the application fee was 
refunded through a credit to Respondent's credit card. Tr. 2092-94 The 
application bears the notation ``Already Have DEA.'' Gov. Exh. 
48, at 3. The application was not returned to Respondent, and no one at 
DEA ever notified him that the application had been rejected. See Gov. 
Exh. 34 & 39; see also Resp. Proposed Findings at 12 (] 94). In 
December 2001, Respondent submitted a second application for 
registration as an Exporter. See Gov. Exh. 48 at 7-8.
    On August 23, 2001, DI DeSantis (accompanied by another DI) 
returned to PSLEI to conduct a conference with Respondent regarding the 
violations that had been found during the inspection. Tr. 545-47. The 
DI told Respondent that the violations included the clinic's lack of 
readily retrievable records, its lack of a biennial inventory, and its 
exporting of controlled substances to persons residing in foreign 
countries without an export registration. Id. at 547-48, 559.
    During the meeting, Respondent produced the statutes that the DI 
had faxed to Dr. Garber and acknowledged that he had discussed the 
violations with Dr. Garber. Id. at 548. Respondent admitted that he did 
not have an

[[Page 6586]]

exporter's registration and claimed that under either 21 U.S.C. 
953(a)(3) or (a)(4) he could export without a registration because he 
was sending the controlled substances to another doctor, who was 
legally authorized to handle controlled substances. Tr. 551-55. The DI 
informed Respondent that he would still need an export permit under 21 
U.S.C. 953(a)(5). Id. at 554. These provisions, however, address the 
exportation of narcotic drugs and not the non-narcotic controlled 
substances (testosterone and phentermine) that Respondent was 
exporting. Rather, the export of these controlled substances is 
governed by 21 U.S.C. 953(e), which requires the filing of a 
declaration and documentary proof that the importation into the 
destination country is not illegal.\11\ Moreover, a registration is 
required to export both narcotic and non-narcotic controlled 
substances. See 21 U.S.C. 957 & 958.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ The record contains letters from the governments of Japan 
and Taiwan to Respondent's associate (Dr. Garber) establishing the 
illegality of PSLEI's exportation of phentermine to persons residing 
in these countries. In a December 11, 2001 letter, the Government of 
Japan notified Dr. Garber that ``[w]ith regard to the medicine 
containing phentermine, you must not send the medicine to your 
patient in Japan.'' Gov. Exh. 38(C) (Tab D) (Letter from Kaoru 
Misawa, Deputy Director, Compliance and Narcotics Division, 
Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labor, 
and Welfare of Japan, to Darryl J. Garber). According to this 
letter, a ``patient can import the medicine into Japan if he carries 
the medicine containing less than 1.125 grams of phentermine by 
himself when entering into Japan.'' Id. This letter further states 
that while the Government of Japan did not object to the exportation 
of testosterone gel to a patient in Japan, the medicine must be 
``for his personal use and of the amount within one-month['s] 
consumption.'' Id.
    In a January 4, 2002 letter, the Government of Taiwan informed 
Dr. Garber that ``phentermine * * * has been prohibited for use by 
the Department of Health since December 8, 1980, and is not allowed 
for importation.'' Gov. Exh. 38(C) (Tab E) (Letter, Kai-Yuan Tan, 
M.D., Director-General, Bureau of Medical Affairs, Department of 
Health, Taiwan, to Darryl J. Garber, M.D.).
    The record also contains a letter dated July 26, 2001 from Dr. 
Garber to Raymond A. Conner, Diversion Group Supervisor in DEA's 
Riverside, California, office. In this letter, Dr. Garber 
acknowledged that ``[i]n Japan and Korea it is against the law to 
prescribe Anabolic Steroids * * * and phentermine * * * for the 
purpose of Anti-Aging Medicine.'' Gov. Exh. 38(C) (Tab C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the meeting Respondent did not mention that he had applied 
for an exporter's registration. Moreover, Respondent told the DI that 
he had continued to export controlled substances notwithstanding her 
earlier admonition to Dr. Garber to stop. Tr. 557. Respondent further 
admitted that there had probably been many more violations in the 
interim but that he would not stop until ``he received something in 
writing from'' the DEA. Id. at 558.
    The other DI asked Respondent how he was shipping the controlled 
substances overseas. Id. Respondent refused to answer and invoked his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. He also told 
the investigators that ``it was up to [DEA] to find out how he was 
shipping [the controlled substances] overseas.'' Id. at 559.
    During the meeting, Respondent provided the DI with several 
invoices for controlled substances. One of the invoices documented that 
on March 14, 2001, PSLEI had purchased five kilograms of micronized 
testosterone from Pharmacia and Upjohn and that the product was shipped 
to Dr. Garber's residence. See Gov. Exh. 21.5, at 2. At the time, 
Respondent owned PSLEI and Dr. Garber was no longer registered at his 
residence. Id.
    Respondent also provided the DI with an invoice from Farmacias 
Castaneda, a pharmacy located in Tijuana, Mexico. See Gov. Exh. 22, Tr. 
576. The invoice, which is dated June 26, 2001, indicated that the 
PSLEI had purchased 120 units of Depo testosterone and 40 units of 
Decadurabolin, two anabolic steroids and Schedule III controlled 
substances, from the Tijuana pharmacy. See Gov. Exh. 22. The pharmacy 
did not hold a DEA registration because DEA does not register foreign 
pharmacies or distributors. Tr. 573-74. Neither Respondent, nor Mr. 
Romero, the pharmacy's owner, was registered as an importer. See ALJ at 
60, ] 205 (citing Tr. 167 & 970); Gov. Exh. 2.
    On August 31, 2001, DI DeSantis sent an additional fax to 
Respondent which included copies of 21 U.S.C. 823, 952, 953, 954 and 
958. The ``Comments'' portion of the Cover Sheet included the following 
statement:

    I have attached all the registration requirements . * * * 
concerning applicants to import or export controlled substances. You 
are not currently registered with DEA as an exporter/importer (nor 
do you possess any permits to export issued by the Attorney 
General), thus you are not authorized to perform either activity. 
You must immediately cease all [activity] in these areas as 
previously instructed on 02/13/01 and 8/23/01 by D/I DeSantis.

Gov. Exh. 23, at 1. On September 5, 2001, DeSantis sent an additional 
fax that included a copy of 21 U.S.C. 957 (Persons required to 
register), which had been omitted from the previous fax. See Gov. Exh. 
24.
    On November 12, 2001, DI DeSantis along with other DEA personnel, 
served the first Order to Show Cause and Notice of Immediate 
Suspension. Tr. 591. Upon her arrival at the PSLEI, the DI was informed 
that Respondent was out of the country and was not expected to return 
for possibly two weeks. Id. at 592. The DI then met with Dr. Garber and 
asked for Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration. Id. at 592. 
Neither Dr. Garber, nor Respondent's secretary, Vanessa Koloen, knew 
where the certificate was. Id. at 593.
    The DI also sought to seize the controlled substances on the 
premises. Id. Dr. Garber told the DI that Respondent ``had not 
purchased any controlled substances'' and that controlled substances at 
the clinic were purchased by him. Id. at 593-94. Dr. Garber refused to 
turn over the controlled substances. Id.
    The DI then requested to see the invoices for controlled substance 
purchases to verify Dr. Garber's statement. Id. at 594. Clinic 
personnel gave the DI various invoices. Id; see also Gov. Exh. 45. The 
first of these invoices documented that on March 26, 2001, PSLEI had 
purchased two kilograms of testosterone (which was received on March 
30, 2001) using Connie Chein's DEA number. See Gov. Exh. 45a. The next 
three invoices documented that on three dates in February and March 
2001 (Feb. 16 & 21, Mar. 13, 2001), PSLEI purchased various quantities 
of testosterone which was shipped to Dr. Garber's residence. See Gov. 
Exh. 45(b), (c), & (d). The first two of these invoices (the Mar. 14 
Pharmacia & Upjohn and the Feb. 16 Gallipot) did not have a DEA number. 
The third invoice (the Feb. 21 Gallipot) used Respondent's DEA number 
even though the controlled substances were shipped to Dr. Garber's 
residence. See Gov. Exh. 45(d), Gov. Exh. 2.
    Finally, the seventh invoice documents a March 2, 2001, purchase by 
Dr. Garber of testosterone from Paddock Laboratories, which was shipped 
to Dr. Garber's residence. See Gov. Exh. 45(g). Of note, the invoice 
gives the name ``Vanessa'' in the box which includes purchase order 
information; in the ``Ship To Party Address'' box, the invoice gives 
Dr. Garber's name followed on the next line with the notation ``c/o 
Angela Santana.'' Id. The invoice also includes the handwritten 
notation: ``Received by Angie 3/5/01.'' Id. Both these individuals were 
PSLEI employees. Tr. 598. There is no dispute that Respondent was the 
owner of the PSLEI when these four purchases were made.
    Thereafter, on three occasions between January and March 2002, the 
DI (accompanied by another DI) went to PSLEI to search through its 
trash. Tr. 686. During the February trash run, the DIs found 50 empty 
boxes for a testosterone product that had been

[[Page 6587]]

manufactured by Brovel, S.A., a Mexican firm. Tr. 709, Gov. Exh. 58. 
The DI subsequently had someone translate the boxes' label, which was 
written in Spanish. Tr. at 711. The label indicated that the 
testosterone was not for human consumption but rather for animal use. 
See Gov. Exh. 58, at 4; Tr. 711; see also Gov. Exh. 116, at 4 
(declaration of FDA Associate Chief Counsel James Smith).
    I do not, however, adopt the ALJ's finding that because 
``Respondent does not treat animals[,] * * * the records supports an 
inference that this non-human use testosterone was compounded into a 
testosterone gel which was dispensed to the Respondent's human 
patients.'' ALJ at 62. I acknowledge that the existence of the boxes 
does create a suspicion that the substances were dispensed to human 
patients. But the Government produced no additional evidence that PSLEI 
used this testosterone to create products that were dispensed to 
humans. Moreover, Respondent produced credible evidence that he 
performed research into the development of a more effective delivery 
system for testosterone. The Government did not foreclose the 
possibility that the testosterone was used for that purpose by 
producing evidence that the quantity represented by the boxes was in 
excess of what would be needed for research purposes. While this is a 
close call, it is the Government that bears the burden of proof on the 
issue, and I therefore conclude that the ALJ's finding is not supported 
by a preponderance of the evidence.
    During this trash run, the DIs also found a fax for an invoice 
documenting PSLEI's sale of various products to a resident of Japan. 
See Gov. Exh. 70. The invoice was dated October 17, 2001, and lists 
``Testosterone/estradiol Gel 20 ml.'' and ``Adrenal Extract 15 mg. 
 30'' as among the products sold. Id. As found above, PSLEI 
used the term ``Adrenal Extract'' for phentermine. Of further 
significance, the invoice establishes that PSLEI continued to export 
controlled substances following the August 23, 2001 conference and the 
August 31 and September 5, 2001 faxes which told Respondent to cease 
the exports.
    Another document found during this trash run bears the caption 
``HORMONE DEPARTMENT PRESCRIPTION SHEET.'' Gov. Exh. 73. The document, 
which is dated October 29, 2001, makes reference to a Japanese patient 
and instructs a PSLEI employee to ``Please ship Ms. [S.] a tube of 
female strength testosterone to Ginza at no charge, immediately.'' Id. 
The document is signed ``E. Chein, M.D.'' Id.
    Following a third trash run, see Gov. Exh. 121, DI DeSantis 
obtained an Administrative Inspection warrant which was executed at 
PSLEI on March 13, 2002. Tr. 721. During the inspection, DEA personnel 
asked for the biennial inventories that are required by DEA 
regulations. Id. at 759-60. The clinic did not have them, id. at 760, 
and instead provided the investigators with a document entitled 
``Instant Inventory Report.'' Gov. Exh. 82, at 7; Tr. at 760. DEA 
personnel also obtained dispensing logs and approximately 100 patient 
files for patients who lived outside the United States. Id. at 764 & 
811.
    The dispensing logs document hundreds of instances in which 
Respondent dispensed/exported controlled substances to residents of 
foreign countries. See, e.g, Gov. Exh. 84 (dispensing log for 
testosterone-estrogen (4mg.-50 mg. 20 ml.) covering period May 1, 2001, 
through December 31, 2001).\12\ Many of the dispensings/exports 
occurred following the August 23rd conference and the subsequent faxes. 
See id. at pp.1-15. Moreover, the log indicates that on November 13 and 
14, 2001, the day after service of the Notice of Immediate Suspension, 
Respondent dispensed/exported this controlled substance thirteen times. 
See id. at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ The cover sheet of this document indicates that the period 
it covered was from ``11/30/01-5/1/01.'' Gov. Exh. 84. The document, 
however, also includes dispensings that occurred in December 2001. 
See id. at .5 & 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The dispensing log for testosterone gel (0.8% 20 ml.) also 
documents that Respondent dispensed and/or exported following the 
service of the Notice of Immediate Suspension. See Gov. Exh. 87. Of 
note, Respondent dispensed to a Japanese patient on November 13, 2001, 
after service of the Notice of Immediate Suspension. See id. at 6.
    The dispensing log for phentermine 15 mg. likewise documents that 
Respondent made numerous dispensings and/or exports of this controlled 
substance to foreign patients. See generally Gov. Exh. 88. Moreover, it 
also documents that Respondent made several dispensing/ exports after 
service of the Notice of Immediate Suspension. See id. For example, on 
November 13, 2001, Respondent made eight dispensings to foreign 
patients, and on November 14, 2001, Respondent made five dispensings to 
foreign patients. See id. at 6-7. Furthermore, on November 27, 2001, 
Respondent dispensed to a New Jersey patient. See id. at 6.\13\ This 
dispensing occurred more than two weeks after service of the Notice of 
Immediate Suspension.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ Like the dispensing logs that were obtained in February 
2001, some of the logs also failed to contain the name of the 
dispensing physician. See Gov. Exh. 86, at pp. 1-29 (testosterone 
gel 8mg./ml., 20 ml.); Gov. Exh. 89, at 2-8 (phentermine 15 mg.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On October 3, 2002, an additional search warrant was executed at 
the PSLEI. Tr. 836. During the search, DEA investigators seized 
approximately 83 pill containers labeled as ``Adrenal Extract 15 mg,'' 
which held approximately 4300 pills, and 63 pill containers labeled as 
``Adrenal Extract 30mg,'' which held approximately 3150 pills. Gov. 
Exh. 135. The pills were sent to the DEA Southwest Regional Laboratory 
for analysis. See id. The lab determined that the pills contained 
phentermine HCL. See id.
    During the search, DEA also seized a variety of documents. Among 
them is the previously described ``Interoffice Memo'' from Respondent, 
which is dated February 27, 2000, and which directed PSLEI's oral/
growth hormone departments to ensure the cleanliness of the 
testosterone products that were shipped to Japan. Gov. Exh. 136, at 14.
    The investigators also obtained several other memos on PSLEI's 
letterhead that were written from ``Dr. Chein'' on March 6, April 14, 
and July 3, 2000, that discuss shipments to Japan and Taiwan. See id. 
at 11-13. The memos, however, are not signed and do not indicate 
whether the memo was created by Respondent or his sister.
    DEA also seized another memo, which is dated January 14, 2002, and 
which is signed ``Edmund Chein MD.'' Id. at 10. The memo stated that 
``[e]ffective January 15th, all medicines being shipped to Tokyo goes 
[sic] directly to the patient address, except for patients with the 
chart number LEI-Y.'' Id. The memo then directed that ``[a]ll medicines 
for the patients with the chart number LEI-Y will be shipped directly 
to the Osaka clinic address[.]'' Id. Finally, the memo directed that 
shipments for two patients should not be addressed ``as Ever young 
Technologies'' because the patients ``have to pay taxes on the 
shipments that are addressed to Ever young Technologies.'' Id. 
Respondent prepared this memo, which is signed as having been received 
by an employee, following the service of the Notice of Immediate 
Suspension.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Both the Government and Respondent elicited extensive 
expert testimony on whether Respondent's dispensing of testosterone 
and phentermine to six patients who resided in foreign countries was 
for a legitimate medical purpose and within the usual course of 
professional practice. In light of Respondent's flagrant and 
repeated violations of federal law, I conclude that it is not 
necessary to make any findings on this issue.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 6588]]

Discussion

Respondent's Challenges to the Proceeding

    In the course of this matter, Respondent filed numerous motions 
challenging various aspects of this proceeding. In light of my 
conclusion that there is no need to consider the expert testimony 
regarding Respondent's practices with respect to foreign patients, many 
of the issues raised in these motions are now moot. Respondent also 
filed motions seeking to dismiss various allegations or to bar the 
Government from introducing evidence on various issues. Upon reviewing 
the record, I am satisfied that the ALJ's rulings on these motions were 
correct and that further discussion is not warranted.
    One of the motions, however, challenges the integrity of this 
proceeding and therefore requires further discussion before proceeding 
to the merits. More specifically, Respondent alleges that the Office of 
Chief Counsel ``engaged in a pattern of unlawful and unethical 
misconduct in the instant proceeding mandating the disqualification of 
that office.'' Resp. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Respondent's Motion To Disqualify Office of Chief Counsel and Dismiss 
Administrative Proceeding at 1. The alleged ``pattern'' involves two 
statements in an affidavit prepared by an attorney in the Office of 
Chief Counsel and signed by a DEA employee which discussed the 
circumstances surrounding DEA's failure to process Respondent's 
application for an Exporter's Registration. Specifically, the employee 
stated that she was the acting unit chief of the registration unit when 
she signed the declaration (and was not), and that ``the reason why Dr. 
Chein obtained a refund of his registration fee was `unexplained,' '' 
Resp. Memo. at 1, when there was an explanation.
    Respondent argues that this amounts to the subornation of perjury 
and that it ``mandate[s] the disqualification of [the Office of Chief 
Counsel] and its replacement with * * * private counsel.'' Id. 
Respondent contends that this is so because ``[t]he Office of Chief 
Counsel shall defend, cover up and represent its own interests in 
relation to the felony perjury charge and it will also be called to 
testify regarding the Respondent's Complaint that is to be filed in the 
District Court.'' Id. at 3.\15\ Therefore, Respondent maintains that 
``private counsel * * * should be required to continue with any 
prosecution of this matter.'' Id. Respondent further asserts that it is 
not enough to simply ``disregard'' the ``offending evidence'' because 
this would not be an ``effective discouragement of the wrong.'' Id. at 
5. Respondent thus argues that I should take the extraordinary step of 
dismissing the entire proceeding which took thirteen days of hearings 
and produced a record that includes a nearly three thousand page 
transcript and hundreds of exhibits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Respondent did not submit a copy of the purported ``felony 
perjury charge'' for the record. He did, however, submit a copy of a 
proposed complaint for a Bivens action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a component of the Department of Justice, this agency takes most 
seriously allegations of employee misconduct. Respondent's offer of 
proof, however, falls far short of establishing that an employee of the 
Chief Counsel's office suborned perjury. Moreover, even if Respondent 
could make out a prima facie case of subornation of perjury, he offers 
no authority that supports his proposed remedy.
    [P]roof of actual perjury is a necessary element of subornation'' 
of perjury, United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 376 (4th Cir. 
1995), and proof of perjury requires a showing that ``[a] witness 
testifying under oath or affirmation * * * [gave] false testimony 
concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false 
testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty 
memory.'' United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). 
Respondent, however, cannot show either willfulness on the part of the 
employee or that her statements were material.
    The most common formulation'' of the concept of materiality is that 
``a concealment or misrepresentation is material if it `has a natural 
tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of' 
the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.'' Kungys v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (quoting Weinstock v. United States, 
231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956)) (other citation omitted); see also 
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 489 (1997) (quoting Kungys, 485 
U.S. at 770). The evidence must be ``clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing.'' Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772; see also Herring v. United 
States, 424 F.3d 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2005) (``[A] determination of 
fraud on the court may be justified only by the most egregious 
misconduct directed to the court itself, and * * * it must be supported 
by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.'') (int. quotations and 
citation omitted); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic 
Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir. 1976).
    Moreover, ``although the materiality of a statement rests upon a 
factual evidentiary showing, the ultimate finding of materiality turns 
on an interpretation of substantive law.'' Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772 
(int. quotations and citation omitted). As the ALJ pointed out, the 
issues in this case are whether Respondent's continued registration as 
a practitioner ``is inconsistent with the public interest as that term 
is defined in 21 U.S.C. 823(f),'' and whether issuing Respondent a 
registration as an exporter ``would be inconsistent with the public 
interest as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. 958(c) and 823(d).'' ALJ 
Notice and Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Disqualify Office of 
Chief Counsel and to Dismiss Administrative Proceedings, at 7. Applying 
these principles, I conclude that the two statements at issue here are 
not material to the resolution of the issues in this case.
    The first allegedly perjurious statement is the employee's 
assertion that ``I am the Acting Unit Chief of the Registration Unit,'' 
Gov. Exh. 48, when, in fact, the employee served in this capacity on 
the day she was approached by the attorney about Respondent's exporter 
application, but served in this capacity for only a few days and was 
not the Acting Unit Chief on the day she signed the declaration. Tr. 
2198-99. The employee did, however, investigate the facts surrounding 
the non-acceptance of Respondent's application. Ultimately, whether the 
employee was still serving as Acting Unit Chief on the day she signed 
the declaration is of no consequence in deciding any issue in this 
case. In short, the assertion is not the type of statement that ``has a 
natural tendency to influence'' the decision in this case because what 
matters is not her specific title on the date she signed the 
declaration but the fact that she investigated the incident. See 
Kungys, 485 U.S. at 770 (int. quotations and other citations omitted). 
Moreover, Respondent has produced no evidence, let alone that which is 
``clear, unequivocal, and convincing'' that shows that when the 
employee signed the declaration, she did so with the intent to deceive. 
Id. at 772.
    The second allegedly perjurious statement is the employee's 
assertion that ``[f]or an unexplained reason, DEA did not accept the 
application for filing'' and the employee's further statement 
speculating that ``it is likely that [Respondent] or someone from his 
office contacted DEA to request the refund.'' Gov. Exh. 48; Resp. Memo 
at 1. According to Respondent, the statement

[[Page 6589]]

was perjurious because another employee had told the declarant ``that a 
Registration Unit supervisor had instructed her to refund 
[Respondent's] money because he already had a DEA number'' and the 
employee knew ``that neither [Respondent] nor anyone from his office 
had contacted the DEA to request a refund.'' Id.
    Respondent's argument as to why this statement is material to any 
issue in the case is somewhat opaque. Apparently, Respondent believes 
that there was a ``mandatory'' statutory duty to register him as an 
exporter ``unless there was a finding that to do so would not be in the 
public interest'' and that ``there was no such finding'' here. Reply to 
Govt. Resp. to Motion to Disqualify Office of Chief Counsel at 3. 
Respondent further asserts that ``[i]f the DEA had acted properly, and 
had corrected its mistake, the Respondent would have been registered.'' 
Id.
    Under longstanding DEA policy, the approval of an application for 
an Exporter's registration is not a ministerial act. Rather, the 
application is subject to an extensive pre-registration investigation 
which includes a review of the six statutory factors set forth in 21 
U.S.C. 823(d). See 21 U.S.C. 958(c). Although Respondent's application 
should have been processed, the violations uncovered during the January 
and February 2001 visits, as well as the information Respondent 
provided on his application regarding prior disciplinary actions of the 
state authorities, would have supported a finding that granting his 
registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Indeed, 
that is why the second Show Cause Order (which proposed to deny his 
second application for an Exporter's registration) was issued. 
Respondent's assertion that his application would have been granted had 
DEA not mistakenly failed to process his application is thus wishful 
thinking.
    More importantly, Federal law makes clear that ``[n]o person may * 
* * export from the United States any controlled substance * * * unless 
there is in effect with respect to such person a registration issued by 
the Attorney General under section 958 of this title, or unless such 
person is exempt from registration under subsection(b) of this 
section.'' Id. section 957(a). DEA's regulations further state that 
``[n]o person required to be registered shall engage in any activity 
for which registration is required until the application for 
registration is granted and a Certificate of Registration is issued by 
the Administrator to such person.'' 21 CFR 1301.13(a) (emphasis added).
    Furthermore, Federal law does not provide an exemption from 
registration because one has submitted an application which was 
subsequently mishandled. See Dennis Robert Howard, M.D., 62 FR 32658, 
32661 (1997) (``there is no `good faith' exemption from liability in 
administrative proceedings'' under the CSA). And while DEA has 
recognized that acting with a ``good faith belief that [one is] 
properly registered with DEA * * * is a mitigating factor in 
determining the public interest,'' id., DEA has recognized this defense 
in only two situations. The first is where a person had previously held 
a registration for the activity and believed it to be still valid 
pending an appeal of a final order of revocation. See Stanley Alan 
Azen, M.D., 61 FR 57893, 57895-96 (1996). The second is where an 
applicant applied for a registration and received from DEA controlled 
substance order forms that were imprinted with a new DEA number. See 
Howard, 62 FR at 32660.\16\ Howard is thus properly understood as a 
case involving reliance on an affirmative act of the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ I decline to extend the good faith defense beyond these 
situations. Indeed, to do so in a case like this would create an 
incentive for applicants to engage in activities before they had 
obtained the required registration and demonstrated their fitness to 
perform the activity. Such a rule would clearly threaten public 
safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The good faith defense recognized in Azen is not applicable to 
Respondent's situation because Respondent never held an Exporter's 
Registration. Nor can Respondent claim that the allegedly perjurious 
statement is material under the defense recognized in Howard. While 
Respondent's application fee was refunded based on an employee's 
mistaken belief that Respondent already had a DEA number, see Resp. 
Memo at 1, Respondent does not claim that DEA personnel told him that 
he did not need a separate Exporter's registration and Respondent has 
produced no evidence that the application form was returned to him. 
Indeed, in his brief, Respondent concedes that DEA ``never informed 
him'' that his application had been rejected. Resp. Br. 24.
    Furthermore, Respondent has offered no testimony to the effect that 
he relied on DEA's refunding of his application fee in concluding that 
he did not need an Exporter's registration. In fact, during the August 
2001 management conference, Respondent asserted that he was not 
required to obtain an Exporter's registration because he qualified for 
a statutory exemption under 21 U.S.C. 957(b); he did not claim that he 
did not need the registration because his application fee had been 
refunded or that the application had been returned to him and that he 
had relied on the handwritten statement on the application. 
Accordingly, because Respondent makes no claim of reliance on any act 
of DEA, he cannot establish the materiality of the statements regarding 
DEA's failure to process his application.
    Finally, even if Respondent had made out a prima facie case with 
respect to the declarant and could show that the government counsel who 
prepared the affidavit also intended to deceive--a point on which 
Respondent offers nothing more than conclusory assertions--Respondent 
provides no authority to support his proposed remedy of dismissing the 
entire proceeding. Doing so would be an especially untoward result in 
light of the statutory purpose to protect the public interest. 
Furthermore, the Government made available the declarant and Respondent 
was able to thoroughly examine her and demonstrate the inaccuracies in 
her declaration. Under these circumstances, no further relief is 
warranted.

The Statutory Factors

Respondent's Practitioner's Registration
    Section 304(a) of the Controlled Substances Act provides that a 
registration to ``dispense a controlled substance * * * may be 
suspended or revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding that the 
registrant * * * has committed such acts as would render his 
registration under section 823 of this title inconsistent with the 
public interest as determined under such section.'' 21 U.S.C. 
824(a)(4). In making the public interest determination, the Act 
requires the consideration of the following factors:

    (1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board 
or professional disciplinary authority.
    (2) The applicant's experience in dispensing * * * controlled 
substances.
    (3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State 
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 
controlled substances.
    (4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws 
relating to controlled substances.
    (5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and 
safety.

Id. section 823(f).

    ``[T]hese factors are * * * considered in the disjunctive.'' Robert 
A. Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I ``may rely on any one or 
a combination of factors, and may give each factor the weight [I] deem[ 
] appropriate in

[[Page 6590]]

determining whether a registration should be revoked or an application 
for registration [should be] denied.'' Id. Moreover, case law 
establishes that I am ``not required to make findings as to all of the 
factors.'' Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); see also 
Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173-74 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Factor One--The Recommendation of the State Licensing Board
    As explained above, on three occasions the Medical Board of 
California has imposed sanctions against Respondent. At the time the 
ALJ rendered her decision, the the most recent accusation had not been 
resolved. The ALJ nonetheless concluded that ``[t]hroughout the Medical 
Board's proceedings, the Respondent has exhibited an unwillingness to 
practice medicine in a manner consistent with the California Medical 
Board's rules and regulations,'' and that Respondent's ``attitude'' and 
``conduct[ ] demonstrate that [his] continued dispensing of controlled 
substances is not in the public interest.'' ALJ at 66-67.
    There is some merit to the notion that if one is not willing to 
comply with State law they are not likely to comply with Federal law 
either. I conclude, however, that it is unnecessary to decide whether a 
registrant's unwillingness to comply with State rules that are 
unrelated to controlled substances can be considered under the Act when 
the registrant maintains a valid State license.
    In any event, the ALJ did not have the benefit of knowing the 
outcome of the most recent State proceeding which placed Respondent on 
probation for a variety of acts that included several related to his 
handling of controlled substances. See n.4. The Stipulated Settlement 
and Disciplinary Order further states that it ``is intended to resolve 
* * * any disciplinary action taken by another State or the Federal 
government based on conduct alleged in * * * In the Matter of Edmund 
Chein, M.D., Docket No. 02-9 and 02-43 pending before the United States 
Drug Enforcement Administration.'' Stipulated Settlement at 2-3.
    I acknowledge that the Medical Board acted within its sovereign 
prerogatives when it resolved matters arising under State law and 
decided to continue to license Respondent as a medical doctor. 
Moreover, a State can also adopt Federal standards as part of its State 
law. The Controlled Substance Act does not, however, delegate to State 
officials the authority to decide whether the continuation of a DEA 
registration is consistent with the public interest. See 21 U.S.C. 824. 
Rather, Congress entrusted that authority with the Attorney General of 
the United States, and that authority has been delegated solely to the 
officials of this Agency. See id.; see also 28 CFR 0.100(b). State 
officials therefore lack authority to resolve a matter pending before 
the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Stipulated Settlement 
cannot bind this agency. See, e.g., Fourth Street Pharmacy v. DEA, 836 
F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1988).
    Moreover, even viewing the stipulated settlement as, in effect, 
nothing more than a recommendation to continue Respondent's 
registration, I decline to give it deference. As will be explained 
below, the record is replete with evidence of Respondent's repeated and 
flagrant violations of Federal law. Therefore, I conclude that it would 
be inconsistent with the public interest to defer to the Medical 
Board's recommendation and give it no weight in the public interest 
analysis.
Factors Two and Four--Respondent's Experience in Dispensing Controlled 
Substances and His Record of Compliance With Laws Relating To 
Controlled Substances

The Dispensing and Export Violations

    As the ALJ found, on March 17, 1995, and July 20, 1995, Respondent 
dispensed testosterone, an anabolic steroid and Schedule III controlled 
substance, to two undercover agents. As the record establishes, 
Respondent wrote each special agent a prescription for the steroids in 
response to each of the agent's representations that they were 
competitive powerlifters and were seeking the steroids to improve their 
performance in athletic competitions. Respondent also issued each agent 
a letter stating that they had been diagnosed with hypogonadism 
notwithstanding that he did not have the test results. Based on this 
evidence, I conclude that the prescriptions violated Federal law 
because Respondent issued them without a legitimate medical purpose. 
See 21 CFR 1306.04(a).\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ While these incidents occurred some time ago, there is no 
statute of limitations applicable to these proceedings, which are 
remedial in nature and are instituted to protect the public 
interest. See Pettigrew Rexall Drugs, 64 FR 8855, 8859 (1999). While 
the passage of time since the wrongdoing is a factor to be 
considered, the statute expressly directs that a registrant's 
``experience in dispensing'' be considered, an inquiry which 
necessarily requires some review of a registrant's history. If 
Respondent's misconduct was limited to these two instances, this 
would be a different case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The record further establishes that on February 29, 2000, 
Respondent directed his California employees to dispense phentermine, a 
Schedule IV controlled substance, to a patient in Japan. On that date, 
Respondent's state license had been revoked and Respondent was 
therefore without authority under the CSA to dispense. See 21 U.S.C. 
802(21) (``The term `practitioner' means a physician * * * licensed, 
registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the 
jurisdiction in which he practices * * * to * * * dispense * * *.''); 
id. section 802(10) (``The term `dispense' means to deliver a 
controlled substance to an ultimate user * * * by, or pursuant to the 
lawful order of, a practitioner * * *.'').
    Finally, the record establishes that Respondent repeatedly 
dispensed controlled substances to persons residing in foreign 
countries. As explained more fully below, Respondent violated Federal 
law because he was not registered as an exporter and did not file the 
required declarations. Moreover, the record shows that Respondent did 
so even after having been notified that his conduct was illegal. 
Finally, Respondent did so even after he was served with the Notice of 
Immediate Suspension.
    Respondent contends that his practitioner's registration 
``authorize[d] him as a registered doctor to dispense to his patient, 
wherever that patient is located.'' Resp. Exh. 75, at 4 (Resp. Memo. 
Pts. & Auth. in Support of Motion to Dismiss Export Charges); see also 
Resp. Br. at 22. According to Respondent, ``[e]xporting and dispensing 
to an individual simply are two completely different matters,'' Resp. 
Exh. 75, at 3, and ``[t]hese terms simply contemplate different 
conduct.'' Id. at 4.
    Respondent further argues that under 21 U.S.C. 822(b), a registered 
physician is authorized to dispense to the extent authorized by his 
registration and in conformity with the other provisions of subchapter 
I. See Resp. Br. at 23. In Respondent's view, under the statute he was 
only required to comply with subchapter I, which ``expressly authorizes 
physicians to dispense to their patients,'' and because the export 
statutes are located in subchapter II, he was not required to obtain an 
export registration and comply with the other requirements of that 
subchapter. Id. Perhaps recognizing how unpersuasive this argument is, 
Respondent further claims that the statute is ambiguous and that his 
interpretation of section 822(b) is reasonable. Id.
    The starting point in statutory construction is the language of the 
statute. Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991) (other citations 
omitted). Section 302(b) of the CSA provides that:


[[Page 6591]]


    Persons registered by the Attorney General under this subchapter 
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances * * * 
are authorized to possess, manufacture, distribute or dispense such 
substances * * * to the extent authorized by their registration and 
in conformity with the other provisions of this subchapter.

21 U.S.C. 822(b).

    As the Supreme Court has recognized, ``[t]his is a qualified 
authorization of certain activities, not a blanket authorization of all 
acts by certain persons.'' United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 131 
(1975). The statute grants a registrant authority only to perform those 
acts ``authorized by their registration.'' 21 U.S.C. 822(b).
    Contrary to Respondent's understanding, the ``in conformity with 
the provisions of this subchapter'' clause is a further ``limitation'' 
on a registrant's authority. Moore, 423 U.S. at 131. It compels a 
registrant to obey the requirements contained in Subchapter I. What it 
does not do is excuse a registrant from complying with other 
requirements of federal law such as those imposed by Subchapter II, the 
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (CSIEA). Indeed, under 
Respondent's interpretation, any entity which possessed a distributor's 
registration would also be exempt from the requirement of obtaining an 
exporter's registration (as well as obtaining the permits or filing the 
necessary declarations) because the term ``distribute'' is broadly 
defined as ``mean[ing] to deliver * * * a controlled substance,'' 21 
U.S.C. 802(11), which is what an exporter does when it ships a product 
to a foreign entity.
    DEA has never interpreted the Act in this manner for obvious 
reason--it would render the CSIEA a nullity. And contrary to 
Respondent's second contention that Federal law is ambiguous, both the 
statutes and our regulations make clear that Respondent was required to 
obtain an Exporter's registration to ship controlled substances to 
foreign countries.
    Indeed, Respondent completely ignores the clear text of the Export 
Registration provision, 21 U.S.C. 957(a). This section expressly 
provides that ``[n]o person may * * * export from the United States any 
controlled substance * * * unless there is in effect with respect to 
such person a registration issued by the Attorney General under section 
958 of this title, or unless such person is exempt from registration 
under subsection(b) of this section.'' 21 U.S.C. 957(a) (emphasis 
added).
    While the statute does not define the term ``export,'' the 
regulations do. See 21 CFR 1300.01(b)(12). ``The term * * * means, with 
respect to any article, any taking out or removal of such article from 
the jurisdiction of the United States (whether or not such taking out 
or removal constitutes an exportation within the meaning of the customs 
and related laws of the United States).'' Id. Relatedly, the 
regulations define ``[t]he term exporter [to] include[ ] every person 
who exports * * * controlled substances listed in any schedule.'' Id. 
1301(b)(13). Shipping a controlled substance to a person residing in a 
foreign country is to take out or remove the ``article from the 
jurisdiction of the United States,'' id. 1301(b)(12), even if the 
person the drug is being shipped to is an ultimate user.
    Beyond that, Congress clearly stated that a person may not export a 
controlled substance, ``unless there is in effect with respect to such 
person a registration issued * * * under section 958 of this title.'' 
21 U.S.C. 957(a). A practitioner's registration is not issued under 
section 958, but rather under section 823(f). It thus does not provide 
its holder with authority to export.
    Nor is there any merit to Respondent's contention that because he 
shipped out only small amounts of controlled substances, he was not 
engaged in exporting. Section 957(a) clearly provides that exporting 
``any controlled substance'' triggers the registration requirement 
unless a person falls within one of the three statutory exemptions. As 
the plain language demonstrates, there is no threshold amount which 
triggers the registration requirement. Rather, to export any amount, no 
matter how small, a person must first obtain an exporter's 
registration.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Indeed, each exportation was a felony under Federal law. 
See 21 U.S.C. Sec.  960.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The exemptions to the export registration requirement also 
foreclose Respondent's interpretation. While the statute exempts from 
registration ``[a]n ultimate user who possesses'' a controlled 
substance for lawful use by themselves or a family member, this 
provision does not apply to Respondent. 21 U.S.C. 957(b)(1)(C). Under 
this exemption, an ultimate user must have the controlled substance 
``in his possession'' at the time of export from the United States. Id. 
section 956(a)(1). Shipping controlled substances to persons in foreign 
countries is thus not within this exemption; the other exemptions are 
not remotely applicable to Respondent's conduct. See id. Section 
957(b)(1).
    DEA's Regulations also provided clear notice to Respondent that he 
was required to register as an Exporter. Under 21 CFR 1301.13(e), 
``[a]ny person who is required to be registered and who is not so 
registered, shall make application for registration for one of the 
following groups of controlled substance activities, which are deemed 
to be independent of each other.'' (emphasis added). The regulation 
then provides a table that lists each activity and the coincident 
activities that are permissible under a registration for a particular 
activity. As the table makes clear, dispensing and exporting are 
independent activities. See id. Moreover, exporting is not included in 
the Regulation's discussion of the ``[c]oincident activities allowed'' 
for a registration which authorizes dispensing. See id.
    As the foregoing demonstrates, the law and regulations provided 
clear notice to Respondent that he could not ship controlled substances 
to persons residing in foreign countries without obtaining an export 
registration. And while it is true that Respondent was not required to 
obtain an Export Permit for either the testosterone or phentermine he 
exported,\19\ he was still required to file an Export Declaration 
(DEA--Form 236) and submit ``documentary proof that [the] importation 
is not contrary to the laws or regulations of the country of 
destination'' for each shipment. 21 U.S.C. 953(e).\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ While the DI may have misinformed Respondent that he was 
required to obtain a permit, she did not tell him that he had no 
obligation to comply with Federal law.
    \20\ Respondent also contends that he was not required to file 
the declarations (DEA Form 236) because the form ``requires the 
listing of the name and address of the `foreign consignee/
consignor,''' and that ``[i]n this case, there is no `foreign 
consignee/consignor,' since the recipients are end user patients.'' 
Resp. Br. 26. Respondent further contends that these ``terms are 
used in trade to describe the persons from whom and to whom goods 
are shipped for sale to third parties.'' Id.
    The short answer to this contention is that in common usage, the 
term ``consignee'' means ``one to whom something is consigned or 
shipped.'' Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 246 (10th ed. 
1998). Beyond that, the record contains a copy of the ``Commercial 
Invoice'' form that Respondent used to ship products (including 
testosterone) to his foreign patients. Gov. Exh. 107, at 20. Under 
this form, which used the term ``consignee,'' Respondent's clinic 
inserted the patient's name. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the record demonstrates, phentermine is a controlled substance 
in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
and Taiwan. Gov. Exh. 38(c), at 5. The record also establishes that 
both Japan and Taiwan prohibit the importation of this drug. Id. at 
Tabs D & E. Furthermore, testosterone is controlled in both Canada and 
the United Kingdom. See id. at 5.
    Respondent's failure to declare these shipments to DEA prevents the 
United

[[Page 6592]]

States from fulfilling its treaty obligations and denies the country of 
destination the opportunity to determine whether a shipment of a 
controlled substance is permissible before it occurs. See id. at 3. It 
thus undermines the system of international cooperation to prevent the 
illegal flow of controlled substances. See, e.g., Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances, 1971, Art. 21 (``[T]he Parties shall * * * 
[a]ssist each other in the campaign against the illicit traffic in 
psychotropic substances * * * [and] [c]o-operate closely with each 
other * * * with a view to maintaining a co-ordinated campaign against 
the illicit traffic.'').
    Respondent further contends that he acted in good faith to obtain 
an Export registration. But as explained above, Federal law makes clear 
that ``[n]o person may* * * export from the United States any 
controlled substance * * * unless [a registration] is in effect,'' 21 
U.S.C. 957(b), and the regulations further provide that a person cannot 
``engage in any activity for which registration is required until the 
application * * * is granted and a Certificate of Registration is 
issued.'' 21 CFR 1301.13(a). Determining whether the granting of an 
application for an export registration is consistent with the public 
interest requires an extensive and time consuming investigation into 
the same criteria that apply to manufacturers. 21 U.S.C. 958(c) & 
823(d). Granting such a registration is not a ministerial act, and in 
this case, the conduct uncovered before Respondent even applied for the 
registration was enough to deny his application.
    Furthermore, the record establishes that Respondent subsequently 
acted with deliberate disregard for the requirements of federal law. 
Both during the August 2001 management conference, and in several faxes 
thereafter, Respondent was warned by the DI to stop the foreign 
shipments. He nonetheless continued to send controlled substances to 
persons in foreign countries. Furthermore, notwithstanding the service 
of the Notice of Immediate Suspension of his registration, Respondent 
made further dispensings of controlled substances to persons who 
resided both within the U.S. and abroad. Respondent's conduct 
demonstrates that he acted with a deliberate disregard for the law.
    The Import Allegations
    The record also contains evidence suggesting that Respondent 
obtained testosterone products from Mexico. This evidence includes the 
invoice which Respondent gave the DI during the August 2001 management 
conference. Specifically, the invoice, which was dated June 26, 2001, 
indicated that PSLEI had purchased 120 units of Depo testosterone and 
40 units of Decadurabolin from Farmacias Castaneda, which listed its 
address as Tijuana, Mexico. Gov. Exh. 22. Moreover, during the February 
2002 trash run, the DIs found 50 empty boxes of a testosterone product 
that had been manufactured by Brovel, S.A., a Mexican firm. Tr. 709, 
Gov. Exh. 58.
    The ALJ concluded that the Government had failed to prove that 
Respondent ``received imported controlled substances from Mexico,'' 
apparently because the record ``contains evidence that the owner of the 
Mexican pharmacy, Dr. Romero, may have shipped the controlled 
substances from a location in San Diego.'' ALJ 75. The ALJ further 
explained that ``[t]here are no shipping documents in the record to 
refute this evidence.'' Id.
    Romero was not, however, a registered importer. And even accepting 
the ALJ's finding that the drugs may have been shipped to Respondent 
from a location in San Diego, I do not find persuasive the ALJ's 
reasoning that Respondent therefore did not engage in importation. 
Indeed, I conclude that the ALJ's reasoning is contrary to well settled 
authority and that adopting it would gut Federal drug laws.
    ``Importation is a continuing crime that is not complete until the 
controlled substance reaches its final destination.'' United States v. 
Camargo-Vergara, 57 F.3d 993, 1001 (11th Cir. 1995); see also United 
States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1985). The fact that 
someone else brought the drugs across the border, or that the drugs 
were shipped from a way station within the United States, does not make 
the final intended recipient any less an importer. As the Fifth Circuit 
has explained, one ``need not have participated directly in the 
physical movement of the [controlled substance] across the border to be 
convicted under 21 U.S.C. 952(a).'' United States v. Lopez-Escobar, 920 
F.2d 1241, 1245 (1991). Indeed, drug dealers frequently use third 
parties to smuggle controlled substances into this country. That does 
not make them any less an importer.
    Rather, the Government need only show that ``the defendant 
knowingly played a role in bringing the substance from a foreign 
country into the United States,'' United States v. Jackson, 55 F.3d 
1219, 1225 (6th Cir. 1995); or that ``the defendant either imported the 
substance or caused it to be imported.'' United States v. Nusraty, 867 
F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1989); Accord United States v. Samad, 754 F.2d 
1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Diaz-Carreon 915 
F.2d 951, 953 (5th Cir. 1990). The Government's proof satisfies either 
standard.
    The Farmacia Castaneda invoice clearly establishes that: (1) Two 
controlled substances were shipped to Respondent, and (2) that the 
source of the controlled substances was a Mexican based pharmacy 
notwithstanding that the substances may have been shipped from Mr. 
Romero's San Diego address. The invoice further establishes that (3) 
Respondent caused the controlled substances to be imported by ordering 
them from the pharmacy. Finally, Respondent does not dispute that he 
received these two controlled substances but rather only whether the 
substances ``came from San Diego, [and] not Mexico.'' Resp. Proposed 
Findings at 14. The record thus contains substantial evidence that 
Respondent imported controlled substances.
    Under Federal law, ``[n]o person may * * * import into the United 
States from any place outside thereof, any controlled substance * * * 
unless there is in effect with respect to such person a registration 
issued * * * under section 958 of this title'' or the person ``is 
exempt from registration under subsection(b).'' 21 U.S.C. 957(a). 
Respondent was not registered as an importer, Gov. Exh. 2, and does 
fall within any of the three exemptions. See 21 U.S.C. 957(b). I thus 
conclude that Respondent violated federal law when he imported depo 
testosterone and decadurabolin from Mexico without being registered to 
do so.\21\
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    \21\ I have reviewed Respondent's contention that these 
allegations should be dismissed because they were not alleged in the 
Order to Show Cause. While it is true that our regulations and the 
Administrative Procedure Act require that an Order to Show Cause 
contain ``a summary of the matters of fact and law asserted,'' 21 
CFR 1301.37(c), an agency is not required ``to give every 
[Respondent] a complete bill of particulars as to every allegation 
that [it] will confront.'' Boston Carrier, Inc. v. ICC, 746 F.2d 
1555, 1560 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
    Having reviewed the pre-hearing statements, I conclude that the 
Government gave Respondent fair notice that the import allegations 
would be raised and litigated. I further conclude that Respondent 
had ``a meaningful opportunity to litigate the * * * issue in the 
hearing itself.'' NLRB v. Blake Construction Co., Inc., 663 F.2d 
272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Government's refusal to turn over 
FedEx documents that would have shown that the two controlled 
substances had been shipped from Romero's San Diego location did not 
deny Respondent a meaningful opportunity to litigate the issue; 
indeed, I accept that the steroids may have been shipped to 
Respondent from a San Diego address.
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    The Record Keeping Violations
    The record further establishes that Respondent committed numerous 
recordkeeping violations. Beginning

[[Page 6593]]

with the 1994-95 investigation, during the execution of the search 
warrant, none of the required records were found even though Respondent 
had purchased a variety of controlled substances included various 
anabolic steroids and diazepam.
    Moreover, on January 31, 2001, DEA visited Respondent's clinic and 
requested to see its controlled substance records. The invoices for the 
purchase of controlled substance were not on-site, but rather were at 
the office of the clinic's accountant. This violated 21 CFR 1304.04(a). 
Moreover, the inventory records and dispensing logs were stored in a 
computer system and no one was present at the clinic who could access 
them. Tr. 269.
    DEA regulations require that ``each registered individual 
practitioner required to keep records'' shall maintain the records 
``either separately from all other records of the registrant or in such 
form that the information required is readily retrievable from the 
ordinary business records of the registrant.'' 21 CFR 1304.04(g) & 
(f)(2). As relevant here, DEA regulations define the term ``readily 
retrievable'' to mean ``that certain records are kept by automatic data 
processing systems or other electronic or mechanized record-keeping 
systems in such a manner that they can be separated out from all other 
records in a reasonable time.'' Id. Sec.  1300.01(b)(38) (emphasis 
added).
    Respondent is correct that this regulation does not require that 
records be ``instantaneously produced.'' Resp. Br. 9. Moreover, the 
record does not indicate how long DEA personnel were at the clinic 
during the January 31, 2001 visit. Accordingly, there is no basis to 
conclude that the inventory and dispensing records were not readily 
retrievable on that date.
    I nonetheless note Respondent's argument that he ``was not required 
to produce his records on the same day as the DEA's demand.'' Id. at 
17. This is so, Respondent contends, because ``[n]either the statute 
nor the regulation prescribes a time limit within which a practitioner 
must produce his controlled substance records upon the DEA's request to 
examine them.'' Id.
    The regulation does, however, require that records be retrievable 
in ``a reasonable time.'' While what constitutes ``a reasonable time'' 
necessarily depends on the circumstances, under normal circumstances if 
a practice is open for business, it should be capable of producing a 
complete set of records within several hours of the request. In this 
case, I conclude that on the second visit, the clinic's provision of 
the records within two to three hours complied with the regulation but 
barely so. To allow a registrant an even greater period of time to 
produce the records would create an incentive for those who are engaged 
in illegal activity to obstruct investigations by stalling for time in 
the hopes that DEA personnel would eventually give up and leave.
    Most significantly, the records that were provided did not comply 
with DEA's regulations. The ``inventory report'' was dated February 5, 
2001. It did not include a DEA number for either Respondent or his 
associate and did not indicate that it had been done at the opening or 
closing of business. 21 CFR 1304.03(a) & 1304.11(a). Furthermore, the 
dispensing logs did not reflect the name of the dispensing registrant. 
Id. Sec.  1304.03(b). Moreover, the logs covered only a period of 
approximately seven months and not the required two years. Id. Sec.  
1304.04(a). Finally, no invoices for testosterone were provided even 
though the other records clearly showed that the PSLEI had testosterone 
products on hand and was actively dispensing them. Id. Sec.  
1304.21(a).
    Nor were Respondent's recordkeeping violations limited to this time 
period. During the March 2002 Administrative Inspection, DEA personnel 
again requested to inspect Respondent's records including the required 
inventories. While Respondent was not available, the clinic could not 
provide the required inventories for the various controlled substances 
that were being dispensed. See ALJ 23.
    Other Violations
    The record contains evidence of further violations of DEA 
regulations during the period of Respondent's ownership. In March 2001, 
Respondent's clinic used Connie Chein's DEA number to order controlled 
substances even though Ms. Chein did not practice at the clinic and the 
clinic was not her registered location. See Gov. Exh. 45(a). This was a 
violation of 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(2) (prohibiting use of a registration 
number ``issued to another person'' for purpose of obtaining controlled 
substances). Moreover, Respondent's employees ordered controlled 
substances for the clinic using Dr. Garber's registration and had them 
shipped to Dr. Garber's residence, which was no longer a registered 
location. See Gov. Exh 45(b), (c), (d) & (g). This conduct undermines 
the CSA's closed system of distribution which requires that a 
registrant maintain a registration at each place of business from where 
a registrant distributes controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. 822(e); 21 
CFR 1301.12. Under DEA precedents, a registrant is responsible for 
violations of the CSA committed by his employees and his practice's 
failure to comply with the Act. See Leonard Merkow, 60 FR 22075, 22076 
(1995).
    In conclusion, the evidence of Respondent's non-compliance with 
applicable laws related to controlled substances is extensive and 
shocking. Taken as a whole, Respondent's record reflects a flagrant 
disregard for the requirements of Federal law. Accordingly, I conclude 
that Respondent's continued registration as a practitioner would be 
inconsistent with the public interest.\22\
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    \22\ I acknowledge that Respondent has not been convicted under 
either Federal or State law of a controlled substances offense. 
Given Respondent's extensive record of non-compliance with 
applicable laws, this factor is entitled to no weight. Moreover, 
because Respondent's record of violations is extensive enough to 
support the revocation of his registration, it is not necessary to 
discuss whether he engaged in other conduct which threatens public 
health and safety.
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 Respondent's Export Application
    Section 1008 of the Controlled Substances Act provides that ``[t]he 
Attorney General may deny an application for registration [to export 
controlled substances in schedule III or IV] * * * if he determines 
that such registration is inconsistent with the public interest * * * 
or with the United States obligation under international treaties, 
conventions, or protocols in effect on May 1, 1971.'' 21 U.S.C. 
958(d)(2). In making the public interest determination for an 
application to export Schedule III and IV controlled substances, 
Congress further directed that the Attorney General consider the 
factors applicable to manufacturers of Schedule III through V 
controlled substances. Id. section 958(c)(1). The factors are:

    (1) Maintenance of effective controls against diversion of 
particular controlled substances and any controlled substance in 
schedule III, IV or V compounded therefrom into other than 
legitimate medical, scientific, or industrial channels;
    (2) Compliance with applicable State and local law;
    (3) Promotion of technical advances in the art of manufacturing 
these substances and the development of new substances;
    (4) Prior conviction record of applicant under Federal or State 
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 
such substances;
    (5) Past experience in the manufacture, distribution, and 
dispensing of controlled substances, and the existence in the 
establishment of effective controls against diversion; and
    (6) Such other factors as may be relevant to and consistent with 
the public health and safety.


[[Page 6594]]


21 U.S.C. 823(d). As with the public interest determinations applicable 
to other categories of registrants, ``these factors are * * * 
considered in the disjunctive.'' ALRA Laboratories, Inc., 59 FR 50620, 
50621 (1994). I ``may * * * rely on any one or a combination of 
factors, and give each factor the weight [I] deem appropriate'' in 
considering whether to grant Respondent's application. Id. Moreover, 
case law establishes that I am ``not required to make findings as to 
all of the factors.'' Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 482.
    Here, while Congress has directed a slightly different analysis 
than that applicable to Respondent's practitioner's registration, I 
conclude that the same reasons that support the revocation of that 
registration also require the conclusion that granting Respondent's 
application for an export registration would be inconsistent with the 
public interest. There is no need to engage in a lengthy rehashing of 
those factors (such as Respondent's past experience and lack of 
compliance with Federal law) which have already been discussed; that 
discussion is therefore incorporated by reference.
    Both factors one and five inquire into whether an applicant has 
effective controls against diversion. Respondent clearly does not as 
demonstrated by his clinic's repeated failure to provide DEA with 
either initial or biennial inventories that complied with the 
regulations. Accurate inventories are essential to conduct 
accountability audits and to determine whether diversion has occurred.
    Respondent asserts that ``[t]here was no diversion of controlled 
substances from the legitimate chain of distribution.'' Resp. Br. 6. 
That is not so. The record contains abundant evidence that phentermine 
was sent to patients in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. See Gov. Exh. 128. As 
demonstrated by a letter from a Japanese Ministry of Health official, 
it was illegal to export phentermine to Japan (although a person is 
allowed to bring in a small amount of the drug on his person). See Gov. 
Exh. 38(C). Furthermore, Taiwan had prohibited the use of phentermine 
and its importation. Finally, the record indicates that it is illegal 
to prescribe phentermine for anti-aging purposes in Korea and Japan.
    Both Japan and the United States have ratified the 1971 Convention 
on Psychotropic Substances, which regulates phentermine; the Republic 
of Korea has also become a party to the Convention by accession.\23\ As 
explained above, under the Convention, the United States agreed to 
undertake certain measures including assisting other parties ``in the 
campaign against the illicit traffic in psychotropic substances.'' 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances Art. 21(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Taiwan was also a signatory to the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances. It is acknowledged that Republic of China 
has declared Taiwan's ratification of the Convention to be null and 
void.
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    In light of the authority that an export registration grants, as 
well as our treaty obligations, it is appropriate to consider the 
potential impact of Respondent's conduct not only on this country, but 
also on other parties to the Convention.\24\ The statements of various 
government officials regarding the prohibition on the exportation of 
phentermine to their countries, as well as other evidence that it is 
illegal to prescribe phentermine for anti-aging purposes in several of 
these countries, establish that Respondent's exports of phentermine to 
foreign patients were not within the legitimate chain of distribution 
and were not for a legitimate medical purpose. The shipments thus 
establish that Respondent has engaged in diversion. I therefore 
conclude that Respondent's past experience in distributing and 
dispensing controlled substances demonstrates that his practice lacks 
effective controls against diversion--indeed, he is the cause of the 
diversion--and that this factor further supports a finding that 
granting Respondent's application would be inconsistent with the public 
interest. For the same reason, factor one supports a finding that 
granting Respondent's application would be inconsistent with the public 
interest.
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    \24\ Noramco v. DEA, 375 F.3d 1148, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2004), is 
not to the contrary. That case involved an assertion by a competitor 
of a domestic manufacturer that granting the latter an importer's 
registration would lead to increased diversion of narcotic raw 
materials in India, the country of origin. See Penick Corp., Inc., 
68 FR 6947, 6951 (2003). While this assertion was entirely 
speculative, my predecessor further ruled that DEA was not required 
to consider the impact on diversion in the country of origin. See 
id. In affirming that interpretation as a reasonable construction of 
the statute, the court of appeals reasoned that ``Congress was 
concerned with preventing diversion in this country rather than 
abroad.'' 375 F.3d at 1156.
    Here, however, Federal law expressly requires that an exporter, 
before exporting any nonnarcotic controlled substance in schedules 
III or IV, ``furnish'' to DEA ``documentary proof that importation 
is not contrary to the laws or regulations of the country of 
destination for consumption for medical, scientific, or other 
legitimate purposes.'' 21 U.S.C. 953(e)(1). Thus, in contrast to the 
situation at issue in Penick, here, other provisions of the CSIEA 
suggest that in assessing Respondent's application, it is 
appropriate to consider the potential for diversion of the 
controlled substance in the destination country.
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    The ALJ found that Respondent has promoted technical advances in 
the development of new substances (Factor 3) as demonstrated by his 
obtaining of several patents including one for his total hormone 
replacement therapy. See ALJ at 80. The ALJ further concluded that 
granting Respondent an export registration ``would enhance his ability 
to continue to develop [the] therapy for his patients.'' Id.
    I acknowledge that Respondent has obtained various patents for his 
treatment regimen and had applied for a patent for a particular 
testosterone composition. See Resp. Ex. 1016. Even so, Respondent's 
contributions in this area are greatly outweighed by his record of 
misconduct and his flagrant disregard for the requirements of federal 
law. This factor is thus entitled to no weight. I further note, 
however, that denying Respondent's application for an export 
registration (and revoking his practitioner's registration) does not 
preclude him from developing new treatment protocols. Respondent can 
continue to do so as long as he limits his research to non-controlled 
substances.
    Finally, in discussing other relevant factors (Factor 6), the ALJ 
found ``that the public has an interest in the continued access to 
Respondent's total hormone replacement therapy,'' and suggested that I 
could consider this in deciding whether to deny Respondent's 
application for an export registration (as well as to revoke his 
practitioner's registration). ALJ at 81. I need not decide whether this 
is an appropriate consideration under the statute because even if it 
is, Respondent's extensive history of misconduct clearly outweighs any 
benefit to the public that would accrue from allowing Respondent to 
handle controlled substances as either an exporter or practitioner. And 
in any event, Respondent can always license his patents to other 
physicians or offer to teach them his medical discoveries.
    Considering all of the factors, I conclude that Respondent's past 
experience in distributing and dispensing controlled substances is 
entitled to dispositive weight in the public interest determination 
applicable to his application for registration as an Exporter. Because 
that experience manifests a sustained and flagrant disregard for the 
requirements of Federal law, I conclude that granting Respondent's 
application would be inconsistent with the public interest.\25\
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    \25\ Even if the Court of Appeals was to disagree with my 
finding that Respondent was still in charge of the Palm Springs 
clinic's dispensation of controlled substances during the period of 
his sister's putative ownership, the scope of his misconduct during 
the periods in which he owned the clinic is so extensive and 
egregious that I would still revoke his practitioner's registration 
and deny his exporter's application.

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[[Page 6595]]

Order

    Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 
824(a), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I hereby order that DEA 
Certificate of Registration, AC1643661, issued to Edmund Chein, M.D., 
be, and it hereby is, revoked. I also order that any pending 
applications for renewal or modification of such registration be, and 
they hereby are, denied.
    Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 958(d), as well 
as 28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I further order that the application of 
Edmund Chein, M.D., for a DEA Certificate of Registration as an 
Exporter of controlled substances be, and it hereby is, denied.

    Dated: January 19, 2007.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
 [FR Doc. E7-2217 Filed 2-9-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P