

**Citation**

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.17; and 14 CFR 11.38 and 11.19.

**The Special Conditions**

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Quest Aircraft Company Kodiak Model 100.

1. *Protection of Electrical and Electronic Systems from High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)*. Each system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operations, and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical functions, are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high intensity radiated electromagnetic fields external to the airplane.

2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies:

*Critical Functions:* Functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on January 31, 2007.

**Kim Smith,**

*Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. E7-2098 Filed 2-7-07; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION****Federal Aviation Administration****14 CFR Part 23**

[Docket No. CE265, Special Condition 23-205-SC]

**Special Conditions; Aviation Technology Group (ATG); Javelin Model 100; Protection of Systems for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Final special conditions; request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** These special conditions are issued to Aviation Technology Group (ATG), 8001 S. InterPort Blvd., Englewood, CO 80112 for a type certificate for the Javelin Model 100 airplane. These airplanes will have novel and unusual design features when compared to the state of technology

envisaged in the applicable airworthiness standards. These novel and unusual design features include the installation of electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions for which the applicable regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate airworthiness standards for the protection of these systems from the effects of high intensity radiated fields (HIRF). These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to the airworthiness standards applicable to these airplanes.

**DATES:** The effective date of these special conditions is January 31, 2007. Comments must be received on or before March 12, 2007.

**ADDRESSES:** Mail comments in duplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Regional Counsel, ACE-7, Attention: Rules Docket Clerk, Docket No. CE265, Room 506, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Mark all comments: Docket No. CE265. You may inspect comments in the Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** James Brady, Aerospace Engineer, Standards Office (ACE-110), Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 329-4132.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** The FAA has determined that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay issuance of the approval design and thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In addition, the substance of these special conditions has been subject to the public comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments received. The FAA, therefore, finds that good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon issuance.

**Comments Invited**

We invite interested persons to take part in this rulemaking by sending written data, views, or comments. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We ask that you send us two copies of the written comments. Communications should identify the regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the address specified above.

We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel about these special conditions. You can inspect the docket before and after the closing date. If you wish to review the docket in person, go to the address in the **ADDRESSES** section of this preamble between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. We may change these special conditions based on the comments we receive.

If you want us to let you know we received your comments on these special conditions, send us a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the postcard and mail it back to you.

**Background**

On February 15, 2005, Aviation Technology Group (ATG), 8001 S. InterPort Blvd., Englewood, CO 80112 applied to the FAA for a type certificate for the Javelin Model 100. Changes in technology have given rise to advanced airplane electrical and electronic systems and higher energy levels from high-power radio frequency transmitters such as radio and television broadcast stations, radar and satellite uplink transmitters. The combined effect of these developments has been an increased susceptibility of electrical and electronic systems to electromagnetic fields. The proposed modification incorporates a novel or unusual design feature, such as electrical and electronic systems, that are vulnerable to HIRF external to the airplane.

**Type Certification Basis**

Under the provisions of 14 CFR part 21, § 21.17, Aviation Technology Group must show that the Javelin Model 100 airplane meets the type certification basis for the airplane, as applicable, and § 23.1301 of Amendment 23-20; §§ 23.1309, 23.1311, and 23.1321 of Amendment 23-49; and § 23.1322 of Amendment 23-43; exemptions, if any; and the special conditions adopted by this rulemaking action.

**Discussion**

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness standards do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards because of novel or unusual design features of an airplane, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16.

Special conditions, as appropriate, as defined in § 11.19, are issued in accordance with § 11.38 after public notice and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with § 21.17.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model already included on the same type certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of § 21.101.

**Novel or Unusual Design Features**

Aviation Technology Group plans to incorporate certain novel and unusual design features into the Javelin Model 100 airplanes for which the airworthiness standards do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for protection from the effects of HIRF. These features include electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions, which are susceptible to the HIRF environment, that were not envisaged by the existing regulations for this type of airplane.

*Protection of Systems from High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF):* Recent advances in technology have given rise to the application in aircraft designs of advanced electrical and electronic systems that perform functions required for continued safe flight and landing. Due to the use of sensitive solid state advanced components in analog and digital electronics circuits, these advanced systems are readily responsive to the transient effects of induced electrical current and voltage caused by the HIRF. The HIRF can degrade electronic systems performance by damaging components or upsetting system functions.

Furthermore, the HIRF environment has undergone a transformation that was not foreseen when the current requirements were developed. Higher energy levels are radiated from transmitters that are used for radar, radio, and television. Also, the number of transmitters has increased significantly. There is uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of airframe shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, coupling to cockpit-installed equipment through the cockpit window apertures is undefined.

The combined effect of the technological advances in airplane design and the changing environment has resulted in an increased level of vulnerability of electrical and electronic systems required for the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Effective measures against the effects of exposure to HIRF must be provided by the design and installation of these systems. The accepted maximum energy levels in which civilian airplane system installations must be capable of operating safely are based on surveys and analysis of existing radio frequency emitters. These special conditions require that the airplane be evaluated under these energy levels for the protection of the electronic system and its associated wiring harness. These external threat levels, which are lower than previous required values, are believed to represent the worst case to which an airplane would be exposed in the operating environment.

These special conditions require qualification of systems that perform critical functions, as installed in aircraft, to the defined HIRF environment in paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed value using laboratory tests, in paragraph 2, as follows:

(1) The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational capability of the installed electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF environment defined below:

Frequency	Field strength (volts per meter)	
	Peak	Average
10 kHz–100 kHz .....	50	50
100 kHz–500 kHz .....	50	50
500 kHz–2 MHz .....	50	50
2 MHz–30 MHz .....	100	100
30 MHz–70 MHz .....	50	50
70 MHz–100 MHz .....	50	50
100 MHz–200 MHz .....	100	100
200 MHz–400 MHz .....	100	100
400 MHz–700 MHz .....	700	50
700 MHz–1 GHz .....	700	100
1 GHz–2 GHz .....	2000	200
2 GHz–4 GHz .....	3000	200
4 GHz–6 GHz .....	3000	200
6 GHz–8 GHz .....	1000	200
8 GHz–12 GHz .....	3000	300
12 GHz–18 GHz .....	2000	200
18 GHz–40 GHz .....	600	200

The field strengths are expressed in terms of peak root-mean-square (rms) values.

or,

(2) The applicant may demonstrate by a system test and analysis that the electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions can withstand a minimum threat of 100 volts per meter peak root-mean-square (rms), electrical field strength, from 10 kHz to 18 GHz. When using this test to show compliance with the HIRF requirements, no credit is given for signal attenuation due to installation.

A preliminary hazard analysis must be performed by the applicant, for

approval by the FAA, to identify either electrical or electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term “critical” means those functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. The systems identified by the hazard analysis that perform critical functions are candidates for the application of HIRF requirements. A system may perform both critical and non-critical functions. Primary electronic flight display systems, and their associated components, perform critical functions such as attitude, altitude, and airspeed indication. The HIRF requirements apply only to critical functions.

Compliance with HIRF requirements may be demonstrated by tests, analysis, models, similarity with existing systems, or any combination of these. Service experience alone is not acceptable since normal flight operations may not include an exposure to the HIRF environment. Reliance on a system with similar design features for redundancy as a means of protection against the effects of external HIRF is generally insufficient since all elements of a redundant system are likely to be exposed to the fields concurrently.

**Applicability**

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the ATG Javelin Model 100. Should ATG apply at a later date for a supplemental type certificate for a type design change that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that change as well under the provisions of § 21.101.

**Conclusion**

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. For this reason, and because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon

issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols.

#### Citation

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.17; and 14 CFR 11.38 and 11.19.

#### The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the ATG Javelin Model 100.

1. *Protection of Electrical and Electronic Systems from High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)*. Each system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operations, and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical functions, are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high intensity radiated electromagnetic fields external to the airplane.

2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies:

*Critical Functions:* Functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on January 31, 2007.

**Kim Smith,**

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E7-2097 Filed 2-7-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-27150; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-288-AD; Amendment 39-14929; AD 2007-03-18]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A300 and A300-600 Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Final rule; request for comments.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as cracking in the wing main landing gear (MLG) rib 5 aft bearing forward lug, which could affect the structural integrity of the MLG attachment. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

**DATES:** This AD becomes effective February 23, 2007.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain documents listed in this AD as of February 23, 2007.

We must receive comments on this AD by March 12, 2007.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *DOT Docket Web Site:* Go to <http://dms.dot.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.
- *Mail:* Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
- *Hand Delivery:* Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

#### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://dms.dot.gov>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone (800) 647-5227) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Tom Stafford, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1622; fax (425) 227-1149.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Streamlined Issuance of AD

The FAA is implementing a new process for streamlining the issuance of ADs related to MCAI. This streamlined process will allow us to adopt MCAI safety requirements in a more efficient manner and will reduce safety risks to the public. This process continues to follow all FAA AD issuance processes to meet legal, economic, Administrative Procedure Act, and **Federal Register** requirements. We also continue to meet our technical decision-making responsibilities to identify and correct unsafe conditions on U.S.-certificated products.

This AD references the MCAI and related service information that we considered in forming the engineering basis to correct the unsafe condition. The AD contains text copied from the MCAI and for this reason might not follow our plain language principles.

#### Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2006-0372-E, dated December 14, 2006 (referred to after this as "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states that during routine visual inspection, a crack has been found in the wing MLG (main landing gear) rib 5 aft bearing forward lug on two Model A310 in-service aircraft. Laboratory examination of one of the cracked ribs confirmed that the crack is due to the presence of pitting corrosion in the forward lug holes. Also, on both aircraft medium to heavy corrosion was found in the forward lugs on the opposite wing after removal of the bushings. Similar to Model A310 aircraft, Model A300 and A300-600 aircraft are also affected by this situation, which, if not detected, could affect the structural integrity of the MLG attachment. The aim of the MCAI is to mandate repetitive detailed visual inspections of wing MLG rib 5 aft bearing forward lugs for detection of through cracks and corrective action (contacting Airbus and replacing cracked lugs if necessary). The MCAI notes that for Airbus Model A310 aircraft, refer to EASA Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2006-0335-E, issued November 3, 2006. In response to that MCAI, on December 7, 2006, we issued AD 2007-02-09, amendment 39-14896 (72 FR 2612, January 22, 2007), to address this unsafe condition on Model A310 airplanes. You may obtain