

preempts state law, or otherwise has Federalism implications.

This rule announces the provisions of section 6053(b) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. We do not estimate this regulation will have any significant effect on the economy. Nevertheless, we estimate the impact of the provision, once implemented, to be minimal. Our analysis suggests that the modification to the FMAPs will only affect Texas. The effect will likely be a minimal decrease in State Medicaid and SCHIP spending and a corresponding minimal increase in federal Medicaid and SCHIP spending.

In addition, the provisions only directly affect states. Therefore, there is no need to perform a regulatory flexibility analysis in accordance with section 603 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

H. Summary

We propose to adjust the fiscal year 2008 FMAP rate only for the State of Texas, by reducing the income estimates used in the FMAP calculation through the application of adjustments to reflect interstate population dispersal income and FEMA disaster assistance income for evacuees. Because this is the only income that can be attributed to Katrina evacuees based on BEA data, this income will be subtracted from the 2005 state personal income as published by BEA in October 2006 to obtain a new state personal income for Texas. This state personal income will be divided by the state population as of July 2005 to get a revised per capita personal income for each state. This revised 2005 per capita personal income will replace the 2005 per capita personal income in calculating the 2008 FMAPs.

Effective Dates: The percentages listed will be effective for each of the four (4) quarter-year periods in the period beginning October 1, 2007 and ending September 30, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Musco or Robert Stewart, Office of Health Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Room 447D—Hubert H. Humphrey Building, 200 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20201, (202) 690-6870.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.778: Medical Assistance Program; 93.767: State Children's Health Insurance Program)

Dated: January 19, 2007.

Michael O. Leavitt,

Secretary of Health and Human Services.

[FR Doc. E7-1174 Filed 1-24-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4210-31-P

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Meeting of the Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS

AGENCY: Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Secretary, Office of Public Health and Science.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: As stipulated by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is hereby giving notice that the Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS (PACHA) will hold a meeting. This meeting is open to the public. A description of the Council's functions is included with this notice.

DATES: February 27, 2007, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., and February 28, 2007, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.

ADDRESSES: Hubert H. Humphrey Building, 200 Independence Ave., SW., Room 705A, Washington, DC 20201.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dana Ceasar, Program Assistant, Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS, Department of Health and Human Services, Hubert H. Humphrey Building, 200 Independence Avenue, SW., Room 733E, Washington, DC 20201; (202) 690-2470 or visit the Council's Web site at <http://www.pacha.gov>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PACHA was established by Executive Order 12963, dated June 14, 1995, as amended by Executive Order 13009, dated June 14, 1996. The Council was established to provide advice, information, and recommendations to the Secretary regarding programs and policies intended to (a) promote effective prevention of HIV disease, (b) advance research on HIV and AIDS, and (c) promote quality services to persons living with HIV disease and AIDS. PACHA was established to serve solely as an advisory body to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The Council is composed of not more than 21 members. Council membership is determined by the Secretary from individuals who are considered authorities with particular expertise in, or knowledge of, matters concerning HIV/AIDS.

The agenda for this Council meeting includes the following topics: HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care issues, both domestically and internationally. Members of the public will have the opportunity to provide comments at the meeting. Public comment will be limited to three (3) minutes per speaker.

Public attendance is limited to space available and pre-registration is required

for both attendance and public comment. Any individual who wishes to participate should register at <http://www.pacha.gov>. Individuals who plan to attend and need special assistance, such as sign language interpretation or other reasonable accommodations, should indicate in the comment section when registering.

Dated: January 16, 2007.

Anand K. Parekh,

Acting Executive Director, Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS.

[FR Doc. E7-1125 Filed 1-24-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4150-43-P

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Report on Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic Weapons Employer Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities

AGENCY: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) gives notice as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Pub. L. 108-375) of the release of a report on residual contamination of facilities under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA), 42 U.S.C. 7384 *et seq.* The report is below. The report and appendices are also available at: <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas>.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Larry Elliott, Director, Office of Compensation Analysis and Support, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 4676 Columbia Parkway, MS C-46, Cincinnati, OH 45226, Telephone 513-533-6800 (this is not a toll-free number). Information requests can also be submitted by e-mail to OCAS@CDC.GOV.

John Howard,

Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.

Report on Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic Weapons Employer Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities

Prepared by: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
John Howard, M.D., Director, December 2006

I. Summary of Results

This update to the Report on Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic Weapons Employer Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities is the second revision of the original study reported in November 2002 and revised in June 2004. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is required to submit this report by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) (Pub. L. 108-375), which amended the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA), 42 U.S.C. 7384 *et seq.*, as follows:

1. For each facility for which such report found that insufficient information was available to determine whether significant residual contamination was present;
2. For each facility for which such report found that significant residual contamination remained present as of the date of the report, determine the date on which such contamination ceased to be present;
3. For each facility for which such report found that significant residual contamination was present but for which the Director has been unable to determine the extent to which such contamination is attributable to atomic weapons-related activities, identify the specific dates of coverage attributable to such activities and, in so identifying, presume that such contamination is attributable to such activities until there is evidence of decontamination of residual contamination identified with atomic weapons-related activities;
4. For each facility for which such report found significant residual contamination, determine whether it is at least as likely as not that such contamination could have caused an employee who was employed at such facility only during the residual contamination period to contract a cancer or beryllium illness compensable under subtitle B of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000; and
5. If new information that pertains to the report has been made available to the Director since that report was submitted, identify and describe such information.

NIOSH found that there were 94 Atomic Weapons Employer (AWE) facilities and 65 Beryllium Vendors that required evaluation as described above. The documents reviewed did not indicate the existence of a current, unrecognized occupational or public health threat. NIOSH evaluated new information that

had been identified since 2004. NIOSH also based findings on information posted on the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) website as of July 31, 2006 (changes made to the DOE ES&H website after July 31, 2006 are not reflected in this report).

The following actions have been taken in this report:

1. A determination on the presence of significant residual radioactive or beryllium contamination has been made for all of the facilities for which the previous report found that insufficient information was available to determine whether significant residual contamination was present.
2. A determination on the date when significant residual contamination was no longer present has been made for many facilities for which the previous report found that significant residual contamination remained present as of the date of the report. However, many sites were determined to have significant residual contamination remaining as of the date of this report. This is described on a facility-by-facility basis.
3. For all facilities for which the previous report was unable to determine that significant residual contamination was attributable to atomic weapons-related activities, specific dates of coverage attributable to such activities have been determined and, when the source of such contamination was not clear, the contamination was presumed to be associated with atomic weapons-related activities.
4. All facilities for which significant residual contamination was determined to be present after the period of weapons related production are considered to have the potential of causing an employee who was employed at such facility only during the residual contamination period to contract a cancer or beryllium illness compensable under subtitle B of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000.
5. All information used in making the determinations in this report are referenced in the individual facility evaluations found in Appendices A-3 and B-3.

Individual results for the 94 AWEs evaluated as required by the NDAA are as follows:

- 18 of the 94 atomic weapons employer facilities have little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
- 72 of the 94 atomic weapons employer facilities have the potential for significant residual contamination

outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

- 4 of the 94 previously listed Atomic Weapons Employer facilities are no longer listed as Atomic Weapons Employers on the DOE ES&H Web site.

Individual results for the 65 Beryllium Vendor Facilities evaluated are required by the NDAA are as follows:

- 7 of the 65 beryllium vendor facilities have little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
- 58 of the 65 beryllium vendor facilities evaluated have the potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

II. Background and Purpose

The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA), 42 U.S.C. 7384 *et seq.*, established a program to compensate individuals who developed illnesses as a result of their employment in nuclear weapons production-related activities at certain facilities in which radioactive materials or beryllium was processed. DOE was directed by Executive Order 13179 to publish in the **Federal Register** a list of facilities covered by the Act. On January 17, 2001, DOE published a list of AWEs, DOE facilities, and beryllium vendors, in the **Federal Register**; the list was revised on December 27, 2002, 67 FR 32690. Updates to the list (corrections, additions, and deletions) have been made periodically by DOE. This update to the Report on Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic Weapons Employer Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities is the second revision to the original study reported in November of 2002 and revised in June of 2004.

The DOE ES&H Web site (<http://www.eh.doe.gov/advocacy>) provides a synopsis of the work performed at each facility, including a listing of periods during which DOE believes, based on current information, that weapons-related processing was conducted. In determining these periods, DOE has applied the definitions in EEOICPA to the known facts about the time and conditions of weapons-related processing at each facility. DOE changes the entries on its database as additional information is obtained. These periods are referred to in this report as "Periods in which weapons-related production occurred." It must be noted that the Department of Labor (DOL) is responsible for determining actual periods of covered employment based

upon DOE's findings as well as information from claimants and other sources.

This study consisted primarily of an evaluation of documents pertaining to AWEs. These include documents compiled by DOE ES&H, documents obtained through NIOSH data capture efforts, and documents located on the Formerly Utilized Sites Remediation Action Program (FUSRAP) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Web sites. The quantity and quality of the information available for each site varied significantly. Examples of documentation reviewed include radiological surveys, descriptions of production operations, contractual agreements, and interoffice correspondence. In addition, interviews with current and past employees of these facilities were conducted to obtain information not contained in available documentation. When such interviews were used in the facility evaluation, they are listed in the individual site descriptions in Appendix B-3.

NIOSH believes that contamination levels at designated facilities in excess of those indicated in 10 CFR part 835, Appendix D (Occupational Radiation Protection, Surface Contamination Values) indicate that there is "significant contamination" remaining in those facilities. Documentation for each facility was reviewed, as available, to determine if there was an indication that residual radioactive contamination was present outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. Those levels then were compared to current radiation protection limits as listed in 10 CFR part 835, to determine if there was "significant contamination." If there was no documentation or limited documentation on radiation levels at specified facilities, NIOSH made a professional judgment regarding the residual contamination. If NIOSH determined there was "the potential for significant contamination" at a designated facility, then NIOSH determined, pursuant to NDAA, that such contamination "could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee with cancer."

In the case of beryllium contamination, if there was no evidence that the beryllium areas had been decontaminated, it was determined that this material could have caused or substantially contributed to the beryllium illness of an employee. Because beryllium sensitization can occur at very low levels of exposure, the level of residual beryllium

contamination remaining was not included in the determination.

Because the investigation involved evaluating potential radioactive contamination and beryllium contamination, the study was divided so that the required expertise could be devoted to the radiological facilities and the beryllium facilities. Appendices A-1 and B-1 provide synopses of the findings for the 159 facilities that were evaluated as required by NDAA: Appendix A-1 applies to 94 facilities evaluated for residual radioactive contamination while Appendix B-1 applies to 65 facilities evaluated for residual beryllium contamination.

Some of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred have been changed on the DOE ES&H Web site since the June 2004 report. Appendices A-2 and B-2 provide the current descriptions and evaluations for all AWE and Beryllium Vendor facilities, respectively. Appendices A-3 and B-3 provide descriptions of each facility, the data reviewed as a part of this evaluation, and the final findings.

Periods of Residual Contamination

The evaluations focused on determining whether the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. In many cases, no records of decontamination were found or surveys performed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred indicated the existence of significant residual contamination. However, some of the documentation provided dates of decontamination, dates of demolition of the facility, or descriptions of the radiological controls in place during operations. For sites that exhibited a potential for significant residual radioactive contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred, and for which an indication of a more accurate period was available, this time period was provided. For sites that exhibited a potential for significant residual radioactive contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred, and for which an indication of a more accurate period was not available, it was assumed that significant residual contamination existed until the time which the facility was demolished or until the present, defined as July 2006, when this report was written.

Some sites performed work with radioactive material and/or beryllium for commercial purposes, in addition to work for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)/DOE. When it was

impossible to distinguish residual contamination resulting from AEC/DOE activities from those resulting from commercial purposes, it was assumed that the contamination was attributable to weapons-related activities.

III. Residual Radioactive Contamination Evaluation

This study consisted primarily of an evaluation of documents pertaining to AWEs. These include documents compiled by DOE ES&H, documents obtained through data capture efforts of NIOSH, and documents located on the FUSRAP and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Web sites. In all cases, the individual site finding is based on the available information. The finding on any single site was based on the quantity and completeness of the information available regarding that site and professional judgment as necessary.

In this evaluation of residual radioactive contamination, as in the previous report, the following factors were considered:

- (1) The radionuclides involved;
- (2) The quantity of radioactive material processed;
- (3) The physical form of the radioactive material processed (*i.e.*, solid, liquid, or gas);
- (4) The operations performed and their potential for radiation/radioactivity exposure;
- (5) Documented radiological control and monitoring programs that were in place during operations; and
- (6) Documented decontamination of facilities

These factors were used to estimate the potential for radiation exposure both during operations and after production/processing had ceased. For example, a facility for which a decontamination survey was documented was classified as having little potential for residual radioactive contamination after the decontamination date, while a facility with a high potential for residual radioactive contamination during operations and no documented decontamination data was classified as having a potential for residual radioactive contamination after operations had ceased.

Each site was assigned to one of two categories:

1. *Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.*

A site was assigned to this category if the documentation available for the facility indicated one or more of the following characteristics:

(a) The facility was decontaminated within the periods in which weapons-related production occurred,

(b) The facility had very little potential for residual contamination during actual operations, or

(c) The facility is still in operation and the end date is listed as "present."

2. *Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.*

A site was assigned to this category if there was documentation indicating the following:

(a) Radioactive material was present in quantities or forms which could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee, and

(b) Radioactive material was processed or present outside of the dates as listed on the DOE ES&H website.

This type of documentation often included FUSRAP surveys conducted after Manhattan Engineering District (MED)/AEC/DOE operations were complete, which indicated the presence of residual radioactive contamination that could be attributed to those activities.

In some cases, the facilities processed radioactive material for not only nuclear weapons production, but also commercial, non-DOE contracts. Sometimes the material processed for nuclear weapons production was indistinguishable from material processed for commercial purposes. Wherever residual radioactive contamination due to DOE operations was not clearly distinguishable from that resulting from commercial operations, it was assumed that the contamination was the result of weapons production activities. As a result, in these cases, the findings were that the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. For sites that exhibited a potential for significant residual radioactive contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred, and for which an end date could not be determined, it was assumed that significant residual contamination existed until the time the facility was demolished or until the present, defined as the date this report was written.

Findings of Evaluation of Facilities for Residual Radioactive Contamination

The results of this study indicate that there are atomic weapons employer facilities for which the potential for significant residual radiological contamination exists outside of the

periods in which weapons-related production occurred as listed on the DOE ES&H website.

Appendix A-1 lists the findings for the potential for significant residual radioactive contamination at the 94 facilities required for evaluation by NDAA. Appendix A-2 lists all of the AWE facilities and the findings for potential residual radioactive contamination. Appendix A-3 describes each facility evaluated for residual radioactive contamination, the data reviewed as a part of this evaluation, and the final findings.

IV. Residual Beryllium Contamination Evaluation

The primary sources of information used to evaluate each site were the individual facility files compiled by DOE ES&H. In addition, interviews with current and past employees of these facilities were conducted to obtain information not contained in available documentation.

The finding on any single site was based on the quantity and completeness of the information available regarding that site and professional judgment as necessary.

In this evaluation of residual radioactive contamination, as in the previous report, the following factors were considered:

(1) If beryllium was actually handled at the site.

(2) If there was evidence of decontamination of the facility.

These factors were used to estimate the potential for beryllium exposure both during operations and after production/processing had ceased. For example, a facility for which a decontamination survey was documented or for which personal interviews indicated that decontamination was performed, was classified as having little potential for residual beryllium contamination after the decontamination date; a facility without such evidence of decontamination was classified as having a potential for residual beryllium contamination after operations had ceased.

Each site was assigned to one of two categories:

1. Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

A site was assigned to this category if the documentation available for the facility indicated one or more of the following characteristics:

(a) Evidence of decontamination and/or beryllium contamination survey data,

(b) The facility had very little potential for residual contamination during actual operations, or

(c) The facility is still in operation and the end date is listed as "present."

2. Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

A site was assigned to this category if either of the following conditions existed:

(a) Documentation was available indicating that beryllium was processed or present outside of the dates listed on the DOE ES&H website that could have caused or substantially contributed to the beryllium illness of a covered employee.

(b) There was no evidence of a decontamination of the facility or area where beryllium was processed.

In some cases, the facilities processed beryllium material for not only nuclear weapons production, but also commercial, non-DOE contracts. Sometimes the material processed for nuclear weapons production was indistinguishable from material processed for commercial purposes. Wherever residual beryllium contamination due to DOE operations was not clearly distinguishable from that resulting from commercial operations, it was assumed that the contamination was the result of weapons production activities. As a result, in these cases, the findings were that the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. For sites that exhibited a potential for significant residual beryllium contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred, and for which an end date could not be determined, it was assumed that significant residual contamination existed until the time the facility was demolished or until the present, defined as the date this report was written.

Findings of Evaluation of Facilities for Residual Beryllium Contamination

The results of this study indicate that there are Beryllium Vendor facilities for which the potential for significant residual beryllium contamination exists outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred as listed on the DOE ES&H website.

Appendix B-1 lists the findings for the potential for significant residual beryllium contamination at the 65 facilities required for evaluation by NDAA. Appendix B-2 lists all Beryllium Vendor facilities and the

findings for potential residual beryllium contamination. Appendix B-3 describes each facility evaluated for residual beryllium contamination, the data reviewed as a part of this evaluation, and the final findings.

V. Conclusions

The findings of this study are: (1) Some atomic weapons employer facilities and beryllium vendor facilities have the potential for significant residual radiological and beryllium contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. (2) For the purposes of this report, NIOSH believes that facilities having "significant contamination" had quantities of radioactive material that "could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee with cancer." (3) The documents reviewed did not indicate the existence of a current, unrecognized occupational or public health threat.

[FR Doc. E7-1157 Filed 1-24-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4163-19-P

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Request for Information (RFI): Guidance for Prioritization of Pre-pandemic and Pandemic Influenza Vaccine—Extension of Comment Period

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Department of Health and Human Service.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: On December 14, 2006, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a notice in the *Federal Register* (FR Doc. Vol. 71, No. 240, Pages 75252-75253) to request input from the public on considerations in developing guidance for prioritization of the distribution and administration of both pre-pandemic and pandemic influenza vaccines based on various pandemic severity and vaccine supply scenarios. Specifically, HHS is seeking input on pandemic influenza vaccine prioritization considerations from all interested and affected parties, including but not limited to public health and health care individuals and organizations, as well as those from other sectors of the economy including, for example, travel and transportation, commerce and trade, law enforcement, emergency management and responders, other critical infrastructure sectors and the general public.

Previous reports relating to pandemic influenza vaccine prioritization issues are available at <http://www.pandemicflu.gov>.

The purpose of this notice is to inform all interested parties that the comment period originally identified in the December 14, 2006 *Federal Register* is now being extended to February 5, 2007.

DATES: Responses should be submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services on or before 5 p.m., EDT, February 5, 2007.

Instructions for Submitting Comments: Electronic responses are preferred and may be addressed to PandemicFlu.RFI@hhs.gov. Written responses should be addressed to the Department of Health and Human Services, Room 434E, 200 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20201, Attention: Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Prioritization RFI. A copy of this RFI is also available on the PandemicFlu.Gov Web site and at <http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/PIV/rfi>. Please follow instructions for submitting responses.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ben Schwartz, Office of Public Health and Science, (404) 639-8953.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Extensive information on Federal government strategic and implementation plans for pandemic flu is available at <http://www.pandemicflu.gov>.

Dated: January 19, 2007.

John O. Agwunobi,
Assistant Secretary of Health, Office of Public Health and Science, Department of Health and Human Services.

[FR Doc. 07-323 Filed 1-24-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4151-05-M

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Safety and Occupational Health Study Section (SOHSS); Notice of Meeting

In accordance with section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announces the aforementioned committee meeting.

Times and Dates: 8 a.m.–5 p.m., February 20, 2007. 8 a.m.–5 p.m., February 21, 2007.

Place: Embassy Suites Hotel, 1900 Diagonal Road, Alexandria, Virginia, 22314, telephone 703.684.5900, fax 703.684.1403.

Status: Open 8 a.m.–8:30 a.m., February 20, 2007. Closed 8:30 a.m.–5 p.m., February

20, 2007. Closed 8 a.m.–5 p.m., February 21, 2007.

Purpose: The Safety and Occupational Health Study Section will review, discuss, and evaluate grant applications received in response to the Institute's standard grants review and funding cycles pertaining to research issues in occupational safety and health and allied areas.

It is the intent of NIOSH to support broad-based research endeavors in keeping with the Institute's program goals. This will lead to improved understanding and appreciation for the magnitude of the aggregate health burden associated with occupational injuries and illnesses, as well as to support more focused research projects, which will lead to improvements in the delivery of occupational safety and health services and the prevention of work-related injury and illness. It is anticipated that the research funded will promote these program goals.

Matters to be Discussed: The meeting will convene an open session from 8–8:30 a.m. on February 20, 2007, to address matters related to the conduct of SOHSS business. The remainder of the meeting will proceed in closed session. The purpose of the closed session is for the study section to consider safety and occupational health-related grant applications. These portions of the meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with provisions set forth in Section 552b(c)(4) and (6), Title 5 U.S.C., and the Determination of the Director, Management Analysis and Services Office, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, pursuant to Section 10(d) Pub. L. 92-463. Agenda items are subject to change as priorities dictate.

For Further Information Contact: Price Connor, Ph.D., NIOSH Health Scientist, 1600 Clifton Road, NE., Mailstop E-20, Atlanta, Georgia 30333, telephone 404.498.2511, fax 404.498.2571.

The Director, Management Analysis and Services Office, has been delegated the authority to sign *Federal Register* notices pertaining to announcements of meetings and other committee management activities for both CDC and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.

Elaine L. Baker,

Acting Director, Management Analysis and Services Office, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

[FR Doc. E7-1083 Filed 1-24-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4163-18-P

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration

Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection; Comment Request

In compliance with Section 3506(c)(2)(A) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 concerning opportunity for public comment on proposed collections of information, the