[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 11 (Thursday, January 18, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2333-2334]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-594]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Safety Advisory 2007-01

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory; Safety in Yards; Behavior of 
Employees On or About Tracks; and Point Protection.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2007-01, which addresses the 
safety of shoving or pushing movements in yards, including those 
involving remote control locomotives. This advisory also addresses the 
behavior of employees on or about tracks.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alan H. Nagler, Trial Attorney, Office 
of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590, 
telephone (202-493-6049 or 202-493-6052); Edward Pritchard, Director, 
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Office of Safety, FRA, 1120 
Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202-493-6300).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Although the overall safety of railroad 
operations has improved in recent years, a recent fatal accident 
involving a carman struck by a remote control yard movement while he 
was backing a pickup truck onto an in-yard private railroad grade 
crossing (yard crossing) highlights the need to review current railroad 
procedures and practices.

Results of Preliminary Investigation

    The following discussion of the circumstances surrounding a fatal 
accident that occurred on December 14, 2006, is based on FRA's 
preliminary investigation. The accident is still under investigation by 
FRA and local authorities. The causes and contributing factors, if any, 
have not yet been established; therefore, nothing in this Safety 
Advisory should be construed as placing blame or responsibility for the 
accident on the acts or omissions of any person or entity.
    The fatal accident occurred in Manlius, New York, a suburb of 
Syracuse, in CSX Transportation, Inc.'s (CSX) DeWitt Yard at about 5:25 
p.m. on December 14, 2006. The victim was a 54-year-old carman with 
about 30 years of railroad service. While backing a pickup truck onto a 
yard crossing, he was struck by a yard movement of railroad cars shoved 
by a remote control locomotive. The remote control operator (RCO) 
aligned a track switch, initiated the yard movement by remote control, 
and was driven to the East End Yardmasters Tower by another CSX 
employee while the yard movement was underway.
    The RCO stated that as he was riding to the East End Yardmasters 
Tower, he made a visual determination that the track (including the 
track at the two yard crossings over which the movement traversed) was 
clear of equipment or other obstructions. The yard movement was not 
conducted in an activated remote control zone. During the approximately 
\1/4\-mile shoving movement, the leading end of the movement was not 
under continuous observation by the RCO. The route traversed included 
both the yard crossing on which the accident occurred and a second, 
paved yard crossing.
    The leading end of the yard movement, which is the end that struck 
the carman's pickup truck, consisted of six empty flat cars. Due to its 
low profile, the approach of an empty flat car is less perceptible than 
the approach of other rolling stock, e.g., box car, tank car, 
locomotive. This was exacerbated by darkness, as the sun had set 
approximately 1 hour before the accident.
    Upon impact, the carman's truck was shoved for about 444 feet 
whereupon it flipped onto its roof and was additionally shoved 
approximately 490 feet. Immediately after the accident, the truck was 
observed with its backup lights illuminated and its backup alarm 
sounding, indicating that the carman had backed onto the crossing ahead 
of the yard movement.
    The RCO stated that he stopped the yard movement when he noticed a 
strange white light at the leading end of the yard movement and heard a 
radio transmission to stop the yard movement. The preliminary 
investigation disclosed that upon impact, the carman in the pickup 
truck transmitted his urgent plea on the mechanical department radio 
channel to stop the movement. That transmission was heard by the 
yardmaster because he could monitor the mechanical department channel 
in the yard office. Within seconds, the yardmaster observed the 
carman's truck being shoved and radioed the RCO to stop. Because the 
carman and the RCO were utilizing different radio channels, the carman 
was unable to contact the RCO directly. The yard movement finally came 
to rest about 1,490 feet from where the movement was initiated and 934 
feet from where it struck the carman's truck. The autopsy determined 
that the cause of death was due to injuries sustained when the truck 
overturned while being shoved by the yard movement. Post-accident 
testing of the carman's urine specimen revealed the presence of 
marijuana metabolite (THCA) at low levels. Neither the parent drug 
(THC) nor the marijuana metabolite was detected in the blood at the 
established cutoff point. Since the marijuana metabolite was not active 
and the parent drug was not reported in the blood, these findings do 
not provide scientific evidence that would support any conclusion 
regarding possible impairment of the carman's faculties. This is 
particularly the case since death occurred shortly after the impact, 
and marijuana constituents remain stable in these fluids for long 
periods after metabolism ceases.

Safety Issues

    CSX's General and Operating Equipment Rule R15 (published in CSX 
System Bulletin 001 of October 1, 2006, under Instructions Governing 
Remote Control Locomotive Operation) states, in relevant part, that

    [P]oint protection must be provided when cars, platform or 
engines are being moved and conditions require. A crewmember must 
take a position on the lead equipment to see that the track ahead is 
clear, or be ahead of the movement. When an RCO operator is 
providing point protection, that operator should be the primary 
operator when practicable.

CSX rules do not define the term ``point protection.'' Although the RCO 
was ahead of the movement as permitted by CSX rule, he did not observe 
the collision and initiated a brake application only after hearing a 
radio transmission from the yardmaster.
    The preliminary investigation indicates that the RCO controlled the 
yard movement while riding in a moving motor vehicle. CSX General and 
Operating Equipment Rule R8 states, in relevant part, that ``[an] RCL 
[remote control locomotive] crew member will not operate an RCL * * * 
while riding in a moving motor vehicle or other machinery that is not 
connected to their consist.'' This rule goes further than FRA's 
published guidelines for the operation of remote control locomotives, 
which states, in relevant part: ``[W]hen operating an RCL, the RCO 
should not operate any other type of machinery [66 FR 10340, 10344 
(Feb. 14, 2001) (Notice

[[Page 2334]]

of Safety Advisory 2001-01)].'' Both CSX Rule R8 and FRA guidelines 
were intended to address the lack of situational awareness that a 
person may experience when ``multitasking''--in this case, focusing on 
a moving train while at the same time operating or riding in a moving 
vehicle.
    Although Federal regulations do not currently prohibit shoving 
movements conducted in the manner described by the preliminary findings 
of this accident, FRA is contemplating the regulation of shoving 
movements as addressed in a recently published FRA notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM), ``Railroad Operating Rules: Program of Operational 
Tests and Inspections; Railroad Operating Practices: Handling 
Equipment, Switches and Derails [71 FR 60372, 60410 (October 12, 
2006)].'' In the NPRM, FRA stated that it proposes:

    A requirement that the employee providing point protection 
visually determine, for the duration of the shoving or pushing 
movement, that the track is clear within the range of vision for the 
complete distance to be shoved or pushed. Shoving accidents often 
occur because a train crew makes a shoving movement without 
determining that the track is clear in the direction of movement. 
This proposed paragraph would address this problem by requiring an 
operating rule that keeps a qualified employee observing the track 
to make sure it is clear and remains clear [71 FR 60393].

In this instance, the RCO apparently made an initial determination that 
the track was clear, but was not in a position to determine that the 
track would remain clear of conflicting mechanical department vehicles. 
(See 71 FR at 60409 defining ``track is clear.'') Although FRA has 
proposed requirements for shoving movements, it has not made any 
decisions as to the contents of a final rule in that proceeding, and 
thus the proposal is not now, and may not in the future become, a 
regulatory requirement. Railroads, however, are encouraged to consider 
FRA's proposed rule and this incident as they review their operating 
rules.
    The investigation of this accident also raised questions regarding 
the visibility of the rail car leading the shoving movement. As stated 
earlier, the lead car was a low-profile, empty flat car followed by 
five more empty flat cars. The first freight car of significant height 
was the seventh car from the lead, a box car. It is possible that the 
carman did not see the low-profile cars in the darkness. Although FRA 
does have regulations pertaining to reflectorization of freight cars, 
there are no Federal rules regarding illumination within rail yards, at 
yard crossings, or on the leading point of a movement.
    The following CSX rules may apply to this accident:

    CSX Safe Way, Effective January 1, 2006 at GS-10. On or About 
Tracks; When working on or about tracks: * * * Be alert for and keep 
clear of the movement of cars, locomotives, or equipment at any 
time, in either direction, on any track. * * * Stop and look in both 
directions before making any of the following movements: Fouling or 
crossing a track.
    SJP C-177 (Rev 3/99) Safe Procedure for Backing Vehicle Driver 
Only:
    Step 4. Always look behind you before backing. If you are not 
sure get out and look again.
    Step 5. Avoid backing when possible, pull thru if you can, or 
make a circle wide enough.
    Operating rule 103: When cars are shoved and conditions require, 
a trainman must take a conspicuous position on the leading car. At 
night, the trainman must display a white light.

Recommended Action

    In light of the above discussion and in an effort to maintain 
safety in the Nation's rail yards, FRA recommends that railroads:
    (1) Assess their current rules addressing safety at yard crossings, 
including rules governing shoving and pushing movements and backing 
motor vehicles;
    (2) Review, or amend as necessary, their point protection rules to 
clarify that the person protecting the point visually determine, for 
the duration of the shoving or pushing movement, that the track is 
clear either within the person's range of vision or for the complete 
distance the equipment is to be shoved or pushed, or that other 
safeguards are observed to prevent critical incidents involving shoving 
movements. FRA notes that continuous observation cannot be accomplished 
if the person is also attempting to accomplish other tasks that cause 
the person to divert attention from providing point protection;
    (3) Review their point protection rules and their importance with 
all relevant employees;
    (4) Review their current rules pertaining to employee behavior on 
or about tracks with particular emphasis in yards with all relevant 
employees;
    (5) Address the ability of employees to call for assistance in 
emergency situations through the use of common emergency radio 
frequencies, or by other means; and
    (6) Assess the conspicuity of flat cars and other equipment with 
low profiles and consider measures available to increase their 
visibility when they are the lead car in a shoving movement, especially 
at yard crossings.
    Failure of industry members to take action consistent with the 
preceding recommendations or to take other actions to ensure yard 
safety may result in FRA pursuing other corrective measures under its 
rail safety authority. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 2007-01, 
issue additional safety advisories, or take other appropriate action 
necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's 
railroads.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on January 11, 2007.
Joseph H. Boardman,
Administrator.
 [FR Doc. E7-594 Filed 1-17-07; 8:45 am]
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