[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 247 (Tuesday, December 26, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 77414-77417]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-22026]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-313]
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1; Notice of Consideration of Issuance
of Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License, Proposed No
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a
Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating
License No. DPR-51 issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee),
for operation of the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1), located in
Pope County, Arkansas.
The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS)
3.7.14, ``Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration,'' TS 3.7.15, ``Spent
Fuel Pool Storage,'' and the associated Figure 3.7.15-1, and TS 4.3,
``Fuel Storage,'' and the associated Figure 4.3.1.2-1. In addition,
this amendment would add TS 5.5.17, ``Metamic Coupon Sampling
Program,'' and Surveillance Requirement 3.7.15.2 that directs the
performance of the coupon sampling program.
The proposed TS changes support a modification to the ANO-1 spent
fuel
[[Page 77415]]
pool (SFP) that would utilize Metamic[supreg] poison insert assemblies
(PIAs). In addition to the proposed plant modification, the licensee
would increase the SFP boron concentration and credit boron to ensure
that a 5-percent subcriticality margin is maintained during normal and
accident conditions. This proposed amendment also would increase the
allowable initial fuel assembly uranium-235 (U-235) enrichment from 4.1
weight percent (wt%) to a maximum U-235 enrichment of 4.95 wt%.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in
accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) Involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required
by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Fuel Handling Accidents
The current licensing bases for the dose consequences associate
with a fuel handling accident (FHA), which was performed considering
a maximum U-235 enrichment of 4.95 wt% and a maximum burnup of
60,000 megawatt-days/ton of uranium, does not exceed 25% of 10 CFR
100 limits. The proposed change does not impact the current analysis
and therefore, there is no increase in the dose consequences
associated with a[n] FHA.
The probability of having a[n] FHA has not increased. Although
it could be postulated that a Metamic[supreg] panel could be dropped
during installation, the approximate 50 pound weight of the panel
falling on the racks is bounded by the current fuel assembly drop
analysis.
Criticality Accidents Associated With a Dropped Fuel Assembly
The three fuel assembly drop accidents described below can be
postulated to increase reactivity. However, for these accident
conditions, the double contingency principle of ANS[I] [American
National Standards Institute] N-16.1-1975 is applied. This states
that is is unneccessary to assume two unlikely, independent,
concurrent events to ensure protection against a criticality
accident. Thus, for accident conditions, the presence of soluble
boron in the storage pool water can be assumed as a realistic
initial condition since its absence would be a second unlikely
event.
Three types of drop accidents have been considered: A vertical
drop accident, a horizontal drop accident, and an inadvertent drop
of an assembly between the outside periphery of the rack and the
pool wall. The structural damage to the pool liner, the racks, and
fuel assembly resulting from a dropped fuel assembly striking the
rack, the pool floor, or another assembly located in the racks is
primarily dependent on the mass of the falling object and drop
height. Since these two parameters are not changed by the proposed
modification, the postulated structural damage to these items
remains unchanged. In all cases the proposed TS limit for boron
concentration ensures that a five percent subcriticality margin is
met for the postulated accidents.
Criticality Accidents Associated With a Misplaced Fuel Assembly
The fuel assembly misplacement accident was considered for all
storage configurations. An assembly with high reactivity is assumed
to be placed in a storage location which requires restricted storage
based on initial U-235 loading, cooling time, and burnup. The
presence of boron in the pool water assumed in the analysis has been
shown to offset the worst case reactivity effect of a misplaced fuel
assembly for any configuration. This boron requirement is less than
the boron concentration required by the ANO-1 TS. Thus, a five
percent subcriticality margin is met for postulated accidents, since
any reactivity increase will be much less than the negative worth of
the dissolved boron.
Optimum Moderation Accident
For fuel storage applications in the SFP, water is usually
present. An ``optimum moderation'' accident is not a concern in SFP
storage racks because the rack design prevents the preferential
reduction of water density between the cells of a rack (e.g.,
boiling between cells). In addition, the criticality analysis has
demonstrated that keff [k-effective] will remain less
than 1.0 when the SFP is fully flooded with unborated water.
An ``optimum moderation'' accident in the new fuel vault was
evaluated and the conclusions of that evaluation confirmed that the
reactivity effect is less than the regulatory limit of 0.98 for
keff.
Loss of SFP Cooling
The proposed changes to the ANO-1 SFP racks do not result in
changes to the SFP cooling system and therefore the probability of a
loss of SFP cooling is not increased.
The consequences of a loss of spent fuel pool cooling were
evaluated and found to not involve a significant increase as a
result of the proposed changes. A thermal-hydraulic evaluation for
the loss of SFP cooling was performed. The analysis determined that
the minimum time to boil is more than three hours following a
complete loss of forced cooling. This provides sufficient time for
the operators to restore cooling or establish an alternate means of
cooling before the water shielding above the top of the racks falls
below 10 feet. Therefore, the proposed change represents no increase
in the consequences of loss of pool cooling.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The presence of soluble boron in the pool water assumed in the
criticality analysis is less than the boron concentration required
by the ANO-1 TSs. Thus, a five percent subcriticality margin is met
for postulated accidents, since any reactivity increase will be much
less than the negative worth of the dissolved boron.
No new or different types of fuel assembly drop scenarios are
created by the proposed change. During the installation of the
Metamic[supreg] panels, the possible drop of a panel is bounded by
the current fuel assembly drop analysis. No new or different fuel
assembly misplacement accidents will be created. Administrative
controls currently exist to assist in assuring fuel misplacement
does not occur.
No changes are proposed to the spent fuel pool cooling system or
makeup systems and therefore no new accidents are considered related
to the loss of cooling or makeup capability.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
With the presence of a nominal boron concentration, the SFP
storage racks will be designed to assure a subcritical array with a
five percent subcritical margin (95% probability at the 95%
confidence level). This has been verified by criticality analyses.
Credit for soluble boron in the SFP water is permitted under
accident conditions. The proposed modification that will allow
insertion of Metamic[supreg] poison panels does not result in the
potential of any new misplacement scenarios. Criticality analyses
have been performed to determine the required boron concentration
that would ensure the maximum keff does not exceed 0.95.
The ANO-1 TS for the minimum SFP boron concentration is greater than
that required to ensure keff does not exceed 0.95.
Therefore, the margin of safety defined by taking credit for soluble
boron will be maintained.
The structural analysis of the spent fuel racks along with the
evaluation of the SFP structure indicated that the integrity of
these structures will be maintained with the addition of the PIAs.
The structural requirements were shown to be satisfied, thus the
safety margins were maintained.
[[Page 77416]]
In addition the proposed change includes a coupon sampling
program that will monitor the physical properties of the
Metamic[supreg] absorber material. The monitoring program provides a
method of verifying that the assumptions used in the SFP criticality
analyses remain valid.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result,
for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will
occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rulemaking,
Directives and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services,
Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and
page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also
be delivered to Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to
participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request
for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a
hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in
accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic
Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should
consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition
for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a
presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel,
will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the
Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The name, address and telephone
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the
proceeding on the requestors/petitioner's interest. The petition must
also identify the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner
intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The
petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the
petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion.
The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine
dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact.
Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the
amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner/requestor
who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one
contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment
request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held
would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding
officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition,
request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing
of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii).
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the
Secretary of the
[[Page 77417]]
Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (2) courier,
express mail, and expedited delivery services: Office of the Secretary,
Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications
Staff; (3) e-mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, [email protected]; or (4) facsimile
transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, verification number is (301)
415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to
intervene should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and it
is requested that copies be transmitted either by means of facsimile
transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to [email protected]. A
copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene
should also be sent to Terence A. Burke, Associate General Council--
Nuclear Entergy Services, Inc., 1340 Echelon Parkway, Jackson,
Mississippi 39213, the attorney for the licensee.
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated July 27, 2006, as supplemented by
letters dated October 4 and October 9, 2006, which is available for
public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint
North, File Public Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),
Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from
the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by
telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of December 2006.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Farideh E. Saba,
Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch IV, Division of Operating
Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E6-22026 Filed 12-22-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P