[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 247 (Tuesday, December 26, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 77414-77417]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-22026]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-313]


Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1; Notice of Consideration of Issuance 
of Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating 
License No. DPR-51 issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee), 
for operation of the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1), located in 
Pope County, Arkansas.
    The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 
3.7.14, ``Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration,'' TS 3.7.15, ``Spent 
Fuel Pool Storage,'' and the associated Figure 3.7.15-1, and TS 4.3, 
``Fuel Storage,'' and the associated Figure 4.3.1.2-1. In addition, 
this amendment would add TS 5.5.17, ``Metamic Coupon Sampling 
Program,'' and Surveillance Requirement 3.7.15.2 that directs the 
performance of the coupon sampling program.
    The proposed TS changes support a modification to the ANO-1 spent 
fuel

[[Page 77415]]

pool (SFP) that would utilize Metamic[supreg] poison insert assemblies 
(PIAs). In addition to the proposed plant modification, the licensee 
would increase the SFP boron concentration and credit boron to ensure 
that a 5-percent subcriticality margin is maintained during normal and 
accident conditions. This proposed amendment also would increase the 
allowable initial fuel assembly uranium-235 (U-235) enrichment from 4.1 
weight percent (wt%) to a maximum U-235 enrichment of 4.95 wt%.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in 
accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) Involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required 
by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.

Fuel Handling Accidents

    The current licensing bases for the dose consequences associate 
with a fuel handling accident (FHA), which was performed considering 
a maximum U-235 enrichment of 4.95 wt% and a maximum burnup of 
60,000 megawatt-days/ton of uranium, does not exceed 25% of 10 CFR 
100 limits. The proposed change does not impact the current analysis 
and therefore, there is no increase in the dose consequences 
associated with a[n] FHA.
    The probability of having a[n] FHA has not increased. Although 
it could be postulated that a Metamic[supreg] panel could be dropped 
during installation, the approximate 50 pound weight of the panel 
falling on the racks is bounded by the current fuel assembly drop 
analysis.

Criticality Accidents Associated With a Dropped Fuel Assembly

    The three fuel assembly drop accidents described below can be 
postulated to increase reactivity. However, for these accident 
conditions, the double contingency principle of ANS[I] [American 
National Standards Institute] N-16.1-1975 is applied. This states 
that is is unneccessary to assume two unlikely, independent, 
concurrent events to ensure protection against a criticality 
accident. Thus, for accident conditions, the presence of soluble 
boron in the storage pool water can be assumed as a realistic 
initial condition since its absence would be a second unlikely 
event.
    Three types of drop accidents have been considered: A vertical 
drop accident, a horizontal drop accident, and an inadvertent drop 
of an assembly between the outside periphery of the rack and the 
pool wall. The structural damage to the pool liner, the racks, and 
fuel assembly resulting from a dropped fuel assembly striking the 
rack, the pool floor, or another assembly located in the racks is 
primarily dependent on the mass of the falling object and drop 
height. Since these two parameters are not changed by the proposed 
modification, the postulated structural damage to these items 
remains unchanged. In all cases the proposed TS limit for boron 
concentration ensures that a five percent subcriticality margin is 
met for the postulated accidents.

Criticality Accidents Associated With a Misplaced Fuel Assembly

    The fuel assembly misplacement accident was considered for all 
storage configurations. An assembly with high reactivity is assumed 
to be placed in a storage location which requires restricted storage 
based on initial U-235 loading, cooling time, and burnup. The 
presence of boron in the pool water assumed in the analysis has been 
shown to offset the worst case reactivity effect of a misplaced fuel 
assembly for any configuration. This boron requirement is less than 
the boron concentration required by the ANO-1 TS. Thus, a five 
percent subcriticality margin is met for postulated accidents, since 
any reactivity increase will be much less than the negative worth of 
the dissolved boron.

Optimum Moderation Accident

    For fuel storage applications in the SFP, water is usually 
present. An ``optimum moderation'' accident is not a concern in SFP 
storage racks because the rack design prevents the preferential 
reduction of water density between the cells of a rack (e.g., 
boiling between cells). In addition, the criticality analysis has 
demonstrated that keff [k-effective] will remain less 
than 1.0 when the SFP is fully flooded with unborated water.
    An ``optimum moderation'' accident in the new fuel vault was 
evaluated and the conclusions of that evaluation confirmed that the 
reactivity effect is less than the regulatory limit of 0.98 for 
keff.

Loss of SFP Cooling

    The proposed changes to the ANO-1 SFP racks do not result in 
changes to the SFP cooling system and therefore the probability of a 
loss of SFP cooling is not increased.
    The consequences of a loss of spent fuel pool cooling were 
evaluated and found to not involve a significant increase as a 
result of the proposed changes. A thermal-hydraulic evaluation for 
the loss of SFP cooling was performed. The analysis determined that 
the minimum time to boil is more than three hours following a 
complete loss of forced cooling. This provides sufficient time for 
the operators to restore cooling or establish an alternate means of 
cooling before the water shielding above the top of the racks falls 
below 10 feet. Therefore, the proposed change represents no increase 
in the consequences of loss of pool cooling.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The presence of soluble boron in the pool water assumed in the 
criticality analysis is less than the boron concentration required 
by the ANO-1 TSs. Thus, a five percent subcriticality margin is met 
for postulated accidents, since any reactivity increase will be much 
less than the negative worth of the dissolved boron.
    No new or different types of fuel assembly drop scenarios are 
created by the proposed change. During the installation of the 
Metamic[supreg] panels, the possible drop of a panel is bounded by 
the current fuel assembly drop analysis. No new or different fuel 
assembly misplacement accidents will be created. Administrative 
controls currently exist to assist in assuring fuel misplacement 
does not occur.
    No changes are proposed to the spent fuel pool cooling system or 
makeup systems and therefore no new accidents are considered related 
to the loss of cooling or makeup capability.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    With the presence of a nominal boron concentration, the SFP 
storage racks will be designed to assure a subcritical array with a 
five percent subcritical margin (95% probability at the 95% 
confidence level). This has been verified by criticality analyses.
    Credit for soluble boron in the SFP water is permitted under 
accident conditions. The proposed modification that will allow 
insertion of Metamic[supreg] poison panels does not result in the 
potential of any new misplacement scenarios. Criticality analyses 
have been performed to determine the required boron concentration 
that would ensure the maximum keff does not exceed 0.95. 
The ANO-1 TS for the minimum SFP boron concentration is greater than 
that required to ensure keff does not exceed 0.95. 
Therefore, the margin of safety defined by taking credit for soluble 
boron will be maintained.
    The structural analysis of the spent fuel racks along with the 
evaluation of the SFP structure indicated that the integrity of 
these structures will be maintained with the addition of the PIAs. 
The structural requirements were shown to be satisfied, thus the 
safety margins were maintained.

[[Page 77416]]

    In addition the proposed change includes a coupon sampling 
program that will monitor the physical properties of the 
Metamic[supreg] absorber material. The monitoring program provides a 
method of verifying that the assumptions used in the SFP criticality 
analyses remain valid.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The 
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the 
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day 
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, 
for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the 
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment 
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a 
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after 
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will 
occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rulemaking, 
Directives and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services, 
Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and 
page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also 
be delivered to Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. 
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 
O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the 
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of 
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person 
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to 
participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request 
for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a 
hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in 
accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic 
Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should 
consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the 
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 
O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic 
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition 
for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a 
presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief 
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, 
will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the 
Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following general requirements: (1) The name, address and telephone 
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the 
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the 
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the 
proceeding on the requestors/petitioner's interest. The petition must 
also identify the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor 
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
    Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for 
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner 
intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The 
petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific 
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the 
petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. 
The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine 
dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. 
Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the 
amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if 
proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner/requestor 
who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one 
contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If 
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no 
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment 
request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held 
would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
    Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be 
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding 
officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition, 
request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing 
of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii).
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the 
Secretary of the

[[Page 77417]]

Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (2) courier, 
express mail, and expedited delivery services: Office of the Secretary, 
Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications 
Staff; (3) e-mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, [email protected]; or (4) facsimile 
transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, verification number is (301) 
415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to 
intervene should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and it 
is requested that copies be transmitted either by means of facsimile 
transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to [email protected]. A 
copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene 
should also be sent to Terence A. Burke, Associate General Council--
Nuclear Entergy Services, Inc., 1340 Echelon Parkway, Jackson, 
Mississippi 39213, the attorney for the licensee.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated July 27, 2006, as supplemented by 
letters dated October 4 and October 9, 2006, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint 
North, File Public Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from 
the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web 
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have 
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents 
located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by 
telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of December 2006.
    For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Farideh E. Saba,
Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch IV, Division of Operating 
Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 [FR Doc. E6-22026 Filed 12-22-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P