[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 225 (Wednesday, November 22, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 67582-67599]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-19744]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[AU Docket No. 06-104; Report No. AUC-06-69-B (Auction No. 69); DA 06-
2014]


Auction of 1.4 GHz Band Licenses Scheduled for February 7, 2007; 
Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments 
and Other Procedures for Auction No. 69

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This document announces the procedures and minimum opening 
bids for the upcoming auction of licenses in the paired 1392-1395 MHz 
and 1432-1435 MHz bands, and in the unpaired 1390-1392 MHz band. This 
document is intended to familiarize prospective bidders with the 
procedures and minimum opening bids for this auction.

DATES: Bidding for Auction No. 69 is scheduled to begin on February 7, 
2007.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 
Auctions Spectrum and Access Division: For legal questions: Howard 
Davenport at (202) 418-0660. For general auction questions: Roy Knowles 
or Barbara Sibert at (717) 338-2868.
    Mobility Division: For questions: Erin McGrath or Michael Connelly 
(legal) or Keith Harper (technical) and Bettye Woodward (licensing) at 
(202) 418-

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0620. To request materials in accessible formats (Braille, large print, 
electronic files, audio format) for people with disabilities, send e-
mail to [email protected] or call the Consumer and Governmental Affairs 
Bureau at (202) 418-0530 or (202) 418-0432 (TTY).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 69 
Procedures Public Notice released on November 2, 2006. The complete 
text of the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public Notice, including 
attachments, as well as related Commission documents, are available for 
public inspection and copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time 
(ET) Monday through Thursday or from 8 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on Friday at 
the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., 
Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. The Auction No. 69 Procedures 
Public Notice and related Commission documents may also be purchased 
from the Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, 
Inc. (BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, 
Washington, DC, 20554, telephone 202-488-5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, 
or Web site: http://www.BCPIWEB.com. When ordering documents from BCPI 
please provide the appropriate FCC document number, for example, DA 06-
2014 for the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public Notice. The Auction No. 
69 Procedures Public Notice and related documents are also available on 
the Internet at the Commission's Web site: http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/69/.

I. General Information

A. Introduction

    1. The Federal Communications Commission (Commission) announces the 
procedures and minimum opening bid amounts for the upcoming auction of 
1.4 GHz band licenses in the paired 1392-1395 MHz and 1432-1435 MHz 
bands, and in the unpaired 1390-1392 MHz band scheduled to begin on 
February 7, 2007 (Auction No. 69). On August 28, 2006, the Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau (Bureau) released a public notice seeking 
comment on reserve prices or minimum opening bid amounts and the 
procedures to be used in Auction No. 69 for this spectrum reallocated 
for non-government use to provide fixed and mobile services, except for 
aeronautical mobile services. The Bureau received two comments and no 
reply comments in response to the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice 
71 FR 51817, August 31, 2006.
    2. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau proposed 
to include all 64 1.4 GHz band licenses in a single auction using the 
Commission's standard simultaneous multiple-round (SMR) auction format. 
The Bureau sought comment on the feasibility and desirability of 
allocating the 1.4 GHz band licenses using the Commission's package 
bidding format. Based on the record and the particular circumstances of 
the auction of 1.4 GHz band licenses, the Bureau will include all 64 
1.4 GHz licenses in a single auction using the Commission's standard 
SMR format, as proposed. Package bidding will not be used in Auction 
No. 69.
    3. The Bureau also sought comment in the Auction No. 69 Comment 
Public Notice on whether to implement procedures that would withhold 
certain information on bidder interests, and bidder identities that 
typically has been revealed prior to and during past Commission 
auctions. In particular, the Bureau asked commenters to indicate what 
factors weigh for or against limiting disclosure of bidder interests 
and identities, and whether the Commission should condition the use of 
any disclosure limits on a measure of competition in the auction.
    4. For Auction No. 69, the Bureau will determine the information 
procedures based primarily on the eligibility ratio, a measure of 
likely competition in the auction. The eligibility ratio is defined as 
the total number of bidding units of eligibility purchased by bidders 
through their upfront payments, divided by the total number of bidding 
units for the licenses in the auction. Specifically, if the eligibility 
ratio equals or exceeds three, the Bureau will use the information 
procedures typically used in past FCC auctions, since with sufficient 
likely competition, the anti-competitive behavior that limited 
information procedures aim to deter is unlikely to be successful. If 
the eligibility ratio is less than three, in general the Bureau will 
withhold certain information on bidder interests and bidder identities. 
However, if the eligibility ratio is less than three, the Commission 
reserves the discretion to use information procedures typically used in 
past FCC auctions if circumstances indicate that limited information 
procedures would not be an effective tool for deterring anti-
competitive behavior.
    5. In the event that the conditions described above result in the 
use of procedures under which certain information is withheld, the 
Bureau will release: (1) Each bidder's eligibility and upfront payment 
made prior to the start of the auction; and (2) the amounts of all 
gross bids for each license (including the losing bids) after each 
round, but not the identities of the bidders placing the bids. The 
Bureau believes this provides bidders with information regarding 
license valuations without compromising the goal of reducing the 
potential for anti-competitive outcomes.
    6. Pursuant to these procedures, information on the license 
selections of auction applicants will be withheld, at least until the 
upfront payment deadline has passed and the Commission determines the 
information procedures that will be used for the auction. Therefore, to 
enable applicants to comply with the Commission's anti-collusion rules, 
once the Bureau has conducted its initial review of applications to 
participate in Auction No. 69, each applicant with a short-form 
application to participate in the pending auction will receive a letter 
that lists the applicants in Auction No. 69 that have applied for 
licenses in any of the same geographic areas as the applicant. The list 
will identify the applicants by name but will not provide the license 
selections of the applicants.
    7. Spectrum Relocation Fund. The upper half of paired frequencies 
for 1.4 GHz band licenses, i.e., 1432-1435 MHz, is spectrum covered by 
a Congressional mandate that requires that auction proceeds fund the 
estimated relocation costs of incumbent federal entities and restricts 
the conclusion of an auction of affected spectrum, based on 110 percent 
of the estimated relocation costs. On December 27, 2005, pursuant to 
the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act (CSEA), 71 FR 26245, May 4, 
2006, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) notified the Commission that there are no costs associated with 
relocating federal operations from the 1432-1435 MHz band. Thus, the 
CSEA revenue requirement will not affect the Commission's ability to 
conclude Auction No. 69.
i. Background of Proceeding
    8. In its Report and Order, 67 FR 41847, June 20, 2002, the 
Commission adopted service rules to govern the licensing of the paired 
1392-1395 MHz and 1432-1435 MHz bands, and the unpaired 1390-1392 MHz 
band. The Commission provided for the assignment of the 1390-1392 MHz 
band by Major Economic Areas, and the 1392-1395 MHz and 1432-1435 MHz 
bands by Economic Area Groups (EAGs). Further, the Commission allowed 
open eligibility for initial licenses assigned by geographic area 
licensing, and adopted technical

[[Page 67584]]

standards that were consistent with the part 27 rules and provide 
licensees flexibility. The Commission set a ten-year license term from 
the date of grant. Licensees must demonstrate that they are providing 
substantial service when they file their renewal application. The 
Commission allowed licensees to partition and/or disaggregate their 
licenses and applied the general competitive bidding rules set forth in 
47 CFR part 1, Subpart Q.
ii. Licenses to be Auctioned
    9. Auction No. 69 will offer 64 licenses: 12 Economic Area Grouping 
(EAG) licenses and 52 Major Economic Area (MEA) licenses. A complete 
list of the 1.4 GHz band licenses available in Auction No. 69 is 
included in Attachment A of the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public 
Notice.

B. Rules and Disclaimers

i. Relevant Authority
    10. Prospective applicants must familiarize themselves thoroughly 
with the Commission's general competitive bidding rules set forth in 47 
CFR part 1, including recent amendments and clarifications; rules 
relating to the 1.4 GHz band contained in Title 47 CFR part 27; and 
rules relating to applications, practice and procedure contained in 
Title 47 CFR part 1. Prospective applicants must also be thoroughly 
familiar with the procedures, terms and conditions contained in the 
Auction No. 69 Procedures Public Notice and the Commission's decisions 
in proceedings regarding competitive bidding procedures, application 
requirements, and obligations of Commission licensees.
    11. The procedures, terms and conditions contained in the 
Commission's rules, relevant orders, and public notices are not 
negotiable. The Commission may amend or supplement the information 
contained in its public notices at any time, and will issue public 
notices to convey any new or supplemental information to applicants. It 
is the responsibility of all applicants to remain current with all 
Commission rules and with all public notices pertaining to this 
auction.
ii. Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance with Antitrust Laws
    12. To ensure the competitiveness of the auction process, 47 CFR 
1.2105(c) prohibits applicants competing for licenses in any of the 
same geographic license areas from communicating with each other about 
bids, bidding strategies, or settlements unless such applicants have 
identified each other on their short-form applications (FCC Forms 175) 
as parties with whom they have entered into agreements pursuant to 
Sec.  1.2105(a)(2)(viii). In Auction No. 69, the rule would apply to 
any applicants bidding for the same EAG or MEA. The rule would also 
apply to applicants bidding for licenses in overlapping EAGs and MEAs, 
such as a situation when one applicant applies for an EAG and a second 
applicant applies for a MEA covering any area within that EAG. The rule 
would preclude applicants that apply to bid for all markets from 
communicating with all other applicants. Thus, applicants that have 
applied for the same markets (unless they have identified each other on 
their FCC Form 175 applications as parties with whom they have entered 
into agreements under Sec.  1.2105(a)(2)(viii)) must affirmatively 
avoid all communications with or disclosures to each other that affect 
or have the potential to affect bids or bidding strategy, which may 
include communications regarding the post-auction market structure. 
This prohibition begins at the short-form application filing deadline 
and ends at the down payment deadline after the auction. This 
prohibition applies to all applicants regardless of whether such 
applicants become qualified bidders or actually bid.
    13. For purposes of this prohibition, Sec.  1.2105(c)(7)(i) defines 
applicant as including all officers and directors of the entity 
submitting a short-form application to participate in the auction, all 
controlling interests of that entity, as well as all holders of 
partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest 
amounting to 10 percent or more of the entity, or outstanding stock, or 
outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting a short-form 
application.
    14. Applicants for licenses for any of the same geographic license 
areas must not communicate directly or indirectly about bids or bidding 
strategy. Accordingly, such applicants are encouraged not to use the 
same individual as an authorized bidder. A violation of the anti-
collusion rule could occur if an individual acts as the authorized 
bidder for two or more competing applicants, and conveys information 
concerning the substance of bids or bidding strategies between such 
applicants. Also, if the authorized bidders are different individuals 
employed by the same organization a violation similarly could occur. In 
such a case, at a minimum, applicants should certify on their 
applications that precautionary steps have been taken to prevent 
communication between authorized bidders and that applicants and their 
bidding agents will comply with the anti-collusion rule. A violation of 
the anti-collusion rule could occur in other contexts, such as an 
individual serving as an officer for two or more applicants. Moreover, 
the Commission has found a violation of the anti-collusion rule where a 
bidder used the Commission's bidding system to disclose its bidding 
strategy in a manner that explicitly invited other auction participants 
to cooperate and collaborate in specific markets, and has placed 
auction participants on notice that the use of its bidding system to 
disclose market information to competitors will not be tolerated and 
will subject bidders to sanctions. Bidders are cautioned that the 
Commission remains vigilant about prohibited communications taking 
place in other situations. The Commission has warned that prohibited 
communications concerning bids and bidding strategies may include 
communications regarding capital calls or requests for additional funds 
in support of bids or bidding strategies to the extent such 
communications convey information concerning the bids and bidding 
strategies directly or indirectly. Applicants are hereby placed on 
notice that public disclosure of information relating to bidder 
interests and bidder identities that typically has been revealed prior 
to and during past Commission auctions, but is confidential in this 
auction at the time of disclosure, may violate the anti-collusion rule. 
Thus, communication by an applicant to another applicant for one or 
more of the same licenses of the applicant's license selections on its 
short-form application, or of the fact that the applicant does nor does 
not hold provisionally winning bids on particular licenses, may well 
violate the anti-collusion rule. Bidders should use caution in their 
dealings with other individuals, such as members of the press, 
financial analysts, or others who might become a conduit for the 
communication of prohibited bidding information. For example, where 
limited information disclosure procedures are in place, as in this 
auction, an applicant's statement to the press that it has lost bidding 
eligibility and stopped bidding in the auction could give rise to a 
finding of an anti-collusion violation.
    15. The Commission's rules do not prohibit applicants from entering 
into otherwise lawful bidding agreements before filing their short-form 
applications, as long as they disclose the existence of the 
agreement(s) in their

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short-form application. If parties agree in principle on all material 
terms prior to the short-form filing deadline, each party to the 
agreement must identify the other party or parties to the agreement on 
its short-form application under Sec.  1.2105(c), even if the agreement 
has not been reduced to writing. If the parties have not agreed in 
principle by the short-form filing deadline, they should not include 
the names of parties to discussions on their applications, and they may 
not continue negotiations, discussions or communications with any other 
applicants after the short-form filing deadline.
    16. By electronically submitting its short-form application, each 
applicant certifies its compliance with Sec.  1.2105(c). However, the 
Bureau caution that merely filing a certifying statement as part of an 
application will not outweigh specific evidence that collusive behavior 
has occurred, nor will it preclude the initiation of an investigation 
when warranted. Any applicant found to have violated the anti-collusion 
rule may be subject to sanctions.
    17. Applicants are also reminded that, regardless of compliance 
with the Commission's rules, they remain subject to the antitrust laws. 
Compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Commission's anti-
collusion rule will not insulate a party from enforcement of the 
antitrust laws. To the extent the Commission becomes aware of specific 
allegations that may give rise to violations of the federal antitrust 
laws the Commission may refer such allegations to the United States 
Department of Justice for investigation. If an applicant is found to 
have violated the antitrust laws or the Commission's rules in 
connection with its participation in the competitive bidding process, 
it may be subject to forfeiture of its upfront payment, down payment, 
or full bid amount and may be prohibited from participating in future 
auctions, among other sanctions.
    18. As required by 47 CFR 1.65, an applicant must maintain the 
accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its pending 
application and must notify the Commission within 30 days of any 
substantial change that may be of decisional significance to that 
application. Thus, Sec.  1.65 requires an auction applicant to notify 
the Commission of any substantial change to the information or 
certifications included in its pending short-form application. 
Applicants are therefore required by Sec.  1.65 to report to the 
Commission any communications they have made to or received from 
another applicant after the short-form filing deadline that affect or 
have the potential to affect bids or bidding strategy unless such 
communications are made to or received from parties to agreements 
identified under Sec.  1.2105(a)(2)(viii). In addition, Sec.  
1.2105(c)(6) provides that any applicant that makes or receives a 
communication prohibited by Sec.  1.2105(c) must report such 
communication to the Commission in writing immediately, and in no case 
later than five business days after the communication occurs.
    19. As required by 47 CFR 1.2107(d), applicants that are winning 
bidders will be required to disclose in their long-form applications 
the specific terms, conditions, and parties involved in any bidding 
consortia, joint ventures, partnerships, agreements and other 
arrangements entered into relating to the competitive bidding process.
 iii. Protection of Incumbent Government and Non-Government Operations
    20. Potential applicants are advised that there are several 
government operations that will continue to operate in these bands.
    21. The 1390-1392 MHz Band. Radio astronomy observations may be 
assigned in the 1350-1400 MHz band on an unprotected basis at the 16 
radio astronomy observatories identified at 47 CFR 2.106 note US311. In 
the 1390-1400 MHz band, government operations authorized as of March 
22, 1995, at the 17 sites identified at 47 CFR 2.106 note US351 will 
continue to operate on a fully protected basis until January 1, 2009. 
All other government operations, except for medical telemetry (1395-
1400 MHz), will operate on a non-interference basis to authorized non-
Government operations and shall not hinder implementation of any non-
Government operations.
    22. The 1392-1395 MHz and 1432-1435 MHz Bands. Radio astronomy 
observations may be assigned in the 1350-1400 MHz band on an 
unprotected basis at the 16 radio astronomy observatories identified at 
47 CFR 2.106 note US311. In the 1390-1400 MHz band, government 
operations authorized as of March 22, 1995, at the 17 sites identified 
at 47 CFR 2.106 note US351 will continue to operate on a fully 
protected basis until January 1, 2009. All other government operations, 
except for medical telemetry (1395-1400 MHz), will operate on a non-
interference basis to authorized non-Government operations and shall 
not hinder implementation of any non-Government operations. In the 
1432-1435 MHz band, government stations in the fixed and mobile 
services may operate indefinitely on a primary basis at the 23 sites 
identified at 47 CFR 2.106 note US361. All other Government stations in 
the fixed and mobile services shall operate on a primary basis until 
re-accommodated in accordance with the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 1999.
    a. International Coordination.
    23. Operations in the paired 1392-1395 MHz and 1432-1435 MHz bands 
and in the unpaired 1390-1392 MHz band must not cause harmful 
interference across the borders with Mexico and Canada. Until such time 
as agreements between the United States, Mexico and Canada become 
effective, the same technical restrictions at the border that are 
adopted for operation between geographic service areas will apply, to 
the extent they are not in violation of current bilateral agreements 
and arrangements. When interim arrangements or agreements between the 
United States, Mexico and Canada are final and become effective, 
licensees in the paired 1392-1395 MHz and 1432-1435 MHz bands and in 
the unpaired 1390-1392 MHz band must comply with these agreements. In 
addition, if these agreements are modified in the future, licensees in 
the paired 1392-1395 MHz and 1432-1435 MHz bands and in the unpaired 
1390-1392 MHz band must comply with these modifications. Current 
agreements and coordination arrangements between the United States and 
Canada or Mexico may be found on the Commission's Web site under http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sand/agree/welcome.html.
    b. Quiet Zones.
    24. As specified at 47 CFR 1.924, 1.4 GHz Band licensees must 
protect the radio quiet zones set forth in the Commission's rules. 
Licensees are cautioned that they must receive the appropriate 
approvals directly from the relevant quiet zone entity prior to 
operating within the areas described in the Commission's rules.
iv. Due Diligence
    25. The Bureau cautions potential applicants formulating their 
bidding strategies to investigate and consider the extent to which 1.4 
GHz band frequencies are occupied. Applicants and their investors 
should also understand that Commission rules and requirements place 
limitations on the ability of 1.4 GHz band licensees to use this 
spectrum. Government and non-government incumbent operations in the 1.4 
GHz band must be protected. These limitations may restrict the ability 
of 1.4 GHz band geographic area licensees to use certain portions of 
the electromagnetic spectrum or provide service to certain areas in 
their

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geographic license areas. Bidders should become familiar with the 
status of these operations, applicable Commission rules, orders and any 
pending proceedings related to the service, in order to make reasoned, 
appropriate decisions about their participation in Auction No. 69 and 
their bidding strategy.
    26. 1.4 GHz band licensees must comply with the pertinent rule 
sections set forth in 47 CFR part 27. Potential bidders should be aware 
that as part of the 2007 World Radio Communications Conference, WRC-07, 
NTIA has proposed more stringent out-of-band emission limits than 
presently specified in 47 CFR 27.53(i) in the bands 1350-1400 MHz and 
1427-1452 MHz. The potential for stricter emission limits could impact 
the operations in these bands.
    27. Potential bidders are reminded that they are solely responsible 
for investigating and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors 
that may have a bearing on the value of the 1.4 GHz band licenses in 
this auction. The FCC makes no representations or warranties about the 
use of this spectrum for particular services. Applicants should be 
aware that an FCC auction represents an opportunity to become an FCC 
licensee in the 1.4 GHz band subject to certain conditions and 
regulations. An FCC auction does not constitute an endorsement by the 
FCC of any particular service, technology, or product, nor does an FCC 
license constitute a guarantee of business success. Applicants should 
perform their individual due diligence before proceeding as they would 
with any new business venture.
    28. Potential bidders are strongly encouraged to conduct their own 
research prior to the beginning of bidding in Auction No. 69 in order 
to determine the existence of any pending administrative or judicial 
proceedings that might affect their decision regarding participation in 
the auction. Participants in Auction No. 69 are strongly encouraged to 
continue such research throughout the auction. In addition, potential 
bidders should perform technical analyses sufficient to assure 
themselves that, should they prevail in competitive bidding for a 
specific license, they will be able to build and operate facilities 
that will fully comply with the Commission's technical and legal 
requirements.
    29. Applicants should also be aware that certain pending and future 
proceedings, including applications (including those for modification), 
petitions for rulemaking, requests for special temporary authority, 
waiver requests, petitions to deny, petitions for reconsideration, 
informal oppositions, and applications for review, before the 
Commission may relate to particular applicants or incumbent licensees 
or the licenses available in Auction No. 69. In addition, pending and 
future judicial proceedings may relate to particular applicants or 
incumbent licensees, or the licenses available in Auction No. 69. 
Prospective bidders are responsible for assessing the likelihood of the 
various possible outcomes, and considering their potential impact on 
spectrum licenses available in this auction.
    30. Applicants should perform due diligence to identify and 
consider all proceedings that may affect the spectrum licenses being 
auctioned and that could have an impact on the availability of spectrum 
for Auction No. 69. In addition, although the Commission may continue 
to act on various pending applications, informal objections, petitions, 
and other requests for Commission relief, some of these matters may not 
be resolved by the beginning of bidding in the auction.
    31. Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated 
risks and for investigating and evaluating the degrees to which such 
matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make 
use of licenses available in Auction No. 69. Potential applicants are 
strongly encouraged to physically inspect any prospective sites located 
in, or near, the service area for which they plan to bid, and also to 
familiarize themselves with environmental review obligations.
    32. Applicants may obtain information about non-Federal Government 
incumbent licenses that may have an effect on availability of licenses 
in Auction No. 69 through the Bureau's licensing databases at http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls.
    33. The Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding 
the accuracy or completeness of information in its databases or any 
third party databases. To the extent the Commission's databases may not 
include all information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant, 
applicants may obtain or verify such information from independent 
sources or assume the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said 
databases. Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations or 
guarantees regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that 
has been provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into its 
databases.
v. Use of Integrated Spectrum Auction System
    34. The Commission will make available a browser-based bidding 
system to allow bidders to participate in Auction No. 69 over the 
Internet using the Commission's Integrated Spectrum Auction System 
(ISAS or FCC Auction System). The Commission makes no warranty 
whatsoever with respect to the FCC Auction System. In no event shall 
the Commission, or any of its officers, employees or agents, be liable 
for any damages whatsoever (including, but not limited to, loss of 
business profits, business interruption, loss of business information, 
or any other loss) arising out of or relating to the existence, 
furnishing, functioning or use of the FCC Auction System that is 
accessible to qualified bidders in connection with this auction. 
Moreover, no obligation or liability will arise out of the Commission's 
technical, programming or other advice or service provided in 
connection with the FCC Auction System.
vi. Bidder Alerts
    35. As is the case with many business investment opportunities, 
some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use Auction No. 69 to 
deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Information about deceptive 
telemarketing investment schemes is available from the Commission as 
well as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Complaints about specific deceptive 
telemarketing investment schemes should be directed to the FTC, the 
SEC, or the National Fraud Information Center.
vii. Environmental Review Requirements
    36. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules regarding 
implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act and other 
federal environmental statutes. The construction of a wireless antenna 
facility is a federal action and the licensee must comply with the 
Commission's environmental rules for each such facility. The 
Commission's environmental rules require, among other things, that the 
licensee consult with expert agencies having environmental 
responsibilities, including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
State Historic Preservation Office, the Army Corps of Engineers and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (through the local authority with 
jurisdiction over floodplains). In assessing the effect of facilities

[[Page 67587]]

construction on historic properties, the licensee must follow the 
provisions of the Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the 
Section 106 National Historic Preservation Act Review Process, 47 CFR 
part 1, Appendix C. The licensee must prepare environmental assessments 
for facilities that may have a significant impact in or on wilderness 
areas, wildlife preserves, threatened or endangered species or 
designated critical habitats, historical or archaeological sites, 
Indian religious sites, floodplains, and surface features. The licensee 
also must prepare environmental assessments for facilities that include 
high intensity white lights in residential neighborhoods or excessive 
radio frequency emission.

C. Auction Specifics

i. Auction Date
    37. Bidding in Auction No. 69 will begin on Wednesday, February 7, 
2007. The initial schedule for bidding will be announced by public 
notice at least one week before the start of the auction. Unless 
otherwise announced, bidding on all licenses will be conducted on each 
business day until bidding has stopped on all licenses.
ii. Auction Title
    38. Auction No. 69--1.4 GHz band
iii. Bidding Methodology
    39. As discussed in more detail below, the bidding methodology for 
Auction No. 69 will be simultaneous multiple round bidding. The 
Commission will conduct this auction over the Internet using the FCC 
Auction System, and telephonic bidding will be available as well. 
Qualified bidders are permitted to bid electronically via the Internet 
or by telephone. All telephone calls are recorded.
iv. Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines
    40. Dates and Deadlines.

Auction Seminar November 29, 2006
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Opens--November 29, 
2006; 12 noon ET.
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Deadline--December 
11, 2006; 6 p.m. ET.
Upfront Payments (via wire transfer)--January 12, 2007; 6 p.m. ET.
Mock Auction--February 5, 2007.
Auction Begins--February 7, 2007.
v. Requirements for Participation
    41. Those wishing to participate in the auction must: (1) Submit a 
short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6 p.m. 
Eastern Time (ET), December 11, 2006, following the electronic filing 
procedures set forth in Attachment C to the Auction No. 69 Procedures 
Public Notice; (2) submit a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC 
Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159) by 6 p.m. ET, January 12, 2007; 
and (3) comply with all provisions outlined in the Auction No. 69 
Procedures Public Notice and applicable Commission rules.

II. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Requirements

    42. An application to participate in an FCC auction provides 
information used in determining whether the applicant is legally, 
technically, and financially qualified to participate in Commission 
auctions for licenses or permits. The short-form application is the 
first part of the Commission's two-phased auction application process. 
In the first phase of this process, parties desiring to participate in 
the auction file streamlined, short-form applications in which they 
certify under penalty of perjury as to their qualifications. 
Eligibility to participate in bidding is based on the applicants' 
short-form applications and certifications as well as their upfront 
payments. In the second phase of the process, winning bidders file a 
more comprehensive long-form application.
    43. Entities seeking licenses available in Auction No. 69 must file 
a short-form application electronically via the FCC Auction System 
prior to 6 p.m. ET on December 11, 2006, following the procedures 
prescribed in Attachment C of the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public 
Notice. If an applicant claims eligibility for a bidding credit, the 
information provided in its FCC Form 175 will be used in determining 
whether the applicant is eligible for the claimed bidding credit. 
Applicants bear full responsibility for submitting accurate, complete 
and timely short-form applications. All applicants must certify on 
their short-form applications under penalty of perjury that they are 
legally, technically, financially and otherwise qualified to hold a 
license. Applicants should read the instructions set forth in 
Attachment C carefully and should consult the Commission's rules to 
ensure that, in addition to the materials described below, all the 
information that is required under the Commission's rules is included 
with their short-form applications.
    44. An entity may not submit more than one short-form application 
for a single auction. In the event that a party submits multiple short-
form applications, only one application will be accepted for filing.
    45. Applicants also should note that submission of a short-form 
application constitutes a representation by the certifying official 
that he or she is an authorized representative of the applicant, that 
he or she has read the form's instructions and certifications, and that 
the contents of the application, its certifications, and any 
attachments are true and correct. Applicants are not permitted to make 
major modifications to their applications; such impermissible changes 
include a change of the certifying official to the application. 
Submission of a false certification to the Commission may result in 
penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license forfeitures, 
ineligibility to participate in future auctions, and/or criminal 
prosecution.

A. Preferences for Small Businesses and Others

i. Size Standards for Bidding Credits
    46. A bidding credit represents the amount by which a bidder's 
winning bid will be discounted. For Auction No. 69, bidding credits 
will be available to small businesses and very small businesses, and 
consortia thereof, as follows: (1) A bidder with attributed average 
annual gross revenues that exceed $15 million and do not exceed $40 
million for the preceding three years (small business) will receive a 
15 percent discount on its winning bid; and (2) a bidder with 
attributed average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $15 million 
for the preceding three years (very small business) will receive a 25 
percent discount on its winning bid. Bidding credits are not 
cumulative; a qualifying applicant receives either the 15 percent or 25 
percent bidding credit on its winning bid, but not both.
    47. Every applicant that claims eligibility for a bidding credit as 
either a small business or a very small business, or a consortium of 
small businesses or very small businesses, will be required to provide 
information regarding revenues attributable to the applicant, its 
affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its 
controlling interests on its FCC Form 175 short-form application to 
establish that it satisfies the applicable eligibility requirement. 
Applicants claiming eligibility as a designated entity in Auction No. 
69 should review carefully the CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM, 71 
FR 6992, February 10, 2006, and the Designated Entity Second Report and 
Order, 71 FR 26245, May 4, 2006. In that connection, the Commission 
adopted rules governing eligibility for designated entity benefits

[[Page 67588]]

in the Designated Entity Second Report and Order. The Commission's new 
rules regarding applicants seeking eligibility for designated entity 
benefits requires the disclosure of a list of all parties with which 
the applicant has entered into arrangements for the lease or resale 
(including wholesale agreements) of any of the capacity of any of the 
applicant's spectrum; and a list, separately and in the aggregate, of 
the gross revenues of entities with which the applicant has an 
attributable material relationship, as defined in 47 CFR 
1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(B). Certain otherwise attributable material 
relationships may not be attributable pursuant to the provisions of 47 
CFR 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(C)(2).
ii. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit
    48. To encourage the growth of wireless services in federally 
recognized tribal lands, the Commission has implemented a tribal lands 
bidding credit.
iii. Installment Payments
    49. Installment payment plans will not be available in Auction No. 
69.

B. License Selection

    50. In Auction No. 69, applicants must select the licenses on which 
they want to bid from the eligible licenses list. In Auction No. 69, 
the FCC Form 175 will include a filtering mechanism that allows an 
applicant to filter the available licenses. The applicant will make 
selections for one or more of the filter criteria and the system will 
produce a list of licenses satisfying the specified criteria. The 
applicant may select all the licenses in the customized list or select 
individual licenses from the list. Applicants also will be able to 
select licenses from one customized list and then create additional 
customized lists to select additional licenses. There will be no 
opportunity to change license selection after the short-form filing 
deadline. It is critically important that an applicant confirm its 
license selections before submitting its short-form application because 
the FCC Auction System will not accept bids on licenses that an 
applicant has not selected on its FCC Form 175.

C. Disclosure of Bidding Arrangements

    51. Applicants will be required to identify in their short-form 
applications all parties with whom they have entered into any 
agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind relating to the 
licenses being auctioned, including any agreements relating to post-
auction market structure. Applicants also will be required to certify 
under penalty of perjury in their short-form applications that they 
have not entered and will not enter into any explicit or implicit 
agreements, arrangements or understandings of any kind with any 
parties, other than those identified in the application, regarding the 
amount of their bids, bidding strategies, or the particular licenses on 
which they will or will not bid. If an applicant has had discussions, 
but has not reached a joint bidding agreement by the short-form 
application filing deadline, it would not include the names of parties 
to the discussions on its application and may not continue such 
discussions with any applicants after the deadline.
    52. After the filing of short-form applications, the Commission's 
rules do not prohibit a party holding a non-controlling, attributable 
interest in one applicant from acquiring an ownership interest in or 
entering into a joint bidding arrangement with other applicants 
provided that (i) the attributable interest holder certifies that it 
has not and will not communicate with any party concerning the bids or 
bidding strategies of more than one of the applicants in which it holds 
an attributable interest, or with which it has entered into a joint 
bidding arrangement; and (ii) the arrangements do not result in a 
change in control of any of the applicants. While the anti-collusion 
rules do not prohibit non-auction-related business negotiations among 
auction applicants, applicants are reminded that certain discussions or 
exchanges could touch upon impermissible subject matters because they 
may convey pricing information and bidding strategies. Further, 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Commission's anti-
collusion rule will not insulate a party from enforcement of the 
antitrust laws.

D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements

    53. All applicants must comply with the uniform part 1 ownership 
disclosure standards and provide information required by 47 CFR 1.2105 
and 1.2112. Specifically, in completing the short-form application, 
applicants will be required to fully disclose information on the real 
party or parties-in-interest and ownership structure of the applicant. 
The ownership disclosure standards for the short form are prescribed in 
Sec. Sec.  1.2105 and 1.2112. Each applicant is responsible for 
information submitted in its short-form application being complete and 
accurate.
    54. An applicant's most current ownership information on file with 
the Commission, if in an electronic format compatible with the short-
form application (FCC Form 175) (such as information submitted in an 
on-line FCC Form 602 or in an FCC Form 175 filed for a previous auction 
using ISAS) will automatically be entered into the applicant's short-
form application. Applicants are responsible for ensuring that the 
information submitted in their FCC Form 175 for Auction No. 69 is 
complete and accurate. Accordingly, applicants should carefully review 
any information automatically entered to confirm that it is complete 
and accurate as of the deadline for filing the short-form application. 
Applicants can update any information that was entered automatically 
and needs to be changed directly in the short-form application.

E. Bidding Credit Revenue Disclosures

    55. To determine which applicants qualify for bidding credits as 
small businesses or very small businesses, the Commission considers the 
gross revenues of the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling 
interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests. Therefore, 
entities applying to bid as small businesses or very small businesses 
(or consortia of small businesses or very small businesses) will be 
required to disclose on their FCC Form 175 short-form applications the 
gross revenues of each of the following for the preceding three years: 
(1) The applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its controlling interests, 
and (4) the affiliates of its controlling interests. Certification that 
the average annual gross revenues of such entities and individuals for 
the preceding three years do not exceed the applicable limit is not 
sufficient. In order to comply with the Commission's disclosure 
requirements for bidding credit eligibility, an applicant must provide 
separately for itself, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and 
the affiliates of its controlling interests, the gross revenues for 
each of the preceding three years. If the applicant is applying as a 
consortium of small businesses or very small businesses, this 
information must be provided for each consortium member.
    56. Controlling interests of an applicant include individuals and 
entities with either de facto or de jure control of the applicant. 
Typically, ownership of at least 50.1 percent of an entity's voting 
stock evidences de jure control. De facto control is determined on a 
case-by-case basis. The following are some common indicia of de facto 
control: (1) The entity constitutes or appoints more than 50 percent of 
the board of directors or management committee; (2) the entity has 
authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire senior executives that 
control the day-to-day activities of the licensee; and (3)

[[Page 67589]]

the entity plays an integral role in management decisions.
    57. Officers and directors of an applicant are also considered to 
have controlling interest in the applicant. The Commission does not 
impose specific equity requirements on controlling interest holders. 
Once the principals or entities with a controlling interest are 
determined, only the revenues of those principals or entities, the 
affiliates of those principals or entities, and the applicant and its 
affiliates will be counted in determining small business eligibility.
    58. In recent years the Commission has made modifications to its 
rules governing the attribution of gross revenues for purposes of 
determining small business eligibility. These changes include exempting 
the gross revenues of the affiliates of a rural telephone cooperative's 
officers and directors from attribution to the applicant if certain 
specified conditions are met. The Commission has also clarified that, 
in calculating an applicant's gross revenues under the controlling 
interest standard, it will not attribute the personal net worth, 
including personal income, of its officers and directors to the 
applicant. However, to the extent that the officers and directors of 
the applicant are controlling interest holders of other entities, the 
gross revenues of those entities will be attributed to the applicant.
    59. A consortium of small businesses or very small businesses is a 
conglomerate organization composed of two or more entities, each of 
which individually satisfies the definition of a small business or very 
small business as those terms are defined in the service-specific 
rules. Thus, each member of a consortium of small or very small 
businesses that applies to participate in Auction No. 69 must 
individually meet the definition of small business or very small 
business adopted by the Commission for the 1.4 GHz band. Each 
consortium member must disclose its gross revenues along with those of 
its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its 
controlling interests. Although the gross revenues of the consortium 
members will not be aggregated for purposes of determining the 
consortium's eligibility as a small business or very small business, 
this information must be provided to ensure that each individual 
consortium member qualifies for any bidding credit awarded to the 
consortium. Significantly, the CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order modified 
the procedure by which a consortium that is a winning bidder will apply 
for a license. Applicants applying as consortia should review that 
order, as well as 47 CFR 1.2107(g) and 1.2110(b)(3), for this license 
application procedure.

F. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters

    60. Each applicant must state under penalty of perjury on its 
short-form application whether or not the applicant, its affiliates, 
its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling 
interests, as defined by 47 CFR 1.2110, have ever been in default on 
any Commission license or have ever been delinquent on any non-tax debt 
owed to any Federal agency. In addition, each applicant must certify 
under penalty of perjury on its short-form application that as of the 
short-form filing deadline, the applicant, its affiliates, its 
controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests, 
as defined by Sec.  1.2110, are not in default on any payment for a 
Commission license (including downpayments) and that they are not 
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency. Prospective 
applicants are reminded that submission of a false certification to the 
Commission is a serious matter that may result in severe penalties, 
including monetary forfeitures, license revocations, exclusion from 
participation in future auctions, and/or criminal prosecution.
    61. Former defaulters--i.e., applicants, including any of their 
affiliates, any of their controlling interests, or any of the 
affiliates of its controlling interests, that in the past have 
defaulted on any Commission license or been delinquent on any non-tax 
debt owed to any Federal agency, but that have since remedied all such 
defaults and cured all of their outstanding non-tax delinquencies--are 
eligible to bid in Auction No. 69, provided that they are otherwise 
qualified. However, former defaulters are required to pay upfront 
payments that are fifty percent more than the normal upfront payment 
amounts.
    62. Current defaulters--i.e., applicants, including any of their 
affiliates, any of their controlling interests, or any of the 
affiliates of their controlling interests, that are in default on any 
payment for any Commission license (including downpayments) or are 
delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency as of the 
filing deadline for applications to participate in this auction--are 
not eligible to bid in Auction No. 69.
    63. Applicants are encouraged to review the Bureau's previous 
guidance on default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the 
context of the short-form application process. For example, it has been 
determined that to the extent that Commission rules permit late payment 
of regulatory or application fees accompanied by late fees, such debts 
will become delinquent for purposes of 47 CFR 1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a) 
only after the expiration of a final payment deadline. Therefore, with 
respect to regulatory or application fees, the provisions of Sec. Sec.  
1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a) regarding default and delinquency in connection 
with competitive bidding are limited to circumstances in which the 
relevant party has not complied with a final Commission payment 
deadline. However, even where Commission rules expressly permit late 
payment subject to payment of an additional late fee, and do not impose 
a final payment deadline, the Commission may in some cases issue a 
demand for payment by a date certain. Failure to comply with the terms 
of a particular demand letter in the time period provided may render 
the subject debt delinquent, notwithstanding rules generally permitting 
late payments.
    64. The Commission considers outstanding debts owed to the United 
States Government, in any amount, to be a serious matter. The 
Commission adopted rules, including a provision referred to as the red 
light rule, that implement the Commission's obligations under the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act of 1996, which governs the collection of 
claims owed to the United States. Under the red light rule, the 
Commission will not process applications and other requests for 
benefits filed by parties that have outstanding debts owed to the 
Commission. In the same rulemaking order, the Commission explicitly 
declared, however, that the Commission's competitive bidding rules are 
not affected by the red light rule. As a consequence, the Commission's 
adoption of the red light rule does not alter the applicability of any 
of the Commission's competitive bidding rules, including the provisions 
and certifications of Sec. Sec.  1.2105 and 1.2106, with regard to 
current and former defaults or delinquencies. Applicants are reminded, 
however, that the Commission's Red Light Display System, which provides 
information regarding debts owed to the Commission, may not be 
determinative of an auction applicant's ability to comply with the 
default and delinquency disclosure requirements of Sec.  1.2105. Thus, 
while the red light rule ultimately may prevent the processing of long-
form applications by auction winners, an auction applicant's red light

[[Page 67590]]

status is not necessarily determinative of its eligibility to 
participate in this auction or of its upfront payment obligation.
    65. Prospective applicants in Auction No. 69 should note that any 
long-form applications filed after the close of competitive bidding 
will be reviewed for compliance with the Commission's red light rule, 
and such review may result in the dismissal of a winning bidder's long-
form application. Applicants that have their long-form applications 
dismissed will be deemed to have defaulted and will be subject to 
default payments under 47 CFR 1.2104(g) and 1.2109(c).

G. Other Information

    66. Applicants owned by member of minority groups and/or women, as 
defined in Sec.  1.2110(c)(3), may identify themselves in filling out 
their short-form applications regarding this status. This applicant 
status information is collected for statistical purposes only and 
assists the Commission in monitoring the participation in its auctions 
of designated entities, which include rural telephone companies.

H. Minor Modifications to Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 175)

    67. As of the deadline for filing short-form applications (FCC 
Forms 175) at 6:00 p.m. ET on December 11, 2006, applicants are 
permitted to make only minor changes to their applications. Applicants 
are not permitted to make major modifications to their applications 
(e.g., change their license selections, change control of the 
applicant, change the certifying official, or claim eligibility for a 
higher bidding credit). Permissible minor changes include deletion and 
addition of authorized bidders and revision of addresses and telephone 
numbers of the applicants and their contact persons.
    68. Any application amendment and related statements of fact must 
be certified by: (1) The applicant, if the applicant is an individual, 
(2) one of the partners if the applicant is a partnership, (3) an 
officer, director, or duly authorized employee, if the applicant is a 
corporation, (4) by a member who is an officer, if the applicant is an 
unincorporated association, (5) the trustee if the applicant is an 
amateur radio service club, or (6) a duly elected or appointed official 
who is authorized to make such certifications under the laws of the 
applicable jurisdiction, if the applicant is a governmental entity.
    69. An applicant must make permissible minor changes to its short-
form application as such changes are defined by 47 CFR 1.2105(b), 
electronically, using the FCC Auction System. Applicants must click on 
the Submit button in the FCC Auction System for the changes to be 
submitted and considered by the Commission. Note: After the filing 
window has closed, the auction system will not permit applicants to 
make certain changes, such as legal classification, and bidding credit.
    70. In addition, an applicant should submit a letter briefly 
summarizing the changes and subsequently update their short-form 
applications in ISAS as soon as possible. Any letter describing changes 
to an applicant's short-form application should be submitted by 
electronic mail to the following address: [email protected]. The 
electronic mail summarizing the changes must include a subject or 
caption referring to Auction No. 69 and the name of the applicant. The 
Bureau requests that parties format any attachments to electronic mail 
as Adobe [supreg] Acrobat [supreg] (pdf) or Microsoft [supreg] Word 
documents.
    71. Applicants must not submit application-specific material 
through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS), which 
was used for submitting comments regarding Auction No. 69 procedures.

I. Maintaining Current Information in Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 
175)

    72. Section 1.65 of the Commission's rules requires an applicant to 
maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its 
pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days of any 
substantial change that may be of decisional significance to that 
application. Changes that cause a loss of or reduction in eligibility 
for a bidding credit must be reported immediately. If an amendment 
reporting substantial changes is a major amendment, as defined by 47 
CFR 1.2105, the amendment will not be accepted and may result in the 
dismissal of the short-form application.
    73. After the short-form filing deadline, applicants may make only 
minor changes to their FCC Form 175 applications. Applicants must click 
on the SUBMIT button in the FCC Auction System for the changes to be 
submitted and considered by the Commission. In addition, applicants 
must submit a letter, briefly summarizing the changes, by electronic 
mail at the following address: [email protected]. The electronic mail 
summarizing the changes must include a subject or caption referring to 
Auction No. 69 and the name of the applicant. The Bureau requests that 
parties format any attachments to electronic mail as Adobe [supreg] 
Acrobat [supreg] (pdf) or Microsoft [supreg] Word documents.
    74. Applicants must not submit application-specific material 
through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS) into 
the record of the proceeding concerning Auction No. 69 procedures.

III. Pre-Auction Procedures

A. Auction Seminar--November 29, 2006

    75. On Wednesday, November 29, 2006, the FCC will sponsor a free 
seminar for parties interested in participating in Auction No. 69 at 
the FCC headquarters, located at 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC. 
The seminar will provide attendees with information about pre-auction 
procedures, completing FCC Form 175, auction conduct, the FCC Auction 
System, auction rules, and the 1.4 GHz band rules. The seminar will 
also provide an opportunity for prospective bidders to ask questions of 
FCC staff concerning the auction, auction procedures, filing 
requirements and other matters related to this auction.
    76. To register, please provide the information listed on 
Attachment B of the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public Notice by Monday, 
November 27, 2006. Registrations are accepted on a first-come, first-
served basis.
    77. For individuals who are unable to attend, an Audio/Video 
webcast of this seminar will be available from the FCC's Auction No. 69 
Web page at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/69/.

B. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)--Due Prior to 6 p.m. ET on 
December 11, 2006

    78. In order to be eligible to bid in this auction, applicants must 
first submit an FCC Form 175 application electronically via the FCC 
Auction System. This application must be received at the Commission 
prior to 6 p.m. ET on December 11, 2006. Late applications will not be 
accepted. There is no application fee required when filing an FCC Form 
175. However, to be eligible to bid, an applicant must submit an 
upfront payment.
    79. Applications may generally be filed at any time beginning at 
noon ET on November 29, 2006, and the filing window will close at 6 
p.m. ET on December 11, 2006. Applicants are strongly encouraged to 
file early and are responsible for allowing adequate time for filing 
their applications. Applicants may update or amend their applications 
multiple times until the filing deadline on December 11, 2006.

[[Page 67591]]

    80. Applicants must always click on the SUBMIT button on the 
Certify & Submit screen of the electronic form to successfully submit 
their FCC Form 175's or modifications. Any form that is not submitted 
will not be reviewed by the FCC. Information about accessing, 
completing, and viewing the FCC Form 175 is included in Attachment C of 
the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public Notice. FCC Auctions Technical 
Support is available.

C. Application Processing and Minor Corrections

    81. After the deadline for filing the FCC Form 175 applications has 
passed, the FCC will process all timely submitted applications to 
determine which are acceptable for filing, and subsequently will issue 
a public notice identifying: (1) Those applications accepted for 
filing; (2) those applications rejected; and (3) those applications 
which have minor defects that may be corrected, and the deadline for 
resubmitting corrected applications.
    82. After the short-form filing deadline on December 11, 2006, 
applicants may make only minor corrections to their FCC Form 175 
applications. Applicants will not be permitted to make major 
modifications to their applications (e.g., change their license 
selections, change control of the applicant, change certifying 
official, or claim eligibility for a higher bidding credit).

D. Upfront Payments--Due January 12, 2007

    83. In order to be eligible to bid in the auction, applicants must 
submit an upfront payment accompanied by an FCC Remittance Advice Form 
(FCC Form 159). After completing the FCC Form 175, filers will have 
access to an electronic version of the FCC Form 159 that can be printed 
and sent by facsimile to Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, PA. All upfront 
payments must be received in the proper account at Mellon Bank by 6 
p.m. ET on January 12, 2007.
i. Making Auction Payments by Wire Transfer
    84. Wire transfer payments must be received by 6 p.m. ET on January 
12, 2007. To avoid untimely payments, applicants should discuss 
arrangements (including bank closing schedules) with their banker 
several days before they plan to make the wire transfer, and allow 
sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and completed before 
the deadline.
    85. At least one hour before placing the order for the wire 
transfer (but on the same business day), applicants must send by 
facsimile a completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to Mellon Bank at 
(412) 209-6045. On the facsimile cover sheet, the applicant must write 
Wire Transfer--Auction Payment for Auction No. 69. In order to meet the 
Commission's upfront payment deadline, an applicant's payment must be 
credited to the Commission's account before the deadline. Applicants 
are responsible for obtaining confirmation from their financial 
institution that Mellon Bank has timely received their upfront payment 
and deposited it in the proper account.
    86. Please note that: (1) All payments must be made in U.S. 
dollars; (2) all payments must be made by wire transfer; (3) upfront 
payments for Auction No. 69 go to a lockbox number different from the 
lockboxes used in previous FCC auctions, and different from the lockbox 
number to be used for post-auction payments; and (4) failure to deliver 
the upfront payment by the January 12, 2007 deadline, will result in 
dismissal of the application and disqualification from participation in 
the auction.
ii. FCC Form 159
    87. A completed FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159, Revised 
2/03) must be sent by facsimile to Mellon Bank to accompany each 
upfront payment. Proper completion of FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) is 
critical to ensuring correct crediting of upfront payments. Detailed 
instructions for completion of FCC Form 159 are included in Attachment 
D of the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public Notice. The FCC Form 159 can 
be completed electronically, but must be filed with Mellon Bank via 
facsimile.
iii. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
    88. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that the amount of the upfront payment would determine a 
bidder's initial bidding eligibility, the maximum number of bidding 
units on which a bidder may place bids. In order to bid on a license, 
otherwise qualified bidders that selected that license on Form 175 must 
have a current eligibility level that meets or exceeds the number of 
bidding units assigned to that license. At a minimum, therefore, an 
applicant's total upfront payment must be enough to establish 
eligibility to bid on at least one of the licenses selected on its Form 
175, or else the applicant will not be eligible to participate in the 
auction. An applicant does not have to make an upfront payment to cover 
all licenses the applicant selected on its Form 175, but rather to 
cover the maximum number of bidding units that are associated with 
licenses on which the bidder wishes to place bids and hold 
provisionally winning bids at any given time. Provisionally winning 
bids are bids that would become final winning bids if the auction were 
to close after the given round.
    89. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to calculate upfront payments for Auction No. 69 on a license-
by-license basis using the following formula:
    $0.005 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per 
license. The Bureau set forth the specific upfront payments and bidding 
units for each license in Attachment A of the Auction No. 69 Comment 
Public Notice and sought comment on this proposal. The Bureau received 
no comments in response to the proposed upfront payments. The specific 
upfront payments and bidding units for each license are set forth in 
Attachment A of the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public Notice.
    90. Applicants must make upfront payments sufficient to obtain 
bidding eligibility on the licenses on which they will bid. In 
calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant should determine 
the maximum number of bidding units on which it may wish to be active 
(bid on or hold provisionally winning bids on) in any single round, and 
submit an upfront payment amount covering that number of bidding units. 
In order to make this calculation, an applicant should add together the 
upfront payments for all licenses on which it seeks to be active in any 
given round. Applicants should check their calculations carefully, as 
there is no provision for increasing a bidder's eligibility after the 
upfront payment deadline. In some cases, a qualified bidder's maximum 
eligibility may be less than the amount of its upfront payment because 
the qualified bidder, pursuant to 47 CFR 1.2106(a), has either 
previously been in default on a Commission license or delinquent on a 
non-tax debt owed to a Federal agency, or has submitted an upfront 
payment that exceeds the total amount of bidding units associated with 
the licenses the applicant selected on its FCC Form 175 application.
    91. In the Part 1 Fifth Report and Order, 65 FR 52323, August 29, 
2000, the Commission ordered that applicants that are former defaulters 
be required to pay upfront payments 50 percent greater than non-former 
defaulters. For purposes of this calculation, the applicant includes 
the applicant itself, its affiliates, its controlling interests,

[[Page 67592]]

and affiliates of its controlling interests, as defined by 47 CFR 
1.2110. Accordingly, former defaulters should calculate their upfront 
payment for all licenses by multiplying the number of bidding units on 
which they wish to be active by 1.5. In order to calculate the number 
of bidding units to assign to former defaulters, the Commission will 
divide the upfront payment received by 1.5 and round the result up to 
the nearest bidding unit. If a former defaulter fails to submit a 
sufficient upfront payment to establish eligibility to bid on at least 
one of the licenses applied for on its Form 175, the applicant will not 
be eligible to participate in the auction.
    92.
iii. Applicant's Wire Transfer Information for Purposes of Refunds of 
Upfront Payments
    93. To ensure that refunds of upfront payments are processed in an 
expeditious manner, the Commission is requesting that all pertinent 
information as specified in the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public Notice 
be supplied to the FCC. For example, the Commission must be provided 
with a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) before it can disburse 
refunds. Applicants can provide the information electronically during 
the initial short-form application filing window after the form has 
been submitted. (Applicants are reminded that information submitted as 
part of an FCC Form 175 will be available to the public; for that 
reason, wire transfer information should not be included in an FCC Form 
175.) Wire Transfer Instructions can also be manually sent by facsimile 
to the FCC, Financial Operations Center, Auctions Accounting Group, 
ATTN: Gail Glasser. All refunds will be returned to the payer of record 
as identified on the FCC Form 159 unless the payer submits written 
authorization instructing otherwise.

E. Auction Registration

    94. Approximately ten days before the auction, the FCC will issue a 
public notice announcing all qualified bidders for the auction. 
Qualified bidders are those applicants whose FCC Form 175 applications 
have been accepted for filing and have timely submitted upfront 
payments sufficient to make them eligible to bid.
    95. All qualified bidders are automatically registered for the 
auction. Registration materials will be distributed prior to the 
auction by overnight mail. The mailing will be sent only to the contact 
person at the contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 and will 
include the SecurID [supreg] cards that will be required to place bids, 
the Integrated Spectrum Auction System (ISAS) Bidder's Guide, and the 
Auction Bidder Line phone number.
    96. Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration mailing 
will not be able to submit bids. Therefore, any qualified bidder that 
has not received this mailing by noon on Thursday, February 1, 2007, 
should call (717) 338-2868. Receipt of this registration mailing is 
critical to participating in the auction, and each applicant is 
responsible for ensuring it has received all of the registration 
material.
    97. In the event that SecurID [supreg] cards are lost or damaged, 
only a person who has been designated as an authorized bidder, the 
contact person, or the certifying official on the applicant's short-
form application may request replacement registration material. 
Qualified bidders requiring the replacement of these items must call 
Technical Support.

F. Remote Electronic Bidding

    98. The Commission will conduct this auction over the Internet, and 
telephonic bidding will be available as well. Qualified bidders are 
permitted to bid electronically and telephonically. Each applicant 
should indicate its bidding preference--electronic or telephonic--on 
the FCC Form 175. In either case, each authorized bidder must have its 
own SecurID [supreg] card, which the FCC will provide at no charge. 
Each applicant with one authorized bidder will be issued two SecurID 
cards, while applicants with two or three authorized bidders will be 
issued three cards. For security purposes, the SecurID [supreg] cards, 
the telephonic bidding telephone number, and the Integrated Spectrum 
Auction System (ISAS) Bidder's Guide are only mailed to the contact 
person at the contact address listed on the FCC Form 175. Please note 
that each SecurID [supreg] card is tailored to a specific auction; 
therefore, SecurID [supreg] cards issued for other auctions or obtained 
from a source other than the FCC will not work for Auction No. 69.

G. Mock Auction--February 5, 2007

    99. All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a mock 
auction on Monday, February 5, 2007. The mock auction will enable 
applicants to become familiar with the FCC Auction System prior to the 
auction. Participation by all bidders is strongly recommended. Details 
will be announced by public notice.

IV. Auction Event

    100. The first round of bidding for Auction No. 69 will begin on 
Wednesday, February 7, 2007. The initial bidding schedule will be 
announced in a public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is to 
be released approximately 10 days before the start of the auction.

A. Auction Structure

i. Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction
    101. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to auction all 1.4 GHz band licenses in a single auction using 
the Commission's standard simultaneous multiple-round (SMR) auction 
format. This type of auction offers every license for bid at the same 
time and consists of successive bidding rounds in which eligible 
bidders may place bids on individual licenses. A bidder may bid on, and 
potentially win, any number of licenses. Typically, bidding remains 
open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license, unless a 
modified stopping rule is invoked.
    102. The Bureau also sought comment on using a simultaneous 
multiple-round with package bidding (SMR-PB) format for Auction No. 69. 
A commenter advocated in its brief comments that the Bureau employ 
package bidding because bidders likely will wish to aggregate licenses 
to put together nationwide coverage or coverage of substantial parts of 
the country. However, the SMR format addresses such a need to aggregate 
spectrum licenses. The Bureau does not believe that the circumstances 
of Auction No. 69 present significant conflicting complementarities 
that could weigh more strongly in favor of package bidding.
    103. Two comments were filed suggesting that package bidding be 
used and recommending modifications to the SMR-PB format as programmed 
in the FCC Auction System, noting that the current package bidding 
format may be too complex. The Bureau is not persuaded that the 
economic characteristics of the 1.4 GHz Band weigh in favor of package 
bidding and therefore, the Bureau will not use an SMR-PB format for 
Auction No. 69. As a result, the Bureau did not address the specifics 
of the SMR-PB format in the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public Notice.
    104. The Bureau concludes that the standard SMR auction format will 
meet the needs of bidders in Auction No. 69, and the Bureau adopted its 
proposal to use a simultaneous multiple-round auction format without 
package bidding. Unless otherwise announced, bids will be accepted on 
all licenses in each round of the auction until bidding stops

[[Page 67593]]

on every license. This approach, the Bureau believes, allows bidders to 
take advantage of synergies that exist among licenses.
ii. Information Available to Bidders Before and During the Auction
    105. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau sought 
comment on whether to implement procedures that would limit the 
disclosure of information on bidder interests and identities relative 
to the information procedures that have typically been used for 
Commission auctions. In that connection, the Bureau sought comment on 
whether technological considerations or the likely level of competition 
in Auction No. 69 weigh in favor of or against limiting the disclosure 
of information on bidder interests and identities relative to most past 
Commission spectrum auctions, or whether the Commission should 
condition the implementation of such limits on a measure of the 
competitiveness of the auction, such as the eligibility ratio or a 
modified version of the eligibility ratio. The Bureau received no 
comments on this issue.
    106. Although the Commission has the option to limit the 
availability of information on an auction-by-auction basis, in the 
past, the Commission generally has elected not to limit such 
information. However, as discussed by the Commission in connection with 
Auction No. 66, there are potential harms as well as benefits from 
publicly revealing all information during the auction process. The 
potential harms from anti-competitive behavior facilitated by the 
release of certain information are likely to be greater when the 
auction is less competitive--that is, when the number of bidders and 
the level of upfront payments are relatively low compared to the number 
of licenses offered. Therefore, for Auction No. 69, the Bureau will use 
limited information procedures if it appears likely that the 
competitiveness of the auction will be low, and if the Bureau believes 
that limited information procedures will be effective in making anti-
competitive behavior less likely to be successful. Alternatively, if 
the Bureau determines that the auction is likely to be sufficiently 
competitive, and therefore, that the risk of successful collusion is 
low, the Bureau will make available bidding information that the Bureau 
typically has made available in previous Commission auctions.
    107. Specifically, the Bureau will estimate the likely level of 
competition in the auction by considering the eligibility ratio, 
defined as the total number of bidding units of eligibility purchased 
by bidders through their upfront payments divided by the total number 
of bidding units for the licenses in the auction. If the eligibility 
ratio equals or exceeds three, the Bureau will use the information 
procedures typically used in past FCC auctions. If the eligibility 
ratio is less than three, in general the Bureau will withhold certain 
information on bidder interests and bidder identities.
    108. However, if the eligibility ratio is less than three, the 
Bureau reserves the discretion to use information procedures typically 
used in past FCC auctions if circumstances indicate that limited 
information procedures would not be an effective tool for deterring 
anti-competitive behavior. The Bureau anticipates announcing the 
information disclosure procedures to be used at or about the time that 
the Bureau releases a public notice announcing the applicants that are 
qualified to participate in the bidding.
    109. If it is determined that limited information procedures will 
be used, the Bureau will make available prior to the auction the total 
eligibility level for the auction as well as the eligibility of each 
bidder, but will not identify bidders' license selections. After each 
round of bidding, the amounts of each bid placed will be made 
available, but not the identities of the bidders. This information will 
give bidders an indication of demand for the licenses, so that bidders 
and their investors will be able to assess whether their bids are 
likely to be consistent with the valuations of other bidders, 
mitigating fear of the winner's curse. In addition, after each round 
bidders logged in to the FCC Auction System will be able to access 
reports indicating whether their own bids are provisionally winning.
    110. Other Issues. The Bureau does not believe that the information 
disclosure procedures established for this auction will interfere with 
the administration of or compliance with the Commission's anti-
collusion rule, 47 CFR 1.2105(c). In Auction No. 69, the Commission 
will not disclose information regarding license selection at least 
until the upfront payment deadline has passed and the Commission 
determines the information disclosure procedures to be used for the 
auction. The Commission will disclose the other portions of applicants' 
short-form applications, through its on-line database and certain 
application-based information through public notices. Thus, even 
without information regarding license selection, applicants would be 
able to comply with Sec.  1.2105(c) by not disclosing bids or bidding 
strategies to any other applicants in the auction. This approach, 
however, could inhibit otherwise lawful communications with applicants 
for licenses in other geographic license areas, which the Commission's 
rule permits. Consequently, the Bureau will notify separately each 
applicant with short-form applications to participate in a pending 
auction, including but not limited to Auction No. 69, whether 
applicants in Auction No. 69 have applied for licenses in any of the 
same geographic areas as that applicant. Specifically, after the Bureau 
conducts its initial review of applications to participate in Auction 
No. 69, each applicant with a short-form application to participate in 
a pending auction will receive a letter that lists the applicants in 
Auction No. 69 that have applied for licenses in any of the same 
geographic areas as the applicant. The list will identify the Auction 
No. 69 applicant(s) by name but will not list the license selections of 
the Auction No. 69 applicant(s).
    111. For purposes of the anti-collusion rule, the term applicant is 
defined in 47 CFR 1.2105(c)(7) to include all controlling interests, 
all parties with ownership interests greater than 10%, and all officers 
and directors of the applicant. As in past auctions, additional 
information regarding applicants in Auction No. 69 that is needed to 
comply with Sec.  1.2105(c), such as, the identifies of controlling 
interests in the applicant and ownership interests greater than 10%, 
will be available through the publicly accessible on-line short-for 
application database.
iii. Eligibility and Activity Rules
    112. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder 
would determine the initial (maximum) eligibility (as measured in 
bidding units) for each bidder. The Bureau received no comments on this 
issue.
    113. The Bureau adopted the proposed use of upfront payments to 
determine initial (maximum) eligibility (as measured in bidding units) 
for Auction No. 69. The amount of the upfront payment submitted by a 
bidder determines initial bidding eligibility, the maximum number of 
bidding units on which a bidder may be active. Each license is assigned 
a specific number of bidding units equal to the upfront payment listed 
in Attachment A of the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public Notice on a 
bidding unit per dollar basis. Bidding units for a given license do not 
change as prices rise during the

[[Page 67594]]

auction. A bidder's upfront payment is not attributed to specific 
licenses. Rather, a bidder may place bids on any of the licenses 
selected on its FCC Form 175 as long as the total number of bidding 
units associated with those licenses does not exceed its current 
eligibility. Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction; it can 
only remain the same or decrease. Thus, in calculating its upfront 
payment amount, an applicant must determine the maximum number of 
bidding units it may wish to bid on or hold provisionally winning bids 
on in any single round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering 
that total number of bidding units. The total upfront payment does not 
affect the total dollar amount a bidder may bid on any given license.
    114. In order to ensure that an auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively 
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction 
before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a specific 
percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of 
the auction.
    115. A bidder's activity level in a round is the sum of the bidding 
units associated with licenses on which the bidder is active. A bidder 
is considered active on a license in the current round if it is either 
the provisionally winning bidder at the end of the previous bidding 
round and does not withdraw the provisionally winning bid in the 
current round, or if it submits a bid in the current round. The minimum 
required activity is expressed as a percentage of the bidder's current 
eligibility, and increases by stage as the auction progresses. Because 
these procedures have proven successful in maintaining the pace of 
previous auctions, the Bureau adopted them for Auction No. 69. Failure 
to maintain the requisite activity level will result in the use of an 
activity rule waiver, if any remain, or a reduction in the bidder's 
eligibility, possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder's ability to 
place bids in the auction.
iv. Auction Stages
    116. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to conduct the auction in two stages and employ an activity 
rule. The Bureau further proposed that, in each round of Stage One, a 
bidder desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility would be 
required to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of 
its current bidding eligibility. Finally, the Bureau proposed that in 
each round of Stage Two, a bidder desiring to maintain its current 
bidding eligibility would be required to be active on at least 95 
percent of its current bidding eligibility. The Bureau received no 
comments on this proposal.
    117. The Bureau adopted its proposals for the activity rules and 
stages. As explained further in the Auction No. 69 Procedures Public 
Notice, during Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will 
be calculated by multiplying the bidder's current round activity (the 
sum of bidding units of the bidder's provisionally winning bids and 
bids during the current round) by five-fourths (5/4). During Stage Two, 
reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by 
multiplying the bidder's current round activity (the sum of bidding 
units of the bidder's provisionally winning bids and bids during the 
current round) by twenty-nineteenths (20/19). Because the procedures 
have proven successful in maintaining the proper pace in previous 
auctions, the Bureau adopted them for Auction No. 69.
    118. Because activity requirements increase in Stage Two, bidders 
must check carefully their activity during the first round following a 
stage transition to ensure that they are meeting the increased activity 
requirements. This is especially critical for bidders that have 
provisionally winning bids and do not plan to submit new bids. In past 
auctions, some bidders have lost bidding eligibility inadvertently or 
used an activity rule waiver because they did not re-verify their 
activity status at stage transitions. Bidders may check their activity 
against the required activity level by logging into the FCC Auction 
System.
v. Stage Transitions
    119. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that the auction would generally advance to the next stage 
(i.e., from Stage One to Stage Two) when the auction activity level, as 
measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving new provisionally 
winning bids, is approximately 20 percent or lower for three 
consecutive rounds of bidding. The Bureau further proposed that the 
Bureau would retain the discretion to change stages unilaterally by 
announcement during the auction. This determination, the Bureau 
proposed, would be based on a variety of measures of bidder activity, 
including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the 
percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there 
are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in 
revenue. The Bureau received no comments on this issue. The Bureau 
believes that these stage transition rules, having proven successful in 
prior auctions, are appropriate for use in Auction No. 69. The Bureau 
adopted its proposal. Thus, the auction will start in Stage One and 
will generally advance to Stage Two when, in each of three consecutive 
rounds of bidding, the provisionally winning bids have been placed on 
20 percent or less of the licenses being auctioned (as measured in 
bidding units). (However, the stage of the auction does not affect the 
auction stopping rules; the auction may conclude in Stage One.) The 
Bureau will retain the discretion to regulate the pace of the auction 
by announcement.
vi. Activity Rule Waivers
    120. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that each bidder in the auction be provided with three 
activity rule waivers. The Bureau received no comments on this issue. 
The Bureau is satisfied that providing three waivers over the course of 
the auction will give bidders a sufficient number of waivers and 
flexibility, while also safeguarding the integrity of the auction. 
Therefore, the Bureau adopted its proposal that each bidder be provided 
three activity rule waivers.
    121. Bidders may use an activity rule waiver in any round during 
the course of the auction. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the 
bidder's current bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in 
the current round being below the required minimum activity level. An 
activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of bidding and not to a 
particular license. Activity rule waivers can be either applied 
proactively by the bidder (a proactive waiver) or applied automatically 
by the FCC Auction System (an automatic waiver) and are principally a 
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of bidding 
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from 
placing a bid in a particular round.
    122. The FCC Auction System assumes that bidder with insufficient 
activity would prefer to apply an activity rule waiver (if available) 
rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will 
automatically apply a waiver at the end of any bidding round where a 
bidder's activity level is below the minimum required unless: (1) There 
are no activity rule waivers available; or (2) the bidder overrides the 
automatic application of a waiver by reducing eligibility. If a bidder 
has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy the activity requirement, 
the FCC Auction

[[Page 67595]]

System will permanently reduce the bidder's eligibility, possibly 
curtailing or eliminating the bidder's ability to place additional bids 
in the auction.
    123. A bidder with insufficient activity that wants to reduce its 
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver must 
affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the 
bidding round by using the reduce eligibility function in the FCC 
Auction System. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is permanently 
reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the activity rules. 
Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to 
regain its lost bidding eligibility even if the round has not yet 
closed.
    124. Finally, a bidder may apply an activity rule waiver 
proactively as a means to keep the auction open without placing a bid. 
If a bidder proactively applies an activity waiver during a bidding 
round in which no bids or withdrawals are submitted, the auction will 
remain open and the bidder's eligibility will be preserved. However, an 
automatic waiver applied by the FCC Auction System in a round in which 
there are no new bids, withdrawals, or proactive waivers will not keep 
the auction open. A bidder cannot submit a proactive waiver after 
submitting a bid in a round, and submitting a proactive waiver will 
preclude a bidder from placing any bids in that round. Applying a 
waiver is irreversible; once a proactive waiver is submitted that 
waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if the round has not yet closed.
vii. Auction Stopping Rules
    125. For Auction No. 69, the Bureau proposed to employ a 
simultaneous stopping rule approach. The Bureau also sought comment on 
a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule (modified stopping 
rule). The modified stopping rule would close the auction for all 
licenses after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, 
places a withdrawal, or submits any new bids on any license on which it 
is not the provisionally winning bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding 
activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it is the 
provisionally winning bidder would not keep the auction open under this 
modified stopping rule.
    126. The Bureau further proposed retaining the discretion to keep 
the auction open even if no new bids or proactive waivers are submitted 
and no provisionally winning bids are withdrawn in a round. In this 
event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had applied a waiver. 
Thus, the activity rule will apply as usual, and a bidder with 
insufficient activity will either use an activity rule waiver (if it 
has any left) or lose bidding eligibility.
    127. In addition, the Bureau proposed that it reserve the right to 
declare that the auction will end after a specified number of 
additional rounds (special stopping rule). If the Bureau invokes this 
special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final 
round(s) and the auction will close.
    128. The Bureau proposed to exercise these options only in 
circumstances such as where the auction is proceeding very slowly, 
where there is minimal overall bidding activity or where it appears 
likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of 
time.
    129. The Bureau believes that the proposed stopping rules are 
appropriate for Auction No. 69, because experience in prior auctions 
demonstrates that these stopping rules balance interests of 
administrative efficiency and maximum bidder participation. The Bureau 
received no comments concerning the auction stopping rules. Therefore 
the Bureau adopted the stopping rule proposals made in the Auction No. 
69 Comment Public Notice. Auction No. 69 will begin under the 
simultaneous stopping rule approach, and the Bureau will retain the 
discretion to employ the other versions of the stopping rule. Moreover, 
the Bureau will retain the discretion to use the modified stopping rule 
with or without prior announcement during the auction.
viii. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
    130. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that, by public notice or by announcement during the auction, 
the Bureau may delay, suspend, or cancel the auction in the event of 
natural disaster, technical obstacle, evidence of an auction security 
breach, unlawful bidding activity, administrative or weather necessity, 
or for any other reason that affects the fair conduct of competitive 
bidding. The Bureau received no comment on this issue.
    131. Because the Bureau's approach to notification of delay during 
an auction has proven effective in resolving exigent circumstances in 
previous auctions, the Bureau adopted its proposals regarding auction 
delay, suspension, or cancellation. The Bureau, in its sole discretion, 
may elect to resume the auction starting from the beginning of the 
current round, resume the auction starting from some previous round, or 
cancel the auction in its entirety. The Bureau emphasizes that exercise 
of this authority is solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and 
its use is not intended to be a substitute for situations in which 
bidders may wish to apply their activity rule waivers.

B. Bidding Procedures

i. Round Structure
    132. The initial schedule of bidding rounds will be announced in 
the public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is released 
approximately 10 days before the start of the auction. Each bidding 
round is followed by the release of round results. Multiple bidding 
rounds may be conducted in a given day.
    133. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in 
order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the 
bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding 
strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for 
the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day, 
depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors.
ii. Reserve Price and Minimum Opening Bids
    a. Reserve Price.
    134. Congress recently required the Commission to revise existing 
regulations regarding reserve prices for auctions involving eligible 
frequencies subject to CSEA. CSEA defines eligible frequencies as 
including frequencies from 1432-1435 MHz. Thus, twelve 1.4 GHz band 
licenses authorize use of frequencies half of which are subject to CSEA 
requirements. In CSEA, Congress directed the Commission to make 
revisions that would prescribe methods by which the total cash proceeds 
from any auction of licenses authorizing use of eligible frequencies 
shall equal at least 110 percent of the total estimated relocation 
costs provided to the Commission pursuant to CSEA. Accordingly, the 
Commission recently revised its reserve price rule.
    135. CSEA also imposes other related requirements regarding the 
proceeds from an auction involving eligible frequencies. Pursuant to 
CSEA, the total cash proceeds attributable to eligible spectrum must be 
at least 110 percent of the total estimated relocation costs before the 
Commission may conclude the auction. If this condition is not met, CSEA 
requires that the Commission shall cancel the auction. Finally, in 
CSEA, Congress also directed that cash proceeds attributable to the 
auction of any eligible frequencies * * * shall be deposited in the 
Spectrum Relocation Fund created by CSEA. Pursuant to CSEA, on December 
27, 2005, NTIA notified the Commission that there are

[[Page 67596]]

no costs associated with relocating federal operations from the 1432-
1435 MHz band. Accordingly, a reserve price will not be used for this 
auction to cover relocation costs under CSEA.
    b. Minimum Opening Bids.
    136. The Bureau proposed in the Auction No. 69 Comment Public 
Notice to establish minimum opening bids for each license, while 
retaining discretion to lower the minimum opening bids. Specifically, 
for Auction No. 69, the Bureau proposed the following formula for 
calculating license-by-license minimum opening bids:
    $0.005 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per 
license. The Bureau sought comment on this proposal and, in the 
alternative, whether, the public interest would be served by having no 
minimum opening bid.
    137. In Commission auctions, minimum opening bids are intended to 
serve as useful starting points for bidding. Minimum opening bids are 
not intended to be estimates of final auction prices or to reflect all 
differences between license values. Accordingly, differences in license 
characteristics, such as population density, that may result in 
different final prices do not always necessitate different minimum 
opening bids for the licenses.
    138. A commenter proposed that the minimum opening bids should be 
reduced substantially, claiming that the proposed minimum opening bids 
do not take into account the amount of spectrum being auctioned. The 
commenter asserted that the proposed minimum opening bid levels are 
relatively high as compared with other auctions and will discourage 
bidders from participating. The commenter further suggested the value 
of this spectrum is constrained by other factors, such as the need to 
protect the radioastronomy service. Finally, the commenter argues that 
the proposed minimum opening bids for this auction are higher than 
those used for the auction of Multiple Address Systems spectrum 
(Auction No. 59), which, in the commenter's view, is more valuable 
spectrum than the 1.4 GHz band licenses offered here. The Bureau, 
however, was not persuaded that the commenter's comparison is apt in 
that it compares two completely different services with different 
bandwidth, geographic areas and band plans. The Bureau continued to 
believe that the previously-proposed minimum opening bids for this 
auction are reasonable. Accordingly, the Bureau adopted its proposal 
and set the minimum opening bids using the proposed formula of $0.005 * 
MHz * license area population.
    139. The Bureau did not receive any comments addressing its 
proposal that it retain the discretion to reduce minimum opening bid 
amounts. The Bureau adopted this proposal. The minimum opening bid 
amounts adopted for Auction No. 69 are reducible at the discretion of 
the Bureau. The Bureau emphasized, however, that such discretion will 
be exercised, if at all, sparingly and early in the auction, i.e., 
before bidders lose all activity waivers. During the course of the 
auction, the Bureau will not entertain requests to reduce the minimum 
opening bid amount on specific licenses. The Bureau noted further that 
effectively the minimum opening bids operate as reserve prices.
    140. The specific minimum opening bid amounts for each license 
available in Auction No. 69 calculated pursuant to the procedure 
describe above are set forth in Attachment A of the Auction No. 69 
Procedures Public Notice.
iii. Bid Amounts
    141. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed that in each round, eligible bidders be able to place a bid on 
a given license in any of nine different amounts, if the bidder has 
sufficient eligibility to place a bid on the particular license. Under 
the proposal, the FCC Auction System interface will list the nine 
acceptable bid amounts for each license, unless rounding produces 
duplicate bid amounts. The Bureau received no comment on this issue. 
Based on experience in prior auctions, the Bureau adopted its proposals 
for Auction No. 69.
    142. The first of the nine acceptable bid amounts is called the 
minimum acceptable bid amount. The minimum acceptable bid amount for a 
license will be equal to its minimum opening bid amount until there is 
a provisionally winning bid for the license. After there is a 
provisionally winning bid for a license, the minimum acceptable bid 
amount for that license will be equal to the amount of the 
provisionally winning bid plus a percentage of that bid amount 
calculated using the specified formula. In general, the percentage will 
be higher for a license receiving many bids than for a license 
receiving few bids. In the case of a license for which the 
provisionally winning bid has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable 
bid amount will equal the second highest bid received for the license.
    143. The percentage of the provisionally winning bid used to 
establish the minimum acceptable bid amount (the additional percentage) 
is calculated at the end of each round, based on an activity index 
which is a weighted average of the number of bids in that round and the 
activity index from the prior round. (Because there is no prior round, 
for Round 1 calculations, the activity index from the prior round is 
zero.) Specifically, the activity index is equal to a weighting factor 
times the number of bids on the license in the most recent bidding 
round plus one minus the weighting factor times the activity index from 
the prior round. The additional percentage is determined as one plus 
the activity index times a minimum percentage amount, with the result 
not to exceed a given maximum. The additional percentage is then 
multiplied by the provisionally winning bid amount to obtain the 
minimum acceptable bid for the next round. The Commission will 
initially set the weighting factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage at 
0.1 (10%), and the maximum percentage at 0.2 (20%). Hence, at these 
initial settings, the minimum acceptable bid for a license will be 
between 10% and 20% higher than the provisionally winning bid, 
depending upon the bidding activity for the license. Equations and 
examples are shown in Attachment E of the Auction No. 69 Procedures 
Public Notice.
    144. The eight additional bid amounts are calculated using the 
minimum acceptable bid amount and a bid increment percentage. The first 
additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable bid 
amount times one plus the bid increment percentage, rounded. If, for 
example, the bid increment percentage is 5 percent, the calculation is 
(minimum acceptable bid amount) * (1 + 0.05), rounded, or (minimum 
acceptable bid amount) * 1.05, rounded; the second additional 
acceptable bid amount equals the minimum acceptable bid amount times 
one plus two times the bid increment percentage, rounded, or (minimum 
acceptable bid amount) * 1.1, rounded; the third additional acceptable 
bid amount equals the minimum acceptable bid amount times one plus 
three times the bid increment percentage, rounded, or (minimum 
acceptable bid amount) * 1.15, rounded; etc. The Bureau will round the 
results of these calculations, as well as the calculations to determine 
the minimum acceptable bid amounts, using its standard rounding 
procedures. For Auction No. 69, the Bureau proposed to use a bid 
increment percentage of 5 percent to calculate the eight additional 
acceptable bid amounts. The Bureau received no comment on this issue 
and will begin the auction

[[Page 67597]]

with a bid increment percentage of 5 percent.
    145. The Bureau did not receive any comments on its proposal to 
retain the discretion to change the minimum acceptable bid amounts, the 
parameters of the formula to determine the percentage of the 
provisionally winning bid used to determine the minimum acceptable bid, 
and the bid increment percentage if it determines that circumstances so 
dictate. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the FCC Auction 
System during the auction if circumstances warrant. The Bureau adopted 
this proposal.
iv. Provisionally Winning Bids
    146. At the end of each bidding round, a provisionally winning bid 
will be determined based on the highest bid amount received for each 
license. A provisionally winning bid will remain the provisionally 
winning bid until there is a higher bid on the same license at the 
close of a subsequent round. Provisionally winning bids at the end of 
the auction become the winning bids. Bidders are reminded that 
provisionally winning bids count toward activity for purposes of the 
activity rule.
    147. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
proposed to use a random number generator to select a single 
provisionally winning bid in the event of identical high bid amounts 
being submitted on a license in a given round (e.g. tied bids). No 
comments were received on this proposal. Therefore, the Bureau adopted 
its proposal. A pseudo-random number generator based on the L'Ecuyer 
algorithms will be used to assign a random number to each bid. The tied 
bid with the highest random number wins the tiebreaker, and becomes the 
provisionally winning bid. The remaining eligible bidders, as well as 
the provisionally winning bidder, can submit higher bids in subsequent 
rounds. However, if the auction were to close with no other bids being 
placed, the winning bidder would be the one that placed the selected 
provisionally winning bid.
    148. During a round, a bidder may submit bids for as many licenses 
as it wishes (providing that it is eligible to bid), withdraw 
provisionally winning bids from previous rounds, remove bids placed in 
the current bidding round, or permanently reduce eligibility. Bidders 
also have the option of submitting and removing multiple bids and 
withdrawing multiple provisionally winning bids (subject to the 
limitation on withdrawal rounds discussed below) during a round. If a 
bidder submits multiple bids for a single license in the same round, 
the system takes the last bid entered as that bidder's bid for the 
round. Bidders should note that the bidding units associated with 
licenses for which the bidder has removed or withdrawn its bid do not 
count towards the bidder's current activity.
    149. All bidding will take place remotely either through the FCC 
Auction System or by telephonic bidding. There will be no on-site 
bidding during Auction No. 69. Please note that telephonic bid 
assistants are required to use a script when entering bids placed by 
telephone. Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow 
sufficient time to bid by placing their calls well in advance of the 
close of a round. Normally, five to ten minutes are necessary to 
complete a telephonic bid submission.
    150. A bidder's ability to bid on specific licenses is determined 
by two factors: (1) the licenses selected on the bidder's FCC Form 175 
and (2) the bidder's eligibility. The bid submission screens will allow 
bidders to submit bids on only those licenses the bidder selected on 
its FCC Form 175.
    151. In order to access the bidding function of the FCC Auction 
System, bidders must be logged in during the bidding round using the 
passcode generated by the SecurID[supreg] card and a personal 
identification number (PIN) created by the bidder. Bidders are strongly 
encouraged to print a round summary for each round after they have 
completed all of their activity for that round.
    152. In each round, if there is sufficient eligibility to place a 
bid on the particular license, an eligible bidder will be able to place 
bids on a given license in any of nine different amounts. (In the event 
of duplicate bid amounts due to rounding, however, the FCC Auction 
System will omit the duplicates and will list fewer than nine 
acceptable bid amounts for the license.) For each license, the FCC 
Auction System will list the nine acceptable bid amounts in a drop-down 
box. Bidders use the drop-down box to select from among the acceptable 
bid amounts. The FCC Auction System also includes an upload function 
that allows bidders to upload text files containing bid information.
    153. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount for that license will be equal to its minimum 
opening bid amount. Once there are bids on a license, minimum 
acceptable bids for a license will be determined.
    154. Finally, bidders are cautioned to select their bid amounts 
carefully because, bidders that withdraw a provisionally winning bid 
from a previous round, even if the bid was mistakenly or erroneously 
made, are subject to bid withdrawal payments.
v. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal
    155. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the Commission 
proposed bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. With respect to bid 
withdrawals, the Commission proposed limiting each bidder to 
withdrawals in no more than two rounds during the course of the 
auction. The round in which withdrawals are used would be at each 
bidder's discretion. The Bureau received no comments on this issue. In 
previous auctions, the Bureau has detected bidder conduct that, 
arguably, may have constituted anti-competitive behavior through the 
use of bid withdrawals. While the Bureau continues to recognize the 
important role that bid withdrawals may play in an auction, i.e., 
reducing risk associated with efforts to secure various licenses in 
combination, the Bureau concluded that, for Auction No. 69, adoption of 
a limit on the use of withdrawals to two rounds per bidder is 
appropriate and a reasonable compromise that will allow bidders to use 
withdrawals. The Bureau based its decision on this issue upon 
experience with bid withdrawals in prior auctions. The Bureau will 
therefore limit the number of rounds in which bidders may place 
withdrawals to two rounds.
    156. Procedures. Before the close of a bidding round, a bidder has 
the option of removing any bids placed in that round. By using the 
REMOVE BIDS function in the FCC Auction System, a bidder may 
effectively unsubmit any bid placed within that round. A bidder 
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal 
payments. Removing a bid will affect a bidder's activity for the round 
in which it is removed, i.e., a bid that is removed does not count 
toward bidding activity. These procedures will enhance bidder 
flexibility during the auction, and therefore the Bureau adopted them 
for Auction No. 69.
    157. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. 
However, in later rounds, a bidder may withdraw provisionally winning 
bids from previous rounds using the WITHDRAW BIDS function in the FCC 
Auction System (assuming that the bidder has not already withdrawn bids 
in a previous round). A provisionally winning bidder that withdraws its 
provisionally winning bid from a previous round during the auction is 
subject to the bid withdrawal payments specified in 47 CFR 1.2104(g). 
Once a withdrawal is submitted during a round,

[[Page 67598]]

that withdrawal cannot be unsubmitted even if the round has not yet 
ended.
    158. The rounds in which a bidder may withdraw its bids will be at 
the bidder's discretion and there will be no limit on the number of 
bids that may be withdrawn in either of these rounds. Withdrawals 
during the auction will be subject to the bid withdrawal payments 
specified in 47 CFR 1.2104(g). Bidders should note that abuse of the 
Commission's bid withdrawal procedures could result in the denial of 
the ability to bid on a market.
    159. If a provisionally winning bid is withdrawn, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount will equal the amount of the second highest bid 
received for the license, which may be less than, or in the case of 
tied bids, equal to, the amount of the withdrawn bid. To set the 
additional bid amounts, the second highest bid amount also will be used 
in place of the provisionally winning bid in the formula used to 
calculate bid increment amounts. The Commission will serve as a place 
holder provisionally winning bidder on the license until a new bid is 
submitted on that license. The Bureau retains the discretion to lower 
the minimum acceptable bid on such licenses in the next round or in 
later rounds.
    160. Calculation of Bid Withdrawal Payment. Generally, the 
Commission imposes payments on bidders that withdraw high bids during 
the course of an auction. If a bidder withdraws its bid and there is no 
higher bid in the same or subsequent auction(s), the bidder that 
withdrew its bid is responsible for the difference between its 
withdrawn bid and the provisionally winning bid in the same or 
subsequent auction(s). Pursuant to 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(1), the payment 
will equal the lower of: (1) The difference between the net withdrawn 
bid and the subsequent net wining bid, or (2) the difference between 
the gross withdrawn bid and the subsequent gross wining bid.
    161. In the case of multiple bid withdrawals on a single license, 
within the same or subsequent auctions(s), the payment for each bid 
withdrawal will be calculated based on the sequence of bid withdrawals 
and the amounts withdrawn. No withdrawal payment will be assessed for a 
withdrawn bid if either the subsequent winning bid or any of the 
intervening subsequent withdrawn bids, in either the same or subsequent 
auctions(s), equals or exceeds that withdrawn bid. Thus, a bidder that 
withdraws a bid will not be responsible for any withdrawal payments if 
there is a subsequent higher bid in the same or subsequent auction(s). 
The Bureau retains the discretion to scrutinize multiple bid 
withdrawals on a single license for evidence of anti-competitive 
strategic behavior and take appropriate action when deemed necessary.
    162. The payment obligations of a bidder that withdraws a high bid 
on a license during the course of an auction is specified in 47 CFR 
1.2104(g)(1), which also provides for the assessment of interim bid 
withdrawal payments. In the Auction No. 69 Comment Public Notice, the 
Bureau proposed to establish the percentage at ten percent (10%) for 
the 1.4 GHz band auction and sought comment on the proposal. The Bureau 
received no comments on this issue and adopted its proposal. The 
Commission will assess an interim withdrawal payment equal to 10 
percent of the amount of the withdrawn bids. The 10 percent interim 
payment will be applied toward any final bid withdrawal payment that 
will be assessed after subsequent auction of the license.
vi. Round Results
    163. The identities of parties that are qualified to bid in Auction 
No. 69 will be available before the auction. Thus, bidders will know in 
advance of this auction the identities of the parties against which 
they may be bidding in the auction. If information is withheld in 
accordance with the procedures described in the Auction No. 69 
Procedures Public Notice, limited information about the results of a 
round will be made public after the conclusion of the round. 
Specifically, after a round closes, the Bureau will make available for 
each license, its current provisionally winning bid amount, the minimum 
acceptable bid amount for the following round, the amounts of all bids 
placed on the license during the round, and whether the license is FCC 
held. The reports will be publicly accessible. Moreover, after the 
auction, the Bureau will make available complete reports of all bids 
placed during each round of the auction, including bidder identities.
    164. If, however, limited information procedures are not used, more 
information will be provided after each round in the auction. Bids 
placed during a round, including bidder identities, will be made public 
at the conclusion of that round. Specifically, after a round closes, 
the Bureau will compile reports of all bids placed and which bidders 
made them, current provisionally winning bids, new minimum acceptable 
bid amounts, and bidder eligibility status (bidding eligibility and 
activity rule waivers) and will post the reports for public access.
vii. Auction Announcements
    165. The Commission will use auction announcements to announce 
items such as schedule changes and stage transitions. All auction 
announcements will be available by clicking a link in the FCC Auction 
System.

V. Post-Auction Procedures

A. Down Payments

    166. After bidding has ended, the Commission will issue a public 
notice declaring the auction closed and identifying winning bidders, 
down payments and final payments due.
    167. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing 
notice, each winning bidder must submit sufficient funds (in addition 
to its upfront payment) to bring its total amount of money on deposit 
with the Commission for Auction No. 69 to 20 percent of the net amount 
of its winning bids (gross bids less any applicable small business or 
very small business bidding credits).

B. Final Payments

    168. Each winning bidder will be required to submit the balance of 
the net amount of its winning bids within 10 business days after the 
deadline for submitting down payments.

C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601)

    169. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing 
notice, winning bidders must electronically submit a properly completed 
long-form application (FCC Form 601) for each license won through 
Auction No. 69. Winning bidders that are small businesses or very small 
businesses must demonstrate their eligibility for a small business or 
very small business bidding credit. Further filing instructions will be 
provided to auction winners at the close of the auction.
    170. The CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order modifies the procedure by 
which a consortium that is a winning bidder in Auction No. 69 will 
apply for a license. In particular, (a) each member or group of members 
of a winning consortium seeking separate licenses will be required to 
file a separate long-form application for its respective license(s) 
and, in the case of a license to be partitioned or disaggregated, the 
member or group filing the applicable long-form application shall 
provide the parties' partitioning or disaggregation agreement in its 
long-form application; (b) two or more consortium members seeking to be 
licensed together shall first form a legal business entity; and (c) any 
such entity must meet the applicable

[[Page 67599]]

eligibility requirements in Commission rules for small business status. 
Applicants applying as consortia should review the CSEA/Part 1 Report 
and Order in detail and monitor any relevant future proceedings to 
understand how the members of the consortia will apply for a license in 
the event they are winning bidders.

D. Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602)

    171. At the time it submits its long-form application (FCC Form 
601), each winning bidder also must comply with the ownership reporting 
requirements as set forth in 47 CFR 1.913, 1.919 and 1.2112. An 
ownership disclosure record is automatically created in ULS for any 
applicant that submits an FCC Form 175. However, winning bidders will 
be required to review and confirm that it is complete and accurate as 
of the date of filing Form 601. Further instructions will be provided 
to auction winning bidders at the close of the auction.

E. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit

    172. A winning bidder that intends to use its license(s) to deploy 
facilities and provide services to federally recognized tribal lands 
that are unserved by any telecommunications carrier or that have a 
wireline penetration rate equal to or below 85 percent is eligible to 
receive a tribal lands bidding credit as set forth in 47 CFR 1.2107 and 
1.2110(f). A tribal lands bidding credit is in addition to, and 
separate from, any other bidding credit for which a winning bidder may 
qualify.
    173. Unlike other bidding credits that are requested prior to the 
auction, a winning bidder applies for the tribal lands bidding credit 
after winning the auction when it files its long-form application (FCC 
Form 601). When initially filing the long-form application, the winning 
bidder will be required to advise the Commission whether it intends to 
seek a tribal lands bidding credit, for each market won in the auction, 
by checking the designated box(es). After stating its intent to seek a 
tribal lands bidding credit, the applicant will have 180 days from the 
close of the long-form filing window to amend its application to select 
the specific tribal lands to be served and provide the required tribal 
government certifications. Licensees receiving a tribal lands bidding 
credit are subject to performance criteria as set forth in 47 CFR 
1.2110(f)(3)(vi).
    174. For additional information on the tribal lands bidding credit, 
including how the amount of the credit is calculated, applicants should 
review the Commission's rule making proceeding regarding tribal lands 
bidding credits and related public notices.

F. Default and Disqualification

    175. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the 
close of the auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment 
within the prescribed period of time, fails to submit a timely long-
form application, fails to make full payment, or is otherwise 
disqualified) will be subject to the payments described in 47 CFR 
1.2104(g)(2). The payments include both a deficiency payment, equal to 
the difference between the amount of the bidder's bid and the amount of 
the winning bid the next time a license covering the same spectrum is 
won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal to a percentage of 
the defaulter's bid or of the subsequent winning bid, whichever is 
less. Pursuant to recent modifications to the rule governing default 
payments, the percentage of the applicable bid to be assessed as an 
additional payment for defaults in a particular auction is established 
in advance of the auction. Accordingly, in the Auction No. 69 Comment 
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to set the additional default 
payment for the auction of 1.4 GHz band licenses at ten percent (10%) 
of the applicable bid. The Bureau sought comment on its proposal.
    176. No comments were received on this issue. The Bureau therefore 
adopted its proposal and set the additional default payment for the 
auction of 1.4 GHz band licenses at ten percent (10%) of the applicable 
bid.
    177. Finally, the Bureau noted that in the event of a default, the 
Commission may re-auction the license or offer it to the next highest 
bidder (in descending order) at its final bid amount. In addition, if a 
default or disqualification involves gross misconduct, 
misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant, the Commission may 
declare the applicant and its principals ineligible to bid in future 
auctions, and may take any other action that it deems necessary, 
including institution of proceedings to revoke any existing licenses 
held by the applicant.

G. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance

    178. All applicants that submit upfront payments but after the 
close of the auction are not winning bidders for a license in Auction 
No. 69 may be entitled to a refund of their remaining upfront payment 
balance after the conclusion of the auction. All refunds will be 
returned to the payer of record, as identified on the FCC Form 159, 
unless the payer submits written authorization instructing otherwise.
    179. Bidders that drop out of the auction completely may be 
eligible for a refund of their upfront payments before the close of the 
auction. Qualified bidders that have exhausted all of their activity 
rule waivers, have no remaining bidding eligibility, and have not 
withdrawn a provisionally winning bid during the auction may also be 
eligible for a refund of their upfront payment before the close of the 
auction. If an applicant has completed the refund instructions 
electronically, the refund will be sent automatically. If an applicant 
has not completed the refund instructions electronically, the applicant 
must submit a written request for the refund and include wire transfer 
instructions, Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) and FCC Registration 
Number (FRN). Send refund requests to: Federal Communications 
Commission, Financial Operations Center, Auctions Accounting Group, 
Gail Glasser, 445 12th Street, SW., Room 1-C864, Washington, DC 20554.

Federal Communications Commission.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
 [FR Doc. E6-19744 Filed 11-21-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P