[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 208 (Friday, October 27, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63046-63050]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-18066]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[EA-06-250]
In the Matter of Holders of Material Licenses Authorized To
Manufacture or Distribute Items Containing Radioactive Material of
Concern; Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records
Check Requirements for Unescorted Access to Certain Radioactive
Material and Modification of the Additional Security Measures
(Effective Immediately)
I
The Licensees identified in Attachment 1 \1\ to this Order hold
licenses issued in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954,
as amended, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or
Commission) or Agreement States, authorizing them to manufacture or
initially transfer items containing radioactive materials for sale or
distribution. On August 8, 2005, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct)
was enacted. Section 652 of the EPAct amended Section 149 of the AEA to
require fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
identification and criminal history records check of any person who is
permitted unescorted access to radioactive materials subject to
regulation by the Commission, and which the Commission determines to be
of such significance to the public health and safety or the common
defense and security as to warrant fingerprinting and background
checks. NRC has decided to implement this requirement, in part, prior
to the completion of the rulemaking to implement the provisions under
the EPAct, which is underway, because a deliberate malevolent act by an
individual with unescorted access to these radioactive materials has a
potential to result in significant adverse impacts to the public health
and safety or the common defense and security. Those exempted from
fingerprinting requirements under 10 CFR 73.59 (71 FR 33,989 (June 13,
2006)) for access to Safeguards Information \2\ (SGI) are also exempt
from the fingerprinting requirements under this Order. In addition,
individuals who have a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal
history record check within the last five (5) years, or individuals who
have an active Federal security clearance (provided in each case that
they make available the appropriate documentation), have satisfied the
EPAct fingerprinting requirement and need not be fingerprinted again.
Individuals who have been fingerprinted and granted access to SGI by
the reviewing official under Order EA-06-155 do not need to be
fingerprinted again.
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\1\ Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and will not be
released to the public.
\2\ Safeguards Information is a form of sensitive, unclassified,
security-related information that the Commission has the authority
to designate and protect under section 147 of the AEA.
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II
Subsequent to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC
issued a security Order requiring certain Manufacturing and
Distribution (M&D) Licensees to implement Additional Security Measures
(ASMs) for certain radioactive materials. The requirements imposed by
that Order (M&D Order), and measures licensees have developed to comply
with that Order, were designated by the NRC as Safeguards Information
(SGI) and were not released to the public. One specific ASM, imposed by
the M&D Order, required licensees to conduct local background checks to
determine the trustworthiness and reliability of individuals needing
unescorted access to radioactive materials. ``Access,'' to these
radioactive materials means that an individual could exercise some
physical control over the material or device. At that time, the NRC did
not have the authority, except in the case of power reactor licensees,
to require licensees to submit fingerprints for an FBI criminal history
records checks of individuals being considered for unescorted access to
radioactive materials subject to NRC regulations. Therefore, in
accordance with Section 149 of the AEA, as amended by the EPAct, the
Commission is imposing the FBI criminal history records check
requirements, as set forth in this Order, including Attachment 2 to
this Order, on all Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order,
who possess risk-significant radioactive materials equal to or greater
than the quantities listed in Attachment 3 to this Order. These
requirements will remain in effect until the Commission determines
otherwise.
This Order also modifies the M&D Order (EA-03-225 or EA-05-126M),
to reflect recent Commission regulatory actions. The ASMs for M&D
Licensees are modified to be consistent with (1) the ``Order Imposing
Additional Security Measures on the Transportation of Radioactive
Materials Quantities of Concern'' (EA-05-006), (2) the final rule on
the Export and Import of Radioactive Material: Security Policies (70 FR
37985 and 46066), dated July 1, 2005, (3) the Order Imposing Increased
Controls (EA-05-090), and (4) the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources.
In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I find that in light of the
common defense and security matters identified above, which warrant the
issuance of this Order, the public health, safety, and interest require
that this Order be effective immediately.
III
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182,
and 186 of the AEA of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Part 30, and 10 CFR Part 32, It is
hereby ordered, effective immediately, that all licensees identified in
Attachment 1 to this order
[[Page 63047]]
shall comply with the requirements set forth in this order.
A. All licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall
comply with the following requirements:
1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of this
Order, establish and maintain a fingerprinting program that meets the
requirements of Attachment 2 to this Order, for unescorted access to
radioactive materials that equal or exceed the quantities listed in
Attachment 3 to this Order.
2. The Licensee shall, in writing, within twenty (20) days of the
date of this Order, notify, the Commission, (1) receipt and
confirmation that compliance with the Order will be achieved, or (2) if
it is unable to comply with any of the requirements described in
Attachment 2, or (3) if compliance with any of the requirements is
unnecessary in its specific circumstances. The notification shall
provide the Licensee's justification for seeking relief from or
variation of any specific requirement.
B. In accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting and
Criminal History Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards
Information'' (EA-06-155), issued on August 21, 2006, only the NRC-
approved reviewing official shall review results from an FBI criminal
history records check. The reviewing official shall determine whether
an individual may have, or continue to have, unescorted access to
radioactive materials that equal or exceed the quantities listed in
Attachment 3 to this Order. Fingerprinting and the FBI identification
and criminal history records check are not required for individuals
that are exempted from fingerprinting requirements under 10 CFR 73.59
[71 FR 33989 (June 13, 2006)] for access to SGI. In addition,
individuals who have a favorably decided U.S. Government criminal
history records check within the last five (5) years, or individuals
who have an active Federal security clearance, (provided in each case
that the appropriate documentation is made available to the Licensee's
reviewing official) have satisfied the EPAct fingerprinting requirement
and need not be fingerprinted again.
C. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with
the procedures described in Attachment 2 to this Order. Individuals who
have been fingerprinted and granted access to SGI by the reviewing
official under Order EA-06-155 do not need to be fingerprinted again.
D. The Licensee may allow any individual who currently has
unescorted access to radioactive materials, in accordance with the M&D
Order, to continue to have unescorted access without being
fingerprinted, pending a decision by the reviewing official (based on
fingerprinting, an FBI criminal history records check, and a
trustworthy and reliability determination) that the individual may
continue to have unescorted access to radioactive materials that equal
or exceed the quantities listed in Attachment 3 to this Order. The
licensee shall complete implementation of the requirements of
Attachment 2 to this Order by January 15, 2007.
E. The ASMs of the M&D Order are modified as follows:
1. ASM 7.d. is superseded in its entirety by Order EA-05-006.
2. ASM 8. is superseded by 10 CFR Part 110--Export and Import of
Nuclear Equipment and Material [see also Final Rule 10 CFR Part 110,
dated July 1, 2005 (70 FR 37985 and 46066)--Export and Import of
Radioactive Material: Security Policies].
3. ``Table 1: Radionuclides of Concern'' is superseded by
Attachment 3 to this Order.
4. The requirement for a local criminal history check in ASM 5.a.
is superceded by the FBI criminal history records check. All other
requirements in ASM 5.a. are still applicable.
Licensee responses to Condition A.2. shall be submitted to the
Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental
Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555. In addition, Licensee responses shall be marked as ``Security-
Related Information--Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390.''
The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind
any of the above conditions upon demonstration of good cause by the
Licensee.
IV
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20) days
of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration
will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for
extension of time in which to submit an answer or request a hearing
must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Federal and State
Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of
good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order.
Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in writing
and under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the matters of
fact and law on which the Licensee or other person adversely affected
relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued.
Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the
Secretary, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies
also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Federal and State
Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General
Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address,
and to the Licensee if the answer or hearing request is by a person
other than the Licensee. Because of possible delays in delivery of mail
to United States Government offices, it is requested that answers and
requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of the Commission
either by means of facsimile transmission to (301) 415-1101 or by e-
mail to [email protected] and also to the Office of the General
Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to (301) 415-3725 or
by e-mail to [email protected]. If a person other than the Licensee
requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the
manner in which his/her interest is adversely affected by this Order
and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309.
If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,
the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order
should be sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition to
demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error. In the absence of any request for
hearing, or written approval of an extension of time in which to
request a hearing, the provisions as specified above in Section III
shall be final twenty (20) days from the date of this Order without
further Order or proceedings.
[[Page 63048]]
If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved,
the provisions as specified above in Section III shall be final when
the extension expires, if a hearing request has not been received. An
answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate
effectiveness of this order.
Dated this 17 day of October 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Charles L. Miller,
Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental
Management Programs.
Attachment 1--List of Applicable Materials Licensees (Redacted)
Attachment 2--Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal History
Checks of Individuals When Licensee's Reviewing Official Is Determining
Unescorted Access to Radioactive Material Subject to EA-06-250
General Requirements
Licensees shall comply with the following requirements of this
attachment.
1. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment shall
fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted unescorted
access to risk significant radioactive materials equal to, or greater
than, the quantities listed in Attachment 3 to EA-06-250. The Licensee
shall review and use the information received from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and ensure that the provisions contained in the
subject Order and this attachment are satisfied.
2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the
fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for revising
the record or including an explanation in the record, as specified in
the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' section of this
attachment.
3. Fingerprints for unescorted access need not be taken if an
employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor,
manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting
requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 for access to Safeguards Information, has a
favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal history check within the
last five (5) years, or has an active Federal security clearance.
Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which granted the Federal
security clearance or reviewed the criminal history check must be
provided for either of the latter two cases. The Licensee must retain
this documentation for a period of three (3) years from the date the
individual no longer requires unescorted access to radioactive
materials associated with the Licensee's activities.
4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this Order
must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the FBI.
5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the FBI
and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and reliability
requirements of the M&D Order, in making a determination whether to
grant, or continue to allow, unescorted access to radioactive
materials.
6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an
individual's suitability for unescorted access to risk-significant
radioactive materials equal to or greater thank the quantities used in
Attachment 3 to EA-06-250.
7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination
whether to grant, or continue to allow, unescorted access to risk-
significant radioactive materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 3 to EA-06-250.
Prohibitions
A Licensee shall not base a final determination to deny an
individual access to radioactive materials solely on the basis of
information received from the FBI involving: An arrest more than one
(1) year old for which there is no information of the disposition of
the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an
acquittal.
A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal
history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that would
infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the Licensee use the
information in any way which would discriminate among individuals on
the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age.
Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks
For the purpose of complying with this Order, Licensees shall,
using an appropriate method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the NRC's
Division of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one completed,
legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where
practicable, other fingerprint records for each individual seeking
unescorted access to the risk-significant radioactive materials equal
to or greater thank the quantities used in Attachment 3 to EA-06-250,
to the Director of the Division of Facilities and Security, marked for
the attention of the Division's Criminal History Check Section. Copies
of these forms may be obtained by writing the Office of Information
Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, by calling (301) 415-5877, or by e-mail to [email protected].
Practicable alternative formats are set forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The
Licensee shall establish procedures to ensure that the quality of the
fingerprints taken results in minimizing the rejection rate of
fingerprint cards due to illegible or incomplete cards.
The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for completeness.
Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions or evident
errors will be returned to the Licensee for corrections. The fee for
processing fingerprint checks includes one re-submission if the initial
submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions
cannot be classified. The one free re-submission must have the FBI
Transaction Control Number reflected on the re-submission. If
additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as initial
submittals and will require a second payment of the processing fee.
Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application.
Licensees shall submit payment with the application for processing
fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, cashier's check,
money order, or electronic payment, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.'' [For
guidance on making electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security
Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at (301) 415-7404].
Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable. The
application fee (currently $27) is the sum of the user fee charged by
the FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted
by the NRC on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which
covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of Licensee
fingerprint submissions. The Commission will directly notify Licensees
who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes.
The Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data
received from the FBI as a result of the Licensee's application(s) for
criminal history checks, including the FBI fingerprint record.
Right to Correct and Complete Information
Prior to any final adverse determination, the Licensee shall make
available to the individual the contents
[[Page 63049]]
of any criminal records obtained from the FBI for the purpose of
assuring correct and complete information. Written confirmation by the
individual of receipt of this notification must be maintained by the
Licensee for a period of one (1) year from the date of the
notification.
If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is
incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct,
or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in the
record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These
procedures include either direct application by the individual
challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency)
that contributed the questioned information, or direct challenge as to
the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history
record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28
CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the
challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests that
agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an
official communication directly from the agency that contributed the
original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes
necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency.
The Licensee must provide at least ten (10) days for an individual to
initiate an action challenging the results of an FBI criminal history
records check after the record is made available for his/her review.
The Licensee may make a final determination on unescorted access to
risk-significant radioactive materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 3 to EA-06-250, based upon the criminal
history record only upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or
correction of the record. Upon a final adverse determination on
unescorted access to risk-significant radioactive materials equal to or
greater than the quantities used in Attachment 3 to EA-06-250, the
Licensee shall provide the individual its documented basis for denial.
Unescorted access to risk-significant radioactive materials equal to or
greater than the quantities used in Attachment 3 to EA-06-250, shall
not be granted to an individual during the review process.
Protection of Information
1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an
individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a system
of files and procedures for protecting the record and the personal
information from unauthorized disclosure.
2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal information
collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual,
his/her representative, or to those who have a need to access the
information in performing assigned duties in the process of determining
unescorted access to risk-significant radioactive materials equal to or
greater than the quantities listed in Attachment 3 to EA-06-250. No
individual authorized to have access to the information may re-
disseminate the information to any other individual who does not have a
need-to-know.
3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a
criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee if
the Licensee holding the criminal history record receives the
individual's written request to re-disseminate the information
contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies
information such as the individual's name, date of birth, social
security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for
identification purposes.
4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained under
this section, available for examination by an authorized representative
of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws.
5. The licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history
records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file has
been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of employment
or denial to unescorted access to risk-significant radioactive
materials equal to or greater than the quantities listed in Attachment
3 to EA-06-250. After the required three (3) year period, these
documents shall be destroyed by a method that will prevent
reconstruction of the information in whole or in part.
Attachment 3--Radionuclides of Concern
Table A.--Radionuclides of Concern
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantity of
Radionuclide Quantity of concern concern \2\
\1\ (TBq) (Ci)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Am-241........................... 0.6.................. 16
Am-241/Be........................ 0.6.................. 16
Cf-252........................... 0.2.................. 5.4
Cm-244........................... 0.5.................. 14
Co-60............................ 0.3.................. 8.1
Cs-137........................... 1.................... 27
Gd-153........................... 10................... 270
Ir-192........................... 0.8.................. 22
Pm-147........................... 400.................. 11,000
Pu-238........................... 0.6.................. 16
Pu-239/Be........................ 0.6.................. 16
Ra-226 \3\....................... 0.4.................. 11
Se-75............................ 2.................... 54
Sr-90 (Y-90)..................... 10................... 270
Tm-170........................... 200.................. 5,400
Yb-169........................... 3.................... 81
Combinations of radioactive See Footnote Below
materials listed above \4\. \5\.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The aggregate activity of multiple, collocated sources of the same
radionuclide should be included when the total activity equals or
exceeds the quantity of concern.
\2\ The primary values used for compliance with this Order are TBq. The
curie (Ci) values are rounded to two significant figures for
informational purposes only.
[[Page 63050]]
\3\ The Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
authorizes NRC to regulate Ra-226 and NRC is in the process of
amending its regulations for discrete sources of Ra-226.
\4\ Radioactive materials are to be considered aggregated or collocated
if breaching a common physical security barrier (e.g., a locked door
at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the
radioactive material or devices containing the radioactive material.
\5\ If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the ratios of
the activity of each source, I of radionuclide, n, A(i,n), to the
quantity of concern for radionuclide n, Q(n), listed for that
radionuclide equals or exceeds one. [(aggregated source activity for
radionuclide A) / (quantity of concern for radionuclide A)] +
[(aggregated source activity for radionuclide B) / (quantity of
concern for radionuclide B)] + etc. * * * >=1.
Guidance for Aggregation of Sources
NRC supports the use of the International Atomic Energy
Association's (IAEA) source categorization methodology as defined in
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.9, ``Categorization of
Radioactive Sources,'' (2005) (see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf) and as endorsed by the
agency's Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources, January 2004 (see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf). The Code defines a
three-tiered source categorization scheme. Category 1 corresponds to
the largest source strength (equal to or greater than 100 times the
quantity of concern values listed in Table 1.) and Category 3, the
smallest (equal or exceeding one-tenth the quantity of concern values
listed in Table 1.). Additional security measures apply to sources that
are equal to or greater than the quantity of concern values listed in
Table 1, plus aggregations of smaller sources that are equal to or
greater than the quantities in Table 1. Aggregation only applies to
sources that are collocated.
Licensees who possess individual sources in total quantities that
equal or exceed the Table 1 quantities are required to implement
additional security measures. Where there are many small (less than the
quantity of concern values) collocated sources whose total aggregate
activity equals or exceeds the Table 1 values, licensees are to
implement additional security measures.
Some source handling or storage activities may cover several
buildings, or several locations within specific buildings. The question
then becomes, ``When are sources considered collocated for purposes of
aggregation?'' For purposes of the additional controls, sources are
considered collocated if breaching a single barrier (e.g., a locked
door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the
sources. Sources behind an outer barrier should be aggregated
separately from those behind an inner barrier (e.g., a locked source
safe inside the locked storage room). However, if both barriers are
simultaneously open, then all sources within these two barriers are
considered to be collocated. This logic should be continued for other
barriers within or behind the inner barrier.
The following example illustrates the point: A lockable room has
sources stored in it. Inside the lockable room, there are two shielded
safes with additional sources in them. Inventories are as follows:
The room has the following sources outside the safes: Cf-252,
0.12 TBq (3.2 Ci); Co-60, 0.18 TBq (4.9 Ci), and Pu-238, 0.3 TBq
(8.1 Ci). Application of the unity rule yields: (0.12 / 0.2) + (0.18
/ 0.3) + (0.3 / 0.6) = 0.6 + 0.6 + 0.5 = 1.7. Therefore, the sources
would require additional security measures.
Shielded safe 1 has a 1.9 TBq (51 Ci) Cs-137 source and
a 0.8 TBq (22 Ci) Am-241 source. In this case, the sources would
require additional security measures, regardless of location,
because they each exceed the quantities in Table 1.
Shielded safe 2 has two Ir-192 sources, each having an
activity of 0.3 TBq (8.1 Ci). In this case, the sources would not
require additional security measures while locked in the safe. The
combined activity does not exceed the threshold quantity 0.8 TBq (22
Ci).
Because certain barriers may cease to exist during source handling
operations (e.g., a storage location may be unlocked during periods of
active source usage), licensees should, to the extent practicable,
consider two modes of source usage--``operations'' (active source
usage) and ``shutdown'' (source storage mode). Whichever mode results
in the greatest inventory (considering barrier status) would require
additional security measures for each location.
Use the following method to determine which sources of radioactive
material require implementation of the Additional Security Measures
(ASMs):
Include any single source equal to or greater than the
quantity of concern in Table A.
Include multiple collocated sources of the same
radionuclide when the combined quantity equals or exceeds the quantity
of concern.
For combinations of radionuclides, include multiple
collocated sources of different radionuclides when the aggregate
quantities satisfy the following unity rule: [(amount of radionuclide
A) / (quantity of concern of radionuclide A)] + [(amount of
radionuclide B) / (quantity of concern of radionuclide B)] + etc. . . .
[gteqt]1.
[FR Doc. E6-18066 Filed 10-26-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P