[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 202 (Thursday, October 19, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61731-61736]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-17508]



[[Page 61731]]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Notice of Intent To Prepare a Supplement to the Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement--Complex 2030

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of intent.

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SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an agency 
within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE or Department), announces its 
intent to prepare a Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and 
Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement--Complex 2030 
(Complex 2030 SEIS or SEIS, DOE/EIS-0236-S4), pursuant to the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), the 
Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ's) and DOE's regulations 
implementing NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508 and 10 CFR part 1021, 
respectively). The SEIS will analyze the environmental impacts from the 
continued transformation of the United States' nuclear weapons complex 
by implementing NNSA's vision of the complex as it would exist in 2030, 
which the Department refers to as Complex 2030, as well as 
alternatives. Since the end of the Cold War, there continue to be 
significant changes in the requirements for the nation's nuclear 
arsenal, including reductions in the number of nuclear weapons. To 
fulfill its responsibilities for certifying the safety and reliability 
of nuclear weapons without underground testing, DOE proposed and 
implemented the Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SSM) Program in 
the 1990s. Stockpile Stewardship includes activities required to 
maintain a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of 
nuclear weapons in the absence of underground testing, and in the 
capability of the United States to resume nuclear testing if directed 
by the President. Stockpile Management activities include 
dismantlement, maintenance, evaluation, repair, and replacement of 
weapons and their components in the existing stockpile.
    NNSA's proposed action is to continue currently planned 
modernization activities and select a site for a consolidated plutonium 
center for long-term research and development, surveillance, and pit 
\1\ manufacturing; consolidate special nuclear materials throughout the 
complex; consolidate, relocate, or eliminate duplicative facilities and 
programs and improve operating efficiencies; identify one or more sites 
for conducting NNSA flight test operations; and accelerate nuclear 
weapons dismantlement activities. This Notice of Intent (NOI), the 
initial step in the NEPA process, informs the public of NNSA's 
intention to prepare the Complex 2030 SEIS, announces the schedule for 
public scoping meetings, and solicits public input. Following the 
scoping period, NNSA will prepare and issue a draft of the Complex 2030 
SEIS that will describe the Complex 2030 proposal, the alternatives 
analyzed, and potential impacts of the proposal and the alternatives.
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    \1\ A pit is the central core of a nuclear weapon typically 
containing plutonium-239 that undergoes fission when compressed by 
high explosives.
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    This NOI also announces that NNSA has cancelled the previously 
planned Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility (DOE/
EIS-0236-S2).

DATES: NNSA invites comments on the scope of the Complex 2030 SEIS. The 
public scoping period starts with the publication of this NOI in the 
Federal Register and will continue through January 17, 2006. Scoping 
comments received after this date will be considered to the extent 
practicable. NNSA will hold public scoping meetings to discuss issues 
and receive oral and written comments on the scope of the Complex 2030 
SEIS. The locations, dates, and times for these public scoping meetings 
are listed below and will be announced by additional appropriate means. 
NNSA requests federal agencies that desire to be designated as 
cooperating agencies on the SEIS to contact NNSA's Office of 
Transformation at the address listed under ADDRESSES by the end of the 
scoping period.

North Augusta, South Carolina, North Augusta Community Center, 495 
Brookside Avenue. November 9, 2006, 11 a.m.--3 p.m., 6 p.m.--10 p.m.
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Oak Ridge City Center Club Room, 333 Main Street. 
November 13, 2006, 11 a.m.--3 p.m., 6 p.m.--10 p.m.
Amarillo, Texas, Amarillo Globe-News Center, Education Room, 401 S. 
Buchanan. November 15, 2006, 11 a.m.--3 p.m., 6 p.m.--10 p.m.
Las Vegas, Nevada, Cashman Center, 850 Las Vegas Boulevard North (at 
Washington). November 28, 2006. 11 a.m.--3 p.m., 6 p.m.--10 p.m.
Tonopah, Nevada, Tonopah Convention Center, 301 Brougher Avenue. 
November 29, 2006, 6 p.m.--10 p.m.
Socorro, New Mexico, Macey Center (at New Mexico Tech), 801 Leroy 
Place. December 4, 2006, 6 p.m.--10 p.m.
Albuquerque, New Mexico, Albuquerque Convention Center, 401 2nd St. NW. 
December 5, 2006, 11 a.m.--3 p.m., 6 p.m.--10 p.m.
Los Alamos, New Mexico, Mesa Public Library, 2400 Central Avenue. 
December 6, 2006, 10:30 a.m.--2:30 p.m.
Santa Fe, New Mexico, Genoveva Chavez Community Center, 3221 Rodeo 
Road. December 6, 2006, 6 p.m.--10 p.m.
Livermore, California, Robert Livermore Community Center, 4444 East 
Avenue. December 12, 2006, 11 a.m.--3 p.m.
Tracy, California, Tracy Community Center, 950 East Street. December 
12, 2006, 6 p.m.--10 p.m.
U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Room 1E-245, 
Washington, DC. December 14, 2006, 1 p.m.--5 p.m.

    NNSA officials will be available to informally discuss the Complex 
2030 proposal during the first hour. Following this, NNSA intends to 
hold a plenary session at each scoping meeting in which officials will 
explain the Complex 2030 proposal and the SEIS, including preliminary 
alternatives. The meetings will provide the public with an opportunity 
to provide oral and written comments to NNSA on the scope of the SEIS. 
Input from the scoping meetings will assist NNSA in preparing the draft 
SEIS.

ADDRESSES: General questions concerning the NOI can be asked by calling 
toll-free 1-800-832-0885 (ext. 63519), e-mailing to 
[email protected], or writing to Theodore A. Wyka, Complex 2030 
SEIS Document Manager, Office of Transformation, U.S. Department of 
Energy, NA-10.1, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585. 
Written comments on the scope of the SEIS or requests to be placed on 
the document distribution list can be sent to the Complex 2030 SEIS 
Document Manager. Additional information regarding Complex 2030 is 
available on Complex2030PEIS.com.
    For general information on the DOE NEPA process, please contact 
Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance, 
U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, 
DC 20585, (202) 586-4600 or 1-800-472-2756. Additional information 
regarding DOE NEPA activities and access to many DOE NEPA documents are 
available on the Internet through the DOE NEPA Web site at http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

[[Page 61732]]

    Background: The early days of the nuclear weapons complex after 
World War II saw a rapid build-up of capability and capacity to support 
the growth of the stockpile to fight the Cold War. By the 1960s, the 
United States had built a large stockpile of nuclear weapons, and the 
nation began to focus on improving, rather than expanding, the 
stockpile. NNSA's predecessor agencies began to consolidate operations 
and close some production facilities. In the 1980s, facilities were 
shut down across the nuclear weapons complex, including certain 
facilities at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina; the Oak Ridge 
Reservation in Tennessee; the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado; the 
Fernald Site in Ohio; the Hanford Reservation in Washington; and 
elsewhere.
    Prior DOE NEPA Reviews: DOE completed a Nuclear Weapons Complex 
Reconfiguration (``Complex-21'') Study in January 1991, which 
identified significant cost savings that could be achieved by further 
downsizing of the nuclear weapons complex.
    DOE then initiated a programmatic EIS (Reconfiguration PEIS) 
examining alternatives for reconfiguring the nuclear weapons complex. 
However, in December 1991, the Department decided to separate proposals 
for transforming non-nuclear production from the Reconfiguration PEIS 
because (1) proposals to consolidate non-nuclear facilities might not 
require preparation of an EIS, and (2) proposals and decisions 
regarding transformation of non-nuclear production would neither 
significantly affect nor be affected by proposals and decisions 
regarding transformation of nuclear production. On January 27, 1992, 
the Department issued an NOI (57 FR 3046) to prepare an environmental 
assessment (DOE/EA-0792) for the consolidation of non-nuclear 
production activities within the nuclear weapons complex. Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States reduced the budget for 
the nuclear weapons program. President George H. W. Bush imposed a 
moratorium in 1992 on underground nuclear testing.
    On September 14, 1993, DOE published a Finding of No Significant 
Impact (FONSI) regarding its proposal to consolidate non-nuclear 
component production (58 FR 48043). This proposal included termination 
of non-nuclear production missions at the Mound Plant in Ohio, the 
Pinellas Plant in Florida, and the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado. The 
electrical and mechanical manufacturing functions were consolidated at 
the Kansas City Plant. Detonators and beryllium capabilities for 
technology and pit support were consolidated at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico, and neutron generator production was 
relocated to Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico.
    In October 1993, President William J. Clinton issued Presidential 
Decision Directive 15 (PDD-15), which directed DOE to establish the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program. PDD-15 significantly redirected the 
nuclear weapons program. Throughout the Cold War, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories had based a 
portion of their confidence in the reliability of nuclear weapons on 
performance data from atmospheric and underground tests. To ensure 
weapons reliability during the moratorium on testing, DOE proposed to 
invest in new scientific tools to assess the complex phenomena involved 
in the detonation of nuclear weapons. DOE also began to develop 
sophisticated tools and computer-based simulation techniques to assess 
various aging phenomena as nuclear weapons continued to serve well 
beyond their originally anticipated lifetimes. These actions enhanced 
research and development (R&D) and deferred spending on the production 
complex.
    DOE concluded in October 1994 that the alternatives described in 
the Reconfiguration PEIS no longer contained realistic proposals for 
reconfiguration of the nuclear weapons complex. That conclusion was 
based on several factors, including: comments offered at the September-
October 1993 Reconfiguration PEIS scoping meetings; the anticipation 
that no production of new nuclear weapons types would be required for 
the foreseeable future; budget constraints; and the Department's 
decision to prepare a separate PEIS on Storage and Disposition of 
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials (DOE/EIS-0229; NOI published June 21, 
1994, 59 FR 17344).
    Consequently, the Department separated the Reconfiguration PEIS 
into two new PEISs: (1) A Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS (DOE/EIS-
0161); and (2) the SSM PEIS (DOE/EIS-0236). The Final PEIS for Tritium 
Supply and Recycling was issued on October 27, 1995 (60 FR 55021). In 
its Record of Decision (ROD) on May 14, 1999 (64 FR 26369 \2\), DOE 
decided it would produce the tritium needed to maintain the nuclear 
arsenal at commercial light water reactors owned and operated by the 
Tennessee Valley Authority and extract tritium at a new DOE-owned 
Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site. With regard to 
the SSM PEIS, DOE issued an NOI on June 6, 1995 (60 FR 31291), a final 
SSM PEIS on November 19, 1996 (61 FR 58871), and a ROD on December 26, 
1996 (61 FR 68014) announcing its decision to transform the weapons 
production complex by (1) reducing the weapon assembly capacity located 
at the Pantex Plant in Texas; (2) reducing the high-explosives 
fabrication capacity at Pantex; (3) reducing the uranium, secondary, 
and case fabrication capacity in the Y-12 National Security Complex in 
Tennessee; (4) reducing nonnuclear component fabrication capacity at 
the Kansas City Plant; and (5) reestablishing a modest interim pit 
fabrication capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico 
while evaluating the need for greater pit manufacturing capacity in the 
future.
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    \2\ This ROD also contains decisions for the EIS for 
Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the 
Savannah River Site (DOE/EIS-0271) and EIS for the Production of 
Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor (DOE/EIS-0288).
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    In accordance with the decisions in the SSM PEIS, the Non-nuclear 
Consolidation Environmental Assessment (EA), and the Tritium Supply and 
Recycling PEIS, DOE began transforming the nuclear weapons complex to 
its present configuration. DOE has also prepared other EISs that 
facilitated the transformation of the complex. The relevant RODs for 
these site-wide and project-specific EISs are listed below:
     1996 ROD for the EIS for the Nevada Test Site and Off-Site 
Locations in the State of Nevada (61 FR 65551, December 13, 1996).
     1997 ROD for the EIS for the Continued Operation of the 
Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components (62 FR 
3880, January 27, 1997).
     1999 ROD for the Site-wide EIS for Continued Operation of 
the Los Alamos National Laboratory (64 FR 50797, September 20, 1999).
     1999 ROD for the EIS for Site-wide Operation of Sandia 
National Laboratories (64 FR 69996, December 15, 1999).
     2000 Amended ROD for the Nevada Test Site EIS (65 FR 
10061, February 25, 2000).
     2002 ROD for the Site-wide EIS for the Oak Ridge Y-12 
National Security Complex (67 FR 11296, March 13, 2002).
     2002 ROD for the EIS for the Relocation of Technical Area 
18 Capabilities and Materials at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (67 
FR 79906, December 31, 2002).
     2004 ROD for the EIS for the Chemistry and Metallurgy 
Research Building Replacement Project, Los

[[Page 61733]]

Alamos National Laboratory (69 FR 6967, February 12, 2004).
     2005 ROD for the Site-wide EIS for Continued Operation of 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Supplemental Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management Programmatic EIS (70 FR 71491, November 29, 
2005).
    Nuclear Weapons Complex: The current nuclear weapons complex 
consists of eight major facilities located in seven states. NNSA 
maintains a limited capability to design and manufacture nuclear 
weapons; provides surveillance of and maintains nuclear weapons 
currently in the stockpile; and dismantles retired nuclear weapons. 
Major facilities and their primary responsibilities within the nuclear 
weapons complex are listed below:
    Savannah River Site (SRS) (Aiken, South Carolina)--Extracts tritium 
(when the Tritium Extraction Facility becomes operational in 2007); 
provides loading, unloading and surveillance of tritium reservoirs. SRS 
does not maintain Category I/II \3\ quantities of special nuclear 
material (SNM) \4\ associated with weapons activities, but does 
maintain Category I/II quantities of SNM associated with other 
Department activities (e.g., environmental management).
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    \3\ Category I/II quantities of special nuclear material are 
determined by grouping materials by type, attractiveness level, and 
quantity. These grouping parameters are defined in DOE Manual 470.4-
6, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [see https://www.directives.doe.gov].
    \4\ As defined in section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
special nuclear material are: (1) Plutonium, uranium enriched in the 
isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines to be special nuclear 
material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by plutonium or 
uranium 233 or 235.
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    Pantex Plant (PX) (Amarillo, Texas)--Dismantles retired weapons; 
fabricates high-explosives components; assembles high explosive, 
nuclear, and non-nuclear components into nuclear weapons; repairs and 
modifies weapons; and evaluates and performs non-nuclear testing of 
weapons. Maintains Category I/II quantities of SNM for the weapons 
program and material no longer needed by the weapons program.
    Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) (Oak Ridge, Tennessee)--
Manufactures nuclear weapons secondaries, cases, and other weapons 
components; evaluates and performs testing of weapon components; 
maintains Category I/II quantities of SNM; conducts dismantlement, 
storage, and disposition of nuclear weapons materials; and supplies SNM 
for use in naval reactors.
    Kansas City Plant (KCP) (Kansas City, Missouri)--Manufactures and 
acquires non-nuclear weapons components; and evaluates and performs 
testing of weapon components. No Category I/II quantities of SNM are 
maintained at the KCP.
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) (Livermore, 
California)--Conducts research and development of nuclear weapons; 
designs and tests advanced technology concepts; designs weapons; 
maintains a limited capability to fabricate plutonium components; and 
provides safety and reliability assessments of the stockpile. Maintains 
Category I/II quantities of SNM associated with the weapons program and 
material no longer needed by the weapons program.
    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (Los Alamos, New Mexico)--
Conducts research and development of nuclear weapons; designs and tests 
advanced technology concepts; designs weapons; provides safety and 
reliability assessments of the stockpile; maintains interim production 
capabilities for limited quantities of plutonium components (e.g., 
pits); and manufactures nuclear weapon detonators for the stockpile. 
Maintains Category I/II quantities of SNM associated with the nuclear 
weapons program and material no longer needed by the weapons program.
    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) (Albuquerque, New Mexico; 
Livermore, California)--Conducts system engineering of nuclear weapons; 
designs and develops non-nuclear components; conducts field and 
laboratory non-nuclear testing; conducts research and development in 
support of the nuclear weapon non-nuclear design; manufactures non-
nuclear weapon components; provides safety and reliability assessments 
of the stockpile; and manufactures neutron generators for the 
stockpile. Maintains Category I/II quantities of SNM associated with 
the nuclear weapons program.
    Nevada Test Site (NTS) (Las Vegas, Nevada)--Maintains capability to 
conduct underground nuclear testing; conducts experiments involving 
nuclear material and high explosives; provides capability to 
disposition a damaged nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device; 
conducts non-nuclear experiments; and conducts research and training on 
nuclear safeguards, criticality safety and emergency response. 
Maintains Category I/II quantities of SNM associated with the nuclear 
weapons program.
    Purpose and Need for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management 
Program: Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), 
DOE is responsible for providing nuclear weapons to support the United 
States' national security strategy. The National Nuclear Security 
Administration Act (Pub. L. 106-65, Title XXXII) assigned this 
responsibility to NNSA within DOE. One of the primary missions of NNSA 
is to provide the nation with safe and reliable nuclear weapons, 
components and capabilities, and to accomplish this in a way that 
protects the environment and the health and safety of workers and the 
public.
    Changes in national security needs and budgets have necessitated 
changes in the way NNSA meets its responsibilities regarding the 
nation's nuclear stockpile. As a result of a changed security 
environment, unilateral decisions by the United States and 
international arms control agreements, the nation's stockpile is 
significantly smaller today and by 2012, it will be the smallest since 
the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961). The Treaty of Moscow will 
eventually lead to a level of 1,700-2,200 operationally-deployed 
strategic nuclear weapons.
    However, nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of 
United States national security policy, and NNSA must continue to meet 
its responsibilities for ensuring the safety and reliability of the 
nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. The current policy is contained in 
the Nuclear Posture Review, submitted to Congress in early 2002, which 
states that the United States will:
     Change the size, composition and character of the nuclear 
weapons stockpile in a way that reflects that the Cold War is over;
     Achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest possible 
number of nuclear warheads consistent with national security needs, 
including obligations to allies; and
     Transform the NNSA nuclear weapons complex into a 
responsive infrastructure that supports the specific stockpile 
requirements established by the President and maintains the essential 
United States nuclear capabilities needed for an uncertain global 
future.
    Complex 2030 SEIS: NNSA has been evaluating how to establish a more 
responsive nuclear weapons complex infrastructure since the Nuclear 
Posture Review was transmitted to Congress in early 2002. The Stockpile 
Stewardship Conference in 2003, the Department of Defense Strategic 
Capabilities Assessment in 2004, the recommendations of the Secretary 
of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) Task Force on the Nuclear Weapons 
Complex Infrastructure in 2005, and the Defense

[[Page 61734]]

Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities in 2006 have provided 
information for NNSA's evaluations.
    In early 2006, NNSA developed a planning scenario for what the 
nuclear weapons complex would look like in 2030. See http://www.nnsa.doe.gov for more information regarding Complex 2030 planning. 
The Complex 2030 planning scenario incorporates many of the decisions 
NNSA has already made based on the evaluations in the SSM PEIS, Tritium 
Supply and Recycling PEIS, and other NEPA documents. See discussion in 
background above. The following table identifies which components of 
Complex 2030 are based on the existing SSM PEIS and Tritium PEIS RODs, 
including RODs for subsequent tiered EISs:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Components of Complex 2030 that                       Tritium  PEIS
       reflect earlier decisions         SSM  PEIS  ROD        ROD
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maintain but reduce the existing                     X   ...............
 weapon assembly capacity located at
 Pantex...............................
Maintain but reduce the high-                        X   ...............
 explosives fabrication capacity at
 Pantex...............................
Maintain but reduce the existing                     X   ...............
 uranium, secondary, and case
 fabrication capacity at the Y-12
 Plant at Oak Ridge...................
Reduce the non-nuclear component                     X   ...............
 fabrication capacity at the Kansas
 City Plant...........................
Reestablish limited pit fabrication                  X   ...............
 capability at Los Alamos National
 Laboratory while evaluating the need
 for a larger capability..............
Irradiate tritium producing rods in     ...............               X
 commercial light water reactors;
 construct and operate a new Tritium
 Extraction Facility at DOE's Savannah
 River Site...........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Types of Decisions that Would Be Based on the Complex 2030 SEIS: 
The decisions set forth in the Complex 2030 ROD would:
     Identify the future missions of the SSM Program and the 
nuclear weapons complex; and
     Determine the configuration of the future weapons complex 
needed to accomplish the SSM Program.
    For specific programs or facilities, NNSA may need to prepare 
additional NEPA documents to implement the decisions announced in the 
ROD. The baseline that will be used for the analyses of program and 
facility needs in the SEIS is 1,700-2,200 operationally-deployed 
strategic nuclear weapons, in addition to augmentation weapons, 
reliability-reserve weapons and weapons required to meet NATO 
commitments. The numbers are consistent with international arms-control 
agreements. Consistent with national security policy directives, 
replacement warhead design concepts may be pursued under the 
alternatives as a means of, for example, enhancing safety and security, 
improving manufacturing practices, reducing surveillance needs, and 
reducing need for underground tests.
    The SEIS will evaluate reasonable alternatives for future 
transformation of the nuclear weapons complex. The Proposed Action and 
alternatives to the Proposed Action will assume continued 
implementation of the following prior siting decisions that DOE made in 
the SSM PEIS and Tritium PEIS RODs, including RODs for subsequent 
tiered EISs:
     Location of the weapon assembly/disassembly operations at 
the Pantex Plant in Texas.
     Location of uranium, secondary, and case fabrication at 
the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee.
     Location of tritium extraction, loading and unloading, and 
support operations at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.
    NNSA does not believe it is necessary to identify additional 
alternatives beyond those present in the SSM PEIS. Regarding the 
uranium, secondary, and case fabrication at Y-12, NNSA is currently 
preparing a Y-12 Site-wide EIS to evaluate reasonable alternatives for 
the continued modernization of the Y-12 capabilities. The Complex 2030 
SEIS will incorporate any decisions made pursuant to the Y-12 Site-wide 
EIS.
    While the Complex 2030 planning scenario proposes to consolidate 
further non-nuclear production activities performed at the Kansas City 
Plant, this proposal will be evaluated in a separate NEPA analysis, as 
was done in the 1990s. NNSA believes that it is appropriate to separate 
the analyses of the transformation of non-nuclear production from the 
SEIS because decisions regarding those activities would neither 
significantly affect nor be affected by decisions regarding the 
transformation of nuclear production activities.
    The SSM PEIS ROD announced NNSA's decision to establish a small 
interim pit production capacity at LANL. In the 1999 LANL Site-wide EIS 
ROD, NNSA announced it would achieve a pit production capacity at LANL 
of up to 20 pits per year. The 2006 draft LANL Site-wide EIS evaluates 
a proposal for a production capacity of 50 certified pits annually. 
This proposed capacity is based on an annual production rate of 80 pits 
per year in order to provide NNSA with sufficient flexibility to obtain 
50 certified pits. Any decisions made pursuant to the LANL Site-wide 
EIS will be included in the Complex 2030 SEIS.
    Based upon the studies \5\ and analyses that led to NNSA's 
development of the Complex 2030 scenario, NNSA has developed 
alternatives that are intended to facilitate public comment on the 
scope of the SEIS. NNSA's decisions regarding implementation of Complex 
2030 will be based on the following alternatives, or a combination of 
those alternatives.
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    \5\ The Stockpile Stewardship Conference in 2003, the Department 
of Defense Strategic Capabilities Assessment in 2004, the 
recommendations of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) 
Task Force on the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure in 2005, 
and the recommendations of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Nuclear Capabilities in 2006.
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    The Proposed Action--Transform to a More Modern, Cost-Effective 
Nuclear Weapons Complex (Complex 2030). This alternative would 
undertake the following actions to continue the transformation of 
NNSA's nuclear weapons complex:
     Select a site to construct and operate a consolidated 
plutonium center for long-term R&D, surveillance, and manufacturing 
operations for a baseline capacity of 125 qualified pits per year at a 
site with existing Category I/II SNM.
     Reduce the number of sites with Category I/II SNM and 
consolidate SNM to fewer locations within each given site.
     Consolidate, relocate or eliminate duplicative facilities 
and programs and improve operating efficiencies, including at 
facilities for nuclear materials storage, tritium R&D, high explosives 
R&D, environmental testing, and hydrotesting facilities.
     Identify one or more sites for conducting NNSA flight test 
operations.

[[Page 61735]]

Existing DOD and DOE test ranges (e.g., White Sands Missile Range in 
New Mexico and Nevada Test Site in Nevada) would be considered as 
alternatives to the continued operation of the Tonopah Test Range in 
Nevada.
     Accelerate dismantlement activities.
    The DOE sites that will be considered as potential locations for 
the consolidated plutonium center and consolidation of Category I/II 
SNM include: Los Alamos, Nevada Test Site, Pantex Plant, Y-12 National 
Security Complex, and the Savannah River Site. Other DOE sites are not 
considered reasonable alternative locations because they do not satisfy 
certain criteria such as population encroachment, or mission 
compatibility or synergy with the site's existing mission.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

    No Action Alternative. The No Action Alternative represents the 
status quo as it exists today and is presently planned. It includes the 
continued implementation of decisions made pursuant to the SSM PEIS and 
the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS (as summarized above) and related 
site-specific EISs and EAs. These decisions are contained in RODs and 
Findings of No Significant Impact (FONSIs), including those discussed 
above, and copies can be located on the DOE NEPA Document Web page at 
http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa/documents.html.
    The No Action Alternative would also include any decisions made as 
a result of the new Y-12 Site-wide EIS and the LANL Site-wide EIS once 
these EISs are finished. NNSA expects to issue RODs on these EISs prior 
to publication of the draft Complex 2030 SEIS.
    The No Action Alternative is illustrated in the following matrix:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Sites (no action alternative)
           Capability            -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     KCP      LANL      LLNL       NTS      Y-12       PX        SNL       SRS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapons assembly/Disassembly....  ........  ........  ........        X   ........        X   ........  ........
Nonnuclear components...........        X         X   ........  ........  ........  ........        X   ........
Nuclear components:
    --Pits......................  ........        X   ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........
    --Second aries and cases....  ........  ........  ........  ........        X   ........  ........  ........
High explosives components......  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........        X   ........  ........
Tritium Extraction, Loading and   ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........        X
 Unloading......................
High explosives R&D.............  ........        X         X   ........  ........        X         X   ........
Tritium R&D.....................  ........        X         X   ........  ........  ........  ........        X
Large Scale Hydrotesting........  ........        X         X         X   ........  ........  ........  ........
Category I/II SNM Storage.......  ........        X         X         X         X         X         X         X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The No Action Alternative also includes continuation of 
environmental testing at current locations and flight-testing 
activities at the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada.

Reduced Operations and Capability-Based Complex Alternative

    In this alternative, NNSA would maintain a basic capability for 
manufacturing technologies for all stockpile weapons, as well as 
laboratory and experimental capabilities to support stockpile 
decisions, but would reduce production facilities to a ``capability-
based'' \6\ capacity. This alternative would not have a production 
capacity sufficient to meet current national security objectives. This 
alternative would be defined as follows:
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    \6\ The capability to manufacture and assemble nuclear weapons 
at a nominal level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Do not construct and operate a consolidated plutonium 
center for long-term R&D, surveillance, and manufacturing operations; 
and do not expand pit production at LANL beyond 50 certified pits per 
year.
     Reduce the number of sites with Category I/II SNM and 
consolidate SNM to fewer locations within a given site.
     Consolidate, relocate or eliminate duplicative facilities 
and programs and improve operating efficiencies, including at 
facilities for nuclear materials storage, tritium R&D, high explosives 
R&D, environmental testing facilities, and hydrotesting facilities.
     Identify one or more sites for conducting NNSA flight test 
operations. Existing DOD and DOE test ranges (e.g. White Sands Missile 
Range in New Mexico and Nevada Test Site in Nevada) would be considered 
as potential alternatives to the continued operation of the Tonopah 
Test Range in Nevada.
     Production capacities at Pantex, Y-12, and the Savannah 
River Site would be considered for further reductions limited by the 
capability-based capacity.
     NNSA would continue dismantlement activities.
    Proposal Not Being Considered for Further Analysis. The SEAB Task 
Force on the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure recommended that 
NNSA pursue a consolidated nuclear production center (CNPC) as a single 
facility for all research, development, and production activities 
relating to nuclear weapons that involve significant amounts (i.e. 
Category I/II quantities) of SNM. The CNPC, as envisioned by the SEAB 
Task Force, would contain all the nuclear weapons manufacturing, 
production, assembly, and disassembly facilities and associated weapon 
surveillance and maintenance activities for the stockpile weapons. The 
CNPC would include the plutonium activities of the consolidated 
plutonium center proposed by NNSA in its Complex 2030 vision, as well 
as the consolidated activities of the uranium, tritium, and high 
explosive operations. DOE believes that creation of a CNPC is not a 
reasonable alternative and does not intend to analyze it as an 
alternative in the SEIS because of the technical and schedule issues 
involved in constructing a CNPC, as well as associated costs. NNSA 
invites and will consider comments on this matter during the scoping 
process.
    The SEAB Task Force developed three business cases for transforming 
the nuclear weapons complex, two of which were characterized as high 
risk. Its preferred least-risk option was to establish a CNPC 
``quickly'' by accelerating site selection, NEPA analyses, regulatory 
approvals, and construction. The Task Force assumed that NNSA could, 
under these circumstances, begin operating a CNPC in 2015, start 
consolidation of SNM shortly thereafter, accelerate dismantlements, and 
begin other major transformational activities. Until the CNPC was 
completed, NNSA would have to maintain, and in some cases improve, 
existing production and research facilities. According to the Task 
Force's estimates, this option would require an additional 1 billion 
dollars per year for weapons programs

[[Page 61736]]

activities for the next 10 years, and lead to a net savings through 
2030 of 15 billion dollars.
    Accelerated construction of a CNPC would not allow NNSA to avoid 
immediate expenditures to restore and modernize interim production 
capabilities to meet essential Life Extension Program (LEP) schedules 
and support the existing stockpile during the next decade. LEP is the 
refurbishment of nuclear weapons parts and components to extend the 
weapon deployment life. NNSA has concluded that the SEAB Task Force 
underestimated the nonfinancial challenges of constructing a CNPC. A 
CNPC would require moving a unique and highly skilled workforce to a 
new location. It would require NNSA to obtain significant regulatory 
approvals rapidly, and to construct a unique and complex facility on a 
tight schedule. It would put many of the significant aspects of the 
weapons complex transformation into ``one basket''--until the CNPC 
began operations, all the other facilities and activities would be 
delayed. NNSA's Proposed Action would achieve many of the benefits of 
the CNPC approach--consolidation of SNM and facilities, integrated R&D 
and production involving SNM, and aggressive dismantlements--in a way 
that addresses immediate national security needs in a technically 
feasible and affordable manner.
    Nuclear Materials Consolidation: DOE is pursuing SNM consolidation 
from all DOE sites including those that comprise the nuclear weapons 
complex. The SEIS will look at alternatives for the storage and 
consolidation of nuclear materials within the nuclear weapons complex 
including materials needed to maintain the United States' nuclear 
weapons arsenal. There is a potential overlap between the SEIS and the 
activities of the Department's other nuclear materials consolidation 
activities, and DOE will ensure that there is appropriate coordination 
between the two activities.
    Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility: NNSA 
issued a Draft Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
on Stockpile Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility (MPF) 
on June 4, 2003 (68 FR 33487; also 68 FR 33934, June 6, 2003) that 
analyzed alternatives for producing the plutonium pits that are an 
essential component of nuclear weapons. On January 28, 2004, NNSA 
announced that it was indefinitely postponing any decision on how it 
would obtain a large capacity pit manufacturing facility. Because the 
Complex 2030 SEIS will analyze alternatives for plutonium-related 
activities that include pit production, DOE, effective upon publication 
of this NOI, cancels the MPF PEIS.
    Public Scoping Process: The scoping process is an opportunity for 
the public to assist the NNSA in determining the issues for analysis. 
NNSA will hold public scoping meetings at locations identified in this 
NOI. The purpose of these meetings is to provide the public with an 
opportunity to present oral and written comments, ask questions, and 
discuss concerns regarding the transformation of the nuclear weapons 
complex and the SEIS with NNSA officials. Comments and recommendations 
can also be communicated to NNSA as discussed earlier in this notice.
    Complex 2030 PEIS Supplement Preparation Process: The SEIS 
preparation process begins with the publication of this NOI in the 
Federal Register. NNSA will consider all public comments that it 
receives during the public comment period in preparing the draft SEIS. 
NNSA expects to issue the draft SEIS for public review during the 
summer of 2007. Public comments on the draft SEIS will be received 
during a comment period of at least 45 days following the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency's publication of the Notice of 
Availability in the Federal Register. Notices placed in local 
newspapers will specify dates and locations for public hearings on the 
draft SEIS and will establish a schedule for submitting comments on the 
draft SEIS, including a final date for submission of comments. Issuance 
of the final SEIS is scheduled for 2008.
    Classified Material: NNSA will review classified material while 
preparing the SEIS. Within the limits of classification, NNSA will 
provide the public as much information as possible to assist its 
understanding and ability to comment. Any classified material needed to 
explain the purpose and need for the action, or the analyses in the 
SEIS, will be segregated into a classified appendix or supplement, 
which will not be available for public review. However, all 
unclassified information or results of calculations using classified 
data will be reported in the unclassified section of the SEIS, to the 
extent possible in accordance with federal classification requirements.

    Issued in Washington, DC on October 11, 2006.
Linton F. Brooks,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
 [FR Doc. E6-17508 Filed 10-18-06; 8:45 am]
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