[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 192 (Wednesday, October 4, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58634-58638]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-16357]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251]


Florida Power & Light Company; Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 
3 and 4 Exemption

1.0 Background

    The Florida Power & Light Company (FPL, the licensee) is the holder 
of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41, which authorize 
operation of the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and 4. The 
licenses provide, among other things, that the facility is subject to 
all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC, the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors located in 
Miami-Dade County, approximately 25 miles south of Miami, Florida.

2.0 Request/Action

    Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, 
Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3 addresses fire protection features for 
assuring alternative or dedicated shutdown capability in the event of a 
fire, and requires that fire detection and a fixed fire suppression 
system be installed in the area, room, or zone where equipment or 
components are relied on for the assured shutdown capability. FPL 
requests exemption from the requirements of Subsection III.G.3 of 10 
CFR 50, Appendix R, for fixed suppression in the Mechanical Equipment 
Room and for detection and fixed suppression on the Control Room Roof, 
at Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, on the basis that the existing fire 
barriers at Turkey Point, together with fire protection measures, low 
combustible loading, and administrative controls in place, satisfy the 
underlying intent of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3.
    In summary, by letter dated December 27, 2004, as supplemented May 
23, 2005, January 13, 2006, and July 12, 2006, FPL requests exemption 
from the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3, for 
fixed suppression in the Mechanical Equipment Room and for detection 
and fixed suppression on the Control Room Roof, at Turkey Point, Units 
3 and 4.

3.0 Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security, and 
(2) when special circumstances are present.
    The underlying purpose of Subsection III.G.3 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 
R is to require alternative or dedicated shutdown capability where (a) 
fire protection of systems necessary for hot shutdown does not meet 
Subsection III.G.2, or (b) redundant trains of systems necessary for 
hot shutdown are located in the same fire area and may be subject to 
damage from fire suppression activities or systems. In addition, 
III.G.3 requires fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system in 
the area, room, or zone under consideration.
    The staff examined information supplied by the licensee in support 
of the exemption request and concluded that special circumstances exist 
in that, with the installation of the fire detection system in the 
Mechanical Equipment Room proposed by the licensee, the existing fire 
protection features in and accessible for the specific fire zones (FZs) 
referenced for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, and the administrative 
controls for combustibles, the facility meets the underlying purpose of 
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3. The following evaluation 
provides the basis for this conclusion.

3.1 Background

    The NRC approved the alternate shutdown capability proposed by the 
licensee for Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, for compliance with the 
requirements of III.G.3, in a safety evaluation dated April 16, 1984. 
At that time, the licensee identified three fire areas that could be 
subject to the condition specified in III.G.3.b, which states, 
``(w)here redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located 
in the same fire area may be subject to damage from fire suppression 
activities * * *, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system 
shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration.'' 
The three affected fire areas were the Control Room, Cable Spreading 
Room, and North-South Breezeway. To resolve these vulnerabilities, the 
licensee proposed plant modifications and procedure revisions that the 
staff found acceptable for compliance with III.G.3.
    However, in February 2004, during an NRC triennial fire inspection 
at Turkey Point, the inspection team reviewed fire protection systems, 
features, and equipment, and found that all FZs supporting the 
alternate safe shutdown function for the Control Room (Fire Area MM) do 
not provide full area fire detection and a fixed suppression system in 
accordance with the requirements of III.G.3, quoted above, for both 
reactor units. Specifically, the Mechanical Equipment Room, the Main 
Control Room, and Control Room Roof are identified in the plant fire 
protection program report as alternative safe shutdown areas for, and 
thereby part of, the Control Room. However, the Mechanical Equipment 
Room does not have full area detection and fixed suppression.
    In response to this inspection finding, the licensee declared the 
detection and suppression inoperable for the Mechanical Equipment Room 
(and the Control Room Roof, which also fails to provide detection and 
fixed suppression) and established an hourly fire watch. An exemption 
from these detection and suppression requirements is now requested for 
the Control Room Roof, and an exemption from suppression requirements 
is requested for the Mechanical Equipment Room. The licensee proposes 
installation of area detection in the Mechanical Equipment Room.

3.2 Existing Fire Protection Features

    Fire Area MM is the Unit 3 and 4 Control Room, located at the 42-
foot elevation level of the plant. It is a multiple zone area 
consisting of FZs 106 (the Main Control Room), 106R (the Control Room 
Roof), and 97 (the Mechanical Equipment Room). FZs 97 and 106R contain 
redundant trains of air-conditioning equipment that support the 
habitability and operability of Fire Area MM. The licensee's fire 
protection program report identifies FZs 97, 106, and 106R as the 
alternative shutdown capability for Fire Area MM. FZ 106R is located 
outdoors at the plant's 58-foot elevation on the control building roof. 
The flooring is tar and gravel on a concrete base, occupying a section 
of the roof with an area of approximately 640 square feet. Three 
heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) condensing units for 
the control room are located here. The licensee's submittal states that 
motors, cable and

[[Page 58635]]

raceway protection, and tar material make up its in situ \1\ 
combustible load.
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    \1\ Fixed in place as part of the construction, fabrication, or 
installation of a plant structure, system, or component.
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    The licensee states that redundant safe shutdown components and 
circuits in this zone are protected by at least 10 feet of separation 
or by 25-minute rated Thermo-Lag fire barrier. This is in conformance 
with an exemption from separation and protection requirements for the 
control room roof, which the NRC granted on May 4, 1999. The licensee's 
submittal states that the proposed exemption request does not supersede 
the exemption from separation and protection requirements granted by 
the NRC in May 1999.
    The submittal describes the suppression capability for this zone as 
consisting of three portable fire extinguishers located near the roof 
access stairs at the 42-foot elevation on the turbine deck, with an 
additional three extinguishers located at the 30-foot elevation on the 
mezzanine level. In addition, a hose station with 75 feet of hose is 
located on the turbine deck near the roof access stairs and a hose 
station with 100 feet of hose is located at the mezzanine level near 
the stairway. The hose in this building is 1.5 inches (minimum), with 
1.5 inch (minimum) electrically-safe fog nozzles, and threading 
compatible with that used by local fire departments. No area detection 
is provided in FZ 106R.
    FZ 97 is an enclosed room located adjacent to the Cable Spreading 
Room at the 30-foot elevation, just below the Main Control Room. It has 
377 square feet of floor area and houses the safety-related emergency 
recirculating filter unit and the air handling supply fans for the main 
control room. The licensee's submittal identifies cable insulation, 
charcoal, and motors as the in situ combustible loading for this zone. 
The walls, floor, and ceiling are concrete block or reinforced 
concrete, providing 3-hour rated fire barrier protection.
    An ionization smoke detector is installed in FZ 97 inside the air-
handling exhaust downstream of the motors and charcoal filter. If 
actuated, the detector initiates an alarm in the Control Room to alert 
operators to summon the fire brigade to respond with manual (not fixed) 
fire suppression. No full area detection is provided in FZ 97. No fixed 
suppression is provided.
    The submittal identifies nearby suppression capabilities for this 
zone consisting of four portable fire extinguishers located at the 30-
foot elevation on the mezzanine level. In addition, a hose station is 
located on the mezzanine level outside the cable spreading room with 
100 feet of hose. Area detection and a Halon suppression system are 
also provided in the cable spreading room adjacent to FZ 97.

3.3 Evaluation

    The 2001 fire hazards analysis (FHA) in the Turkey Point Fire 
Protection Program Report describes each fire area, including details 
(i.e., listings of essential equipment, combustible loadings, fire 
boundaries and barriers, detection capability, suppression systems, and 
venting capability) for each FZ in the fire area. The NRC staff 
reviewed these details for FZs 106R and 97 to determine what fire 
protection features were relied on to assure the defense-in-depth 
elements of adequate fire suppression and detection. In situ 
combustible loading must be considered in determining the level of 
suppression and detection needed. The staff's evaluation of in situ 
combustible loadings for each FZ is discussed below.
    For transient combustibles, Turkey Point has implemented 
administrative controls through programs and procedures such as the 
Transient Combustible Permit Program and designated Transient 
Combustible Control Areas. Associated procedures include such controls 
as visual posting of transient fire loads, labeling of storage 
containers, and required attendance while certain types of combustibles 
are located in the specific FZ. During plant activities, these controls 
also ensure that restrictions are placed on fire loading added and/or 
that appropriate fire suppression is available during temporary 
increases in combustible loading. They also control the location and 
duration of hot work. These administrative controls for the transport 
and storage of combustible material apply throughout the plant, 
including FZs 106R and 97, and are based on the in situ combustible 
load and ignition sources in the zone (identified in the FHA), the 
types and amounts of combustibles introduced into the area, how the 
transient combustibles are stored, and on the potential for spillage 
(which is minimized by procedure).
3.3.1 FZ 106R--Control Room Roof
    The safe shutdown equipment in this FZ consists of three HVAC 
condensing units for the control room. Fire protection features include 
an absence of significant fire loading, separation and fire barriers to 
protect redundant trains of equipment, nearby suppression capabilities, 
and an open air configuration.
    The in situ combustible load for this zone is identified in the 
licensee's submittal as motors, cable and raceway protection, and tar 
and gravel roofing materials. However, the staff found that the FHA 
list of in situ combustibles for this FZ (on page 9.6A-230 (Rev. 8) of 
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)) excludes the tar 
roofing material. Therefore, as stated in its July 12, 2006, letter, 
the licensee intends to revise this page of the FHA to include the 
combustible tar material in the list of combustibles. In addition, the 
licensee estimated the potential heat load contribution from the tar 
material, using the specific heat value for petroleum-based materials 
(i.e., 20,000 British Thermal Units (BTU) per pound), as 52,000 BTU per 
square foot. The FHA considers a significant combustible load for 
outdoor areas to be greater than the equivalent of 200 gallons of 
combustible liquid, or 68 million BTU. Therefore, with approximately 
640 square feet of floor area in this zone, the revised heat load 
estimate would be 34 million BTU, which is not a significant 
combustible load. However, since it is not a negligible quantity, the 
FHA heat load characterization for this FZ on UFSAR page 9.6A-230 will 
also be revised accordingly. This revision to the FHA will not 
significantly affect the results of the FHA, but will provide 
completeness and consistency with the description in the licensee's 
submittal. The FHA page revisions will be handled under the licensee's 
normal process for UFSAR updates. The licensee's evaluation and 
supporting calculations confirmed the staff's expectation that the 
roofing material is not a significant fire load. This, together with 
the licensee's actions to include the roofing material in the FHA, 
resolved the staff's concern.
    The licensee's December 27, 2004, submittal states that ``redundant 
safe shutdown components and circuits are protected by at least 10 feet 
of separation or by 25-minute Thermo-Lag fire rated barrier'' for FZ 
106R. The licensee further states that ``this exemption request does 
not supersede the exemption from separation and protection requirements 
granted by the NRC in May 4, 1999.'' These issues refer to an earlier 
review of an exemption request for this FZ which relates to this 
review.
    In 1998, the staff denied the licensee's exemption request for FZ 
106R from the requirements of III.G.2.a, based on the uncertainty of 
the combustibility and fire classification of the roof. In 1999, the 
staff granted the licensee an exemption for FZ 106R from the 
requirements of III.G.2.a, based on

[[Page 58636]]

raceway protection and separation consistent with that described in 
Section 3.2 above. Also, based on the licensee's evaluation of the 
construction of the roof flooring composite (e.g., the type and amount 
of tar material used, the specifications of gravel applied over the tar 
material to improve its fire protection performance, and its similarity 
to other Class A \2\ roofing configurations), the staff concluded there 
was reasonable assurance that the level of fire safety provided by the 
roof is equivalent to a Class A design.
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    \2\ According to the Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., Roofing 
Materials and Systems Directory, Class A includes roof coverings 
which are effective against severe fire exposures. Under such 
exposures roof coverings of this class are not readily flammable and 
do not carry or communicate fire; afford a fairly high degree of 
fire protection to the roof deck; do not slip from position; possess 
no flying brand hazard; and do not require frequent repairs in order 
to maintain their fire resisting properties.
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    The licensee now seeks an exemption from III.G.3 for this FZ since 
it functions as a component of Fire Area MM, which provides an 
alternate shutdown capability in accordance with III.G.3. The staff's 
conclusion in 1999 was based on the licensee's comparative evaluation 
and the existing separation and protection configuration. However, the 
exemption request currently under review applies to III.G.3, which does 
not impose separation and protection requirements for safety-related 
equipment in the area.
    Because the composite tar and gravel flooring in FZ 106R was not 
tested by the Underwriters Laboratories (UL) and, therefore, is not 
listed by UL, and the licensee has performed no separate combustible 
loading analysis on this unique flooring, the licensee's comparative 
evaluation in 1999 requires the additional defense-in-depth element of 
the separation and protection (or comparable) configuration, described 
in Section 3.2 above, to provide reasonable assurance that the control 
room roof will provide an adequate level of fire safety for post-fire 
safe shutdown.
    Primary suppression for this FZ is supplied by eleven nearby 
portable fire extinguishers. The licensee's submittal identifies six 
extinguishers in FZs 105 and 117 (described in Section 3.2). The staff 
found that the FHA (on page 9.6A-230 of the UFSAR) also identifies the 
five fire extinguishers in the Control Room for primary suppression in 
this zone. Therefore, operators responding to a fire in this zone, from 
the Control Room or from nearby areas, can minimize their response 
times by using those extinguishers that are most accessible. The 
licensee stated in its July 12, 2006, letter that it intends to revise 
this page of the FHA to include all eleven extinguishers.
    Secondary suppression is provided by nearby hose stations. The 
nearest hose station, which is located at the 42-foot elevation (the 
turbine deck) just outside the roof access stairway, has 75 feet of 
hose for additional suppression capability, providing stream access to 
all points in FZ 106R located on the 58-foot elevation.
    The combination of the primary and secondary sources of suppression 
provide reasonable assurance of adequate suppression capability, given 
the open air configuration and absence of any significant combustible 
and ignition source loading in this zone.
3.3.2 FZ 97--Mechanical Equipment Room
    The safe shutdown equipment in this FZ consists of the emergency 
recirculating filter unit and the air handling supply fans for the 
control room. Fire protection features in FZ 97 include nearby 
suppression capabilities, a component-specific detector, administrative 
controls for combustibles, ventilation capability, and rated fire 
barriers for the walls, floor, and ceiling.
    In situ combustible loadings are identified in the FHA as cable 
insulation, oil (motor), pipe insulation, and charcoal. Cable 
insulation was quantified as 252 pounds (lbs), for a potential heat 
load of 3.3 million BTU, and Charcoal as 250 lbs, with a potential heat 
load of 4.5 million BTU. Oil and pipe insulation are present in such 
small quantities that they contribute a negligible heat load. The 
staff, therefore, concludes that the combustible and ignition source 
loading in this zone is not significant.
    The walls, floor, and ceiling are concrete block or reinforced 
concrete, providing 3-hour rated fire barrier protection.
    Although no full area detection is provided in FZ 97, the licensee 
proposes to install area detection to satisfy the detection 
requirements of III.G.3. New ionization detectors that meet the 
requirements of the latest edition of National Fire Protection 
Association Standard 72 will be installed outside of any direct, 
forced-air flow paths in FZ 97. If actuated, the detectors will 
initiate an alarm in the Main Control Room to alert operators to summon 
the fire brigade to respond with manual fire suppression. An existing 
ionization smoke detector is located inside the air handling duct work 
downstream of the motors and charcoal filter, also with a Main Control 
Room alarm. With the installation of area detection as described above, 
the detection provided in FZ 97 will be acceptable for compliance with 
III.G.3.
    No fixed suppression is located in this zone. However, four nearby 
portable fire extinguishers (described in Section 3.2) provide an 
adequate primary suppression capability for the combustible and 
ignition source loading in this zone, with the hose station at the 30-
foot elevation (the mezzanine level) as a secondary means of 
suppression with 100 feet of hose providing stream access to all points 
in FZ 97. The primary and secondary sources of suppression provide 
reasonable assurance of adequate suppression capability, given the 
installation of detection, as described above, and the absence of any 
significant combustible and ignition source loading in this zone.
    The staff asked the licensee to provide information on whether a 
fire that caused failure of the safety-related equipment in either FZ 
97 or 106R, resulting in loss of Main Control Room HVAC equipment, 
would challenge the safe shutdown capability of the plant. The licensee 
responded that, with no reduction in the Main Control Room heat load, 
the rise in Main Control Room temperature for this scenario, although 
not analyzed for these FZs specifically, is expected to be consistent 
with or bounded by the rate of temperature increase during a complete 
loss of HVAC for other individual rooms in the Control Building, 
including the Computer Room, which results in bulk ambient temperatures 
that remain below 104[deg] F during the first hour of the event without 
compensatory cooling. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that a 
minimum of greater than 30 minutes would be available before a loss of 
Control Room habitability. If the Control Room is evacuated, the plant 
is shut down from the Alternate Shutdown Panel. Each unit has an 
Alternate Shutdown Panel, located in the Unit's ``B'' Switchgear Room, 
with adequate controls to bring the plant to hot standby. A minimum of 
greater than 30 minutes is sufficient time for operators to either shut 
down the plant from the Main Control Room or to evacuate the Main 
Control Room due to high temperature and safely shut down the plant 
from the Alternate Shutdown Panel.
3.3.3 Risk Analysis
    Because the combustibles and ignition source loading are not 
significant for this zone and the suppression capability more than 
adequate, no risk analysis was performed by the licensee for lack of 
detection and fixed suppression. However, the NRC's Turkey Point

[[Page 58637]]

Triennial Fire Inspection Report, dated March 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML040890083), states that the NRC staff analyzed the safety 
significance of the lack of detection and fixed suppression using NRC 
Inspection Manual Chapter 609, ``Significance Determination Process,'' 
Appendix F. The staff concluded that the condition had very low safety 
significance.
3.3.4 Defense-in-Depth
    Section II of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, states that a licensee's fire 
protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire 
protection with the following objectives:
     To prevent fires from starting,
     To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those 
fires that do occur, and
     To provide protection for structures, systems and 
components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly 
extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the 
safe shutdown of the plant.
    Regulatory Guide 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the 
Licensing Basis,'' also identifies factors to be considered when 
evaluating defense-in-depth for a risk-informed change. The staff has 
evaluated the elements of defense-in-depth used for fire protection at 
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant that are applicable to the FZs under review. 
For FZ 106R, based on a configuration of separation and fire barrier 
protection of redundant trains of safety-related equipment, the absence 
of significant fire loading, adequate primary and secondary suppression 
capabilities, the open-air configuration, implementation of transient 
combustibles controls, and sufficient time for operators to respond to 
a fire in this zone, the staff finds that fixed suppression and 
detection are not necessary to ensure safe shutdown of the plant and 
meet the underlying intent of the rule (Subsection III.G.3 to 10 CFR 
50, Appendix R). For FZ 97, based on fire barrier protection in the 
walls, floor and ceiling; existing (and installation of proposed) fire 
detection, adequate primary and secondary suppression capabilities, 
implementation of transient combustibles controls, sufficient time for 
operators to respond to a fire in this zone, and the absence of 
significant fire loading, the staff finds that fixed suppression is not 
necessary to ensure safe shutdown of the plant and meet the underlying 
intent of the rule. Therefore, based on the staff's analysis, defense-
in-depth is maintained.
    Special Circumstances. Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 
CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present whenever application of the regulation 
in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose 
of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of 
the rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection 
III.G.3. is to assure alternative or dedicated shutdown capability in 
the event of a fire. Based on the evaluation presented in Section 3.3, 
the staff finds that fixed suppression and detection in FZ 106R and 
fixed suppression in FZ 97 are not necessary to ensure safe shutdown of 
the plant and meet the underlying intent of the rule. For FZ 106R, the 
combination of the primary and secondary sources of suppression provide 
reasonable assurance of adequate suppression capability, given the open 
air configuration and absence of any significant combustible and 
ignition source loading in this zone. For FZ 97, the primary and 
secondary sources of suppression provide reasonable assurance of 
adequate suppression capability, given the proposed installation of 
detection, as described above, and the absence of any significant 
combustible and ignition source loading in this zone. Also, for a fire 
in either zone, there would be adequate time to evacuate the Control 
Room, if necessary, and shut down the plant from the Alternate Shutdown 
Panel. Therefore, since the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 
R, Subsection II.G.3 is achieved, the special circumstances required by 
10 CFR 50.12 for the granting of an exemption from 10 CFR 50 exist.
    Authorized by Law. This exemption would waive the requirements of 
Subsection III.G.3 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, for fixed suppression in 
the Mechanical Equipment Room and for fixed suppression and detection 
on the Control Room Roof, at Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4. As stated 
above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant exemptions from the 
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC staff has determined that 
granting of the licensee's proposed exemption is permissible under the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's 
regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.
    No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety. The underlying purpose 
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3. is to assure alternative 
or dedicated shutdown capability in the event of a fire. As noted 
above, the staff finds that the proposed exemption utilizes the 
existing fire barriers at Turkey Point, together with fire protection 
measures, low combustible loading, and administrative controls in 
place, to satisfy the underlying intent of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, 
Subsection III.G.3. Thus, no new accident precursors are created by the 
proposed exemption, and the probability of postulated accidents is not 
increased. Similarly, the consequences of postulated accidents are not 
increased. Therefore, there is no undue risk [since risk is probability 
x consequences] to public health and safety.
    Consistent with Common Defense and Security. The proposed exemption 
would waive the requirements of Subsection III.G.3 of 10 CFR 50, 
Appendix R, for fixed suppression in the Mechanical Equipment Room and 
for fixed suppression and detection on the Control Room Roof, at Turkey 
Point, Units 3 and 4. This change in fire protection requirements has 
no relation to security issues. Therefore, the common defense and 
security are not impacted by this exemption.

4.0 Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), special circumstances are present such that application of 
the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the 
underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the 
underlying purpose of the rule. In addition, the Commission has 
determined that the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the 
common defense and security. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants 
FPL an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, 
Section III.G.3, to provide area detection and a fixed fire suppression 
system in FZ 106R and to provide a fixed fire suppression system in FZ 
97 for the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and 4, subject to the 
installation of proposed area fire detection in FZ 97 (discussed in 
Section 3.3.2 above). The granting of this exemption is contingent upon 
installation of the proposed area fire detection in FZ 97, maintaining 
existing or comparable separation and protection for redundant safe 
shutdown equipment in FZ 106R, the availability of manual firefighting 
and associated firefighting equipment, and maintaining existing or 
comparable administrative controls for combustibles.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the

[[Page 58638]]

human environment (71 FR 56188, dated September 26, 2006).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of September 2006.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Catherine Haney,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E6-16357 Filed 10-3-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P