

**Unsafe Condition**

(d) This AD results from several reports indicating that some chemical oxygen generators failed to activate during in-flight decompression events. These failures were due to fracture of components between the passenger oxygen mask and the release pin in the oxygen generator. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the activation mechanism of the chemical oxygen generator, which could result in the unavailability of supplemental oxygen and possible incapacitation of passengers and cabin crew during an in-flight decompression.

**Compliance**

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

**Modification**

(f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD: Modify the activation mechanism in the chemical oxygen generator of each passenger service unit (PSU) by doing all the applicable actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of the applicable service bulletin in Table 1 of this AD.

**Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)**

(g)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards Certificate Holding District Office.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 6, 2006.

**Ali Bahrami,**

*Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,  
Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. E6-11021 Filed 7-12-06; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION****Federal Aviation Administration****14 CFR Part 39**

[Docket No. FAA-2006-25337; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-138-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

**Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 airplanes. This proposed AD would require inspecting the three-phase circuit breakers and three-phase circuit breaker panels for discrepancies; and fixing any discrepancy and replacing unserviceable units with new units, if necessary. This proposed AD results from reports of three-phase circuit breakers overheating on in-service airplanes. We are proposing this AD to prevent failure of a three-phase circuit breaker. Such failure could prevent an electrical load from being isolated from its electrical supply, which could result in smoke or fire in the flight deck.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by August 14, 2006.

**ADDRESSES:** Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this proposed AD.

- *DOT Docket Web site:* Go to <http://dms.dot.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- *Government-wide rulemaking Web site:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- *Mail:* Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590.

- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.

- *Hand Delivery:* Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Contact British Aerospace Regional Aircraft American Support, 13850 Mclearen Road, Herndon, Virginia 20171, for service information identified in this proposed AD.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**

Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-1175; fax (425) 227-1149.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:****Comments Invited**

We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or arguments regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed in the **ADDRESSES** section. Include the docket number "FAA-2006-25337; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-138-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the proposed AD in light of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://dms.dot.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review the DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the **Federal Register** published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you may visit <http://dms.dot.gov>.

**Examining the Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://dms.dot.gov>, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT street address stated in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System receives them.

**Discussion**

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the airworthiness authority for the European Union, notified us that an unsafe condition may exist on all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 airplanes. The EASA advises that three-phase circuit breakers, which are used at various locations throughout the airplane (but predominantly in the under floor electrical bay and the flight deck) have overheated on in-service airplanes. The possible cause of the overheating is the age-related deterioration of the three-phase circuit breakers. Failure of a three-phase circuit breaker, if not corrected, could prevent an electrical load from being isolated from its electrical supply, which could result in smoke or fire in the flight deck.

**Relevant Service Information**

BAE Systems (Operations) Limited has issued Inspection Service Bulletin ISB.24-141, dated August 15, 2005. The inspection service bulletin describes procedures for performing a detailed visual inspection of the three-phase circuit breakers and three-phase circuit

breaker panels for discrepancies (such as physical damage, cracks, deterioration, corrosion, discoloration, contamination by foreign objects, and missing or improperly installed terminal connections or attachments), fixing any discrepancy and replacing unserviceable units with new units, if necessary. Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is intended to adequately address the unsafe condition. The EASA mandated the service information and issued airworthiness directive 2006-0132, dated May 18, 2006, to ensure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes in the European Union.

#### FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD

This airplane model is manufactured in the United Kingdom and is type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. As described in FAA Order 8100.14A, "Interim Procedures for Working with the European Community on Airworthiness Certification and Continued Airworthiness," dated August 12, 2005, the EASA has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. We have examined the EASA's findings, evaluated all pertinent information, and determined that we need to issue an AD for airplanes of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.

#### Clarification of Inspection Terminology

In this proposed AD, the "detailed visual inspection" specified in the BAE Systems (Operations) Limited inspection service bulletin is referred to as a "detailed inspection." We have included the definition for a detailed inspection in a note in the proposed AD.

#### Costs of Compliance

This proposed AD would affect about 368 airplanes of U.S. registry. The proposed inspection would take about 5 work hours per airplane, at an average labor rate of \$80 per work hour. Based on these figures, the estimated cost of the proposed AD for U.S. operators is \$147,200, or \$400 per airplane.

#### Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, "General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

#### Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed regulation:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the **ADDRESSES** section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

#### The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

#### PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

##### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

**BAE Systems (Operations) Limited**  
(Formerly British Aerospace Regional

**Aircraft**): Docket No. FAA-2006-25337; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-138-AD.

#### Comments Due Date

- (a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by August 14, 2006.

#### Affected ADs

- (b) None.

#### Applicability

- (c) This AD applies to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model Bae 146-100A, -200A, and -300A series airplanes, certificated in any category.

#### Unsafe Condition

- (d) This AD results from reports of three-phase circuit breakers overheating on in-service airplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of a three-phase circuit breaker. Such failure could prevent an electrical load from being isolated from its electrical supply, which could result in smoke or fire in the flight deck.

#### Compliance

- (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

#### Detailed Inspection and Corrective Actions

- (f) Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, do a detailed inspection of the three-phase circuit breakers and three-phase circuit breaker panels for discrepancies (including but not limited to physical damage, cracks, deterioration, corrosion, discoloration, contamination by foreign objects, and missing or improperly installed terminal connections or attachments), in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Inspection Service Bulletin ISB.24-141, dated August 15, 2005. If any discrepancy is found, before further flight, fix the discrepancy and replace unserviceable units with new units, as applicable, in accordance with the inspection service bulletin.

**Note 1:** For the purposes of this AD, a detailed inspection is: "An intensive examination of a specific item, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be necessary. Surface cleaning and elaborate procedures may be required."

#### No Reporting

- (g) Although the inspection service bulletin referenced in this AD specifies to submit certain information to the manufacturer, this AD does not include that requirement.

#### Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

- (h)(1) The Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards Certificate Holding District Office.

#### Related Information

(i) The European Aviation Safety Agency airworthiness directive 2006-0132, dated May 18, 2006, also addresses the subject of this AD.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 6, 2006.

Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,  
Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E6-11022 Filed 7-12-06; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2006-25326; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-081-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757-200 and -300 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 757-200 and -300 series airplanes. This proposed AD would require changes to existing wiring; installation of new circuit breakers, relays, relay connectors, and wiring; and replacement of certain circuit breakers with higher-rated circuit breakers. For certain airplanes, this proposed AD also requires modification of wiring of the control module assembly for the electrical systems. This proposed AD results from an in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems review. We are proposing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew is able to turn off electrical power to the IFE system through utility bus switches in the flight compartment. The flightcrew's inability to turn off power to the IFE system during a non-normal or emergency situation could result in the inability to control smoke or fumes in the airplane flight deck or cabin.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by August 28, 2006.

**ADDRESSES:** Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this proposed AD.

- *DOT Docket Web site:* Go to <http://dms.dot.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- *Government-wide rulemaking Web site:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- *Mail:* Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590.

- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.

- *Hand Delivery:* Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207, for the service information identified in this proposed AD.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Natalie Phan-Tran, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5343; fax (562) 627-5210.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Comments Invited

We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or arguments regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed in the **ADDRESSES** section. Include the docket number "FAA-2006-25326; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-081-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the proposed AD in light of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://dms.dot.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the **Federal Register** published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you may visit <http://dms.dot.gov>.

#### Examining the Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://dms.dot.gov>, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT street address stated in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System receives them.

#### Discussion

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) completed a review of in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems certified by supplemental type certificate (STC) and installed on transport category airplanes. The review focused on the interface between the IFE system and airplane electrical system, with the objective of determining if any unsafe conditions exist with regard to the interface. STCs issued between 1992 and 2000 were considered for the review.

The type of IFE systems considered for review were those that contain video monitors (cathode ray tubes or liquid crystal displays; either hanging above the aisle or mounted on individual seat backs or seat trays), or complex circuitry (i.e., power supplies, electronic distribution boxes, extensive wire routing, relatively high power consumption, multiple layers of circuit protection, etc.). In addition, in-seat power supply systems that provide power to more than 20 percent of the total passenger seats were also considered for the review. The types of IFE systems not considered for review include systems that provide only audio signals to each passenger seat, ordinary in-flight telephone systems (e.g., one telephone handset per group of seats or bulkhead-mounted telephones), systems that have only a video monitor on the forward bulkhead(s) (or a projection system) to provide passengers with basic airplane and flight information, and in-seat power supply systems that provide power to less than 20 percent of the total passenger seats.

Items considered during the review include the following:

- Can the electrical bus(es) supplying power to the IFE system be de-energized when necessary without removing power from systems that may be required for continued safe flight and landing?
- Can IFE system power be removed when required without pulling IFE system circuit breakers (i.e., is there a