[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 134 (Thursday, July 13, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 39593-39595]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-11021]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 134 / Thursday, July 13, 2006 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 39593]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2006-25336; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-070-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500, -600,
-700, -800 and -900 Series Airplanes; and Model 757-200 and -300 Series
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD)
for certain Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700, -800 and -900
series airplanes; and Model 757-200 and -300 series airplanes. This
proposed AD would require modifying the activation mechanism in the
chemical oxygen generator of each passenger service unit (PSU). This
proposed AD results from several reports indicating that some chemical
oxygen generators failed to activate during in-flight decompression
events. These failures were due to fracture of components between the
passenger oxygen mask and the release pin in the oxygen generator. We
are proposing this AD to prevent failure of the activation mechanism of
the chemical oxygen generator, which could result in the unavailability
of supplemental oxygen and possible incapacitation of passengers and
cabin crew during an in-flight decompression.
DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by August 28, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on
this proposed AD.
DOT Docket Web site: Go to http://dms.dot.gov and follow
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124-2207, for the service information identified in this
proposed AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan Letcher, Aerospace Engineer,
Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 917-6474; fax (425) 917-6590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or
arguments regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed in the ADDRESSES section. Include the docket number ``FAA-2006-
25336; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-070-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will
consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the
proposed AD in light of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will
also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of
that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our
dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or
signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union,
etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the
Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you
may visit http://dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-
5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be
available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System
receives them.
Discussion
We have received several reports indicating that some chemical
oxygen generators failed to activate during in-flight decompression
events. These failures were due to fracture of components between the
passenger oxygen mask and the release pin in the oxygen generator. The
release pin must be pulled out of the oxygen generator firing mechanism
to activate the generator. The fractures occur when a passenger
encounters resistance when attempting to pull down the oxygen mask. The
system is designed so that when a mask is pulled down for donning, a
lanyard attached to the mask pulls down on a release cable within the
passenger service unit (PSU). The release cable is attached to a pin in
the oxygen generator firing mechanism. Downward pressure applied on the
release cable when the mask is pulled down causes the pin to be pulled
out of the firing mechanism, activating the generator and starting the
flow of oxygen to the masks. If excessive resistance occurs when
pulling down the mask, the components between the mask and the
generator release pin can break, such as the tab that connects the
oxygen mask to the lanyard or the ring that attaches the lanyard to the
release cable. Failure of the activation mechanism of the chemical
oxygen generator could result in the unavailability of supplemental
oxygen and possible incapacitation of passengers and cabin crew during
an in-flight decompression.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed the service bulletins identified in the following
table. The service bulletins describe
[[Page 39594]]
procedures for modifying the activation mechanism in the chemical
oxygen generator of each PSU. The modification includes replacing the
oxygen generator release pin; reworking the center cable guides;
replacing the pulley guards/covers, and adding a pulley configuration
placard.
Service Bulletins
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Applicable to model/
Boeing special attention service bulletin series--
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737-25-1545, dated September 8, 2005......... 737-600, -700, -800, and
900.
737-25-1548, dated November 22, 2005......... 737-300, -400, and -500.
757-25-0284, dated November 22, 2005......... 757-200.
757-25-0285, dated November 22, 2005......... 757-300.
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Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is
intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.
FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD
We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an
unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes
of this same type design. For this reason, we are proposing this AD,
which would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service
information described previously.
Costs of Compliance
There are about 3,283 airplanes of the affected design in the
worldwide fleet. This proposed AD would affect about 815 airplanes of
U.S. registry. The proposed modification would take about 1 work hour
per PSU, per airplane, at an average labor rate of $80 per work hour.
Required parts would cost between $68 and $75 per PSU, per airplane.
Based on these figures, the estimated cost of the modification proposed
by this AD for U.S. operators is between $148 and $155 per PSU, per
airplane.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the
ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec. 39.13 by
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):
Boeing: Docket No. FAA-2006-25336; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-
070-AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by August
28, 2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500, -600, -
700, -800 and -900 series airplanes; and Model 757-200 and -300
series airplanes; certificated in any category; as identified in the
applicable service bulletin in Table 1 of this AD.
Table 1.--Service Bulletins
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boeing special attention Applicable to model/
service bulletin Date series
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737-25-1545................. September 8, 2005... 737-600, -700, -800,
and -900.
737-25-1548................. November 22, 2005... 737-300, -400, and -
500.
757-25-0284................. November 22, 2005... 757-200.
757-25-0285................. November 22, 2005... 757-300.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 39595]]
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from several reports indicating that some
chemical oxygen generators failed to activate during in-flight
decompression events. These failures were due to fracture of
components between the passenger oxygen mask and the release pin in
the oxygen generator. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of
the activation mechanism of the chemical oxygen generator, which
could result in the unavailability of supplemental oxygen and
possible incapacitation of passengers and cabin crew during an in-
flight decompression.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Modification
(f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD: Modify
the activation mechanism in the chemical oxygen generator of each
passenger service unit (PSU) by doing all the applicable actions
specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of the applicable
service bulletin in Table 1 of this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(g)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in
accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards
Certificate Holding District Office.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 6, 2006.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E6-11021 Filed 7-12-06; 8:45 am]
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