[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 130 (Friday, July 7, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 38564-38593]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-6013]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 
27, 52, 53, 54, 63, 64, 68, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 90, 95, 97 and 101

[EB Docket No. 06-119; FCC 06-83]


In the Matter of Recommendations of the Independent Panel 
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission) initiates a comprehensive rulemaking to address and 
implement the recommendations presented by the Independent Panel 
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks 
(Independent Panel). The Independent Panel's report described the 
impact of the worst natural disaster in the Nation's history as well as 
the overall public and private response efforts. In addition, the 
report included recommendations which relate to: pre-positioning the 
communications industry and the government for disasters in order to 
achieve greater network reliability and resiliency; improving recovery 
coordination to address existing shortcomings and to maximize the use 
of existing resources; improving the operability and interoperability 
of public safety and 911 communications in times of crisis; and 
improving communication of emergency information to the public. The 
Commission, in this proceeding, is to take the lessons learned from 
this disaster and build upon them to promote more effective, efficient 
response and recovery efforts as well as heightened readiness and 
preparedness in the future. To accomplish this goal, the Commission 
invites comment on what actions the Commission can take to address the 
Independent Panel's recommendations.

DATES: Comments are due on or before August 7, 2006, and reply comments 
are due on or before August 21, 2006. Written comments on the Paperwork 
Reduction Act proposed information collection requirements must be 
submitted by the public, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and 
other interested parties on or before September 5, 2006.

ADDRESSES: Send comments and reply comments to the Office of the 
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, SW., 
Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. You may submit comments, identified 
by EB Docket No. 06-119, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov/. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Federal Communications Commission's Web site: http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request 
reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language 
interpreters, CART, etc.) by e-mail; [email protected] or phone: 202-418-
0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.
    In addition to filing with the Secretary, a copy of any comments on 
the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements 
contained herein should be submitted to Judith B. Herman, Federal 
Communications Commission, Room 1-C804, 445 12th Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20554, or via the Internet to [email protected], and to Kristy 
L. LaLonde, OMB Desk Officer, Room 10234, NEOB, 725 17th Street, NW., 
Washington, DC 20503, via the Internet to Kristy--L.[email protected] 
or via fax at 202-395-5167.

[[Page 38565]]


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa M. Fowlkes, Assistant Bureau 
Chief, Enforcement Bureau, at (202) 418-7450 or Jean Ann Collins, 
Senior Counsel, Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau at 
(202) 418-1199. For additional information concerning the Paperwork 
Reduction Act information collection requirements contained in this 
document, contact Judith B. Herman at (202) 418-0214 or via the 
Internet at [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in EB Docket No. 06-119, FCC 06-83, 
adopted June 16, 2006 and released June 19, 2006. The complete text of 
this document is available for inspection and copying during normal 
business hours in the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 
12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. This document may 
also be purchased from the Commission's duplicating contractor Best 
Copy and Printing, Inc., Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-
B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone (800) 378-3160 or (202) 488-5300, 
facsimile (202) 488-5563, or via e-mail at [email protected]. It is also 
available on the Commission's Web site at http://www.fcc.gov.
    This document contains proposed information collection 
requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to 
reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the OMB to 
comment on the proposed information collection requirements contained 
in this document, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 
Public Law 104-13. Public and agency comments are due September 5, 
2006.
    Comments should address: (a) Whether the proposed collection of 
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of 
the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical 
utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's burden estimates; (c) 
ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information 
collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of 
information on the respondents, including the use of automated 
collection techniques or other forms of information technology. In 
addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 
Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment 
on how it might ``further reduce the information collection burden for 
small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.''
    OMB Control Number: None
    Title: Emergency Communications Status and Contact Information.
    Form No.: N/A.
    Type of Review: New Collection.
    Respondents: Business or other for-profit, not-for-profit, state, 
local or tribal governments.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 1,300.
    Frequency of Response: Contact information--0.167 hours for initial 
collection; 0.084 hours for updates; Readiness Checklist--40 hours.
    Frequency of Response: On occasion.
    Estimated Total Annual Burden: 16,113 hours.
    Estimated Total Annual Costs: $0.
    Privacy Act Impact Assessment: N/A.
    Needs and Uses: The Commission will use the information collected 
to promote more effective, efficient response and recovery efforts in 
the event of a natural disaster or emergency situation, as well as 
heightened readiness and preparedness. Additionally, this information 
collection will be used to compile a roster of key communications 
providers and other emergency personnel throughout the United States 
and in determining the extent of communications disruption and the 
appropriate agency response. This information collection will be used 
to compile a list of outages to communications infrastructure within an 
area affected by a disaster. This information will assist in ensuring 
rapid restoration of communications capabilities after disruption by a 
natural disaster, terrorist attack or other emergency and will assist 
in ensuring the public safety, public health, and other emergency and 
defense personnel have effective communications services available to 
them.

Synopsis of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    1. Background. On Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck 
the Gulf Coast of the United States, causing significant damage in 
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The destruction to communications 
companies' facilities in the region, and therefore to the services upon 
which citizens rely, was extraordinary. Hurricane Katrina knocked out 
more than three million customer phone lines in Alabama, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi. The wireline telecommunications network sustained enormous 
damage--dozens of central offices and countless miles of outside plant 
were damaged or destroyed as a result of the hurricane or the 
subsequent flooding. Local wireless networks also sustained 
considerable damage--more than a thousand cell sites were knocked out 
of service by the hurricane. At the hurricane's height, more than 
thirty-five Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) were out of service, 
and some parishes in Louisiana remained without 911 or enhanced 911 
(E911) service for weeks.
    2. In January 2006, Chairman Kevin J. Martin established the 
Independent Panel pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
Public Law 92-463, as amended (71 FR 933, January 6, 2006). The mission 
of the Independent Panel was to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina 
on the telecommunications and media infrastructure in the areas 
affected by the hurricane. Specifically, the Independent Panel was to 
study the impact of Hurricane Katrina on all sectors of the 
telecommunications and media industries, including public safety 
communications. In addition, the Independent Panel was to review the 
sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery effort with respect to 
the communications infrastructure. The Independent Panel was tasked 
with making recommendations to the Commission by June 15, 2006, 
regarding ways to improve disaster preparedness, network reliability, 
and communications among first responders such as police, fire 
fighters, and emergency medical personnel.
    3. The Independent Panel met directly on five occasions. Four of 
these meetings were used to examine the facts surrounding the impact of 
Hurricane Katrina and to obtain evidence concerning the extent of the 
damage and the sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery efforts. 
On one occasion, the Independent Panel met in the area struck by 
Hurricane Katrina to hear first-hand from victims of the disaster. In 
addition to the in-person meetings, the Independent Panel also received 
written comments from interested members of the public. Finally, the 
Independent Panel's informal working groups met on numerous occasions 
via conference call and in person to discuss their progress.
    4. On June 9, 2006, the Independent Panel held its final meeting in 
Washington, DC to conclude its analysis and deliberations. The 
Independent Panel finalized its findings and recommendations and 
submitted its report on June 12, 2006. A copy of the report is attached 
to this NPRM.
    5. Introduction. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the 
Commission initiates a comprehensive rulemaking to address and 
implement the recommendations presented by the Independent Panel. 
Congress has charged the Commission with promoting the safety of life 
and property

[[Page 38566]]

through the use of wire and radio communications. In this regard, the 
Commission has already taken a number of steps to fulfill this mandate 
and we will continue to do so. The Independent Panel's report described 
the impact of the worst natural disaster in the Nation's history, as 
well as the overall public and private response and recovery efforts. 
Our goal in this proceeding is to take the lessons learned from this 
disaster and build upon them to promote more effective, efficient 
response and recovery efforts, as well as heightened readiness and 
preparedness, in the future. To accomplish this goal, we invite comment 
on what actions the Commission can take to address the Independent 
Panel's recommendations.
    6. We seek comment on the recommendations presented by the 
Independent Panel in its final report. The Independent Panel's 
recommendations are organized into four areas: (1) Pre-positioning the 
communications industry and the government for disasters in order to 
achieve greater network reliability and resiliency; (2) improving 
recovery coordination to address existing shortcomings and to maximize 
the use of existing resources; (3) improving the operability and 
interoperability of public safety and 911 communications in times of 
crisis; and (4) improving communication of emergency information to the 
public. In some cases, the Independent Panel recommends actions that 
require the Commission to modify its rules pursuant to notice-and-
comment rulemaking. In other cases, the Independent Panel recommends 
that the Commission take actions that are not dependent upon 
rulemakings, such as increased outreach and education campaigns, or 
recommends measures that may not fall within the Commission's statutory 
authority and jurisdiction. In advocating implementation of the 
Independent Panel's recommendations, commenters should note what 
actions would fall within the Commission's statutory authority and 
jurisdiction, and what the Commission could do to encourage the 
appropriate entities (e.g., state and local authorities) to take 
action. In evaluating the Independent Panel's recommendations, our goal 
is to determine what actions the Commission should take to promote 
greater resiliency and reliability of communications infrastructure, as 
well as the actions the Commission should take to strengthen and 
improve response and recovery efforts. We therefore invite broad 
comment on the Independent Panel's recommendations and on the measures 
the Commission should take to address the problems identified. We also 
generally seek comment on whether, in adopting any of the Independent 
Panel's recommendations, any additional safeguards should be 
implemented to limit disclosure of sensitive infrastructure information 
or commercial information to prevent exposing potential targets to 
wrongdoers and subjecting regulated entities to competitive harm.
    7. In addition to presenting recommendations, the Independent 
Panel's final report describes the Independent Panel's observations 
regarding the hurricane's impact and the sufficiency of the recovery 
efforts. We also seek comment on whether the Independent Panel's 
observations warrant additional measures or steps beyond the report's 
specific recommendations. Thus, to the extent parties believe 
additional measures beyond the Independent Panel's recommendations or 
different actions are warranted, we welcome these suggestions and 
recommendations. We also seek comment whether we should rely on 
voluntary consensus recommendations, as advocated by the Independent 
Panel, or whether we should rely on other measures for enhancing 
readiness and promoting more effective response efforts.
    8. Pre-Positioning for Disasters. The Independent Panel 
recommendation notes that the sheer force of Hurricane Katrina and the 
extensive flooding that occurred severely tested the reliability and 
resiliency of communications networks in the Gulf Coast region. To help 
speed response efforts, the Independent Panel recommends the adoption 
of a proactive (rather than reactive) program for network reliability 
and resiliency. At the heart of the Independent Panel's recommendations 
are steps the Independent Panel believes the communications industry, 
public safety organizations, and the Commission should take for a 
faster, more effective response to disasters and emergencies. In 
particular, the Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work 
with industry sectors, associations, and other organizations to 
establish a ``Readiness Checklist'' for the communications industry 
that would include developing formal business continuity plans, 
conducting training exercises, developing suitable plans and 
procedures, and maintaining pre-positioned supplies and equipment to 
help in disaster response. We seek comment on these recommendations. 
The Independent Panel recommends that we rely on checklists developed 
by industry consensus groups, such as the Network Reliability and 
Interoperability Council (NRIC) and the Media Security and Reliability 
Council (MSRC). We seek comment on this recommendation, including 
whether we should rely on the results of voluntary consensus 
recommendations or instead rely on other measures. We invite parties to 
comment on the appropriate breadth of business continuity plans. Are 
the suggested elements presented by the Independent Panel adequate, or 
are other elements useful or necessary? We seek comment on whether we 
should adopt guidance or criteria for developing business continuity 
plans, conducting exercises, developing and practicing communications 
plans, or routinely archiving critical system back-ups for secure off-
site facilities.
    9. The Independent Panel also recommends enhancing the awareness of 
the public safety community in non-traditional emergency alternatives 
through community education campaigns. We seek comment on this 
recommendation and on other steps we can take within our jurisdiction 
and statutory authority to assist the public safety community response 
to disasters and other emergencies. The Independent Panel recommends 
that the Commission establish a prioritized system of automatically 
waiving regulatory requirements, or of granting automatic Special 
Temporary Authority (STA) in certain instances, and provides a list of 
specific Commission requirements. We invite comment on this suggestion. 
Are there other areas where regulatory relief would be appropriate? 
Should we establish specific thresholds or requirements in the 
Commission's rules pertaining to demonstrations that should be made? 
The Independent Panel also recommends that the Commission coordinate 
all federal outage and infrastructure reporting requirements in times 
of crisis. We seek comment on this recommendation and on the measures 
the Commission can take within its statutory authority and 
jurisdiction. Parties should address the appropriate content of 
emergency outage reports, format, frequency, distribution, and related 
issues. We seek comment on whether additional safeguards should be 
implemented to address issues concerning potential disclosure of 
sensitive infrastructure information or commercial information to avoid 
potential harm to communications providers or others. Finally, we 
invite comment on other steps beyond those recommended by the panel 
that we could take within our statutory authority and jurisdiction to

[[Page 38567]]

improve or strengthen network resiliency and reliability.
    10. We seek comment on whether and how the Commission can assist 
organizations whose primary business is not communications (e.g., 
hospitals, nursing homes, day care facilities, and so forth) with 
developing communications plans for an emergency. We also seek comment 
on whether the Commission should develop a hotline and/or Website to 
assist these entities.
    11. Recovery Coordination. The Independent Panel observed 
significant challenges to maintenance and restoration of communications 
services after Hurricane Katrina due in part to problems with access to 
the affected area and key resources such as power and/or generator 
fuel. The Independent Panel ``generally supports the National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC's) recommendation for a 
national standard for credentialing telecommunications repair 
workers.'' The Independent Panel advocates, however, expanding the 
NSTAC's credentialing recommendations to include repair workers of all 
communications infrastructure (e.g., wireline, wireless, WISP, cable, 
broadcasting, satellite). The Independent Panel recommends that the 
Commission work with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies 
to promptly develop national credentialing requirements and guidelines 
to enable communications infrastructure providers and their contracted 
workers to access affected areas post-disaster. The Independent Panel 
also recommends that the Commission ``encourage states to develop and 
implement a credentialing program consistent with [the NSTAC's 
guidelines].'' We seek comment on these recommendations, including 
measures the Commission can take within its statutory authority and 
jurisdiction. The Independent Panel also recommends that the Commission 
work with Congress and appropriate federal departments and agencies to 
implement the NSTAC's recommendation that telecommunications 
infrastructure providers should be afforded emergency responder status 
under the Stafford Act and that this designation should be incorporated 
into the National Response Plan and state and local emergency response 
plans. The Independent Panel further recommends that the emergency 
responder designation be expanded to include all communications 
services providers (e.g., wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable, 
and broadcast media) and their contract workers. The Commission seeks 
comment on these recommendations and on other steps we can take within 
our statutory authority and jurisdiction.
    12. The Independent Panel makes several recommendations related to 
improving and enhancing communications and coordination among Federal, 
state, and local authorities and the private sector. In particular, the 
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission ``should encourage, 
but not require, each regional, state and local [Emergency Operating 
Center (EOC)] and the [Joint Field Office (JFO)] to engage in the 
following activities:
     Facilitate coordination between communications 
infrastructure providers and state and local emergency preparedness 
officials;
     Develop credentialing requirements and procedures for the 
purposes of allocating communications infrastructure providers (and 
their contractors and security teams) into disaster areas to perform 
repairs;
     Develop and facilitate inclusion in the state's Emergency 
Preparedness Plan, where appropriate, one or more clearly identified 
post-disaster coordination areas for communications infrastructure 
providers;
     Share information and coordinate resources to facilitate 
repair of key communications infrastructure; and
     Facilitate electric and other utilities' maintenance of 
priority lists for commercial power restoration.
    We seek comment on these recommendations and on other measures the 
Commission could take within its statutory authority and jurisdiction 
to encourage other Federal agencies, state and local authorities, and 
the private sector to address the Independent Panel's recommendations 
in this regard.
    13. In addition to recommending the Commission encourage other 
governmental bodies to engage in these activities, the Independent 
Panel notes its support for communications infrastructure providers 
forming an industry-only group for disaster planning, coordinating 
recovery efforts, and other purposes. The Independent Panel also 
recommends that the Commission work with the National Communications 
System, an organization within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), to broaden the membership of the National Coordinating Center 
for Telecommunications (NCC) to include representation of all types of 
communications systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite, and 
other new technologies. We seek comment on these recommendations, 
including how the Commission can work within its statutory authority 
and jurisdiction to promote greater membership in the DHS's National 
Communications System coordination body. We seek comment on how the 
Commission could best work within its own jurisdiction and statutory 
authority to assist in promoting extensive, cross-jurisdictional 
coordination. We also seek comment generally on how we can better 
facilitate coordination during times of crisis.
    14. The Independent Panel also recommended that the Commission work 
with the DHS's National Communications System to promote the use of 
existing priority communications services, such as Government Emergency 
Telecommunications Service (GETS), Wireless Priority Service (WPS), and 
Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP). In particular, the 
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work with the DHS's 
National Communications System to promote WPS, GETS and TSP to all 
eligible government, public safety, and critical industry groups. We 
seek comment on how the Commission can address these recommendations 
within its statutory authority and jurisdiction. Finally, the 
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission create two Web sites 
identifying: (1) The key state emergency management contacts and post-
disaster staging areas for communications providers; and (2) contact 
information for the Commission's Task Force that coordinates disaster 
response efforts and procedures for facilitating disaster response and 
outage recovery. We seek comment on these recommendations.
    15. First Responder Communications. The Independent Panel made 
several recommendations intended to facilitate the restoration of 
public safety communications capabilities. As with other 
recommendations, the Independent Panel recommends that the Commission 
encourage state and local authorities to take actions, and to assist in 
supporting these efforts consistent with our statutory authority and 
jurisdiction. For example, the Independent Panel recommended that the 
Commission encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain and 
maintain a cache of equipment components that would be needed to 
immediately restore existing public safety communications within hours 
of a disaster. Such a cache of pre-positioned equipment would include 
Radiofrequency (RF) gear (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) gateways, 
dispatch consoles, etc), trailers, tower system components (e.g., 
antenna systems and

[[Page 38568]]

hydraulic masts), back-up power equipment, and fuel. We seek comment on 
these recommendations. We invite parties to comment on the capabilities 
and content of pre-positioned equipment, as well as the functionalities 
most critical to support in the early stages of a crisis. The 
Independent Panel Report also includes recommendations intended to 
facilitate interoperability among first responder communications, 
including a recommendation that the Commission encourage the 
expeditious development of regional plans for the use of 700 MHz 
systems and move promptly to review and approve such plans. The 
Commission seeks comment on these recommendations, including how they 
should be implemented within our statutory authority and jurisdiction.
    16. The Independent Panel also made recommendations intended to 
ensure a more robust 911 and E911 service. For example, the panel 
recommends that the Commission encourage the implementation of certain 
NRIC best practices intended to promote the reliability and resiliency 
of the 911 and E911 architecture. In particular, the Independent Panel 
recommends that service providers and network operators should consider 
placing and maintaining 911 circuits over diverse interoffice transport 
facilities and should ensure availability of emergency back-up power 
capabilities (located on-site, when appropriate). The Independent Panel 
further recommends that network operators should consider deploying 
dual active 911 selective router architectures as a means for 
eliminating single points of failure. The Independent Panel also 
recommends that network operators, service providers, equipment 
suppliers, and public safety authorities should establish alternative 
methods of communication for critical personnel. We seek comment on how 
the Commission can best encourage implementation of these 
recommendations consistent with our statutory authority and 
jurisdiction, and we welcome further suggestions on measures that could 
be taken to strengthen 911 and E911 infrastructure and architecture.
    17. With respect to Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), the 
Independent Panel recommends the designation of a secondary back-up 
PSAP that is more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the primary 
and secondary PSAPs are disabled. The Independent Panel also recommends 
that the Commission work with other Federal agencies to enhance funding 
for 911 enhancement and interoperability. The Independent Panel 
recommends that the Commission work to assist the emergency medical 
community to facilitate the resiliency and effectiveness of their 
emergency communications system. The Independent Panel report includes 
four recommendations regarding the emergency medical community, stating 
that the Commission should, inter alia, educate the emergency medical 
community about emergency communications and the various priority 
communications services and help to coordinate this sector's emergency 
communications efforts. We seek comment on how to address these 
recommendations consistent with our statutory authority and 
jurisdiction. We also invite comment on what additional steps the 
Commission can take within its statutory authority to assist the 
emergency medical community enhance its disaster response capabilities.
    18. Emergency Communications to the Public. The Independent Panel 
report also includes recommendations intended to facilitate and 
complement use of the Emergency Alert System (EAS), including 
recommendations that the Commission educate state and local officials 
about the existing EAS, its benefits, and how it can be utilized. 
Further, the report recommends that the Commission develop a program 
for educating the public about EAS and promote community awareness of 
potential mechanisms for accessing those alerts sent during power 
outages or broadcast transmission failures. In order to ensure that all 
Americans, including persons with disabilities and persons who do not 
speak English, are able to receive emergency communications, the 
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission: (1) Promptly find a 
mechanism to resolve any technical hurdles in the current EAS to ensure 
that persons with hearing or vision disabilities and persons who do not 
speak English have equal access to public warnings; (2) work with the 
various industry trade associations to create and publicize best 
practices for serving persons with disabilities and persons who do not 
speak English; and (3) encourage state and local government agencies 
who provide emergency information to take steps to make critical 
emergency information accessible to persons with disabilities and 
persons who do not speak English. We seek comment on how to address 
these recommendations consistent with our statutory authority and 
jurisdiction. With respect to item (1), we note that the issue is the 
subject of the Commission's ongoing EAS rulemaking proceeding, and we 
expect to address these and related issues in that proceeding.

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    19. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended (RFA), the Commission has prepared this present Initial 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities by the 
policies and rules proposed in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM). Written public comments are requested on this IRFA. Comments 
must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the 
deadlines for comments on the NPRM provided in section IV of the item. 
The Commission will send a copy of the NPRM, including this IRFA, to 
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration 
(SBA). In addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be 
published in the Federal Register.

Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules

    20. On Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf 
Coast of the United States, causing significant damage in Alabama, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi. The destruction to communications 
companies' facilities in the region, and therefore to the services upon 
which citizens rely, was extraordinary. Hurricane Katrina knocked out 
more than three million customer phone lines in Alabama, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi. The wireline telecommunications network sustained enormous 
damage--dozens of central offices and countless miles of outside plants 
were damaged or destroyed as a result of the hurricane or the 
subsequent flooding. Local wireless networks also sustained 
considerable damage--more than a thousand cell sites were knocked out 
of service by the hurricane. At the hurricane's height, more than 
thirty-five Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) were out of service, 
and some parishes in Louisiana remained without 911 or enhanced 911 
(E911) service for weeks.
    21. In January 2006, Chairman Kevin J. Martin established the 
Independent Panel pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
Public Law 92-463, as amended. The mission of the Independent Panel was 
to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the telecommunications and 
media infrastructure in the areas affected by the hurricane. 
Specifically, the Independent Panel was to study the impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on all

[[Page 38569]]

sectors of the telecommunications and media industries, including 
public safety communications. In addition, the Independent Panel was to 
review the sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery effort with 
respect to the communications infrastructure. The Independent Panel was 
tasked with making recommendations to the Commission, by June 15, 2006, 
regarding ways to improve disaster preparedness, network reliability, 
and communications among first responders such as police, fire 
fighters, and emergency medical personnel.
    22. On June 12, 2006, the Independent Panel submitted its Report 
and Recommendations. As explained in the NPRM, Congress has charged the 
Commission with promoting the safety of life and property through the 
use of wire and radio communications. In this regard, we have already 
taken a number of steps to fulfill this mandate and we will continue to 
do so. The Independent Panel's report described the impact of the worst 
natural disaster in the Nation's history as well as the overall public 
and private response and recovery efforts. Our goal in this proceeding 
is to take the lessons learned from this disaster and build upon them 
to promote more effective, efficient response and recovery efforts, as 
well as heightened readiness and preparedness, in the future. To 
accomplish this goal, we invite comment on what actions the Commission 
can take to address the Independent Panel's recommendations.
    23. As we note in the NPRM, in some cases, the Independent Panel 
recommends action that require the Commission to modify its rules 
pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking. In other cases, the 
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission take actions that are 
not dependent upon rulemakings, such as increased outreach and 
education campaigns, or recommends measures that may not fall within 
the Commission's statutory authority and jurisdiction. In advocating 
implementation of the Independent Panel's recommendations, commenters 
should note what actions would fall within the Commission's statutory 
authority and jurisdiction and what the Commission could do to 
encourage the appropriate entities (e.g., states and local authorities) 
to take action.
    24. To speed response efforts, the Independent Panel recommends 
that adoption of a proactive (rather than reactive) program for network 
reliability and resiliency. Specifically, the Independent Panel 
recommends working with industry sectors, associations and other 
organizations to establish a ``Readiness Checklist'' for the 
communications industry that would include developing formal business 
continuity plans, conducting training exercises, developing suitable 
plans and procedures, and maintaining pre-positioned supplies and 
equipment to help in disaster response. The NPRM seeks comment on these 
recommendations. The Independent Panel also recommends that we rely on 
checklists developed by industry consensus groups, such as the Network 
Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) and the Media Security 
and Reliability Council (MSRC). The NPRM seeks comment on this 
recommendation, including whether we should rely on the results of 
voluntary consensus recommendations or instead rely on other measures. 
The NPRM also seeks comment on whether we should adopt guidance or 
criteria for developing business continuity plans, conducting 
exercises, developing and practicing communications plans, or routinely 
archiving critical system back-ups for secure off-site facilities.
    25. The Independent Panel also recommends enhancing the public 
safety community's awareness of non-traditional emergency alternatives 
through community education campaigns. The NPRM seeks comment on this 
recommendation and other steps we can take within our jurisdiction and 
statutory authority to assist the public safety community in responding 
to disasters and other emergencies. The Independent Panel recommends 
that the Commission establish a prioritized system of automatically 
waiving regulatory requirements, or of granting automatic Special 
Temporary Authority (STA) in certain instances, and provides a list of 
specific Commission requirements. The NPRM seeks comment on this 
suggestion. The NPRM also seeks comment on the Independent Panel's 
recommendation that the Commission coordinate all federal outage and 
infrastructure reporting requirements in times of crisis. In addition, 
the NPRM seeks comment on other steps beyond those recommended by the 
Panel that the Commission could take within our statutory authority and 
jurisdiction to improve or strengthen network resiliency and 
reliability.
    26. As discussed in the NPRM, the Independent Panel generally 
supports the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee's 
(NSTAC's) recommendation for a national standard for credentialing 
telecommunications repair workers. The Independent Panel, however, 
advocates expanding the NSTAC recommendations to include repair workers 
of all communications infrastructure. The Independent Panel recommends 
that the Commission work with other appropriate Federal departments and 
government agencies to promptly develop national credentialing 
requirements and guidelines to enable communications infrastructure 
providers and their contracted workers to access affected areas post-
disaster. The Independent Panel also recommends that the Commission 
encourage states to develop and implement a credentialing program 
consistent with the NSTAC guidelines. The NPRM seeks comment on these 
recommendations as well as measures the Commission can take within its 
statutory authority and jurisdiction.
    27. The NPRM seeks comment on the Independent Panel's 
recommendation that the Commission work with Congress and appropriate 
federal departments and agencies to implement the NSTAC's 
recommendation that telecommunications infrastructure providers should 
be afforded emergency responder status under the Stafford Act and that 
this designation should be incorporated into the National Response Plan 
and state and local emergency response plans. With respect to this 
proposal, the Independent Panel also recommends that the emergency 
responder designation include all types of communications services.
    28. In order to enable the communications industry and state and 
local emergency officials to better coordinate their preparation for 
and response to disasters affecting communications infrastructure, the 
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work with state and 
local emergency officials and the communications industry to encourage 
the formation of coordinating and planning bodies at the state or 
regional level. As set forth in the NPRM, the Panel's recommendation 
also lists activities that the Commission should encourage each state 
or regional coordinating body to engage in. The NPRM seeks comment on 
this recommendation and on the measures the Commission could take 
within its statutory authority and jurisdiction to encourage other 
Federal agencies, state and local authorities and the private sector to 
address the Independent Panel's recommendations in this regard.
    29. The Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work with 
the National Communications System (NCS) to broaden the membership of 
the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications to include 
representation from all types of

[[Page 38570]]

communications systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite, and 
other new technologies. The NPRM seeks comment on this recommendation, 
including how the Commission can work within its statutory authority 
and jurisdiction to promote greater membership in the DHS's National 
Communications System coordination body.
    30. The NPRM seeks comment on several recommendations designed to 
facilitate the use of existing priority communications services, such 
as Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), Wireless 
Priority Service (WPS) and Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP), 
all of which are administered by DHS's National Communications System. 
In addition, the NPRM seeks comment on the Independent Panel's 
recommendation that the Commission create two Web sites identifying: 
(1) The key state emergency management contacts and post disaster 
staging areas for communications providers; and (2) contact information 
for the Commission's Task Force that coordinates disaster response 
efforts and procedures for facilitating disaster response and outage 
recovery.
    31. In the NPRM, the Commission seeks comment on several 
recommendations intended to facilitate the restoration of public safety 
communications capabilities. For example, it seeks comment on the 
Panel's recommendation that the Commission encourage state and local 
jurisdictions to retain and maintain a cache of equipment components 
that would be needed to immediately restore existing public safety 
communications within hours of a disaster. The NPRM also seeks comment 
on a number of recommendations intended to facilitate interoperability 
among first responder communications, including a recommendation that 
the Commission encourage the expeditious development of regional plans 
for the use of 700 MHz systems and move promptly to review and approve 
such plans.
    32. Regarding 911 and E911 service, the Independent Panel 
recommends that the Commission encourage the implementation of certain 
NRIC best practices intended to promote the reliability and resiliency 
of the 911 and E911 architecture. The Panel recommends that: (1) 
Service providers and network operators consider placing and 
maintaining 911 circuits over diverse interoffice transport facilities 
and should ensure availability of emergency back-up power capabilities 
(located on-site, when appropriate); (2) network operators consider 
deploying dual service 911 selective router architectures as a means 
for eliminating single points of failure; and (3) network operators, 
service providers, equipment suppliers, and public safety authorities 
establish alternative methods of communication for critical personnel. 
The NPRM seeks comment on these recommendations.
    33. With respect to Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), the 
Independent Panel recommends (1) the designation of a secondary back-up 
PSAP that is more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the primary 
and secondary PSAPs are disabled; (2) that the Commission work with 
other federal agencies to enhance funding for 911 enhancement and 
interoperability; and (3) that the Commission work to assist the 
emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency and 
effectiveness of their emergency communications system. The NPRM seeks 
comment on these recommendations. In addition, the Independent Panel's 
Report and Recommendations includes four recommendations regarding the 
emergency medical community, stating that the Commission should, inter 
alia, educate the emergency medical community about emergency 
communications and the various priority communications services and 
help to coordinate this sector's emergency communications efforts. The 
NPRM seeks comment on these recommendations.
    34. Finally, the NPRM seeks comment on the Independent Panel's 
recommendations that the Commission: (1) Work with various industry 
trade associations to create and publicize best practices for serving 
persons with disabilities and persons who do not speak English; and (2) 
encourage state and local government agencies to provide emergency 
information to take steps to make critical emergency information 
accessible to persons with disabilities and persons who do not speak 
English.

Legal Basis

    35. Authority for the actions proposed in this NPRM may be found in 
sections 1, 4(i), 4(o), 201, 303(r), 403, and 706 of the Communications 
Act of 1934, as amended, (Act) 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(o), 303(r), 
403 and 606.

Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which Rules 
Will Apply

    36. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, 
where feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may 
be affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the 
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small 
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental 
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same 
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business 
Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) Is independently 
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and 
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business 
Administration (SBA).
    37. Nationwide, there are a total of approximately 22.4 million 
small businesses, according to SBA data. A ``small organization'' is 
generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is independently owned 
and operated and is not dominant in its field.'' Nationwide, as of 
2002, there were approximately 1.6 million small organizations. The 
term ``small governmental jurisdiction'' is defined generally as 
``governments of cities, towns, townships, villages, school districts, 
or special districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.'' 
Census Bureau data for 2002 indicate that there were 87,525 local 
governmental jurisdictions in the United States. We estimate that, of 
this total, 84,377 entities were ``small governmental jurisdictions.'' 
Thus, we estimate that most governmental jurisdictions are small.
    38. Television Broadcasting. The SBA has developed a small business 
sized standard for television broadcasting, which consists of all such 
firms having $13 million or less in annual receipts. Business concerns 
included in this industry are those ``primarily engaged in broadcasting 
images together with sound.'' According to Commission staff review of 
the BIA Publications, Inc. Master Access Television Analyzer Database 
(BIA) on October 18, 2005, about 873 of the 1,307 commercial television 
stations (or about 67 percent) have revenues of $12 million or less and 
thus quality as small entities under the SBA definition. We note, 
however, that, in assessing whether a business concern qualifies as 
small under the above definition, business (control) affiliations must 
be included. Our estimate, therefore, likely overstates the number of 
small entities that might be affected by our action, because the 
revenue figure on which it is based does not include or aggregate 
revenues from affiliated companies. There are also 2,127 low power 
television stations (LPTV). Given the nature of this service, we will 
presume that all LPTV licensees qualify as small entities under the SBA 
size standard.

[[Page 38571]]

    39. Radio Stations. The proposed rules and policies potentially 
will apply to all AM and commercial FM radio broadcasting licensees and 
potential licensees. The SBA defines a radio broadcasting station that 
has $6.5 million or less in annual receipts as a small business. A 
radio broadcasting station is an establishment primarily engaged in 
broadcasting aural programs by radio to the public. Included in this 
industry are commercial, religious, educational, and other radio 
stations. Radio broadcasting stations which primarily are engaged in 
radio broadcasting and which produce radio program materials are 
similarly included. However, radio stations that are separate 
establishments and are primarily engaged in producing radio program 
material are classified under another NAICS number. According to 
Commission staff review of BIA Publications, Inc. Master Access Radio 
Analyzer Database on March 31, 2005, about 10,840 (95%) of 11,410 
commercial radio stations have revenue of $6 million or less. We note, 
however, that many radio stations are affiliated with much larger 
corporations having much higher revenue. Our estimate, therefore, 
likely overstates the number of small entities that might be affected 
by our action.
    40. Cable and Other Program Distribution. The Census Bureau defines 
this category as follows: ``This industry comprises establishments 
primarily engaged as third-party distribution systems for broadcast 
programming. The establishments of this industry deliver visual, aural, 
or textual programming received from cable networks, local television 
stations, or radio networks to consumers via cable or direct-to-home 
satellite systems on a subscription or fee basis. These establishments 
do not generally originate programming material.'' The SBA has 
developed a small business size standard for Cable and Other Program 
Distribution, which is: all such firms having $13.5 million or less in 
annual receipts. According to Census Bureau data for 2002, there were a 
total of 1,191 firms in this category that operated for the entire 
year. Of this total, 1,087 firms had annual receipts of under $10 
million, and 43 firms had receipts of $10 million or more but less than 
$25 million. Thus, under this size standard, the majority of firms can 
be considered small.
    41. Cable Companies and Systems. The Commission has also developed 
its own small business size standards, for the purpose of cable rate 
regulation. Under the Commission's rules, a ``small cable company'' is 
one serving 400,000 or fewer subscribers, nationwide. Industry data 
indicate that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but eleven are 
small under this size standard. In addition, under the Commission's 
rules, a ``small system'' is a cable system serving 15,000 or fewer 
subscribers. Industry data indicate that, of 7,208 systems nationwide, 
6,139 systems have under 10,000 subscribers, and an additional 379 
systems have 10,000-19,999 subscribers. Thus, under this second size 
standard, most cable systems are small.
    42. Cable System Operators. The Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, also contains a size standard for small cable system 
operators, which is ``a cable operator that, directly or through an 
affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than 1 percent of all 
subscribers in the United States and is not affiliated with any entity 
or entities whose gross annual revenues in the aggregate exceed 
$250,000,000.'' The Commission has determined that an operator serving 
fewer than 677,000 subscribers shall be deemed a small operator, if its 
annual revenues, when combined with the total annual revenues of all 
its affiliates, do not exceed $250 million in the aggregate. Industry 
data indicate that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but ten 
are small under this size standard. We note that the Commission neither 
requests nor collects information on whether cable system operators are 
affiliated with entities whose gross annual revenues exceed $250 
million, and therefore we are unable to estimate more accurately the 
number of cable system operators that would qualify as small under this 
size standard.
    43. Multipoint Distribution Systems. The established rules apply to 
Multipoint Distribution Systems (MDS) operated as part of a wireless 
cable system. The Commission has defined ``small entity'' for purposes 
of the auction of MDS frequencies as an entity that, together with its 
affiliates, has average gross annual revenues that are not more than 
$40 million for the preceding three calendar years. This definition of 
small entity in the context of MDS auctions has been approved by the 
SBA. The Commission completed its MDS auction in March 1996 for 
authorizations in 493 basic trading areas. Of 67 winning bidders, 61 
qualified as small entities. At this time, we estimate that of the 61 
small business MDS auction winners, 48 remain small business licensees.
    44. MDS also includes licensees of stations authorized prior to the 
auction. As noted above, the SBA has developed a definition of small 
entities for pay television services, cable and other subscription 
programming, which includes all such companies generating $13.5 million 
or less in annual receipts. This definition includes MDS and thus 
applies to MDS licensees that did not participate in the MDS auction. 
Information available to us indicates that there are approximately 392 
incumbent MDS licensees that do not generate revenue in excess of $11 
million annually. Therefore, we estimate that there are at least 440 
(392 pre-auction plus 48 auction licensees) small MDS providers as 
defined by the SBA and the Commission's auction rules which may be 
affected by the rules adopted herein.
    45. Instructional Television Fixed Service. The established rules 
would also apply to Instructional Television Fixed Service (ITFS) 
facilities operated as part of a wireless cable system. The SBA 
definition of small entities for pay television services also appears 
to apply to ITFS. There are presently 2,032 ITFS licensees. All but 100 
of these licenses are held by educational institutions. Educational 
institutions are included in the definition of a small business. 
However, we do not collect annual revenue data for ITFS licensees, and 
are not able to ascertain how many of the 100 non-educational licensees 
would be categorized as small under the SBA definition. Thus, we 
tentatively conclude that at least 1,932 are small businesses and may 
be affected by the established rules.
    46. Wireless Service Providers. The SBA has developed a small 
business size standard for wireless small businesses within the two 
separate categories of Paging and Cellular and Other Wireless 
Telecommunications. Under both SBA categories, a wireless business is 
small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. According to Commission data, 
1,012 companies reported that they were engaged in the provision of 
wireless service. Of these 1,012 companies, an estimated 829 have 1,500 
or fewer employees and 183 have more than 1,500 employees. This SBA 
size standard also applies to wireless telephony. Wireless telephony 
includes cellular, personal communications services, and specialized 
mobile radio telephony carriers. According to the data, 437 carriers 
reported that they were engaged in the provision of wireless telephony. 
We have estimated that 260 of these are small businesses under the SBA 
small business size standard.
    47. Broadband Personal Communications Service. The broadband 
personal communications services (PCS) spectrum is divided into six 
frequency blocks designated A

[[Page 38572]]

through F, and the Commission has held auctions for each block. The 
Commission has created a small business size standard for Blocks C and 
F as an entity that has average gross revenues of less than $40 million 
in the three previous calendar years. For Block F, an additional small 
business size standard for ``very small business'' was added and is 
defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates, has average 
gross revenues of not more than $15 million for the preceding three 
calendar years. These small business size standards, in the context of 
broadband PCS auctions, have been approved by the SBA. No small 
businesses within the SBA-approved small business size standards bid 
successfully for licenses in Blocks A and B. There were 90 winning 
bidders that qualified as small entities in the Block C auctions. A 
total of 93 ``small'' and ``very small'' business bidders won 
approximately 40 percent of the 1,479 licenses for Blocks D, E, and F. 
On March 23, 1999, the Commission reauctioned 155 C, D, E, and F Block 
licenses; there were 113 small business winning bidders. On January 26, 
2001, the Commission completed the auction of 422 C and F Broadband PCS 
licenses in Auction No. 35. Of the 35 winning bidders in this auction, 
29 qualified as ``small'' or ``very small'' businesses. Subsequent 
events, concerning Auction 35, including judicial and agency 
determinations, resulted in a total of 163 C and F Block licenses being 
available for grant.
    48. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). We have 
included small incumbent local exchange carriers in this present IRFA 
analysis. As noted above, a ``small business'' under the RFA is one 
that, inter alia, meets the pertinent small business size standard 
(e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer 
employees), and ``is not dominant in its field of operation.'' The 
SBA's Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small 
incumbent LECs are not dominant in their field of operation because any 
such dominance is not ``national'' in scope. We have therefore included 
small incumbent local exchange carriers in this RFA analysis, although 
we emphasize that this RFA action has no effect on Commission analyses 
and determinations in other, non-RFA contexts. Neither the Commission 
nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically 
for incumbent local exchange services. The appropriate size standard 
under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. 
Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or 
fewer employees. According to Commission data, 1,303 carriers have 
reported that they are engaged in the provision of incumbent local 
exchange services. Of these 1,303 carriers, an estimated 1,020 have 
1,500 or fewer employees and 283 have more than 1,500 employees. 
Consequently, the Commission estimates that most providers of incumbent 
local exchange service are small businesses that may be affected by our 
proposed rules.
    49. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive LECs), 
Competitive Access Providers (CAPs), ``Shared-Tenant Service 
Providers,'' and ``Other Local Service Providers.'' Neither the 
Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard 
specifically for these service providers. The appropriate size standard 
under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. 
Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or 
fewer employees. According to Commission data, 769 carriers have 
reported that they are engaged in the provision of either competitive 
access provider services or competitive local exchange carrier 
services. Of these 769 carriers, an estimated 676 have 1,500 or fewer 
employees and 93 have more than 1,500 employees. In addition, 12 
carriers have reported that they are ``Shared-Tenant Service 
Providers,'' and all 12 are estimated to have 1.500 or fewer employees. 
In addition, 39 carriers have reported that they are ``Other Local 
Service Providers.'' Of the 39, an estimated 38 have 1,500 or fewer 
employees and one has more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, the 
Commission estimates that most providers of competitive local exchange 
service, competitive access providers, ``Shared-Tenant Service 
Providers,'' and ``Other Local Service Providers'' are small entities 
that may be affected by our proposed rules.
    50. Satellite Telecommunications and Other Telecommunications. 
There is no small business size standard developed specifically for 
providers of satellite service. The appropriate size standards under 
SBA rules are for the two broad census categories of ``Satellite 
Telecommunications'' and ``Other Telecommunications.'' Under both 
categories, such a business is small if it has $13.5 million or less in 
average annual receipts.
    51. The first category of Satellite Telecommunications ``comprises 
establishments primarily engaged in providing point-to-point 
telecommunications services to other establishments in the 
telecommunications and broadcasting industries by forwarding and 
receiving communications signals via a system of satellites or 
reselling satellite telecommunications.'' For this category, Census 
Bureau data for 2002 show that there were a total of 371 firms that 
operated for the entire year. Of this total, 307 firms had annual 
receipts of under $10 million, and 26 firms had receipts of $10 million 
to $24,999,999. Consequently, we estimate that the majority of 
Satellite Telecommunications firms are small entities that might be 
affected by our action.

Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements for Small Entities

    52. This NPRM contains proposals that may result in specific 
reporting or recordkeeping requirements. The NPRM seeks comment on the 
Independent Panel's recommendation that the Commission coordinate all 
federal outage and infrastructure reporting requirements in times of 
crisis. Specifically, the NPRM seeks comment on the appropriate content 
of emergency outage reports, format, frequency, distribution and 
related issues. The NPRM requests suggestions on the appropriate 
content of emergency outage reports, format, frequency, distribution 
and related issues. The NPRM also seeks comment on the Independent 
Panel's recommendation that the Commission establish a ``Readiness 
Checklist'' for the communications industry that would include, inter 
alia, developing formal business continuity plans. The NPRM requests 
comment on the appropriate breadth of business continuity plans as well 
as whether the Commission should adopt guidance or criteria for the 
elements that would comprise the Readiness Checklist.

Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    53. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant 
alternatives that it has considered in developing its approach, which 
may include the following four alternatives (among others): ``(1) the 
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small 
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and 
(4) an exemption

[[Page 38573]]

from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small 
entities.'' We invite comment on whether small entities should be 
subject to different requirements if we adopt rules to promote more 
effective, efficient response and recovery efforts, and whether 
differentiating such requirements based on the size of the entities is 
warranted. For example, should there be timing differences for 
requirements imposed on small entities? Should small entities be 
subject to different continuity of operations requirements?

Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the 
Proposed Rules

    54. None.

Ex Parte Rules

    These matters shall be treated as a ``permit-but-disclose'' 
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons 
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda 
summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance 
of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects 
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and 
arguments presented is generally required. Other requirements 
pertaining to oral and written presentations are set forth in Sec.  
1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.

Ordering Clauses

    55. It is ordered, that pursuant to sections 1, 4(i) and (o), 201, 
303(r), 403, and 706 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 
U.S.C. 151, 154(i) and (o), 201, 303(r), 403, and 606, this Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking Is hereby Adopted.
    56. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and 
Government Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, Shall Send a 
copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including the Initial 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Council for Advocacy of 
the Small Business Administration.

Federal Communications Commission.
William F. Caton,
Deputy Secretary.

Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Networks

Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission

June 12, 2006.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
I. Panel Formation and Charge
II. Process and Activities of the Panel
PANEL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON THE 
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND THE SUFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
RECOVERY EFFORT
I. Network Reliability and Resiliency
    A. Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Various Types of 
Communications Networks
    B. Major Problems Identified Following Katrina
II. Recovery Coordination and Procedures
    A. Access to the Affected Area and Key Resources
    B. Coordination Between Industry and Government
    C. Emergency Communications Services and Programs
III. First Responder Communications
    A. Lack of Advanced Planning for Massive System Failures
    B. Lack of Interoperability
    C. PSAP Rerouting
    D. Emergency Medical Communications
IV. Emergency Communications to the Public
    A. Lack of Activation
    B. Limitations on Coverage
    C. Reaching Persons With Disabilities and Non-English Speaking 
Americans
    D. Inconsistent or Incorrect Emergency Information
RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX A: Members of the Independent Panel

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    The Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Networks (``Katrina Panel'' or ``Panel'') hereby submits 
its report to the Federal Communications Commission (``Commission'' or 
``FCC''). The Panel is charged with studying the impact of Hurricane 
Katrina on the telecommunications and media infrastructure in the areas 
affected by the hurricane and making recommendations for improving 
disaster preparedness, network reliability and communications among 
first responders.

FINDINGS

    Hurricane Katrina had a devastating impact on the Gulf Coast 
region, including its communications networks. The sheer force of this 
deadly hurricane and the extensive flooding from the breached levees in 
New Orleans severely tested the reliability and resiliency of the 
communications infrastructure in the area. Indeed, every sector of the 
communications industry was impacted by the storm. The Panel observed 
that most of the region's communications infrastructure fared fairly 
well through the storm's extreme wind and rain, with the coastal areas 
suffering the worst damage. However, the unique conditions in Katrina's 
aftermath--substantial flooding, widespread, extended power outages, 
and serious security issues--were responsible for damaging or 
disrupting communications service to a huge geographic area for a 
prolonged period of time. Indeed, in reviewing the impact on each 
communications sector, there appeared to be three main problems that 
caused the majority of communications network interruptions: (1) 
flooding; (2) lack of power and/or fuel; and (3) failure of redundant 
pathways for communications traffic. In addition, a fourth item--
inadvertent line cuts during restoration--resulted in additional 
network damage, causing new outages or delaying service restoration.
    The Panel also observed significant impediments to the recovery 
effort resulting from:
     Inconsistent and unclear requirements for communications 
infrastructure repair crews and their subcontractors to gain access to 
the affected area;
     Limited access to power and/or generator fuel;
     Limited security for communications infrastructure and 
personnel;
     Lack of pre-positioned back-up equipment;
     Lack of established coordination between the 
communications industry and state and local officials as well as among 
federal, state and local government officials with respect to 
communications matters; and
     Limited use of available priority communications services, 
such as GETS, WPS and TSP.
    On a more positive note, in the wake of the storm, lines of 
communication between the communications industry and the federal 
government were established and seemed generally effective in 
facilitating coordination, promptly granting needed regulatory relief, 
and gathering outage information. The FCC was widely praised as playing 
a critical role in helping to restore communications connectivity. In

[[Page 38574]]

addition, ad hoc, informal sharing of fuel and equipment among 
communications industry participants helped to maximize the assets 
available and bolster the recovery effort. However, additional 
coordination of personnel and assets within industry and among 
government agencies could have substantially facilitated restoration of 
communications networks.
    With respect to emergency communications, Hurricane Katrina 
significantly hampered the functionality of these typically resilient 
systems. The areas in and around New Orleans were seriously impacted, 
due to heavier storm impact and the levee flooding. As a result, more 
than 2,000 police, fire and emergency medical service personnel were 
forced to communicate in single channel mode, radio-to-radio, utilizing 
only three mutual aid frequencies. This level of destruction did not 
extend to inland areas, which generally did not lose their 
communications capabilities and were soon operating at pre-Katrina 
capabilities. In the hardest hit areas, however, the disruption of 
public safety communications operability, as well as a lack of 
interoperability, frustrated the response effort and caused tremendous 
confusion among official personnel and the general public.
    The Panel observed that lack of effective first responder 
communications after the storm revealed inadequate planning, 
coordination and training on the use of technologies that can help to 
restore emergency communications. Very few public safety agencies had 
stockpiles of key equipment on hand to implement rapid repairs or 
alternative, redundant systems to turn to when their primary systems 
failed. To the extent alternative systems were available, lack of 
training and familiarity with the equipment limited functionality and 
impeded the recovery effort. Communications assets that could have been 
used to fill gaps were apparently not requested or deployed in 
sufficient quantities to have a significant impact. Hurricane Katrina 
also highlighted the long-standing problem of interoperability among 
public safety communications systems operating in different frequency 
bands and with different technical standards. Additionally, 911 
emergency call handling suffered from a lack of preprogrammed routing 
of calls to PSAPs not incapacitated by the hurricane. Finally, the 
emergency medical community seemed lacking in contingency 
communications planning and information about technologies and services 
that might address their critical communications needs.
    The use of communications networks to disseminate reliable 
emergency information to the public is critical--before, during and 
after such events. While the Panel understands that the National 
Weather Service used the Emergency Alert System (``EAS'') to provide 
severe weather warnings to citizens in the Gulf States in advance of 
Katrina making landfall, the system was apparently not utilized by 
state and local officials to provide localized emergency evacuation and 
other important information. In the absence of EAS activation, 
inconsistent or erroneous information was sometimes provided within the 
affected area. Further, the Panel heard about notification technologies 
that may permit emergency messages to be sent to wireline and wireless 
telephones as well as personal digital assistants and other mobile 
devices, thus complementing the traditional broadcast-based EAS. 
Ensuring emergency communications reach Americans with hearing or 
visual disabilities or who do not speak English was a major challenge. 
Although the broadcast industry has taken significant steps to provide 
on-screen sign language interpreters, closed captioning, and critical 
information in a second language, these steps were reported to be 
insufficient in certain instances. Shelters also generally did not have 
communications capabilities for those with hearing or speech 
disabilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

    Based upon its observations regarding the impact of Hurricane 
Katrina on communications networks and the sufficiency and 
effectiveness of the recovery effort, the Panel has developed a number 
of recommendations to the FCC for improving disaster preparedness, 
network reliability and communications among first responders. These 
recommendations fall within four basic areas:
    [rtrif] Pre-positioning the communications industry and the 
government for disasters in order to achieve greater network 
reliability and resiliency. These recommendations include:
     Pre-positioning for the Communications Industry--A 
Readiness Checklist. The FCC should work with and encourage each 
industry sector, through their organizations or associations, to 
develop and publicize sector-specific readiness recommendations.
     Pre-positioning for Public Safety--An Awareness Program 
for Non-Traditional Emergency Alternatives. The FCC should take steps 
to educate the public safety community about the availability and 
capabilities of non-traditional technologies that might provide 
effective back-up solutions for existing public safety communications 
systems.
     Pre-positioning for FCC Regulatory Requirements--An A 
Priori Program for Disaster Areas. The FCC should explore amending its 
rules to permit automatic grants of certain types of waivers or special 
temporary authority (STA) in a particular geographic area if the 
President declares that area to be a ``disaster area''.
     Pre-positioning for Government Outage Monitoring--A Single 
Repository and Contact with Consistent Data Collection. The FCC should 
coordinate with other federal and state agencies to identify a single 
repository/point of contact for communications outage information in 
the wake of an emergency. The Panel suggests that the FCC is the 
Federal agency best situated to perform this function.
    [rtrif] Improving recovery coordination to address existing 
shortcomings and to maximize the use of existing resources. These 
recommendations include:
     Remedying Existing Shortcomings--National Credentialing 
Guidelines for Communications Infrastructure Providers. The FCC should 
work with other appropriate federal departments and agencies and the 
communications industry to promptly develop national credentialing 
requirements and process guidelines for enabling communications 
infrastructure providers and their contracted workers access to the 
affected area post-disaster.
     Remedying Existing Shortcomings--Emergency Responder 
Status for Communications Infrastructure Providers. The Panel supports 
the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee's 
(``NSTAC's'') recommendation that telecommunications infrastructure 
providers and their contracted workers be afforded emergency responder 
status under the Stafford Act, but recommends that it be broadened to 
include all communications infrastructure providers.
     Remedying Existing Shortcomings--Utilization of State/
Regional Coordination Bodies. The FCC should work with state and local 
government and the communications industry (including wireline, 
wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting) to better utilize 
the coordinating capabilities at regional, state and local Emergency 
Operations Centers, as well as the Joint Field Office.
     Maximizing Existing Resources--Expanding and Publicizing 
Emergency

[[Page 38575]]

Communications Programs (GETS, WPS, and TSP). The FCC should work with 
the National Communications System (``NCS'') to actively and 
aggressively promote GETS, WPS and TSP to all eligible government, 
public safety, and critical industry groups.
     Maximizing Existing Resources--Broadening NCC to Include 
All Communications Infrastructure Sectors. The FCC should work with the 
NCS to broaden the membership of the National Coordination Center for 
Telecommunications (``NCC'') to include adequate representation of all 
types of communications systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite 
and other new technologies, as appropriate.
     Maximizing Existing Resources--FCC Web site for Emergency 
Coordination Information. The FCC should create a password-protected 
Web site, accessible by credentialed entities, listing the key state 
emergency management contacts, as well as post-disaster coordination 
areas for communications providers.
     Maximizing Existing Resources--FCC Web site for Emergency 
Response Team Information. The FCC should create a Web site to 
publicize the agency's emergency response team's contact information 
and procedures for facilitating disaster response and outage recovery.
    [rtrif] Improving the operability and interoperability of public 
safety and 911 communications in times of crisis. These recommendations 
include:
     Essential Steps in Pre-positioning Equipment, Supplies and 
Personnel--An Emergency Restoration Supply Cache and Alternatives 
Inventory. The FCC should encourage state and local jurisdictions to 
retain and maintain, including through arrangements with the private 
sector, a cache of equipment components that would be needed to 
immediately restore existing public safety communications. The FCC 
should also work with the NCC to develop inventories of alternative 
communications assets.
     Essential Steps in Enabling Emergency Communications 
Capabilities--Facilitating First Responder Interoperability. The FCC 
should take several steps to facilitate interoperability among first 
responder communications, including maintaining the schedule for 
commercial spectrum auctions to fund the federal public safety grant 
programs; working with the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (``NTIA'') and the Department of Homeland Security 
(``DHS'') to establish appropriate criteria for these grants; 
encouraging the expeditious development and approval of 700 MHz 
regional plans; working with NTIA and DHS to develop spectrum sharing 
among federal, state and local agencies for emergency response 
purposes; and publicizing interoperability successes and best 
practices.
     Essential Steps in Addressing E-911 Lessons Learned--A 
Plan for Resiliency and Restoration of E-911 Infrastructure and Public 
Safety Answering Points (``PSAPs''). The FCC should encourage 
implementation of certain Network Reliability and Interoperability 
Council (``NRIC'') best practice recommendations to ensure more robust 
E-911 service. In addition, the FCC should recommend and take steps to 
permit the designation of a secondary back-up PSAP more than 200 miles 
away, as well as urge applicable federal programs to expand eligibility 
for 911 enhancement/interoperability grants.
     Essential Steps in Addressing Lessons Learned Concerning 
Emergency Medical and Hospital Communications Needs--An Outreach 
Program to Educate and Include the Emergency Medical Community in 
Emergency Communications Preparedness. The FCC should work to assist 
the emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency and 
effectiveness of their emergency communications systems through 
education and clarification of Stafford Act classification and funding 
eligibility.
    [rtrif] Improving communication of emergency information to the 
public. These recommendations include:
     Actions to Alert and Inform--Revitalize and Publicize the 
Underutilized Emergency Alert System. The FCC should revitalize and 
publicize the underutilized EAS through education and the exploration 
of complementary notification technologies.
     Actions to Alert and Inform--Commence Efforts to Ensure 
that Persons with Disabilities and Non-English-Speaking Americans 
Receive Meaningful Alerts. The FCC should commence efforts to ensure 
that persons with disabilities and non-English-speaking Americans 
receive meaningful alerts, including resolving technical hurdles to 
these individual's utilization of EAS, publicizing best practices for 
serving these individuals, and encouraging state and local emergency 
agencies to make critical emergency information accessible to persons 
with disabilities and non-English-speaking Americans.
     Actions to Alert and Inform--Ensure Consistent and 
Reliable Emergency Information Through a Consolidated and Coordinated 
Public Information Program. The FCC should work with federal, state and 
local agencies to ensure consistent and reliable emergency information 
through a consolidated and coordinated public information program.
* * * * *
    The Katrina Panel commends Chairman Martin and the Commission for 
their actions to assist industry and first responders before, during 
and after Hurricane Katrina and for forming this Panel to identify 
steps to be taken to enhance readiness and recovery in the future. The 
Panel hopes that its observations and recommendations prove useful to 
the Commission and assist our Nation in preparing for and responding to 
future hurricanes and any other disasters that might lay ahead for us.

INTRODUCTION

    The Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Networks (``Katrina Panel'' or ``Panel'') hereby submits 
its report to the Federal Communications Commission (``Commission'' or 
``FCC''). The Panel is charged with studying the impact of Hurricane 
Katrina on the telecommunications and media infrastructure\1\ in the 
areas affected by the hurricane. As directed by the Commission, this 
report presents the Panel's findings as well as recommendations for 
improving disaster preparedness, network reliability and communications 
among first responders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Throughout this report, the terms ``communications 
infrastructure'' and ``communications networks'' are intended to 
refer to both telecommunications (e.g., telephony, wireless, 
satellite, WISP) and media (e.g., radio, television, cable) 
infrastructure. ``Communications providers'' is intended to refer to 
the operators of these networks.
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I. Panel Formation and Charge

    On September 15, 2005, FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin announced that 
he would establish an independent expert panel to review the impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on the communications infrastructure.\2\ Chairman 
Martin made the announcement at the FCC's Open Meeting focusing on the 
effects of Hurricane Katrina, which was held in

[[Page 38576]]

Atlanta, Georgia. He stated that the Panel would be composed of public 
safety and communications industry representatives.\3\ The twenty-seven 
members of the Panel, reflecting that diverse composition, are 
identified in Appendix A. Chairman Martin appointed Nancy J. Victory of 
Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, the former Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
for Communications and Information and Administrator of the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, to chair the 
Panel.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal 
Communications Commission, Open Meeting on the Effects of Hurricane 
Katrina, Atlanta, GA, at 3 (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-261095A1.pdf 
[hereinafter ``Martin Sept. 15 Statement'']; see also FCC Takes 
Steps to Assist in Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief, 2005 FCC LEXIS 
5109 (rel. Sept. 15, 2005) (Commission news release).
    \3\ Martin Sept. 15 Statement at 3.
    \4\ Chairman Kevin J. Martin Names Nancy J. Victory as Chair of 
the Federal Communication Commission's Independent Panel Reviewing 
the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, 2005 FCC 
LEXIS 6514 (rel. Nov. 28, 2005) (Commission news release).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In accordance with the requirements of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, the FCC published a notice announcing the establishment 
of the Katrina Panel in the Federal Register on January 6, 2006.\5\ The 
Panel's charter details the Katrina Panel's objectives and the scope of 
its activity.\6\ Specifically, the Charter directs the Panel:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ See Federal Communications Commission, Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 933 (Jan. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/hkipnoe.pdf. Access to the public 
comments filed with and notices generated by the Katrina Panel 
(unless otherwise noted with a URL designation in the citations 
which follow) is through the Panel's website, available at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/.
    \6\ See FCC Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane 
Katrina on Communications Networks, Charter (filed Jan. 9, 2006), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/HKIPCharter.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     To study the impact of Hurricane Katrina on all sectors of 
the telecommunications and media industries, including public safety 
communications;
     To review the sufficiency and effectiveness of the 
recovery effort with respect to this infrastructure; and
     To make recommendations to the Commission by June 15, 2006 
regarding ways to improve disaster preparedness, network reliability, 
and communication among first responders such as police, fire fighters, 
and emergency medical personnel.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Id. at 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to the Charter, the Panel became operational on January 9, 
2006. The Charter also provides that the Panel will terminate on June 
15, 2006 and must carry out its duties before that date.

II. Process and Activities of the Panel

    In order to gather information to fulfill the directives of its 
Charter, the Panel called upon the experiences of its members, many of 
whom were directly involved in the recovery efforts following Hurricane 
Katrina. The Panel also solicited broad public input by providing 
processes by which interested parties could submit written comments\8\ 
and provide oral presentations.\9\ The Panel additionally invited 
certain experts to present to the Panel or demonstrate new technologies 
and applications. The written comments received by the Panel, as well 
as transcripts of the Panel's meetings, are publicly available at the 
FCC's Public Reference Room and on the Panel's website. Finally, the 
Panel also reviewed publicly available information regarding matters 
under the Panel's consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission, Federal 
Advisory Committee Act; Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, Notice of opportunity 
to provide oral presentations, 71 Fed. Reg. 5846 (Feb. 3, 2006), 
available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20061800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/pdf/06-1057.pdf.
    \9\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Panel met five times to hear oral presentations, to discuss 
draft findings and recommendations, and to finalize and approve this 
report. Those meetings occurred on January 30, March 6-7, April 18, May 
12, and June 9, 2006. The March 6-7 meeting was held in Jackson, 
Mississippi, where the Panel was able to hear oral presentations by 
interested parties. All other meetings of the Panel occurred in 
Washington, DC. All of these meetings were public, with prior notice of 
their date, time and location provided to the public.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ See, e.g., Notice of Appointment Of Members To Serve On 
Federal Communications Commission's Independent Panel Reviewing The 
Impact Of Hurricane Katrina On Communications Networks; And 
Independent Panel's First Meeting Scheduled For January 30, 2006, 
Public Notice, 21 FCC Rcd 197 (2006). The Commission also published 
notices in the Federal Register announcing Panel meetings. See, 
e.g., Federal Communications Commission, Federal Advisory Committee 
Act; Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Networks, Notice of public meeting, 71 Fed. Reg. 2233 
(Jan. 13, 2006). The Panel's website at &fnlhttp://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/Meetings.html contains more information about meeting notices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Panel formed informal working groups (``IWGs''), made up of 
small numbers of Panel members, to help it effectively review and 
process the necessary information within the time required. The working 
groups met numerous times in person and telephonically during the 
Panel's existence. These working groups were not decision-making 
bodies. Rather, they compiled and sorted information in particular 
issue areas for presentation to the full Panel. The Panel had three 
informal working groups:
     IWG-1: Infrastructure Resiliency. This working group 
focused its discussions and efforts on four main areas: (1) Reviewing 
how and why certain portions of the communications networks failed; (2) 
identifying which portions of the communications networks continued to 
work and withstood the hurricane and why; (3) examining how 
communications technology can be made less vulnerable to failing; and 
(4) studying what steps can be taken, pre-event, to strengthen the 
communications infrastructure. Marion Scott, Vice President--
Operations, CenturyTel, served as the Chair of this working group and 
Steve Dean, Fire Chief of Mobile, Alabama, served as Vice-Chair.
     IWG-2: Recovery Coordination and Procedures. This working 
group focused on seven main issues: (1) Examining ways to increase the 
speed with which communications networks can be restored post-event; 
(2) reviewing whether communications technology could have been used 
more effectively during the recovery period, including issues relating 
to consumer education and post-event deployment of communications 
technology; (3) reviewing the intra-industry procedures that 
communications providers use to coordinate recovery efforts; (4) 
reviewing the industry-government procedures that private 
communications firms and federal, state and local governments use to 
coordinate recovery efforts; (5) studying ways that private industry 
can obtain faster and more efficient access to impacted areas; (6) 
reviewing the security and protection procedures utilized by private 
communications industry members when they send their first responders 
to impacted areas; and (7) reviewing how well emergency communications 
services, including Telecommunications Service Priority, Government 
Emergency Telecommunications Service, and Wireless Priority Service, 
performed during Katrina and the extent to which emergency responders 
used these services. Steve Davis, Senior Vice President--Engineering, 
Clear Channel Radio, served as the Chair of this working group and Lt. 
Colonel Joseph Booth, Deputy Superintendent, Louisiana State Police, 
served as Vice-Chair.
     IWG-3: Emergency Communications. This working group 
focused on six main issues: (1) Identifying means for ensuring or 
enabling rapid deployment of interoperable communications in the wake 
of an event like Hurricane Katrina that can be implemented in the short 
term; (2) identifying any coordination that needs to occur among public 
safety entities to facilitate implementation of

[[Page 38577]]

such a system in the wake of a disaster; (3) reviewing Hurricane 
Katrina's impact on the Gulf Coast Region's 911 and E-911 systems; (4) 
reviewing the impact of the hurricane on PSAPs and the procedures used 
to re-route emergency calls; (5) examining whether and how the 
communications networks could have provided greater 911 connectivity 
for private citizens; and (6) reviewing the adequacy of emergency 
communications to the public before, during and after the hurricane, 
and the best ways to alert and inform the public about emergencies in 
the future. Steve Delahousey, Vice President--Operations, American 
Medical Response, served as the Chair of this working group and Jim 
Jacot, Vice President, Cingular Network Group, served as Vice-Chair.
    Typically, discussion about various findings and recommendations 
occurred first within the working groups. The working groups then 
presented draft findings and recommendations to the full Panel for 
further discussion. Certain issues were referred back to the working 
groups for additional discussion and revision.
    The Panel held its final meeting on June 9, 2006. During this 
meeting, the Panel discussed the final draft report, including 
recommendations to the Commission. The Panel then unanimously approved 
this report for submission to the Commission.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ The Panel would like to recognize and express appreciation 
to Lisa Fowlkes and Jean Ann Collins, the Designated and Alternate 
Designated FACA Officers for the Panel, for their important 
contributions in enabling the Panel to carry out its mission under 
the Charter. In addition, the Panel would like to thank Michael A. 
Lewis, Thomas Dombrowsky, and Brendan T. Carr of Wiley Rein & 
Fielding LLP for their considerable assistance in preparing this 
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PANEL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON THE 
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND THE SUFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
RECOVERY EFFORT

    The Katrina Panel has been charged with studying the impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on all sectors of the telecommunications and media 
industries, including public safety communications. The Panel has also 
been directed to review the effectiveness of the recovery effort with 
respect to this infrastructure. To inform its views on these issues, 
the Panel heard oral presentations and reviewed written comments from 
numerous government and industry representatives, as well as other 
interested members of the public. The Panel members also brought to 
bear their own experiences with Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. As 
a result of digesting and discussing all of this information, the Panel 
members identified a number of areas where problems were observed or 
communications recovery and restoration efforts could have been more 
effective. The Panel also identified areas where successes were 
achieved--successes that should be repeated. These observed problems 
and successes, which are detailed below, generally formed the basis for 
the Panel's recommendations to the Commission.
    The Panel's observations below are divided into four sections. 
Section I, Network Reliability and Resiliency, discusses the successes 
and failures in the resiliency and reliability of various types of 
communications networks from an operational perspective. This section 
looks at the effects of both the hurricane itself and the subsequent 
levee breaches on communications infrastructure. Section II, Recovery 
Coordination and Procedures, reviews the challenges communications 
infrastructure providers encountered in restoring and maintaining 
communications service, particularly with regard to access and 
credentialing issues, restoration of power, and security. Section III, 
First Responder Communications, examines the challenges posed to public 
safety and emergency first responders in the days following Hurricane 
Katrina. And finally Section IV, Emergency Communication to the Public, 
focuses on the adequacy and effectiveness of emergency communications 
to the public before, during and after Hurricane Katrina.

I. Network Reliability and Resiliency

    The sheer force of Hurricane Katrina and the extensive flooding 
resulting from the breached levees severely tested the reliability and 
resiliency of communications networks in the Gulf Coast region. Katrina 
also affected areas of the Gulf Coast in varied fashions. In the high 
impact zones near Gulfport, MS and New Orleans, LA, the hurricane 
created much heavier damage to the infrastructure due to strong winds 
and, in New Orleans, extensive flooding in the days after the storm. In 
less impacted areas, damage was less severe and recovery efforts were 
more easily accomplished. Katrina taxed each type of communications 
infrastructure in a variety of ways: (1) strong winds and rain made it 
difficult for technical staff to support and maintain the networks and 
blew antennas out of alignment; (2) heavy flooding following Katrina 
overwhelmed a large portion of the communications infrastructure, 
damaging equipment and impeding recovery; (3) single points of failure 
in vital communications links led to widespread communications outages 
across a variety of networks; and (4) the duration of power outages far 
outlasted most generator fuel reserves, leading to the failure of 
otherwise functional infrastructure. However, there were resiliency 
successes in the aftermath: (1) a large portion of the communications 
infrastructure withstood the storm's wind and rain with only minor 
damage (as distinguished from post-storm flooding from levee breaches 
and power outages, which had a more devastating impact); (2) satellite 
networks, although taxed by extensive numbers of additional users, 
remained available and usable throughout the affected region; and (3) 
the communications networks operated by utilities appeared to have a 
very high rate of survivability. By examining the failures in network 
resiliency and reliability, along with the successes, we can better 
prepare communications infrastructure to withstand or quickly recover 
from future catastrophic events.

A. Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Various Types of Communications 
Networks

    Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath had a devastating impact on 
communications networks in the Gulf Coast region. In the affected areas 
of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, more than three million customer 
telephone lines were knocked out of service. Both switching centers and 
customer lines sustained damage. Thirty-eight 911 call centers went 
down. Approximately 100 broadcast stations were unable to transmit and 
hundreds of thousands of cable customers lost service.\12\ Even 
generally resilient public safety networks experienced massive outages. 
In short, Katrina had a catastrophic impact over a huge geographic 
area. Further, due to the unique circumstances associated with this 
disaster, repair and activation of the communications infrastructure in 
the region was not a matter of days, but rather a long and slow 
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See Written Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal 
Communications Commission, Hearing on Public Safety Communications 
from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, Before the 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, at 2 
(Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-261417A1.pdf [hereinafter ``Martin Sept. 29 
Written Statement''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To understand the precise impact that Hurricane Katrina had on 
communications networks, it is useful to distinguish between the impact 
of the

[[Page 38578]]

storm itself (i.e., hurricane force winds and rain) and the effect of 
what came later--extensive flooding from breached levees and 
widespread, long term power outages. As detailed below, it appears that 
most communications infrastructure in the areas impacted by Katrina 
fared fairly well through the storm's wind and rain, in most cases 
sustaining only minor damage or damage that should have been promptly 
repairable. Indeed, the tower industry reported that of all the towers 
in the path of the 2005 hurricanes in the Southeastern and Gulf Coast 
areas of the United States, less than 1 percent suffered any structural 
damage.\13\ The coastal areas that bore the brunt of the storm suffered 
the worst infrastructure damage from the hurricane. Not to diminish the 
significant impact of the hurricane itself, what made Katrina unique 
and particularly catastrophic were the unique conditions after the 
winds subsided--substantial flooding and widespread, extended power 
outages. These developments impacted communications networks greatly, 
causing irreparable damage to submerged electronics and prolonged 
outages in many cases. The Panel's observations on how each type of 
communications infrastructure withstood Katrina and its challenging 
aftermath is presented below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ See Comments of PCIA--The Wireless Infrastructure 
Association, at 1 (May 15, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    1. Public Safety Communications Networks. Public safety 
communications networks are generally built to be reliable in extreme 
conditions.\14\ To ensure this, the systems are planned to accommodate 
everyday peak service times as well as large incidents. They are also 
designed to account for radio system disruptions, such as power 
outages, transmission failures, system interconnect failures, and 
personal radio equipment failures. However, these systems are generally 
not designed for widespread catastrophes of long duration--the 
situation resulting from Katrina.\15\ As a result of the storm and its 
aftermath, public safety networks in the Gulf states experienced a 
large number of transmission outages that impacted the functionality of 
both primary and back-up systems. The loss of power and the failure of 
switches in the wireline telephone network also had a huge impact on 
the ability of public safety systems to function.\16\ Public safety 
personnel's apparent lack of familiarity with the operation of back-up 
or alternate systems (such as satellite systems) also limited 
functionality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See, e.g., Written Statement of Chief Harlin R. McEwen, 
Chairman, Communications and Technology Committee, International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter 
``McEwen Mar. 6 Written Statement''].
    \15\ Id. at 4.
    \16\ See id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    a. Tower Failures. In general, public safety's antenna towers 
remained standing after the storm. The winds did blow antennas out of 
alignment, requiring readjustment. However, the main cause of 
transmission failures was loss of power (as discussed below). Most 
public safety radio systems by design are able to handle and manage a 
single or isolated subsystem failure or loss.\17\ However, Katrina 
affected parts of four states, causing transmission losses at a much 
greater number and over a larger area than public safety planning had 
envisioned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ See id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    b. Power Failures. Power for radio base stations and battery/
chargers for portable radio devices are carefully planned for public 
safety systems. However, generators are typically designed to keep base 
stations operating for 24 to 48 hours. The long duration of power 
outages in the wake of Katrina substantially exceeded the capabilities 
of most of public safety's back-up generators and fuel reserves.\18\ 
Similarly, portable radios and back-up batteries generally have an 8 to 
10 hour duty cycle.\19\ Without access to power to recharge the devices 
and backup batteries, portable devices quickly ran out of power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ See id.
    \19\ Id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    c. Wireline and Network Infrastructure Failures. Katrina and the 
subsequent levee breaches caused significant failures of the Public 
Switched Telephone Network (``PSTN''), particularly in the New Orleans 
area.\20\ Public safety radio networks rely on interconnection with the 
PSTN or by fixed microwave links to get communications through to 
public safety responders. Given PSTN failures, as well as damage to 
fixed microwave links, public safety communications were significantly 
affected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    d. Training Issues. Because of failures of the primary public 
safety networks, public safety personnel had to utilize back-up or 
alternative communications technologies with which they may not have 
had substantial experience. Confusion or unfamiliarity with the 
capabilities or operational requirements of the alternative technology 
seemed to result in limitations in functionality.\21\ For example, some 
public safety personnel handed satellite phones were not familiar with 
their special dialing requirements and, as a result, thought the phones 
did not work.\22\ Public safety personnel did not seem to have adequate 
training on alternative communications technologies, such as paging, 
satellite, license-exempt WISP systems, and thus were not able to 
transition seamlessly to these alternatives when existing public safety 
communications networks failed. Additionally, because alternative 
technologies were used so infrequently, there were reported problems 
with upkeep and maintenance of the equipment.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Dr. Sandy Bogucki, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Tr. at 54-55 (Mar. 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral Testimony''].
    \22\ Written Testimony of David Cavossa, Executive Director, 
Satellite Industry Association, Before the FCC's Independent Panel 
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 4-5 (Mar. 3, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony'']; Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral 
Testimony, Tr. at 55.
    \23\ See Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs). Handling of 911 calls 
was identified as a problem during Katrina. As a result of the storm 
and subsequent flooding, thirty-eight 911 call centers ceased to 
function.\24\ Limited training and advanced planning on how to handle 
rerouting of emergency calls under this situation created serious 
problems.\25\ As an example, the City of Biloxi was able to relocate 
their 911 call center prior to landfall; however, representatives 
relocated to the facility did not have full 911 capabilities. This 
severely hampered their ability to effectively route 911 calls to the 
appropriate agencies. The Katrina experience identified that there 
appeared to be a lack of 911 PSAP failovers and some deficits in 
training on routing and handling of calls when a crisis and rerouting 
occurs. Nevertheless, the vast majority of 911 call centers, especially 
in the less impacted portions of the region, were up and running by 
September 9.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 2.
    \25\ See, e.g., Comments of Comcare at 2 (May 11, 2006) (there 
was no plan to bring in additional telecommunicators to the region 
to keep up with the influx of 911 calls from victims and rescue 
response teams).
    \26\ See Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. Wireline. According to FCC data, more than 3 million customer 
phone lines were knocked out in the Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama 
area following Hurricane Katrina.\27\ The wireline

[[Page 38579]]

telephone network sustained significant damage both to the switching 
centers that route calls and to the lines used to connect buildings and 
customers to the network.\28\ Katrina highlighted the dependence on 
tandems and tandem access to SS7 switches.\29\ The high volume routes 
from tandem switches, especially in and around New Orleans were 
especially critical and vulnerable. Katrina highlighted the need for 
diversity of call routing and avoiding strict reliance upon a single 
routing solution. One tandem switch, which was critical for 911 call 
routing, was lost from September 4 to September 21. This switch went 
down due to flooding that did not allow for fuel to be replenished. Due 
to the high winds and severe flooding, there were multiple breaks in 
the fiber network supporting the PSTN. Katrina demonstrated that in 
many areas there may be a lack of multiple fiber routes throughout the 
wireline network and that aerial fiber was more at risk than 
underground fiber. As with other private sector communications 
providers, lack of access to facilities (due to both flooding and 
inadequate credentialing), lack of commercial power, and lack of 
security greatly hampered recovery efforts. Nevertheless, ten days 
after Katrina, nearly 90 percent of wireline customers in the Gulf 
region who had lost service had their service restored.\30\ However, 
the vast majority of these customers were in the less impacted regions 
of the Gulf; regions that were harder hit sustained more infrastructure 
damage and continued to have difficulty in restoring service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ See Written Statement of Kenneth P. Moran, Director, Office 
of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, FCC, on Hurricane Katrina, 
Before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of 
Representatives, at 2 (Sept. 7, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260895A1.pdf 
[hereinafter ``Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement''].
    \28\ Id. at 2-3.
    \29\ See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Woody Glover, Director, St. 
Tammany Parish Communications District, Tr. at 64-67 (Mar. 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Woody Glover Mar. 6 Oral Testimony''].
    \30\ Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Cellular/PCS. Local cellular and personal communications service 
(``PCS'') networks received considerable damage with more than 1,000 
base station sites impacted.\31\ In general, cellular/PCS base stations 
were not destroyed by Katrina, although some antennas required 
adjustment after the storm. Rather, the majority of the adverse effects 
and outages encountered by wireless providers were due to a lack of 
commercial power or a lack of transport connectivity to the wireless 
switch (wireline T1 line lost or fixed microwave backhaul offline). The 
transport connectivity is generally provided by the local exchange 
carrier. With either failure, wireless providers would be required to 
make a site visit to return the base station to operational status. 
Wireless providers cited security for their personnel, access and fuel 
as the most pressing needs and problems affecting restoration of 
wireless service. However, within one week after Katrina, approximately 
80 percent of wireless cell sites were up and running.\32\ Consistent 
with other systems, the 20 percent of base stations still affected were 
in the areas most impacted by Katrina. Cellular base stations on wheels 
(``COWs'') were successfully used as needed to restore service 
throughout the affected region. Over 100 COWs were delivered to the 
Gulf Coast region.\33\ In addition to voice services, text messaging 
was used successfully during the crisis and appeared to offer 
communications when the voice networks became overloaded with traffic. 
Additionally, wireless providers' push-to-talk services appeared to be 
more resilient than interconnected voice service inasmuch as they do 
not necessarily rely upon connectivity to the PSTN.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 3.
    \32\ Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 44.
    \33\ S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov't Affairs, 109th 
Cong., Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared at 18-4, May 
2006, available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/FullReport.pdf [hereinafter ``Senate Report on Katrina''].
    \34\ See Written Testimony of Dave Flessas, VP, Network 
Operations, Sprint Nextel Corp, Before the FCC's Independent Panel 
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 3 (Jan. 30, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Sprint Nextel Jan. 30 Written Testimony''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. Paging. Paging systems seemed more reliable in some instances 
than voice/cellular systems because paging systems utilize satellite 
networks, rather than terrestrial systems, for backbone 
infrastructure.\35\ Paging technology is also inherently redundant, 
which means that messages may still be relayed if a single transmitter 
or group of transmitters in a network fails.\36\ Paging signals 
penetrate buildings very well, thus providing an added level of 
reliability.\37\ Additionally, pagers benefited from having a long 
battery life and thus remained operating longer during the power 
outages.\38\ Other positive observations concerning paging systems 
included that they were effective at text messaging and were equipped 
to provide broadcast messaging.\39\ Finally, although it is unclear 
whether this function was utilized, group pages can be sent out during 
times of emergencies to alert thousands of pager units all at the same 
time.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See, e.g., Written Testimony of Vincent D. Kelly, President 
and Chief Executive Officer, USA Mobility, Before the FCC's 
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina at 7 
(Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ``Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 
Written Testimony'']; Oral Testimony of Bruce Deer, President, 
American Association of Paging Carriers, Tr. at 122-123 (Mar. 6, 
2006) [hereinafter ``Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony''].
    \36\ See, e.g., Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written 
Testimony at 7-8.
    \37\ Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 123.
    \38\ Id.
    \39\ See, e.g., Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written 
Testimony at 3.
    \40\ See, e.g., Comments of Interstate Wireless, Inc., at 1 (May 
10, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. Satellite. Satellite networks appeared to be the communications 
service least disrupted by Hurricane Katrina.\41\ As these networks do 
not heavily depend upon terrestrial-based infrastructure, they are 
typically not affected by wind, rain, flooding or power outages.\42\ As 
a result, both fixed and mobile satellite systems provided a 
functional, alternative communications path for those in the storm-
ravaged region.\43\ Mobile satellite operators reported large increases 
in satellite traffic without any particular network/infrastructure 
issues.\44\ More than 20,000 satellite phones were deployed to the Gulf 
Coast region in the days following Katrina.\45\ Broadband capacity

[[Page 38580]]

was provided by fixed satellite operators for voice, video and data 
network applications. Nevertheless, there were functionality issues 
with satellite communications - largely due to lack of user training 
and equipment preparation.\46\ Some satellite phones require 
specialized dialing in order to place a call. They also require line of 
sight with the satellite and thus do not generally work indoors.\47\ 
Users who had not been trained or used a satellite phone prior to 
Katrina reported frustration and difficulty in rapid and effective use 
of these devices.\48\ Satellite phones also require charged batteries. 
Handsets that were not charged and ready to go were of no use as there 
was often no power to recharge handsets. Additionally, most of 
Louisiana's parishes (all but three) did not have satellite phones on 
hand because they had previously chosen to discontinue their service as 
a cost-saving measure.\49\ Finally, users expressed the observation 
that satellite data networks (replacing wireline T1 service) were more 
robust and had fewer difficulties in obtaining and maintaining 
communications with the satellite network than voice services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See, e.g., Comments of Globalstar LLC, at 1 (Jan. 27, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Globalstar Comments''].
    \42\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-9 (``satellite 
phones do not rely on terrestrial * * * infrastructure that is 
necessary for land mobile radio, land-line, and cellular 
communications''); Written Statement of Tony Trujillo, Chairman, 
Satellite Industry Association, Hearing on Public Safety 
Communications From 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, 
Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of 
Representatives, at 3 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/09292005Hearing1648/Trujillo.pdf 
[hereinafter ``Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement''].
    \43\ See, e.g., Written Statement of Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy 
Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness, Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the 
State of Louisiana, Before the Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 
United States House of Representatives, at 12 (Dec. 14, 2005), 
available at http://katrina.house.gov/hearing/12-14-05/smith_121405.doc [hereinafter ``Jeff Smith Written Statement'']; Written 
Statement of Bruce Baughman, Director, Alabama State Emergency 
Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by 
the State of Alabama, Before the Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 
United States House of Representatives, at 4 (Nov. 9, 2005), 
available at http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/11_09_05/baughman_110905.doc; Written Statement of Robert Latham, Director, 
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina: 
Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Before the 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina, United States House of 
Representatives, at 4 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12_07_05/latham_120705.pdf.
    \44\ Globalstar Comments at 2.
    \45\ Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement at 4.
    \46\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-9 (problems with 
satellite phones do not appear to have been caused by the phones 
themselves or the satellite networks; a combination of user error 
and obstruction of satellite signals were most likely the problems); 
Cavossa-SIA Testimony at 4-5; Bogucki Mar. 6 Public Testimony, Tr. 
at 55.
    \47\ Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony at 5.
    \48\ Id. at 4.
    \49\ See Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 
H.R. Rep. No. 109-377, at 172-73 (2006), available at http://www.gpo.access.gov/serialset/creports/Katrina.html, [hereinafter 
``House Report''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    7. Broadcasting. The television and radio broadcasting industry was 
also hard hit by Katrina. Approximately 28 percent of television 
stations experienced downtime in the storm zone; approximately 35 
percent of radio stations failed in one fashion or another.\50\ In 
addition, in New Orleans and the surrounding area, only 4 of the 41 
broadcast radio stations remained on the air in the wake of the 
hurricane.\51\ Some broadcasters continued broadcasting only by 
partnering with other broadcasters whose signals were not 
interrupted.\52\ Broadcasters reported very few tower losses as a 
result of Katrina. Instead, the wind displacing and causing misaligning 
antennas was the biggest cause of broadcast outages. Although this type 
of damage could be readily repaired, the lengthy power outages--which 
substantially exceeded back-up generator capabilities--prevented many 
broadcast stations from coming back on the air. Power outages at the 
viewer/listener end were also an issue as they prevented broadcast 
transmissions from being successfully received. Additionally, the lack 
of security for broadcast facilities and repair personnel impeded 
recovery efforts. Nevertheless, within three weeks after Katrina, more 
than 90 percent of broadcasters were up and running in the affected 
region.\53\ However, in the areas most impacted by the storm, the vast 
majority of stations remained down much longer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See, e.g., Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 45; Written 
Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications 
Commission, Hearing on Communications in a Disaster, Before the 
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation at 2 (Sept. 
22, 2005) (an estimated 100 broadcast stations were knocked off the 
air).
    \51\ Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 3.
    \52\ Oral Testimony of Dave Vincent, Station Manager, WLOX-TV, 
Before the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane 
Katrina on Communications Networks, Tr. at 309 (Mar. 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Oral Testimony''] (WLOX in 
Biloxi partnered with WXXV in Gulfport, Mississippi, which carried 
WLOX's signal until they could get back on the air).
    \53\ Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    8. Cable. As with the broadcasting industry, cable companies in the 
region reported limited infrastructure damage to their head ends 
following Katrina. In the areas hardest hit by the storm itself, aerial 
cable infrastructure was heavily damaged. Some cable facilities are 
underground; the storm's wind and rain had only minimal effects on 
them. However, the opposite was true in areas where the levees' breach 
caused heavy flooding. There, underground facilities were heavily 
damaged and the electronics in those facilities were generally 
completely lost. The cable industry indicated that new cable plants 
generally allowed for multiple points of failure and system workarounds 
that permitted the network to operate in spite of some widespread 
faults in the infrastructure. However, lack of power to cable 
facilities and security proved to be key problems. The cable operator 
serving New Orleans indicated that, even where its network was intact, 
lack of power/fuel prevented it from restoring operations in those 
areas.\54\ Also, similar to broadcasting, power outages at the viewer 
end prevented cable programming from being successfully received.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ See, e.g., Comments of Greg Bicket, Cox Communications, at 
1 (Jan. 27, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    9. Utilities. Electric utility networks (including utility-owned 
commercial wireless networks) appeared to have a high rate of 
survivability following Katrina.\55\ These communications systems did 
not have a significant rate of failure because: (1) the systems were 
designed to remain intact to aid restoration of electric service 
following a significant storm event; (2) they were built with 
significant onsite back-up power supplies (batteries and generators); 
(3) last mile connections to tower sites and the backbone transport are 
typically owned by the utility and have redundant paths (both T1 and 
fixed microwave); and (4) the staff responsible for the communications 
network have a focus on continuing maintenance of network elements (for 
example, exercising standby generators on a routine basis).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See, e.g., UTC Comments, Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of 
Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks, at 2 
(Jan. 27, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    10. License Exempt Wireless (WISPs). The License Exempt Wireless or 
wireless internet service provider (``WISP'') infrastructure, in 
general, was not heavily damaged by Katrina or the subsequent flooding, 
although some antennas required adjustment because of high winds. 
Rather, the majority of the adverse effects and outages encountered by 
WISP providers were due to a lack of commercial power and difficulty 
with fuel resupply. WISP providers cited access difficulties as their 
most pressing problem in restoring their networks.
    11. Amateur Radio Service. As with other communications services, 
amateur radio stations were also adversely affected by Katrina. 
Equipment was damaged or lost due to the storm and trained amateurs 
were difficult to find in the immediate aftermath. However, once called 
into help, amateur radio operators volunteered to support many 
agencies, such as FEMA, the National Weather Service, Hurricane Watch 
and the American Red Cross.\56\ Amateurs provided wireless 
communications in many locations where there was no other means of 
communicating and also provided other technical aid to the communities 
affected by Katrina.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See Hurricane Katrina Amateur Radio Emergency 
Communications Relief Effort Operations Review Summary, Written 
Statement submitted by Gregory Sarratt, W4OZK, at 2 (Mar. 7, 2006).
    \57\ Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Major Problems Identified Following Katrina

    In reviewing the detailed reports from each communications sector, 
there were three main problems that caused the majority of 
communications network interruptions: (1) Flooding; (2) lack of power 
and/or fuel; and (3) failure of redundant pathways for communications 
traffic. In addition, a fourth item--inadvertent line cuts during 
restoration--resulted in additional network damage, causing

[[Page 38581]]

new outages or delaying service restoration. Each of these areas of 
concern is detailed below.
    1. Flooding. Hurricanes typically have flooding associated with 
them due to the torrential rainfall and storm surge associated with the 
storms. However, in addition to these sources of flooding, the levee 
breaks in New Orleans caused catastrophic flooding that was extremely 
detrimental to the communications networks.\58\ While communications 
infrastructure had been hardened to prepare against strong winds from a 
hurricane, the widespread flooding of long duration associated with 
Katrina destroyed or disabled substantial portions of the 
communications networks and impeded trained personnel from reaching and 
operating the facilities.\59\ In addition, as detailed below, the 
massive flooding caused widespread power outages that were not readily 
remedied (electric substations could not be reached nor were there 
personnel available to remedy the outages). The flooding also wiped out 
transportation options, preventing fuel for generators from getting 
where it needed to be.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See, e.g., House Report at 164 (reporting that flooding 
knocked out two telephone company switches and hindered the 
communications abilities of six out of eight police districts in New 
Orleans, as well as the police department headquarters).
    \59\ See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Dr. Juliette M. Saussy, 
Director, Emergency Medical Services of the City of New Orleans, 
Louisiana, Tr. at 43-44 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ``Saussy Mar. 6 
Oral Testimony''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Power and Fuel. Katrina caused extensive damage to the power 
grid. Significant portions of electrical facilities in Mississippi, 
Alabama and Louisiana--including both power lines and electric plants--
were severely impaired due to wind and flooding. As a result, power to 
support the communications networks was generally unavailable 
throughout the region.\60\ This meant that, for communications systems 
to continue to operate, backup batteries and generators were required. 
While the communications industry has generally been diligent in 
deploying backup batteries and generators and ensuring that these 
systems have one to two days of fuel or charge, not all locations had 
them installed. Furthermore, not all locations were able to exercise 
and test the backup equipment in any systemic fashion. Thus, some 
generators and batteries did not function during the crisis. Where 
generators were installed and operational, the fuel was generally 
exhausted prior to restoration of power. Finally, flooding, shortages 
of fuel and restrictions on access to the affected area made refueling 
extraordinarily difficult.\61\ In some instances, fuel was confiscated 
by federal or local authorities when it was brought into the Katrina 
region.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ House Report. at 166.
    \61\ Id. at 164.
    \62\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (citing 
Committee staff interview of William Smith, Chief Technology 
Officer, BellSouth, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006) (FEMA commandeered 
communications fuel reserves in order to refuel helicopters).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. Redundant pathways. The switches that failed, especially 
tandems, had widespread effects on a broad variety of communications in 
and out of the Katrina region. In addition, T1 and other leased lines 
were heavily used by the communications networks throughout the region, 
with those failures leading to loss of service. As an example, a major 
tandem switch in New Orleans was isolated, which meant that no 
communications from parts of New Orleans to outside the region could 
occur. This switch, an access tandem that carried long distance traffic 
through New Orleans and out to other offices, had two major routes out 
of the city (one to the east and one to the west). The eastern route 
was severed by a barge that came ashore during the hurricane and cut 
the aerial fiber associated with the route. If only this route had been 
lost, the access tandem traffic could have continued. However, the 
western route was also severed--initially by large trees falling across 
aerial cables, then subsequently by construction crews removing debris 
from highway rights-of-way. While there were provisions for rerouting 
traffic out of the city, the simultaneous loss of both of these major 
paths significantly limited communications service in parts of New 
Orleans.
    4. Line cuts. During the restoration process following Katrina, 
there were numerous instances of fiber lines cut accidentally by 
parties seeking to restore power, phone, and cable, remove trees and 
other debris, and engage in similar restoration activities.\63\ 
BellSouth indicated in its comments to the Katrina Panel that several 
of its major routes were cut multiple times.\64\ For example, on 
Monday, September 12th, a major fiber route from Hammond, Louisiana to 
Covington, Louisiana was cut by a tree trimming company.\65\ Cox 
Communications reported that, by the eleventh day after the storm, more 
outages of its network in the region were caused by human damage than 
storm damage. Public safety entities also noted similar cuts in service 
during the restoration process.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ See, e.g., Woody Glover Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 66 
(Mar. 6, 2006).
    \64\ See Comments by William L. Smith, BellSouth, Before the 
FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Networks, at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Smith-
BellSouth Jan. 30 Written Statement'').
    \65\ Id.
    \66\ See, e.g., Comments of Robert G. Bailey, National Emergency 
Number Association, Harris County Emergency Communications, at 1 
(Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Bailey Jan. 30 Written Testimony''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to these major causes of network interruptions, 
security and access to facilities were consistently mentioned as 
significant issues affecting restoration of communications services. 
These problems are discussed in detail in the following section.

II. Recovery Coordination and Procedures

    After Katrina's wind and rain subsided, challenges to 
communications service maintenance and restoration continued. Flooding, 
which submerged and damaged equipment and blocked access for 
restoration, was a major problem. The Panel also observed significant 
challenges to the recovery effort resulting from (1) inconsistent and 
unclear requirements for communications infrastructure repair crews and 
their subcontractors to gain access to the affected area; (2) limited 
access to power and/or generator fuel; (3) limited security for 
communications infrastructure and personnel and lack of pre-positioned 
back-up equipment; (4) lack of established coordination between the 
communications industry and state and local officials as well as among 
federal, state and local government officials with respect to 
communications matters; and (5) limited use of available priority 
communications services. On the other hand, lines of communication 
between the communications industry and the federal government were 
established and seemed generally effective in facilitating 
coordination, promptly granting needed regulatory relief, and gathering 
outage information. In addition, ad hoc, informal sharing of fuel and 
equipment among communications industry participants helped to maximize 
the assets available and bolster the recovery effort. However, 
additional industry coordination of personnel and assets internally and 
among governments could have substantially facilitated restoration of 
communications networks.

A. Access to the Affected Area and Key Resources.

    1. Perimeter Access and Credentialing. Communications

[[Page 38582]]

restoration efforts were hampered significantly by the inability of 
communications infrastructure repair crews and their contracted workers 
to access the impacted area post-disaster.\67\ For important safety and 
security reasons, law enforcement personnel set up a perimeter around 
much of the impacted region and imposed restrictions on who could 
access the area. Communications infrastructure repair crews from all 
sectors of the industry had great difficulty crossing the perimeter to 
access their facilities in need of repair.\68\ This seemed to be a 
particular problem for smaller or non-traditional communications 
companies,\69\ who tended to have lower levels of name recognition with 
law enforcement personnel guarding the perimeter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ See, e.g., Oral Testimony of William L. Smith, Chief 
Technology Officer, BellSouth Corp., Before the FCC's Independent 
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 188 (Jan. 
30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Oral Testimony'']; 
see also Statement of Jim Jacot, Vice President, Cingular Network 
Group, Before the FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of 
Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 125 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Jacot-
Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony'']; Trujillo Sept. 29 Written 
Statement at 9; Comments of M/A-Com at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006).
    \68\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (repair workers 
sometimes had difficulty gaining access to their equipment and 
facilities because the police and National Guard refused to let 
crews enter the affected area); Federal Support to 
Telecommunications Infrastructure Providers in National Emergencies: 
Designation as ``Emergency Responders (Private Sector)'', The 
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, 
Legislative and Regulatory Task Force, at 7 (Jan. 31, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Jan. 31 NSTAC Report''].
    \69\ See, e.g., Comments of the Satellite Industry Association 
at 6 (January 27, 2006) (describing how satellite system repair 
crews had difficulty obtaining access to the impacted area); 
Comments of Xspedius Communications, LLC, at 2, 6 (Mar. 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Comments of Xspedius''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although some jurisdictions provided credentials to communications 
infrastructure repair crews to permit them to access the affected area, 
the process appeared to be unique for each local jurisdiction. 
Communications providers reported that credentials that permitted 
access through one checkpoint would not be honored at another.\70\ In 
many cases, different checkpoints required different documentation and 
credentialing before permitting access.\71\ As a result, repair crews 
needed to carry multiple credentials and letters from various federal, 
state and local officials.\72\ There was no uniform credentialing 
method in place whereby one type of credential would permit access at 
any checkpoint.\73\ Communications providers were also not clear about 
which agency had authority to issue the necessary credentials.\74\ And 
there did not appear to be any mechanism in place for issuing 
credentials to those who needed them prior to Katrina making landfall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (citing 
Committee staff interview of Christopher Guttman-McCabe, Vice 
President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006) 
(industry representatives said that their technicians would benefit 
from having uniform credentialing that is recognized by the multiple 
law enforcement agencies operating in a disaster area).
    \71\ See, e.g., Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 5 
(stating that a credential that permitted access in one county was 
sometimes not honored in a different county).
    \72\ See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 2-3.
    \73\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at Findings at 8 
(efforts by private sector to restore communications efforts were 
hampered by the fact that the government did not provide uniform 
credentials to gain access to affected areas).
    \74\ See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Once communications infrastructure repair crews gained access to 
the impacted area, they had no guarantee they would be allowed to 
remain there. The enforcement of curfews and other security procedures 
at times interrupted repair work and required communications 
restoration crews to exit the area. In at least one instance, law 
enforcement personnel insisted that communications technicians cease 
their work splicing a key telecommunications cable and exit the area in 
order to enforce a curfew.\75\ Although such practices may have been 
necessary from a security standpoint, they did interrupt and hamper the 
recovery process.
    The problems with access were not all one-sided. Law enforcement 
personnel also expressed frustration with the access situation, 
particularly with respect to the different credentials issued and not 
knowing what to ask for or what to honor. It was also reported that 
credentialed communications infrastructure repair personnel sometimes 
allowed non-credentialed individuals to ride in their vehicles through 
checkpoints, which compromised the security of the area. It also caused 
law enforcement personnel at the perimeter to be wary of persons 
seeking to access the affected area and the credentials they presented, 
potentially further slowing the access process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 191; see 
also Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 125.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Fuel. Problems with maintaining and restoring power for 
communications infrastructure significantly affected the recovery 
process. As described in Section I.B.2 above, many facilities could 
have been up and operating much more quickly if communications 
providers had access to sufficient fuel. The commercial power upon 
which the vast majority of communications networks depended for day-to-
day operations was knocked out over a huge geographic area. Back-up 
generators and batteries were not present at all facilities. Where they 
were deployed, most provided only enough power to operate particular 
communications facilities for 24-48 hours--generally a sufficient 
period of time to permit the restoration of commercial power in most 
situations, but not enough for a catastrophe like Hurricane Katrina.
    Access to fuel reserves or priority power restoration appeared 
extremely limited for the communications industry.\76\ Only a few 
communications providers had stockpiles of fuel or special supplier 
arrangements. However, if the fuel was not located fairly near to the 
perimeter, it was difficult and expensive to get it where it was needed 
in a timely fashion. Perimeter access issues also impeded the ability 
to bring reserve fuel into the region. Moreover, many roads and 
traditional means of accessing certain facilities could not be used due 
to the extensive flooding that followed Hurricane Katrina. And many 
communications providers did not anticipate the need for alternative 
means of reaching their facilities. In addition, some providers 
reported having their limited fuel reserves confiscated by law 
enforcement personnel for other pressing needs.\77\ Although electric 
and other utilities maintain priority lists for commercial power 
restoration, it does not appear that commercial communications 
providers were on or eligible for such lists. Indeed, one wireless 
provider speaking at the Katrina Panel's January 2006 meeting--more 
than 4 months after Katrina's landfall--reported that it had 23 cell 
sites in the impacted area still running on backup generators.\78\ Most 
communications providers also did not appear to be able to access any 
government fuel reserves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ See, e.g., Comments of Mississippi Assn. of Broadcasters at 
1-2 (Jan. 27, 2006).
    \77\ See, e.g., id.; House Report at 167 (``[O]ne of Nextel's 
fuel trucks was stopped at gunpoint and its fuel taken for other 
purposes while en route to refuel cell tower generators, and the 
Mississippi State Police redirected a fuel truck carrying fuel 
designated for a cell tower generator to fuel generators at Gulfport 
Memorial Hospital.'').
    \78\ See Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 123.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On a positive note, several companies apparently shared their 
reserve fuel with other communications providers who needed it, even 
their competitors.\79\

[[Page 38583]]

This sharing occurred on a purely ad hoc basis.\80\ There did not 
appear to be any forum or coordination area for fostering industry 
sharing of fuel or other equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ See, e.g., Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 
312 (describing how the radio station shared fuel with a nearby news 
organization).
    \80\ See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Steve Davis, Senior Vice 
President of Engineering, Clear Channel Radio, Before the FCC's 
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 
81-82 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Steve Davis-Clear Channel Jan. 
30 Oral Testimony''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. Security. Limited security for key communications facilities and 
communications infrastructure repair crews also hampered the recovery 
effort.\81\ Security concerns, both actual and perceived, led to delays 
in the restoration of communications networks.\82\ Communications 
providers reported generators being stolen from key facilities, even if 
they were bolted down. Lack of security for communications 
infrastructure repair workers at times delayed their access to certain 
facilities to make repairs.\83\ Some providers employed their own 
security crews.\84\ However, obtaining credentials to allow these 
individuals to access the affected area was sometimes a problem. 
Further, communications infrastructure repair crews generally did not 
receive security details from law enforcement. Clearly, law enforcement 
had other very significant responsibilities in the wake of Katrina. In 
addition, communications providers are apparently not considered 
``emergency responders'' under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act \85\ and the National Response Plan and 
thus are not eligible to receive non-monetary Federal assistance, like 
security protection for critical facilities and repair personnel.\86\ 
In one instance, however, a major communications provider successfully 
sought governmental security for its Poydras St. office in New Orleans, 
which serves as a regional hub for multiple telecommunications 
carriers. Both the Louisiana State Police and the FBI provided security 
so that BellSouth workers could return to the office and keep it in 
service.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4.
    \82\ The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 
February 2006, at 40, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/.
    \83\ Jan. 31 NSTAC Report at 5.
    \84\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18-4 (when 
government security proved unavailable, many telecommunications 
providers hired private security to protect their workers and 
supplies); Written Statement of Dave Flessas, Vice President for 
Network Operations, Sprint Nextel Corp., Before the FCC's 
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 2 
(Jan. 30, 2006) (security issues forced Sprint to hire armored 
guards to protect its employees and contractors); Jan. 31 NSTAC 
Report at 5.
    \85\ Pub. L. No. 93-288, as amended [hereinafter ``Stafford 
Act''].
    \86\ See, e.g., Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Written Statement at 9; 
Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 125; see also Oral 
Testimony of Captain Thomas Wetherald, Deputy Operations Director, 
National Communications System, Before the FCC's Independent Panel 
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 24 (Apr. 18, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony''].
    \87\ Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Written Statement at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Apparently, several companies that had their own security forces 
shared them with other communications providers by forming a convoy to 
go to a particular area.\88\ Such arrangements seemed to occur on a 
purely informal basis. There did not appear to be any forum or staging 
area for fostering industry sharing of security forces or other 
resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Pre-positioning of Equipment. Limited pre-positioning of 
communications equipment may have slowed the recovery process. While 
some individual companies and organizations had some backup 
communications technologies on-hand for use after a disaster, most did 
not appear to locate strategic stockpiles of communications equipment 
that could be rapidly deployed and immediately used by persons in the 
impacted area.

B. Coordination Between Industry and Government

    1. Industry--Federal Government Coordination. Despite problems 
related above at the scene of the disaster, at the federal level, 
industry and government recovery coordination for the communications 
sector appeared to function as intended. Under the National Response 
Plan, the lead federal agency for emergency support functions regarding 
communications is the National Communications System (``NCS''). NCS 
manages the National Coordination Center for Telecommunications 
(``NCC'') in Washington, DC, which is a joint industry-federal 
government endeavor with 36 member companies.\89\ The NCC meets on a 
regular basis during non-emergency situations; during and immediately 
after Katrina, it met daily and conducted analysis and situational 
monitoring of ongoing events and response capabilities.\90\ The Katrina 
Panel heard that this group played an important and effective role in 
coordinating communications network recovery and allowing for 
information sharing among affected industry members.\91\ Yet, NCC 
membership is limited to only certain providers and does not represent 
a broad cross-section of the communications industry (for example, no 
broadcasters, WISPs, or cable providers are members).\92\ Accordingly, 
certain industry sectors or companies that might have been helpful were 
not a part of this coordination effort. State and local government are 
also not a part of this coordination effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ The NSTAC Report on the National Coordinating Center (4/27/
06 Draft), The President's National Security Telecommunications 
Advisory Committee, May 10, 2006, at 9-10 [hereinafter ``May 10 
NSTAC Report''].
    \90\ See Written Statement of Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Director, 
National Communications System, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Ensuring Operability During Catastrophic Events, Before 
the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Committee on Homeland 
Security, United States House of Representatives, at 2, 6 (Oct. 26, 
2005), available at http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyFonash.pdf.
    \91\ See, e.g., Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 
17-18.
    \92\ See May 10 NSTAC Report at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FCC was widely praised as playing a critical role in helping to 
restore communications connectivity in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina.\93\ During and immediately after Katrina, the Commission 
stayed open 24 hours a day, seven days a week to respond to the 
disaster.\94\ Within hours of Katrina's landfall in the Gulf Coast 
region, the Commission established an internal Task Force to coordinate 
its response efforts,\95\ focusing on providing regulatory relief where 
necessary, coordinating efforts with other federal agencies, and 
providing information and assistance to evacuees. To assist 
communications providers in their recovery, the Commission established 
emergency procedures to streamline various waiver and special temporary 
authority processes to speed needed relief,\96\ reached out to various 
providers to determine their needs, and assisted communications 
providers in obtaining access to necessary resources.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ See, e.g., The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Lessons Learned at 142-43 (February 2006).
    \94\ See, e.g., Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 3.
    \95\ Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 4.
    \96\ See, e.g., International Bureau Announces Procedures to 
Provide Emergency Communications in Areas Impacted by Hurricane 
Katrina, FCC Public Notice (rel. Sept. 1, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260835A1.pdf.
    \97\ See Steve Davis-Clear Channel Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. 
at 83 (describing how the Audio Division of the FCC's Media Bureau 
helped radio licensees secure access to fuel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These actions by the Commission appeared substantially to assist 
the industry in the recovery effort. The emergency, 24/7 contacts the 
Commission made available and the

[[Page 38584]]

new streamlined processes clearly accelerated the time frame for 
receiving necessary regulatory approvals. However, the extensive 
communications outages made accessing this new information about who to 
contact and how to comply with the new processes difficult. Similarly, 
repair crews often did not know what repairs they needed to make until 
they reached the site.
    In addition, while it was generally clear to communications 
providers that the Commission was the right agency to contact for 
regulatory relief after the disaster, the roles of other federal 
agencies in the recovery effort were not as clear to a large portion of 
the industry.\98\ Communications providers who needed federal 
assistance (such as obtaining fuel authorizations or access to the 
impacted area), often did not know whom to contact. Industry 
participants also appeared generally unclear about which federal agency 
was responsible for implementing important recovery programs or 
distributing resources to communications companies operating in the 
impacted area. Competing requests for outage information from 
government entities at the federal, state and local level added to the 
confusion about agency roles. And responding to duplicative, repeated 
inquiries in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was cited by some as a 
distraction to communications providers' restoration efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ See, e.g., Written Statement of C. Patrick Roberts, 
President of the Florida Association of Broadcasters, Before the 
FCC's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, 
at 3 (Mar. 7, 2006) (observing that America must have a more 
cohesive and comprehensive program among federal, state, and local 
governments to prepare for disasters); see also Sprint-Nextel Jan. 
30 Written Testimony at 4-5 (recognizing that there is a need to 
clarify the roles and responsibilities of the government agencies 
that are involved in telecommunications restoration).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Industry--State and Local Government Coordination. In general, 
coordination between communications providers and state and local 
government officials in the affected region for communications network 
recovery purposes did not appear to exist except on an ad hoc basis. 
For the most part, there did not appear to be in existence any 
organized mechanism for communications providers to share information 
with local officials or to seek their assistance with respect to 
specific recovery issues, like access and fuel. Following Katrina, the 
Panel heard that state and local government representatives were 
exchanging business cards with communications providers in their area 
for the first time. Local government officials noted that they 
sometimes did not know where to turn to figure out why communications 
to and from key government locations did not work and how to express 
their priorities for communications service restoration. In addition, 
coordinating credentialing, access, fuel sharing, security and other 
key recovery efforts was difficult because there were no identified 
staging areas or coordination points for the communications industry.
    3. Federal Government, State and Local Government Coordination. The 
Panel is not aware of pre-established mechanisms through which the 
federal government coordinated with state and local governments 
concerning communications network restoration issues in the wake of 
Katrina. For example, the Panel heard that civilian public safety 
officials were often unable to communicate with military officials 
brought in to assist local law enforcement. In addition, state and 
local governments are not a part of the NCC \99\ and, therefore, were 
not able to directly coordinate with that industry-federal government 
group. As noted above, and due in part to a lack of pre-arranged 
recovery procedures, state and local government officials did not seem 
to be part of communications network recovery efforts. This meant that 
their restoration priorities may not have been effectively conveyed to 
communications providers and that communications providers did not have 
an identified place to turn for assistance with access and other 
recovery issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ See May 10 NSTAC Report at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Emergency Communications Services and Programs

    The federal government, through the NCS, has established several 
programs for priority communications services during and following an 
emergency.\100\ These are the Government Emergency Telecommunications 
Service (``GETS''), which enables an eligible user to get priority call 
completion for wireline telephone calls; the Wireless Priority Service 
(``WPS''), which enables an eligible user to get access to the next 
free channel when making a wireless call; and Telecommunications 
Service Priority (``TSP''), which enables a qualifying user to get 
priority restoration and provisioning of telecommunications 
services.\101\ During and after Katrina, these priority services seemed 
to work well for those who subscribed to them. However, only a small 
percentage of those eligible for the services appeared to do so. This 
is particularly true of public safety users--many eligible public 
safety entities have not signed up for these services. It also appears 
to be true for some communications providers, including broadcast, 
WISP, and cable companies. These priority services could be an 
extremely useful tool in network restoration efforts. Yet, they are 
tools that appear not fully utilized. Like other emergency tools, they 
require training and practice. In some cases, users who had access to 
these services did not fully understand how to use them (e.g., that a 
WPS call requires inputting a GETS code so the call would get priority 
treatment when it reached the landline network).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ See, e.g., Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 
18.
    \101\ See, e.g., Written Statement of Dr. Peter Fonash, Deputy 
Manager, National Communications System, S. Comm. on Homeland 
Security and Gov't Affairs, Hearing on Managing Law Enforcement and 
Communications in a Catastrophe at 3-4 (Feb. 6, 2006), available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/020606Fonash.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. First Responder Communications

    In the days following Hurricane Katrina, the ability of public 
safety and emergency first responders to communicate varied greatly 
across the affected region. The areas in and around New Orleans were 
seriously impacted.\102\ New Orleans EMS was forced to cease 911 
operations in anticipation of Katrina's landfall and, after the levees 
were breached, a total loss of EMS and fire communications ensued.\103\ 
The communications infrastructure in coastal areas was heavily damaged 
due to winds or flooding.\104\ As a result, more than 2,000 police, 
fire and EMS personnel were forced to communicate in single channel 
mode, radio-to-radio, utilizing only three mutual aid frequencies.\105\ 
Some mutual-aid channels required each speaker to wait his or her turn 
before speaking, sometimes up to twenty minutes.\106\ This level of 
destruction did not extend to inland areas affected by the hurricane 
so, in contrast to New Orleans, neither Baton Rouge nor Jackson County, 
Mississippi, completely lost their communications capabilities and were 
soon operating at pre-Katrina capabilities.\107\ In the

[[Page 38585]]

hardest hit areas, however, the disruption of public safety 
communications operability, as well as a lack of interoperability, 
frustrated the response effort and caused tremendous confusion among 
official personnel \108\ and the general public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ See, e.g., Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43.
    \103\ Id.
    \104\ Jeff Smith Written Statement at 12.
    \105\ Presentation of Major Mike Sauter, Office of Technology 
and Communications, New Orleans Police Department, Before the FCC's 
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 1 
(Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter ``Sauter Written Statement''].
    \106\ See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 21-6 (NOFD and NOPD 
were forced to use a mutual aid channel, rather than the 800 MHz 
trunk system they were supposed to operate on; transmission over the 
mutual aid channel was limited and could not reach certain parts of 
the city).
    \107\ See Oral Testimony of George W. Sholl, Director, Jackson 
County Emergency Communications District, Before the FCC's 
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at Tr. 
at 58-59 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ``Scholl Mar. 6 Oral 
Testimony''].
    \108\ Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43-44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    State and local first responders are required to act and 
communicate within minutes after disasters have occurred and not hours 
or days later when Federal or other resources from outside the affected 
area become available. As further described below, the lack of 
effective emergency communications after the storm revealed inadequate 
planning, coordination and training on the use of technologies that can 
help to restore emergency communications. Hurricane Katrina also 
highlighted the long-standing problem of interoperability among public 
safety communications systems operating in different frequency bands 
and with different technical standards.\109\ One advantage that New 
Orleans had was the fact that no broadcasters were using the 700 MHz 
spectrum set aside for public safety, thus freeing it up immediately 
for first responder use.\110\ As a result of this availability, 
communications providers were able to provide emergency trucks and 
hundreds of radios that operated on this spectrum as soon as first 
responders needed them.\111\ Finally, 911 emergency call handling 
suffered from a lack of preprogrammed routing of calls to PSAPs not 
incapacitated by the hurricane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ See, e.g., Written Statement of Colonel (ret.) Terry J. 
Ebbert, Director, Homeland Security for New Orleans, Hurricane 
Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Before 
the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina, United States House of 
Representatives, at 3-4 (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12_14_05/ebbert_121405.doc.
    \110\ See Written Statement of Kelly Kirwin, Vice President, 
Motorola Comm. & Electronics, Before the FCC's Independent Panel 
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 5 (Jan. 30, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Kirwin Jan. 30 Written Statement''] (in some major 
cities (e.g., New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco), the 700 MHz 
spectrum would not be available to first responders).
    \111\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Lack of Advanced Planning for Massive System Failures

    It was described to the Panel that public safety officials plan for 
disasters but that Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophe.\112\ This left 
many state and local agencies, those who are required to respond first 
to such emergencies, ill-prepared to restore communications essential 
to their ability to do their jobs.\113\ Very few public safety agencies 
had stockpiles of key equipment on hand to implement rapid repairs or 
patches to their systems. Had they been available, spare radios, 
batteries and chargers as well as portable repeaters or self-sufficient 
communications vehicles (also known as ``communications on wheels'') 
would have enabled greater local communications capabilities.\114\ 
Further, when the primary communications system failed, many public 
safety entities did not have plans for an alternative, redundant system 
to take its place.\115\ Similarly, public safety entities, including 
state and local government offices, did not appear to have plans in 
place for call forwarding or number portability to route their calls to 
alternative locations when they relocated. The apparent absence of 
contingency plans to address massive system failures, including 
widespread power outages,\116\ was a major impediment to the rapid 
restoration of first responder communications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ Written Statement of Sheriff Kevin Beary, Major County 
Sheriffs Assn. at 1 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Beary Jan. 30 
Written Statement''].
    \113\ Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43-44.
    \114\ Beary Jan. 30 Written Statement at 1.
    \115\ Presentation of Sheriff Ted Sexton, Sr. National Sheriffs 
Assn at 5 (Jan. 30, 2006); McEwen Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 35-
36.
    \116\ McEwen Mar. 6 Written Statement at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Public safety agencies rely heavily on their equipment vendors to 
support them during such disasters by providing replacement parts and 
spare radios. Motorola stated that 72 hours prior to Katrina's 
landfall, it had mobilized more than 100,000 pieces of equipment and 
more than 300 employees to support their customers.\117\ Similarly, M/
A-Com supported the restoration and maintenance of the New Orleans 800 
MHz system as well as the systems for Mobile, Biloxi, Gulfport, and St. 
Tammany Parish.\118\ Reports indicate that these efforts with 
established vendors were generally well-executed, except for problems 
with access into New Orleans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ Kirwin Jan. 30 Written Statement at 2.
    \118\ Comments of M/A-Com at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, the Panel was made aware of a variety of non-traditional, 
alternative technologies that could have served as effective, back-up 
communications for public safety until their primary systems were 
repaired. As noted in Section I, satellite infrastructure was generally 
unaffected by the storm and could have provided a viable back-up 
system. Two-way paging operations remained generally operational during 
the storm and did provide communications capabilities for some police, 
fire emergency medical personnel, but could have been more widely 
utilized.\119\ Other types of non-traditional technology that can be 
deployed quickly, such as WiFi and WiMax, or self-contained 
communications vehicles, could also have been effectively utilized. 
These all appear deserving of exploration as back-up communications 
options to primary public safety systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 7-
9; Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 122-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First responders' lack of training on alternative, back-up 
communications equipment was also an impediment in the recovery 
effort.\120\ This lack of training may have accounted for a sizeable 
number of communications failures during the first 48 hours after 
Katrina.\121\ Public safety officials noted that that there was little 
time after Katrina to investigate the capabilities of new technologies 
for which none of their personnel had been adequately trained. This 
highlights the need for public safety entities to have contingency 
communications plans with training as a key component. The lack of 
training issue evidenced itself in particular with the distribution of 
satellite phones. These phones proved to be a beneficial resource to 
some, while others described the service as spotty and capacity 
strained. In many cases, it appears that complaints about spotty 
coverage really resulted from the user's lack of understanding about 
how to use the phone (e.g., some satellite phones have a unique dialing 
pattern and they generally do not work indoors).\122\ However, the 
uncontrolled distribution of satellite phones could also have triggered 
capacity issues in certain areas.\123\ Additionally, public safety 
officials reminded the Panel that users must be properly trained before 
they can be expected to competently use technologies during high stress 
events.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ See, e.g., Written Statement of James Monroe III, Chief 
Executive Officer, Globalstar LLC, Before the FCC's Independent 
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina at 4 (Mar. 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Monroe-Globalstar Written Statement''] (some first 
responders failed to keep handset batteries charged, others did not 
realize that satellite phones require a clear line of sight between 
the handset and the satellite).
    \121\ Id.
    \122\ Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony at 4-5.
    \123\ See Report of Ed Smith, Chief, Baton Rouge Fire 
Department, Hurricane Katrina Independent Panel Meeting, at 1 (Jan. 
30, 2006) [hereinafter ``Written Report of Ed Smith''].
    \124\ See, e.g., Scholl Oral Testimony, Tr. at 57-58, 61-62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, it seems that communications assets that were available 
and could have been used by first responders were

[[Page 38586]]

not requested or deployed. There have been reports that federal 
government communications assets operated and maintained by FEMA and 
USDA were available, but not utilized, for state and local public 
safety operations.\125\ This underutilization may have been due to the 
fact that FEMA's pre-staged communications vehicles apparently were 
located 250-350 miles away from the devastated areas,\126\ and that 
FEMA did not request deployment of these vehicles until twenty-four 
hours after landfall.\127\ Further, first responders were not made 
aware of these assets and/or did not know how to request them.\128\ As 
noted above, many public safety officials failed to subscribe to the 
GETS, TSP and WPS priority programs, despite their eligibility.\129\ 
Communications assets made available by the private sector also appear 
to have been underutilized by first responders. The Panel heard that 
manufacturers of alternative public safety communications systems were 
unable to gain the attention of key public safety officials to 
effectuate their proposed donation of equipment and services. Some 
offered equipment or access to their network in Katrina's aftermath but 
``found no takers''.\130\ These and other outlets could have provided 
some measure of communications capabilities, while repairs to primary 
systems were completed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 
February 2006, at 55.
    \126\ Senate Report on Katrina at 12-19 (citing Committee staff 
interview of James Attaway, Telecommunications Specialist, Region 
VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006).
    \127\ Senate Report on Katrina at 12-19 (citing Committee staff 
interview of William Milani, Chief Mobile Operations Section, FEMA, 
conducted on Jan. 13, 2006).
    \128\ See, e.g., Monroe-Globalstar Written Statement at 5 (first 
responders generally did not have pre-emergency deployment plans 
that they could invoke in advance of the actual emergency).
    \129\ During and after Katrina, the NCS issued 1,000 new GETS 
access code numbers to first responders, and the GETS system was 
used to make more than 35,000 calls between August 28 and September 
9. House Report at 176. During Katrina, the NCS enabled and 
distributed more than 4,000 new WPS phones. Id. The NCS also 
completed more than 1,500 TSP assignments following Hurricane 
Katrina. Id. at 177. It would have been helpful if these assets had 
been in place before the disaster and first responders were fully 
trained in how to use them.
    \130\ Statement of Jerry Knoblach, Chairman & CEO, Space Data 
Corporation, Before the Federal Communications Commission's 
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Networks, at 6 (Mar. 7, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Lack of Interoperability

    Because of its scope and severity, Hurricane Katrina demanded a 
coordinated response from federal and affected state and local 
agencies, as well as volunteers from states both neighboring and 
distant. The Panel heard evidence that, in many cases, responders in 
different agencies were unable to communicate due to incompatible 
frequency assignments.\131\ When the existing infrastructure for the 
New Orleans system was incapacitated by flooding, communications were 
almost completely thwarted as too many users attempted to use the three 
mutual aid channels in the 800 MHz band.\132\ In addition, 
communications between the military and first responders also appeared 
to suffer from lack of interoperability.\133\ In some cases, the 
military was reduced to using human runners to physically carry 
messages between deployed units and first responders.\134\ In another 
case, a military helicopter had to drop a message in a bottle to warn 
first responders about a dangerous gas leak.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ A Failure to Communicate: A Stocktake of Government 
Inaction to Address Communications Interoperability Failures 
Following Hurricane Katrina, First Response Coalition, December 
2005.
    \132\ Sauter Written Statement at 1; Written Report of Ed Smith 
at 1.
    \133\ See Written Statement of Dr. William W. Pinsky on behalf 
of the American Hospital Association, The State of Interoperable 
Communications: Perspectives from the Field, Before the Subcommittee 
on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, Committee on 
Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, at 5 
(Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyPinsky.pdf.
    \134\ See, e.g., Written Statement of The Honorable Timothy J. 
Roemer, Director, Center for National Policy, Public Safety 
Communications From 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, 
Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of 
Representatives, at 5 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/hearings/09292005Hearing1648/Roemer.pdf 
(describing the use of human couriers by the National Guard).
    \135\ Heather Greenfield, Katrina Revealed Gaps In Emergency 
Response System, The Wash. Times, Dec. 28, 2005, at B1, available at 
http://washingtontimes.com/metro/20051227-095134-3753r.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While most observers characterized ``operability'' as the primary 
communications failure following Katrina,\136\ increased ability to 
interoperate with other agencies would have provided greater redundant 
communications paths and a more coordinated response. While 
technological solutions, such as IP gateways to integrate frequencies 
across multiple bands,\137\ are a critical tool for improving 
interoperability, the Panel was reminded that technology is not the 
sole driver of an optimal solution.\138\ Training, agreement on 
standard operating procedures, governance or leadership and proper 
usage are all critical elements of the interoperability continuum.\139\ 
However, the Panel heard testimony that Project SAFECOM, which is 
intended to provide a solution for interoperability among Federal, 
state and local officials, will take years to achieve its 
objectives.\140\ However, the Panel is also aware of more expedient 
proposals, such as the M/A-COM, Inc. proposal to mandate construction 
of all Federal and non-Federal mutual aid channels to provide baseline 
interoperability to all emergency responders that operate across 
multiple frequency bands using disparate technologies.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina--Lessons 
Learned, February 2006, at 55; Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 
44.
    \137\ See, e.g., Presentation to the Meeting of the Independent 
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications 
Networks, Dr. John Vaughan, Vice President TYCO Electronics: M/A-
COM, March 6, 2006; see also Presentation to the FCC's Independent 
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications 
Networks, Wesley D. Smith, Technical Director, ARINC (Mar. 7, 2006).
    \138\ See Interoperability Continuum Brochure, Project Safecom, 
Dept. of Homeland Security (April 5, 2005), available at http://www.safecomprogram.gov/NR/rdonlyres/5C103F66-A36E-4DD1-A00A-54C477B47AFC/0/ContinuumBrochure40505.pdf.
    \139\ Id. at 4.
    \140\ Oral Testimony of Dr. David G. Boyd, Director of SAFECOM, 
Dept. of Homeland Security, Tr. at 29-30 (Apr. 18, 2006); see also 
Stephen Losey, Defense re-examines homeland role, tactics, Federal 
Times.com (Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=1174164.
    \141\ See Further Comments of M/A-Com, Inc. (May 30, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. PSAP Rerouting

    When a PSAP becomes disabled, 911 emergency calls from the public 
are typically diverted to a secondary neighboring PSAP using 
preconfigured traffic routes. In many cases, Katrina disabled both the 
primary and secondary PSAPs, which resulted in many unanswered 
emergency calls. Additionally, many PSAPs in Louisiana did not have 
protocols in place to identify where 911 calls should go and had not 
arranged for any rerouting, resulting in dropped emergency calls.\142\ 
The Panel heard testimony that Katrina has highlighted a need to 
identify additional back-up PSAPs at remote locations. However, FCC 
regulations may currently restrict the ability of local phone companies 
to establish pre-configured routes across LATA boundaries.\143\ In 
addition, the routing of calls to more distant PSAPs would require 
specific planning to ensure appropriate and timely response to 
emergency calls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ House Report at 173.
    \143\ Bailey Jan. 30 Written Testimony at 3.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 38587]]

D. Emergency Medical Communications

    There are indications that the emergency medical community was 
lacking in contingency communications planning and information about 
technologies and services that might address their critical 
communications needs.\144\ In particular, this group of first 
responders did not seem to avail itself of existing priority 
communications services, such as GETS, WPS and TSP. It also appeared 
that emergency medical personnel were not always integrated into a 
locality's public safety communications planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ See House Report at 269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Emergency Communications to the Public

    The communications infrastructure, in all of its forms, is a key 
asset in delivering information to the American public. In emergencies 
and disaster situations, ensuring public safety is the first priority. 
The use of communications networks to disseminate reliable and relevant 
information to the public is critical--before, during and after such 
events. Moreover, to the extent a more well-informed citizenry is 
better able to prepare for and respond to disasters, there should be 
less strain on already taxed resources, thereby benefiting recovery 
efforts.
    The Emergency Alert System (``EAS'') and its predecessor systems 
have long made use of broadcast radio and television stations as the 
principal tools for communicating with the public about emergencies and 
disaster situations. The Panel heard stories of heroic efforts by 
broadcasters and cable operators to provide members of the public 
impacted by Katrina with important storm-related information. However, 
there were also reports of missed opportunities to utilize the EAS and 
limitations in existing efforts to deliver emergency information to all 
members of the public. New technologies may address some of these 
limitations by facilitating the provision of both macro- and micro-
level information about impending disasters and recovery efforts.

A. Lack of Activation

    The EAS can be activated by the federal government as well as by 
state and local officials to disseminate official news and information 
to the public in the event of an emergency. The Panel understands that 
the National Weather Service used the EAS to provide severe weather 
warnings to citizens in the Gulf States in advance of Katrina making 
landfall.\145\ However, the Panel also heard that the EAS was not 
utilized by state and local officials to provide localized emergency 
evacuation and other important information.\146\ That means that an 
existing and effective means of distributing timely information to our 
citizens was not fully utilized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina----Lessons 
Learned, February 2006, at 28.
    \146\ Comments of Hilary Styron of the National Organization on 
Disability Emergency Preparedness Initiative at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter ``Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Limitations in Coverage

    The primary source of emergency information about Katrina came 
through broadcast (including satellite broadcast) and cable 
infrastructure, whether through the EAS or local or national news 
programming. Citizens who were not watching TV or listening to the 
radio at the time of the broadcast missed this emergency information. 
Damage to communications infrastructure made it difficult for news and 
emergency information to reach the public, as did power outages.\147\ 
As a result, a fairly large percentage of the public likely were 
uninformed. The Panel heard about notification technologies that may 
permit emergency messages to be sent to wireline and wireless 
telephones as well as personal digital assistants and other mobile 
devices.\148\ For example, the Association of Public Television 
Stations has developed a means for utilizing the digital transmissions 
of public television stations to datacast emergency information to 
computers or wireless devices.\149\ In addition, the St. Charles Parish 
Public School District used a telephone-based, time-sensitive 
notification technology to send out recorded evacuation messages to 
over 21,000 phone numbers in advance of Katrina's landfall.\150\ The 
District continued to utilize this technology to provide members of the 
public with specific information regarding conditions in the community 
in the storm's aftermath. While the use of phone-based technologies for 
post-disaster communications is necessarily dependent on the state of 
the telephone network, such technologies--which are less subject to 
disruption from power outages--offer the potential for complementing 
the traditional broadcast-based EAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 2.
    \148\ Comments of Notification Technologies, Inc., EB Docket No. 
04-296 (Jan. 24, 2006).
    \149\ Written Testimony of John M. Lawson, President and CEO, 
Association of Public Television Stations, Before the FCC's 
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Networks (April 18, 2006).
    \150\ Id. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Panel also understands that the FCC is considering extending 
the reach of the existing emergency alert system to other technologies, 
such as wireless and the Internet.\151\ The Panel understands that 
there are ongoing collaborative industry-government efforts to overcome 
the hurdles to extending alerts to other technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ Review of the Emergency Alert System, First Report and 
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 18,625, 
18,653 (] 69) (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Reaching Persons With Disabilities and Non-English-Speaking 
Americans

    Ensuring emergency communications reach all Americans, even those 
with hearing and visual disabilities or who do not speak English, 
remains a major challenge. Unfortunately, accessibility to suitable 
communications devices for the deaf and hard of hearing was difficult 
during and after Hurricane Katrina.\152\ This problem was intensified 
by the fact that Katrina brought humidity, rain, flooding, and high 
temperatures (which translate into perspiration), all of which reduce 
the effectiveness of hearing aids and cochlear implants.\153\ For 
persons with visual impairments, telephone and broadcast outages made 
information very hard to obtain, and many people with vision loss were 
unable to evacuate.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ See, e.g., Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 2 (over 80% 
of shelters did not have access to communications devices for the 
deaf; over 60% of shelters did not have captioning capabilities 
utilized on the televisions screens and several broadcasters did not 
caption their emergency information, even though it is required by 
the FCC); Oral Testimony of Cheryl Heppner, Vice Chair, Deaf and 
Hard of Hearing Consumer Advocacy Network, FCC Independent Panel 
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications 
Networks, Tr. at 283 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ``Heppner Mar. 6 
Oral Testimony''] (many television stations did not provide visual 
information).
    \153\ Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 282.
    \154\ Comment of the American Council of the Blind and American 
Foundation for the Blind, at 2 (May 3, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The broadcast industry has taken significant steps to provide on-
screen sign language interpreters and close captioning. Broadcasters 
also sometimes broadcast critical information in a second language 
where there are a significant number of non-English speaking residents 
in the community. For example, a Spanish-language radio station in the 
New Orleans area provided warnings, and information about family 
members and disaster relief assistance.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ See, e.g., Comments by the National Council of La Raza, In 
the Eye of the Storm: How the Gov't and Private Response to 
Hurricane Katrina Failed Latinos at 5 (Apr. 24, 2006) [hereinafter 
``La Raza Comments''].

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[[Page 38588]]

    However, the Panel also heard that written or captioned information 
was at times inadequate and that station logos or captions sometimes 
covered up the sign-language interpreter or close-captioning.\156\ 
Additionally, personnel who provided these critical services often 
evacuated, leaving the station with no ability to deliver these 
services. Further, specialized radios relied upon by the hearing-
impaired, because they can display text messages, are not currently 
designed to be battery-operated and thus became useless when power goes 
out.\157\ The distribution of emergency weather information in 
languages other than English appeared limited, based primarily on the 
willingness and ability of local weather forecasting offices and the 
availability of ethnic media outlets.\158\ Innovative notification 
technologies, such as those described above, may provide a partial 
answer to the emergency communications needs of persons with 
disabilities and non-English-speaking members of the public as such 
technologies can be used to deliver targeted messages in a specified 
format.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \156\ Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 283-84; Remarks by 
Cheryl Heppner, Deaf and Hard of Hearing Consumer Advocacy Network, 
at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006).
    \157\ Heppner Mar. 6. Oral Testimony at 283-85.
    \158\ See, e.g., La Raza Comments at 5 (citing Interview with 
official at the National Weather Service, Jan. 6, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Relatedly, individuals with disabilities often had a difficult time 
using communications capabilities at shelters or other recovery 
areas.\159\ Phone and computer banks provided at these locations 
generally did not have capabilities to assist the hearing or speech-
impaired.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ Id.; Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 2.
    \160\ See, e.g., id.; Comments of the Consortium for Citizens 
With Disabilities at 1-2 (April 13, 2006); Styron Mar. 6 Oral 
Testimony, Tr. at 291.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Inconsistent or Incorrect Emergency Information

    One of the benefits of the EAS is that it facilitates the 
communication of a uniform message to the public by an authoritative or 
credible spokesperson, thereby minimizing confusion and contributing to 
an orderly public response. However, as noted above, the EAS was not 
activated in several jurisdictions. Moreover, while broadcasters, cable 
operators and satellite providers went to considerable lengths to 
provide the public with information regarding Katrina and its impact, 
the Panel understands that inconsistent or erroneous information about 
critical emergency issues was sometimes provided within the affected 
region. For example, information regarding conditions in one portion of 
New Orleans did not necessarily accurately depict conditions in other 
areas of the city. The dissemination of targeted information from an 
authoritative source through the EAS or other notification technologies 
might have assisted with this problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS

    Based upon its observations regarding the impact of Hurricane 
Katrina on communications networks and the sufficiency and 
effectiveness of the recovery effort, the Panel has developed a number 
of recommendations to the FCC for improving disaster preparedness, 
network reliability and communications among first responders. As with 
its observations, these recommendations are grouped into four sections. 
The first contains recommendations for steps to better pre-position the 
communications industry and the government for disasters in order to 
achieve greater network reliability and resiliency. The second section 
presents suggestions for improving recovery coordination to address 
existing shortcomings and to maximize the use of existing resources. 
The third section focuses on first responder communications issues, 
recommending essential steps for improving the operability and 
interoperability of public safety and 911 communications in times of 
crisis. And finally, the last group of recommendations presents the 
Panel's suggestions for improving emergency communications to the 
public. All of our citizens deserve to be sufficiently informed should 
a major disaster strike in the future.

Pre-Positioning for Disasters--A Proactive, Rather Than Reactive 
Program for Network Reliability and Resiliency

    1. Pre-positioning for the Communications Industry--A Readiness 
Checklist--The FCC should work with and encourage each industry sector, 
through their organizations or associations, to develop and publicize 
sector-specific readiness recommendations. Such a checklist should be 
based upon relevant industry best practices as set forth by groups such 
as the Media Security and Reliability Council (``MSRC'') and the 
Network Reliability and Interoperability Council (``NRIC''). Any such 
checklist should include the following elements:
    a. Developing and implementing business continuity plans, which 
would at a minimum address:
    i. Power reserves,
    ii. Cache of essential replacement equipment,
    iii. Adequate sparing levels,
    iv. Credentialing,
    v. Emergency Operations Center (``EOC'') coordination,
    vi. Training/disaster drills, and
    vii. Appropriate disaster preparedness checklists;
    b. Conducting exercises to evaluate these plans and train 
personnel;
    c. Developing and practicing a communications plan to identify 
``key players'' and multiple means of contacting them (including 
alternate communications channels, such as alpha pagers, Internet, 
satellite phones, VOIP, private lines, BlackBerry-type devices, etc.);
    d. Routinely archiving critical system backups and providing for 
their storage in a ``secure off-site'' facilities.
    2. Pre-positioning for Public Safety--An Awareness Program for Non-
Traditional Emergency Alternatives--The FCC should take steps to 
educate the public safety community about the availability and 
capabilities of non-traditional technologies that might provide 
effective back-up solutions for existing public safety communications 
systems. Examples of these technologies would be pagers, satellite 
technology and phones, portable towers and repeaters, point-to-point 
microwave links, license-exempt WISP systems, other systems less 
reliant on the PSTN, and bridging technologies/gateways that would 
facilitate interoperability. One means for the FCC to do this would be 
to organize an exhibit area or demonstration of these technologies in 
conjunction with one or more large public safety conferences, such as:
    a. APCO International Annual Conference and Exposition August 6-10, 
2006; Orlando, FL
    b. IAFC Fire Rescue International September 14-16, 2006; Dallas, TX
    c. International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference October 
14-18, 2006; Boston, MA
    d. NENA Annual Conference and Trade Show June 9-14, 2007; Fort 
Worth, TX
    e. National Sheriff's Association Annual Conference June 23-27, 
2007; Salt Lake City, UT
    f. National Fraternal Order of Police August 13-16, 2007; 
Louisville, KY
    The FCC should also consider organizing a similar exhibit/
demonstration for other industry sectors that might benefit from this 
information
    3. Pre-positioning for FCC Regulatory Requirements--An A Priori 
Program for

[[Page 38589]]

Disaster Areas--The FCC should explore amending its rules to permit 
automatic grants of certain types of waivers or special temporary 
authority (STA) in a particular geographic area if the President 
declares that area to be a ``disaster area''. As a condition of the 
waiver or STA, the FCC could require verbal or written notification to 
the Commission staff contemporaneously with activation or promptly 
after the fact. Further, the FCC should examine expanding the on-line 
filing opportunities for STA requests, including STA requests for AM 
broadcast stations. Examples of possible rule waivers and STAs to study 
for this treatment include:
    a. Wireline.
    i. Waiver of certain carrier change requirements to allow customers 
whose long distance service was disrupted to be connected to an 
operational long distance provider.
    ii. Waiver of aging residential numbers rules for customers in the 
affected area. This allows carriers to disconnect temporarily 
customers' telephone service, upon request, and reinstate the same 
number when the service is reconnected.
    iii. Waiver of number portability requirements to allow rerouting 
of traffic to switches unaffected by the crisis.
    iv. Waiver of reporting filings, such as Form 477 on local 
competition and broadband data, during the crisis.
    b. Wireless.
    i. Waiver of amateur radio and license exempt rules permitting 
transmissions necessary to meet essential communications needs.
    ii. Waiver of application filing deadlines (e.g., renewals, 
construction notifications, discontinuance notices, etc.), construction 
requirements, and discontinuance of service requirements.
    iii. Streamlined STA process, such that parties in the affected 
area may simply notify the FCC in writing or verbally of a need to 
operate in order to restore service.
    c. Broadcast and Cable.
    i. Waiver of non-commercial educational (``NCE'') rules to permit 
NCE television and radio stations in the affected area to simulcast and 
rebroadcast commercial station programming during a crisis.
    ii. Waiver of requirements for notifying the FCC of use of 
emergency antennas within 24 hours.
    iii. Waiver of limits on AM nighttime operations, so long as 
operation is conducted on a noncommercial basis.
    iv. Waiver of rules on limited and discontinued operations.
    v. Tolling of broadcast station construction deadlines.
    vi. Automatic STAs, or STAs granted through written or oral 
notification, for broadcast stations to go silent.
    vii. Waiver of restrictions on simulcast programming of commonly 
owned stations within the same band.
    viii. Waiver of location and staffing requirements of a main studio 
within the community.
    ix. Waiver of activation and post-event Section 73.1250 reporting 
requirements related to transmission of point-to-point communications 
during a declared emergency.
    d. Satellite.
    i. Waiver of requirements for notifying the FCC of use of emergency 
antenna equipment within 24 hours.
    ii. Streamlined STA process for satellite operators responding to a 
declared emergency.
    4. Pre-positioning for Government Outage Monitoring--A Single 
Repository and Contact with Consistent Data Collection--The FCC should 
coordinate with other federal and state agencies to identify a single 
repository/point of contact for communications outage information in 
the wake of an emergency. The Panel suggests that the FCC is the 
federal agency best situated to perform this function. The FCC should 
work with affected industry members and their trade associations to 
establish a consolidated data set and geographic area for data 
collection. Once broad agreement is reached on the appropriate outage 
information to be collected, it should be consistently applied and not 
subject to routine changes. To the extent practical, the frequency of 
voluntary reporting and duration of reporting requirements should be 
specified as part of any emergency outage reporting plan. The Panel 
suggests that reporting no more than once a day would strike the right 
balance between supplying important outage information and not 
distracting resources from critical recovery efforts. Additionally, any 
proprietary information that is gathered through voluntary outage 
reporting must be kept confidential, with only aggregated information 
provided to appropriate government entities, such as the local EOC, 
during a crisis situation. Any carrier-specific data should be 
disclosed to other agencies only with appropriate confidentiality 
safeguards (such as non-disclosure agreements) in place.

Recovery Coordination--Critical Steps for Addressing Existing 
Shortcomings and Maximizing Use of Existing Resources

    1. Remedying Existing Shortcomings--National Credentialing 
Guidelines for Communications Infrastructure Providers--The Panel 
generally supports the National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committee's (``NSTAC's'') recommendation for a national standard for 
credentialing telecommunications repair workers, but believes this 
should be broadened to include repair workers of all communications 
infrastructure providers (including wireline, wireless, WISP, 
satellite, cable and broadcasting infrastructure providers). 
Specifically, the Panel recommends that the FCC work with other 
appropriate federal departments and agencies and the communications 
industry to promptly develop national credentialing requirements and 
process guidelines for enabling communications infrastructure providers 
and their contracted workers access to the affected area post-disaster. 
The FCC should encourage states to develop and implement a 
credentialing program consistent with these guidelines as promptly as 
possible and encourage appropriate communications industry members to 
secure any necessary credentialing. Under this program, credentials 
should be available to be issued to communications infrastructure 
providers at any time during the year, including before, during and 
after a disaster situation. The credentials should be issued directly 
to communications infrastructure providers, which will then be 
responsible for distributing these credentials to their employees and 
contracted workers. These credentials, together with company-issued 
employee or contractor identification should be sufficient to permit 
access. As a condition of credentialing, the program should require 
that communications infrastructure providers receiving credentials 
ensure that their employees and contracted workers receiving 
credentials complete basic National Incident Management System 
(``NIMS'') training (i.e., ``Introduction to NIMS''). The FCC should 
work with the communications industry to develop an appropriate basic 
NIMS training course (no more than one hour) for communications repair 
workers that can be completed online. Once developed, this 
communications-specific training course should replace ``Introduction 
to NIMS'' as the requirement for credentialing. The FCC should also

[[Page 38590]]

encourage states to recognize and accept credentials issued by other 
states.
    2. Remedying Existing Shortcomings--Emergency Responder Status for 
Communications Infrastructure Providers--The Panel supports the NSTAC's 
recommendation that telecommunications infrastructure providers and 
their contracted workers be afforded emergency responder status under 
the Stafford Act and that this designation be incorporated into the 
National Response Plan, as well as state and local emergency response 
plans. However, the Panel suggests that this recommendation be 
broadened to include all communications infrastructure providers 
(including wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting 
infrastructure providers) and their contracted workers. The FCC should 
work with Congress and the other appropriate federal departments and 
agencies to implement this broadened recommendation.
    3. Remedying Existing Shortcomings--Utilization of State/Regional 
Coordination Bodies--The FCC should work with state and local 
government and the communications industry (including wireline, 
wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting) to better utilize 
the coordinating capabilities at regional, state and local EOCs, as 
well as the Joint Field Office (``JFO''). The FCC should encourage, but 
not require, each regional, state and local EOC and the JFO to engage 
in the following activities:
    a. Facilitate coordination between communications infrastructure 
providers (including wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and 
broadcasting providers, where appropriate) and state and local 
emergency preparedness officials (such as the state emergency 
operations center) in the state or region at the EOC or JFO. The 
parties should meet on a periodic basis to develop channels of 
communications (both pre- and post-disaster), to construct joint 
preparedness and response plans, and to conduct joint exercises.
    b. Develop credentialing requirements and procedures for purposes 
of allowing communications infrastructure providers, their contracted 
workers and private security teams, if any, access to the affected area 
post-disaster. These requirements and procedures should be consistent 
with any nationally-developed credentialing guidelines. Where possible, 
web-based applications should be created to pre-clear or expedite 
movement of communications infrastructure providers into a disaster 
area.
    c. Develop and facilitate inclusion in the state's Emergency 
Preparedness Plan, where appropriate, one or more clearly identified 
post-disaster coordination areas for communications infrastructure 
providers, their contracted workers, and private security teams, if 
any, to gather post-disaster where credentialing, security, escorts and 
further coordination can be achieved. The state's Emergency 
Preparedness Plan should describe the process for informing 
communications infrastructure providers where these coordination 
area(s) will be located.
    d. Post-disaster, share information and coordinate resources to 
facilitate repair of key communications infrastructure. Specifically, 
this would include identifying key damaged infrastructure; if 
necessary, assigning priorities for access and scarce resources (fuel, 
security, etc.) to repair this infrastructure. Additionally, the 
coordination body and staging area can provide a means for industry to 
share and maximize scarce resources (share surplus equipment, double 
and triple up on security escorts to a particular area, etc.).
    e. Facilitate electric and other utilities' maintenance of priority 
lists for commercial power restoration. Include commercial 
communications providers on this priority list and coordinate power 
restoration activities with communications restoration.
    The Panel would also support communications infrastructure 
providers in a state or region forming an industry-only group for 
disaster planning, coordinating recovery efforts and other purposes. 
Nevertheless, the Panel believes that coordinating capabilities and 
staffing of regional, state and local EOCs, as well as the JFO, need to 
be better utilized for the purposes described above.
    4. Maximizing Existing Resources--Expanding and Publicizing 
Emergency Communications Programs (GETS, WPS and TSP)--To facilitate 
the use of existing emergency communications services and programs, the 
FCC should:
    a. Work with the National Communications System (``NCS'') to 
actively and aggressively promote GETS, WPS and TSP to all eligible 
government, public safety, and critical industry groups. As part of 
this outreach effort, the Commission should target groups that have 
relatively low levels of participation. For example, the Panel 
recommends that the Commission reach out to the emergency medical 
community and major trauma centers to make them aware of the 
availability of these services.
    b. Work with the NCS to clarify whether broadcast, WISP, satellite, 
and cable company repair crews are eligible for GETS and WPS under the 
Commission's existing rules. If so, the Commission should promote the 
availability of these programs to those entities and urge their 
subscribership. If the Commission determines that these entities are 
not eligible, the Panel recommends that the Commission revise its rules 
so that these entities can subscribe to WPS and GETS.
    c. Work with the NCS to explore whether it is technically and 
financially feasible for WPS calls to automatically receive GETS 
treatment when they reach landline facilities (thus avoiding the need 
for a WPS caller to also enter GETS information). The Commission may 
desire to set up an industry task force to explore this issue.
    d. Work with the NCS and the communications sector to establish and 
promote best practices to ensure that all WPS, GETS, and TSP 
subscribers are properly trained in how to use these services.
    5. Maximizing Existing Resources--Broadening NCC to Include All 
Communications Infrastructure Sectors--The FCC should work with the NCS 
to broaden the membership of the National Coordination Center for 
Telecommunications (``NCC'') to include adequate representation of all 
types of communications systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite 
and other new technologies, as appropriate.
    6. Maximizing Existing Resources--FCC Web site for Emergency 
Coordination Information--The FCC should create a password-protected 
Web site, accessible by credentialed entities (under recovery 
coordination recommendation 1), listing the key state 
emergency management contacts (especially the contacts for 
communications coordinating bodies), as well as post-disaster 
coordination areas for communications providers. During an emergency, 
this Web site should be updated on a 24/7 basis.
    7. Maximizing Existing Resources--FCC Web site for Emergency 
Response Team Information--The FCC should create a Web site to 
publicize the agency's emergency response team's contact information 
and procedures for facilitating disaster response and outage recovery.

First Responder Communications--Essential Steps for Addressing Lessons 
Learned From Hurricane Katrina

    1. Essential Steps in Pre-positioning Equipment, Supplies and 
Personnel--An Emergency Restoration Supply Cache and Alternatives 
Inventory--To facilitate the restoration of public safety 
communications capabilities, the FCC should:

[[Page 38591]]

    a. Encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain and maintain, 
including through arrangements with the private sector, a cache of 
equipment components that would be needed to immediately restore 
existing public safety communications within hours of a disaster. At a 
minimum, the cache should include the necessary equipment to quickly 
restore communications capabilities on all relevant mutual aid 
channels. Such a cache would consist of:
    i. RF gear, such as 800 MHz, UHF, VHF, Mutual Aid, IP Gateway, and 
dispatch consoles;
    ii. trailer and equipment housing;
    iii. tower system components (antenna system, hydraulic mast);
    iv. power system components (generator, UPS, batteries, 
distribution panel); and
    v. fuel.
    The cache should be maintained as a regional or statewide resource 
and located in areas protected from disaster impacts. The cache should 
be included as an element of the National Response Plan.
    b. Encourage state and local jurisdictions to utilize the cache 
through training exercises on a regular basis.
    c. Support the ongoing efforts of the NCC to develop and maintain a 
database of state and local public safety system information, including 
frequency usage, to allow for more efficient spectrum sharing, rapid 
on-site frequency coordination, and emergency provision of supplemental 
equipment in the event of system failures.
    d. Urge public safety licensees to familiarize themselves with 
alternative communications technologies to provide communications when 
normal public safety networks are down. Such technologies include 
satellite telephones, two-way paging devices, and other technologies 
less reliant on the PSTN. Most importantly, public safety agencies 
should be reminded/encouraged to train and use such devices prior to 
emergencies.
    e. Support the efforts of the NCC to develop an inventory of 
available communications assets (including local, state, federal 
civilian and military) that can be rapidly deployed in the event of a 
catastrophic event. The list should include land mobile radios, 
portable infrastructure equipment, bridging technologies/gateways, and 
backup power system components. This information should include the 
steps necessary for requesting the deployment of these assets. The FCC 
should work with the NCC and the appropriate agencies to educate key 
state and local emergency response personnel on the availability of 
these assets and how to request them.
    f. Coordinate with the NCS/NCC to assure that, immediately 
following any large disaster, there is an efficient means by which 
federal, state and local officials can identify and locate private 
sector communications assets that can be made rapidly available to 
first responders and relief organizations. One such means to be 
considered would be a Web site maintained by either the FCC or NCC 
through which the private sector could register available assets along 
with product information. The Web site should be designed with a 
special area for registering available equipment to assist persons with 
disabilities in their communications needs.
    2. Essential Steps in Enabling Emergency Communications 
Capabilities--Facilitating First Responder Interoperability--To 
facilitate interoperability among first responder communications, the 
FCC should:
    a. Consistent with recent legislation, maintain the schedule for 
commencing commercial spectrum auctions before January 28, 2008 to 
fully fund the $1 billion public safety interoperability program.
    b. Work with National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (``NTIA'') and the Department of Homeland Security 
(``DHS'') to establish appropriate criteria for the distribution of the 
$1 billion in a manner that best promotes interoperability with the 700 
MHz band. Among other things, such criteria should mandate that any 
radios purchased with grant monies must be capable of operating on 700 
MHz and 800 MHz channels established for mutual aid and 
interoperability voice communications.
    c. Encourage the expeditious development of regional plans for the 
use of 700 MHz systems and move promptly to review and approve such 
plans.
    d. Expeditiously approve any requests by broadcasters to terminate 
analog service in the 700 MHz band before the end of the digital 
television transition in 2009 in order to allow public safety users 
immediate access to this spectrum.
    e. Work with the NTIA and DHS to develop strategies and policies to 
expedite allowing Federal (including the military), state and local 
agencies to share spectrum for emergency response purposes, 
particularly the Federal incident response channels and channels 
established for mutual aid and interoperability.
    f. Publicize interoperability successes and/or best practices by 
public safety entities to serve as models to further interoperability.
    3. Essential Steps in Addressing E-911 Lessons Learned--A Plan for 
Resiliency and Restoration of E-911 Infrastructure and PSAPs--In order 
to ensure a more robust E-911 service, the FCC should encourage the 
implementation of these best practice recommendations issued by Focus 
Group 1C of the FCC-chartered NRIC VII:
    a. Service providers and network operators should consider placing 
and maintaining 911 circuits over diverse interoffice transport 
facilities (e.g., geographically diverse facility routes, automatically 
invoked standby routing, diverse digital cross-connect system services, 
self-healing fiber ring topologies, or any combination thereof). See 
NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-0566.
    b. Service providers, network operators and property managers 
should ensure availability of emergency/backup power (e.g., batteries, 
generators, fuel cells) to maintain critical communications services 
during times of commercial power failures, including natural and 
manmade occurrences (e.g., earthquakes, floods, fires, power brown/
blackouts, terrorism). The emergency/backup power generators should be 
located onsite, when appropriate. See NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-5204.
    c. Network operators should consider deploying dual active 911 
selective router architectures to enable circuits from the caller's 
serving end office to be split between two selective routers in order 
to eliminate single points of failure. Diversity should also be 
considered on interoffice transport facilities connecting each 911 
selective router to the PSAP serving end office. See NRIC VII 
Recommendations 7-7-0571.
    d. Network operators, service providers, equipment suppliers and 
public safety authorities should establish alternative methods of 
communication for critical personnel. See NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-
1011.
    In addition, the FCC should:
    a. Recommend the designation of a secondary back-up PSAP that is 
more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the primary and secondary 
PSAPs are disabled. This requires the FCC to eliminate any regulatory 
prohibition against the transport of 911 across LATA boundaries. The 
Panel recommends that the FCC expeditiously initiate such a rulemaking. 
This rulemaking should also consider

[[Page 38592]]

permitting a backup E-911 tandem across a LATA boundary.
    b. Recommend that the FCC urge the DHS, Fire Grant Act, and other 
applicable federal programs to permit state or local 911 commissions or 
emergency communications districts, which provide 911 or public safety 
communications services, to be eligible to apply for 911 enhancement 
and communications enhancement/interoperability grants.
    4. Essential Steps in Addressing Lessons Learned Concerning 
Emergency Medical and Hospital Communications Needs--An Outreach 
Program to Educate and Include the Emergency Medical Community in 
Emergency Communications Preparedness--The FCC should work to assist 
the emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency and 
effectiveness of their emergency communications systems. Among other 
things, the FCC should:
    a. Educate the emergency medical community about emergency 
communications and help to coordinate this sector's emergency 
communications efforts;
    b. Educate the emergency medical community about the various 
priority communications services (i.e., GETS, WPS and TSP) and urge 
them to subscribe;
    c. Work with Congress and the other appropriate federal departments 
and agencies to ensure emergency medical personnel are treated as 
public safety personnel under the Stafford Act; and
    d. Support DHS efforts to make emergency medical providers eligible 
for funding for emergency communications equipment under the State 
Homeland Security Grant Program.

Emergency Communications to the Public--Actions To Alert and Inform

    1. Actions to Alert and Inform--Revitalize and Publicize the 
Underutilized Emergency Alert System--To facilitate and complement the 
use of the existing Emergency Alert System (``EAS''), the FCC should:
    a. Educate state and local officials about the existing EAS, its 
benefits, and how it can be best utilized.
    b. Develop a program for educating the public about the EAS and 
promote community awareness of potential mechanisms for accessing those 
alerts sent during power outages or broadcast transmission failures.
    c. Move expeditiously to complete its proceeding to explore the 
technical and financial viability of expanding the EAS to other 
technologies, such as wireless services and the Internet, recognizing 
that changes to communications networks and equipment take time to 
implement.
    d. Consistent with proposed legislation, work with Congress and 
other appropriate federal departments and agencies to explore the 
technical and financial viability of establishing a comprehensive 
national warning system that complements existing systems and allows 
local officials to increase the penetration of warnings to the public 
as well as target, when necessary, alerts to a particular area.
    e. Work with the DHS and other appropriate federal agencies on 
pilot programs that would allow more immediate evaluation and testing 
of new notification technologies.
    f. Work with the Department of Commerce to expand the distribution 
of certain critical non-weather emergency warnings over NOAA weather 
radios to supplement the EAS.
    2. Actions to Alert and Inform--Commence Efforts to Ensure that 
Persons with Disabilities and Non-English-Speaking Americans Receive 
Meaningful Alerts--To help to ensure that all Americans, including 
those with hearing or visual disabilities or who do not speak English, 
can receive emergency communications, the FCC should:
    a. Promptly find a mechanism to resolve any technical and financial 
hurdles in the current EAS to ensure that non-English-speaking people 
or persons with disabilities have access to public warnings, if readily 
achievable.
    b. Work with the various industry trade associations and the 
disabled community to create and publicize best practices for serving 
persons with disabilities and non-English-speaking Americans.
    c. Encourage state and local government agencies who provide 
emergency information (through video or audio broadcasts or Web sites) 
to take steps to make critical emergency information accessible to 
persons with disabilities and non-English-speaking Americans.
    3. Actions to Alert and Inform--Ensure Consistent and Reliable 
Emergency Information Through a Consolidated and Coordinated Public 
Information Program--Public information functions should be coordinated 
and integrated across jurisdictions and across functional agencies, 
among federal, state, local and tribal partners, and with private 
sector and non-governmental organizations. The FCC should work with all 
involved parties to help facilitate the following:
    a. Integration of media representatives into the development of 
disaster communications plans (ESF 2). These plans should 
establish systems and protocols for communicating timely and accurate 
information to the public during crisis or emergency situations.
    b. Designation of a public information officer at each EOC. This 
individual should be accessible to the media to handle media and public 
inquiries, emergency public information and warnings, rumor monitoring 
and response, and other functions required to coordinate, clear with 
appropriate authorities, and disseminate accurate and timely 
information related to the incident, particularly regarding information 
on public health, safety and protection.
    c. During large-scale disasters, the formation of a Joint 
Information Center (``JIC'') for the collocation of representatives 
from federal, regional, state, local and/or tribal EOCs tasked with 
primary incident coordination responsibilities. The JIC would provide 
the mechanism for integrating public information activities across 
jurisdictions and with private sector and non-governmental 
organizations. Media operations should be an integral part of the JIC.

CONCLUSION

    The Katrina Panel commends Chairman Martin and the Commission for 
their actions to assist industry and first responders before, during 
and after Hurricane Katrina and for forming this Panel to identify 
steps to be taken to enhance readiness and recovery in the future. The 
Panel thanks the Commission for the opportunity to address the 
important issues associated with this devastating hurricane's effect on 
our nation's communications networks. In this effort, the Panel members 
have brought to bear a broad background of public safety and industry 
experiences, including (for many) first-hand knowledge of the 
devastation wrought by Katrina. The Panel has also benefited from 
information provided in the many comments and expert presentations. The 
Panel hopes that its resulting observations and recommendations prove 
useful to the Commission in helping to ensure that the communications 
industry, first responders, and government at all levels are better 
prepared for future hurricanes and any other disasters that might lie 
ahead for us.

APPENDIX A--Members of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks

Chair: Nancy J. Victory, Partner, Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP

[[Page 38593]]

Carson Agnew, Executive Vice President, Mobile Satellite Ventures, 
LP
Michael R. Anderson, Chairman, PART-15.ORG
Robert G. (Gil) Bailey, ENP, Telecommunications Manager, Harrison 
County, MS Emergency Communications Commission
Kevin Beary, Sheriff, Orange County, FL
Greg Bicket, Vice President/Regional Manager, Cox Communications
Lt. Colonel Joseph Booth, Deputy Superintendent, Louisiana State 
Police
Steve Davis, Senior Vice President--Engineering, Clear Channel Radio
Robert G. Dawson, President & CEO, SouthernLINC Wireless
Stephen A. Dean, Fire Chief, City of Mobile, AL
Steve Delahousey, Vice President--Operations, American Medical 
Response
Dave Flessas, Vice President--Network Operations, Sprint Nextel 
Corp.
Martin D. Hadfield, Vice President--Engineering, Entercom 
Communications Corp.
Jim O. Jacot, Vice President, Cingular Network Group
Tony Kent, Vice President--Engineering & Network Operations, 
Cellular South
Kelly Kirwan, Vice President--State and Local Government and 
Commercial Markets Division, The Americas Group, Government, 
Enterprise, and Mobility Solutions, Motorola Communications and 
Electronics, Inc.
Jonathan D. Linkous, Executive Director, American Telemedicine 
Association
Adora Obi Nweze, Director, Hurricane Relief Efforts, NAACP; 
President, Florida State Conference, NAACP; Member, National Board 
of Directors, NAACP
Eduardo Pe[ntilde]a, Board Member, League of United Latin American 
Citizens
Billy Pitts, President of Government Affairs, The NTI Group
Major Michael Sauter, Commander, Office of Technology and 
Communications, New Orleans Police Department
Marion Scott, Vice President--Operations, CenturyTel
Kay Sears, Senior Vice President of Sales and Marketing, G2 
Satellite Solutions, PanAmSat Corporation
Edmund M. ``Ted'' Sexton, Sr., President, National Sheriffs 
Association
Edwin D. Smith, Chief, Baton Rouge Fire Department
William L. Smith, Chief Technology Officer, BellSouth Corporation
Patrick Yoes, President, Louisiana Fraternal Order of Police, 
National Secretary, Fraternal Order of Police
[FR Doc. 06-6013 Filed 7-6-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P