[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 95 (Wednesday, May 17, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 28622-28626]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-7475]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2006-24787; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-043-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10 and 
DC-10-10F Airplanes; Model DC-10-15 Airplanes; Model DC-10-30 and DC-
10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10) Airplanes; Model DC-10-40 and DC-10-40F 
Airplanes; Model MD-10-10F and MD-10-30F Airplanes; and Model MD-11 and 
MD-11F Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) 
for certain McDonnell Douglas transport category airplanes. This 
proposed AD would require fabrication and installation of a wire 
harness guard in the right wheel well of the main landing gear (MLG), 
and related investigative and corrective actions as necessary. For 
certain airplanes, the proposed AD also would require replacement of 
the electrical connectors of the auxiliary hydraulic pumps with 
improved electrical connectors and related investigative and corrective 
actions. This proposed AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by 
the manufacturer. We are proposing this AD to prevent damage to the 
wire support bracket and wiring of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and, 
for certain airplanes, water intrusion through the electrical 
connectors of the auxiliary hydraulic pump. These conditions could lead 
to a potential ignition source in the right wheel well of the MLG 
around the fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, 
could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the 
airplane.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by July 3, 2006.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on 
this proposed AD.
     DOT Docket Web site: Go to http://dms.dot.gov and follow 
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
     Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the 
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and 
Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024), for the service 
information identified in this proposed AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ken Sujishi, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin 
Safety/Mechanical and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150L, FAA, Los 
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 
Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5353; fax (562) 
627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or 
arguments regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed in the ADDRESSES section. Include the docket number ``FAA-2006-
24787; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-043-AD'' at the beginning of your 
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will 
consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the 
proposed AD in light of those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will 
also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA 
personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of 
that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our 
dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or 
signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, 
etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the 
Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you 
may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

Examining the Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-
5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT 
street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 
available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System 
receives them.

Discussion

    The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel 
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the 
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes 
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for 
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a 
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design

[[Page 28623]]

Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection 
Requirements'' (67 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new 
airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance 
requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation 
No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 
and 21-83).
    Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., 
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders 
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition 
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design 
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for 
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to 
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance 
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety 
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to 
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary 
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
    In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four 
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel 
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of 
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable 
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address 
the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in 
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure 
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included 
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for 
further action.
    We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are 
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel 
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result 
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
    We have received two reports indicating that the auxiliary 
hydraulic pump system failed on McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-30F 
airplanes. Failure of the hydraulic pump resulted in several feet of 
burnt electrical wiring between the auxiliary hydraulic pump motor and 
the right wheel well of the main landing gear (MLG). Operators also 
found damage to the adjacent structure, control cables, hydraulic 
pipes, and hoses. Investigation revealed that electrical arcing between 
damaged wiring and the adjacent structure caused a short in the pump 
motor, which led to the failure of the hydraulic pump. The damaged 
wiring was caused by maintenance personnel stepping on the wiring 
assembly. Damage to the wire support bracket and wiring, if not 
corrected, could lead to a potential ignition source in the right wheel 
well of the MLG around the fuel tank, which, in combination with 
flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and 
consequent loss of the airplane.
    We have also received a third report that the auxiliary hydraulic 
pump failed on a McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 airplane. Investigation 
of the third report revealed that water entered into the auxiliary 
hydraulic pump through the electrical connectors, causing electrical 
arcing. The electrical arcing led to the failure of the hydraulic pump. 
Water intrusion through the electrical connectors of the auxiliary 
hydraulic pump, if not corrected, could lead to a potential ignition 
source in the right wheel well of the MLG around the fuel tank, which, 
in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank 
explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

Other Related Rulemaking

    On February 26, 2004, we issued AD 2004-05-20, amendment 39-13515 
(69 FR 11504, March 11, 2004). That AD is applicable to certain 
McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10 and DC-10-10F airplanes; Model DC-10-
15 airplanes; Model DC-10-30 and DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10) 
airplanes; Model DC-10-40 and DC-10-40F airplanes; Model MD-10-10F and 
MD-10-30F airplanes; and Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes. That AD 
requires modification of the installation wiring for the electric motor 
operated auxiliary hydraulic pumps in the right wheel well area of the 
main landing gear, and repetitive inspections of the numbers 1 and 2 
electric motors of the auxiliary hydraulic pumps for electrical 
resistance, continuity, mechanical rotation, and associated airplane 
wiring resistance/voltage; and corrective actions if necessary. We 
issued that AD to prevent failure of the electric motors of the 
hydraulic pump and associated wiring, which could result in fire at the 
auxiliary hydraulic pump and consequent damage to the adjacent 
electrical equipment and/or structure. The repetitive inspections of 
that AD ensure that any damage to the wiring of the auxiliary hydraulic 
pumps can be detected and corrected.

Relevant Service Information

    We have reviewed the following service information:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Airplanes                        Service bulletin                         Dated
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10 and DC-   Boeing Alert Service          April 6, 2005.
 10-10F airplanes; Model DC-10-15           Bulletin DC10-29A146,
 airplanes; Model DC-10-30 and DC-10-30F    Revision 1.
 (KC-10A and KDC-10) airplanes; Model DC-
 10-40 and DC-10-40F airplanes; and Model
 MD-10-10F and MD-10-30F airplanes.
                                           McDonnell Douglas DC-10       September 8, 1993.
                                            Service Bulletin 29-135.
McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and MD-11F   Boeing Alert Service          April 30, 2001.
 airplanes.                                 Bulletin MD11-29A060.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Boeing Alert Service Bulletins DC10-29A146 and MD11-29A060 describe 
procedures for fabricating a wire harness guard and installing it in 
the right wheel well of the main landing gear (MLG), and doing related 
investigative and corrective actions. The related investigative actions 
are a visual inspection of the wiring installations of the auxiliary 
hydraulic pump in the right main wheel well at station Y = 1381 for 
chafing; and verification that the area around the wiring of auxiliary 
hydraulic pump is clean and free of debris. The corrective action is to 
repair any damaged or chafed wiring.
    McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-135 describes 
procedures for replacing the electrical connectors, having part number 
(P/N) FC6DE24-10S or DC62E24-10SN, of the auxiliary hydraulic pumps at 
the right wheel well of the MLG with improved electrical connectors 
having P/N DC62F24-10SN, and doing a related investigative action. The 
related investigative action is a test of the auxiliary hydraulic 
system.

[[Page 28624]]

    Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is 
intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD

    We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an 
unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes 
of this same type design. For this reason, we are proposing this AD, 
which would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service 
information described previously, except as discussed under 
``Differences Between the Proposed AD and Service Bulletins.''

Differences Between the Proposed AD and Service Bulletins

    Boeing Alert Service Bulletins DC10-29A146 and MD11-29A060 describe 
procedures for verifying that the area around the wiring of auxiliary 
hydraulic pump is clean and free of debris. However, the service 
bulletins do not specify what corrective action to take if any debris 
is found in the area around the wiring of the auxiliary hydraulic pump. 
This NPRM proposes to require cleaning the area of the debris before 
further flight.
    Although Boeing Alert Service Bulletins DC10-29A146 and MD11-29A060 
recommend accomplishing the modification within a compliance time of 18 
months, this NPRM would require a compliance time of 60 months. Since 
issuance of those service bulletins, the manufacturer has reviewed the 
identified unsafe condition in response to SFAR 88. As a result, the 
manufacturer recommends extending the compliance time to 60 months 
because the unsafe condition occurs in an area outside of the fuel 
tank. Also as stated previously, we issued AD 2004-05-20 that in part 
requires repetitive inspections of the auxiliary hydraulic pumps at 
intervals of 2,500 flight hours. AD 2004-05-20 ensures that any damage 
to the wiring of the auxiliary hydraulic pumps can be detected and 
corrected. For these reasons, we find that a compliance time of 60 
months represents an appropriate interval of time for affected 
airplanes to continue to operate without compromising safety.
    This NPRM identifies the correct P/N for a certain rivet that is 
incorrectly specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-29A060. P/N 
MS20470AD5-7, shown in the parts and material table in paragraph 2.C.2 
of the service bulletin, is not a valid P/N. The correct P/N that must 
be used is P/N MS20470AD6-7; this P/N is correctly referenced in Figure 
2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. The 
manufacturer is aware of this discrepancy, concurs with the change, and 
has issued Information Notice MD11-29A060 IN 01, dated August 15, 2002, 
to inform operators of the error. We have included this information in 
paragraph (g) of this NPRM.
    McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-135 specifies testing 
the auxiliary hydraulic system, but does not specify what corrective 
action to take if the auxiliary hydraulic system fails that test. This 
NPRM proposes to require, before further flight, repairing the 
auxiliary hydraulic system according to a method approved by the 
Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA. Chapter 29-20-
00 of the DC-10 Aircraft Maintenance Manual is one approved method for 
repairing the auxiliary hydraulic system.
    Although McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-135 recommends 
accomplishing the replacements at the earliest practical maintenance 
period, we have determined that this imprecise compliance time would 
not address the identified unsafe condition in a timely manner. In 
developing an appropriate compliance time for this NPRM, we considered 
not only the manufacturer's recommendation, but the degree of urgency 
associated with addressing the subject unsafe condition, the average 
utilization of the affected fleet, and the time necessary to perform 
the replacements. In light of all of these factors, we find a 
compliance time of 60 months for completing the replacements to be 
warranted, in that it represents an appropriate interval of time for 
affected airplanes to continue to operate without compromising safety. 
This difference has been coordinated with the manufacturer.

Clarification of Concurrent Requirements

    Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC10-29A146 recommends accomplishing 
Boeing Service Bulletins DC10-29A144 and DC10-29A142 concurrently for 
ease of maintenance and scheduling. Also, Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 
MD11-29A060 recommends accomplishing Boeing Service Bulletins MD11-
29A059 and MD11-29A057 concurrently for ease of maintenance and 
scheduling. This NPRM, however, would not require operators to 
accomplish any of these service bulletins concurrently.

Clarification of Inspection Terminology

    The ``visual inspection'' specified in Boeing Alert Service 
Bulletins DC10-29A146 and MD11-29A060 is referred to as a ``general 
visual inspection'' in this NPRM. We have included the definition for a 
general visual inspection in a note in this NPRM.

Costs of Compliance

    There are about 627 airplanes of the affected design in the 
worldwide fleet. This proposed AD would affect about 303 airplanes of 
U.S. registry. The following table provides the estimated costs, at an 
average labor rate of $80 per hour, for U.S. operators to comply with 
this proposed AD.

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  Number of U.S.-
            Models                  Action        Work    Parts      Cost per       registered      Fleet cost
                                                 hours               airplane        airplanes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-    Fabrication and        3     $889          $1,129             206        $232,574
 15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F (KC-   Installation.
 10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40,
 DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, and MD-
 10-30F airplanes.
                               Replacement....        2      290             450             206          92,700
MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes...  Fabrication and        3      866           1,106              97         107,282
                                installation.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

[[Page 28625]]

    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed 
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the 
ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec.  39.13 by 
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA-2006-24787; Directorate Identifier 
2006-NM-043-AD.

Comments Due Date

    (a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by July 3, 
2006.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to the McDonnell Douglas airplanes 
identified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD, certificated 
in any category.
    (1) Model DC-10-10 and DC-10-10F airplanes; Model DC-10-15 
airplanes; Model DC-10-30 and DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10) 
airplanes; Model DC-10-40 and DC-10-40F airplanes; and Model MD-10-
10F and MD-10-30F airplanes; fuselage numbers (FNs) 1 through 446 
inclusive.
    (2) Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes; F/Ns 0447, 0448, 0449, 
0451 through 0464 inclusive, 0466 through 0489 inclusive, 0491 
through 0517 inclusive, 0519 through 0552 inclusive, and 0554 
through 0646 inclusive.

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the 
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent damage to the wire 
support bracket and wiring of the auxiliary hydraulic pump and, for 
certain airplanes, water intrusion through the electrical connectors 
of the auxiliary hydraulic pump. These conditions could lead to a 
potential ignition source in the right wheel well of the main 
landing gear (MLG) around the fuel tank, which, in combination with 
flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and 
consequent loss of the airplane.

Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Installation and Replacement for Certain Airplanes

    (f) For Model DC-10-10 and DC-10-10F airplanes; Model DC-10-15 
airplanes; Model DC-10-30 and DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10) 
airplanes; Model DC-10-40 and DC-10-40F airplanes; and Model MD-10-
10F and MD-10-30F airplanes: Within 60 months after the effective 
date of this AD, do the actions specified in paragraph (f)(1) and 
(f)(2) of this AD.
    (1) Fabricate a wire harness guard and install it in the right 
wheel well of the MLG, and do all related investigative and 
applicable corrective actions, by accomplishing all of the actions 
specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service 
Bulletin DC10-29A146, Revision 1, dated April 6, 2005; except as 
provided by paragraph (h) of this AD. Do all applicable corrective 
actions before further flight. If any debris is found in the area 
around the wiring of the auxiliary hydraulic pump, before further 
flight, clean the area of the debris.
    (2) Replace any electrical connector having part number (P/N) 
DC62E24-10SN or FC6DE24-10S of the auxiliary hydraulic pumps at the 
right wheel well of the MLG with improved electrical connectors 
having P/N DC62F24-10SN, and do the related investigative action 
before further flight, by accomplishing all of actions specified in 
the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service 
Bulletin 29-135, dated September 8, 1993. If the auxiliary hydraulic 
system fails the test, before further flight, repair the auxiliary 
hydraulic system according to a method approved by the Manager, Los 
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA. Chapter 29-20-00 
of the DC-10 Aircraft Maintenance Manual is one approved method.

Installation for Other Certain Airplanes

    (g) For Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes: Within 60 months after 
the effective date of this AD, fabricate and install a wire harness 
guard in the right wheel well of the MLG, and do all related 
investigative and applicable corrective actions, by accomplishing 
all of the actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of 
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-29A060, dated April 30, 2001; 
except as provided by paragraph (h) of this AD. Do all applicable 
corrective actions before further flight. If any debris is found in 
the area around the wiring of the auxiliary hydraulic pump, before 
further flight, clean the area of the debris. Rivet P/N MS20470AD5-
7, shown in the parts and material table in paragraph 2.C.2 of the 
service bulletin, is not a valid P/N; the correct P/N that must be 
used is P/N MS20470AD6-7.

Exception to Service Bulletins

    (h) Where Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service 
Bulletin DC10-29A146, Revision 1, dated April 6, 2005; and Boeing 
Alert Service Bulletin MD11-29A060, dated April 30, 2001, specify 
doing a visual inspection of the wiring installations of the 
auxiliary hydraulic pump in the right main wheel well at station 
Y=1381 for chafing, do a general visual inspection.

    Note 1: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection 
is: ``A visual examination of an interior or exterior area, 
installation, or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, or 
irregularity. This level of inspection is made from within touching 
distance unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be necessary to 
ensure visual access to all surfaces in the inspection area. This 
level of inspection is made under normally available lighting 
conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or 
droplight and may require removal or opening of access panels or 
doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be required to gain 
proximity to the area being checked.''

Credit for Original Issue of Service Bulletin

    (i) For Model DC-10-10 and DC-10-10F airplanes; Model DC-10-15 
airplanes; Model DC-10-30 and DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10) 
airplanes; Model DC-10-40 and DC-10-40F airplanes; and Model MD-10-
10F and MD-10-30F airplanes: Actions done before the effective date 
of this AD in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC10-
29A146, dated April 30, 2001,

[[Page 28626]]

are acceptable for compliance with the corresponding requirements of 
this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (j)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA, has the authority to 
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the 
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
    (2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.  
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the 
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards 
Certificate Holding District Office.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 9, 2006.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
 [FR Doc. E6-7475 Filed 5-16-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P