[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 93 (Monday, May 15, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 28168-28197]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-4387]



[[Page 28167]]

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Part IV





Department of Transportation





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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration



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49 CFR Parts 555, 567, 568, and 571



Vehicles Built in Two or More Stages; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 93 / Monday, May 15, 2006 / Rules and 
Regulations  

[[Page 28168]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 555, 567, 568, and 571

Docket No. NHTSA-2006-24664
RIN 2127-AJ91


Vehicles Built in Two or More Stages

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; response to petition for reconsideration.

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SUMMARY: This document responds to a petition for reconsideration of 
the February 14, 2005 final rule under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 and its 
implementing regulations pertaining to vehicles built in two or more 
stages and, to a lesser degree, to altered vehicles. This document 
clarifies the recognition in that rule that under NHTSA's regulations, 
multistage vehicles may be treated as a separate type of vehicle, 
including, as appropriate, vehicles built on chassis-cab incomplete 
vehicles. This document also amends a provision of the temporary 
exemption procedures to allow, as appropriate, for exemption of 
multistage vehicles from standards based on dynamic testing. This 
document denies the remainder of the petition for reconsideration, 
which involved certification of multistage vehicles and responsibility 
for recalls of multistage vehicles.

DATES: The amendments made in this final rule are effective on 
September 1, 2006. This final rule amends the final rule published on 
February 14, 2005 (70 FR 7414), which is also effective on September 1, 
2006.
    Petitions: Petitions for reconsideration must be received by June 
26, 2006 and should refer to this docket and be submitted to: 
Administrator, Room 5220, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. The 
agency will not entertain petitions for reconsideration on 49 CFR Parts 
567 Certification, 568 Vehicles Manufactured in Two or More Stages--All 
Incomplete, Intermediate and Final Stage Manufacturers of Vehicles 
Manufactured in Two or More Stages, or 573 Defect and Noncompliance 
Responsibility and Reports. Issues under these regulations have been 
addressed in rulemaking, including negotiated rulemaking, and in this 
document. Any further consideration of these provisions would be 
repetitive.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
    For nonlegal issues: Harry Thompson, Office of Vehicle Safety 
Compliance, NHTSA (telephone 202-366-5289).
    For legal issues: For issues related to multistage vehicles as a 
type of vehicle and temporary exemptions, George Feygin, Office of the 
Chief Counsel, NHTSA (telephone 202-366-2992); For other legal issues, 
Katherine Gehringer, Office of the Chief Counsel, NHTSA (telephone 202-
366-5263).
    You can reach the above at the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 400 Seventh St., SW., Washington, DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background
    A. Description of issues unique to multistage vehicles
    1. Multistage vehicles
    2. Multistage vehicle manufacturers
    3. Pass-through certification
    4. Assumption of certification and recall responsibility
    5. Incomplete vehicle document
    6. Altered vehicles
    B. The underlying rulemaking
II. NTEA's Petition for Reconsideration and the Agency's Response
    A. Multistage vehicles built on chassis-cabs are treated the 
same as those built on other types of incomplete vehicles
    B. The new temporary exemption in Part 555 provision is 
sufficient.
    1. Clarification of what information petitioners must provide to 
show good faith efforts to comply with applicable regulations
    C. The current multistage vehicle certification scheme is 
workable
    1. Overview of the certification of multistage vehicles
    2. Practical aspects of the multistage vehicle process
    3. NTEA's position
    4. The availability of multistage vehicles belies NTEA's 
position
    5. NTEA's argument is too broad and ignores gradations in types 
of multistage vehicles
    6. The existing IVDs are workable
    a. FMVSS 105 Hydraulic and Electric Brake Systems and FMVSS 135 
Light Vehicle Brake Systems.
    b. FMVSS 204 Impact Protection for the Driver from the Steering 
Control System.
    c. FMVSS 201 Occupant Protection in Interior Impact.
    d. FMVSS 212 Windshield Mounting.
    e. FMVSS 219 Windshield Zone Intrusion.
    f. FMVSS 214 Side Impact Protection
    g. FMVSS 208 Occupant Crash Protection.
    h. FMVSS 216 Roof Crush Resistance
    i. FMVSS 301 Fuel System Integrity
    7. Additional resources available to final-stage manufacturers
    D. NHTSA's market forces argument is justified and consistent 
with the multistage vehicle market
    E. NHTSA's decision not to include a reasonableness requirement 
is consistent with other NHTSA regulations
    F. Impracticability should be decided in context of rulemaking 
for each
    FMVSS or on a petition for a temporary exemption
    G. The current certification scheme is not an unlawful 
delegation of agency authority
    H. The agency's decision not to change default recall 
responsibility, which historically has been assigned to final-stage 
manufacturers, was reasonable
    1. Background
    2. Summary of NTEA's position
    3. NTEA has not demonstrated that based on size, default 
responsibility should be shifted from final-stage manufacturers
    4. NTEA has not demonstrated that safety will be enhanced by 
assigning default recall responsibility to incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers
    5. Additional points in support of NHTSA's decision
    6. Conclusion
    I. There is no need for NHTSA to require IVDs for completed 
vehicles that are commonly altered, or to allow alterers to rely on 
pass-through certification opportunities presented in IVDs
    J. Technical amendment
III. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    C. National Environmental Policy Act
    D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
    E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    F. Executive Order 12778 (Civil Justice Reform)
    G. Paperwork Reduction Act
    H. Executive Order 13045
    I. Privacy Act
    J. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
    K. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

I. Background

A. Description of Issues Unique to Multistage and Altered Vehicles

    The petition at issue requests NHTSA to reconsider certain 
amendments adopted as part of a final rule published on February 14, 
2005 (at 70 FR 7414) to address certification issues related to 
vehicles built in two or more stages, and to a lesser degree, to 
altered vehicles. Concepts and terminology relating to the 
certification of these vehicles are described below.
1. Multistage Vehicles
    In the typical situation, a vehicle built in two or more stages is 
one in which an incomplete vehicle, such as a chassis-cab or cut-away 
chassis built by one manufacturer, is completed by another manufacturer 
who adds work-performing or cargo-carrying components to the vehicle. 
For example, the incomplete vehicle may have a cab, but nothing built 
on the frame behind the cab. As completed, it may be a dry freight van 
(box truck), dump truck, tow truck, or plumber's truck. Like all

[[Page 28169]]

vehicles that are manufactured for sale in the United States, a 
multistage vehicle must be certified as complying with all applicable 
Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) before the vehicle is 
introduced into interstate commerce.\1\ Certification is provided in 
the form of a label permanently affixed to the vehicle in a prescribed 
location, which, among other things, identifies the vehicle's 
manufacturer and date of manufacture, and states that the vehicle 
conforms to all applicable FMVSS in effect on that date.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 30115.
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2. Multistage Vehicle Manufacturers
    Manufacturers involved in the production of multistage vehicles can 
include, in addition to the incomplete vehicle manufacturer, one or 
more intermediate manufacturers, who perform manufacturing operations 
on the incomplete vehicle after it has left the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer's hands, and a final-stage manufacturer who completes the 
vehicle so that it is capable of performing its intended function.
3. Pass-Through Certification
    In some circumstances, a manufacturer at an earlier stage in the 
chain of production for a multistage vehicle can certify that the 
vehicle will comply with one or more FMVSS when completed, provided 
specified conditions are met. This allows what is commonly referred to 
as ``pass-through certification.'' As long as a subsequent manufacturer 
meets the conditions of the prior certification, that manufacturer may 
rely on this certification and pass it through when certifying the 
completed vehicle.
4. Assumption of Certification and Recall Responsibility
    Although the final-stage manufacturer normally certifies the 
completed vehicle's compliance with all applicable FMVSS, this 
responsibility can be assumed by any other manufacturer in the 
production chain. To take on this responsibility, the other 
manufacturer must ensure that it is identified as the vehicle 
manufacturer on the certification label that is permanently affixed to 
the vehicle. The identified manufacturer also has legal responsibility 
to provide NHTSA and vehicle owners with notification of any defect 
related to motor vehicle safety or noncompliance with an FMVSS that is 
found to exist in the vehicle, and to remedy any such defect or 
noncompliance without charge to the vehicle's owner.
5. Incomplete Vehicle Document
    The agency's regulations governing vehicles manufactured in two or 
more stages at 49 CFR part 568 require incomplete vehicle manufacturers 
to provide with each incomplete vehicle an incomplete vehicle document 
(IVD). This document details, with varying degrees of specificity, the 
types of future manufacturing contemplated by the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer and must provide, for each applicable safety standard, one 
of three statements that a subsequent manufacturer can rely on when 
certifying compliance of the vehicle, as finally manufactured, to some 
or all of all applicable FMVSS.
    First, the IVD may state, with respect to a particular safety 
standard, that the vehicle, when completed, will conform to the 
standard if no alterations are made in identified components of the 
incomplete vehicle. This representation, which is referred to as a 
``Type 1 statement,'' is most often made with respect to chassis-cabs, 
since a significant portion of the occupant compartment in incomplete 
vehicles of that type is already complete.
    Second, the IVD may provide a statement of specific conditions of 
final manufacture under which the completed vehicle will conform to a 
particular standard or set of standards. This statement, which is 
referred to as a ``Type 2 statement,'' is applicable in those instances 
in which the incomplete vehicle manufacturer has provided all or a 
portion of the equipment needed to comply with the standard, but 
subsequent manufacturing might be expected to change the vehicle such 
that it may not comply with the standard once finally manufactured. For 
example, the incomplete vehicle could be equipped with a brake system 
that would, in many instances, enable the vehicle to comply with the 
applicable brake standard once the vehicle was complete, but that would 
not enable it to comply if the completed vehicle's weight or center of 
gravity height were significantly altered from those specified in the 
IVD.
    Third, the IVD may identify those standards for which no 
representation of conformity is made because conformity with the 
standard is not substantially affected by the design of the incomplete 
vehicle. This is referred to as a ``Type 3 statement.'' A statement of 
this kind could be made, for example, by a manufacturer of a stripped 
chassis who may be unable to make any representations about conformity 
to any crashworthiness standards if the incomplete vehicle does not 
contain an occupant compartment. When it issued the original set of 
regulations regarding certification of vehicles built in two or more 
stages, the agency indicated that it believed final-stage manufacturers 
would be able to rely on the representations made in the IVDs when 
certifying the completed vehicle's compliance with all applicable 
FMVSS.
6. Altered Vehicles
    An altered vehicle is one that is completed and certified in 
accordance with the agency's regulations and then altered, other than 
by the addition, substitution, or removal of readily attachable 
components, such as mirrors or tire and rim assemblies, or by minor 
finishing operations such as painting, before the first retail sale of 
the vehicle, in such a manner as may affect the vehicle's compliance 
with one or more FMVSS or the validity of the vehicle's stated weight 
ratings or vehicle type classification. The person who performs such 
operations on a completed vehicle is referred to as a vehicle 
``alterer.'' An alterer must certify that the vehicle remains in 
compliance with all applicable FMVSS affected by the alteration.

B. The Underlying Rulemaking

    Issues involving vehicles built in two or more stages have long 
been matters of contention within the affected industry and before the 
agency and the courts. Historically, NHTSA's regulations for 
certification of multistage vehicles contained provisions for 
certification statements by chassis-cab manufacturers.\2\ In 1990, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled in National 
Truck and Equipment Ass'n v. NHTSA, 919 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1990), that 
the requirements of a particular FMVSS were impracticable for final-
stage manufacturers using vehicles other than chassis-cabs for which 
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer was not required to provide ``pass-
through'' certification. Thereafter, the agency published a notice of 
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that proposed extending certification 
requirements for chassis-cab manufacturers to manufacturers of all 
incomplete vehicles.\3\ This would have permitted pass-through 
certification for all types of multistage vehicles.
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    \2\ 49 CFR 567.5 (1977 and 1978).
    \3\ 56 FR 61392 (December 3, 1991).
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    The proposal was highly controversial. On December 12, 1995, the 
agency held a public meeting to solicit information from affected 
manufacturers and members of the public on the certification of 
vehicles built in two or more stages and

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suggestions for the revision of agency regulations governing those 
activities. On May 20, 1999, NHTSA published a notice of intent to 
convene a negotiated rulemaking committee on the subject.\4\ In late 
1999 and early 2000, NHTSA held public meetings. A chartered committee 
that included representatives from incomplete vehicle manufacturers, 
component manufacturers, final-stage manufacturers and alterers, 
vehicle end-users, and NHTSA held several meetings between March 2000 
and February 2002 at which issues involving the certification and 
recall of vehicles built in two or more stages were discussed. The 
committee failed to reach a consensus on several key issues involving 
certification and recall responsibilities.
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    \4\ 64 FR 27499.
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    On June 28, 2004, the agency published a supplemental notice of 
proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) addressing five different parts of the 
agency's regulations related to vehicles built in two or more stages 
and, to a lesser degree, to altered vehicles.\5\
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    \5\ 69 FR 36038.
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    In the SNPRM, the agency addressed the issue of whether it 
possesses the legal authority to exclude multi-stage vehicles as a 
group from a standard.\6\ The agency tentatively concluded that it 
could do so in regulations establishing FMVSS.
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    \6\ 69 FR at.
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    The proposed amendments included adding a new subpart to 49 CFR 
part 555, Temporary Exemption from Motor Vehicle Safety and Bumper 
Standards that would allow final-stage manufacturers and alterers to 
obtain temporary exemptions from those portions of safety standards for 
which the agency verifies compliance through dynamic crash testing. The 
agency also proposed to streamline the temporary exemption process by 
allowing an association or other party representing the interests of 
multiple manufacturers to bundle petitions for a single vehicle design, 
precluding the need for individual manufacturers to explain the 
potential safety impacts of the requested exemption and their good 
faith attempts to comply with the standard that is the subject of the 
exemption request. The agency also proposed amendments that would 
commit it to processing these temporary exemption requests in an 
expedited fashion.
    The agency also proposed in the SNPRM to amend 49 CFR part 567, 
Certification, to extend to all incomplete vehicles, not just to 
chassis-cabs, requirements for the incomplete vehicle manufacturer to 
provide pass-through certification and to furnish information labels or 
incomplete vehicle documents (IVDs) with the vehicle. The agency also 
proposed to amend 49 CFR part 568, Vehicles Manufactured in Two or More 
Stages, to reflect that an incomplete vehicle manufacturer may 
incorporate by reference body builder or other design and engineering 
guidance into the IVD. The agency also proposed to amend 49 CFR 571.8, 
Effective Date, by providing intermediate and final-stage manufacturers 
and alterers with an additional year or more of lead time to achieve 
conformity with certain amendments to the FMVSS. NHTSA also published, 
without the agency's endorsement, amendments to 49 CFR part 573, Defect 
and Noncompliance Responsibility and Reports prepared by some parties 
in the negotiated rulemaking process. These would permit the agency to 
assign recall responsibility to the party it believes is in the best 
position to conduct a notification and remedy campaign in circumstances 
where accountability for the underlying defect or noncompliance is in 
dispute among the various manufacturers in the production chain. The 
agency solicited public comment on the amendments proposed in the 
SNPRM.
    After considering comments on the SNPRM, NHTSA published a final 
rule, as previously noted, on February 14, 2005.\7\ The final rule 
contained considerable relief for final stage manufacturers. First, as 
a legal matter, the agency concluded that it possesses the legal 
authority to exclude multistage vehicles as a group from a standard.\8\ 
This means that NHTSA could promulgate FMVSS that applied to some types 
of vehicles such as trucks but that would not apply to multistage 
vehicles. NHTSA concluded that it is appropriate to consider incomplete 
vehicles, other than chassis-cabs, as a vehicle type subject to 
consideration in the establishment of a regulation.\9\
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    \7\ 70 FR 7414.
    \8\ 70 FR at 7420 et seq.
    \9\ 70 FR at 7421.
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    Second, the agency amended its regulations to establish a process 
under which intermediate and final-stage manufacturers and alterers can 
obtain temporary exemptions from dynamic performance requirements of 
certain standards, and accorded those entities an additional year of 
lead time to achieve compliance with new safety requirements, unless 
the agency determines that either a longer or a shorter period is 
appropriate. As stated in the final rule, under the new provisions, 
qualified manufacturers may be granted temporary exemptions from FMVSS 
requirements that are based on dynamic crash testing.
    The final rule revised 49 CFR Parts 567 Certification and 568 
Vehicles Manufactured in Two or More Stages--All Incomplete, 
Intermediate and Final Stage Manufacturers of Vehicles Manufactured in 
Two or More Stages. The final rule adopted much of the SNPRM as it 
pertained to the certification of vehicles manufactured in two or more 
stages. Unlike the earlier regulation, the certification provision for 
manufacturers of multistage vehicles is no longer largely limited to 
chassis-cabs. Under the February 2005 rule, the final-stage 
manufacturer certifies that the vehicle meets applicable FMVSS, but can 
rely on the prior manufacturers' IVD. The incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer and intermediate manufacturers have certification 
responsibilities for the vehicle as further manufactured or completed 
by a final-stage manufacturer to the extent that the vehicle is 
completed in accordance with the IVD. The incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer and intermediate manufacturers also have certification 
responsibilities for equipment subject to equipment standards that they 
supply and for other items and associated standards in the contract 
between them and the next stage manufacturer(s). The fact that some 
components were provided by an incomplete vehicle manufacturer, absent 
more, does not shift responsibility for certification to those 
manufacturers with respect to completed vehicle performance standards. 
The agency did not adopt in the final rule the recommendation of 
certain commenters that it require incomplete vehicle manufacturers to 
provide subsequent stage manufacturers with ``reasonable compliance 
envelopes'' in the IVD.
    The final rule did not amend the agency's rules under which the 
final-stage manufacturer has the ultimate responsibility for conducting 
a notification and remedy (recall) campaign when a safety-related 
defect or noncompliance with a safety standard is found to exist in a 
vehicle built in two or more stages. The agency noted that under the 
existing rule, recalls are not delayed on account of disputes between 
manufacturers. We observed that leaving ultimate recall responsibility 
with the final-stage manufacturer avoids delays in removing unsafe 
vehicles from the road. The agency further decided not to assume a role 
of determining whether the incomplete vehicle manufacturer or final 
stage manufacturer should conduct the recall where that issue is in 
dispute.

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In the comments there was considerable opposition to the proposal for 
the agency to assign recall responsibility. The agency also rejected, 
as moot, a companion proposal to make the decision assigning recall 
responsibility nonreviewable.

II. NTEA's Petition for Reconsideration and the Agency's Response

    On March 31, 2005, the National Truck Equipment Association (NTEA) 
petitioned NHTSA for reconsideration of the final rule. In the 
petition, NTEA noted that it participated as a committee member in the 
negotiated rulemaking that preceded the issuance of the final rule. 
NTEA observed that in the negotiated rulemaking, it argued that dynamic 
test standards (which it identified as including FMVSS Nos. 105 
Hydraulic and Electric Brake Systems, 121 Air Brake Systems, 201 
Occupant Protection in Interior Impact, 203 Impact Protection for the 
Driver from the Steering Control System, 204 Steering Control Rearward 
Displacement, 206 Door Locks and Door Retention Components, 208 
Occupant Crash Protection, 210 Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, 212 
Windshield Mounting, 214 Side Impact Protection, 219 Windshield Zone 
Intrusion, 223 Rear Impact Guards, 301 Fuel System Integrity, 303 Fuel 
System Integrity of Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles, and 305 Electric-
Powered Vehicles; Electrolyte Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection) 
are impractical for intermediate manufacturers, final-stage 
manufacturers, and alterers who complete multistage vehicles because 
the tests that are incorporated into those standards cannot be 
rationally performed by small businesses that build custom-manufactured 
vehicles in production runs as small as one unit. NTEA contended that 
because small businesses that complete multistage vehicles cannot 
afford to conduct the tests that are the core of the dynamic test 
standards, those standards remain impractical as applied to 
intermediate and final-stage manufacturers and alterers. Citing the 
agency's recognition in the preamble of the final rule that multistage 
vehicles can be treated as a distinct vehicle type for the purpose of 
establishing applicability of the FMVSS, NTEA contended that the agency 
was no longer subject to any legal constraints in exempting such 
vehicles from compliance with the dynamic test standards.
    Aside from these general observations, the NTEA petition focused on 
specific issues concerning the adoption of standards to which 
multistage vehicles are subject, temporary exemptions, and 
certification and recall responsibilities of multistage vehicle 
manufacturers. The positions expressed by NTEA with respect to each of 
those issues, and the agency's response, are set forth below.

A. Multistage Vehicles Built on Chassis-Cabs are Treated the Same as 
Those Built on Other Types of Incomplete Vehicles

    NTEA raised several arguments relating to the treatment of 
multistage vehicles built on chassis-cabs under NHTSA's regulations, 
including the new temporary exemption provisions that were added to 49 
CFR part 555 Temporary Exemptions from Motor Vehicle Safety and Bumper 
Standards as subpart B Vehicles Built in Two or More Stages and Altered 
Vehicles. NTEA first argues that the procedures in subpart B should be 
available to all manufacturers of vehicles built in two or more stages, 
and should not exclude manufacturers of vehicles built on chassis-cabs.
    The relevant regulatory text reads as follows:

    ``Sec.  555.11 Application. This subpart applies to alterers and 
manufacturers of motor vehicles built in two or more stages to which 
one or more standards are applicable. * * * Nothing in this subpart 
prohibits an alterer, an intermediate manufacturer, a manufacturer 
of incomplete vehicles other than chassis-cabs, or a final-stage 
manufacturer from applying for a temporary exemption under subpart A 
of this part.''

    ``Sec.  555.12 Petition for exemption. An alterer, intermediate 
or final-stage manufacturer, or industry trade association 
representing a group of alterers, intermediate and/or final-stage 
manufacturers may seek, as to any vehicle configuration built in two 
or more stages, a temporary exemption or a renewal of a temporary 
exemption from any performance requirement for which a Federal motor 
vehicle safety standard specifies the use of a dynamic crash test 
procedure to determine compliance * * *''

    NTEA also took issue with the statement in the final rule that 
NHTSA had reconsidered its previous position with respect to the 
agency's authority to either exclude vehicles manufactured in two or 
more stages from certain FMVSS or to subject them to different 
standards. There we stated that it is appropriate to consider 
multistage vehicles built on incomplete vehicles ``other than those 
incorporating chassis-cabs,'' as a vehicle type subject to 
consideration in the establishment of regulations.\10\ We explained 
that the agency could take multistage vehicles (other than those built 
on chassis-cabs) as a group and exclude them from FMVSS that are 
impracticable as they apply to these vehicles, or could subject these 
vehicles to different requirements. In the final rule, we expressed 
anticipation that final-stage manufacturers using chassis-cabs to 
produce multistage vehicles would be in position to take advantage of 
``pass-through certification,'' and therefore concluded that these 
vehicles did not merit special consideration.
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    \10\ See 70 FR 7421.
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    We now note that the regulatory text in sections 555.11 and 555.12, 
as quoted above, does not expressly preclude manufacturers of vehicles 
built on chassis-cabs from petitioning under the new procedures in 
subpart B. However, the last sentence of Sec.  555.11 may be read to 
imply that a manufacturer of a chassis cab cannot petition for a 
temporary exemption under the pre-existing temporary exemption 
procedures in subpart A.
    NTEA position: In its petition, NTEA argued that NHTSA should not 
distinguish between multistage vehicles built on chassis-cabs and other 
types of vehicles built in two or more stages. NTEA was especially 
concerned that the new temporary exemption procedures would not apply 
to multistage vehicles built on chassis-cabs. NTEA argued that the 
certification obstacles could be as significant for vehicles built on 
chassis-cabs as they are for other types of vehicles manufactured in 
two or more stages. NTEA noted that in the preamble to the final rule, 
NHTSA recognized that certain multistage vehicles--those other than 
chassis-cabs--are a vehicle type subject to consideration in the 
establishment of agency regulations (i.e., that, in the future, the 
agency could subject multistage vehicles to different standards). NTEA 
agreed with NHTSA's resolution as far as it goes, but raised issues 
concerning certain language in the preamble that distinguished 
multistage vehicles built on chassis-cabs from those built on 
incomplete vehicles other than chassis-cabs. The specific language that 
is the subject of NTEA's concern is found in the agency's discussion of 
its authority to exclude multistage vehicles from the FMVSS. There the 
agency stated:

    We are also concerned that we had overlooked the existence of 
relevant physical attributes of multistage vehicles. Many of the 
multistage vehicles in question have distinct physical features 
related to their end use. More important, all of them incorporate 
incomplete vehicles other than chassis-cabs. Especially in the 
context of the difficulties of serving niche markets, the physical 
limitations of the incomplete vehicles other than chassis-cabs can 
adversely affect the ability of multistage manufacturer[s] to design 
safety performance into their completed vehicles.

(70 FR 7421).

[[Page 28172]]

    According to NTEA, the distinction drawn in this paragraph between 
multistage vehicles built on chassis-cabs, and those built on other 
types of incomplete vehicles is an artificial one. NTEA observed that 
many types of completed vehicles can be built on more than one type of 
chassis. NTEA contended that vehicles built on chassis-cabs face 
certification obstacles that could be as significant as those for 
vehicles built on non-chassis cabs.

Agency Response

    a. Distinction between vehicles built on chassis-cabs and those 
built on other types of incomplete vehicles.
    In discussing our authority relating to multistage vehicles in the 
February 2005 final rule,\11\ the agency drew a distinction between 
vehicles built on chassis-cabs and other vehicles manufactured in two 
or more stages with respect to consideration of future standards or 
revisions to existing FMVSS and exemptions from those standards. We 
stated that we would consider multistage vehicles other than those 
built on chassis-cabs in setting new standards and in revising existing 
ones. On further consideration, we want to make clear that the 
distinction between different types of multistage vehicles is not one 
of legal authority. That is, for the purposes of our authority to 
prescribe regulations affecting vehicles manufactured in two or more 
stages, there is no legal distinction between vehicles built on 
chassis-cabs and other vehicles manufactured in two or more stages. In 
those instances where it is deemed appropriate because of 
practicability concerns, and where it is consistent with our safety 
objectives, the agency can consider any multistage vehicle, including 
those built on a chassis-cab, as a vehicle type in establishing or 
amending our regulations. Accordingly, we grant NTEA's petition to the 
extent it sought this clarification and we are amending one section 
added under the final rule (49 CFR 555.12) to ensure that it is 
consistent with this clarification.
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    \11\ NHTSA also followed this approach in its August 2005 NPRM 
on roof crush resistance. See Docket No. NHTSA-2005-22143-5, August 
23, 2005.
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    Notwithstanding this clarification of our authority, we continue to 
believe, in general, that there will be less need for the agency to 
establish different standards for multistage vehicles built on chassis-
cabs, because their manufacturers should be able to take advantage of 
pass-through certification and are less likely to face the 
practicability concerns more readily associated with other types of 
multistage vehicles. This practical distinction is discussed elsewhere 
in this document.\12\
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    \12\ See section II.C.5.
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    b. Scope of the new temporary exemption provisions:
    After carefully considering NTEA's petition, we wish to clarify the 
scope of the new temporary exemption provisions in subpart B of 49 CFR 
part 555. First, our discussion of our authority in the final rule, and 
the distinction we noted between multistage vehicles built on chassis-
cabs and multistage vehicles built on other types of incomplete 
vehicles, related primarily to consideration of future FMVSS or 
revisions to existing standards. In those instances, the treatment of 
multistage vehicles would be based on the facts. The discussion was not 
intended to apply to subpart B, which, as the regulatory text correctly 
indicates, applies not only to manufacturers of all types of multistage 
vehicles, but also to alterers of completed vehicles. Therefore, the 
new procedures in subpart B do not preclude manufacturers of multistage 
vehicles built on chassis-cabs from petitioning for a temporary 
exemption from one or more standards.
    With respect to the last sentence of section 555.11, we conclude 
that the sentence is unnecessary and confusing. The agency is making a 
technical correction to section 555.11 to remove that sentence. We 
observe that the scope of subpart A is unaffected by the availability 
of the new procedures in subpart B.
    Second, we note that both the subpart A and B temporary exemption 
procedures are available only to manufacturers who assume legal 
responsibility for the vehicle and intend to certify the vehicle in 
accordance with 49 CFR part 567. In most instances, these parties are 
final-stage manufacturers. However, under 49 CFR 568.7, the incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer or an intermediate manufacturer can assume legal 
responsibility for the vehicle as finally manufactured. Therefore, 
these entities may petition the agency under either subpart A or B if 
they intend to affix a certification label required by 49 CFR 567.5(f) 
or (g), and if they meet other criteria specified in section 555.11. As 
a practical matter, most incomplete vehicle manufacturers and 
intermediate manufacturers would not qualify for financial hardship 
relief because of the size of their operations. It is clear that the 
new procedures in the final rule were not available to incomplete 
vehicle manufacturers and intermediate manufacturers who do not certify 
the vehicle as finally manufactured under 49 CFR 567.5(f) or (g), and 
instead furnish IVDs and amendments to IVDs to final-stage 
manufacturers in accordance with 49 CFR 568.4 or 568.5. Nevertheless, 
we believe it is important to clarify the issue. Accordingly, the 
agency is making a technical correction to the text of section 555.12.
    For the reasons discussed above, it is clear that the new temporary 
exemption procedures encompass manufacturers of all types of multistage 
vehicles, including vehicles built on chassis-cabs, but are also 
limited to manufacturers who assume legal responsibility for the 
vehicle and intend to certify the vehicle in accordance with 49 CFR 
part 567.

B. The New Temporary Exemption in Part 555 Is Sufficient

    NTEA position: Though it acknowledged that the temporary exemption 
provisions adopted by the agency in the final rule may help a 
particular final-stage manufacturer to temporarily address a 
certification problem, NTEA contended that those provisions do not 
remedy the continuing inability of many final-stage manufacturers to 
certify compliance with dynamic test standards. NTEA took issue with 
language in sections 555.12 and 555.13, as added under the final rule, 
which expressly limits the newly established temporary exemptions for 
which alterers and manufacturers of motor vehicles built in two or more 
stages may apply under subpart B of part 555. Those sections 
characterize the temporary exemptions as being available from ``dynamic 
crash test'' requirements found in the FMVSS. NTEA observed that the 
agency has previously recognized that dynamic tests that do not involve 
crashes may also be beyond the financial capability of final-stage 
manufacturers. Accordingly, NTEA contended that the temporary exemption 
provisions should apply to all dynamic test standards, and not just 
those standards for which dynamic crash test requirements are 
prescribed.

Agency Response

    In the final rule, the agency limited subpart B to FMVSS 
requirements that incorporate dynamic crash tests. As discussed above, 
NTEA argued that subpart B should apply to all standards that are based 
on dynamic testing and not just dynamic crash testing.
    After carefully considering NTEA's petition, we have decided to 
expand the scope of subpart B so that manufacturers of multistage 
vehicles can petition the

[[Page 28173]]

agency for a temporary exemption from requirements that incorporate 
various dynamic tests generally, and not exclusively dynamic crash 
tests. Therefore, we grant this aspect of NTEA's petition, and amend 
the final rule accordingly.
    First, we observe that small volume manufacturers are currently 
able to petition the agency for temporary exemptions from all Federal 
motor vehicle safety and bumper standards under subpart A. Therefore 
our reconsideration of the scope of subpart B relates to the 
availability of the more streamlined procedures in that subpart rather 
than to the possibility of a manufacturer obtaining an exemption, in 
appropriate circumstances, at all.
    Second, we note that under section 555.13(a) and (b) of subpart B, 
in order to petition for an exemption, the petitioner must show why the 
test requirements of a particular standard would cause substantial 
economic hardship. This showing must include detailed financial 
information and a complete description of the petitioner's good faith 
efforts to comply with the standards.
    Specifically, the petitioner must explain the inadequacy of IVD 
documents furnished by one or more incomplete vehicle manufacturers or 
by prior intermediate manufacturers pursuant to part 568. The 
petitioner must also show why generic or cooperative testing is 
impracticable. In addition, the petitioner must explain its difficulty 
in procuring goods and services necessary to conduct dynamic tests. We 
also note that in addition to showing hardship, each petitioner is 
required to explain under section 555.13(c) why the requested temporary 
exemption would not unreasonably degrade safety.
    In limited circumstances, the difficulty or impracticability of 
testing a multitude of unique vehicle configurations, or otherwise 
obtaining an appropriate basis for certification, with the associated 
financial hardships, may extend beyond the requirements for which the 
agency verifies compliance solely through crash testing. We note that a 
dynamic test is one that requires application of forces or energy to 
the vehicle and the FMVSS include a variety of dynamic tests in 
addition to those involving crash tests. As the negotiated rulemaking 
committee pointed out, and as we noted in the SNPRM,\13\ in some 
circumstances, there may be considerable costs associated with dynamic 
tests other than dynamic crash tests, and there may be significant 
damage to vehicles from such tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ See 69 FR 36042.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While we have decided not to restrict the exemption provisions in 
subpart B to requirements incorporating dynamic crash tests, but 
instead to extend those provisions to requirements incorporating any 
kind of dynamic test, we note that the ability of multistage vehicle 
manufacturers to make the requisite showing of hardship will be related 
to the testing costs (or the cost of other means of obtaining an 
appropriate basis for certification) associated with each specific 
standard and requirement for which an exemption is sought, as well as 
the availability of alternatives (such as using a different incomplete 
vehicle) and potential safety consequences. Therefore, in view of the 
range of possible circumstances, we do not believe it is necessary for 
us to attempt, in this document, to specify the dynamic tests that may 
have high costs, as opposed to those for which the costs should be 
relatively low.
    While we have expected the number of instances in which an 
exemption will be needed from requirements incorporating dynamic crash 
tests to be small, we expect the number to be even smaller for 
requirements incorporating other types of dynamic tests. This 
expectation reflects the nature of the tests at issue, the alternatives 
available to final-stage manufacturers, the information contained in 
incomplete vehicle documents, and the other relief that multistage 
manufacturers were provided in the February 2005 final rule.
    In consideration of these issues, the agency is amending the scope 
of subpart B to include requirements that are based on dynamic testing 
generally, rather than those based on dynamic crash tests alone. We 
have revised the text of section 555.12 accordingly.
1. Clarification of What Information Petitioners Must Provide To Show 
Good Faith Efforts To Comply With Applicable Regulations
    As indicated in the previous section, petitioners under subpart B 
are required to provide ``a complete description of each manufacturer's 
good faith efforts to comply with the standards.'' See section 
555.13(b).\14\ The ability of the manufacturers of vehicles built in 
two or more stages to take advantage of ``pass-through'' certification 
may be dependent on selection of an incomplete vehicle that is 
appropriate for the intended application. That is, the availability of 
a sufficient ``pass-through'' to permit certification of compliance 
depends not only on information provided by incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers, but also on the intermediate and final-stage 
manufacturers using the appropriate incomplete vehicle for the intended 
application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ 49 U.S.C. 30113(b)(3)(B)(i) authorizes NHTSA to exempt only 
those manufacturers that have tried to comply with the standard in 
good faith.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One aspect of the final-stage manufacturer's good faith efforts to 
comply with an FMVSS is determining whether an incomplete vehicle is 
available that will enable it to utilize ``pass-through 
certification.'' We note that it is unlikely that the agency would find 
it in the public interest to grant petitions filed by a final-stage 
manufacturer that made no good-faith effort to determine whether an 
appropriate incomplete vehicle, which would allow effective pass-
through certification, was available. The granting of a petition would 
exempt the vehicle from one or more safety standards and, as a general 
matter, we believe this would not be justified if there were an 
alternative that would comply with safety standards.
    While the issue of appropriate selection of the incomplete vehicle 
is relevant to compliance with dynamic crash test standards, we believe 
the issue is likely to be more significant as we extend the scope of 
subpart B to include requirements including dynamic tests more 
generally. For example, in order to take advantage of pass-through 
certification for a braking standard, the final stage manufacturer 
needs to assess whether an incomplete vehicle is available that will 
enable it to stay within the envelopes for weight and center of gravity 
for the intended application. This may involve assessing incomplete 
vehicles of varying size, gross vehicle weight rating or ``GVWR, \15\ 
and number of axles that are available from different manufacturers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ GVWR means the value specified by the manufacturer as the 
loaded weight of a single vehicle. 49 CFR 571.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While we believe that the current requirement that petitioners 
provide a complete description of each manufacturer's good faith 
efforts to comply with the standards may be read to encompass this in 
relevant situations, we believe it is appropriate to make it clear in 
the regulatory text. This is particularly important since the issue is 
likely to become more significant with the expanded scope of subpart B.
    Accordingly, we are including in section 555.13 a provision 
requiring the petitioners to furnish the agency with information 
regarding the availability of

[[Page 28174]]

alternative incomplete vehicles (including ones of different size, GVWR 
and number of axles), from the same and other incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers, that could allow the petitioner to rely on IVDs when 
certifying the completed vehicle, instead of petitioning under subpart 
B. This information will also help the agency make its decisions in the 
timeframe specified in subpart B.

C. The Current Multistage Vehicle Certification Scheme Is Workable

    NTEA position: NTEA asserted that even though NHTSA recognized in 
the SNPRM that incomplete vehicle manufacturers must provide vehicle 
upfitters (as final-stage manufacturers are sometimes referred to in 
the trade) with reasonable conformity envelopes (referencing 69 FR 
36044), the agency did not adopt as part of the final rule a 
reasonableness standard for conformity statements in an IVD. NTEA 
further observed that the agency relied on a market-based argument in 
concluding that ``incomplete vehicle manufacturers have business 
reasons to provide workable IVDs'' and that ``[t]here is no market for 
incomplete vehicles that cannot be manufactured into completed vehicles 
that will meet the applicable FMVSS'' (citing final rule at 70 FR 
7425). NTEA contends that the market forces theory articulated by the 
agency is simply wrong. According to NTEA, incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers at present provide no meaningful compliance envelope, 
even on chassis-cabs, for numerous dynamic test standards.
    NTEA also contends that NHTSA's market-forces argument is premised 
on the erroneous assumption that the final-stage manufacturer is in a 
position to choose the brand chassis on which it will complete a 
vehicle. NTEA observed that in the vast majority of cases, the customer 
goes to a truck dealer, not a final-stage manufacturer, to purchase a 
multistage vehicle. The dealer then engages the final-stage 
manufacturer to install the body and related equipment per the 
customer's specifications. Given this scenario, NTEA asserts that the 
final-stage manufacturer is not in a position to inform the dealer that 
he would prefer to work on a different chassis. As a consequence, NTEA 
concludes that the market does not exert any pressure on the incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer to provide reasonable compliance envelopes.
    NTEA also surmised that the incomplete vehicle manufacturer will 
err on the side of not taking on liability, and does so by making its 
envelope as narrow as possible or nonexistent. Reasoning that 
meaningful pass-through certification would require the incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer to expend resources on testing to determine the 
proper parameters of such certification, NTEA concludes that the 
elimination of meaningful pass-through certification therefore saves 
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer time and money.
    NTEA also took issue with the agency's observation in the preamble 
of the final rule that because of its subjectivity, the reasonableness 
standard recommended by NTEA for conformity statements in the IVD is 
not susceptible to effective enforcement (referencing 70 FR 7425). NTEA 
asserted that this is inconsistent with the fact that the agency uses a 
good faith standard for determining the application of civil penalties. 
NTEA faults the agency for failing to explain why it cannot fashion a 
reasonableness standard for IVDs, but can in a closely-related context.
    Agency response: For the reasons set forth below, we deny this 
aspect of NTEA's petition.
1. Overview of the Certification of Multistage Vehicles
    The certification process is governed by 49 CFR part 567.\16\ 49 
CFR 567.5 \17\ sets forth the certification requirements for 
manufacturers of vehicles manufactured in two or more stages. With 
limited exceptions,\18\ each manufacturer of an incomplete vehicle and 
each intermediate manufacturer \19\ assumes legal responsibility for 
all certification-related duties under the Vehicle Safety Act \20\ with 
respect to:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\See also 49 U.S.C. 30115.
    \17\ In this part of the preamble, except as otherwise stated, 
the references to the regulations are to the regulations published 
on February 14, 2005 that will take effect September 1, 2006. See 70 
FR 7414, 7428 (Feb. 14, 2005).
    \18\ See 70 FR at 7432-33, 49 CFR 567.5 (b) and (c).
    \19\ In the remainder of the preamble, NHTSA will not discuss 
intermediate manufacturers separately.
    \20\ The Vehicle Safety Act is officially 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (i) Components and systems it installs or supplies for installation 
on the incomplete vehicle, unless changed by a subsequent manufacturer;
    (ii) The vehicle as further manufactured or completed by an 
intermediate or final-stage manufacturer, to the extent that the 
vehicle is completed in accordance with the IVD [incomplete vehicle 
document]; and
    (iii) The accuracy of the information contained in the IVD.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ 49 CFR 567.5(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final-stage manufacturers have complementary duties. Pursuant to 49 
CFR 567.5(d), final-stage manufacturers assume

legal responsibility for all certification-related duties and 
liabilities under the Vehicle Safety Act, except to the extent that 
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer or an intermediate manufacturer 
has provided equipment subject to a safety standard or expressly 
assumed responsibility for standards related to systems and 
components it supplied and except to the extent that the final-stage 
manufacturer completed the vehicle in accordance with the prior 
manufacturers' IVD or any addendum furnished pursuant to 49 CFR part 
568, as to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards fully 
addressed therein.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ 49 CFR 567.5(d)(1).

Final-stage manufacturers also have the duty to affix a certification 
label to each vehicle in a manner that does not obscure labels affixed 
by previous stage manufacturers and that, among other things, contains 
certification statements.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ 49 CFR 567.5(d)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final-stage manufacturer may make one of the following 
alternative certification statements: (1) The vehicle conforms to all 
applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS); (2) the 
vehicle was completed in accordance with the prior manufacturers' IVD 
where applicable and conforms to all applicable FMVSS; or (3) the 
vehicle was completed in accordance with the prior manufacturers' IVD 
where applicable except for certain listed exceptions by FMVSS and the 
vehicle conforms to all applicable FMVSS.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ 49 CFR 567.5(d)(2)(v)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As reflected above, a number of certification provisions refer to 
incomplete vehicle documents or IVDs. The incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer furnishes an IVD for incomplete vehicles pursuant to 49 
CFR 568.4. In the IVD, among other things, for each applicable FMVSS, 
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer makes one of three affirmative 
statements: (1) A Type 1 statement that the vehicle when completed will 
conform to the standard if no alterations are made in identified 
components; (2) a Type 2 statement that sets forth the specific 
conditions of final manufacture under which the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer specifies that the completed vehicle will conform to the 
standard (e.g., the vehicle when completed will meet the brake standard 
if it does not exceed gross axle weight ratings, the center of gravity 
at a specific vehicle weight rating is not above a certain height and 
no alterations are made to any brake system component on the incomplete 
vehicle.); or (3) a Type 3 statement that

[[Page 28175]]

conformity to the standard cannot be determined based on the incomplete 
vehicle as supplied, and the incomplete vehicle manufacturer makes no 
representation as to conformity with the standard (e.g., when 
components and systems must be added by the final-stage manufacturer 
and compliance cannot be decided at the time the incomplete vehicle 
leaves the incomplete vehicle manufacturer).
    When the IVD makes a Type 1 or Type 2 statement, there is ``pass-
through'' certification unless obviated by a subsequent manufacturer. 
The final-stage manufacturer relies on the IVD to certify the vehicle 
to a particular standard.
2. Practical Aspects of the Multistage Vehicle Process
    An incomplete vehicle, as long defined by NHTSA,\25\ is not a 
vehicle. It is either
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Prior to the 2005 amendments, incomplete vehicle was 
similarly defined in 49 CFR 568.3 as: ``* * * an assemblage 
consisting, as a minimum, of frame and chassis structure, power 
train, steering system, suspension system, and braking system, to 
the extent that those systems are to be part of the completed 
vehicle, that requires further manufacturing operations, other than 
the addition of readily attachable components, such as mirrors or 
tire and rim assemblies, or minor finishing operations such as 
painting, to become a completed vehicle.''

    (1) An assemblage consisting, at a minimum, of chassis 
(including the frame) structure, power train, steering system, 
suspension system, and braking system, in the state that those 
systems are to be part of the completed vehicle, but requires 
further manufacturing operations to become a completed vehicle; or 
(2) An incomplete trailer.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ 49 CFR 567.3 (2006).

    In the multistage vehicle process, the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer builds a chassis that has sufficient attributes to meet 
the definition of incomplete vehicle. After the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer completes its work, it ships the chassis. The chassis may 
range from being relatively close to completion (such as a chassis-cab 
\27\) to being relatively far from completion (such as a stripped 
chassis \28\). The chassis may end up at a dealer, in a pool of 
incomplete vehicles that are readily available for completion, or at a 
final-stage manufacturer. Following the addition of a truck body or 
equipment, the chassis could be used for a flatbed truck, dump truck, 
tow truck (wrecker), box truck (dry freight van), service truck, 
utility truck or other specialized application.\29\ Regardless of the 
state of completion of the chassis or where it goes after it leaves the 
incomplete vehicle manufacturer's plant, there is a fundamental fact: 
once the incomplete vehicle is out of the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer's hands, the incomplete vehicle manufacturer does not have 
control over what is done with or added to the incomplete vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ A chassis cab is an incomplete vehicle with a completed 
occupant compartment that requires only the addition of cargo-
carrying, work-performing, or load-bearing components to perform its 
intended function. See 49 CFR 567.3 (2005). For illustration 
purposes, an example is a pickup truck without a standard pickup 
truck bed. These may be built into various trucks including a 
tradesman's utility service truck, a tow truck, a dump truck, a box 
truck or a specialized work truck.
    \28\ A stripped chassis may be viewed as meeting the definition 
of an incomplete vehicle without more. As shipped by the incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer, it would have steering control and braking 
systems (to meet the definition of incomplete vehicle). It 
ordinarily would not have the windshield, roof, A-pillar (the pillar 
to which the windshield attaches), B pillar (the pillar behind the 
front doors) or body components. Ford's E-series incomplete vehicle 
manual refers to this as a basic chassis. These may not be 
particularly evident on the road and may underlie, for illustration 
purposes, school buses or large recreation vehicles.
    \29\ See NTEA Petition at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There can be problems with the vehicle once completed that may not 
be attributed to the incomplete vehicle manufacturer but that may 
fairly be attributed to the final-stage manufacturer. For example, 
assume that an incomplete vehicle manufacturer ships a chassis with 
brakes that under the IVD would meet the applicable brake systems FMVSS 
if the chassis were used for light duty applications but not for heavy 
duty applications. The chassis is then out of the control of the 
incomplete vehicle manufacturer. Assume that the final-stage 
manufacturer adds a dump truck body so that the completed truck has a 
GVWR greater than that specified in the IVD. In a colloquial sense, the 
truck would be overloaded.\30\ Alternatively, assume that the final-
stage manufacturer mounts a top-heavy gasoline tank on the chassis. In 
such cases, the vehicle would not meet the FMVSS for brake systems, and 
ordinarily would be outside the IVD compliance envelope. As another 
example, the final-stage manufacturer may make modifications to the 
interior compartment of a chassis-cab, which could take the incomplete 
vehicle out of compliance with various FMVSS developed to protect 
occupants in crashes. Final-stage manufacturers could also add parts 
and equipment that make the vehicle noncompliant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ The term overloaded has a particular meaning in the context 
of some FMVSS, not as an issue here. In this preamble, NHTSA is 
using ``overloaded'' in a colloquial way, meaning too heavy or 
exceeding GVWR specifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In recognition of the fact that incomplete vehicle manufacturers do 
not control work performed by final-stage manufacturers and can fairly 
anticipate only some things, but not everything, done by final-stage 
manufacturers, the regulatory system of ``pass-through'' certification 
is reasonable. The IVD, prepared by the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer, provides the basis for the final-stage manufacturer's 
certification with enumerated FMVSS, on various conditions, including, 
for example, that the final-stage manufacturer does not exceed the GVWR 
of the chassis or introduce modifications to the incomplete vehicle 
that interfere with compliance. Usually, the IVD is a general document 
that accompanies the incomplete vehicle. IVDs are typically not limited 
to one application (one body or type of equipment), but contain limits 
and conditions in light of the nature and capacity of the chassis and 
potential problems resulting from completion of an incomplete vehicle. 
Final-stage manufacturers are informed, by the IVD, of components and 
systems that should not be altered, and, by following those 
instructions and other information from the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer, they are able to certify.
    The system of pass-through certification has existed for more than 
25 years, and in that time many multistage vehicles have been built and 
certified by final-stage manufacturers. This indicates that the system 
is workable and operates as intended.
3. NTEA's Position
    NTEA takes issue with the IVD and pass-through certification 
process. Assuming that FMVSS apply,\31\ NTEA maintains as a sweeping 
proposition that the IVDs currently provided are unworkable and 
insufficient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ In NTEA's view, some FMVSS should not apply to multistage 
vehicles as a vehicle type, and even if they are applicable under 
the regulations establishing FMVSS (49 CFR part 571), there should 
be exemptions from FMVSS based on petitions from individual final-
stage manufacturers or groups of such manufacturers. 49 CFR part 
555.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA does not accept NTEA's position. The certification provisions 
are important. Under them, the final-stage manufacturer historically 
has provided, and under the regulations published in February of 2005 
must provide, its certification that the vehicle complies with 
applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. For almost 40 years, 
these standards have been one of the most critical foundations for 
motor vehicle safety. Under 49 U.S.C. 30115, the manufacturer may not 
issue the certificate if, in exercising reasonable care, it has reason 
to know the

[[Page 28176]]

certificate is false or misleading in a material respect.
    NTEA's petition is conclusory. Overall, NTEA seeks to remove the 
certification responsibility from final-stage manufacturers and impose 
much of that responsibility on incomplete vehicle manufacturers. NTEA's 
petition ignores the fact that incomplete vehicle manufacturers do not 
control what final-stage manufacturers do with the incomplete vehicles. 
NTEA also complains generally without constructively delineating the 
contents of an alternative IVD that would be fair to incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers and would not require them to be involved in the design 
and testing of completed vehicle. Finally, NTEA fails to demonstrate 
that NHTSA has the authority to unilaterally rewrite the IVDs and 
impose them on incomplete vehicle manufacturers, and does not recognize 
the fact that the certification process is working and multistage 
vehicles are being built and certified.
4. The Availability of Multistage Vehicles Belies NTEA's Position
    Overall, NTEA offers the view that it is not possible for a final-
stage manufacturer to comply with an agency's multistage certification 
regulations and even if it were possible, such compliance would be 
economically ruinous. NTEA's position is inconsistent with the current 
state of the multistage vehicle industry. There are many multistage 
vehicles on the road that have been certified and the final-stage 
manufacturers are still in business. For example, most school buses are 
multistage vehicles. They are certified by final-stage manufacturers to 
a number of federal standards. The major final-stage manufacturers such 
as Winnebago, Thomas Built and Blue Bird are able to certify vehicles 
and are in business.\32\ There are also large numbers of other 
multistage vehicles, such as tanker trucks, work trucks, box trucks, 
flatbed and stake trucks, tow trucks and dump trucks on the road.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ They do face economic pressures, such as those associated 
with competitive bidding in the procurement of the buses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA's position does not correspond to statements by final-stage 
manufacturers. In the trade, final-stage manufacturers are known as 
upfitters or as body builders. Many of these companies readily can be 
found on the web with searches for terms such as upfitter or as body 
builder or by type of completed truck such as flat bed truck, service 
truck, school bus or utility truck. They can also be found in the 
yellow pages under truck bodies. For example, in the Washington, DC 
area in the Yellow pages there are companies such as Wilbar Truck 
Equipment Inc. and Fallsway Spring and Equipment Co. They have web 
sites that refer to their products including http://www.wilbar.com/ and 
http://www.fallswayspring.com/. The common theme on these web sites is 
a ``can do'' approach. Their clear message is that they can make a 
variety of trucks. NHTSA has not found any that state the reservations, 
expressed by NTEA, that final-stage manufacturers cannot do so.
    In addition, NTEA's position sounds a chord not expressed by 
organizations within NTEA's umbrella organization. NTEA has numerous 
affiliate divisions that operate ``under the NTEA umbrella'' and 
``represent specific product segments within the truck body and 
equipment industry.''\33\ These affiliate groups include the Ambulance 
Manufacturers Division, which promulgates standards with the General 
Services Administration to which all ambulances must conform,\34\ and 
two bus divisions, the Manufacturers Council of Small School Buses and 
the Mid-Size Bus Manufacturers Association.\35\ The members of these 
affiliate divisions have been building and certifying a number of 
models of multistage vehicles in their niche markets under the existing 
certification structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ http://www.ntea.com/mr/divisions.asp.
    \34\ http://www.ntea.com/mr/divisions/amd/intro.asp.
    \35\ http://www.ntea.com/mr/divisions.asp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA's petition does not mention a single final-stage manufacturer 
that has been unable to certify a vehicle under the existing framework. 
When NTEA's failure to include a single concrete example is viewed in 
light of the obvious numbers of multistage vehicles,\36\ NTEA's 
position can not be accepted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ In its 2004 Annual Report, NTEA characterized truck chassis 
as $64.7 billion worth of a $98.3 billion commercial truck and 
transportation equipment industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Certification serves an important safety function in the multistage 
vehicle business. Many multistage vehicles carry people and important 
cargo--from schoolchildren on school buses to liquid fuel on propane 
and gasoline trucks. The safety need for certification of compliance 
with FMVSS in these types of vehicles is uncontroverted. Again, final-
stage manufacturers regularly certify these and other types of 
multistage vehicles.
5. NTEA's Argument Is too Broad and Ignores Gradations in Types of 
Multistage Vehicles
    NTEA's petition paints a broad picture of final-stage manufacturers 
that are subject to many FMVSS and that must engage in extensive 
engineering of the vehicle from the ground up to meet the FMVSS. There 
are at least two problems with this sweeping view. First, many 
multistage vehicles are heavy vehicles with a gross vehicle weight 
rating (GVWR) of over 10,000 lbs (4536 kilograms) and are not subject 
to a number of FMVSS.\37\ For illustration purposes, as a rough gauge, 
most trucks with a GVWR of more than 10,000 lbs have at least four rear 
wheels (two on each side). Trucks with one rear wheel on each side 
ordinarily have a GVWR equal to or less than 10,000 lbs. As a general 
rule of thumb, medium duty and heavy duty trucks have a GVWR of over 
10,000 lbs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ 70 FR at 7420-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To certify a motor vehicle with a GVWR of more than 10,000 lbs 
requires consideration of fewer FMVSS than for a vehicle with a GVWR of 
10,000 lbs or less. Among the FMVSS that do not apply to multistage 
vehicles, such as work-type and recreation vehicles with a GVWR greater 
than 10,000 lbs are the following:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                FMVSS                                Title
------------------------------------------------------------------------
114..................................  Theft protection.
118..................................  Power-operated window, partition,
                                        and roof panel systems.
138..................................  Tire pressure monitoring systems.
201..................................  Occupant protection in interior
                                        impact.
202..................................  Head restraints.
203..................................  Impact protection for the driver
                                        from the steering control
                                        system.
204..................................  Steering control rearward
                                        displacement.
212..................................  Windshield retention.
214 \38\.............................  Side impact protection.
216 \39\.............................  Roof crush resistance
219..................................  Windshield zone intrusion.
225 \40\.............................  Child restraint anchorage
                                        systems.
301 \41\.............................  Fuel system integrity.
303..................................  Fuel system integrity of
                                        compressed natural gas vehicles.
305..................................  Electric-powered vehicles:
                                        electrolyte spillage and
                                        electrical shock protection.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, for some FMVSS, only some requirements apply. For 
example, pursuant to FMVSS 208 Occupant Crash Protection, trucks with a 
GVWR of 8,500 lbs or less or an unloaded vehicle weight of over 5,500 
lbs are subject to seat belt and labeling requirements but

[[Page 28177]]

are not required to be equipped with an inflatable restraint system 
(air bag) at each front outboard seating position.\42\ Also, crash 
tests are not required for heavier vehicles. NTEA does not address the 
limited applicability of the FMVSS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Dynamic crash test requirements apply to MPVs, trucks and 
buses with a GVWR of 6,000 lbs and less.
    \39\ Quasi-static test applies to MPVs, trucks, and buses other 
than school buses with a GVWR of 6,000 lbs and less.
    \40\ Requirements do not apply to MPVs and trucks with a GVWR 
greater than 8,500 lbs.
    \41\ Dynamic crash test applies to school buses regardless of 
GVWR; same for FMVSS 303.
    \42\ See 49 CFR 571.208 S 4.2.6.2.
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    Second, many of the lighter multistage vehicles, with a GVWR of 
10,000 lbs or less, are often built on chassis-cabs. A chassis-cab is 
an incomplete vehicle, with a completed occupant compartment, that 
requires only the addition of cargo-carrying, work-performing, or load-
bearing components to perform its intended function.\43\ Multistage 
vehicles built on chassis-cabs resemble pickup trucks, except that 
behind the cab there is another structure instead of a pickup box.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ 49 CFR 567.3 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA recognizes that

chassis-cabs are the most ``evolved'' of the incomplete vehicle 
types (followed, in descending order, by cutaways, chassis cowls and 
stripped chassis). Likewise, it is undoubtedly true that the 
conformity statements provided by incomplete vehicle manufacturers 
give final-stage manufacturers more pass-through opportunities \44\ 
on chassis-cabs than on other types of incomplete vehicles.\45\
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    \44\ NTEA's footnote stated in pertinent part ``Under existing 
regulations, there is no pass-through certification available for 
incomplete vehicles other than chassis-cabs.''
    \45\ Petition at 5.

Nevertheless, NTEA does not temper its sweeping assertions or make any 
allowance for the multistage vehicles that are built on chassis-cabs 
and thus have more complete IVDs with (to use NTEA's words) more pass-
through opportunities. It is easier for final-stage vehicle 
manufacturers to certify these vehicles in view of the scope of the 
IVDs.
6. The Existing IVDs Are Workable
    One of the principal pillars on which the NTEA petition rests is 
the contention that incomplete vehicle manufacturers presently provide 
subsequent stage manufacturers with no meaningful compliance envelope, 
even on chassis-cabs, for numerous dynamic test standards. As 
previously noted, NTEA surmised that incomplete vehicle manufacturers 
have an incentive to make the compliance envelope as narrow as possible 
or nonexistent to avoid taking on liability and the need to expend 
resources on testing to determine the proper parameters of such 
certification. NTEA appended a GM CK Chassis-Cab IVD to its petition, 
and cited the IVD in many instances as an example of purported 
deficiencies in IVDs generally. To assess the validity of these 
contentions, the agency carefully examined the certification statements 
in the GM IVD that NTEA identified as inadequate. Our findings are set 
forth below, individually addressing each standard that was the subject 
of this inquiry.\46\
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    \46\ Our discussion of the FMVSS in this document is not 
intended to be comprehensive. The reader is referred to the standard 
itself and associated Federal Register documents for a full 
description of each standard discussed.
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a. FMVSS 105 Hydraulic and Electric Brake Systems and FMVSS 135 Light 
Vehicle Brake Systems
    NTEA contends that the GM IVD, as it pertains to FMVSS 105 
Hydraulic and Electric Brake Systems and 135 Light Vehicle Brake 
Systems, provides no meaningful pass-through certification 
opportunities because the compliance envelopes are non-existent. FMVSS 
105 and 135 specify performance requirements for hydraulic and electric 
brake systems. FMVSS 135 applies to vehicles with a GVWR of 3,500 kg/ 
7,716 lbs and less; FMVSS 105 applies to vehicles with a GVWR greater 
than 3,500kg/7,716 lbs.\47\ These standards include stopping distance 
requirements, as well as requirements for parking brakes and warning 
indicators.
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    \47\ Under NHTSA's regulations at 49 CFR 567.4(g)(3), the 
manufacturer must specify on a vehicle's certification label the 
vehicle's ``Gross Vehicle Weight Rating'' or ``GVWR.'' The 
regulation provides that the value specified ``shall not be less 
than the sum of the unloaded vehicle weight, rated cargo load, and 
150 pounds times the vehicle's designated seating capacity [except 
that] for school buses the minimum occupant weight allowance shall 
be 120 pounds.'' The requirement for stating the GVWR is intended to 
inform the operator of the extent to which the vehicle can be safely 
loaded.
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    Incomplete vehicles have functioning braking systems.\48\ The GM 
IVD provides pass-through certification for both FMVSS 105 and 135 if 
the final-stage manufacturer adheres to certain requirements. 
Specifically, the GM IVD states that: (1) Alterations by the final-
stage manufacturer may not affect the function, properties, location or 
vital special clearances of the brake system on the chassis installed 
by GM; (2) the completed vehicle must not exceed the GVWR and gross 
axle weight ratings (GAWR) \49\ front and rear specified by GM for the 
incomplete vehicle; and (3) the center of gravity of the final vehicle 
must fall within the bounds of the center of gravity chart in the 
IVD.\50\
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    \48\ See 49 CFR 567.3 (definition of incomplete vehicle) (2006).
    \49\ GAWR means the value specified by the vehicle manufacturer 
as the load-carrying capacity of a single axle system.
    \50\ GM IVD, attached to Petition, at 8-12, 16-19.
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    In addition to the IVD, GM's Web site http://www.gmupfitter.com, 
contains publications including ``Body Builder's Manuals'' and ``Best 
Practices Manuals.'' The Body Builder's Manual for each model (e.g., CK 
full-size pickups) provides information and instructions about the 
incomplete vehicle that can be used by final-stage manufacturers to 
design the second body unit. As specified in the manual's introduction, 
GM's Best Practices Manuals are intended for use by RV, truck, and 
commercial upfitters in converting and completing incomplete vehicles. 
In general, the information in the Best Practices Manual describes how 
to install the body onto the incomplete vehicle, including clearances 
between the chassis and the body that must be assured.
    The GM IVD is workable and final-stage manufacturers can construct 
a vehicle that adheres to the instructions in the IVD and therefore 
carries pass-through certification for FMVSS 105 and 135. To begin, 
GM's requirement that the final-stage manufacturer not alter the 
incomplete vehicle in such a way that it changes the function, 
properties, location or vital spatial clearances of the brake system 
components \51\ is workable. It is common sense that GM would provide 
pass-through certification with limitations on the retention of the 
integrity of the brake system and that GM would not provide pass-
through certification if a final-stage manufacturer made alterations to 
the brake system. Beyond not changing the brake system, a final-stage 
manufacturer also must not add equipment that impinges on vital spatial 
clearances of the system. In this regard, GM has provided guidance to 
upfitters. GM's Best Practices Manual states: ``provide at least 2 
inches clearance between body- or chassis-mounted components and brake 
hoses.'' GM's Body Builder's Manual reinforces the clearance check for 
brake hoses to include brake hose travel with the vehicle's suspension. 
The Best Practices Manual includes requirements for a 0.7 inch minimum 
clearance between a brake line and moving components, and 0.5 inch 
minimum clearance between a brake line and vibrating components. These 
instructions by GM provide a final-stage manufacturer with ample 
information to

[[Page 28178]]

work within the limits of the pass-through certification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ GM IVD at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, GM's IVD contains a restriction on the completed vehicle's 
GVWR and GAWRs. The principle that brake systems are designed for 
limited weight ranges is basic and widely accepted. The GM IVD states 
that the GVWR and front and rear GAWRs identified on the incomplete 
vehicle label cannot be exceeded. If the final-stage manufacturer 
assigns a higher GVWR and changes or increases the GAWRs, or if the 
completed vehicle, when loaded according to the manufacturer's 
recommendations, exceeds its GVWR or a GAWR, the vehicle may not meet 
stopping distance requirements. Viewed in light of the IVD, the vehicle 
will be overloaded (in the colloquial sense of that term) and GM should 
not be held responsible.
    The final-stage manufacturer can determine whether the GVWR or 
GAWRs assigned by the incomplete vehicle manufacturer have been 
exceeded either by weighing the vehicle when fully manufactured or by 
using engineering analysis and aggregating the weights of the 
components it adds to the vehicle, which often may be obtained from 
equipment suppliers, coupled with estimates of further loadings by the 
user. A key concern for the final-stage manufacturer in complying with 
this portion of the IVD is to use an appropriate incomplete vehicle 
(chassis) for the multistage vehicle it is producing, as is addressed 
more fully in other sections of this preamble. The final-stage 
manufacturer cannot fairly use a chassis designed for lighter duty than 
that intended for the ultimate application and then assert that the 
incomplete vehicle manufacturer is responsible for the completed 
vehicle's shortcomings. So long as the final-stage manufacturer uses an 
appropriate chassis, it will be able to comply with this aspect of the 
IVD.\52\
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    \52\ NTEA's own documents recognize this. An NTEA handout from 
the 2006 Design Show states: ``Before ordering a chassis, make sure 
it can be upfitted as intended.'' See Johnson, Robert, Design and 
Specifications for Vocational Vehicles; a Functional Approach, in 
NHTSA Docket No. NHTSA-99-5673.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the center of gravity of the vehicle must fall within the 
areas set forth in the GM IVD. The IVD contains a formula to calculate 
the approximate center of gravity location in a vehicle.\53\ The IVD 
also contains a chart that lists the different vehicle types and the 
coordinates of allowable centers of gravity for the completed vehicle. 
There is no question that center of gravity is a fundamental concept, 
and that the final-stage manufacturer could complete a vehicle in a way 
that has a problematic center of gravity. There are ample resources 
beyond the IVD itself to aid final-stage manufacturers in making the 
correct center of gravity calculations. In fact, NTEA's own Web site 
includes products for calculating the center of gravity, including off-
the-shelf computer programs to perform the calculations.\54\ NTEA also 
conducts workshops on performing the center of gravity calculations and 
selecting the right chassis.\55\ NTEA has not shown that the centers of 
gravity for GM's vehicles are unreasonable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ GM IVD at 9.
    \54\ See, e.g., http://www.ntea.com/tr/techtalk_detail.asp?DOC_ID=101120; http://www.ntea.com/im/prod_detail.asp?prod_id=1.
    \55\ http://www.trailer-bodybuilders.com/mag/trucks_back_basicshow_match/index.html. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of the foregoing, the GM IVD is reasonable with regard to 
FMVSS 105 and 135. It would be manifestly unreasonable to expect an 
incomplete vehicle manufacturer to provide a ``blank check'' pass-
through certification on FMVSS 105 or 135 without providing limitations 
on the final-stage manufacturer to protect the integrity of the brake 
system and to ensure that the vehicles are not overloaded in the 
colloquial sense and have an appropriate center of gravity height. NTEA 
did not provide any information to support a contrary conclusion.
b. FMVSS 204 Impact Protection for the Driver From the Steering Control 
System
    NTEA also complains about the pass-through certification in the GM 
IVD pertaining to FMVSS 204 Impact Protection for the Driver from the 
Steering Control System. FMVSS 204 regulates the rearward displacement 
of the steering control to reduce the likelihood of chest, neck, or 
head injury to the driver in the event of a front impact. The standard 
has limited application in the multistage vehicle context because it 
does not apply to vehicles with an unloaded vehicle weight greater than 
2495 kg (5,500 lbs) or a GVWR of more than 4536 kg (10,000 lbs) and 
most multistage vehicles exceed one or both of these weights. FMVSS 204 
establishes a maximum displacement of the steering column and shaft in 
a 48 km/hr (30 mph) crash test into a fixed concrete barrier.
    The GM IVD provides pass-through certification for FMVSS 204 for 
vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs or less and an unloaded vehicle 
weight of 5,500 lbs or less, which corresponds to the applicable 
weights in FMVSS 204, provided that the maximum unloaded vehicle weight 
is not exceeded and no alterations are made to affect the properties, 
location, or vital spatial clearances of the steering control system 
and the frontal systems such as the frame, hood and powertrain, which 
often bear the brunt of a frontal crash. The IVD provides no pass-
through certification for incomplete vehicles purchased with any bumper 
delete option.
    The weight restrictions in the IVD are logical and consistent with 
the realities of a crash. In a crash, the energy of the moving 
vehicle(s) is dissipated and the metal in the vehicle is displaced and 
crumples. The energy that is dissipated is a function of the mass of 
the vehicle and its speed. The incomplete vehicle manufacturer can 
design a vehicle that will withstand a frontal crash of a certain 
intensity such that the steering wheel is not displaced beyond 
allowances in FMVSS 204. If the vehicle, as completed and loaded, 
exceeds the maximum weight for which the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer provided pass-through certification (usually based on a 
crash test the incomplete vehicle manufacturer performed), it would not 
be reasonable to expect the certification to apply because in a crash 
the excess vehicle weight could cause greater front-end displacement 
than contemplated in the design of the incomplete vehicle and the 
steering control mechanisms would therefore be displaced further into 
the passenger compartment. The final-stage manufacturer can readily 
work within weight requirements by taking care to purchase the 
appropriate incomplete vehicle chassis for the use to which the vehicle 
will be put.
    Similarly, the restrictions in the GM IVD on alterations that 
interfere with the integrity of the frontal vehicle systems and 
steering system are logical and consistent with the realities of a 
crash. In a crash, the energy of the vehicle is, in lay terms, absorbed 
by various vehicle systems, including the bumper, front sheet metal, 
hood and fenders, and drive train. Because the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer designs vehicle parts to be displaced and crumple in order 
to absorb the energy of the crash, actions by the final-stage 
manufacturer that modify the incomplete vehicle manufacturers' frontal 
design could reduce vehicle's crashworthiness such that the steering 
wheel is displaced beyond allowances in FMVSS 204. The final-stage 
manufacturer could readily satisfy the conditions of the IVD by not 
modifying the front or engine compartment of the chassis-cab.
    Finally, the absence of pass-through certification on incomplete 
vehicles

[[Page 28179]]

purchased with the ``bumper delete'' option is logical. If a final-
stage manufacturer purchases a chassis without a front bumper, it is 
reasonable to expect that there will not be a pass-through 
certification for FMVSS 204 because the bumper is an integral component 
of the front end. In all likelihood, GM based the IVD's pass-through 
certification on a vehicle with a bumper. Moreover, to satisfy State 
inspection requirements for bumpers, it is likely that a bumper of some 
form will be added, which further alters the vehicle's crash 
performance. GM cannot be expected to provide any certification of 
front impact crash test standards in such a circumstance because it 
does not know what, if any, bumper the final-stage manufacturer will 
install. If the final-stage manufacturer seeks front impact crash test 
standard compliance, it can purchase an incomplete vehicle with a front 
bumper, and obtain the workable pass-through certification described 
above.
c. FMVSS 201 Occupant Protection in Interior Impact
    NTEA contends that the GM IVD does not provide a compliance 
envelope for compliance with FMVSS 201 Occupant Protection in Interior 
Impact. In general, FMVSS 201 is concerned with head impacts on 
interior surfaces of the vehicle. FMVSS 201 includes standards for 
lower areas, such as the instrument panel, and for upper areas, such as 
the headliner and upper trim. Testing is done with headforms that 
impact various interior areas when the vehicle is stationary. Single 
stage vehicle manufacturers routinely comply with FMVSS 201 by 
installing padding and energy absorbing trim on instrument panels and 
other areas of the vehicle. The standard has limited application in the 
multistage vehicle context because it does not apply, among others, to 
vehicles with a GVWR of more than 4536 kg (10,000 lbs).
    The GM IVD provides vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs or less with 
pass-through certification for FMVSS 201, which corresponds to the 
FMVSS, provided that no alterations are made that affect the function, 
properties, location or vital spatial clearances of various interior 
components including the air bag system, armrests, headliner, 
instrument panel, interior compartment doors, seats, seat backs and 
head restraints, sun visors and upper interior trim. The IVD provides 
no pass-through certification for incomplete vehicles purchased with 
any seat delete option.
    The restrictions in the IVD are logical and consistent with 
Standard 201. In essence, if the final-stage manufacturer does not 
modify the interior of the chassis-cab, it obtains pass-through 
certification. If it modifies the vehicle, such as by removing padding 
or by adding its own protruding equipment with sharp edges, it does not 
obtain the benefit of pass-through certification. This is reasonable. 
Modifications to the interior of the vehicle may affect the intensity 
of the impact as measured by the regulatory headform.
    Second, with regard to the seat delete option, under FMVSS 201, 
tests are performed from various reference points. One is the seating 
reference point.\56\ In all likelihood, GM based the IVD's pass-through 
certification on a vehicle with a standard GM seat and reference points 
associated with its seat. If a seat other than one supplied by GM with 
the vehicle were used (seat delete option) those reference points would 
no longer apply, and it would at the very least be questionable whether 
the certification would be valid. It would not be reasonable to expect 
GM to provide pass-through certification for vehicles with different 
seats and associated reference points from which to gauge regulatory 
compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See 49 CFR 571.201 S8.12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final-stage manufacturers can readily work within the GM IVD by 
purchasing a vehicle with the GM seat and by not modifying the interior 
of the vehicle.\57\ NTEA did not provide data showing otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ It also is readily possible to add some controls. The 
final-stage manufacturer can use equipment switches from GM that 
come with GM packages, install controls in an area essentially not 
regulated by FMVSS 201, or use umbilical cable controls so that 
mounting controls inside the vehicle is avoided altogether. For 
example, the GM Body Builder's Manual, Special Applications section 
for snow plow prep, explains how to install a roof-mounted emergency 
light and switch. On pages 3, 5, and 7 of the manual, option code 
TRW Provision for Roof-Mounted Emergency Light is identified and on 
pages 15-17 the installation is explained. A final-stage 
manufacturer would be able to install a roof-mounted light using 
factory-installed components (with the purchase of the optional 
equipment package from GM), without the need to conduct headform 
tests for FMVSS 201 compliance. The GM Best Practices and the 
Special Applications manuals describe how final-stage manufacturers 
can add driver convenience optional equipment, such as switches and 
controls for equipment mounted on the vehicle, including snow plows. 
Further, installation of other controls can be accomplished by 
mounting the controls beneath the instrument panel, so that they 
fall outside of the target areas in the regulation. The agency also 
reviewed control systems available from a snow plow supplier, Myer. 
That company offers plow controls attached to an umbilical cord so 
that the driver may operate the plow using a hand-held controller. 
This type of arrangement eliminates the need to install the controls 
on or near the instrument panel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. FMVSS 212 Windshield Mounting
    NTEA levels similar criticisms at the GM IVD's treatment of FMVSS 
212 Windshield Mounting. The standard provides for windshield retention 
in the event of a crash, thus enabling occupants to take advantage of 
the penetration-resistance and injury-avoidance properties of the 
windshield materials and preventing ejection of occupants from the 
vehicle. The standard requires the retention of a minimum portion of 
the windshield periphery in a front-impact crash test using dummies 
with the vehicle restraint systems engaged. The portion of the 
windshield periphery that must be retained varies depending on whether 
the vehicle is equipped with passive restraints. The standard has 
limited application in the multistage vehicle context because it does 
not apply, among others, to vehicles with a GVWR of more than 4536 kg 
(10,000 lbs).
    The GM IVD states that all vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs or 
less will conform to FMVSS 212 if (1) no alterations are made that 
affect the function, properties, location or vital spatial clearances 
of the components, assemblies or systems of various vehicle parts, 
including the air bag system, seats, seat belts (including anchorages), 
frame, hood, powertrain, front impact bar assembly, steering control 
system, sun visor assemblies, and the windshield system; (2) the 
completed vehicle does not exceed a specified weight, center of gravity 
height, and vehicle height (See Table A, p.28); (3) the clearance 
between the rear-most part of the cab and the added body does not 
exceed the minimum distance specified (3 inches); (4) the vertical 
clearance between the cab roof and any added body parts or accessories 
extending over the roof is not less than 8 inches; and (5) during a 
frontal barrier impact test, no component installed moves forward from 
its permanently mounted position.
    The GM IVD does not provide pass-through certification if the 
final-stage manufacturer modifies various parts of the vehicle, 
including the front of the vehicle, that may be impacted and absorb 
some of the crash energy, as well as the seat belts and the air bags. 
As NHTSA has noted in a crashworthiness context, a vehicle is a system 
comprised of various parts. In a crash, the items of equipment 
identified in the IVD individually and collectively may prevent the 
occupants, as represented by crash dummies, from making contact with 
the windshield or may affect the intensity of their impact. The 
windshield and associated attachment mechanisms would affect the 
retention of the windshield periphery. It is understandable that the 
IVD's pass-through certification for a standard

[[Page 28180]]

involving windshields would not apply if the final-stage manufacturer 
makes alterations that could increase the likelihood that occupants 
would contact the windshield, increase the force with which they would 
impact the windshield, or affect the windshield itself. NTEA provided 
no data or other specific information on why final-stage manufacturers 
are not able to meet these provisions of the IVD in order to obtain 
pass-through certification when upfitting a chassis-cab.
    GM's IVD also contains weight, center of gravity height, and 
vehicle height limitations relating to the body or equipment installed. 
These parameters affect the vehicle's performance in a crash. This in 
turn affects windshield retention. The IVD also includes clearance 
requirements (3 inches) between the rear part of the cab and the body 
added by the final-stage manufacturer, and minimum vertical clearances 
between the cab roof and any portion of the installed body that extends 
over the cab roof. These take into account flexing and movement of the 
body in a crash. These clearance requirements preserve the integrity of 
the cab, which in turn supports the windshield. Final-stage 
manufacturers can refer to GM's Best Practices Manual for additional 
information regarding mounting a service body to a chassis-cab. The 
manual includes a section entitled ``NTEA Recommended Body-Mounting 
Practices.''
    In addition, the IVD provides that no component installed by the 
final-stage manufacturer shall move forward from its permanently 
mounted position in a 30 mph crash. The rational relationship between 
this requirement and pass-through certification for FMVSS 212 is 
plain--the body added by the final-stage manufacturer must be well 
secured to the chassis. Movement poses a direct threat to the integrity 
of the cab and, in turn, the windshield, and could lead to separation 
of more than the allowed portion of the windshield in a crash. There is 
considerable available information on securing bodies from both GM and 
NTEA. NTEA's assertion that GM's requirement can only be verified by 
the performance of a completed vehicle in a dynamic test is incorrect. 
Engineering judgments may be used. For example, if the final-stage 
manufacturer mounted a body on the chassis (within weight, center of 
gravity, and height limitations) and followed the detailed instructions 
provided in the GM Best Practices Manual for mounting bodies, the 
final-stage manufacturer could reasonably judge that the body would not 
move forward.
    The GM IVD is workable insofar as it concerns FMVSS 212. NTEA 
members can take full advantage of its statement if they do not modify 
the front of the vehicle or the cab, they meet weight, center of 
gravity height, body height and clearance requirements, and they 
properly secure the body to the chassis. If based on the final-stage 
manufacturer's modifications and additions to the chassis, the 
completed vehicle does not conform to the IVD, there would be an 
increased likelihood that FMVSS 212 would not be met. That risk 
properly rests on the final-stage manufacturer.
e. FMVSS 219 Windshield Zone Intrusion
    FMVSS 219 Windshield Zone Intrusion sets forth limits for the 
displacement of motor vehicle components into the windshield area 
during a crash. In general, the standard requires that in a forward 
crash up to and including 48 km/hr (30 mph), no part of the vehicle 
outside the occupant compartment, with the exception of windshield 
molding or other materials already in contact with the windshield, may 
penetrate the delineated protective zone by more than 6 mm or penetrate 
the inner surface of the windshield within that zone at all. The 
standard has limited application within the multistage vehicle arena 
because it does not apply to vehicles with a GVWR of more than 4536 kg 
(10,000 lbs). It also does not apply to certain types of vehicles such 
as walk-in vans.
    The GM IVD states that the vehicle will have pass-through 
certification for FMVSS 219 provided that (1) no alterations are made 
to the properties, location or vital spatial clearances of various 
components, including antennae, body roof, sheet metal and structural 
components, hood mounts and assemblies, motor compartment structure, 
and windshield wipers; (2) the vehicle does not exceed a specified 
unloaded weight; and (3) during a 30 mph test, no component installed 
by the final-stage manufacturer prevents the hood from folding in its 
designed folding pattern or penetrates the windshield or protected 
zone.
    The limitation in the IVD on alterations of certain components is 
logical and based on the reality that in a frontal crash, sheet metal 
is pushed backward. The IVD basically prohibits final-stage 
manufacturers from altering the components of the incomplete vehicle 
that could penetrate or contribute to the penetration of the windshield 
in a frontal crash, including the hood and windshield wipers. The 
incomplete vehicle manufacturer engineers these components to comply 
with FMVSS 219. It would be unreasonable to expect an incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer to provide pass-through certification to this 
standard that allows the final-stage manufacturer to override the 
incomplete vehicle manufacturer's engineering. The final-stage 
manufacturer could easily work within these limitations by not altering 
the completed portion of the vehicle.
    As discussed elsewhere in this document, the mass of a completed 
vehicle affects its performance in a crash. It is not unreasonable for 
GM to include a weight limitation in the IVD. A final-stage 
manufacturer can take advantage of pass-through certification with 
respect to this provision of the IVD by installing equipment such that 
the weight of the vehicle does not exceed GM's limitations.
    The final portion of the limitations in the IVD specifies that 
components added by the final-stage manufacturer cannot make the hood 
crumple differently in a crash test or penetrate the protected zone in 
a crash test. NTEA contends that this necessitates the final-stage 
manufacturers' conducting a crash test. This is not true. Final-stage 
manufacturers can make reasonable judgments without performing a crash 
test. For example, in many instances such as in assembly of a work 
truck, final-stage manufacturers do not install anything in front of a 
clearance zone behind the rear wall of the cab.\58\ They could make 
objective good-faith judgments that if they do not install anything 
there, the hood will fold properly and will not penetrate the 
windshield in a frontal crash test. Also, if they wish to install 
equipment, they could install an equipment package designed for the 
vehicle, such as a GM snow plow package, in front of the front bumper.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See GM Best Practices Manual at 21-31 of the GM Best 
Practices manual for body mounting guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA expresses concerns about provisions in the IVD on the folding 
pattern of the hood. To comply with FMVSS 219, the hoods on vehicles 
fold so that in a crash they do not slice through the windshield. NTEA 
observes that final-stage manufacturers do not have any information 
regarding the hood folding pattern for GM C/K platform trucks. 
Ordinarily, they do not need such information because they can use 
their judgment when building trucks with nothing added forward of the 
rear wall of the cab. In any event, GM's 2006 Light Duty Manual for C/K 
Full Size Trucks, Pickups and Chassis-Cabs, found on the GM Upfitter 
Web

[[Page 28181]]

site, contains a drawing of the hood inner panel that shows the folding 
points of the hood.\59\ These are the points provided in the hood inner 
panel that result in the hood folding pattern. As is discussed 
elsewhere, if a final-stage manufacturer has additional questions after 
consulting the manual, GM provides a telephone number for contacting 
its engineering staff. These numbers are found throughout all of the 
final-stage manufacturer body builder manuals available from the GM 
Upfitters website, and throughout the CK IVD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ This is located about midway along the longitudinal 
centerline of the hood. See GM Light Duty Manual at 86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency also tests vehicles and makes information from those 
tests available. NHTSA's Safer Car Web site contains photograph of a 4-
door Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck (that is in the GM CK vehicle 
line to which the IVD under discussion belongs) \60\ during a New Car 
Assessment Program (NCAP) frontal barrier test. This photograph shows 
that the hood folds upwards from the engine compartment with the fold 
line at the transverse midpoint of the hood. The photograph also shows 
that the hood remains attached to the hinges and cowl structure, which 
are areas that are not to be modified per the IVD for pass-through 
certification.
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    \60\ See http://www.safercar.gov/NCAP/Cars/3451.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The statements in GM's IVD pertaining to FMVSS 219 are workable. It 
is not reasonable to expect GM to provide pass-through certification 
for equipment added by the final-stage manufacturer that could go 
through the windshield or impair the folding pattern of the hood.
f. FMVSS 214 Side Impact Protection
    NTEA also contends there is no meaningful pass-through opportunity 
for FMVSS 214 Side Impact Protection. FMVSS 214 sets forth performance 
requirements for the protection of vehicle occupants in a side impact 
crash. In general, FMVSS 214 contains two sets of requirements. In one, 
vehicles must satisfy crush resistance requirements that apply in the 
area of the door(s) in a static test. These requirements are applicable 
to trucks, multipurpose passenger vehicles and buses with a GVWR of 
10,000 lbs or less except for walk-in vans. In the other, vehicles must 
meet dynamic performance requirements when impacted by a moving 
deformable barrier. Performance is measured on test dummies seated in 
the vehicle. The dynamic performance requirements have limited 
application in the multistage vehicle context. Specifically, they do 
not apply to multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a 
GVWR of more than 6,000 lbs or to walk-in vans, motor homes, tow 
trucks, dump trucks, ambulances, fire trucks, vehicles equipped with 
wheelchair lifts, and other specified vehicles.
    The GM IVD provides pass-through certification to vehicles with a 
GVWR of 4536 kg (10,000 lbs) or less for requirements based on the 
static test and 2722 kg (6,000 lbs) or less for dynamic requirements. 
The IVD states the vehicle will comply with the requirements of FMVSS 
214 as long as no alterations are made that affect the properties, 
environment, or vital spatial clearances of various components and 
systems in the vehicle, including the air bag system, the door 
assemblies, hinges, and latches, the door pillars, and the seat and 
seat belt anchorages and assemblies.
    The GM IVD is workable insofar as it concerns FMVSS 214. GM has 
designed vehicles, including the doors and associated structural 
members, such as pillars, to withstand various forces applied to the 
side of the vehicle. Ordinarily, GM would have tested the side of a 
single stage pickup truck. Vehicles completed from a chassis-cab 
incomplete vehicle have door support structures and doors that are 
identical to a single stage pickup truck. Unless the final-stage 
manufacturer makes alterations to the door-related structures and parts 
enumerated in the IVD, pass-through certification should be available.
    It would be unreasonable to expect GM or any other incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer to provide pass-through certification with FMVSS 
214, which is directly contingent on the engineering and performance of 
the systems set forth in the IVD, without a limitation on alteration of 
those systems. Moreover, if a final-stage manufacturer replaces the 
seats in the incomplete vehicle, the new seats may be in a different 
location or result in different acceleration measurements on the test 
dummy. A final-stage manufacturer can readily mount a body onto an 
incomplete GM vehicle without making modifications that would place it 
outside the pass-through certification provisions of GM's IVD.
g. FMVSS 208 Occupant Crash Protection
    NTEA also complains about the pass-through certification in the GM 
IVD pertaining to FMVSS 208, Occupant Crash Protection. FMVSS 208 
specifies vehicle crashworthiness requirements in terms of forces and 
accelerations measured on dummies in test crashes and by specifying 
equipment requirements for active and passive restraints, such as seat 
belts and air bags. There are more substantial requirements related to 
the front seating positions than the rear seating positions of covered 
vehicles. The standard has limited application in the multistage 
vehicle context because various requirements such as those involving 
air bags do not apply to heavier vehicles.\61\
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    \61\ For FMVSS 208, the requirements related to dummy 
performance in a frontal impact do not apply to vehicles with a GVWR 
greater than 8,500 lbs or an unloaded vehicle weight greater than 
5,500 lbs. In an informal review, NGTSA staff noted that the 
majority of the multistage vehicles observed at dealerships had a 
GVWR of 8,600 lbs and greater.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The GM IVD provides pass-through certification for FMVSS 208 for 
vehicles with a GVWR of 3,588 kg (8,500 lbs) or less provided that the 
maximum unloaded vehicle weight specified by GM is not exceeded and no 
alterations are made that affect the properties, location, or vital 
spatial clearances of various components, including the number, 
location and configuration of designated seating positions and seat 
belt assemblies, the instrument panel, steering wheel, air bag modules 
and coverings, the Sensor Diagnostic Module (which is involved in 
triggering air bag deployment) and associated wiring, air bag labels, 
the vehicle frame and structural members, sheet metal, and the engine 
compartment, that would result in a difference in the modified 
vehicle's deceleration if it were subject to barrier impact tests under 
FMVSS 208.
    FMVSS 208 is a complicated crashworthiness standard, and a summary 
of the standard is beyond the scope of this notice. As NHTSA has 
pointed out in the FMVSS 208 rulemaking context, a vehicle is a system. 
That system provides protection with respect to two crashes, the crash 
of the vehicle into another vehicle or object, and the ensuing crash of 
the occupants or their surrogate test dummies into one or more parts of 
the vehicle. In the course of the crash, various parts of the vehicle 
and its restraint systems (seat belts and air bags) mitigate forces and 
accelerations on the occupants. In crash tests, dummies are placed in 
seated positions, the vehicle impacts a barrier and decelerates from a 
test speed (e.g., 30 mph) to largely a stop in considerably less than a 
second, and the test dummies move forward following the impact of the 
vehicle with the barrier. The dummies are used to measure the impacts. 
The person

[[Page 28182]]

conducting the tests compares the test results to requirements in the 
NHTSA standard.
    The restrictions in GM's Type 1 IVD are logical and consistent with 
a systematic approach to occupant crash protection employed by 
manufacturers. GM's first restriction is on unloaded vehicle weight and 
GVWR. As discussed in the context of other standards, vehicle weight is 
an essential component of crashworthiness standard certification. If 
the vehicle, as completed and loaded, exceeds the maximum weight for 
which the incomplete vehicle manufacturer provided pass-through 
certification (usually based on a crash test the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer performed), it would not be reasonable to expect the 
certification to apply because the excess vehicle weight could cause 
different and excessive forces and accelerations on crash dummies. The 
final-stage manufacturer can readily work within weight requirements by 
taking care to purchase the appropriate incomplete vehicle chassis for 
the use to which the vehicle will be put.
    The restrictions in the GM IVD on alterations that interfere with 
the seating positions, seat belts, instrument panel and air bags, SDM, 
and vehicle frame and body in a way that would result in a difference 
from the modified vehicle's deceleration if it were subjected to a 
FMVSS 208 barrier test are not unreasonable. To begin, in all 
likelihood, GM provided pass-through certification based on tests 
performed on a pickup truck with stock GM seats and dummies in seating 
positions specified by FMVSS 208. If the seating positions were 
different, the test results as recorded on dummies likely would be 
different. GM could not be held to anticipate performance, as measured 
on dummies, in these circumstances.
    Next, some tests are conducted with dummies restrained by GM seat 
belts. GM would not provide pass-through certification for other, 
unknown belts. Other requirements relate to the air bags and their 
control unit. GM could not be expected to provide pass-through 
certification if the final-stage manufacturer modified these items.
    Finally, the IVD provides that various structural and sheet metal 
components cannot be modified if the modifications would result in a 
difference in the modified vehicle's deceleration in a barrier test 
under FMVSS 208. A basic concept in designing vehicles is to design 
vehicle structures that minimize the amount of injury-causing crash 
energy that reaches the occupants. To accomplish this, in part, 
manufacturers design into the vehicle structural zones that collapse 
and absorb crash energy. A crashworthy vehicle is designed to deform 
according to a deceleration-time response, or crash pulse. These vary 
among vehicles. The frontal structure largely controls the deceleration 
pulse. Ultimately, the deceleration response of the vehicle affects the 
response experienced by the test dummies, as gauged by regulatory 
injury criteria such as the thoracic acceleration of a test dummy. 
Modifications by a final-stage manufacturer to the frame, sheet metal 
and other components identified in GM's IVD may change the vehicle's 
deceleration and its performance in a crash test, including 
measurements on test dummies. GM could not reasonably be expected to 
assume certification responsibility in these circumstances. But the 
final-stage manufacturer could readily satisfy the conditions of the 
IVD by not modifying the identified components of the incomplete 
vehicle when it adds equipment to the chassis of the vehicle.
    GM's IVD also addresses rear seating positions. It states, in 
essence, that for pass-through certification, there shall be no changes 
to the designated seating positions or seat belt assemblies. FMVSS 208 
requires seat belts at designated seating positions and the belts must 
meet specified standards. A change in the vehicle or its seat belts 
could render the vehicle noncompliant. Most multistage vehicles do not 
have rear seats, but those that do, such as those having rear seats for 
crews, can readily meet IVD requirements by retaining original 
equipment such as rear seats and seat belts.
    The GM IVD provides pass-through certification for FMVSS 208 for 
vehicles with a GVWR of greater than 8,500 lbs or an unloaded vehicle 
weight of greater than 5,500 lbs. FMVSS 208 has fewer requirements for 
these heavier vehicles than for lighter vehicles. GM fairly provides 
pass-through certification for vehicles with complete seats and seat 
belt anchorages, assemblies and warning systems that the final-stage 
manufacturer does not modify. A modification by the final-stage 
manufacturer could result in a noncompliance. The final-stage 
manufacturer can readily meet these requirements for pass-through 
certification.
h. FMVSS 216 Roof Crush Resistance
    NTEA also contends that the GM IVD provides no meaningful pass-
through certification for FMVSS 216 Roof Crush Resistance. FMVSS 216 
establishes strength requirements for the passenger compartment roof. 
Vehicles subject to the standard must pass a static test in which a 
test device applies a force, based on the vehicle's unloaded vehicle 
weight, to either side of the forward edge of a vehicle's roof. The 
lower surface of the test device must not move more than a specified 
distance. The standard has limited applicability in the multistage 
context; it applies to passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, 
trucks, and buses with a GVWR of 2,722 kg (6,000 lbs) or less, a weight 
that is exceeded by many multistage vehicles. Additionally, the 
standard does not apply to school buses, which are subject to different 
standards.
    The GM IVD provides pass-through certification for incomplete 
vehicles with a GVWR of 2,722 kg (6,000 lbs) or less. The certification 
is conditioned on the final-stage manufacturer's making no alterations 
which affect the function, properties, or vital spatial clearances of 
various components and systems, including antennae, body roof 
structure, body sheet metal and structural components, windshield 
wipers, structural components and door assemblies.
    The alteration limitations on pass-through certification in the IVD 
are reasonable and logical in light of the function that the various 
components serve and the effect that their alteration would have on the 
roof crush capacity of the vehicle. Roof strength is dependent on 
structural members such as the vehicle's A pillars and B pillars and 
the roof itself. GM could not be expected to provide pass-through 
certification if the vehicle components that are related to roof crush 
resistance are modified. A final-stage manufacturer could readily 
complete a vehicle without breaching the limitations established in the 
IVD. As such, a final-stage manufacturer could complete a vehicle 
without having to conduct any tests of the roof.
i. FMVSS 301 Fuel System Integrity
    NTEA also contends that the GM IVD provides no meaningful pass-
through opportunity with regard to FMVSS 301 Fuel System Integrity. 
FMVSS 301 specifies requirements for the integrity of motor vehicle 
fuel systems. Its purpose is to reduce injuries from fires resulting 
from fuel spillage during and after motor vehicle crashes and injuries 
from ingestion of fuels during siphoning. The standard includes barrier 
testing. Tests under FMVSS 208 cover frontal barrier requirements under 
FMVSS 301. In addition, there are tests in which moving barriers impact 
the vehicle from the side and from the rear. These tests are followed 
by a static roll-over test to determine whether any fuel leaks from the 
vehicle. The standard

[[Page 28183]]

contains various fuel spillage rates for different periods of time 
after the crash test. It also contains an anti-siphoning requirement. 
The standard has limited application in the multistage vehicle context 
because it applies only to vehicles with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,000 
lbs) or less and to school buses.
    The GM IVD provides that the incomplete vehicle, when completed, 
will comply with FMVSS 301 if (1) no alterations are made that affect 
the properties, environment or vital spatial clearance of certain 
components or systems, including the fuel system, the fuel tank 
assembly, the fuel tank filler neck/pipe assembly, and the fuel tank 
shields; (2) no alterations are made to the fuel system and attaching 
or protective structure, the body structure, the chassis structure, the 
tires and wheels; (3) the unloaded weight of the vehicle does not 
exceed the specified limits; (4) the final-stage manufacturer completes 
the fuel filler neck where applicable in accordance with provided 
instructions; and (5) during all barrier impact tests (a) no component 
installed by the final-stage manufacturer impinges or causes distortion 
to the fuel system in such a way that it punctures or separates the 
fuel system; (b) no vehicle modification results in any portion of the 
vehicle impinging upon or causing distortion to the fuel system in such 
a way that the system is punctured or separates; and (c) any body 
installed is mounted securely to absorb loads and prevent movement 
relative to the frame which would cause any fuel system component to be 
punctured, separated or damaged when tested to FMVSS 301.
    The GM IVD as it relates to FMVSS 301 is workable. The alteration 
limitations on pass-through certification in the IVD are reasonable and 
logical in light of the fact that the systems and components are part 
of the fuel system. Because the standard regulates the integrity of the 
fuel system, it is logical that GM would provide pass-through 
certification for FMVSS 301 only so long as the fuel system is not 
altered. The GM IVD further limits pass-through certification if 
alterations are made to the attaching or protective structure, the body 
or chassis structure of the incomplete vehicle, or to the tires and 
wheels on the incomplete vehicle. These provisions are logical as well. 
Many fuel system parts are located inside structural components of the 
vehicle. If the structure is altered, in a crash, the resulting 
structure might no longer adequately protect the fuel system or the 
alterations themselves could impact the fuel system components. The 
tires and wheels are important to clearances that preserve the 
integrity of the fuel system.
    GM's weight limitation, as discussed in the context of other 
standards, has a bearing on how the vehicle will withstand the effects 
of a crash. A final-stage manufacturer can ensure satisfaction of this 
portion of the IVD by assuring that the chassis to which it adds 
equipment is appropriate.
    The requirements regarding the installation of the fuel filler neck 
are likewise completely workable. Fuel filler necks need to be 
installed by final-stage manufacturers because they are not located in 
the cab. For illustration, in pickup trucks, they are located on the 
side of the vehicle, outside of the box. GM provides instructions with 
the fuel filler neck on how to install it, and provides pass-through 
certification only if the neck is installed in accordance with those 
instructions. Because the fuel filler neck is an essential component 
with respect to compliance with portions of FMVSS 301, it would be 
unreasonable to expect GM to provide pass-through certification for 
FMVSS 301 when a fuel filler neck is installed in a manner inconsistent 
with GM's instructions.
    The section of the IVD pertaining to the performance of components 
added by final-stage manufacturers in barrier impact tests is likewise 
reasonable. The IVD basically provides no pass-through certification 
for FMVSS 301 if components added by, modifications made by, or a body 
installed by the final-stage manufacturer will puncture or separate the 
fuel system in a barrier impact test. It would be unreasonable to 
expect GM to provide pass-through certification in these circumstances, 
given the uncertainties about what the final-stage manufacturer may add 
to the chassis. Moreover, these provisions of the IVD do not require 
final-stage manufacturers to conduct a barrier impact test. Instead, 
those manufacturers may exercise their own judgment.
    As professionals in their field and sometimes as specialists (such 
as school bus manufacturers), final-stage manufacturers should be 
familiar with various types of vehicle bodies that can be fitted to 
incomplete vehicles. The GM Chassis Upfitter guide provides clear 
guidance for final-stage manufacturers working around fuel system 
components and fuel lines. Among other things, the guide instructs 
final-stage manufacturers to provide a minimum clearance around the 
exhaust system or to install a protective metal shield around added 
components. The Upfitter guide also instructs final-stage manufacturers 
to avoid routing fuel lines around sharp objects and edges and to use 
metal clips with plastic lining to avoid damaging the fuel lines. The 
guide advises those manufacturers to leave a minimum clearance between 
the fuel tank and the body or supports and to direct bolts, screws and 
other potentially damaging objects away from the fuel tank.\62\ In 
addition, final-stage manufacturers can obtain further information from 
suppliers. Some equipment manufacturers market equipment as complying 
with FMVSS 301. For example, Knapheide specifies the use of body 
installation brackets, called ``Quick Mount brackets,'' that are 
designed to comply with FMVSS 301.\63\
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    \62\ See GM Best Practices Guide, available at http://www.gmupfitter.com/publicat/Best_Practices.pdf
    \63\ See http://www.knapheide.com/pdfpages/pricepages/servicebody/UBPP8.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Additional Resources Available to Final-Stage Manufacturers
    As a group, final-stage manufacturers do not operate in an 
informational vacuum. There are many resources available to them. In 
addition to the IVDs, these resources include upfitter guides from 
incomplete vehicle manufacturers, incomplete vehicle manufacturer help 
lines, the final-stage manufacturers' own experience and judgment, and 
commercially available software.
    The instructions and limitations in the IVDs themselves provide 
information to final-stage manufacturers. For example, in order to 
provide instructions to final-stage manufacturers, incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers sometimes limit the types of vehicles into which the 
incomplete vehicle may be completed. Some incomplete vehicles may be 
completed as buses but not as school buses. School buses are required 
to meet some FMVSS that apply only to them (e.g., FMVSS 131, 220, 221); 
other FMVSS have additional school bus requirements.
    Additionally, a number of incomplete vehicle manufacturers provide 
guides known as upfitter guides or body builder guides, which include 
information that facilitates the completion of the vehicle. Some 
incomplete vehicle manufacturers, such as General Motors, also have 
hotlines staffed with engineers who can answer final-stage 
manufacturers' questions. These resources are discussed elsewhere in 
this notice.
    Final-stage manufacturers can also use their judgment, including 
engineering judgment, to certify vehicles. Testing, as provided in the 
FMVSS, is not required as a matter of

[[Page 28184]]

law to certify a vehicle.\64\ Instead, sound engineering judgment may 
be used.\65\ Many final-stage manufacturers bring considerable judgment 
to bear. They have been building and certifying vehicles for years. 
Final-stage manufacturers can and do use their base of experience in 
certifying vehicles as complying with the FMVSS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ This has been recognized in interpretations by NHTSA's 
Chief Counsel.
    \65\ Manufacturers of passenger cars and multipurpose passenger 
vehicles, among others, routinely conduct one or more tests to 
assure that a representative vehicle is compliant based on the test 
procedure in the FMVSS. For carryover vehicles, they may not conduct 
tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some final-stage vehicle manufacturers have a wealth of experience 
in various product lines. This includes buses, school buses and 
ambulances. They make a variety of models that have evolved over the 
years. The yellow school buses that one sees on the road are not novel, 
one-of-a-kind items.
    Other final-stage vehicles often are built on chassis-cabs or 
cutaways \66\ using equipment sold by specialized providers. The 
majority of work-type trucks with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs or less at new 
vehicle dealers are chassis-cabs with service bodies mounted to the 
chassis behind the cab, chassis-cabs with stake or dump bodies mounted 
to the frame behind the cab, and van cutaways with both service and 
cargo storage bodies mounted to the frame behind the van-body portion 
of the cutaway. The truck bodies have been manufactured by companies 
such as America's Body Company, Crysteel, Forest River, Knapheide, 
Monroe, Morgan, Stahl, Supreme and Unicell (collectively referred to as 
truck body manufacturers). In some cases, the truck body manufacturer 
completes the vehicle as a final-stage manufacturer. In other cases, 
the truck bodies are sold to a distributor who installs the body on the 
incomplete vehicle as a final-stage manufacturer. The availability of 
prefabricated vehicle body parts to complete chassis-cab and cutaway 
vehicles facilitates certification. NTEA is aware of these equipment 
companies and their products because NTEA annually runs the largest 
work truck show and many of these companies have booths at the NTEA 
show.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ A cutaway is similar to a chassis cab in that it contains 
the cab and ordinarily the seat supplied by the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer. For illustration purposes, it may be viewed as a van 
without any body structure rearward of the vehicle's B pillar 
(located slightly rearward of its front seating positions) There is 
no rear wall. Thus, the occupant compartment is essentially 
complete, surrounding the front seating positions but open to the 
rear.
    \67\ NTEA also holds educational sessions at the Work Truck 
Show. For example, at the March, 2006 Work Truck Show there was a 
session on Designs and Specifications for Vocational Vehicles--A 
Functional Approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many incomplete vehicles are completed as work-type vehicles by the 
addition of cargo-carrying, work-performing, or load-bearing 
components. For example, a typical beverage delivery truck is a vehicle 
completed with a cargo-carrying component, and a dump truck is an 
example of a vehicle completed with a load-bearing component. These 
types of vehicles are generally produced by making the same kinds of 
additions to the incomplete vehicles, thus reducing the variation in 
the completion work the final-stage manufacturer must perform. The 
relatively routine nature of these types of variations creates a body 
of knowledge from which final-stage manufacturers can work. 
Manufacturer changes to work-truck vehicles are either infrequent or 
they represent product improvements.
    In addition, some of the equipment installed by final-stage 
manufacturers has been certified as complying with relevant FMVSS. Many 
final-stage manufacturers rely on that certification. The following 
components and systems are typically found on work-type vehicles 
manufactured in two or more stages (the associated FMVSS is stated in 
parenthesis): Brake hoses (FMVSS 106), lamps, reflective devices and 
associated equipment (108), brake fluid (116), tires for vehicles other 
than passenger cars (119), glazing materials (205), door locks and door 
retention components (206), seat belt assemblies (209), and rear impact 
guards (223). Recreational vehicles have all of the above except rear 
impact guards. They also may have platform lifts systems (403) for 
people who are disabled or who are in wheelchairs. Some of the above-
noted FMVSS have additional requirements that must be satisfied by a 
vehicle manufacturer, including ranges of locations for lamps and 
reflective devices (108), the track and slide or other supporting means 
for a sliding door under transverse loading (206), and the installation 
of rear impact guards (223 and 224) and platform lift systems (403 and 
404).
    The work of final-stage manufacturers is facilitated by the fact 
that incomplete vehicle manufacturers do not change the chasses that 
they offer every year or even every several years. When the vehicle or 
chassis is not significantly changed from the previous model year, it 
is referred to as a carryover vehicle. In many cases, the vehicle 
components and systems that affect compliance with FMVSS requirements 
are unchanged. Unless other components or systems will influence how 
the vehicle performs relative to the FMVSS, the work needed to support 
the final-stage manufacturers' certification to FMVSS requirements will 
be limited.
    Therefore, NTEA's underlying premise that the IVDs currently 
supplied by incomplete vehicle manufacturers, such as the IVD attached 
to NTEA's petition, cannot be used to construct compliant vehicles, is 
invalid.

D. NHTSA's Market Forces Argument Is Justified and Consistent With the 
Multistage Vehicle Market

    In the final rule, NHTSA rejected NTEA's suggestion that the rule 
specifically require IVDs to be reasonable or be prepared in good 
faith.\68\ Part of the agency's justification for this decision was 
that ``[t]here is no market for incomplete vehicles that cannot be 
manufactured into completed vehicles that will meet the applicable 
FMVSS.'' \69\ NHTSA also noted that incomplete vehicle manufacturers 
have business reasons to provide workable IVDs.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ 70 FR 7414, 7425 (Feb. 14, 2005).
    \69\ Id.
    \70\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA disputes NHTSA's market force statements.\71\ NTEA first 
contends that NHTSA's position is incorrect because incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers have been required to provide conformity statements in 
IVDs for almost 30 years and market forces have not caused reasonable 
compliance envelopes to exist today. NTEA's argument is extraordinarily 
general, conclusory and unsupported. From a macro standpoint, NTEA's 
market force argument ignores the fact that many types of multistage 
vehicles are being manufactured and offered for sale, including those 
manufactured by NTEA members. These include ambulances, service trucks, 
small school buses, mid-size buses, tow trucks and vans.\72\ The fact 
that vehicles such as these are being made indicates that the IVDs are 
workable. Moreover, as discussed above, we do not agree that the IVDs 
supplied by incomplete vehicle manufacturers are insufficient to permit 
final-stage manufacturers to construct compliant vehicles and certify 
their compliance with federal motor vehicle safety standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Petition at 9.
    \72\ See, e.g., http://www.ntea.com/mr/divisions.asp
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA next contends that final-stage manufacturers do not have 
sufficient

[[Page 28185]]

market presence to choose the brand of the chassis on which they will 
complete a vehicle. NTEA offers the hypothetical of a customer who goes 
to a Ford truck dealer that assists the customer in developing the 
specification for the vehicle. In this example, the final-stage 
manufacturer has no say but is willing to complete the vehicle. NTEA 
observes that if the final-stage manufacturer were to decline the 
business, ``another final-stage manufacturer undoubtedly would be glad 
to take it.'' \73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ Petition at 9-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA's hypothetical of a customer simply going to a Ford dealer is 
unduly narrow. It assumes that there are no communications with the 
final-stage manufacturer with regard to the truck body to be chosen. It 
implies that the final-stage manufacturer faces substantial 
difficulties in completing the vehicle but does not identify what those 
difficulties are. Even that implication is contradicted by NTEA's 
hypothetical. NTEA's point that another final-stage manufacturer 
undoubtedly would be glad to finish the vehicle strongly indicates that 
such a manufacturer can do so within the confines of the current rule 
while maintaining its business. We assume NTEA did not mean to suggest 
that the final stage manufacturer that would accept the work would do 
so with an intention to ignore its certification responsibilities.
    Moreover, a customer ordinarily is not limited to the franchised 
truck dealer of one brand of truck. For example, many of the chasses 
for multistage vehicles in the service truck category are known, based 
on payload, as \3/4\ ton trucks and 1 ton trucks. A number of 
manufacturers make these chasses, including DaimlerChrysler (Dodge), 
Ford and General Motors. These manufacturers compete in the sale of 
chasses. As such, they must be, and are, sensitive to the concerns of 
the marketplace.
    As important, customers purchasing trucks can and do go directly to 
final-stage manufacturers to purchase trucks. Many of the final-stage 
manufacturers use chasses built by more than one incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer. Thus, final-stage manufacturers do have choices with 
regard to the incomplete vehicles on which they work. The incomplete 
vehicle manufacturers are marketing to, and working with, the truck 
purchasers and final-stage manufacturers. For example, in NTEA's 2004 
and 2006 Work Truck Shows, at least 12 of the world's leading chassis 
manufacturers displayed product, and many of those manufacturers hosted 
chassis update sessions.\74\ This is another reflection of a 
competitive marketplace in which the chassis manufacturers are 
sensitive to the marketplace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ NTEA Annual Report, 2004. At NTEA's 2006 Work Truck Show, 
the following Truck Manufacturers had major displays: International, 
Work Horse, Toyota, Hino Tucks, Mitsubishi Fuso, Sterling Trucks, 
General Motors, Isuzu, Ford, Kenworth, Dodge, Freightliner, 
Peterbilt and Nissan Diesel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, NTEA ignores the cooperative relationships between 
incomplete and final-stage manufacturers. For example, GM has 
relationships with final-stage manufacturers it refers to as Special 
Vehicle Manufacturers (SVMs). SVMs ``are contractual partners who must 
provide a quality upfit product that will enhance GM chassis and van 
vehicles. SVMs are selected on the merit of their upfit/conversion, 
financial stability, and adherence to governmental and trade 
association requirements.'' \75\ Of 108 distinct companies listed as 
SVMs on GM's Web site, 20 are NTEA members. Thus, 18.5 percent, or 
nearly one fifth, of the SVMs are NTEA members, illustrating that NTEA 
is well aware of this cooperative relationship between incomplete and 
final-stage manufacturers. These partnerships between final-stage and 
incomplete vehicle manufacturers demonstrate that both groups play a 
large role in the market for multistage vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ http://www.gmfleet.com/gmfleetjsp/svm/administration /
locator/index.jsp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA also focuses too narrowly on the IVD itself and ignores other 
resources available to final-stage vehicle manufacturers. A number of 
incomplete vehicle manufacturers provide substantial resources to 
assist final-stage manufacturers in the completion of multistage 
vehicles. For example, GM has extensive Web sites geared toward both 
selecting the proper incomplete vehicle \76\ and completing the 
incomplete vehicle once it is purchased.\77\ The purpose of the 
extensive Web site is ``to improve the quality of Chevrolet and GMC 
second stage manufactured vehicles by assisting the Upfitter, Body 
Builder and Aftermarket Accessory communities.'' \78\ The Web site goes 
on to say that GM accomplishes this goal through various avenues, 
including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ http://www.gmfleet.com
    \77\ http://www.gmupfitter.com
    \78\ Id.

    a ``Hotline'' assistance program, which provides engineering 
support and technical information; publications including Body 
Builders Manuals and Technical Bulletins; and New Product Preview; 
meetings, to name a few. We also represent General Motors at 
upfitter association tradeshows and committee meetings, which 
enables us to be your ``Voice of Customer'' within the GM Vehicle 
Engineering organization.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ Id.

    The Hotline, which provides technical assistance, can be accessed 
both via phone and via online submissions.\80\ GM also publishes a Best 
Practices Guidelines Manual, which includes examples of how to complete 
incomplete vehicles and comply with Federal standards.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ http://www.gmupfitter.com/wwedo/wwwd.htm.
    \81\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    GM's Fleet Division \82\ assists consumers or final-stage 
manufacturers in selecting the correct GM incomplete vehicle for the 
intended use of the truck. The GM Fleet advisors are either dealers or 
advisors who can be reached through another help line. GM also 
publishes a Light Commercial Vehicle Body Application Guide, which 
contains the specifications and possible uses of the GM incomplete 
vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ http://www.gmfleet.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As another example, Ford offers other contact information for 
choosing the correct incomplete vehicle.\83\ Additionally, Ford offers 
the Ford Truck Body Builders' Layout Book, which provides additional 
engineering information and is referenced in the IVDs for Ford 
incomplete vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See generally http://www.fleet.ford.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These examples of additional resources for final-stage 
manufacturers indicate that the incomplete vehicle manufacturers devote 
substantial resources that facilitate the work of final-stage 
manufacturers. The incomplete vehicle manufacturers' allocation of 
resources to the needs of final-stage manufacturers demonstrates the 
market power possessed by final-stage manufacturers.
    NTEA does not address the fact that the multistage vehicle industry 
is a multi-billion dollar industry in which the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer and the final-stage manufacturer have complementary 
interests. NTEA's arguments, which are not supported by evidence, are 
inconsistent with the reality that final-stage manufacturers are doing 
business and certifying vehicles within the existing IVD framework. 
NTEA submitted no data demonstrating that final-stage manufacturers are 
going out of business, NTEA's prediction for what will happen to final-
stage manufacturers who either complete vehicles with unworkable IVDs 
or refuse to complete vehicles with unworkable IVDs. Thus, the 
foundation for NTEA's argument lacks support.

[[Page 28186]]

E. NHTSA's Decision Not To Include a Reasonableness Requirement Is 
Consistent With Other NHTSA Regulations

    In the final rule, NHTSA rejected NTEA's proposal that NHTSA 
require that incomplete vehicle manufacturers use ``good faith'' 
efforts to provide ``reasonable'' conformity statements that are 
susceptible to being passed through to final-stage manufacturers.\84\ 
NHTSA stated it would not adopt the suggested language because ``due to 
its subjectivity, the suggested language is not susceptible to 
effective enforcement.'' \85\ NTEA contends that this is inconsistent 
with the ``good faith'' standard for determining the application of 
civil penalties in the context of certification and the final rule's 
provision that applications for temporary exemptions contain complete 
descriptions of each manufacturer's good faith efforts to comply with 
the standards.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ 70 FR at 7425.
    \85\ Id.
    \86\ Petition at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA states that the agency does not explain why it is unable to 
fashion a workable reasonableness standard.\87\ However, it is NTEA 
that has not met its burden. Although NTEA did submit comments in 
response to the SNPRM recommending an alternative approach to 
multistage certification, it did not provide a workable means for 
incorporating a reasonableness standard under the Safety Act. If such a 
means exists, NTEA has had more than an ample opportunity to suggest a 
workable approach, in response to an NPRM, in a regulatory negotiation, 
and in a response to a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking. It 
is not the agency's obligation to take a vague concept from a 
commenter, make it workable, flesh it out, and include it in a rule. 
NTEA has not offered any basis by which the agency could determine 
whether an incomplete vehicle manufacturer exercised good faith in 
producing an IVD that might be usable by a final-stage manufacturer, 
since it is the particular final-stage manufacturer's actions that 
largely control its usability. As shown above, the typical IVDs are 
usable on their face.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ Petition at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The two provisions that NTEA cites are not analogous. First, the 
imposition of civil penalties is based on a statutory provision, 49 
U.S.C. 30165, which authorizes the agency to impose and compromise 
civil penalties. This provision does not provide for consideration of 
``good faith,'' but does provide for consideration of other matters--
the size of the business and the gravity of the violation. The 
statutory certification provision states that a person may not issue 
the certificate if, in exercising reasonable care, the person has 
reason to know the certificate is false or misleading in a material 
respect.\88\ Second, the good faith requirement in the final rule's 
provisions for temporary exemptions requires a manufacturer to make a 
good faith effort to comply with FMVSS prior to seeking exemptions from 
those standards, and the petition for an exemption must include a 
discussion of these good faith efforts.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ 49 U.S.C. 30115.
    \89\ 49 CFR 555.13(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unlike civil penalties, which are considered in an enforcement 
context between the government and a regulated entity and on a case-by-
case basis, or petitions for exemptions from FMVSS, which are addressed 
in an administrative proceeding involving the agency and a regulated 
entity on a case-by-case basis, IVDs are documents of general 
application that are passed from one private entity--incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers--to another private entity--final-stage manufacturers--
when a multistage vehicle is manufactured. The agency does not have a 
statutory role in this private process to rewrite IVDs and impose a 
rewritten IVD on the manufacturers involved in making a multistage 
vehicle. Moreover, the agency does not have the resources to do so.
    The agency cannot police or enforce a nebulous ``reasonableness'' 
standard for IVDs particularly given that, for all of the reasons 
discussed above, NTEA has demonstrated that it cannot agree with NHTSA 
as to what a workable IVD contains. The agency would thus be left 
policing a relationship between companies that have sometimes competing 
interests and concerns regarding IVDs, and NHTSA would have to do so 
with its only norm being the one of ``reasonableness'' in the context 
of particular upfits of trucks.

F. Impracticability Should Be Decided in Context of Rulemaking for Each 
FMVSS or on a Petition for a Temporary Exemption

    NTEA contends that it is impracticable for final-stage 
manufacturers to comply with standards that require dynamic tests. To 
the extent that impracticability is a legitimate concern, it is 
properly addressed in the context of an individual FMVSS itself. In the 
final multistage rule, NHTSA recognized that multistage vehicles are a 
type of vehicle. As a result, within a particular FMVSS, separate 
requirements may be established for multistage vehicles. NHTSA is 
following this approach on a standard-by-standard basis. For example, 
in the August 2005 NPRM \90\ on roof crush standards, NHTSA proposed 
the designation of incomplete vehicles ``as a vehicle type subject to 
different regulatory requirements.'' \91\ The NPRM proposed allowing 
final-stage manufacturers to certify ``non-chassis-cab vehicles to the 
roof crush requirements of FMVSS 220, as an alternative to the 
requirements of FMVSS 216.'' \92\ Alternatively, the final-stage 
manufacturer should apply for a temporary exemption as provided by the 
final rule and amended in this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ 70 FR 49223 (Aug. 23, 2005).
    \91\ Id. at 49235.
    \92\ Id. FMVSS 216 regulates standard roof crush resistance for 
passenger compartments, while FMVSS 220 regulates school bus 
rollover protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. The Current Certification Scheme Is Not an Unlawful Delegation of 
Agency Authority

    NTEA position: NTEA observed that under the final rule, the 
incomplete vehicle manufacturer creates the IVD and the IVD controls 
the assignment of certification responsibility. NTEA further asserts 
that narrow compliance envelopes shift responsibility for certifying 
compliance to the final-stage manufacturer. Based on these 
observations, NTEA contends that the agency has, in effect, delegated 
to a private, self-interested party (i.e., the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer) the authority to determine, as between itself and the 
final-stage manufacturer, which entity bears certification 
responsibility. NTEA contends that the determination of certification 
responsibility by this private, self-interested party is essentially 
non-reviewable, as the agency declined to impose a reasonableness 
standard for conformity statements in the IVD. Noting that courts 
disfavor delegation of agency responsibility to outside entities, 
particularly private entities whose objectivity may be questioned on 
grounds of conflict of interest, NTEA argues that the agency's 
delegation to incomplete vehicle manufacturers of unfettered authority 
to determine certification responsibility should be subject to careful 
review.
    Agency's response: NTEA relies on a case involving an unlawful 
delegation of an agency's authority to a private entity.\93\ However, 
NTEA ignores the

[[Page 28187]]

central premise of the case, namely, that the relevant inquiry on a 
private delegation issue is to assess Congressional intent, based on 
the pertinent statute(s) and its legislative history. Moreover, NTEA 
does not refer at all to the statutory certification provisions in the 
Vehicle Safety Act. Specifically, NTEA does not cite to any statutory 
provision assigning to NHTSA any duty to regulate the allocation of 
certification responsibility for any particular vehicle between the 
incomplete vehicle manufacturer and final-stage manufacturers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ Nat'l Park and Conservation Ass'n v. Stanton, 54 F.Supp. 2d 
7 (D.D.C. 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Congress 
imposed the responsibility to certify compliance on manufacturers and 
distributors.\94\ The Safety Act created a self-certification scheme. 
Under this statutory framework, the agency promulgates the FMVSS, and 
it is then the manufacturer's or distributor's responsibility to comply 
with these standards and to furnish a certification to the distributor 
or dealer that the vehicle or equipment conforms to all applicable 
FMVSS. The statute, as originally enacted, did not provide for agency 
review and approval of the manufacturer's certification or for agency 
allocation of responsibility of certification in the multistage vehicle 
context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ See Section 114 of the Act, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 726 
(recodified at 49 U.S.C. 30115).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 1970s, NHTSA promulgated regulations specifying 
certification requirements for manufacturers of vehicles manufactured 
in two or more stages and prescribing the method by which manufacturers 
of vehicles manufactured in two or more stages shall ensure conformity 
of those vehicles with FMVSS.\95\ Under these regulations, 
certification responsibility may rest with incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers, or with intermediate or final-stage manufacturers. 
NHTSA's regulations do not provide for the agency to allocate 
certification responsibility between incomplete vehicle manufacturers 
and final-stage manufacturers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ See 49 CFR 567.5 and 49 CFR part 568 (1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2000, Congress enacted the Transportation Recall Enhancement, 
Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act.\96\ Section 9 of the Act 
amended 49 U.S.C. 30115 to address certification labels.\97\ In 
general, the amendments required an intermediate or final-stage 
manufacturer to certify with respect to each FMVSS either that it has 
followed the compliance documents provided by the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer or that it has chosen to assume responsibility for 
compliance with that standard.\98\ The amendments further provided that 
if an intermediate or final-stage manufacturer assumes responsibility 
for compliance with a standard covered by the documentation, it must 
notify the incomplete vehicle manufacturer within a reasonable 
time.\99\ Significantly, the TREAD Act amendments did not alter the 
regulatory approach in 49 CFR 567.5 and 49 CFR part 568. They did not 
require NHTSA to allocate certification responsibilities between the 
various manufacturers in the chain of production of multistage 
vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ Pub. L. 106-414.
    \97\ 114 Stat. 1805.
    \98\ Id.
    \99\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In contrast to this regulatory approach, Congress has enacted other 
regulatory schemes that require agency review and approval of 
manufacturers' certifications. For example, the Clean Air Act requires 
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to test 
or require testing of motor vehicles or engines to determine whether 
they comply with the emissions requirements and, if they conform, to 
issue a certificate of conformity.\100\ In that context, EPA has a 
significant administrative role. In contrast, in the Vehicle Safety 
Act, Congress did not provide for agency review or approval of a 
manufacturer's certification. Moreover, the TREAD Act amendments 
specifically addressed certification in the multistage vehicle context 
and did not assign the agency an arbiter role in the certification 
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ 42 U.S.C. 7525(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In view of the foregoing, NHTSA does not accept NTEA's argument 
that the certification scheme in the final rule delegates too much 
power to the final-stage vehicle manufacturers. Accordingly, NHTSA will 
not modify the final rule on this ground and denies this aspect of 
NTEA's petition.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ The agency also notes that NTEA has not addressed the 
practical implications of its assertions. The imposition of 
reponsibilities on NHTSA to arbitrate certification issues would 
delay the introduction of vehicles into the market. NHTSA does not 
have staff to undertake these activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. The Agency's Decision Not To Change Default Recall Responsibility, 
Which Historically Has Been Assigned to Final-Stage Manufacturers, Was 
Reasonable

    NTEA position: NTEA notes that in the SNPRM, NHTSA sought to change 
its practice of allocating recall responsibility to the final-stage 
manufacturer in the case of a dispute between manufacturers, and 
proposed instead to allocate recall responsibility to the party it 
believed to be best able to conduct the recall (referencing 69 FR 
36047). NTEA further notes that the agency did not carry this through 
in the final rule. NTEA contends that the correct approach is the one 
proposed in the SNPRM--the elimination of any default allocation of 
recall responsibility and the assignment of such responsibility to the 
party responsible for the defect. NTEA observes that if the agency does 
not wish to resolve disputes, then the default responsibility should be 
on the incomplete vehicle manufacturer. Alternately, the agency could 
hold all manufacturers responsible.
    NTEA further observes that in the SNPRM, the agency recognized that 
final-stage manufacturers may lack the financial resources to conduct 
recall campaigns (referencing 69 FR 36047). NTEA contends that the 
agency downplayed this in the final rule by noting that ``historically, 
incomplete and final-stage manufacturers have been able to resolve 
issues of determination of responsibility'' (referencing 70 FR 7427). 
According to NTEA, these disputes are typically resolved by the final-
stage manufacturer ``agreeing'' to conduct the recall because it can 
ill afford to do otherwise. NTEA contends that NHTSA's treatment of the 
final-stage manufacturer as the default party gives extraordinary 
leverage to the incomplete vehicle manufacturer, because in case of a 
disagreement, the incomplete vehicle manufacturer can report the defect 
to NHTSA, causing the final-stage manufacturer to take on the recall to 
avoid a costly legal challenge. NTEA characterizes NHTSA's policy as 
ignoring the final-stage manufacturer's lack of bargaining power with 
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer. According to NTEA, the final-stage 
manufacturer values its relationship with the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer more than the incomplete vehicle manufacturer values its 
relationship with the final-stage manufacturer.
    NTEA also contends that safety will be enhanced if incomplete 
vehicle manufacturers have default recall responsibility. Noting that 
most incomplete vehicle manufacturers are large multi-national 
companies that have dealerships in most counties in the United States, 
NTEA postulates that the campaigns will be more efficiently conducted, 
particularly where vehicles are sold over a wide geographic area. In 
this circumstance, NTEA observes that disruption to customers will be 
minimized.

[[Page 28188]]

    NTEA further notes that the incomplete vehicle manufacturer makes 
or supplies most of the complex components on the vehicle that are 
likely to be involved in recall campaigns, and the final-stage 
manufacturer may lack technical expertise with regard to these 
components. Disputing the agency's expressed (70 FR 7427) presumption 
that the present recall scheme ``provides an incentive for a final-
stage manufacturer to deal with a solid and reputable incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer,'' NTEA reiterates its contention that the final-
stage manufacturer cannot choose which incomplete vehicle supplier to 
use. NTEA further observes that most final-stage manufacturers cannot 
identify owners from sales and warranty records because they have no 
interaction with the end user, and the incomplete vehicle manufacturer 
is in a better position to obtain this information through the dealer.
    Agency response: For the reasons set forth below, we deny this 
aspect of NTEA's petition.
1. Background
    NHTSA's basic approach to, and regulation of, recall responsibility 
has been in effect for several decades. The regulations on recall 
responsibility were adopted in 1978 and codified in 49 CFR part 579. In 
essence, the regulations provided that each manufacturer of a motor 
vehicle shall be responsible for any safety-related defect determined 
to exist in the vehicle or in any item of original equipment.\102\ 
Under the agency's interpretations, an incomplete vehicle is classified 
as an original equipment item for which the final-stage manufacturer 
has recall responsibility. Separately, the rules on certification of 
multistage vehicles were adopted in 1971 and codified in 49 CFR part 
568.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \102\ 49 CFR 579.5 (1978).
    \103\ The regulations defined an ``incomplete vehicle'' as ``an 
assemblage consisting, as a minimum, of frame and chassis structure, 
power train * * *.'' In contrast, a ``complete vehicle'' was defined 
as ``a vehicle that requires no further manufacturing operations.'' 
49 CFR 568.3 (emphasis added). The Act defined a motor vehicle as 
``any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured 
primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except 
any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.'' 15 U.S.C. 
1391(3) (1985), recodified at 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(6) (1994). Because 
it requires further manufacturing operations to perform its intended 
function, an incomplete vehicle cannot be regarded as having been 
primarily manufactured for use on public streets, roads, and 
highways, and therefore does not qualify as a ``motor vehicle'' 
under the above definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1988, NTEA petitioned NHTSA to institute a rulemaking to amend 
49 CFR part 579 to clarify and equitably apportion between incomplete 
vehicle manufacturers and final-stage manufacturers the responsibility 
for conducting recalls.\104\ NHTSA granted the petition to institute a 
rulemaking proceeding.\105\ The decision to grant the petition was 
influenced by a conflict between an incomplete vehicle manufacturer and 
final-stage vehicle manufacturers that produced ambulances. The defect 
at issue, which caused the contents of the vehicle's fuel tank to boil 
and seep through the gas cap, posed a grave risk of vehicle fires. The 
parties to the dispute denied their own fault and attributed the defect 
to the others' actions. This dispute delayed the recall. Ultimately, 
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer agreed to conduct the recall.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ 58 FR 40402, 40403 (July 28, 1993).
    \105\ Id.
    \106\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1993, NHTSA terminated the rulemaking on the grounds that there 
was no need for the requested rule. NHTSA pointed out that the 
conflicts between incomplete vehicle manufacturers and final-stage 
manufacturers that the agency had witnessed in the ambulance recall had 
not been evident in subsequent enforcement actions involving multistage 
vehicles.\107\ The agency further explained that its regulations do not 
mandate that responsibility for defects be borne exclusively by final-
stage manufacturers. Instead, the recall could be conducted by either 
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer or the final-stage manufacturer. 
NHTSA emphasized that its objective was to ensure that a manufacturer 
in the production chain assumes responsibility for the recall.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ Id.
    \108\ 58 FR at 40404.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1991, NHTSA issued an NPRM that proposed to extend the 
certification requirements then being exercised by chassis-cab 
manufacturers to all incomplete vehicle manufacturers.\109\ This would 
have permitted pass-through certification for multistage vehicles built 
on all types of incomplete vehicles. The proposal generated a great 
deal of controversy. \110\ Following a public meeting in 1995 \111\ and 
the creation of an ad hoc advisory committee on the subject of 
multistage vehicle certification,\112\ in 1999, NHTSA initiated a 
negotiated rulemaking in an effort to resolve the assignment of 
certification responsibilities among multistage vehicle 
manufacturers.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ 56 FR 61392 (December 3, 1991).
    \110\ 60 FR 57694 (November 17, 1995).
    \111\ 64 FR 57499, 27500 (May 20, 1999).
    \112\ Id.
    \113\ 64 FR 66447, 66447 (Nov. 26, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although, historically, the agency has addressed certification and 
recall responsibility for multistage vehicles separately, in the 
negotiated rulemaking the interests representing final-stage 
manufacturers added issues related to recall responsibility. In the 
negotiated rulemaking, the final-stage and incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers largely maintained opposing positions. The final-stage 
manufacturers contended that the incomplete vehicle manufacturers 
should be responsible at least for recalls involving incomplete 
vehicles. The incomplete vehicle manufacturers asserted that final-
stage vehicle manufacturers should be held responsible for the 
vehicles. The incomplete vehicle manufacturers pointed out that the 
final-stage manufacturer is free to add to or modify the incomplete 
vehicle in any way, as the vehicle is no longer under the control of 
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer. These additions and modifications 
may introduce defects or affect the conformity of the vehicle to 
federal standards. These diametrically opposed positions could not be 
harmonized without substantial compromise, which led in part to the 
failure of the negotiated rulemaking. After several years of meetings 
that did not culminate in an agreed-upon rule, in 2004 NHTSA published 
an SNPRM.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ 69 FR 36038 (June 28, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the SNPRM, NHTSA, although not legally bound to do so, honored a 
commitment made in the course of the negotiated rulemaking to propose a 
regulation that mirrored a report produced, but not agreed upon, in the 
negotiated rulemaking process. NHTSA made clear in the SNPRM that it 
was proposing ``the applicable regulations as drafted by the 
committee,'' \115\ not as proposals NHTSA itself supported. In this 
vein, NHTSA proposed for the first time to amend its recall 
responsibility regulation, which had been recodified at 49 CFR 573.5 
from 49 CFR part 579.\116\ The proposal provided that when there is a 
determination of a safety-related defect and the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer and final-stage manufacturer can not agree as to which 
manufacturer is responsible for the defect, NHTSA would determine which 
manufacturer is in the best position to conduct the recall.\117\ 
NHTSA's decision would not be reviewable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ 69 FR at 36041; see id at 36048.
    \116\ In 2002, the regulations on recall responsibility were 
moved to 49 CFR 573.5 and the early warning rules were added to 49 
CFR part 579.
    \117\ 69 FR at 36047.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 28189]]

    As noted in the preamble to the SNPRM, this proposal was the 
subject of vociferous objection by many of the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers.\118\ Their primary concern was that NHTSA's 
determination would not be reviewable. One incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer offered alternative language that did not provide a 
dispute resolution mechanism.\119\ As NHTSA further noted in the 
preamble, the alternative language also did not assure that in the 
event of a dispute that is not easily resolvable, a recall campaign is 
conducted in a timely manner. The agency observed that 
``[h]istorically, NHTSA has maintained that while any stage 
manufacturer may assume responsibility for a recall campaign, the 
final-stage manufacturer is responsible for any campaign that a 
previous stage manufacturer has not agreed to conduct.'' \120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ Id.
    \119\ Id.
    \120\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the SNPRM, NHTSA further noted that the allocation of recall 
responsibility was a ``difficult issue.'' \121\ The agency observed 
that final-stage manufacturers often may not have the resources to 
conduct a recall for a safety problem they did not cause. On the other 
hand, NHTSA maintained that allocating recall responsibility to a 
specific party in the event of a dispute as to legal responsibility 
allows the agency to achieve the result it believes is essential to its 
safety-based mission: getting defective systems or equipment remedied 
as soon as possible so as to reduce the likelihood of motor vehicle-
related injury or death.\122\ In the absence of a default allocation of 
recall responsibility, recalls would be delayed by disputes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ Id.
    \122\ Id. at 36047-48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA also voiced concerns in the SNPRM that the non-reviewability 
provision in the proposed rule may ``ultimately be determined 
impermissible.'' \123\ In connection with our concerns about the non-
reviewability provision's chances of withstanding judicial review, we 
asked commenters to ``provide arguments and analysis as to which 
manufacturer should be deemed responsible for a recall campaign in the 
event that NHTSA and the various-stage manufacturers could not 
determine in a timely manner which party should bear responsibility for 
the recall.'' \124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ Id. at 36048.
    \124\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In February 2005, NHTSA issued the final rule that is the subject 
of the NTEA petition.\125\ In the final rule, NHTSA decided not to 
amend the rules on allocation of recall responsibility. Thus, the 
final-stage manufacturer continued to have default responsibility for 
recalls in the event of a dispute with the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer. NHTSA recognized that the majority of commenters opposed 
the proposal for NHTSA to allocate recall responsibility.\126\ The 
agency stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ 70 FR 7414 (February 14, 2005).
    \126\ 70 FR at 7425.

    NHTSA's primary concern is safety; NHTSA is also concerned that 
the rule be workable. The most compelling fact is that under 
existing Sec.  573.5, in general, recalls are not delayed by 
disputes between manufacturers. In fact, practical disputes rarely 
occur * * * It is clear from this fact that the private parties are 
able to resolve and in fact are successfully resolving the issues 
regarding the conducting of recalls * * * In addition, the proposal 
was not well received.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ Id. at 7427.

The agency concluded that ``the existing rule meets the fundamental 
safety need for prompt recalls.'' \128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Summary of NTEA's Position
    In its petition, NTEA asserts that NHTSA should adopt the proposal 
published in the SNPRM and rejected in the final rule--that should the 
manufacturers in the production chain of a multistage vehicle or NHTSA 
be unable to determine or agree which manufacturer is responsible for a 
safety-related defect, NHTSA shall make a nonreviewable determination 
as to which manufacturer is to conduct the recall campaign.\129\ This 
would eliminate the default responsibility of final-stage manufacturers 
that has long existed under NHTSA's regulations. In its petition, the 
NTEA further proposed that if the agency does not wish to resolve 
recalls in this manner, default recall responsibility should rest with 
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer instead of the final-stage 
manufacturer. Alternatively, NTEA proposed that default recall 
responsibility be placed on all manufacturers of a defective or 
noncompliant multistage vehicle.\130\ NTEA does not explain how the 
latter alternative would work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ Petition at 12.
    \130\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In support of its request, NTEA asserts, first, that final-stage 
manufacturers lack the financial resources needed to have default 
recall responsibility.\131\ Second, NTEA contends that safety will be 
enhanced if incomplete vehicle manufacturers have default recall 
responsibility.\132\ NTEA's arguments why NHTSA should reconsider its 
position on this issue basically mirror these concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ Petition at 12-14.
    \132\ Petition at 14-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. NTEA Has Not Demonstrated That, Based on Size, Default 
Responsibility Should Be Shifted From Final-Stage Manufacturers
    In its petition, NTEA notes that in the preamble to the SNPRM, 
NHTSA recognized that final-stage manufacturers often ``may'' not have 
the resources to conduct a recall for a safety problem they did not 
cause.\133\ NTEA offers that the cost of a recall campaign could easily 
bankrupt a final-stage manufacturer.\134\ In its view, the final rule 
downplays the adverse consequences the assignment of disputed recalls 
can have on final-stage manufacturers by asserting that ``historically, 
incomplete and final-stage manufacturers have been able to resolve 
issues of determination of responsibility.'' \135\ In NTEA's view, 
disputes typically are resolved by the final-stage manufacturer 
agreeing to conduct the recall because it can not afford to do 
otherwise.\136\ NTEA provides no factual support for its 
assertions.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ Petition at 12.
    \134\ Id at 13.
    \135\ Id., quoting 70 FR at 7427.
    \136\ Petition at 13.
    \137\ Petition at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA's argument is based in part on the assertion that incomplete 
vehicle manufacturers are in a better financial position to conduct 
recalls. This disregards the fact that the Vehicle Safety Act (49 
U.S.C. Chapter 301) does not identify financial means as a criterion 
for exercising recall responsibility. The Safety Act states that the 
vehicle's manufacturer shall conduct the recall.\138\ In the multistage 
vehicle context, NHTSA has interpreted that to be the final-stage 
manufacturer, because the incomplete vehicle is an original equipment 
item, and not a vehicle.\139\ Further, assuming that recall 
responsibility could be allocated between incomplete and final stage 
manufacturers, NTEA has not addressed the issue of whether the Federal 
courts would be likely to accept the view that under the Safety Act, 
NHTSA may make decisions allocating recall responsibility that would be 
unreviewable by the courts, as discussed in the SNPRM.\140\ NTEA has 
also not addressed the resource demands for NHTSA involvement in the 
allocation of recall

[[Page 28190]]

responsibility and NHTSA's corresponding lack of resources to be so 
engaged. In any event, on the question of finances, it is a matter of 
public record that a number of incomplete vehicle manufacturers are 
financially strained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ See 49 U.S.C. 30118.
    \139\ See 58 FR 40402, 40403 (July 28, 1993).
    \140\ See 69 FR 36047-48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA's arguments regarding default recall responsibility rest in 
general on NTEA's premise that final-stage manufacturers are left with 
the responsibility for recalling vehicles to remedy problems that were 
not of their own making. NTEA goes on to argue that final-stage 
manufacturers left with the responsibility for these recalls will be 
put out of business by the crippling costs of these recalls.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ See generally Petition at 12-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In an effort to evaluate these assertions, NHTSA assessed recalls 
of multistage vehicles over a three model-year period.\142\ As detailed 
below, the review revealed that incomplete vehicle manufacturers 
conducted the recalls in 98 percent (193 of 197) of the instances in 
which the underlying cause could be attributed to them. Additionally, 
final-stage manufacturers conducted recalls for which the underlying 
cause could be attributed to incomplete vehicle manufacturers in only 2 
percent (4 of 197) of the recalls conducted for which the incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer was most likely responsible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ See report, in administrative record. NHTSA Docket No. 99-
5673.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To conduct the assessment, the agency reviewed about three years of 
recall data covering model year 2003 and more recent vehicles.\143\ 
Based on our experience with recalls, this would provide sufficient 
relevant information upon which to make an assessment. We searched 
Artemis, NHTSA's central repository of vehicle data on, among other 
things, vehicle complaints, investigations and recalls. More 
particularly, Artemis contains summaries of safety recalls of motor 
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment, as well as Defect and 
Noncompliance Information Reports submitted by manufacturers under 49 
CFR 573.6 and copies of notification letters from manufacturers to 
vehicle owners under 49 CFR part 577 and 49 CFR 573.6(c)(11).\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ The agency began its assessment in November of 2005, based 
on data that was available as of that date. The data do not include 
recalls in November and December of 2005.
    \144\ Artemis contains no information not contained in 573 
reports and 577 reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Artemis does not include a separate code for multistage vehicles. 
Agency staff screened the vehicle recalls in Artemis to identify those 
involving multistage vehicles. The search produced three hundred 
seventy-nine (379) recalls of MY 2003 and more recent vintage 
multistage vehicles. Next, agency staff made an assessment of the 
nature of the safety-related defect, the manufacturer likely to be 
responsible for the defect and the manufacturer that conducted the 
recall. The assignment of responsibility was made by engineers based on 
the information about the problem and the remedy based on summary 
information from part 573 and 577 reports and the reports in Artemis.
    Based on this review, a substantial portion of the recalls of 
multistage vehicles were conducted by incomplete vehicle manufacturers. 
Of the 379 recalls of multistage vehicles, 193 (51%) were conducted by 
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer. This is illustrated by the 
following examples:
     On September 14, 2005, Ford notified ODI (05V-415) \145\ 
about F-650/750 medium duty trucks built with a defective park brake 
anchor bolt, which upon failure could allow the truck to roll away from 
a parked position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ The numbers in parentheses are the identifying Recall 
Numbers assigned by NHTSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     On September 2, 2005, Freightliner notified ODI (05V-408) 
of a defect on its motor home chassis in which the steering shaft was 
pushing through the lower yoke, resulting in a loss of steering.
     On November 10, 2005, International Truck and Engine 
notified ODI (05V-523) of a defect concerning a cab entry step failure, 
possibly resulting in personal injury.
     On October 11, 2005, Hino Motors Sales USA Inc. notified 
ODI (05V-492) of a defect in which the battery box was not properly 
torqued in place on certain cabs and chassis. This could result in the 
battery and box becoming dislodged from the vehicle.
     On July 7, 2005, Mack Trucks notified ODI (05V-312) of a 
defect concerning non-conforming transverse beam castings on the AD 
Series suspensions. If a part were to fail, it could drop to the ground 
and become a projectile or cause sparks and ignite a fire.
     On June 29, 2005, Four Winds International, a final-stage 
manufacturer, notified ODI of a defect in certain RV chassis-cab 
vehicles built by Ford (05V-306). Ford notified Four Winds of a fuel 
line which could disconnect resulting in a stall. Ford, the incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer, conducted the recall (05V-266).
     On June 23, 2005, International notified ODI (05V-297) of 
a defect on model year 2006, model 4200 and 4300 trucks. The defect 
involved the rub through of a front brake hose resulting in diminished 
brake performance.
     On June 16, 2005, General Motors notified ODI of a defect 
(05V-288) in which a power steering hose was chafing on the 
intermediate steering shaft. The trucks involved were model year 2003-
2005 4500/5500 Kodiak school bus chassis and the GMC Top Kick. The 
defect is loss of power steering fluid, which could result in an 
increased steering and braking effort, increasing the risk of a crash.
     On June 15, 2005, Spartan Chassis Inc. notified ODI of a 
defect (05V-283) in the steering system on certain model Spartan 
chassis. Due to a defect in the linkage between the steering wheel and 
steering gear, the connection could be lost, resulting in a loss of 
steering.
    Of the 193 recalls conducted by incomplete vehicle manufacturers 
for problems that can be attributed to the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer, 18 warrant a comment. These 18 recalls, using NHTSA's 
nomenclature, are: 03V-040, 03V-041, 03V-047, 0V-048, 03V-059, 03V-060, 
03V-064, 03V-066, 03V-068, 03V-069, 03V-080, 03V-092, 03V-116, 03V-119, 
03V-148, 03V-149, 03V-152, and 03V-347. These 18 recalls stemmed from a 
notification letter sent by Ford Motor Company (02V-327) in January 
2003 pertaining to model years 2000-2003 F53 chassis built at the IMMSA 
and Detroit chassis plant and assembled at the final stage 
manufacturer's facility. Ford's letter states ``The instrument panel, 
as shipped by Ford[,] may not be wired correctly to illuminate the 
brake warning indicator and/or low brake fluid light as required by 
FMVSS 105 S5.3.''
    In reviewing the owner notifications for these recalls, ODI found 
examples where the remedy was apparently conducted by the final stage 
manufacturer, with such language as ``Damon Corporation will notify 
owners and dealers of the affected vehicles to return them to a dealer 
to have the remedy performed at no charge to them.'' We found other 
statements which indicated that Ford, the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer, would conduct the recall. For example, ``Winnebago 
Industries will assist Ford to correct the situation by sending them a 
list containing the names and addresses of the owners and dealers who 
have the defective panel installed in their motor homes.'' During this 
review, NHTSA discussed the matter with Ford and was informed that any 
final stage manufacturer that conducted the recall was notified to 
submit a form for each remedied vehicle and Ford would reimburse the 
final stage

[[Page 28191]]

manufacturer $110.00 dollars per vehicle in an attempt to reduce or 
eliminate the financial burden associated with this recall. The $110 
reimbursement appeared to be sufficient. For example, in one recall 
NHTSA found that .7 hours of labor were allowed by the final stage 
manufacturer for an inspection and repair. Therefore, even though some 
of these recalls could technically be classified as being performed by 
the final stage manufacturer, NHTSA has decided that all recalls 
related to this matter will be binned into the group where the 
incomplete manufacturer is listed as conducting the recall, since they 
either did conduct the recall or they reimbursed the final stage 
manufacturers when appropriate paperwork was submitted for 
reimbursement.
    Forty-one (41) percent of the recalls of multistage vehicles (157 
of 379) were conducted by the final-stage manufacturer. In 80 percent 
of these recalls (126 of 157), the underlying problem appeared to have 
been created by the final-stage manufacturer. In these recalls, there 
were problems in or with parts or equipment installed by the final 
stage manufacturer. For example, some problems stemmed from parts and 
equipment that themselves were flawed or noncompliant (including 
rendering a vehicle noncompliant). Others were the result of the final 
stage manufacturer's improper installation of parts and equipment by 
(e.g., improper attachment of parts and equipment, installation of 
equipment that was missing parts such as bolts, and improper routing of 
parts). Some problems originated from the installation by the final 
stage manufacturer of parts and equipment that were not proper for the 
application. Still others involved parts and equipment installed by the 
final stage manufacturer that could interfere with the functioning of 
parts or equipment on the chassis or the vehicle as a whole, such as 
parts that were too close to or could rub chassis components such as 
fuel lines and brake lines. Also, some recalls were based on improper 
labels added by final stage manufacturers (e.g., labels stating GVWR, 
tire pressure). For example:
     On October 7, 2005, Winnebago Industries notified the 
agency (05V-475) of a safety-related defect in 3,613 Winnebago 
recreational vehicles built on a Ford chassis. Winnebago discovered 
that the fasteners holding the fuel tank mounting straps may not have 
been properly tightened, allowing the possibility for the fuel tank to 
loosen and fall, which has the potential to ignite.
     On September 22, 2005, Gulf Stream Coach, Inc. notified 
ODI (05V-446) of a safety defect in 306 Class ``B'' motor homes built 
on the Sprinter chassis. The steel bracket securing the holding tank 
was installed in a location that pressed against the OEM brake line. 
This created points of possible wear due to vibration during vehicle 
operation, which, over time, could cause the brake lines to leak brake 
fluid, thus causing deterioration in braking performance. Winnebago was 
made aware of this matter by an owner.
     On September 23, 2005, the agency was notified (05V-440) 
of a safety defect by Collin Bus Corporation. The company identified 
150 school buses built on the Chevrolet and Ford ``cutaway'' van 
chassis as having a safety defect. On the vehicles in question, the 
fasteners securing the seats and barriers to the wall tack may not have 
been adequately tightened. This could allow the seat or barrier to move 
relative to the vehicle wall in a crash and compromise passenger crash 
protection.
     On August 11, 2005, Monaco Coach Corporation notified the 
agency of a defect (05V-366) on 114 Class ``A'' motorhomes built on a 
Roadmaster chassis. Monaco determined that the headlight switch was 
overloading, possibly causing the headlights to stop functioning 
without warning.
     On July 3, 2005, McNeilus Truck and Manufacturing Company 
notified the agency (05V-357) of a safety defect on 107 trucks. 
McNeilus discovered a potential overload on the front axle that was 
rated at 10,000 lbs. The wheels were rated at 9,000 lbs. and the tires 
were rated at 8,270 lbs. Thus, both the tires and wheels would be 
overloaded in a maximum (10,000 lbs) front axle load condition.
     On April 28, 2005, ElDorado National notified the agency 
(05V-194) of a safety defect on 39 low-floor conversions built on the 
Chrysler minivan chassis. The defect involved a rubber fuel line that 
could come in close proximity to the van's exhaust system, thus 
resulting in a fire.
     On August 19, 2005, Girardin Minibus notified the agency 
(05V-365) of a non-compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard 221, on certain school buses built on Ford and General Motors 
chassis. Compliance testing showed that the company had built 10 buses 
with inadequate body joint strength. This could lead to a compromise of 
the passenger compartment in the event of a crash.
    Twenty-seven (27) of the recalls conducted by the final-stage 
manufacturers were attributed to components manufactured by an 
equipment supplier and added to the incomplete vehicle by the final-
stage manufacturer. For example, safety recalls 05V-429, (Les 
Enterprises Michel Corbel Inc.), 05V-490 (Mid Bus Inc.), 05V-352 
(Girardin Minibus, Inc.), 05V-347 (Thomas Built Buses), 05V-345 
(Collins Bus Corporation), 05V-336 (U.S. Bus Corporation), and 05V-308 
(Van-Con Inc.) were all conducted by the final-stage manufacturers as 
the result of notification from an equipment supplier, Specialty 
Manufacturing Company (05E-032) advising of a safety defect in school 
bus stop arms. The stop arms had a micro switch that could malfunction 
in extremely cold and wet weather, causing the arm to not open or 
close. Other examples of recalls based on faulty equipment manufactured 
by an equipment supplier and added to the incomplete vehicle by the 
final-stage manufacturer involved water heaters on recreational 
vehicles. Safety recalls were conducted by Featherlite Inc. on motor 
coach conversions (05V-280), Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc. (05V-268), and 
Gulf Stream Coach Inc. (05V-258) after they were advised by Aqua-Hot 
heaters of a problem (05E-015) that could result in the ignition of 
combustible materials in and around the vehicle.
    Four (4) safety recalls were conducted by final-stage manufacturers 
for problems that appeared to be attributable to an incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer.\146\ These include the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ Nothing herein constitutes a finding of fact as would be 
the case after a hearing or trial, or a final agency action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     On November 1, 2005, Winnebago Industries, Inc. notified 
the agency (05V-496) of a defect in certain motor homes in which the 
cinch bolt in the steering column that connects to the intermediate 
shaft was improperly tightened, resulting in the possibility of bolt 
threads being stripped. This could cause a loss of steering control.
     On February 20, 2003, Jayco Inc. notified the agency (03V-
057) of a defect in motor homes which involved a change made by the 
chassis manufacturer that increased pressure in the fuel return line. 
Jayco was not aware of the change. On account of the change, when 
connecting the RV's generator system into the chassis fuel system, fuel 
could overflow from the generator's carburetor, resulting in fuel 
spillage. This creates a fire hazard.
     On July 25, 2003, Monaco notified the agency of a defect 
(03V-268) in

[[Page 28192]]

which the parking brake bracket was improperly secured to the chassis 
by the chassis manufacturer. This could allow the coach to roll away.
     On May 5, 2003, Fleetwood notified the agency of a defect 
(03V-169) in which drive shaft carrier bolts were not properly torqued. 
This could lead to carrier bearing failure and resulting drive shaft 
failure.
    The remaining 29 recalls were conducted by equipment manufacturers 
for problems attributed to the equipment supplied by the equipment 
manufacturer. For example:
     On May 4, 2005, Country Coach, Inc. submitted a 573 report 
(05V-209) notifying NHTSA of a recall that would be conducted by 
Vehicle Systems, Inc. Vehicle Systems, Inc. had informed Country Coach 
that certain coolant heaters supplied to Country Coach by Vehicle 
Systems, Inc., had a burner tube that may have been made out of 
material that is not within specification and could fail prematurely 
and cause a fire. Vehicle Systems, Inc. conducted the recall (05E-015).
     On September 14, 2004, Glaval Bus informed NHTSA (04V-458) 
that Sure-Lok would be conducting a recall on wheelchair securement 
retractor assemblies installed in Glaval's buses (04E-058).
     On September 30, 2004, Daimler Chrysler notified NHTSA of 
a recall (04V-505) Sure-Lok was conducting on a seatbelt retractor 
assembly installed in certain Daimler Chrysler commercial buses (04E-
058).
     On January 15, 2003, Georgie Boy Manufacturing, LLC 
(Georgie Boy), filed a 573 Report (03V-012) alerting NHTSA to a recall 
being conducted by Caterpillar on certain engine models sold in the 
2000 model year and which were installed in ten Georgie Boy vehicles. 
The engines experienced a fuel system problem that could result in a 
stall. Caterpillar conducted the recall (03V-012.001).
    Thus, only 8 percent of the recalls (31 of 379) conducted on 
multistage vehicles were conducted by final-stage manufacturers for 
problems that appeared to have been created by others. This indicates 
that, contrary to NTEA's assertion, incomplete vehicle manufacturers 
are not exploiting the final-stage-manufacturers' default recall 
responsibility, but are, instead, in the overwhelming majority of cases 
assuming responsibility for the recalls for which they were the source 
of the defect. Indeed, of the 197 recalls for which NHTSA staff 
informally determined that incomplete vehicle manufacturers were the 
source of the precipitating problem, the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers conducted the recalls in 98 percent of the cases (193 of 
197).
    The remaining 2 percent (the 4 safety recalls conducted by final-
stage manufacturers for problems attributable to incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers addressed above) demonstrate the need to maintain the 
default rule. Those recalls involved significant safety concerns, 
including brakes, steering, fires, and motive power. It is very 
important that problems such as these be corrected promptly. In the 
absence of a default rule, there would be delays while the various 
manufacturers pointed fingers at each other, ramped up their legal 
teams and engaged in a dispute. Meanwhile, the safety problem would go 
unresolved. To make matters worse, NHTSA might not know about the 
safety-related defect. The first notification that NHTSA receives is 
the manufacturer's Defect and Noncompliance Information Report under 49 
CFR 573.6 (part 573 Report). Section 573.6(b) requires the report to be 
filed with NHTSA not later than five days after the manufacturer 
determines the existence of the defect or noncompliance. In the case of 
a dispute between manufacturers, it is likely that neither manufacturer 
would file a part 573 Report in order to avoid taking responsibility 
for the recall. If default responsibility were placed on the incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer, those manufacturers would face responsibility in 
many circumstances to remedy defects or noncompliances that they had no 
hand in creating.
    We also considered NTEA's assertion that final-stage manufacturers 
that conducted recalls for problems caused by incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers were being driven out of business. NTEA did not support 
its assertion. We researched multistage vehicle manufacturers whose 
products have been the subject of recall campaigns or compliance tests. 
A review of the available financial information on multistage vehicle 
manufacturers (both intermediate and final-stage) involved in the 
recalls, concluded that these companies are not being run out of 
business.\147\ No business failures have been identified among 
multistage vehicle manufacturers that can be specifically traced to any 
Federal safety recall campaigns. Moreover, in the small number of cases 
in which final-stage manufacturers conducted recalls for problems 
attributable to incomplete vehicle manufacturers, we have no 
information on whether the final-stage manufacturers obtained any 
reimbursement for some or all of their expenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ See Report on Business Failures Resulting from Recall 
Campaigns, NHTSA Docket No. 99-5673.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA's review of the recalls, set forth above, does not support 
NTEA's contention that disputes between final-stage and incomplete 
vehicle manufacturers over recall responsibility ``typically are 
resolved by the final-stage manufacturer `agreeing'' to conduct the 
recall because it cannot afford to do otherwise.'' Contrary to NTEA's 
unsusstantiated assertion, incomplete vehicle manufacturers in practice 
took responsibility for the defects and noncompliances they created and 
conducted recalls to remedy those problems 96 percent of the time.
    NTEA has failed to demonstrate any actual harm to any final-stage 
manufacturers, and instead relies on unsubstantiated allegations 
regarding the theoretical impact of default recall responsibility. 
NHTSA's own review of three years of multistage vehicle recalls 
demonstrates that NTEA's general assertions about the harm likely to 
befall final-stage manufacturers due to the retention of default recall 
responsibility are not valid.
4. NTEA Has Not Demonstrated That Safety Will Be Enhanced by Assigning 
Default Recall Responsibility to the Incomplete Vehicle Manufacturers
    NTEA offers several rationales for shifting recall responsibility 
to incomplete vehicle manufacturers. Before turning to those reasons, 
we note that NTEA ignores the fact that the system that has been in 
place for over twenty-five years is working. That is reflected, in 
part, by the analysis of recalls explained above.
    NTEA advances two arguments as to why safety would be enhanced if 
default recall responsibility were assigned to the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer. These are premised on the contention that final-stage 
manufacturers are often confined to a single geographic location while 
incomplete vehicle manufacturers are large international organizations 
with a much greater geographic range. NTEA argues that the incomplete 
vehicle manufacturers' geographic diversity would allow recalls to be 
more efficiently conducted, because more outlets would be available to 
perform remedies. NTEA also argued that recalls conducted by incomplete 
vehicles manufacturers are likely to be more effective because owners 
are more likely to respond to recall notices when the remedy is 
available at multiple locations.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ Petition at 14.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 28193]]

    NTEA submits no information or data that suggests that final-stage 
manufacturers' products are dispersed over a geographically wide area 
that would make recalls difficult. Additionally, NTEA has not submitted 
evidence of situations in which a final-stage manufacturer could not 
conduct a recall effectively. Also, as discussed more thoroughly above, 
NHTSA's analysis of multistage vehicle recalls reveals that in nearly 
all of the cases in which an incomplete vehicle manufacturer was 
responsible for the problem necessitating a recall, that manufacturer 
conducted the recall campaign. Thus, final-stage manufacturers are most 
often conducting recalls only to remedy problems they created. The fact 
that incomplete vehicle manufacturers often have a more widespread 
network of locations and service centers provides no rationale for 
requiring them to shoulder responsibility for problems caused by final-
stage manufacturers. Finally, NTEA has not demonstrated that incomplete 
vehicle manufacturers' dealers have the knowledge and wherewithal to 
address many of the defects and noncompliances that final-stage 
manufacturers introduce into a vehicle, such as those inherent in the 
equipment (including such items as hot water heaters in recreational 
vehicles) a final-stage manufacturers may install.
    NTEA also argues that because the incomplete vehicle manufacturer 
supplies the most complicated components of the vehicle, a recall 
campaign is more likely to involve components installed by the 
incomplete vehicle manufacturer.\149\ NTEA cites this as another reason 
why default recall responsibility should be assigned to the incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer. NTEA's argument relies on, and assumes the truth 
of, its underlying assertion that incomplete vehicle manufacturers do 
not conduct recalls when they are responsible for the underlying defect 
or noncompliance. As discussed at great length above, this contention 
is inconsistent with the facts and utterly groundless.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ Petition at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA contends that NHTSA's position that default recall 
responsibility should remain with the final-stage manufacturer rests on 
a faulty interpretation of the market power of incomplete vehicle 
manufacturers. Specifically, NTEA takes issue with the agency's 
position that the default recall responsibility scheme ``provides an 
incentive for a final-stage manufacturer to deal with a solid and 
reputable incomplete vehicle manufacturer.''\150\ The agency has 
addressed the weakness of NTEA's market forces argument in the section 
of this notice pertaining to the reasonableness of IVDs. NHTSA relies 
on that analysis in rejecting NTEA's argument on this issue as well. As 
reflected in that analysis, final-stage manufacturers have been shown 
to be a considerable market force in a multi-billion dollar industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ Id. (quoting 70 FR at 7427).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA also takes issue with a statement in a 1993 Federal Register 
notice published by NHTSA.\151\ In that notice, NHTSA announced that it 
was terminating a rulemaking proceeding, initiated in response to an 
NTEA petition, that sought to allocate recall responsibility for 
vehicles built in two or more stages to the various manufacturers in 
the chain of production for those vehicles \152\ Among the reasons 
stated for NHTSA's termination of the rulemaking was that ``the final-
stage manufacturer is most likely to be able to identify owners from 
sales and warranty records, as well as State registration records, 
which may not be available to incomplete or intermediate stage vehicle 
manufacturers.'' \153\ NTEA contends that this justification is not 
true.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ Petition at 14.
    \152\ 58 FR at 40402.
    \153\ Id. at 40404.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NTEA considerably overreaches in asserting that:

    The incomplete vehicle manufacturer is in a much better position 
to obtain information about the current owner of a vehicle subject 
to a recall. The incomplete vehicle manufacturer is likely to have 
the longer and more lucrative relationship with the dealer, and, 
consequently, more leverage to obtain the dealer's prompt 
cooperation in compiling the necessary information.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ Petition at 14.

    NTEA overlooks the fact that there are many different kinds of 
incomplete vehicles, and incomplete vehicles are sold in various stages 
of completion. Similarly, for some types of multistage vehicles (e.g., 
school buses, recreational vehicles and ambulances), the customer often 
purchases the vehicle from a final-stage manufacturer or one of its 
dealers rather than from a dealer franchised by the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer. Moreover, NTEA ignores the fact that mailing lists for 
many recalls, particularly those for vehicles in service for some time, 
are obtained from companies such as R.L. Polk, which cull the names and 
addresses of vehicle owners from State motor vehicle registries. NTEA 
provides no information or support for its statements regarding the 
relationships between incomplete vehicle manufacturers and dealers or 
its contention that ``the incomplete vehicle manufacturer is in a much 
better position to obtain information'' about owners to conduct a 
recall.
    NTEA's position also contradicts the manner in which NHTSA has 
historically treated multistage and incomplete vehicles. As discussed 
above, NHTSA has traditionally regarded an incomplete vehicle as an 
item of original equipment installed on the vehicle, as finally 
assembled, at the time it is delivered to its first purchaser.\155\ 
Under provisions of the Safety Act now codified at 49 U.S.C. 
30102(b)(G) and (b)(F), a defect or noncompliance in original equipment 
``is deemed to be a defect or noncompliance of the motor vehicle in or 
on which the equipment was installed at the time of delivery of the 
first purchaser,'' and ``the manufacturer of a motor vehicle in or on 
which original equipment was installed at the time of delivery to the 
first purchaser is deemed to be the manufacturer of the equipment.'' As 
such, the final-stage manufacturer properly holds default recall 
responsibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ See Interp. letter to B.H. Smith, Nabors Trailers, Inc. 
(Oct. 3, 1969).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Additional Points in Support of NHTSA's Decision
    NTEA's alternative argument is that default responsibility should 
rest with incomplete vehicle manufacturers. Apart from the legal issues 
and practices noted above, this ignores the fact that there are 
considerable fairness issues associated with assigning default recall 
responsibility to a class of manufacturers that has no say in what 
happens to an incomplete vehicle once it leaves their hands. The 
incomplete vehicle manufacturer transfers the incomplete vehicle to a 
subsequent manufacturer over which the incomplete vehicle manufacturer 
has no control, and the subsequent manufacturer builds on the 
incomplete vehicle a completed vehicle about which the incomplete 
vehicle manufacturer may have no knowledge. Given these circumstances, 
to require the incomplete vehicle manufacturer to have default recall 
responsibility over the vehicle as finally assembled would be to impose 
a regulatory scheme without logical support, which NHTSA declines to 
do.
6. Conclusion
    Because NTEA's arguments regarding default recall responsibility 
are

[[Page 28194]]

founded, in large part, on a factual premise (i.e., that final-stage 
manufacturers often unfairly assume the burden of recalls for problems 
they did not cause) expressly controverted by NHTSA's review of 
multistage vehicle recalls, many of NTEA's arguments cannot be 
accepted. Moreover, the logic and policy behind assigning default 
recall responsibility to final-stage manufacturers are supported by 
both the agency's historical treatment of multistage vehicles and the 
documented practice of incomplete vehicle manufacturers taking 
responsibility for recalls for which their actions are the 
precipitating cause. Therefore, NHTSA must deny NTEA's petition as it 
pertains to recall responsibility.

I. There Is No Need for NHTSA To Require IVDs for Completed Vehicles 
That Are Commonly Altered, or To Allow Alterers To Rely on Pass-Through 
Certification Opportunities Presented in IVDs

    Noting that IVDs and the related pass-through opportunities are 
available only for incomplete vehicles, but that some IVDs include 
conformity statements for completed vehicles as well as for incomplete 
vehicles, NTEA asked that alterers be allowed to rely on such 
conformity statements in performing their own certification 
responsibilities. NTEA further requested the agency to require IVDs for 
completed vehicle configurations commonly altered prior to first retail 
sale.
    Agency response: Unlike incomplete vehicles, completed vehicles 
that are altered prior to first retail sale have already been certified 
by their original manufacturer as complying with all applicable FMVSS. 
By affixing the appropriate label, as required under 49 CFR 567.4, the 
original manufacturer discharges its certification responsibilities 
with respect to the vehicle. It would be unreasonable to expect the 
original manufacturer to be able to anticipate that a vehicle it has 
fully manufactured and certified will be altered prior to first retail 
sale, and even more unreasonable to expect the manufacturer to 
anticipate the myriad kinds of alterations that could be performed on 
such a vehicle. The agency is therefore unwilling to require 
manufacturers to supply IVDs with completed vehicles. Accordingly, we 
deny this aspect of NTEA's petition.
    Nevertheless, the agency is aware that IVDs for some incomplete 
vehicle models are readily available on their manufacturers' websites 
and elsewhere. To the extent that a vehicle to be altered is similar to 
one produced in an incomplete vehicle configuration, the alterer is 
able to rely on appropriate compliance statements made in the relevant 
IVD, if any, in certifying that the vehicle remains in compliance with 
all applicable FMVSS affected by the alteration.
    The agency notes that unlike a final-stage manufacturer, which must 
certify a vehicle's compliance with all applicable standards, an 
alterer need only ``ascertain that the vehicle as altered conforms to 
the standards which are affected by the alteration,'' and must certify 
that the vehicle, as altered, ``conforms to all applicable Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety, Bumper, and Theft Prevention Standards affected 
by the alteration.'' \156\ Given the more circumscribed nature of this 
certification, the agency does not recognize alterers as needing the 
same opportunities for pass-through certification that are needed by 
final-stage manufacturers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \156\ See 49 CFR 567.7 and 568.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

J. Technical Amendment

    NTEA noted that section 568.4(a)(5), as amended under the final 
rule, provides that the IVD should include the ``[g]ross axle weight 
rating (GAWR) for each axle of the completed vehicle * * *'' (Emphasis 
added.) NTEA suggested that ``incomplete vehicle'' be substituted for 
the highlighted phrase. The agency agrees that the existing language in 
paragraph (a)(5) is unclear, and has reworded the first sentence of 
that paragraph to correspond to the language of paragraph (a)(4), 
pertaining to the gross vehicle weight rating specification in the IVD. 
By doing so, the agency grants this aspect of NTEA's petition.

III. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' (58 FR 
51735, October 4, 1993), provides for making determinations whether a 
regulatory action is ``significant'' and therefore subject to Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) review and to the requirements of the 
Executive Order. The Order defines a ``significant regulatory action'' 
as one that is likely to result in a rule that may:
    (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or 
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the 
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public 
health or safety, or State, local, or Tribal governments or 
communities;
    (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an 
action taken or planned by another agency;
    (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, 
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients 
thereof; or
    (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal 
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in 
the Executive Order.
    We have considered the impact of this rulemaking under Executive 
Order 12866 and the Department of Transportation's regulatory policies 
and procedures, and for the following reasons have determined that it 
is not a ``significant regulatory action'' within the meaning of 
section 3 of E.O. 12866 and is not ``significant'' within the meaning 
of the Department of Transportation's regulatory policies and 
procedures. There are only two non-technical amendments adopted in this 
rulemaking. The first permits manufacturers of multistage vehicles to 
petition the agency for temporary exemptions from ``dynamic test 
requirements'' in the FMVSS, as opposed to ``dynamic crash test 
requirements,'' which was specified in the February 2005 Final Rule. 
This amendment places no additional requirements on multistage vehicle 
manufacturers for the purpose of obtaining temporary exemptions, and 
can have no adverse consequence, financial or otherwise, for any party 
that stands to be affected by the rule.
    The second non-technical amendment requires multistage vehicle 
manufacturers who petition the agency for a temporary exemption under 
the expedited procedures in subpart B of 49 CFR part 555 to discuss in 
the petition the availability of alternate incomplete vehicles that 
could allow the petitioner to rely on IVDs when certifying a completed 
vehicle, instead of petitioning under that subpart. This amendment does 
not preclude multistage vehicles manufacturers who fail to discuss the 
availability of alternate incomplete vehicles from petitioning for a 
temporary exemption, as the temporary exemption procedures set forth in 
subpart A of 49 CFR part 555 could still be used in that circumstance. 
However, given the critical time limitations that the agency faces in 
processing a petition under subpart B, obvious means to avoid the need 
for filing such a petition must be addressed. This document was not 
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget under E.O. 12866, 
``Regulatory Planning and Review.''
    For the following reasons, NHTSA concludes that this final rule 
will not

[[Page 28195]]

have any quantifiable cost effect on motor vehicle manufacturers or 
motor vehicle equipment manufacturers. Even though multistage vehicle 
manufacturers stand to be affected by the two non-technical amendments 
adopted in this final rule, one of those amendments confers a benefit 
on those manufacturers by broadening the range of requirements in the 
FMVSS from which multistage manufacturers may obtain temporary 
exemptions. The other non-technical amendment merely adds a requirement 
for a fuller discussion of the need for a multistage manufacturer to 
obtain a temporary exemption on an expedited basis, but does not 
preclude those manufacturers from obtaining temporary exemptions under 
other procedures.
    Because the economic effects of this final rule are so minimal, no 
further regulatory evaluation is necessary.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., 
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 
(SBFEFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice 
of proposed rulemaking for any proposed or final rule, it must prepare 
and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis 
that describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small 
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions). 
The Small Business Administration's regulations at 13 CFR part 121 
define a small business, in part, as a business entity ``which operates 
primarily within the United States.'' (13 CFR 121.105(a)). No 
regulatory flexibility analysis is required if the head of an agency 
certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on 
a substantial number of small entities. The SBREFA amended the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act to require Federal agencies to provide a 
statement of the factual basis for certifying that a rule will not have 
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.
    The Deputy Administrator has considered the effects of this 
rulemaking action under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et 
seq.) and certifies that this final rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The 
statement of the factual basis for the certification is that this final 
rule, formulated in response to a petition for reconsideration, makes 
two non-technical amendments to the agency's regulations. The first 
allows multistage vehicle manufacturers, many of which qualify as small 
businesses, to obtain temporary exemptions on an expedited basis from a 
broader range of requirements in the FMVSS than were previously 
permitted under the regulation in question. The second non-technical 
amendment requires a petitioner to provide a fuller discussion of the 
need to obtain a temporary exemption on an expedited basis, but does 
not preclude a petitioner unwilling to provide this discussion from 
seeking an exemption under other applicable procedures. As such, the 
amendments impose no adverse economic impact on any party.
    For these reasons, and for the reasons described in our discussion 
on Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, 
NHTSA concludes that this final rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

C. National Environmental Policy Act

    NHTSA has analyzed these amendments for the purposes of the 
National Environmental Policy Act and determined that they will not 
have any significant impact on the quality of the human environment.

D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    Executive Order 13132 requires NHTSA to develop an accountable 
process to ensure ``meaningful and timely input by State and local 
officials in the development of regulatory policies that have 
federalism implications.'' The Executive Order defines ``policies that 
have federalism implications'' to include regulations that have 
``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between 
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.'' Under 
Executive Order 13132, NHTSA may not issue a regulation with Federalism 
implications, that imposes substantial direct compliance costs, and 
that is not required by statute, unless the Federal government provides 
the funds necessary to pay the direct compliance costs incurred by 
State and local governments, or the agency consults with State and 
local officials early in the process of developing the regulation. 
NHTSA also may not issue a regulation with Federalism implications and 
that preempts State law unless the agency consults with State and local 
officials early in the process of developing the regulation.
    NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking action in accordance with the 
principles and criteria set forth in Executive Order 13132. The agency 
has determined that this rule will not have sufficient federalism 
implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or 
the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This rule 
will not have any substantial effects on the States, or on the current 
Federal-State relationship, or on the current distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various local officials. Thus, the 
requirements of section 6 of the Executive Order do not apply.

E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) 
requires Federal agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, 
benefits and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a 
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local or 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more 
than $100 million annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of 
1995). Before promulgating a rule for which a written assessment is 
needed, section 205 of the UMRA generally requires NHTSA to identify 
and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and to 
adopt the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome 
alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule. The provisions of 
Section 205 do not apply when they are inconsistent with applicable 
law. Moreover, Section 205 allows NHTSA to adopt an alternative other 
than the least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome 
alternative if the agency publishes with the final rule an explanation 
as to why that alternative was not adopted.
    This rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local, or 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more 
than $100 million annually. Accordingly, this rule is not subject to 
the requirements of sections 202 and 205 of the UMRA.

F. Executive Order 12778 (Civil Justice Reform)

    Pursuant to Executive Order 12988 ``Civil Justice Reform,'' this 
agency has considered whether this final rule would have any 
retroactive effect. NHTSA concludes that this final rule will not have 
any retroactive effect. Judicial review of the rule may be obtainable 
under 5 U.S.C. 702. That section does not require submission of a 
petition for reconsideration or other administrative proceedings before 
parties may file suit in court.

[[Page 28196]]

G. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), a person is not 
required to respond to a collection of information by a Federal agency 
unless the collection displays a valid OMB control number. This final 
rule does not impose any new information collection requirements for 
which a 5 CFR part 1320 clearance must be obtained.

H. Executive Order 13045

    Executive Order 13045 applies to any rule that: (1) is determined 
to be ``economically significant'' as defined under E.O. 12866, and (2) 
concerns an environmental, health, or safety risk that NHTSA has reason 
to believe may have a disproportionate effect on children. If the 
regulatory action meets both criteria, we must evaluate the 
environmental health or safety effects of the planned rule on children, 
and explain why the planned regulation is preferable to other 
potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives considered 
by us.
    This rulemaking is not economically significant and does not 
involve any environmental, health, or safety risks that 
disproportionately affect children.

I. Privacy Act

    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all submissions 
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment or petition (or signing the comment or petition, 
if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). 
You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 
Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 
19477-78) or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

J. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

    Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement 
Act of 1995 (NTTAA), Pub. L. 104-113, section 12(d) (15 U.S.C. 272) 
directs NHTSA to use voluntary consensus standards in its regulatory 
activities unless doing so would be inconsistent with applicable law or 
otherwise impractical. Voluntary consensus standards are technical 
standards (e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling 
procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by 
voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as the Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE). The NTTAA directs the agency to provide Congress, 
through the OMB, explanations when we decide not to use available and 
applicable voluntary consensus standards.
    This rulemaking only addresses the allocation of legal 
responsibilities among regulated parties. As such, the issues involved 
here are not amenable to the development of voluntary standards.

K. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

    The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier 
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of 
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center 
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may 
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document 
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

0
In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR Chapter V as 
follows:

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Parts 555, 567, 568, and 571

    Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Tires.

PART 555--TEMPORARY EXEMPTION FROM MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY AND BUMPER 
STANDARDS

0
1. The authority citation for part 555 of title 49 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30113, 32502, Pub. L. 105-277; delegation 
of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.


0
2. Part 555 subpart B is amended by revising Sec. Sec.  555.11, 555.12, 
and 555.13 to read as follows:


Sec.  555.11  Application.

    This subpart applies to alterers and manufacturers of motor 
vehicles built in two or more stages to which one or more standards are 
applicable. No manufacturer or alterer that produces or alters a total 
exceeding 10,000 motor vehicles annually shall be eligible for a 
temporary exemption under this subpart. Any exemption granted under 
this subpart shall be limited, per manufacturer, to 2,500 vehicles to 
be sold in the United States in any 12 consecutive month period. 
Incomplete vehicle manufacturers and intermediate manufacturers that do 
not intend to certify the vehicles in accordance with 49 CFR 567.5(f) 
or (g), and instead furnish Incomplete Vehicle Documents to final-stage 
manufacturers in accordance with 49 CFR 568.4 or 49 CFR 568.5, are not 
eligible for temporary exemptions under this subpart.


Sec.  555.12  Petition for exemption.

    An alterer; an incomplete vehicle manufacturer intending to certify 
the vehicle in accordance with 49 CFR 567.5(f); an intermediate 
manufacturer intending to certify the vehicle in accordance with 49 CFR 
567.5(g); a final-stage manufacturer; or an industry trade association 
representing a group of alterers, incomplete vehicle manufacturers, 
intermediate manufacturers and/or final-stage manufacturers may seek, 
as to any vehicle configuration altered and/or built in two or more 
stages, a temporary exemption or a renewal of a temporary exemption 
from any performance requirement for which a Federal motor vehicle 
safety standard specifies the use of a dynamic test procedure to 
determine compliance. Each petition for an exemption under this section 
must be submitted to NHTSA and must:
    (a) Be written in the English language;
    (b) Be submitted in three copies to: Administrator, National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh St., SW., 
Washington, DC 20590;
    (c) State the full name and address of the applicant, the nature of 
its organization (e.g., individual, partnership, corporation, or trade 
association), the name of the State or country under the laws of which 
it is organized, and the name of each alterer, incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer, intermediate manufacturer and/or final-stage manufacturer 
for which the exemption is sought;
    (d) State the number, title, paragraph designation, and the text or 
substance of the portion(s) of the standard(s) from which the exemption 
is sought;
    (e) Describe by type and use each vehicle configuration (or range 
of vehicle configurations) for which the exemption is sought;
    (f) State the estimated number of units of each vehicle 
configuration to be produced annually by each of the manufacturer(s) 
for whom the exemption is sought;
    (g) Specify any part of the information and data submitted that the 
petitioner requests be withheld from public disclosure in accordance 
with part 512 of this chapter, as provided by Sec.  555.5(b)(6).
    (1) The information and data which petitioner requests be withheld 
from public disclosure must be submitted in accordance with Sec.  512.4 
of this chapter.
    (2) The petitioner's request for withholding from public disclosure 
must be accompanied by a certification in support as set forth in 
appendix A to part 512 of this chapter.


Sec.  555.13  Basis for petition.

    The petition shall:
    (a) Discuss any factors (e.g., demand for the vehicle 
configuration, loss of

[[Page 28197]]

market, difficulty in procuring goods and services necessary to conduct 
dynamic tests) that the applicant desires NHTSA to consider in deciding 
whether to grant the application based on economic hardship.
    (b) Explain the grounds on which the applicant asserts that the 
application of the dynamic test requirements of the standard(s) in 
question to the vehicles covered by the application would cause 
substantial economic hardship to each of the manufacturers on whose 
behalf the application is filed, providing a complete financial 
statement for each manufacturer and a complete description of each 
manufacturer's good faith efforts to comply with the standards, 
including a discussion of:
    (1) The extent that no Type (1) or Type (2) statement with respect 
to such standard is available in the incomplete vehicle document 
furnished, per part 568 of this chapter, by the incomplete vehicle 
manufacturer or by a prior intermediate-stage manufacturer or why, if 
one is available, it cannot be followed;
    (2) A description of the incomplete vehicle to be used to 
manufacture the vehicle(s) subject to the petition. This description 
must identify the manufacturer of the incomplete vehicle, state the 
incomplete vehicle's GVWR, and provide other available specifications;
    (3) The availability of alternative incomplete vehicles, including 
incomplete vehicles of different size, GVWR, and number of axles, from 
the same and other incomplete vehicle manufacturers, that could allow 
the petitioner to rely on Incomplete Vehicle Documents when certifying 
the completed vehicle, instead of petitioning under this subpart;
    (4) The existence, or lack thereof, of generic or cooperative 
testing that would provide a basis for demonstrating compliance with 
the standard(s); and
    (c) Explain why the requested temporary exemption would not 
unreasonably degrade safety.

PART 568--VEHICLES MANUFACTURED IN TWO OR MORE STAGES

0
1. The authority citation for part 568 of title 49 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30111, 30115, 30117, 30116; delegation of 
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.


0
2. Part 568 is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph 
(a)(5) of Sec.  568.4 to read as follows:


Sec.  568.4  Requirements for incomplete vehicle manufacturers.

    (a) * * *
    (5) Gross axle weight rating (GAWR) for each axle of the completed 
vehicle for which the incomplete vehicle is intended, listed and 
identified in order from front to rear (e.g., front, first 
intermediate, second intermediate, rear). * * *
* * * * *

Jacqueline Glassman,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 06-4387 Filed 5-12-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P