[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 69 (Tuesday, April 11, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18380-18390]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-5216]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on 
Technical Specification Improvement Regarding Revision to the 
Completion Time in STS 3.6.6A, ``Containment Spray and Cooling 
Systems'' for Combustion Engineering Pressurized Water Reactors Using 
the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model license amendment 
request (LAR), model safety evaluation (SE), and model proposed no 
significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination related to 
changes to the completion times (CT) in Standard Technical 
Specification (STS) 3.6.6A, ``Containment Spray and Cooling Systems.'' 
The proposed changes would revise STS 3.6.6A by extending the CT for 
one containment spray system (CSS) train inoperable from 72 hours to 
seven days, and add a Condition describing required Actions and CT when 
one CSS and one containment cooling system (CCS) are inoperable. These 
changes are based on analyses provided in a joint applications report 
submitted by the Combustion Engineering Owner's Group (CEOG). The CEOG 
participants in the Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) proposed 
this change to the STS in Change Traveler No. TSTF-409, Revision 2.
    The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently 
process amendments to incorporate these changes into plant-specific STS 
for Combustion Engineering pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Licensees 
of nuclear power reactors to which the models apply can request 
amendments conforming to the models. In such a

[[Page 18381]]

request, a licensee should confirm the applicability of the SE and NSHC 
determination to its plant, and provide the expected supplemental 
information requested in the model LAR. The NRC staff is requesting 
comments on the model LAR, model SE and NSHC determination before 
announcing their availability for referencing in license amendment 
applications.

DATES: The comment period expires 30 days from the date of this 
publication. Comments received after this date will be considered if it 
is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to ensure 
consideration only for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S. 
mail.
    Submit written comments to: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, 
Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail 
Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001.
    Hand deliver comments to 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 
between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays.
    Comments may be submitted by electronic mail to [email protected].
    Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's Public 
Document Room, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1-
F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric Thomas, Mail Stop: O-12H2, 
Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-6772.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process [CLIIP] for Adopting Standard Technical 
Specifications Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 
2000. The CLIIP is intended to improve the efficiency and transparency 
of NRC licensing processes. This is accomplished by processing proposed 
changes to the STS in a manner that supports subsequent license 
amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the 
public to comment on proposed changes to the STS following a 
preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change 
will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. This notice is 
soliciting comment on a proposed change to the STS that changes the CSS 
CTs for the Combustion Engineering reactor STS, NUREG-1432, Revision 3. 
The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments received for a 
proposed change to the STS and to either reconsider the change or 
proceed with announcing the availability of the change for proposed 
adoption by licensees. Those licensees opting to apply for the subject 
change to TSs are responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation, 
referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any 
necessary plant-specific information. Following the public comment 
period, the model SE will be finalized, and posted on the NRC webpage. 
The model SE is accompanied by a model LAR. The model LAR shows 
licensees the expected level of detail that needs to be included in 
order to adopt TSTF-409, Rev. 2, as well as guidelines for staff 
review. The NRC will establish an internal review plan that designates 
the appropriate staff and approximate timelines to review plant-
specific LARs that reference TSTF-409. Each amendment application made 
in response to the notice of availability will be processed and noticed 
in accordance with applicable NRC rules and procedures.
    This notice involves an increase in the allowed CTs to restore an 
inoperable CSS on Combustion Engineering PWRs. By letter dated November 
10, 2003, the CEOG proposed this change for incorporation into the STS 
as TSTF-409, Revision 2. This change is based on the NRC staff-approved 
generic analyses contained in the CE NPSD-1045-A, ``Joint Applications 
Report: Modification to the Containment Spray System, and Low Pressure 
Safety Injection System Technical Specifications,'' dated March 2000, 
as approved by NRC in a SE dated December 21, 1999, accessible 
electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management 
System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML993620241) at the NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who 
encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, should 
contact the NRC Public Document Room Reference staff by telephone at 1-
800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].

Applicability

    This proposed change to revise the Technical Specification (TS) CT 
for one inoperable CSS is applicable to Combustion Engineering PWRs.
    To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, 
the NRC staff requests that each licensee applying for the changes 
addressed by TSTF-409, Revision 2, use the CLIIP to submit a LAR that 
adheres to the following model. Any deviations from the model LAR 
should be explained in the licensee's submittal. When applying, 
licensees should ensure they address the eight conditions and one 
regulatory commitment listed in the model LAR and model SE.
    The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an alternative 
approach or proposing the changes without providing the information 
described in the eight model LAR conditions, or making the requested 
commitment. Variations from the approach recommended in this notice 
may, however, require additional review by the NRC staff and may 
increase the time and resources needed for the review. Significant 
variations from the approach, or inclusion of additional changes to the 
license, will result in staff rejection of the submittal. Instead, 
licensees desiring significant variations and/or additional changes 
should submit a LAR that does not claim to adopt TSTF-409.

Public Notices

    This notice requests comments from interested members of the public 
within 30 days of the date of this publication. Following the NRC 
staff's evaluation of comments received as a result of this notice, the 
NRC staff may reconsider the proposed change or may proceed with 
announcing the availability of the change in a subsequent notice 
(possibly with some changes to the model LAR, model SE or model NSHC 
determination as a result of public comments). If the NRC staff 
announces the availability of the change, licensees wishing to adopt 
the change will submit a LAR in accordance with applicable rules and 
other regulatory requirements. The NRC staff will, in turn, issue a 
notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility operating 
license(s) for each LAR, a proposed NSHC determination, and an 
opportunity for a hearing. A notice of issuance of an amendment to 
operating license(s) will also be issued to announce the revised 
requirements for each plant that applies for and receives the requested 
change.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 29th day of March 2006.


[[Page 18382]]


    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Thomas H. Boyce,
Branch Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection 
and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
    For inclusion on the technical specification Web page. The 
following example of a License Amendment Request (LAR) was prepared by 
the NRC staff to facilitate the adoption of Technical Specifications 
Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-409, Revision 2, ``Containment Spray 
System Completion Time Extension (CE NPSD-1045-A).'' The model provides 
the expected level of detail and content for a LAR to adopt TSTF-409, 
Revision 2. Licensees remain responsible for ensuring that their plant-
specific LAR fulfills their administrative requirements as well as NRC 
regulations.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk,
Washington, DC 20555.
SUBJECT: Plant Name Application for Technical Specification Improvement 
to Extend the Completion Time for Containment Spray System 
Inoperability in Accordance With TSTF-409, Revision 2.
Dear Sir or Madam:
    In accordance with the provisions of Section 50.90 of Title 10 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), [LICENSEE] is submitting a 
request for an amendment to the technical specifications (TS) for 
[PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.].
    The proposed changes would revise TS 3.6.6A, ``Containment Spray 
and Cooling Systems,'' by extending from 72 hours to seven days the 
completion time (CT) to restore an inoperable containment spray system 
(CSS). In addition, a Condition would be added to the TS to allow one 
CSS and one containment cooling system (CCS) to be inoperable for a 
period of 72 hours.
    The changes are consistent with NRC-approved Industry Technical 
Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change 
Traveler, TSTF-409, Revision 2, ``Containment Spray System Completion 
Time Extension (CE NPSD-1045-A).''
    Enclosure 1 provides a description and assessment of the proposed 
changes and confirmation of applicability. Enclosure 2 provides the 
existing TS pages marked-up to show the proposed changes. Enclosure 3 
provides the existing TS Bases pages marked-up to reflect the proposed 
changes (for information only). Final TS Bases will be provided in a 
future update to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) in 
accordance with the Bases Control Program. Attachments 1 through 8 
provide the discussions of [LICENSEE'S] evaluations and supporting 
information with regard to the conditions stipulated in Section 4.2.1 
of Enclosure 1.
    [LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed license amendment by 
[DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 
DAYS]. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, 
with enclosures, is being provided to the designated [STATE] Official.
    I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United 
States of America that I am authorized by [LICENSEE] to make this 
request and that the foregoing is true and correct. [Note that request 
may be notarized in lieu of using this oath or affirmation statement]. 
If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please 
contact [ ].

 Sincerely,

Name, Title

Enclosures:
    1. Description and Assessment of Proposed Changes
    2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes
    3. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes (if applicable)
Attachments:
    1. Licensee's supporting information for condition 1
    2. Licensee's supporting information for condition 2
    3. Licensee's supporting information for condition 3
    4. Licensee's supporting information for condition 4
    5. Licensee's supporting information for condition 5
    6. Licensee's supporting information for condition 6
    7. Licensee's supporting information for condition 7
    8. Licensee's supporting information for condition 8
cc: NRR Project Manager
 Regional Office
 Resident Inspector
 State Contact
 ITSB Branch Chief

1.0 Description

    This letter is a request to amend Operating License(s) [LICENSE 
NUMBER(S)] for [PLANT/UNIT NAME(S)].
    The proposed changes would revise Technical Specification (TS) 
3.6.6A, ``Containment Spray and Cooling Systems,'' by extending from 72 
hours to seven days the completion time (CT) to restore an inoperable 
containment spray system (CSS) train to operable status, and would add 
a Condition describing the required action and CT when one CSS and one 
containment cooling system (CCS) are inoperable.
    The changes are consistent with NRC approved Industry Owner's Group 
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical 
Specification Change Traveler TSTF-409, Revision 2 (Rev. 2), 
``Containment Spray System Completion Time Extension (CE NPSD-1045-
A).'' TSTF-409, Rev. 2 was approved by the NRC on [DATE].

2.0 Proposed Change

    Specifically, the proposed revision extends the CT (or allowed 
outage time) that one CSS train is permitted to remain inoperable from 
72 hours to seven days based on Reference 1, as accepted by, and 
subject to the limitations specified in, Reference 2. TSTF-409, Rev. 2 
states that the longer CT will enhance overall plant safety by avoiding 
potential unscheduled plant shutdowns and allowing greater availability 
of safety significant components during shutdown. In addition, the 
TSTF-409, Rev. 2 states that this extension provides for increased 
flexibility in scheduling and performing maintenance and surveillance 
activities in order to enhance plant safety and operational flexibility 
during lower modes of operation.
    The revision also adds a condition statement to allow one CSS train 
and one CCS train to be inoperable for up to 72 hours. Since the 
Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) joint applications report 
did not evaluate the concurrent inoperabilities of one CSS train and 
one CCS train, the CT for this condition was limited to 72 hours.
    [LICENSEE] also proposes to make changes to the supporting TS 
Bases. Changes to the Bases include supporting information justifying 
the addition of the Condition statement for one CSS train and one CCS 
train inoperable. The Bases changes also include a reviewer's note that 
requires [LICENSEE] to adopt Reference 1 and meet the requirements of 
References 1 and 2 prior to utilizing the 7-day CT for one inoperable 
CSS. Finally, a reference to Reference 1 is added to the Bases.
    In summary, [LICENSEE] proposes to extend the CT for one inoperable 
CSS from 72 hours to 7 days based on Reference 1, and add a Condition 
statement to allow one CSS train and one CCS to be inoperable for up to 
72 hours.

[[Page 18383]]

3.0 Background

    The function of the containment heat removal systems under accident 
conditions is to remove heat from the containment atmosphere, thus 
maintaining the containment pressure and temperature at acceptably low 
levels. The systems also serve to limit offsite radiation levels by 
reducing the pressure differential between the containment atmosphere 
and the external environment, thereby decreasing the driving force for 
fission product leakage across the containment. The two containment 
heat removal systems are the CCS and the CSS. The CCS fan coolers are 
designed to operate during both normal plant operations and under loss-
of-coolant accident (LOCA) or main steam line break (MSLB) conditions. 
The CSS is designed to operate during accident conditions only.
    The heat removal capacity of the CCS and CSS is sufficient to keep 
the containment temperature and pressure below design conditions for 
any size break, up to and including a double-ended break of the largest 
reactor coolant pipe. The systems are also designed to mitigate the 
consequences of any size break, up to and including a double-ended 
break of a main steam line. The CCS and CSS continue to reduce 
containment pressure and temperature and maintain them at acceptable 
levels post-accident.
    The CCS and CSS at [PLANT NAME] each consist of [Substitute plant-
specific configuration if it differs from the following description] 
two redundant loops and are designed such that a single failure does 
not degrade their ability to provide the required heat removal 
capability. Two of four containment fan coolers and one CSS loop are 
powered from one safety-related bus. The other two containment fan 
coolers and CSS loop are powered from another independent safety-
related bus. The loss of one bus does not affect the ability of the 
containment heat removal systems to maintain containment temperature 
and pressure below the design values in a post-accident mode.
    The [PLANT NAME] CSS consists of [Substitute plant-specific 
configuration if it differs from the following description] two 
independent and redundant loops each containing a spray pump, shutdown 
heat exchanger, piping, valves, spray headers, and spray nozzles. It 
has two modes of operation, which are:
    1. The injection mode, during which the system sprays borated water 
from the refueling water tank (RWT) into the containment, and
    2. The recirculation mode, which is automatically initiated by the 
recirculation actuation signal (RAS) after low level is reached in the 
RWT. During this mode of operation, the safety injection system (SIS) 
sump provides suction for the spray pumps.
    Containment spray is automatically initiated by the containment 
spray actuation signal coincident with the safety injection actuation 
signal and high containment pressure signal. If required, the operator 
can manually activate the system from the main control room.
    Each CSS pump, together with a CCS loop, provides the flow 
necessary to remove the heat generated inside the containment following 
a LOCA or MSLB. Upon system activation, the pumps are started and the 
borated water flows into the containment spray headers. When low level 
is reached in the RWT, sufficient water has been transferred to the 
containment to allow for the recirculation mode of operation. Spray 
pump suction is automatically realigned to the SIS sump upon a RAS.
    During the recirculation mode, the spray water is cooled by the 
shutdown heat exchangers prior to discharge into the containment. The 
shutdown heat exchangers are cooled by the component cooling water 
system. Post-LOCA pH control is provided by [Substitute plant-specific 
configuration if it differs from the following description] trisodium 
phosphate dodecahydrate, which is stored in stainless steel baskets 
located in the containment near the SIS sump intake.
    The longer CT for an inoperable CSS train will enhance overall 
plant safety by avoiding potential unscheduled plant shutdowns and 
allowing greater availability of safety significant components during 
shutdown. In addition, this extension provides for increased 
flexibility in scheduling and performing maintenance and surveillance 
activities in order to enhance plant safety and operational flexibility 
during lower modes of operation.

4.0 Technical Analysis

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed References 1 and 2, as well as TSTF-409, 
Rev. 2, and the model SE published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of 
the CLIIP Notice for Comment. [LICENSEE] has applied the methodology in 
Reference 1 to develop the proposed TS changes. [LICENSEE] has also 
concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-409, Rev. 2 and the 
model SE prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to [PLANT NAME], and 
justify this amendment for the incorporation of changes to the [PLANT 
NAME] TS.
    In determining the suitability and safety impact of its adoption of 
TSTF-409, Rev. 2, [LICENSEE] analyzed the effect of increasing the CT 
for one CSS train to remain out of service using both traditional 
engineering considerations and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) 
methods.

4.1 Traditional (Deterministic) Engineering Analysis

    The functions and operation of the CSS and CCS were described in 
Section 3.0 of this application. Based on a review of the design-basis 
requirements for the CSS, [LICENSEE] concluded that the loss of one CSS 
train is well within the design-basis analyses. This conclusion is 
based on the fact that each CSS pump, together with a CCS loop, 
provides the flow necessary to remove the heat generated inside the 
containment following a LOCA or MSLB. Therefore, the combination of one 
CSS pump and one CCS loop can carry out the design functions of 
maintaining the containment pressure and temperature at acceptably low 
levels following a design-basis accident (DBA), and limiting offsite 
radiation levels by reducing the pressure differential between the 
containment atmosphere and the external environment, thereby decreasing 
the driving force for fission product leakage across the containment.
    The plant status with both CSS trains inoperable is covered by TS 
3.6.6A, ACTION G., which states:

    [With] two containment spray trains inoperable or any 
combination of three or more [CSS/CCS] trains inoperable, LCO 
[Limiting Condition for Operation] 3.0.3 shall be entered 
immediately.

    ACTION G addresses the condition in which two CSS trains are 
inoperable and requires restoration of at least one CSS train to 
OPERABLE status within 1 hour or the plant be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN in 
6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours, with COLD 
SHUTDOWN being the acceptable end state. These requirements are 
consistent with similar requirements elsewhere in the TS and therefore 
are acceptable.
    The plant status with one CSS train and one CCS train inoperable is 
covered by TS 3.6.6A, ACTION D, which states:

    [With] one containment spray and one containment cooling train 
inoperable, restore containment spray train to OPERABLE status 
within 72 hours, or restore containment cooling train to OPERABLE 
status within 72 hours.


[[Page 18384]]


    ACTION D ensures that the iodine removal capabilities of the CSS 
are available, along with 100 percent of the heat removal needs after 
an accident. The supporting analyses performed in CE NPSD-1045-A did 
not evaluate the concurrent inoperabilities of one CSS train and one 
CCS train, therefore, the current CT of 72 hours is retained in 
Condition D. The 72 hour Completion Time was developed taking into 
account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by 
combinations of the CSS and CCS, the iodine removal function of the 
CSS, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

4.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Evaluation

    [LICENSEE] evaluated the proposed CT extension for the CSS using 
Reference 4. This is the same methodology that the NRC staff used in 
Reference 2. The Principles of Risk-Informed Integrated Decisionmaking 
listed in Reference 4 are as follows:

Principle I: The proposed CT change meets the current regulation
Principle II: The proposed CT change is consistent with the defense-in-
depth philosophy
Principle III: The proposed CT change maintains sufficient safety 
margin
Principle IV: The CT risk (Incremental Conditional Core Damage 
Probability [ICCDP], and Incremental Conditional Large Early Release 
Probability [ICLERP]) is small
Principle V: Commitment to monitor the impact of the proposed CT change

    In Reference 2, the NRC staff found, and [LICENSEE] agrees, that in 
risk-informed TS CT applications, Principle I is met, since regulations 
do not require specific CTs, but, rather, require ``remedial actions'' 
when an LCO cannot be met. Additionally, in its analysis of Principle 
III, the NRC staff found, and [LICENSEE] agrees, that the proposed CT 
extension maintains sufficient safety margins. For [PLANT NAME], the 
loss of one CSS train is well within the plant's design basis.
    In Reference 2, the NRC staff determined that the intent of 
Principles II, IV, and V would be met by a three-tiered approach to 
evaluate the plant-specific risk impact associated with the proposed TS 
changes, consistent with the requirements of Reference 4. The first 
tier evaluates the plant-specific PRA model and the impact of the 
proposed CT extension on plant operational risk. The second tier 
addresses the need to preclude potentially high risk configurations by 
identifying the need for any additional constraints or compensatory 
actions that, if implemented, would avoid or reduce the probability of 
a risk-significant configuration during the time when one CSS train is 
out of service. The third tier evaluates [LICENSEE'S] proposed 
Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) to ensure that the 
applicable plant configuration will be appropriately assessed from a 
risk perspective before entering into or during the proposed CT.
    In addition, the NRC staff determined in Reference 2 that the risk 
analysis methodology and approach used by the CEOG to estimate the risk 
impact of increasing the CT were reasonable. For most plants that 
participated in the joint application report, the NRC staff found that 
the risk impact was shown to be consistent with the acceptance 
guidelines for change in core damage frequency ([Delta]CDF), change in 
large early release frequency ([Delta]LERF), incremental conditional 
core damage probability (ICCDP), and incremental conditional large 
early release probability (ICLERP) specified in References 3 and 4 and 
Chapters 19.0 and 16.1 of Reference 5. However, not all Combustion 
Engineering (CE) plants participated in the joint application report, 
and the estimated risk impacts for some plants exceeded the Reference 3 
and/or Reference 4 acceptance guidelines, which would require 
additional justifications and/or compensatory measures to be provided 
for these plants to be determined to have acceptable risk impacts.
    In addition, the NRC staff found that the Tier 2 and Tier 3 
evaluations, as described in Reference 4, could not be approved 
generically since they were not complete, which would require that each 
individual plant-specific license amendment seeking adoption of TSTF-
409, Rev. 2 would need to include an assessment with respect to the 
Tier 2 and Tier 3 principles of Reference 4.
4.2.1 Conditions and Supporting Information
    The following conditions are provided to support adoption of TSTF-
409, Rev. 2 by [PLANT NAME]. Responses to the conditions are contained 
in Attachments 1 through 8 to this application: [NOTE: Licensees who 
cannot meet the Expectations and Acceptance Criteria listed in these 
conditions should not submit an application to adopt TSTF-409, Rev. 2 
under the CLIIP.]
    1. As shown in Attachment 1, the plant-specific Tier 1 information 
associated with extending the CSS CT meets the acceptance guidelines of 
References 3 and 4 associated with [Delta]CDF, [Delta]LERF, ICCDP, and 
ICLERP.
    [EXPECTATIONS/ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: The licensee's submittal must 
provide the [Delta]CDF, [Delta]LERF, ICCDP, and ICLERP values related 
to the CSS extended CT and confirm that they meet the associated 
acceptance guidelines of References 3 and 4 as no more than a small 
risk increase (i.e., are in Region II or III of the acceptance 
guidelines figures). If a zero maintenance PRA model is used (as 
opposed to an average/nominal maintenance PRA model) in performing 
these calculations, then the licensee must make a commitment that no 
other maintenance will be performed during the extended CSS CT and 
describe how this commitment will be implemented.]
    2. As shown in Attachment 2, the technical adequacy (quality) of 
[PLANT NAME'S] plant-specific PRA is acceptable for this application in 
accordance with the guidance provided in Reference 3. Specifically, the 
supporting information addresses the following areas:
    a. Justification that the plant-specific PRA reflects the as-built, 
as-operated plant.
    b. Discussion of plant-specific PRA updates and upgrades since the 
individual plant examination (IPE) and individual plant examination of 
external events (IPEEE).
    c. Discussion of plant-specific PRA peer reviews and/or self-
assessments performed, their overall conclusions, any facts and 
observations (F&Os) applicable to this application, and the licensee 
evaluation and resolution (e.g., by implementing model changes and/or 
sensitivity studies) of these F&Os to demonstrate the conclusions of 
the plant-specific analyses for this application are not adversely 
impacted (i.e., continued acceptability of the proposed extension of 
the CSS CT).
    d. Description of the licensee's plant-specific PRA configuration 
control (quality assurance) program and associated procedures.
    e. Overall determination of the adequacy of the plant-specific PRA 
with respect to this application.
    [EXPECTATION: The licensee's submittal must describe the scope of 
the plant-specific PRA and must justify its technical adequacy 
(quality) for this application in accordance with the guidance provided 
in Reference 3. Specifically, the supporting information must address 
each area in sufficient detail as shown in the following ACCEPTANCE 
CRITERIA:
    a. The licensee must provide a justification that confirms that the 
plant-specific PRA reflects the as-built, as-operated plant. This 
should include a description of the licensee's data and

[[Page 18385]]

model update process, and the frequency of these activities. The 
licensee should also describe how the plant/corporate PRA staff are 
involved in (and/or made aware of) plant and operational/procedural 
modifications.
    b. The licensee must provide a summary description of the plant-
specific PRA updates and upgrades since the IPE and IPEEE.
    c. The licensee must discuss their plant-specific PRA peer reviews 
and/or any self-assessments performed (especially noting those 
conducted per the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) industry peer review 
guidelines, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) (PRA 
Standard, and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.201), their overall conclusions, 
any F&Os applicable to this application, and the licensee's evaluation 
and resolution (e.g., by implementing model changes and/or sensitivity 
studies) of these F&Os to demonstrate the conclusions of the plant-
specific analyses for this application are not adversely impacted 
(i.e., continued acceptability of the proposed extension of the CSS 
CT).
    d. The licensee must describe their plant-specific PRA 
configuration control (quality assurance) program and associated 
procedures.
    e. The licensee must make an overall determination of the adequacy 
of their plant-specific PRA, confirming it is adequate with respect to 
this application.]
    3. Attachment 3 provides supporting information verifying that the 
plant risk impact associated with external events (e.g., fires, 
seismic, tornados, high winds, etc.) does not adversely impact the 
conclusions of the plant-specific analyses for this application.
    [EXPECTATIONS: The licensee's submittal must discuss the plant 
risks associated with external events and specifically identify 
(quantitatively and qualitatively, as appropriate) the impact of CSS CT 
extension on the risks associated with external events.
    If the licensee has performed updated analyses of an external event 
since the staff review and acceptance of their IPEEE, the licensee must 
describe the significant changes involved in their updated analyses and 
the impact of these changes on plant risk associated with this external 
event.
    For external events in which the licensee used a screening approach 
in their IPEEE to screen the external event from further consideration, 
the licensee must specifically identify these external events and 
provide confirmation that the screening took no credit for CSS 
availability/reliability (e.g., fire conditional core damage 
probability (CCDP) models/calculations did not include CSS failure 
rates or unavailabilities) and confirm that the screening is still 
appropriate, especially considering plant/procedural modifications 
since the screening analyses were performed.
    If, however, an external event was screened from consideration and 
part of the screening took credit for the availability/reliability of 
the CSS, or if plant/procedural modifications have occurred such that 
the external event would no longer be screened out, then the licensee 
must provide an analysis of the existing condition which also considers 
the change in impact due to the requested CT extension.
    ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: For external events for which the licensee has 
a PRA, the licensee must provide the risk values (i.e., CDF and LERF) 
associated with the specifically analyzed external events and the 
change in risk (i.e., [Delta]CDF, [Delta]LERF, ICCDP, and ICLERP) 
associated with the CSS CT extension. The licensee must also provide 
the total risk and total change in risk due to all PRA-analyzed 
contributors (combining internal events, internal flooding, external 
events, and shutdown PRA results) and this total contribution must meet 
References 3 and 4 acceptance guidelines for the NRC staff to conclude 
the quantified risk associated with the extension request is 
acceptable.
    For external events for which the licensee does not have a PRA (and 
it is not screened out as above), but rather relies on a non-PRA method 
(e.g., seismic margins analysis (SMA) or fire-induced vulnerability 
evaluation (FIVE)), to determine if the plant risk is acceptable, the 
licensee must confirm that there were and still are no vulnerabilities 
or outliers associated with these external events, or identify any 
vulnerabilities or outliers that were identified in their documented 
analyses (most likely in their IPEEE) and confirm that all of these 
vulnerabilities or outliers have been resolved and, as needed, the 
appropriate plant/procedural modifications have been implemented as 
described in their documented analyses.]
    4. Supporting information is provided in Attachment 4, consistent 
with the evaluation summary and conclusions (Sections 7 and 8) provided 
in Reference 2, that discusses implementation of procedures that 
prohibit entry into an extended CSS CT for scheduled maintenance 
purposes if external event conditions or warnings (e.g., severe weather 
warnings for ice, tornados, high winds, etc.) are in effect. 
[LICENSEE'S] discussion confirms that [PLANT NAME'S] procedures include 
compensatory measures and normal plant practices that help avoid 
potentially high risk configurations during the proposed extension of 
the CSS CT. This supporting information must also address the Tier 2 
aspects of Reference 4.
    [EXPECTATIONS: The licensee's submittal must discuss (including 
licensee commitments related to) implementation of procedures that 
prohibit entry into an extended CSS CT for scheduled maintenance 
purposes if external event conditions or warnings are in effect. If the 
licensee does not want to implement this prohibition for specific 
severe weather conditions or warnings, the licensee must explicitly 
identify these event conditions/warnings and provide a justification 
for not including them.
    The licensee must also confirm that their procedures include 
compensatory measures and normal plant practices that help avoid 
potentially high risk configurations during the proposed extension of 
the CSS CT. This supporting information must also address the Tier 2 
aspects of Reference 4. The Tier 2 evaluation is meant to be an early 
evaluation (at the license submittal stage) to identify and preclude 
potentially high-risk plant configurations that could result if 
equipment, in addition to that associated with the proposed license 
amendment, is taken out of service simultaneously, or if other risk-
significant operational factors, such as concurrent system or equipment 
testing, are also involved.
    ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: The Tier 2 evaluation needs to identify, as 
part of the licensee's submittal, potentially high-risk plant 
configurations that need to be precluded and identify how this is 
implemented (i.e., typically these aspects result in licensees 
establishing compensatory measures/commitments to ensure these 
configurations are precluded). If, in conducting the evaluation, the 
licensee identifies no high-risk plant configurations, then the 
licensee needs to explicitly state this fact.]
    5. Attachment 5 provides supporting information, consistent with 
the evaluation summary and conclusions (Sections 7 and 8) provided in 
Reference 2, that describes the plant-specific risk-informed CRMP to 
assess the risk associated with the removal of equipment from service 
during the extended CSS CT. In this description, [LICENSEE] confirms 
that the program provides the necessary assurances that appropriate 
assessments of plant risk configurations are sufficient to support

[[Page 18386]]

the proposed CSS CT extension request. This supporting information also 
addresses the Tier 3 aspects of Reference 4.
    [EXPECTATIONS/ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: The licensee's submittal must 
describe their CRMP, including how it reflects the current plant PRA 
model (specifically identifying any deviations and simplifications in 
the CRMP model from the plant-specific PRA model) and how the CRMP is 
updated to remain consistent with the plant-specific PRA.
    The licensee's submittal must also describe how the CRMP provides 
the necessary assurances that appropriate assessments of plant risk 
configurations are sufficient to support the proposed CT extension 
request for the CSS.
    Finally, the licensee's submittal must address the Tier 3 aspects 
of Reference 4, including the description of the CRMP, and must confirm 
that their CRMP meets all aspects of Section 2.3.7 of Reference 4, 
specifically describing how their CRMP meets each of the four Key 
Components identified in this Section. The Tier 3 evaluation ensures 
that the CRMP is adequate when maintenance is about to commence, as 
opposed to the early (submittal stage) evaluation performed for Tier 
2.]
    6. Attachment 6 provides supporting information, consistent with 
the evaluation summary (Section 7) provided in Reference 2, confirming 
that the licensee's CRMP will not allow ``at power'' maintenance of the 
CSS and shutdown cooling system (SDCS) at the same time since the SDCS 
may be credited as a backup to CSS in supporting the containment spray 
function. Similarly, supporting information is provided confirming that 
the licensee's CRMP will ensure there is at least one CSS pump operable 
when maintenance of the CSS is performed in the lower modes of 
operation since CSS pumps are a backup to the SDCS pumps.
    [EXPECTATION: The licensee's submittal must describe the 
relationship/interfaces between the CSS and SDCS.
    ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: If the SDCS can be used as a backup to the 
CSS, then the licensee must confirm that ``at power'' maintenance of 
the CSS and SDCS will not be allowed at the same time and describe how 
this is controlled (e.g., specifically identified in the CRMP as a 
configuration that is not allowed). If the SDCS cannot be used (and is 
not credited) as a backup to CSS, then the licensee needs to explicitly 
state this fact.
    If CSS pumps can be used as a backup to the SDCS pumps, then the 
licensee must confirm that at least one CSS pump is required to be 
operable when maintenance of the CSS is performed in lower modes of 
operation and must describe how this is controlled. If CSS pumps cannot 
be used (and are not credited) as a backup to SDCS pumps in lower modes 
of operation, then the licensee needs to explicitly state this fact.]
    7. Attachment 7 provides supporting information confirming that the 
licensee's CRMP assessing Reference 3 and 4 risk acceptance guideline 
metrics, including [Delta]CDF, [Delta]LERF, ICCDP, and ICLERP, 
continues to be met for the CSS extended CT.
    [EXPECTATIONS/ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: The licensee must confirm that 
their CRMP quantitative model calculates [Delta]CDF, [Delta]LERF, 
ICCDP, and ICLERP and that their CRMP quantitative model explicitly 
models the CSS or has been modified to include the CSS, which will be 
used whenever CSS components are made unavailable.
    The licensee also must describe how their CRMP ensures Reference 3 
and 4 acceptance guidelines continue to be met during implementation 
and must describe the actions that are taken if the above calculated 
metrics exceed the associated Reference 3 and 4 acceptance guidelines 
during CRMP implementation (i.e., plant-specific Tier 3/Maintenance 
Rule results exceed acceptance guidelines).]
    8. Attachment 8 provides information addressing how plant-specific 
systems, structures and components (SSC) reliability and availability 
are monitored and assessed at the plant under the Maintenance Rule 
(i.e. 10 CFR 50.65) to confirm that performance continues to be 
consistent with the analyses used to justify the extended CT and that 
the risk-informed decision remains valid through implementation.
    [EXPECTATIONS/ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: The licensee must describe how 
plant-specific SSC reliability and availability are monitored and 
assessed at the plant under the Maintenance Rule (i.e., 10 CFR 50.65) 
to confirm that performance continues to be consistent with the 
analyses used to justify the extended CT. In providing this 
description, the licensee should also indicate how they periodically 
assess previous risk-informed licensing action decisions to ensure that 
these decisions remain valid (i.e., continue to meet the Reference 3 
and Reference 4 acceptance guidelines) for the current plant operations 
and plant-specific PRA and what actions they take if a previously-
approved risk-informed licensing action decision is determined to no 
longer meet these acceptance guidelines.]
4.2.2 Regulatory Commitment
    The Reference 4 Tier 3 program ensures that, while the plant is 
following the TS ACTIONS associated with an extended CT for restoring 
an inoperable CSS to operable status, additional activities will not be 
performed that could further degrade the capabilities of the plant to 
respond to a condition that the inoperable CSS is designed to mitigate 
and, as a result, increase plant risk beyond that determined by the 
Reference 1 analyses. [LICENSEE's] implementation of Reference 4 Tier 3 
guidelines generally implies the assessment of risk with respect to 
CDF. However, the proposed CSS extended CT impacts accident sequences 
that can be mitigated following core damage and, consequently, impacts 
LERF as well as CDF. Therefore, [LICENSEE] has enhanced its CRMP, 
[OPTIONAL: as implemented under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), the Maintenance 
Rule,] to include a LERF methodology and assessment.

5.0 Regulatory Analysis

5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination published in the Federal Register on [DATE] 
([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the 
proposed determination presented in the notice is applicable to [PLANT 
NAME] and the determination is hereby incorporated by reference to 
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

    Based on its answers to the Section 4.2.1 questions provided in 
Attachments 1 through 8 to this application [LICENSEE] determines that 
the information provided in this application is consistent with 
Reference 2. This determination is based on the following:
    1. The traditional engineering evaluation reveals that the loss of 
one CSS train is well within [PLANT NAME's] design basis analyses.
    2. By meeting the conditions identified in Section 4.2.1, 
[LICENSEE] believes that its PRA model is acceptable for this 
application and also concludes that there is minimal impact of the CT 
extensions for the CSS system on plant operational risk (Tier 1 
evaluation).
    3. By meeting the conditions identified in Section 4.2.1, 
[LICENSEE] will ensure that its implementation will identify 
potentially high risk configurations and the need for any

[[Page 18387]]

additional constraints or compensatory actions that, if implemented, 
would avoid or reduce the probability of a risk-significant 
configuration (Tier 2 evaluation).
    4. By meeting the conditions identified in Section 4.2.1, [PLANT 
NAME] will ensure that its risk-informed CRMP will satisfactorily 
assess the risk associated with the removal of equipment from service 
during the proposed CSS CT (Tier 3 evaluation) and the CRMP and plant 
risk will be managed by plant procedures.
    In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) 
there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public 
will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such 
activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's 
regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical 
to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the 
public.

6.0 Environmental Consideration

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in 
the model safety evaluation as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] concluded 
that the staff's findings presented in the evaluation are applicable to 
[PLANT NAME] and the evaluation is hereby incorporated by reference for 
this application.

7.0 References

    [Licensee should include an applicable list of references, 
including but not limited to]

    1. Joint Applications Report: Modification to the Containment 
Spray System, and Low Pressure Safety Injection System Technical, CE 
Owners Group, CE NPSD-1045, March 2000.
    2. Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
Related to CE Owners Group CE NPSD-1045, ``Joint Application Report, 
Modification to the Containment Spray System, and the Low Pressure 
Safety Injection System Technical Specifications, December 21, 1999.
    3. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.174, ``An Approach for Using 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-
Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' Revision 1, November 
2002.
    4. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-
Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,'' 
August 1998.
    5. NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety 
Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants,'' June 1996.

Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)--Enclosure 2
Changes To TS Bases--Enclosure 3
Condition (1) [Licensee's] Evaluation and Supporting Information--
Attachment 1
Condition (2) [Licensee's] Evaluation and Supporting Information--
Attachment 2
Condition (3) [Licensee's] Evaluation and Supporting Information--
Attachment 3
Condition (4) [Licensee's] Evaluation and Supporting Information--
Attachment 4
Condition (5) [Licensee's] Evaluation and Supporting Information--
Attachment 5
Condition (6) [Licensee's] Evaluation and Supporting Information--
Attachment 6
Condition (7) [Licensee's] Evaluation and Supporting Information--
Attachment 7
Condition (8) [Licensee's] Evaluation and Supporting Information--
Attachment 8

Model Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation

Consolidated Line Item Improvement; Technical Specification Task Force 
TSTF-409, Revision 2; ``Containment Spray System Completion Time 
Extension''

1.0 Introduction

    By letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, Commission) 
dated [DATE] (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) 
Accession Number MLXXXXXXXXX), [LICENSEE] (the licensee) requested 
changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for [PLANT NAME]. The 
proposed changes would revise TS 3.6.6A, ``Containment Spray and 
Cooling Systems,'' by extending from 72 hours to seven days the 
completion time (CT) to restore an inoperable containment spray system 
(CSS) train to operable status, and would add a Condition describing 
the required action and CT when one CSS and one containment cooling 
system (CCS) are inoperable.
    The changes are based on Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 
Change Traveler, TSTF-409, Revision 2 (Rev. 2), ``Containment Spray 
System Completion Time Extension (CE NPSD-1045-A)'' and associated TS 
Bases. TSTF-409, Rev. 2, submitted to the NRC by the TSTF in a letter 
dated November 10, 2003 (ADAMS Accession Number ML033280006), was 
approved by the NRC on [DATE] and published in the Federal Register on 
[DATE] ([] FR [ ]).
    TSTF-409, Rev. 2 is based on Combustion Engineering Owner's Group 
(CEOG) Joint Application Report CE NPSD-1045-A, ``Joint Applications 
Report for Modifications to the Containment Spray System Technical 
Specifications,'' dated March 2000 (Reference 1), as accepted by, and 
subject to the limitations specified in, the associated NRC safety 
evaluation (SE), dated December 21, 1999 (ADAMS Accession Number 
ML993620241) (Reference 2).
    In TSTF-409, Rev. 2, the CEOG states that the longer CT for 
restoring an inoperable CSS train to operable status will enhance 
overall plant safety by avoiding potential unscheduled plant shutdowns 
and allowing greater availability of safety significant components 
during shutdown. In addition the CEOG states that this extension 
provides for increased flexibility in scheduling and performing 
maintenance and surveillance activities in order to enhance plant 
safety and operational flexibility during lower modes of operation.

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

    Since the mid-1980's, the NRC has been reviewing and granting 
improvements to TS that are based, at least in part, on probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA) insights. In its final policy statement on TS 
improvements dated July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132), the NRC stated that it:

    * * * expects that licensees, in preparing their Technical 
Specification related submittals, will utilize any plant-specific 
PSA [probabilistic safety assessment] \1\ or risk survey and any 
available literature on risk insights and PSAs * * *. Similarly, the 
NRC staff will also employ risk insights and PSAs in evaluating 
Technical Specifications related submittals. Further, as a part of 
the Commission's ongoing program of improving Technical 
Specifications, it will continue to consider methods to make better 
use of risk and reliability information for defining future generic 
Technical Specification requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ PSA and PRA are used interchangeably herein.

    The NRC reiterated this point when it issued the revision to 10 CFR 
50.36, ``Technical Specifications,'' in July 1995. In August 1995, the 
NRC adopted a final policy statement on the use of PRA methods in 
nuclear regulatory activities that encouraged greater use of PRA to 
improve safety decision-making and regulatory efficiency. The PRA 
policy statement included the following points:
    1. The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory 
matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods 
and data, and in a manner that complements the NRC's deterministic 
approach and supports the

[[Page 18388]]

NRC's traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.
    2. PRA and associated analyses (e.g., sensitivity studies, 
uncertainty analyses, and importance measures) should be used in 
regulatory matters, where practical within the bounds of the state-of-
the-art, to reduce unnecessary conservatism associated with current 
regulatory requirements.
    3. PRA evaluations in support of regulatory decisions should be as 
realistic as practicable and appropriate supporting data should be 
publicly available for review.
    In March 1998, the CEOG submitted a joint applications report for 
the NRC staff's review entitled, ``Joint Applications Report for 
Modifications to the Containment Spray System and Low Pressure Safety 
System Technical Specifications.'' The NRC review accepting this joint 
applications report for referencing in license applications for 
Combustion Engineering (CE) plants, including appropriate exclusions, 
conditions, and limitations, is documented in Reference 2. The final, 
NRC-approved joint applications report, (Reference 1) is dated March 
2000.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

    The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's proposed amendment to extend 
the TS CT for one CSS train out of service from 72 hours to seven days 
using insights derived from traditional engineering considerations and 
the use of PRA methods to determine the safety impact of extending the 
CT.

3.1 Traditional Engineering Evaluation

    The function of the containment heat removal systems under accident 
conditions is to remove heat from the containment atmosphere, thus 
maintaining the containment pressure and temperature at acceptably low 
levels. The systems also serve to limit offsite radiation levels by 
reducing the pressure differential between the containment atmosphere 
and the external environment, thereby decreasing the driving force for 
fission product leakage across the containment. The two containment 
heat removal systems are the CCS and CSS. The CCS fan coolers are 
designed to operate during both normal plant operations and under loss-
of-coolant accident (LOCA) or main steam line break (MSLB) conditions. 
The CSS is designed to operate during accident conditions only.
    The heat removal capacity of the CCS and CSS is sufficient to keep 
the containment temperature and pressure below design conditions for 
any size break, up to and including a double-ended break of the largest 
reactor coolant pipe. The systems are also designed to mitigate the 
consequences of any size break, up to and including a double-ended 
break of a main steam line. The CCS and CSS continue to reduce 
containment pressure and temperature and maintain them at acceptable 
levels post-accident.
    The CCS and CSS at [PLANT NAME] each consist of [Substitute plant-
specific configuration if it differs from the following description] 
two redundant loops and are designed such that a single failure does 
not degrade their ability to provide the required heat removal 
capability. Two of four containment fan coolers and one CSS loop are 
powered from one safety-related bus. The other two containment fan 
coolers and CSS loop are powered from another independent safety 
related bus. The loss of one bus does not affect the ability of the 
containment heat removal systems to maintain containment temperature 
and pressure below the design values in a post-accident mode.
    The [PLANT NAME] CSS consists of [Substitute plant-specific 
configuration if it differs from the following description] two 
independent and redundant loops each containing a spray pump, shutdown 
heat exchanger, piping, valves, spray headers, and spray nozzles. It 
has two modes of operation, which are:
    1. The injection mode, during which the system sprays borated water 
from the refueling water tank (RWT) into the containment, and
    2. The recirculation mode, which is automatically initiated by the 
recirculation actuation signal (RAS) after low level is reached in the 
RWT. During this mode of operation, the safety injection system (SIS) 
sump provides suction for the spray pumps.
    Containment spray is automatically initiated by the containment 
spray actuation signal coincident with the safety injection actuation 
signal and high containment pressure signal. If required, the operator 
can manually activate the system from the main control room.
    Each CSS pump, together with a CCS loop, provides the flow 
necessary to remove the heat generated inside the containment following 
a LOCA or MSLB. Upon system activation, the pumps are started, and 
borated water flows into the containment spray headers. When low level 
is reached in the RWT, sufficient water has been transferred to the 
containment to allow for the recirculation mode of operation. Spray 
pump suction is automatically realigned to the SIS sump upon a RAS.
    During the recirculation mode, the spray water is cooled by the 
shutdown heat exchangers prior to discharge into the containment. The 
shutdown heat exchangers are cooled by the component cooling water 
system. Post-LOCA pH control is provided by [Substitute plant-specific 
configuration if it differs from the following description] trisodium 
phosphate dodecahydrate, which is stored in stainless steel baskets 
located in the containment near the SIS sump intake.
    Based on a review of the design-basis requirements for the CSS, the 
NRC staff concluded that the loss of one CSS train is well within the 
design-basis analyses. The plant status with both CSS trains inoperable 
is covered by TS 3.6.6A, ACTION G., which states:

    [With] two containment spray trains inoperable or any 
combination of three or more [CSS/CCS] trains inoperable, LCO 
[Limiting Condition for Operation] 3.0.3 shall be entered 
immediately.

    ACTION G addresses the condition in which two CSS trains are 
inoperable and requires restoration of at least one CSS train to 
operable status within 1 hour or the plant be placed in hot shutdown in 
6 hours and cold shutdown within the following 30 hours, with cold 
shutdown being the acceptable end state. These requirements are 
consistent with similar requirements elsewhere in the TS and, 
therefore, are acceptable.
    The plant status with one CSS train and one CCS train inoperable is 
covered by TS 3.6.6A, action D, which states:

    [With] one containment spray and one containment cooling train 
inoperable, restore containment spray train to operable status 
within 72 hours, or restore containment cooling train to operable 
status within 72 hours.

    ACTION D ensures that the iodine removal capabilities of the CSS 
are available, along with 100 percent of the heat removal needs after 
an accident. The supporting analyses performed in Reference 1 did not 
evaluate the concurrent inoperabilities of one CSS train and one CCS 
train. Therefore, the current CT of 72 hours is retained in Condition 
D. The 72-hour CT was developed taking into account the redundant heat 
removal capabilities afforded by combinations of the CSS and CCS, the 
iodine removal function of the CSS, and the low probability of a DBA 
occurring during this period.

3.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Evaluation

    The proposed extension of the CSS CT from 72 hours to seven days 
affects plant risk by impacting:

[[Page 18389]]

    1. Accident sequences that can be prevented from leading to core 
damage.
    2. Accident sequences that can be mitigated following core damage.
    The CSS therefore affects both core damage frequency (CDF) and 
large early release frequency (LERF). This is because the CSS performs 
the critical function of controlling containment temperature and 
pressure to cool the reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory that is 
spilled in the sump as a result of a LOCA (core damage prevention role) 
and preventing the release of radionuclides subsequent to a core damage 
event (core damage and radionuclide release mitigation role).
    [The following paragraph will contain plant-specific information 
based on the plant's ability to use the shutdown cooling system (SDCS) 
as a backup to the CSS. The licensee should provide a plant-specific 
system configuration description based on whether its SDCS can be used 
as a backup to the CSS pump.]
    The proposed CT extension also impacts the long-term cooling 
function that can be provided by the SDCS following a small-break LOCA, 
steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), or MSLB. If entry into the 
extended CT is caused by a CSS pump outage, the plants with the ability 
to use the SDCS as a backup to the CSS pump can still preserve the 
spray function of the affected train. If, however, a SDCS heat 
exchanger is removed from service, then both the CSS and SDCS 
capability of the affected train would be lost unless cross-connect 
capability with another unaffected system (e.g., service water) is 
possible. However, this cross-connect capability should not be credited 
unless it is proceduralized.
    The NRC staff used a three-tiered approach to evaluate the plant-
specific risk impact associated with the proposed TS changes. The first 
tier evaluates the plant-specific PRA model and the impact of the 
proposed CT extension on plant operational risk. The second tier 
addresses the need to preclude potentially high risk configurations by 
identifying the need for any additional constraints or compensatory 
actions that, if implemented, would avoid or reduce the probability of 
a risk-significant configuration during the time when one CSS train is 
out of service. The third tier evaluates the licensee's proposed 
Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) to ensure that the 
applicable plant configuration will be appropriately assessed from a 
risk perspective before entering into, or during, the proposed CT.
    In Reference 2, the NRC staff found that the risk analysis 
methodology and approach used by the CEOG to estimate the risk impact 
were reasonable. In its SE, the NRC staff also stated that, for most 
plants that participated in the joint application report, the risk 
impact can be shown to be consistent with the acceptance guidelines for 
change in CDF ([Delta]CDF), change in LERF ([Delta]LERF), incremental 
conditional core damage probability (ICCDP), and incremental large 
early release frequency (ICLERP) specified in Regulatory Guide (RG) 
1.174 (Reference 3) and RG 1.177 (Reference 4) and the associated 
Standard Review Plan (SRP) Chapters 19.0 and 16.1 of NUREG-0800 
(Reference 5). However, not all CE plants participated in the joint 
application report, and the estimated risk impacts for some plants 
exceeded the Reference 3 and/or Reference 4 acceptance guidelines, 
which would require additional justifications and/or compensatory 
measures to be provided for these plants to be determined to have 
acceptable risk impacts.
    In Reference 2, the NRC staff also found that the Tier 2 and Tier 3 
evaluations, as described in Reference 4, could not be approved 
generically since they were not complete, which would require that each 
individual plant-specific license amendment seeking approval through 
TSTF-409, Rev. 2 would need to include an assessment with respect to 
the Tier 2 and Tier 3 principles of Reference 4.
    Based on the above discussion, the NRC staff identified conditions 
that must be addressed in the licensee's plant-specific application 
requesting adoption of TSTF-409, Revision 2. In its application dated 
[DATE], [LICENSEE] provided supporting information for each of the 
conditions which met the NRC staff's expectations and acceptance 
criteria [with the following exceptions: list any exceptions to the 
conditions stated in the model LAR].
3.2.1 Commitment
    The Reference 4 Tier 3 program ensures that, while the plant is 
following the TS ACTIONS associated with an extended CT for restoring 
an inoperable CSS to operable status, additional activities will not be 
performed that could further degrade the capabilities of the plant to 
respond to a condition that the inoperable CSS is designed to mitigate 
and, as a result, increase plant risk beyond that determined by the 
Reference 1 analyses. A licensee's implementation of Reference 4 Tier 3 
guidelines generally implies the assessment of risk with respect to 
CDF. However, the proposed CSS extended CT impacts accident sequences 
that can be mitigated following core damage and, consequently, LERF as 
well as CDF. Therefore, [LICENSEE] enhanced its CRMP [optional: as 
implemented under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), the Maintenance Rule,] to include 
a LERF methodology and assessment.

3.3 Summary

    Having met the conditions identified in the model license amendment 
request (LAR), the NRC staff finds that the licensee's plant-specific 
LAR is consistent with the previous NRC staff approval of Reference 1, 
as documented in the Reference 2 and TSTF-409, Rev. 2, and thus is 
acceptable. This determination is based on the following:
    1. The traditional engineering evaluation reveals that the loss of 
one CSS train is well within the design-basis analyses.
    2. Based on the licensee meeting the conditions identified in the 
model LAR, the NRC staff finds that there is minimal impact of the CT 
extensions for the CSS system on plant operational risk (Tier 1 
evaluation).
    3. Meeting the conditions identified in the model LAR will ensure 
that the licensee's implementation will identify potentially high risk 
configurations and the need for any additional constraints or 
compensatory actions that, if implemented, would avoid or reduce the 
probability of a risk-significant configuration (Tier 2 evaluation).
    4. Meeting the conditions identified in the model LAR will ensure 
that the risk-informed CRMP proposed by the licensee will 
satisfactorily assess the risk associated with the removal of equipment 
from service during the proposed CSS CT (Tier 3 evaluation) and the 
CRMP and plant risk will be managed by plant procedures.

4.0 Regulatory Commitment

    The licensee's letter dated [DATE], contained the following 
regulatory commitment: [state the licensee's commitment and ensure that 
it satisfies the commitment in section 3.2.1 of this SE].
    The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation 
and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the 
above regulatory commitment are best provided by the licensee's 
administrative controls process, including its commitment management 
program. The above regulatory commitment does not warrant the creation 
of a license condition (item requiring prior NRC approval of subsequent 
changes).

[[Page 18390]]

5.0 State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [STATE] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment[s]. The 
State official had [CHOOSE ONE: (1) No comments, OR (2) the following 
comments--with subsequent disposition by the staff].

6.0 Environmental Consideration

    The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has 
determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the 
amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that 
may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in 
individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The 
Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no 
public comment on such finding [(XX FR XXXXX, dated Month DD, YYYY)]. 
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for 
categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 
CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental 
assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the 
amendment

7.0 Conclusion

    The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed 
above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and 
safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to 
the health and safety of the public.

8.0 References

1. Joint Applications Report: Modification to the Containment Spray 
System, and Low Pressure Safety Injection System Technical, CE 
Owners Group, CE NPSD-1045, March 2000.
2. SE by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to CE 
Owners Group CE-NPSD-1045, ``Joint Application Report, Modification 
to the Containment Spray System, and the Low Pressure Safety 
Injection System Technical Specifications,'' December 21, 1999.
3. U.S. NRC RG 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to 
the Licensing Basis,'' Revision 1, November 2002.
4. U.S. NRC RG 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-
Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,'' August 1998.
5. NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety 
Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants,'' June 1996.

Model No Significant Hazards Consideration

    Description of Amendment Request: The proposed amendment would 
revise the technical specifications to extend the completion time (CT) 
from 72 hours to seven days to restore an inoperable containment spray 
system (CSS) train to operable status, and add a Condition describing 
the required Actions and CT when one CSS and one containment cooling 
system (CCS) are inoperable.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change extends from 72 hours to 7 days the CT for 
restoring an inoperable CSS train to operable status. Being in an 
ACTION is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. 
Consequently, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is 
not significantly increased. The consequences of an accident while 
relying on ACTIONS during the extended CT are no different than the 
consequences of an accident while relying on the ACTION during the 
existing 72-hour CT. Therefore, the consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated are not significantly increased by this change. 
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change extends from 72 hours to 7 days the CT for 
restoring an inoperable CSS train to operable status. The proposed 
change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or 
different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the 
methods governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not 
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any 
accident previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change extends from 72 hours to 7 days the CT for 
restoring an inoperable CSS train to operable status. [LICENSEE] 
performed risk-based evaluations using its plant-specific probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA) model in order to determine the effect of this 
change on plant risk. The PRA evaluations were based on the conditions 
stipulated in NRC staff safety evaluations approving both Joint 
Applications Report CE NPSD-1045-A, ``Joint Applications Report, 
Modifications to the Containment Spray System and The Low Pressure 
Safety Injection System Technical Specifications,'' and Technical 
Specification Task Force Change Traveler, TSTF-409, Revision 2, 
``Containment Spray System Completion Time Extension (CE NPSD-1045-
A).'' The results of these plant-specific evaluations determined that 
the effect of the proposed change on plant risk is very small. 
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    Based on the above, the proposed change involves no significant 
hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), 
and accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is 
justified.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Project Manager,
Plant Licensing Branch, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

 [FR Doc. E6-5216 Filed 4-10-06; 8:45 am]
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