

group of individuals for each independent 7 day period the individual or group works not more than 48 hours during the outage or increased threat condition.

Implementation Details

For purposes of compliance with the minimum 24-hour break requirements:

- Because work schedules may contain shifts of more than one length (e.g., combinations of 8 and 12-hour shifts), shift schedules would be defined as follows:

- ▶ 8-hour shift schedules average not more than 9 hours per day.
- ▶ 10-hour shift schedule average not more than 11 hours per day.
- ▶ 12-hour shift schedule average not more than 12 hours per day.

- Only break periods of 24 consecutive hours or more would count towards the break requirements.

- Breaks would be counted in 24-hour increments. For example, a 36 hour break would count as one 24-hour break. A break of 48 consecutive hours would count as two 24-hour breaks.

- The maximum duration of a shift cycle over which a licensee would be able to average breaks would be limited to six weeks.

- Any portion of a plant outage, security outage, or increased threat condition that does not comprise a complete 15 day period would be subject to the individual work hour limits in proposed § 26.199(d)(1), § 26.199(d)(1)(I), and the requirement described above for a minimum 36-hour break in any 9-day period.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of March, 2006.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Eileen McKenna,

Chief, Financial, Policy and Rulemaking Program, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2004-19930; Directorate Identifier 2004-NE-33-AD]

Airworthiness Directives: Rolls-Royce plc RB211 Trent 800 Series Turbofan Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal.

SUMMARY: This action withdraws a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). That NPRM proposed a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Rolls-Royce plc (RR) RB211 Trent 800 series turbofan engines. That proposed action would have required initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the high pressure-and-intermediate pressure (HP-IP) turbine internal and external oil vent tubes for coking and carbon buildup, and cleaning or replacing the vent tubes if necessary. Since we issued that NPRM, RR notified us that the RB211 Trent 800 series turbofan engines are significantly less susceptible to vent tube carbon build-up than the RB211 Trent 700 series turbofan engines. Repeat on-wing inspections therefore, are not required to maintain fleet safety. Accordingly, we withdraw the proposed rule.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ian Dargin, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803-5299; telephone (781) 238-7178; fax (781) 238-7199.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 with a proposed airworthiness directive (AD). The proposed AD applies to Rolls-Royce plc RB211 Trent 800 series turbofan engines. We published the proposed AD in the **Federal Register** on December 27, 2004 (69 FR 77144). That proposed action would have required initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the HP-IP turbine internal and external oil vent tubes for coking and carbon buildup, and cleaning or replacing the vent tubes if necessary. That proposed action resulted from a report of an RB211 Trent 700 series engine experiencing a disk shaft separation, overspeed of the intermediate pressure (IP) turbine rotor, and multiple blade release of IP turbine blades.

Since we issued that NPRM, RR notified us that data collected from a onetime inspection of 200 RB211 Trent 800 series turbofan engines shows that these engines are significantly less susceptible to vent tube carbon build-up than the RB211 Trent 700 series turbofan engines. The RB211 Trent 800 series engines had no evidence of significant accumulation. RR's analysis concluded that repeat on-wing inspections are not required to maintain fleet safety. The vent tube inspection and cleaning can be done at each shop visit. This will ensure that the probability of carbon blockage and spontaneous ignition will be negligible. Based on this analysis, RR has stated

they will cancel Alert Service Bulletin RB.211-72-AE362, dated May 7, 2004.

Upon further consideration, we hereby withdraw the proposed rule based on RR's analysis and conclusion stated above.

Withdrawal of this notice of proposed rulemaking constitutes only such action, and does not preclude the agency from issuing another notice in the future, nor does it commit the agency to any course of action in the future.

Since this action only withdraws a notice of proposed rulemaking, it is neither a proposed nor a final rule. Executive Order 12866, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979) do not cover this withdrawal.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Withdrawal

Accordingly, we withdraw the notice of proposed rulemaking, FAA-2004-19930; Directorate Identifier 2004-NE-33-AD, published in the **Federal Register** on December 27, 2004 (69 FR 77144).

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on March 13, 2006.

Peter A. White,

Acting Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2006-24036; Directorate Identifier 2006-NE-04-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Sicma Aero Seat, Passenger Seat Assemblies

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Sicma Aero Seat, passenger seat assemblies. This proposed AD would require modifying the aft track fittings on these passenger seat assemblies by installing new tab locks, and then torquing the aft track fitting locking bolts. This proposed AD results from