[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 22 (Thursday, February 2, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 5670-5675]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-1402]
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
National Institutes of Health
National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories Record of
Decision
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Health and Human Services, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), has decided, after completion of a Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and a thorough consideration of
the public comments on the Draft EIS and Supplemental EIS, to implement
the Proposed Action, which is identified as the Preferred Alternative
in the Final EIS. This action is to partially fund the construction of
a state-of-the-art National Biocontainment Laboratory (NBL), to be
called the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL),
at the Boston University Medical Center (BUMC) Campus in Boston,
Massachusetts.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Valerie Nottingham, Chief of the
Environmental Quality Branch, Division of Environmental Protection,
Office of Research Facilities Development and Operations, NIH, Building
13, Room 2W64, 9000 Rockville Pike, Bethesda, MD 20892, Fax 301-480-
8056, e-mail [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Decision
After careful review of the environmental consequences in the Final
Environmental Impact Statement for the National Emerging Infectious
Diseases Laboratories (Final NEIDL EIS), and consideration of public
comment throughout the NEPA process, the NIH has decided to implement
the Proposed Action described below as the Selected Alternative.
Selected Alternative
The NIH plans to partially fund the construction of a state-of the
art National Biocontainment Laboratory, which will be known as the
National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL), on the
Boston University Medical Center Campus in Boston, Massachusetts. The
NIH will fund approximately $128 million dollars. The proposed NEIDL
will enhance national security through the development and evaluation
of improved diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for the protection
against naturally emerging and re-emerging diseases, including those
that have the potential for bioterrorism. The proposed NEIDL will not
conduct research to develop biological weapons.
The proposed NEIDL facility will be a new steel and reinforced
concrete seven-story building that will be constructed within the
BioSquare Research Park, with a total assignable area of 84,100 square
feet, and will house Biosafety Level (BSL)-4, BSL-3, and BSL-2
facilities, BSL-4 and BSL-3 animal facilities, an Arthropod Containment
Level (ACL)-3 insectary, offices, conference rooms, and support
facilities including an effluent treatment room, secure loading dock,
and dedicated mechanical floors to enhance containment features of the
building.
The proposed NEIDL facility will be designed to safely support all
the superimposed loads applied to the building and will be constructed
to the requirements of Seismic Performance Category C, which assures
that the building structure stays functional after a seismic event. In
addition to standby generators to provide power in the event of a power
outage, the NEIDL facility will have a distributed on-line
uninterruptible power supply to power the BSL-4 laboratory biosafety
cabinets, critical building control panels and alarms. The four
biosafety levels have increasingly stringent design, security, and
containment requirements. The safety levels are determined based on the
biological materials used in research and the ways they affect the
human population. BSL-1 facilities have no requirements for safety
equipment, while BSL-4 facilities have extensive and multiple
requirements for safety equipment and facility design such as
isolation, buffer zones, airflow and pressure requirements, and high
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration.
The building also will be provided with an environmental monitoring
system to assess room pressure differentials (to ensure negative
pressure in the biocontainment areas), smoke detection, and the
pressure drop condition HEPA filters. Visual indicators (such as
pressure gauges) and audible or strobic alarms will alert NEIDL
personnel in the event of an emergency or situation that requires
corrective action or other response. The NEIDL will have fire
protection systems that meet or exceed requirements specified by the
National Fire Protection Association and all applicable local, state,
Federal, and BUMC requirements.
The design of the proposed NEIDL facility's BSL-4, -3, and -2
laboratories will comply with the recommendations and requirements of
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the NIH joint publication
addressing biosafety in laboratories, the current edition Biosafety in
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, as well as NIH's Design
Policies and Guidelines for Biomedical Research Laboratories. The BSL-
4, -3, -2 animal laboratories will further comply with the
recommendations and requirements of the latest edition of Guide for
Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, published by the National Research
Council.
The BSL-4 laboratory environment employs the concept of a ``box-
within-a-box'' principle, whereby the laboratory is built within a
pressure-
[[Page 5671]]
controlled buffer. The BSL-4 laboratories will be physically and
functionally independent from other laboratory functions. All
penetrations in the walls, ceilings, and floor will be sealed. The
control system for maintaining the required pressure differentials will
be capable of being monitored inside and outside of the laboratory. The
BSL-4 laboratories will utilize a series of airlocks for entry and
exit, will have dedicated supply and exhaust ventilation, and workers
in the BSL-4 laboratories will use positive pressure ventilation suits.
Workers will be required to take a chemical shower to decontaminate
the surface of their suits before they can leave the area. Prior to
emission through stacks on the building roof, exhaust air from the
negatively pressurized BSL-4 laboratories will pass through dual HEPA
filters mounted in series in a dedicated sealed exhaust system. The
exhaust will also pass through isolation dampers that will close within
seconds upon receipt of a containment isolation signal. In addition,
each laboratory will be equipped with multiple Class II Biosafety
Cabinets with their own HEPA exhaust system. Liquid waste will be
sterilized in a biowaste cooker system before discharge. Solid waste
will be sterilized in autoclaves prior to leaving containment areas.
The NEIDL BSL-3 laboratories, BSL-3 animal laboratories, and ACL-3
insectary will be separated by restricted traffic flow within the
building and access to the laboratory will be restricted by the use of
electronic recognition devices. A ventilated airlock will separate the
common corridors from the containment facility. The airlock doors will
be interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening of doors between the
outside corridor and the containment areas. Directional airflow will be
provided through the airlock with differential pressure monitoring.
Similar to the BSL-4 requirements, all electrical conduit, plumbing
piping, supply and exhaust ducts and miscellaneous penetrations will be
sealed at the point of penetration into the BSL-3 laboratory to ensure
a tight structure. Tap water entering the BSL-3 laboratories through
spigots in the sinks will have backflow preventors to protect the
potable water distribution system from contamination. All BSL-3
laboratories will operate under negative air pressure. A dedicated,
ducted HVAC system will draw air into the BSL-3 laboratories from the
surrounding areas toward and through the BSL-3 laboratories with no
recirculation from the laboratories to other areas of the building.
This direction of airflow into the laboratories and the biosafety
cabinets will be verifiable with appropriate visual and audible alarm
systems to notify personnel of HVAC problems or system failure. All air
will be discharged outside the building through HEPA filters. Each BSL-
3 laboratory will be equipped with Class II biosafety cabinets. Each
BSL-3 laboratory will be provided with shower-out facilities for
researchers along with autoclaves for solid waste treatment prior to
removal. Liquid waste will be chemically decontaminated prior to
discharge and solid waste will be sterilized in autoclaves prior to
leaving the laboratories.
Work with moderate-risk biological material will be conducted in
BSL-2 laboratories. The air supply system will be designed to maintain
negative air pressure in relationship to administrative space, offices,
and corridors. There will be no HEPA filtration for BSL-2 exhaust.
Liquid waste will be chemically decontaminated prior to discharge and
solid waste will be sterilized in autoclaves prior to leaving the
laboratories.
The design and construction of the NEIDL facility will address
security concerns. Security measures are discussed below. Scenarios
involving terrorist or intentionally destructive acts at the NEIDL have
been analyzed in an independent Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA). The
design as well as security plans and procedures of the NEIDL facility
will address the TRA analysis and recommendations.
The NEIDL will be surrounded by a protective fencing system that
allows for controlled access at staffed checkpoints for both vehicles
and pedestrians and to create setbacks of approximately 100 feet from
any location that could accommodate unscreened pedestrian traffic.
Vehicular access would be strictly limited to BUMC vehicles and
selected delivery and service vehicles. The service and loading area
will be located on the south side of the facility within the secure
perimeter. Pedestrian access to the building will be limited to a
single entrance and security officers will be assigned to provide
protective services at the site twenty-four hours a day, monitoring
both the building and the grounds.
Access to the NEIDL facility will be strictly controlled by various
measures. All employees will undergo background and security checks
prior to being assigned to a laboratory area. Strict operational
protocols, including specific training, would be imposed on laboratory
personnel prior to working in the facility. Security officers will be
on duty twenty-four hours a day to monitor controlled access. All
employees will be required to wear security badges. Furthermore,
security cameras will be in use, biometric access systems will be
utilized, and all deliveries will be screened.
Access to the BSL-4 laboratory will be restricted to people whose
presence is required and authorized. Air pressure resistant, lockable
doors will be monitored and controlled by the security system. A log of
persons entering and exiting the laboratory with name, time, date, and
reason for entering the lab will be maintained and the log would be
frequently audited by BUMC's Office of Environmental Health and Safety
(OEHS).
Alternatives Considered
The NIH considered the two reasonable alternatives identified and
considered in the Final EIS: (1) The Proposed Action Alternative (now
the selected alternative) and (2) the No Action Alternative (not
constructing the NEIDL). Previously, NIH examined several sites and
various facility designs. Sites for the NBL were evaluated if there was
a reasonable expectation that a facility could be constructed with the
available funding, in a reasonable time, and while meeting federal
safety criteria. To meet these constraints, two minimum siting criteria
were established. These criteria included: (1) The site must be
controlled (owned or currently leased) by Boston University (to remain
within funding and timing constraints); and (2) The lot size must be
sufficient to accommodate a minimum building size of 190,000 square
feet (sf) and at the same time meet federal security setback
requirements. Applying the above screening criteria reduced the
potential sites for detailed evaluation to four locations and four
designs, one of which became the Proposed Action. The three other
alternatives considered were a site on the 210 acre BU Corporate
Education Center in Tyngsborough, Massachusetts; a site at the BU
Charles River Campus; and a site at the BU Sargent Center for Outdoor
Education in Petersborough, New Hampshire. These other sites and
designs were considered technically inferior, provided no environmental
advantage compared to the Proposed Action, or would not meet the
purpose and need as efficiently as the Proposed Action. Therefore, they
were eliminated from detailed analysis in the EIS.
Factors Involved in the Decision
Several factors were involved in the NIH's decision to proceed with
the Proposed Action. Based on analyses in
[[Page 5672]]
the Draft EIS, the Supplemental EIS and Final EIS, the Proposed Action
best satisfies the stated Purpose and Need, which is to rectify the
national shortage of biological containment facilities with
laboratories and procedures for handling potentially lethal infectious
agents. This national shortage of biological containment facilities
represents a substantial impediment to conducting research on
infectious diseases and is a national biodefense vulnerability. To be
most effective, these facilities must be located where established
teams of researchers are already working on related scientific
problems. Additionally, the biological containment facilities should be
located in an area with existing infrastructure critical to providing
timely public health support in the case of a national, state, or local
disease outbreak or bioterrorism emergency. Locating a new national
biocontainment laboratory at the Boston University Medical Center
campus takes advantage of BU's extensive expertise in biological
medical research, and its infrastructure as a regional medical center.
Resources Impacts
The Final EIS describes potential environmental effects of the
Selected Alternative. These potential effects are documented in Chapter
4 of the Final EIS. Any potential adverse environmental effects will be
avoided or mitigated through design elements, procedures, and
compliance with regulatory and NIH requirements. Potential impacts on
air quality are all within government standards (federal, state, and
local). NIH does not expect negative effects on the environment or on
the citizens of Boston from construction and operation of the NEIDL.
Summary of Impacts
The following is a summary of potential impacts resulting from the
Selected Action that the NIH considered when making its decision. No
adverse cumulative effects have been identified during the NEPA
process. Likewise, no unavoidable or adverse impacts from
implementation of the Selected Action have been identified. The
Selected Action will be beneficial to the long-term productivity of the
national and world health communities. Biomedical research conducted at
the NEIDL facility will have the potential to advance techniques in
disease prevention, develop disease immunizations, and prepare defenses
against naturally emerging and re-emerging diseases and against
bioweapons. Additionally, the local community will benefit from
increased employment, income and, government and public finance.
Housing
Temporary impacts during construction are expected to have a
minimal effect on the existing residential neighborhoods. The Boston-
NBL site is bounded by a regional commercial wholesale florist market
on the east, a highway on the south, the Boston University Medical
Center on the north, and the BioSquare Phase 1 Research Park on the
west. Residential neighborhoods are found north of the site on two side
streets off Albany Street and one block north of the site off of
Harrison Avenue. Construction traffic will avoid residential areas and
rely on Albany Street for access.
With over 250,000 housing units in the City of Boston, the Project
would have no adverse impact on housing stock. As required by local
ordinance, the Project would participate in the City of Boston's
Affordable Housing Program through a contribution to the City's
Neighborhood Housing Trust in the amount of approximately $920,000 to
be used for the creation of new affordable housing. NIH funds would not
be used for this contribution.
Education
The current public school capacity in the South End would be
adequate to accommodate the expected minimal growth caused by the
Boston-NBL facility.
Transportation
The results of a traffic analysis conducted for the BioSquare Phase
II Final Environmental Impact Report/Project Impact Report (EIR/PIR)
demonstrates that the transportation infrastructure is adequate to
support the Project. The 70 trips entering and leaving the site during
each of the a.m. and p.m. peak hours that are specifically attributed
to the NBL represents only 15-16 percent of the additional peak hour
traffic; they are not sufficient in and of themselves to change
operations significantly at any of the study area locations. The
potential introduction of new access to and from the regional highway
system would remove existing and future vehicle trips from the
congested corridors of Massachusetts Avenue and Albany Street. Traffic
flow on the Massachusetts Avenue Connector (MAC) is limited by the
signalized intersections at Massachusetts Avenue/Southampton Street/
Melnea Cass Boulevard/MAC and Massachusetts Avenue/Albany Street, which
are presently at capacity. By creating an access point to BioSquare
from the highway system, the Project would reduce existing and future
site generated traffic from these critical intersections.
Community Safety and Risk
Records from the past 21 years of accidents at NIAID laboratories
indicate an outstanding record of safety showing that in more than 3
million hours of exposure, there have been only one clinical infection
and four silent infections (no manifestation of disease symptoms). In
this 21-year period, there has been no agent released from any of these
laboratories to cause infection in the general population. Nationwide,
there have been no clinical infections from working with BSL-4 agents
during the past 31 years at NIAID supported laboratories and no
documented cases of a laboratory worker's family members or the public
acquiring a disease from NIAID laboratory operations.
Records of all reported laboratory accidents were reviewed from the
past ten years by the BUMC Occupational and Environmental Medicine
Department and it has been confirmed by that BUMC did not have any
laboratory-acquired infections from research work at BSL-2 and BSL-3
with the exception of an incident in 2004 in which three research
laboratory workers were accidentally infected with tularemia bacteria
in their BSL-2 lab. Corrective actions already identified and
implemented to prevent this type of accident from occurring again
include increased safety training and procedures for lab workers;
strengthened laboratory safety procedures; unannounced safety
inspections of BUMC laboratories; applying additional tests and
safeguards to infectious material sent to BUMC for research purposes;
and working with the Boston Public Health Commission to improve the
notification process.
With approximately 14 million hours of operating time in the
laboratories during the ten year period described above there were nine
incidents of animal bites; sixteen incidents of percutaneous
penetration; and two incidents of eye splashes that occurred within
BSL-2 laboratories. None of the exposures listed above, with the
exception of the tularemia incident led to illness or evidence of
serological exposure.
Operation of the NEIDL is expected to result in beneficial human
health impacts. The NEIDL facility will allow the development of
diagnostic tests, management strategies, and vaccines for a number of
emerging viral diseases and agents that may be used to cause
intentional harm. The NEIDL facility will also allow for the training
of additional scientists in maximum
[[Page 5673]]
biocontainment conditions, and increase the laboratory space available
for conducting experiments that require maximum containment in response
to emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases.
To ensure that the project does not create any adverse public
health impacts, an analysis was prepared to address the potential risk
to the public of a ``worst case scenario'' involving loss of
containment systems in the BSL-4 laboratory that coincides with a
release within the facility. A quantitative risk assessment was
performed with regard to a theoretical infectious agent release to the
surrounding community from the Boston-NBL. The risk assessment examined
a laboratory accident within the BSL-4 laboratory that coincided with
potential catastrophic failure of containment equipment. The ``worst
case scenario'' also included an analysis of a scenario depicting a
laboratory acquired infection; a scenario depicting a release due to
failure to decontaminate exhaust air; a scenario depicting the escape
of an infected animal; a scenario depicting a biological material
shipment; and a scenario depicting an unauthorized removal of
biological material from containment area. The results of these studies
showed the predicted maximum exposure to any member of the community
from the ``worst case scenario'' is 0.29 spores over the entire
duration of the event. As the exposure to a partial spore is not
feasible, the risk of public harm is so minute that it may be described
as negligible.
In order to address the concerns about community safety that were
raised in public comments, the NIH prepared an additional risk
assessment. An additional exposure modeling strategy was applied to the
proposed Boston University site. The ``Maximum Possible Risk'' or MPR
model was developed by the NIH in response to comments from the public.
Fifteen different scenarios were subjected to analysis using the MPR
model. The MPR model analysis included three scenarios depicting spills
and work disruptions; one scenario depicting a spill on the floor with
no HEPA filter in the HVAC system; one scenario depicting a spill on
the floor during a power outage; two scenarios depicting physical
removal of biological material; two scenarios depicting fire; and seven
scenarios depicting explosions. The conclusions of the MPR model showed
that all fifteen scenarios had no probability of public health harm.
In summary, twenty-one different risk scenarios, six in the
original risk assessment and fifteen in the supplemental risk
assessment, were examined in total. All twenty-one scenarios supported
the conclusion that the facility poses negligible risk to the
community.
Employment
The Boston-NBL facility will create approximately 1,300 temporary
construction jobs and 660 new permanent positions. These new positions
include all types and levels including environmental services, lab
technicians, scientists, and administrative staff. The majority of
positions would require skilled and experienced workers.
During construction, the project will comply with the City of
Boston Jobs Policy through the creation of a Boston Residents
Construction Plan, establishing goals for the recruitment of local
residents for construction employment.
BUMC is committed to working with City agencies to ensure that
Boston residents have the opportunity to benefit from the new
employment generated by the facility. Toward this end, there would be
opportunities for local residents to obtain training for various
positions, such as laboratory staff, which would in turn benefit the
local economy. The Boston-NBL facility will contribute approximately
$185,000 to the City of Boston's Neighborhood Jobs Trust for training
purposes.
Income
The Boston-NBL facility, like other BUMC facilities, would bring
large infusions of outside money to the area to finance the
laboratory's work. The NEIDL will have positive economic impact on the
South End and surrounding neighborhoods throughout the construction and
operation phases. The total direct wages to be paid per year at the
Boston-NBL is projected to be $33,000,000, of which 21.4%, or a total
of $7,062,000, is expected to go to Boston residents.
Environmental Justice
During the construction phase of the project, neighborhoods
immediately abutting the Project site, including Environmental Justice
communities (communities where 25% or more of the population is defined
as a minority), may experience temporary impacts from construction
because of their location and proximity. There will be no
disproportionate effect on Environmental Justice communities. The
project will develop a Construction Management Plan to minimize
construction related transportation impacts.
The worst case scenario analysis shows that during operations of
the laboratory there will be negligible risk to public health for the
entire community. Therefore, there will be no disproportionate impact
on Environmental Justice communities during operations.
Visual Quality
The project has been designed to complement the existing urban
design context of the project area. The site plan and massing of the
project would help to mend the irregular urban edge that now exists
along Albany Street. The site design and building massing have been
reviewed with the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) urban design
staff as part of the design review process to assure compliance with
BRA guidelines and recommendations.
Noise
Construction of the project will result in a temporary increase in
daytime sound levels near the site. The maximum L10 (sound
level exceeded 10% of the time) during construction is estimated to be
71 dBA, which complies with the City of Boston Noise Control Regulation
that permits L10 levels from construction operations to
exceed 75 dBA. To reduce noise from construction the project would
install high-grade mufflers on the diesel powered construction
equipment and generators; combine noisy operations to occur for short
durations during the same time periods; and perform construction
activities only between the hours of 7 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Air Quality
The laboratory exhaust system will be designed to avoid any air
quality impacts inside or outside the building under normal operations.
The potential air quality effects from the laboratories will be
minimized by: (1) Combining the exhaust vents from the internal
laboratory hoods into groups before connecting to rooftop exhaust fans,
thus providing enhanced dilution of any laboratory chemical emissions
before they reach ambient air; (2) designing the rooftop stacks to have
exit velocities of at least 3,000 feet per minute as a stack exit
velocity of this magnitude would be sufficient to avoid stack tip
downwash, a phenomenon in which the emissions from the stack are drawn
downward as strong winds blow by the stack; (3) carefully controlling
and limiting the storage of all chemicals within the building to
minimize chemical emissions, liquid chemicals would not be left exposed
to the air and would always be contained and transferred
[[Page 5674]]
within closed glassware; and (4) handling liquid chemicals in small
quantities to reduce the potential air quality impacts in the event of
an accidental spill.
The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) were established
to protect public health and welfare, with a margin for safety. An air
quality dispersion modeling analysis was performed for the generators,
boilers and laboratory vents at the Boston-NBL in accordance with the
U.S. EPA and state Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
modeling guidelines. The dispersion modeling results demonstrated that
the maximum cumulative concentrations of criteria air pollutants from
the boilers and generators, modeled with the existing interactive
sources, and with background air pollutant concentrations added, will
be safely in compliance with the NAAQS for all of the criteria air
pollutants analyzed.
During the construction period, the project will comply with the
state DEP Diesel Retrofit Program to reduce emissions from
construction-related vehicle exhaust.
Wastewater/Water Supply
The daily sewage flows are estimated at 45,825 gallons per day
(gpd) based on existing flows at similar BUMC labs. The project does
not require improvements to existing sewage infrastructure. Sanitary
sewage for the proposed project would be carried by the New Albany
Street Interceptor, which is designed to carry a theoretical flow of 16
million gallons per day (mgd). This project anticipates a total new
daily flow of 45,825 gpd, or approximately 0.29% of the theoretical
capacity of the interceptor. The estimated peak sewage flow of 137,475
gpd would be approximately 0.86% of the system capacity. At the time
the New Albany Street Interceptor was designed, much larger flows were
expected from this area. Accordingly, there is more than sufficient
capacity in the system to accommodate the additional flows from this
project and the project will have no adverse effects on existing
wastewater systems
The Boston-NBL will have a segregated plumbing system that will
carry laboratory wastewater from every non-BSL-4 area to mixing tanks
in the basement where pH adjustment and compliance sampling would occur
prior to discharge to the sanitary system. The BSL-4 areas of the
Boston-NBL building would feature a sterilization system designed to
use heat to kill any biological agents that might exist in the
wastewater from these BSL-4 areas. The sterilized effluent from the
BSL-4 areas will be cooled and neutralized before discharge. The
discharges from the facility will have no adverse effect on the
wastewater treatment system.
Existing public water supply systems have been significantly
upgraded in the past several years and has more than adequate capacity
to service the Boston-NBL. The project will have no adverse effect on
water supply.
Historic Resources
The proposed project will be sited in an area of large commercial,
industrial and institutional uses near the South End Landmark District
and National Register District. The Project is located within the South
End Harrison/Albany Protection Area, which covers a transitional area
adjacent to the above districts. The proposed Project meets the goals
of the Protection Area and thus has no adverse effects on historic
resources.
Practicable Means To Avoid or Minimize Potential Environmental Harm
From the Selected Alternative
All practicable means to avoid or minimize adverse environmental
effects from the Selected Action have been identified and incorporated
into the action. The proposed NEIDL facility will be subject to the
existing BUMC pollution prevention, waste management, and safety,
security, and emergency response procedures as well as existing
environmental permits. Best management practices, spill prevention and
control, and stormwater management plans will be developed and followed
to appropriately address the construction and operation of the NEIDL
and comply with applicable regulatory and NIH requirements. No
additional mitigation measures have been identified.
Pollution Prevention
Pollution prevention measures are described in Chapter 2 of the
FEIS and reflect standard spill prevention procedures. Additional
pollution from the NEIDL facility is not anticipated. Air quality
permit standards will be met, as will all federal, state, and local
requirements to protect the environment and public health. Additional
pollution prevention methods will include:
Reducing construction waste by recycling materials wherever
possible;
Water efficient landscaping; and
Adhering to current BUMC waste management practices.
Monitoring and Enforcement Program for Mitigation Measures
During the preparation of the FEIS, several potential environmental
issues associated with implementation of the Selected Alternative were
identified.
The local community is concerned about transportation impacts.
Transportation of agents to and from the NEIDL is a concern for some.
Strict rules and regulations govern how agents are packaged, labeled,
handled, tracked, and transported. The transportation of agents will
comply with all rules and regulations. According to the World Health
Organization (WHO), worldwide, there have never been any cases of
illness attributable to the release of infectious materials during
transportation. There have been reports of damage to outer packaging.
The risk to the community from the transport of infectious agents or
other biologically-derived material is negligible.
Emergency planning was raised as a concern. BUMC has an existing
Incident Command System and a detailed Disaster Operations Plan that is
regularly reviewed and will be revised to include the operations of the
NEIDL. Emergency responders in the area are confident that they will be
capable of handling emergency situations.
In addition, possible adverse health and safety impacts on
laboratory workers in the NEIDL and on nearby residents during the
operational phase of the project were evaluated. The risks were deemed
to be negligible and mitigable through adherence to guidelines outlined
in the current edition of Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical
Laboratories, a joint publication of the NIH and CDC, as well as other
standards for safe operational practices.
Conclusion
Based upon review and careful consideration, the NIH has decided to
implement the Selected Alternative to partially fund the construction
of a state-of the-art national biocontainment laboratory, which will be
known as the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL)
on the Boston University Medical Campus (BUMC) in Boston,
Massachusetts.
The decision was based upon review and careful consideration of the
impacts identified in the Final EIS and public comments received
throughout the NEPA process. The decision was also based on BUMC's
extensive expertise in biological medical research, its experience in
operating BSL-2, and -3 laboratories, and its infrastructure as a
regional medical center being able to
[[Page 5675]]
fulfill the purpose and need to provide national biocontainment
facilities. Other relevant factors included in the decision, such as
NIAID's mandate to conduct and support research on agents of emerging
and re-emerging infectious diseases, were carefully considered.
Dated: January 26, 2006.
Juanita M. Mildenberg,
FAIA Acting Director, Office of Research Facilities Development and
Operations, National Institutes of Health.
[FR Doc. E6-1402 Filed 2-1-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P