[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 10 (Tuesday, January 17, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2571-2576]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-437]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[IA-05-052]
David Geisen; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed
Activities (Effective Immediately)
I
Mr. David Geisen was previously employed, at times relevant to this
Order, as the Manager of Design Engineering at the Davis-Besse Nuclear
Power Station (Davis-Besse) operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company (FENOC or licensee). The licensee holds License No. NPF-3 which
was issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission)
pursuant to 10 CFR part 50 on April 22, 1977. The license authorizes
the operation of Davis-Besse in accordance with the conditions
specified therein. The facility is located on the licensee's site near
Oak Harbor, Ohio.
II
On August 3, 2001, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-001,
``Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration
Nozzles,'' (Bulletin). In the Bulletin, the NRC requested that all
holders of operating licenses for pressurized water nuclear power
reactors (PWR), including FENOC for the Davis-Besse facility, provide
information to the NRC relating to the structural integrity of the
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head penetration nozzles at their
respective facilities. The information requested from the licensees
included the extent of RPV head penetration nozzle leakage and cracking
that had been found to date, a description of the inspections and
repairs undertaken to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, and
the basis for concluding that a licensee's plans for future inspections
would ensure compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. The
NRC also required that all Bulletin addressees, including FENOC, submit
a written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions of 10
CFR 50.54(f). That
[[Page 2572]]
regulation provides, in part, that upon request of the NRC, an NRC-
licensee must submit written statements, signed under oath or
affirmation, to enable the NRC to determine whether the license should
be modified, suspended, or revoked.
On September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, the licensee
provided written responses to the Bulletin. Additionally, the licensee
met with the NRC staff on numerous occasions during October and
November of 2001 to provide clarifying information. Based, in part, on
the information provided by FENOC in its written responses to the
Bulletin and during meetings with the NRC staff, the NRC staff allowed
the licensee to continue operation of the Davis-Besse facility until
February 2002, rather than requiring FENOC to shut the unit down to
perform inspections by December 31, 2001, as provided in the Bulletin.
On February 16, 2002, FENOC shut down Davis-Besse for refueling and
inspection of control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) RPV head penetration
nozzles. Using ultrasonic testing, the licensee found cracks in three
CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles and on March 6, 2002, the licensee
discovered a cavity in the RPV head in the vicinity of CRDM Penetration
Nozzle No. 3. The cavity measured approximately 5 to 7 inches long, 4
to 5 inches wide, and penetrated through the 6.63 inch-thick low-alloy
steel portion of the RPV head, leaving the stainless steel cladding
material (measuring 0.202 to 0.314 inches-thick) as the sole reactor
coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary. A smaller cavity was also found
near CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 2.
The licensee conducted a root cause evaluation and determined that,
contrary to the earlier information provided to the NRC, the cavities
were caused by boric acid from the RCS released through cracks in the
CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles. The root cause evaluation found that
the licensee conducted limited cleaning and inspections of the RPV head
during the Twelfth Refueling Outage (12RFO) that ended on May 18, 2000.
However, neither the limited RPV head cleaning nor the resultant
inspections during 12RFO were sufficient to ensure that the significant
boric acid deposits on the RPV head were only a result of CRDM flange
leakage, as supposed, and were not a result of RCS pressure boundary
leakage.
On March 6 and March 10, 2002, the licensee provided information to
the NRC concerning the identification of a large cavity in the RPV head
adjacent to CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 3. The NRC conducted an
Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection at Davis-Besse from March 12
to April 5, 2002, to determine the facts and circumstances related to
the significant degradation of the RPV head. The results of the AIT
inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-03,
issued on May 3, 2002. A follow-up Special Inspection was conducted
from May 15 to August 9, 2002, and on October 2, 2002, the NRC issued
the AIT Follow-up Special Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-08
documenting ten apparent violations associated with the RPV head
degradation.
On April 22, 2002, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) initiated
an investigation at Davis-Besse to determine, among other matters,
whether FENOC and individual employees at the Davis-Besse facility
failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC in its
September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, responses to the
Bulletin and during numerous conference calls and meetings in violation
of 10 CFR 50.9 and 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). The OI report (No. 3-2002-006)
was issued on August 22, 2003. A copy of the OI report was provided to
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of the United States
Attorney, Northern District of Ohio for review. The matter remains
under continued Federal investigation. Mr. Geisen, through the
performance of his engineering duties, and through oral and written
communications with other FENOC employees, was aware of the results of
previous RPV head inspections. For example:
On April 27, 2000, Mr. Geisen signed and closed out
Condition Report (CR) 2000-1037 which included the following problem
statement associated with the identification of five leaking control
rod drives:
``Identified at locations: F10, D10, C11, F8, and G9 * * * There
are no boron deposits on the vertical faces of the flange of G9
drive. The bottom of the flange of G9 drive is inaccessible for
inspection due to the boron buildup on the reactor head insulation,
not allowing full camera insertion. Since the boron is evident only
under the flange and not on the vertical surfaces, there is a high
probability that G9 is a leaking CRD.''
On June 27, 2001, Mr. Giesen approved and signed an intra-
company memorandum that indicated that ``large boron leakage from a
control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) flange was observed during 12RFO
inspection'' and ``This leakage did not permit the detailed inspection
of CRDM nozzles.''
On August 11, 2001, Mr. Geisen received an E-mail that
stated, in part: ``it was pointed out that we cannot clean our head
thru the mouse holes and a system engineer is requesting that three
large holes be cut in the Service Structure for viewing [inspection]
and cleaning.''
Mr. Geisen reviewed a Piedmont Management and Technical
Services, Inc., report, dated September 14, 2001, that indicated, in
part, that at the completion of 12RFO the RPV head had boric acid
deposits of considerable depth left at the center top area of the head.
A Senior Staff Nuclear Advisor (former inservice
inspector), FENOC, at the request of a system engineer from Davis-Besse
plant engineering, reviewed a CD ROM video that the system engineer had
made from videos of the reactor vessel head. The purpose of the review
was to assist in locating or determining the location of some nozzles.
Shortly after completing the review, Mr. Geisen asked the Senior Staff
Nuclear Advisor what he thought, from a visual standpoint, of the data
he had seen on the video. The Senior Staff Nuclear Advisor replied, in
part, that, based on an Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) head
examination document being developed, boron on the Davis-Besse head
would preclude an examination of that nature [EPRI] from being
performed.
In March 2002, a consultant from Martin Sigmund Consulting
Services, Inc., conducted an assessment of reactor head management
issues at Davis-Besse. The consultant provided his assessment to the
Davis-Besse Site Vice President via a memorandum dated March 28, 2002.
The assessment, in part, consisted of interviews with many of the
personnel involved with the reactor head corrosion issues. Mr. Geisen
was interviewed for this assessment on March 27, 2002, and stated, in
part, that some boric acid was left on the head in 2000 and that the
condition report was not very thoroughly evaluated. Mr. Geisen also
stated that he became aware that the reactor vessel head had not been
cleaned completely when reviewing the videos of the inspections in
preparation for interacting with the NRC in August, 2001.
On June 18, 2002, the licensee interviewed Mr. Geisen
regarding the Davis-Besse responses to Bulletin 2001-001. When asked
whether the reactor vessel head was inspected in accordance with plant
procedure, Mr. Geisen stated, in part, that we did the inspection but
clearly not with [in accordance with] the procedure. Mr. Geisen further
stated that Davis-Besse
[[Page 2573]]
was taking credit for a general inspection which clearly did not meet
the requirements in Bulletin 2001-001.
The above information demonstrates that Mr. Geisen had sufficient
knowledge of the results of previous inspections of the RPV head and
that he knew that the licensee's written and oral responses to NRC
Bulletin 2001-001 were incomplete and inaccurate.
Several FENOC employees, including Mr. David Geisen, were
responsible for the information provided to the NRC by FENOC in
response to the Bulletin.
III
David Geisen was employed by FENOC as the Manager of Design
Engineering at Davis-Besse at the time the licensee developed and
transmitted to the NRC its written responses to the Bulletin and at the
time the licensee met with the NRC to provide clarifying information
regarding its written responses.
On August 28, October 17, and October 30, 2001, respectively, Mr.
Geisen concurred in the issuance of the licensee's September 4, October
17, and October 30, 2001, responses to the Bulletin. On the concurrence
sheets, Mr. Geisen was listed as the FENOC manager responsible for
ensuring the completeness and accuracy of the responses. Mr. Geisen
participated in the development and presentation of information to the
NRC during information briefings held on October 3, October 11, and
November 9, 2001.
Item 1.d of the Bulletin requested each pressurized water reactor
(PWR) licensee, including FENOC for Davis-Besse, to provide a
description of the RPV head penetration nozzles and RPV head inspection
(including type, scope, qualification requirements, and acceptance
criteria) that were performed at PWRs in the 4 years preceding the date
of the Bulletin, and the findings resulting from the inspections. The
licensees were requested to include a description of any limitations
(insulation or other impediments) to accessibility of the bare metal of
the RPV head for visual examinations.
On September 4, 2001, FENOC submitted its written response to the
Bulletin for Davis-Besse. Item 1.d of the licensee's September 4, 2001,
response to the Bulletin stated, in part, that:
``The DBNPS [Davis-Besse] has performed two inspections within
the past four years, during the 11th Refueling Outage (RFO) in April
1998 and during the 12th RFO in April 2000. The scope of the visual
inspection was to inspect the bare metal RPV head area that was
accessible through the weep holes to identify any boric acid leaks/
deposits. The DBNPS also inspected 100% of Control Rod Drive
Mechanism (CRDM) flanges for leaks in response to Generic Letter 88-
05, `Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor pressure Boundary
Components in PWR Plants.' The results of these two recent
inspections are described below.
Inspections of the RPV head are performed with the RPV head
insulation installed in accordance with DBNPS procedure NG-EN-0324,
`Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program,' which was developed in
response to Generic Letter 88-05. As stated previously, a gap exists
between the RPV head and the insulation, the minimum gap being at
the dome center of the RPV head where it is approximately 2 inches,
and does not impede visual inspection. The service structure
envelopes the DBNPS RPV head and has 18 openings (weep holes) at the
bottom through which inspections are performed. There are 69 CRDM
nozzles that penetrate the RPV head. The metal reflective insulation
is located above the head and does not interfere with the visual
inspection. The visual inspection is performed by the use of a small
camera. This camera is inserted through the weep holes.''
Item 1.d of the licensee's September 4, 2001, response, under the
section entitled, ``April 2000 Inspection Results (12RFO),'' stated:
``The boric acid deposits were located beneath the leaking
flanges with clear evidence of downward flow. No visible evidence of
nozzle leakage was detected.''
Item 1.d of the licensee's September 4, 2001, response, under the
section entitled, ``Subsequent Review of 1998 and 2000 Inspection
Videotapes Results,'' stated:
``Since May 2001, a review of the 1998 and 2000 inspection
videotapes of the RPV head has been performed. This review was
conducted to re-confirm the indications of boron leakage experienced
at the DBNPS were not similar to the indications seen at ONS and
ANO-1; i.e., was not indicative of RPV nozzle leakage. This review
determined that indications such as those that would result from RPV
head penetration leakage were not evident.''
The licensee's September 4, 2001, response was materially
incomplete and inaccurate in that the response: (1) Mischaracterized
the accumulation of boric acid on the RVP head as a result of the 12RFO
RPV head inspection; (2) failed to include information that during the
Eleventh Refueling Outage (11RFO) and 12RFO, the licensee's access to
the RPV head bare metal was impeded by the presence of significant
accumulations of boric acid deposits; (3) failed to indicate that the
presence of boric acid deposits was not limited to the area beneath
control rod drive mechanism flanges; and (4) failed to indicate that
the build-up of boric acid deposits was so significant that the
licensee could not inspect all of the RPV head penetration nozzles. Mr.
Geisen was aware that the licensee's September 4, 2001, response to the
Bulletin was materially incomplete and inaccurate, but nevertheless
concurred on the response, thereby allowing it to be submitted to the
NRC.
The NRC staff determined that the September 4, 2001 response did
not include sufficient information to justify the NRC permitting FENOC
to operate Davis-Besse beyond December 31, 2001. As a result, FENOC met
with the NRC staff, Commissioners' Technical Assistants, the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and Congressional staff members, and
developed supplemental responses in an effort to better communicate its
justification for continued operations beyond December 31, 2001.
On October 3, 2001, Mr. Geisen participated in a conference call
with the NRC staff. Mr. Geisen was also involved in preparatory
meetings for the October 3rd conference call. The agenda for the
conference call stated ``Video Inspection Review from RFO10, RFO11, and
RFO12: Further Confirmation of no indication of leakage attributable to
CRDM nozzle leakage; clearly CRDM flange leakage.'' During the
conference call, Mr. Geisen informed the NRC that 100% of the reactor
pressure vessel head had been inspected during the last outage (RFO12)
but some areas were precluded from inspection and that videotapes of
the 10RFO, 11RFO, and 12RFO reactor pressure vessel head inspections
had been reviewed. The information communicated by the Mr. Geisen
during the conference call was materially incomplete and inaccurate in
that the licensee did not conduct a 100% inspection of the RPV head
during 12RFO due to the presence of significant amount of boric acid on
the reactor pressure vessel head which obscured a significant number of
RPV head nozzles.
On October 10, 2001, Mr. Geisen attended a meeting with other FENOC
management officials for the purposes of finalizing presentation slides
for an October 11, 2001, meeting with the NRC Commissioner's Technical
Assistants. Draft Presentation Slide 20 stated: ``Reviewed video
inspections of Reactor Vessel head taken during 11RFO (April 1998) and
12RFO (April 2000) and confirmed that Davis-Besse has not experienced
boron leakage as seen at Oconee or Arkansas Nuclear.'' Presentation
Draft Slide 21 stated: ``Reviewed past 3 outages of Reactor Vessel Head
inspection video tapes which were taken to satisfy Generic Letter 97-
01: No telltale ``popcorn'' type boron deposits; During 12RFO (Spring
2000), Davis-Besse identified sources of
[[Page 2574]]
boron that precluded the visual inspection of some CRDM penetrations,
as five leaking flanges above the mirror insulation; Viewed past 3
outages of inspection video tapes of area masked by boron in 12 RFO did
not have previous leakage.''
On October 11, 2001, Mr. Geisen and other licensee staff briefed
the NRC Commissioners' Technical Assistants as to FENOC's basis for
determining that Davis-Besse was safe to operate until the next
refueling outage (March 2002). During the briefing, FENOC and Mr.
Geisen, as a presenter, discussed the presentation slides that were
finalized the previous day. Presentation Slide 6, as presented by FENOC
stated, in part: ``Conducted and recorded video inspections of the head
during 11RFO (April 1998) and 12RFO (April 2000)--No head penetration
leakage was identified.'' Presentation Slide 7, as presented by Mr.
Geisen stated, in part: ``All CRDM [control rod drive mechanism]
penetrations were verified to be free from ``popcorn'' type boron
deposits using video recordings from 11RFO or 12RFO.''
The licensee's October 11, 2001, presentation to the NRC
Commissioners' Technical Assistants was materially incomplete and
inaccurate in that the presentation slides did not state that the
build-up of boric acid on the RPV head was so significant that the
licensee could not inspect all of the RPV head penetration nozzles. Due
to the significant amount of boric acid present on the RPV head, of
which he was aware, Mr. Geisen did not have a basis for stating that no
visible evidence of RPV penetration nozzle leakage was detected.
On October 17, 2001, the licensee provided a supplemental response
to the Bulletin. The second paragraph under the section entitled,
``Previous Inspection Results,'' on Page 2 of Attachment 1 of the
licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response stated, in part:
``The inspections performed during the 10th, 11th, and 12th
Refueling Outage (10RFO, conducted April 8 to June 2, 1996; 11RFO,
conducted April 10 to May 23, 1998; and, 12RFO, conducted April 1 to
May 18, 2000) consisted of a whole head visual inspection of the RPV
head in accordance with the DBNPS Boric Acid Control Program
pursuant to Generic Letter 88-05 `Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon
Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants.' The
visual inspections were conducted by remote camera and included
below insulation inspections of the RPV bare head such that the
Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzle penetrations were viewed.
During 10RFO, 65 of 69 nozzles were viewed, during 11RFO, 50 of 69
nozzles were viewed, and during 12RFO, 45 of 69 nozzles were viewed.
It should be noted that 19 of the obscured nozzles in 12RFO were
also those obscured in 11RFO.''
Information included under Column 6 of Attachment 2 of the
licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response stated, in part,
that 24 nozzles have a ``flange leak evident.'' Note 1 on the same
table stated, in part:
``In 1996 during 10 RFO, the entire RPV head was inspected.
Since the video was void of head orientation narration, each
specific nozzle view could not be correlated.''
The licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response was
materially incomplete and inaccurate, in that the licensee did not view
the stated number of RPV head penetration nozzles during the referenced
outages, and the licensee believed that only five RPV head control rod
drive mechanism flanges were leaking instead of the 24 RPV head control
rod drive mechanism flanges noted in the response. Mr. Geisen was aware
that the licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response was
materially incomplete and inaccurate but, nevertheless, concurred on
the response, thereby allowing it to be submitted to the NRC.
On October 30, 2001, the licensee provided a supplemental response
to the Bulletin. In an enclosure to the supplemental response, the
licensee provided a summary table and photographic images of areas of
accumulated boric acid crystal deposits on the RPV head. The
photographic images were labeled to indicate the time the images were
captured, the specific RPV nozzle locations associated with the images,
except for those associated with 10 RFO (1996), and narrative comments.
The labels also represented that the images were generally indicative
of the condition of the RPV head for 10RFO and 11RFO.
The licensee's October 30, 2001, supplemental response was
materially incomplete and inaccurate, in that the photographic images
of the RPV head nozzles and the accompanying labels were not consistent
with the actual RPV head conditions and with the actual RPV head nozzle
pictured. Specifically, the RPV head images omitted images of the
significant boric acid accumulations present on the RPV head, and many
of the RPV head nozzle images were mislabeled to indicate that the
images were of different RPV head nozzles than actually presented in
the image. In addition, several of the images were mere copies of other
images with the labels changed. Mr. Geisen labeled the images based on
his understanding of the head inspections and his discussions with a
former Davis-Besse system engineer. Mr. Geisen was aware that the
information contained in the licensee's October 30, 2001, supplemental
response was materially incomplete and inaccurate but, nevertheless,
concurred on the response, thereby allowing it to be submitted to the
NRC.
On November 9, 2001, in a transcribed presentation to the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Mr. Geisen stated that the
11RFO (1998) and 12RFO (2000) inspections were focused on inspecting
the RPV for indications of the impact of boric acid leakage from
leaking flanges. Mr. Geisen stated that the 1998 and 2000 inspections
(video tapes) did not give a good view of the control rod drives
because the camera angle was looking upwards at the structural material
of the service structure on top of the head. Mr. Geisen stated that the
video tape of the 10RFO (1996) inspection was a better video because
the camera was following around a vacuum and probe that were
specifically looking for head wastage as a result of boron deposits on
the head. The information provided by the licensee and Mr. Geisen to
the ACRS was materially incomplete and inaccurate in that each of the
video tapes was helpful in understanding the significant boron
accumulations present at the start of each outage, the clear
impediments to 100% inspection of the RPV head nozzles, and difficulty
the licensee encountered in its attempts to fully clean the RPV head of
boron or to complete a comprehensive inspection of the RPV head
nozzles.
Following the 1996 RPV head inspection, the licensee generated
Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report 96-0551, which stated, in
part, on Continuation Sheet Page 9, Part C, Item 1:
``The extent of the inspection was limited to approximately 50
to 60% of the head area because of the restrictions imposed by the
location and size of mouseholes. The inspection showed varying sizes
of boric acid mounds scattered in various areas of the head. It is
extremely difficult to develop an estimate of the amount of boric
acid deposit because of the deposit scatter and limited
inspection.''
Based on the above information, the NRC concludes that Mr. Geisen
had knowledge of the RPV head conditions and the limitations
experienced during RPV head inspections, and that, notwithstanding that
knowledge, he deliberately provided materially incomplete and
inaccurate information when he: (1) Concurred, on August 28,
[[Page 2575]]
October 17, and October 30, 2001, respectively, in the licensee's
September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, responses to the
Bulletin; and (2) assisted in the preparation and presentation of
incomplete or inaccurate information during internal meetings on
October 2 and 10, 2001, and during meetings or teleconferences held
with the NRC on October 3, 11, and November 9, 2001.
The information provided by the licensee under oath in the Bulletin
responses based, in part on the concurrence of Mr. Geisen, was material
to the NRC because the NRC used the information, in part, to allow
FENOC to operate Davis-Besse until February 2002 rather than requiring
the plant to shut down by December 31, 2001, to conduct inspections of
the head as discussed in Item 3.v.1. of the Bulletin. The information
provided to the NRC during teleconferences and meetings was material to
the NRC because the information gave the impression to the NRC staff
that the Davis-Besse RPV head had been completely inspected and that
the licensee had not identified any indications of RPV head penetration
nozzle cracks when this was not the case at the time the response was
submitted.
Based on the above information, Mr. David Geisen, while employed by
the licensee, engaged in deliberate misconduct by deliberately
providing FENOC and the NRC information that he knew was not complete
or accurate in all material respects to the NRC, a violation of 10 CFR
50.5(a)(2). Mr. Geisen's actions also placed FENOC in violation of 10
CFR 50.9. The NRC determined that these violations were of very high
safety and regulatory significance because they demonstrated a pattern
of deliberate inaccurate or incomplete documentation of information
that was required to be submitted to the NRC. Had the NRC been aware of
this incomplete and inaccurate information, the NRC would likely have
taken immediate regulatory action to shut down the plant and require
the licensee to implement appropriate corrective actions.
The NRC must be able to rely on the licensee and its employees to
comply with NRC requirements, including the requirement to provide
information that is complete and accurate in all material respects. Mr.
Geisen's action violated 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2) and caused the licensee to
violate 10 CFR 50.9, and raise serious doubt as to whether he can be
relied upon to comply with NRC requirements and to provide complete and
accurate information to the NRC.
Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that
licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the
Commission's requirements and that the health and safety of the public
will be protected if Mr. Geisen is permitted to be involved in NRC-
licensed activities. Therefore, the public health, safety and interest
require that Mr. Geisen be prohibited from any involvement in NRC-
licensed activities for a period of five years from the effective date
of this Order. Additionally, Mr. Geisen is required to notify the NRC
of his first employment in NRC-licensed activities for a period of five
years following the prohibition period.
V
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 50.5, and 10 CFR
150.20, It is hereby ordered that effective immediately:
1. Mr. David Geisen is prohibited for five years from the date of
this Order from engaging in NRC-licensed activities. The NRC considers
NRC-licensed activities to be those activities that are conducted
pursuant to a specific or general license issued by the NRC, including
those activities of Agreement State licensees conducted pursuant to the
authority granted by 10 CFR 150.20.
2. If Mr. Geisen is currently involved with another licensee in
NRC-licensed activities, he must immediately cease those activities,
and inform the NRC of the name, address and telephone number of the
employer, and provide a copy of this Order to the employer.
3. For a period of five years after the five-year period of
prohibition has expired, Mr. Geisen shall, within 20 days of acceptance
of his first employment offer involving NRC-licensed activities or his
becoming involved in NRC-licensed activities, as defined in Paragraph
IV.1 above, provide notice to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, of the name,
address, and telephone number of the employer or the entity where he
is, or will be, involved in NRC-licensed activities. In the
notification, Mr. Geisen shall include a statement of his commitment to
compliance with regulatory requirements and the basis why the
Commission should have confidence that he will now comply with
applicable NRC requirements.
The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Mr. Geisen of
good cause.
VI
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, David Geisen must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order within 20 days of the
date of this Order. However, since this enforcement action is being
proposed prior to the U.S. Department of Justice completing its review
of the OI investigation results, consideration may be given to
extending the response time for submitting an answer as well as the
time for requesting a hearing, for good cause shown. A request for
extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555,
and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may
consent to this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the
answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically
admit or deny each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall
set forth the matters of fact and law on which Mr. Geisen or other
person adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order
should not have been issued. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Mr.
Giesen, may, in addition to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer
is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the
immediate effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order,
including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on
adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, or
error. Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to
the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for
Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, to the
Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Lisle,
IL 60532-4352, and to Mr. Geisen if the answer or hearing request is by
a person other than Mr. Geisen. Because of continuing disruptions in
delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested
that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary
of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-
1101 or by e-mail to [email protected] and also to the Office of
the General
[[Page 2576]]
Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by
e-mail to [email protected]. If a person other than Mr. Geisen
requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the
manner in which his interest is adversely affected by this Order and
shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309.
If a hearing is requested by Mr. Geisen or a person whose interest
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating
the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be
sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Mr. Goyal, may, in addition to
demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section V above shall be effective immediately and shall
be final 20 days from the date of this Order without further order or
proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been
approved, the provisions specified in Section V shall be final when the
extension expires if a hearing request has not been received.
Dated this 4th day of January 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Martin J. Virgilio,
Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research, State and Compliance
Programs, Office of the Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. E6-437 Filed 1-13-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P