[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 10 (Tuesday, January 17, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2581-2585]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-416]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[IA-05-054]
Steven Moffitt; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed
Activities (Effective Immediately)
I
Mr. Steven Moffitt was previously employed, at times relevant to
this Order, as the Technical Services Director at the Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse) operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear
Operating Company (FENOC or licensee). The licensee holds License No.
NPF-3 which was issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or
Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 on April 22, 1977. The license
authorizes the operation of Davis-Besse in accordance with the
conditions specified therein. The facility is located on the Licensee's
site near Oak Harbor, Ohio.
II
On August 3, 2001, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-001,
``Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration
Nozzles,'' (Bulletin).
[[Page 2582]]
In the Bulletin, the NRC requested that all holders of operating
licenses for pressurized water nuclear power reactors (PWR), including
FENOC for the Davis-Besse facility, provide information to the NRC
relating to the structural integrity of the reactor pressure vessel
(RPV) head penetration nozzles at their respective facilities. The
information requested from the licensees included the extent of RPV
head penetration nozzle leakage and cracking that had been found to
date, a description of the inspections and repairs undertaken to
satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, and the basis for
concluding that a licensee's plans for future inspections would ensure
compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. The NRC also
required that all the Bulletin addressees, including FENOC, submit a
written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR
50.54(f). That regulation provides, in part, that upon request of the
NRC, an NRC-licensee must submit written statements, signed under oath
or affirmation, to enable the NRC to determine whether the license
should be modified, suspended, or revoked.
On September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, the licensee
provided written responses to the Bulletin. Additionally, the licensee
met with the NRC staff on numerous occasions during October and
November of 2001 to provide clarifying information. Based, in part, on
the information provided by FENOC in its written responses to the
Bulletin and during meetings with the NRC staff, the NRC staff allowed
the licensee to continue operation of the Davis-Besse facility until
February 2002, rather than requiring FENOC to shut the unit down to
perform inspections by December 31, 2001, as provided in the Bulletin.
On February 16, 2002, FENOC shut down Davis-Besse for refueling and
inspection of control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) RPV head penetration
nozzles. Using ultrasonic testing, the licensee found cracks in three
CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles and on March 6, 2002, the licensee
discovered a cavity in the RPV head in the vicinity of CRDM Penetration
Nozzle No. 3. The cavity measured approximately 5 to 7 inches long, 4
to 5 inches wide, and penetrated through the 6.63 inch-thick low-alloy
steel portion of the RPV head, leaving the stainless steel cladding
material (measuring 0.202 to 0.314 inches-thick) as the sole reactor
coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary. A smaller cavity was also found
near CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 2.
The licensee conducted a root cause evaluation and determined that,
contrary to the earlier information provided to the NRC, the cavities
were caused by boric acid from the RCS released through cracks in the
CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles. The root cause evaluation found that
the licensee had previously conducted limited cleaning and inspections
of the RPV head during the Twelfth Refueling Outage (12RFO) that ended
on May 18, 2000. However, neither the limited RPV head cleaning nor the
resultant inspections during 12RFO were sufficient to ensure that the
significant boric acid deposits on the RPV head were only a result of
CRDM flange leakage and were not a result of RCS pressure boundary
leakage.
On March 6 and March 10, 2002, the licensee provided information to
the NRC concerning the identification of a large cavity in the RPV head
adjacent to CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 3. The NRC conducted an
Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection at Davis-Besse from March 12
to April 5, 2002, to determine the facts and circumstances related to
the significant degradation of the RPV head. The results of the AIT
inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-03,
issued on May 3, 2002. A follow-up Special Inspection was conducted
from May 15 to August 9, 2002, and on October 2, 2002, the NRC issued
the AIT Follow-up Special Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-08
documenting ten apparent violations associated with the RPV head
degradation.
On April 22, 2002, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) initiated
an investigation at Davis-Besse to determine, among other matters,
whether FENOC and individual employees at the Davis-Besse facility
failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC in its
September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, responses to the
Bulletin and during numerous conference calls and meetings in violation
of 10 CFR 50.9 and 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). The OI report (No. 3-2002-006)
was issued on August 22, 2003. A copy of the OI report was provided to
the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of the United States
Attorney, Northern District of Ohio for review. The matter remains
under continued Federal investigation.
Mr. Moffitt was aware of the scope of the previous reactor vessel
head inspections and the condition of the reactor vessel head due to
his official duties and written and oral communications he received
from other FENOC employees. For example;
During a sworn, transcribed interview with OI, Mr. Moffitt
stated that it was common knowledge that the reactor head was not
totally cleaned during 12RFO.
On June 27, 2001, Mr. Moffitt was sent a memorandum that
provided an engineering evaluation of the question, ``Should Davis-
Besse Perform a Visual Head Inspection if The Plant Shut Down to Mode 5
Conditions?'' Page 2 of the memorandum stated:
``During 12th RFO at Davis-Besse (DB) the Reactor Vessel head
inspection was performed in accordance with boron inspection
walkdown as required by GL-88-05 and GL 97-01. Large boron leakage
from a CRDM flange was observed. This leakage did not permit the
detailed inspection of CRDM nozzles.''
On August 11, 2001, FENOC held a meeting to discuss its
pending response to the Bulletin. Mr. Moffitt was listed as an attendee
at the meeting, as documented in an E-mail from a design engineer that
same day. As stated in the E-mail, ``it was pointed out that we can not
clean our head thru the mouse holes and a system engineer is requesting
that three large holes be cut in the Service Structure for viewing
[inspection] and cleaning.''
During a sworn, transcribed interview with OI, Mr. Moffitt
stated that around the August 11, 2001, time frame he remembered
talking to the engineer who had cleaned the RPV head regarding how much
of the head was cleaned. Mr. Moffitt further stated that the engineer
told him about 80 percent of the head was cleaned.
During September 2001, Mr. Moffitt hired a contractor
employed by Piedmont Management and Technical Services, Inc. to review
Davis-Besse's preparation for 13RFO with implementing the requirements
of Bulletin 2001-001. On September 14, 2001, the contractor provided
Mr. Moffitt a copy of the letter [report] containing his
recommendations and approximately one week later verbally briefed Mr.
Moffitt on the contents of the report. The report stated, in part: ``It
is noted that on completion of 12RFO, the Reactor Vessel head did have
boric acid crystal deposits of considerable depth left in the center
top area of the head, since cleaning of this area at that time was not
successful in removing all the deposits (partly due to limited
access).''
During a licensee interview of Mr. Moffitt on July 1,
2002, Mr. Moffitt indicated that he knew in the July to August 2001
time-frame that boric acid was left on the head in 12RFO and that the
boric acid impeded a complete inspection of the head.
[[Page 2583]]
The above information demonstrates that Mr. Moffitt had sufficient
knowledge of the results of previous inspections of the RPV head and
that he knew the licensee's written and oral responses to NRC Bulletin
2001-001 were incomplete and inaccurate.
Several FENOC employees, including Mr. Steven Moffitt, were
responsible for the information provided to the NRC by FENOC in
response to the Bulletin.
III
Steven Moffitt was employed by FENOC as the Technical Services
Director at Davis-Besse at the time the responses to the Bulletin were
developed and transmitted to the NRC. Mr. Moffitt participated in an
October 3, 2001, teleconference with the NRC staff and a presentation
on October 11, 2001, to the NRC Commissioners' Technical Assistants. On
October 17, 2001, Mr. Moffitt concurred in the issuance of the
supplemental licensee response, dated October 17, 2001.
On October 3, 2001, Mr. Moffitt was a senior Davis-Besse management
official on a conference call with the NRC staff. Mr. Moffitt was also
involved in preparatory meetings for the October 3rd conference call.
The agenda for the conference call stated: ``Video Inspection Review
from RFO10, RFO11, and RFO12: Further Confirmation of no indication of
leakage attributable to CRDM Nozzle leakage; clearly CRDM flange
leakage.'' During the conference call, Mr. Moffitt's direct subordinate
informed the NRC that 100% of the RPV head had been inspected during
the last outage (12RFO) but that some areas were precluded from
inspection and that videotapes of the inspections conducted during
10RFO, 11RFO, and 12RFO had been reviewed. Mr. Moffitt was aware at the
time of the October 3, 2001, meeting that the licensee did not conduct
a 100% inspection of the RPV head during 12RFO due to the presence of
boric acid on the head which obscured a significant number of the RPV
head nozzles yet approved the misleading statements thereby causing the
incomplete and inaccurate information to be submitted to the NRC.
On October 10, 2001, Mr. Moffitt participated in a meeting with
other FENOC officials for the purpose of finalizing presentation slides
to be used during an October 11, 2001, meeting with the NRC
Commissioner's Technical Assistants. Draft Presentation Slide 20
stated: ``Reviewed video inspections of Reactor Vessel head taken
during 11RFO (April 1998) and 12RFO (April 2000) and confirmed that
Davis-Besse has not experienced boron leakage as seen at Oconee or
Arkansas Nuclear.'' Presentation Draft Slide 21 for the briefing
stated: ``Reviewed past 3 outages of Reactor Vessel Head inspection
video tapes which were taken to satisfy Generic Letter 97-01: No
telltale ``popcorn'' type boron deposits; During 12RFO (Spring 2000),
Davis-Besse identified sources of boron that precluded the visual
inspection of some CRDM penetrations, as five leaking flanges above the
mirror insulation; Viewed past 3 outages of inspection video tapes of
area masked by boron in 12 RFO did not have previous leakage.''
On October 11, 2001, Mr. Moffitt and other licensee staff briefed
the NRC Commissioners' Technical Assistants on FENOC's basis for
concluding that Davis-Besse was safe to operate until the next
refueling outage (March 2002). During the briefing, FENOC utilized the
presentation slides that were finalized the previous day. Presentation
Slide 6 stated, in part: ``Conducted and recorded video inspections of
the head during 11RFO (April 1998) and 12RFO (April 2000)--No head
penetration leakage was identified.'' Presentation Slide 7 stated, in
part: ``All CRDM [control rod drive mechanism] penetrations were
verified to be free from ``popcorn'' type boron deposits using video
recordings from 11RFO or 12RFO.''
The licensee's October 11, 2001, presentation to the NRC
Commissioners' Technical Assistants was materially incomplete and
inaccurate in that the presentation slides did not state that the
build-up of boric acid on the RPV head was so significant that the
licensee could not inspect all of the RPV head penetration nozzles. Due
to the significant amount of boric acid present on the RPV head, of
which Mr. Moffitt was aware, the licensee also did not have a basis for
stating that no visible evidence of RPV penetration nozzle leakage was
detected. Mr. Moffitt knew the information was incomplete and
inaccurate and allowed it to be submitted to the NRC.
On October 17, 2001, the licensee provided a supplemental response
to the Bulletin. The second paragraph under the section entitled,
``Previous Inspection Results,'' on Page 2 of Attachment 1 of the
licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response stated, in part:
``The inspections performed during the 10th, 11th, and 12th
Refueling Outage (10RFO, conducted April 8 to June 2, 1996; 11RFO,
conducted April 10 to May 23, 1998; and, 12RFO, conducted April 1 to
May 18, 2000) consisted of a whole head visual inspection of the RPV
head in accordance with the DBNPS Boric Acid Control Program
pursuant to Generic Letter 88-05 ``Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon
Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants.'' The
visual inspections were conducted by remote camera and included
below insulation inspections of the RPV bare head such that the
Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzle penetrations were viewed.
During 10RFO, 65 of 69 nozzles were viewed, during 11RFO, 50 of 69
nozzles were viewed, and during 12RFO, 45 of 69 nozzles were viewed.
It should be noted that 19 of the obscured nozzles in 12RFO were
also those obscured in 11RFO.''
Information included under Column 6 of Attachment 2 of the
licensee's October 17, 2001, response stated, in part, that 24 nozzles
have a ``flange leak evident.'' Note 1 on the same table stated, in
part:
``In 1996 during 10 RFO, the entire RPV head was inspected.
Since the video was void of head orientation narration, each
specific nozzle view could not be correlated.''
The licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental response was
materially incomplete and inaccurate, in that the licensee did not view
the stated number of RPV head penetration nozzles during the referenced
outages, and the licensee believed that only five RPV head control rod
drive mechanism flanges were leaking instead of the 24 RPV head control
rod drive mechanism flanges noted in the response. Specifically, during
12RFO the licensee did not clean all of the RPV head; therefore, the
licensee could not have viewed each of the RPV head penetration nozzles
and determined that the observed boric acid accumulation was not a
result of RPV nozzle leakage. Mr. Moffitt knew the information was
incomplete and inaccurate but nonetheless, concurred on the response,
thereby allowing the information to be submitted to the NRC.
Based on the above information, the NRC concludes that Mr. Moffitt
had knowledge of the condition of the RPV head and the limitations
experienced during RPV head inspections, and he deliberately failed to
ensure that information that was developed for and presented during an
October 3, 2001, teleconference with the NRC; was developed during an
October 10, 2001, meeting and presented during an October 11, 2001,
meeting with the NRC; and was included in the licensee's October 17,
2001, supplemental response to the NRC Bulletin 2001-001 was materially
complete and accurate.
The information presented to the NRC and provided in the licensee's
October 17, 2001, supplemental response was material to the NRC because
the information gave the impression to the NRC staff that the Davis-
Besse RPV head had been completely inspected for
[[Page 2584]]
evidence of nozzle cracks, when this was not the case at the time the
information was provided or the supplemental response was submitted. In
addition, information provided during the October 3 and October 11,
2001, meetings and in the licensee's October 17, 2001, supplemental
response to the NRC was material to the NRC because the NRC used the
information, in part, to allow FENOC to operate Davis-Besse until
February 2002 rather than requiring the plant to shut down by December
31, 2001, to conduct inspections of the RPV head as discussed in Item
3.v.1 of the Bulletin.
Based on the above, Mr. Steven Moffitt, while employed by the
licensee, engaged in deliberate misconduct by providing FENOC and the
NRC information that he knew was not complete and accurate in all
material respects to the NRC, a violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). Mr.
Moffitt's actions also placed FENOC in violation of 10 CFR 50.9. The
NRC determined that these violations were of very high safety and
regulatory significance because they demonstrated a pattern of
deliberate inaccurate or incomplete documentation of information that
was required to be submitted to the NRC. Had the NRC been aware of this
incomplete and inaccurate information, the NRC would likely have taken
immediate regulatory action to shut down the plant and require the
licensee to implement appropriate corrective actions.
IV
The NRC must be able to rely on the licensee and its employees to
comply with NRC requirements, including the requirement to provide
information and maintain records that are complete and accurate in all
material respects. Mr. Moffitt's deliberate actions raise serious doubt
as to whether he can be relied upon to comply with NRC requirements and
to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC.
Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that
licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the
Commission's requirements and that the health and safety of the public
will be protected if Mr. Moffitt is permitted to be involved in NRC-
licensed activities. Therefore, the public health, safety and interest
require that Mr. Moffitt be prohibited from any involvement in NRC-
licensed activities for a period of five years from the date of this
Order.
Additionally, Mr. Moffitt is required to notify the NRC of his
first employment in NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years
following the prohibition period.
V
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 50.5, and 10 CFR
150.20, It is hereby ordered that effective immediately:
1. Mr. Steven Moffitt is prohibited for five years from the date of
this Order from engaging in NRC-licensed activities. The NRC considers
NRC-licensed activities to be those activities that are conducted
pursuant to a specific or general license issued by the NRC, including
those activities of Agreement State licensees conducted pursuant to the
authority granted by 10 CFR 150.20.
2. If Mr. Moffitt is currently involved with another licensee in
NRC-licensed activities, he must immediately cease those activities,
and inform the NRC of the name, address and telephone number of the
employer, and provide a copy of this Order to the employer.
3. For a period of five years after the five-year period of
prohibition has expired, Mr. Moffitt shall, within 20 days of
acceptance of his first employment offer involving NRC-licensed
activities or his becoming involved in NRC-licensed activities, as
defined in Paragraph IV.1 above, provide notice to the Director, Office
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555, of the name, address, and telephone number of the employer or
the entity where he is, or will be, involved in NRC-licensed
activities. In the notification, Mr. Moffitt shall include a statement
of his commitment to compliance with regulatory requirements and the
basis why the Commission should have confidence that he will now comply
with applicable NRC requirements.
The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Mr. Moffitt
of good cause.
VI
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Steven Moffitt must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order within 20 days of the
date of this Order. However, since this enforcement action is being
proposed prior to the U.S. Department of Justice completing its review
of the OI investigation results, consideration may be given to
extending the response time for submitting an answer as well as the
time for requesting a hearing, for good cause shown. A request for
extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555,
and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may
consent to this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the
answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically
admit or deny each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall
set forth the matters of fact and law on which Mr. Moffitt or other
person adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order
should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing shall
be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies
also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General
Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address,
to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road,
Lisle, IL 60532-4352, and to Mr. Moffitt if the answer or hearing
request is by a person other than Mr. Moffitt. Because of continuing
disruptions in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it
is requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to
the Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile
transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to [email protected] and
also to the Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile
transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to [email protected]. If
a person other than Mr. Moffitt requests a hearing, that person shall
set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is
adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set
forth in 10 CFR 2.309.
If a hearing is requested by Mr. Moffitt or a person whose interest
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating
the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be
sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(I), Mr. Moffitt, may, in addition to
demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error.
[[Page 2585]]
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section V above shall be effective immediately and final
20 days from the date of this Order without further order or
proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been
approved, the provisions specified in Section V shall be final when the
extension expires if a hearing request has not been received.
Dated this 4th day of January 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Martin J. Virgilio,
Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research, State, and
Compliance Programs, Office of the Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. E6-416 Filed 1-13-06; 8:45 am]
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