[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 1 (Tuesday, January 3, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 174-196]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-24521]



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Part II





Department of Homeland Security





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Preparedness Directorate; Protective Action Guides for Radiological 
Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents; 
Notice

  Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 3, 2006 / 
Notices  

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Z-RIN 1660-ZA02


Preparedness Directorate; Protective Action Guides for 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 
Incidents

AGENCY: Preparedness Directorate, Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice of draft guidance for interim use with request for 
comment.

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SUMMARY: The Preparedness Directorate of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) is issuing guidance entitled, ``Application of 
Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) and 
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents'' for Federal agencies, and 
as appropriate, State and local governments, emergency responders, and 
the general public who may find it useful in planning and responding to 
an RDD or IND incident. The guidance recommends ``protective action 
guides'' (PAGs) to support decisions about actions that may need to be 
taken to protect the public when responding to or recovering from an 
RDD or IND incident. It also outlines a process to implement the 
recommendations and discusses operational guidelines that may be useful 
in the implementation of the PAGs. The full text of the document is 
included in this Notice. This guidance is provided for interim use and 
will be revised based on comments received. The Preparedness 
Directorate is seeking input on the appropriateness, implementability 
and completeness of the guidance.

DATES: The draft guidance contained in this notice is released for 
interim use effective January 3, 2006. Comments on this draft guidance 
should be received on or before March 6, 2006.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket Number DHS-
2004-0029 and Z-RIN 1660-ZA02, by one of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     E-mail: [email protected]. Include Docket Number DHS-
2004-0029 and Z-RIN 1660-ZA02 in the subject line of the message.
     Fax: 202-646-4536.
     Mail/Hand Delivery/Courier: Rules Docket Clerk, Office of 
the General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Room 840, 500 
C Street, SW., Washington, DC 20472.
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name 
and docket number (if available) or Regulatory Information Number (RIN) 
for this rulemaking. All comments received will be posted without 
change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal 
information provided.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov. Submitted comments 
may also be inspected at 500 C Street, SW., Room 840, Washington, DC 
20472.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Craig Conklin, Chief, Nuclear and 
Chemical Hazards Branch, Preparedness Division, Department of Homeland 
Security, NAC, Washington, DC 20528, 703-605-1228 (phone), 703-605-1198 
(facsimile), or [email protected] (e-mail.)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

(a) Introduction

(1) Background on the Guidance

    Since the terrorist events in the United States on September 11, 
2001, there has been increased worldwide effort to avert and respond to 
terrorist attacks. In addition, based on intelligence information, the 
potential for terrorist attacks in the United States involving 
radiological materials or a nuclear device has grown. The Federal 
Government has responded with an aggressive approach to planning and 
preparedness, utilizing the resources and expertise found in 
departments and agencies across the government. Prior to September 11, 
radiological emergencies were considered bounded by potential nuclear 
power plant accidents. However, new terrorist scenarios have emerged 
that offer new and different response challenges.
    In order to prepare for potential attacks, DHS held a Federal 
interagency ``dirty bomb'' exercise as part of the Top Officials-2 
Exercise (TOPOFF-2) in Seattle, Washington, May 12-16, 2003. The 
exercise brought to light a number of issues in Federal radiological 
emergency response and recovery. One of the most important issues 
raised was how long-term site restoration and cleanup would be 
accomplished following an act of radiological terrorism. This question 
was part of a larger discussion of Federal Government protective action 
recommendations following acts of radiological or nuclear terror. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published PAGs in the ``Manual of 
Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents'' 
(EPA 400-R-92-001, May 1992), in coordination with the Federal 
Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC). However, the 
EPA Manual, often called the PAG Manual, was not developed to address 
response actions following radiological or nuclear terrorist incidents. 
Also, the PAG Manual does not address long-term cleanup.
    In 2003, DHS tasked an interagency working group to address these 
issues. The working group consisted of senior subject matter experts in 
radiological/nuclear emergency preparedness, response, and consequence 
management. The following Federal departments and agencies were 
represented on the working group: DHS, EPA, Department of Commerce 
(DOC), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD), 
Department of Labor (DOL), Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
    The result of the interagency working group process is the 
following Federal consensus guidance entitled, ``Application of 
Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and 
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents.'' (June 1, 2004). In it, the 
Federal agencies support the use of existing early and intermediate 
phase PAGs, as found in the EPA PAG Manual, for acts of radiological 
and nuclear terrorism. The working group also developed late phase 
guidance, also contained in the consensus guidance, for the cleanup and 
restoration of a site following an act of radiological or nuclear 
terrorism that is based on the principle of site-specific optimization.
    In developing this draft guidance, DHS convened a focus group of 
representatives from 13 State agencies with expertise in radiological 
emergency response and consequence management. The State 
representatives were asked to review the draft guidance and provide 
detailed comments on its content, structure, and presentation. DHS was 
particularly interested in how States would make use of the guidance 
and how well the guidance would serve to facilitate Federal and State 
(or local) government interactions during a radiological terrorism 
response. Overall, the State representatives responded very positively 
to the guidance. A number of improvements suggested by the States were 
incorporated into the draft guidance being published today.
    The purpose of this guidance is to aid Federal decision makers in 
protecting the public and emergency responders from the effects of 
radiation during an emergency and to provide guidelines and a process 
for site cleanup and recovery following an RDD or IND incident. This 
guidance is designed to

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be compatible with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 
the National Response Plan (NRP).
    This guidance presents levels of radiation exposure at which the 
Federal Government recommends that actions be considered to avoid or 
reduce radiation dose to the public from an RDD or IND incident. The 
intended audience for this document is principally Federal Government 
emergency response planners and officials; however, this document 
should also be useful to State and local governments for response 
planning. The protective action guides incorporate guidance and 
regulations published by the EPA, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 
and address key health protection questions faced in the various phases 
(early, intermediate, and late) of response to an incident.
    These PAGs are not absolute standards and are not intended to 
define ``safe'' or ``unsafe'' levels of exposure or contamination. 
Rather, they represent the approximate levels at which the associated 
protective actions are recommended. This guidance may also be used by 
State and local decision makers, and provides flexibility to be more or 
less restrictive as deemed appropriate based on the unique 
characteristics of the incident and local considerations.
    This guidance is not intended for use at site cleanups occurring 
under other statutory authorities such as EPA's Superfund program, the 
NRC's decommissioning program, or other Federal or State cleanup 
programs. In addition, the scope of this guidance does not include 
situations involving United States nuclear weapons accidents.

(2) Characteristics of RDD and IND Incidents

    An RDD is any device that causes the purposeful dissemination of 
radioactive material across an area without a nuclear detonation. The 
mode of dispersal typically described as an RDD is an explosive device 
coupled with radioactive material. An RDD poses a threat to public 
health and safety and the environment through the spread of radioactive 
materials, and any explosive device presents an added immediate threat 
to human life and property. Other means of dispersal, both passive and 
active, may be employed. Dissemination of radioactive material not 
carried out via a device would still be treated like an RDD by 
responders and decision makers.
    There is a wide range of possible consequences that may result from 
an RDD depending upon the type and size of the device, the type and 
quantity of radioactive material, and how dispersion is achieved. The 
consequences of an RDD may range from a small, localized area (e.g., a 
street, single building or city block) to large areas, conceivably 
several square miles. However, most experts agree that the likelihood 
of a large impacted area is low. In most plausible scenarios, the 
radioactive material would not result in acutely harmful radiation 
doses and the public health concern from the radioactive materials 
would likely focus on the chronic risk of developing cancer among 
exposed individuals. Hazards from fire, smoke, shock, shrapnel (from an 
explosion), industrial chemicals and other chemical or biological 
agents may also be present.
    An IND is an illicit nuclear weapon bought, stolen, or otherwise 
originating from a nuclear State, or a weapon fabricated by a terrorist 
group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear weapons material that 
produces a nuclear explosion. The guidance does not apply to acts of 
war between nation-states involving nuclear weapons. The nuclear yield 
achieved by an IND produces extreme heat, powerful shockwaves, and 
prompt radiation that would be acutely lethal for a significant 
distance. It also produces potentially lethal radioactive fallout, 
which may spread far downwind and deposit over very large areas. An IND 
would result in catastrophic loss of life, destruction of 
infrastructure and contamination of a very large area. If nuclear yield 
is not achieved, the result would likely resemble an RDD in which 
fissile weapons material was dispersed locally.

(3) RDD and IND Incidents v. Accidents

    Acts of radiological and nuclear terrorism differ from radiological 
and nuclear accidents in several key ways. Accidents occur almost 
exclusively at well-characterized fixed facilities, or along prescribed 
transit routes. Facility operators have a good understanding of the 
kinds of radiological incidents that may occur, and have developed 
safeguards, plans, and procedures to deal with them. Exercises are 
regularly held to practice emergency plans and procedures, and 
improvements are made where necessary. Local communities, such as those 
around nuclear power plants (NPPs) or weapons production facilities, 
are informed and involved in emergency planning, including development 
of public communication strategies, practicing shelter-in-place, and 
orderly evacuation along prescribed routes. Accidents may also occur 
along transit routes, but these are relatively rare and substantial 
contingency planning and exercising occurs for transportation accidents 
as well.
    Acts of radiological and nuclear terrorism, on the other hand, may 
occur virtually anywhere. Major cities are potential targets of such 
incidents. The number of potential targets and the diverse 
circumstances of potential attacks make focused response planning 
almost impossible. Even a rural setting could fall victim, if for 
example, a device were to go off prematurely. Most nuclear facilities 
are located in semi-rural settings around which the number of people 
affected would be less and the amount of critical infrastructure 
impacted is likely to be less.
    The scope of potential accidents is limited and fairly well 
understood. Facilities tend to have fixed quantities of licensed 
radioisotopes or well characterized types of radionuclides on site that 
may be released in an accident. The number of ways accidents can occur 
(within reason) is limited, making possible effective contingency 
planning and improved safety. Accidents of any magnitude are limited to 
a relatively small number of facilities, and these tend to have highly 
trained personnel, advanced security, advanced process designs with the 
most rigorous safeguards and back-up systems, and the most aggressive 
contingency planning. The design of commercial nuclear power reactors 
in the United States, for example, precludes a Chernobyl-type of 
nuclear accident. Smaller facilities, such as radiopharmaceutical or 
radiation source manufacturers, generally possess much less radioactive 
material (or only short half-life materials) that may be involved in an 
accidental release.
    Finally, an RDD or IND incident may be initiated without any 
advance warning and the release would likely have a relatively short 
duration. With a major NPP accident, the most severe type of incident 
previously considered, there is likely to be several hours or days of 
warning before the release starts and the release may be drawn out over 
many hours. The benefit of time is critical. Advance notice affords 
time to make appropriate decisions, communicate to the public, and 
execute orderly evacuation, if necessary, or other protective actions. 
This difference means that most early and some intermediate phase 
protective actions must be made more quickly and with less information 
in an RDD or IND incident if they are to be effective.

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(4) Phases of Response

    Typically, the response to an emergency can be divided into three 
time phases. Although these phases cannot be represented by precise 
time periods and may overlap, they provide a useful framework for the 
considerations involved in emergency response planning. The early phase 
(or emergency phase) is the period at the beginning of the incident 
when the source (e.g., fire or contaminated plume) at the incident is 
active, field measurement data are limited or not available, and 
immediate protective action decisions are required. Exposure to the 
radioactive plume, short-term exposure to deposited materials and 
inhalation of radioactive material are generally included when 
considering protective actions for the early phase of a radiological 
emergency. The response during the early phase includes the initial 
emergency response actions to retrieve and care for victims, stabilize 
the scene, and public health protective actions (such as sheltering-in-
place or evacuation) in the short term. Life-saving and first aid 
actions should be given priority.
    In general, early phase protective actions need to be made very 
quickly, and the protective action decisions can be modified later as 
more information becomes available. If an explosive RDD is deployed 
without warning, there may be no time to take protective actions to 
reduce plume exposure. In the event of a covert dispersal, discovery or 
detection may not occur for days or weeks, allowing contamination to be 
dispersed broadly by foot, vehicular traffic, wind, rain or other 
forces. If an IND explodes, there would only be time to make early 
phase protective action recommendations to protect against exposure 
from fallout in areas miles downwind from the explosion.
    The intermediate phase of the response may follow the early phase 
response within as little as a few hours, up to several days. The 
intermediate phase of the response is usually assumed to begin after 
the incident source and releases have been brought under control and 
protective action decisions can be made based on some field 
measurements of exposure and radioactive materials. Activities in this 
phase typically overlap with early and late phase activities, and may 
continue for weeks to many months until protective actions are 
terminated. During the intermediate phase, decisions must be made on 
the initial actions needed to begin recovery from the incident, reopen 
transportation systems and critical infrastructure, and return to some 
state of normal activities.
    The late phase is the period when recovery and cleanup actions 
designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment to acceptable 
levels commence and ends when all the recovery actions have been 
completed. In the late phase, decision makers will have more time and 
information to allow for better data collection and options analyses. 
In this respect, the late phase is no longer a response to an 
``emergency situation,'' as in the early and intermediate phases, and 
is better viewed in terms of the long-term objectives of cleanup and 
restoration of the site to meet the needs and desires of the community 
and region. With the additional time and increased understanding of the 
situation, there will be opportunities to involve key stakeholders in 
providing sound, cost-effective recommendations.

(5) Protective Action Guides

    A PAG is the projected dose to a reference individual from an 
accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material at which a 
specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is recommended. 
Thus, protective actions, such as evacuation or sheltering-in-place, 
should normally be taken before the anticipated dose is realized. The 
PAG Manual, published by EPA in coordination with the FRPCC, provides 
the basis for this proposed guidance and may be referred to for 
additional details. The EPA PAGs achieve the following criteria and 
goals: (1) Prevent acute effects, (2) reduce risk of chronic effects 
and, (3) require optimization to balance protection with other 
important factors and ensure that actions taken cause more benefit than 
harm.
    The PAG Manual was written to address the kinds of nuclear or 
radiological incidents deemed likely to occur. While intended to be 
applicable to any radiological release, the PAGs were designed 
principally to meet the needs of commercial nuclear power plant 
accidents, the worst type of incident under consideration in the PAGs. 
This is important for two reasons: commercial nuclear power plant 
accidents are almost always signaled by preceding events, giving plant 
managers time (hours or days) to make decisions, and local emergency 
managers time to communicate with the public and initiate evacuations 
if necessary; and, the suite of radionuclides is well-known, and is 
dominated by relatively short-lived isotopes. As a result of September 
11, the Federal Government has reevaluated the PAGs for their 
applicability to RDD and IND incidents.
    The PAGs are non-regulatory, and are meant to provide a flexible 
basis for decisions under varying emergency circumstances. Many factors 
should be considered when deciding whether or not to order an action 
based on the projected dose to a population. For example, evacuation of 
a population is much more difficult and costly as the size of the 
subject population increases. Further, there is a statistical increase 
in casualties directly related to the size of the population evacuated 
that must be taken into consideration. Thus, considering incident-
specific factors like these, actual projected doses at which action is 
recommended may vary up or down.

(b) Developing the Proposed Guidance

(1) Use of Existing PAGs

    In deriving the recommendations contained in this guidance, new 
types of incidents and scenarios that could lead to environmental 
radiological contamination were considered. The working group 
determined that the existing PAGs for the early and intermediate 
phases, including worker protection guides, published in the EPA PAG 
Manual, are also appropriate for use in RDD and IND incidents. The 
proposed recommendations are provided in Table 1 in Section D.3 of the 
following guidance. Appendix 1 of the following guidance provides 
additional details regarding worker protection recommendations and 
includes additional Response Worker Guidelines in Table 1B.

(2) Guidance for Late Phase Site Cleanup and Restoration

    The working group evaluated existing Federal dose and risk-based 
standards, guidance and benchmarks for site cleanup and restoration as 
possible guidance for use after an RDD or IND. Standards considered 
included those of the EPA under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and DOE and NRC 
standards under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. In addition, 
cleanup guidance and benchmarks issued by national and international 
radiation advisory bodies (such as the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection and the International Atomic Energy Agency) 
were considered.
    The working group also examined variations of these standards, 
guidance and benchmarks by explicitly considering the possibility of 
achieving more or less stringent risk or dose levels, and by using 
target ranges.

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    The working group determined that the nature of potential impacts 
from radiological and nuclear terror incidents was extremely broad. 
Because of the broad range of potential impacts that may occur from 
RDDs and INDs ranging, for example, from light contamination of a 
street or building, to widespread destruction of a major metropolitan 
area, a pre-established numeric guideline was not recommended as best 
serving the needs of decision makers in the late phase. Rather, a site-
specific process is recommended for determining the societal objectives 
for expected land uses and the options and approaches available to 
address RDD or IND contamination. For example, if the incident is an 
RDD of limited size, such that the impacted area is small, then it 
might reasonably be expected that a complete return to normal 
conditions can be achieved within a short period of time. However, if 
the impacted area is very large, then achieving even very low criteria 
for remediation of the entire area and/or maintaining existing land 
uses may not be practicable.
    The process recommended in the guidance was based on the risk 
management framework discussed in Appendix 2. This process may be 
implemented through engaging knowledgeable technical experts and key 
stakeholders to provide decision makers with advice on the options, 
costs and implications of various courses of action. The guidance 
recommends that the level of effort and resources invested be scaled to 
the significance of the incident, scope of contamination, potential 
severity of economic impact, technical feasibility, and resource 
constraints. This process should result in the selection of the most 
appropriate solution that is sensitive to the range of involved 
stakeholders. Such a process where multiple factors are considered in 
developing options and deciding on action is often referred to as 
optimization.
    Optimization is a concept that is common to many State, Federal and 
international risk management programs that address radionuclides and 
chemicals, although it is not always referred to as such. Broadly 
speaking, optimization is a flexible, multi-attribute decision process 
that seeks to consider and balance many factors. Optimization analyses 
are quantitative and qualitative assessments applied at each stage of 
site restoration decisionmaking, from evaluation of remedial options, 
to implementation of the chosen alternative. The evaluation of cleanup 
alternatives, for example, should factor all relevant variables, 
including; areas impacted (e.g., size, location relative to 
population), types of contamination (chemical, biological, and 
radioactive), human health, public welfare, technical feasibility, 
costs and available resources to implement and maintain remedial 
options, long-term effectiveness, timeliness, public acceptability, and 
economic effects (e.g., on residents, tourism, business, and industry).
    The optimization process is an approach that may accommodate a 
variety of dose and/or risk benchmarks identified from State, Federal 
or other sources (e.g., national and international advisory 
organizations) as goals or starting points in the analysis of 
remediation options. These benchmarks may be useful for analysis of 
remediation options and levels may move up or down depending on the 
site-specific circumstances and balancing of other relevant factors.

(3) Implementation of Site Cleanup and Restoration

    The guidance presents an implementation plan for long-term site 
cleanup and restoration analysis and decisionmaking that is described 
in detail in Appendix 3 of the guidance. The implementation plan was 
designed principally to describe Federal interactions with State and 
local governments and public stakeholder representatives. For purposes 
of this guidance, it is assumed that the RDD or IND incident is 
significant in size and scope of contamination and that the Federal 
Government will be the primary source of funding for site cleanup and 
restoration. This plan is compatible with NIMS and the NRP, and should 
be seen as a framework for assessing a site, evaluating technologies 
and remediation options, assessing costs and timeframes, and 
incorporating local input on current and future land uses so that site 
cleanup and restoration may be approached in a fair and open manner.
    The plan describes a collaborative and iterative approach in which 
two work groups, one of stakeholders and one of technical subject 
matter experts, interact to develop cleanup options for the site under 
the supervision and oversight of a team of senior local, State and 
Federal management officials. The stakeholder workgroup would represent 
local interests, and relate local land use preferences and public 
health and welfare concerns. The technical work group would perform 
analyses, evaluate technologies and options, assess cost-effectiveness, 
and estimate timelines for completion. Ongoing discussions between the 
groups should result in a remediation solution and cleanup criteria for 
site restoration that are generally acceptable to involved 
stakeholders. The options and recommended decision would be forwarded 
up to decisionmakers for final approval so that cleanup can commence.
    The constitution of the groups and the interactions among them may 
be shaped to meet specific local needs and concerns. For example, 
larger, more complex incidents may require a number of technical 
experts with specific skills and knowledge, and the location may 
warrant varying stakeholder group composition. The implementation plan 
is scalable to the situation.
    The goal of the whole process is to reach an agreed upon approach 
to site cleanup and restoration within a reasonable timeframe that is 
effective, achievable, and meets the needs of local stakeholders. The 
final decision must be approved by local, State and Federal decision 
makers.

(c) Tools and Guidelines To Support Application of the PAGs

    The need for protective action will be based on a determination of 
whether PAGs will be exceeded. To facilitate first responder activities 
and the use of PAGs in the field, operational guidelines are needed 
which can be readily used by local decision makers and by responders. 
Radiation doses are not directly measurable and must be calculated 
based on measurable quantities such as exposure rates, radiation count 
rates or decays per unit surface area, or radioactivity per unit 
volume. Operational guidelines are levels of radioactivity or 
concentrations of radionuclides that can be accurately measured by 
radiation detection and monitoring equipment and related or compared to 
the dose-based PAGs to quickly determine if protective actions need to 
be implemented. Appendix 4 of the guidance provides examples of 
existing operational guidelines, and those being developed.
    Federal Government agencies are continuing development of the 
operational guidelines to support the application of the protective 
action guides in this document, as well as tools that will help in the 
development of incident-specific operational guidelines when they are 
needed. As the Federal agencies develop these guidelines and tools, 
they will be made available for review on the internet at the DOE's Web 
site at http://www.ogcms.energy.gov. This webpage will provide the 
status of operation guideline development and contain or provide a link 
to downloadable documents and tools related to the guidelines.

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(d) Specific Questions for Reviewers

    The Preparedness Directorate/DHS welcomes any comments and 
suggestions regarding the subject document. However, we would 
appreciate if reviewers specifically address the following issues:
     Is the presentation and format of the document useful and 
appropriate for its intended purpose? If not, why not and how should it 
be changed?
     Is the implementation process in Appendix 3 of the 
proposed guidance clear and appropriate for its intended purpose? Are 
roles and responsibilities sufficiently defined in the document?
     Does the guidance provide the appropriate balance between 
(a) public health and environmental protection goals; and (b) the 
flexibility needed for the decision makers to conduct emergency 
response actions and address public welfare needs, costs and benefits, 
technical feasibility and societal interests during response to and 
recovery from an incident? If not, how should the guidance be changed 
to provide the appropriate balance?
     Are the proposed PAGs for the early and intermediate 
phases implementable? Are they appropriate? If not, why not and what 
alternatives do you recommend?
     Is the discussion on worker protection and response worker 
protection helpful? Does Appendix 1 of the proposed guidance provide an 
adequate discussion of expectations and the use of the alternate 
response worker guidelines for life and property saving situations? If 
not, what additional information is needed to make the discussion 
adequate?
     Are the operational guidelines being developed and 
discussed in Appendix 4 of the proposed guidance useful? Are the 
groupings clear and appropriate? Are there additional operational 
guides that should be developed?
     Is the optimization process proposed for late phase site 
restoration and cleanup reasonable and sufficiently flexible to address 
RDD and IND situations? If not, what changes need to be made to improve 
the process?
     Is a flexible process without pre-established limits an 
appropriate method for site recovery? Would a flexible process with 
goals, ranges or limits be more appropriate?
     What other guidance or tools are needed to assist in the 
implementation of the recommendations?

(e) References

    ``National Response Plan'' (NRP), January 2005.
    ``National Incident Management Plan'' (NIMS), March 1, 2004
    ``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for 
Nuclear Incidents'' (EPA PAG) EPA 400-R-92-001, May 1992.

Complete Text of the Guidance

Application of Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal 
Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents

    Prepared by the Department of Homeland Security in coordination 
with the Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of 
Energy, Department of Labor, Department of Health and Human Services, 
Environmental Protection Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Table of Contents

(a) Introduction
(b) Characteristics of RDD and IND Incidents
    (1) Radiological Dispersal Device
    (2) Improvised Nuclear Device
    (3) Differences Between Acts of Terror and Accidents
(c) Phases of Response
    (1) Early Phase
    (2) Intermediate Phase
    (3) Late Phase
(d) Protective Actions and Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND 
Incidents
    (1) Protective Actions
    (2) Protective Action Guides
    (3) Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND Incidents
    (i) Early Phase PAGs
    (ii) Intermediate Phase PAGs
    (iii) Late Phase PAGs
(e) Federal Implementation
(f) Operational Guidelines
    Appendix 1. Radiation Protection for the Responder and Planning 
for Implementation of the Protective Action Guides
    Appendix 2. Risk Management Framework for RDD and IND Incident 
Planning
    Appendix 3. Federal Implementation
    Appendix 4. Operational Guidelines for Implementation of the 
PAGs During RDD or IND Events
    Appendix 5. Acronyms/Glossary

Preface

    Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Management of 
Domestic Incidents, states, ``to prevent, prepare for, respond to and 
recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, 
the United States Government shall establish a single, comprehensive 
approach to domestic incident management.'' It also assigns the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the role of 
Principal Federal Official for domestic incident management.
    DHS coordinated the development of this document in order to 
address the critical issues of protective actions and protective action 
guides (PAGs) to mitigate the effects caused by terrorist use of a 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). 
This document was developed to provide guidance for site cleanup and 
recovery following an RDD or IND incident and affirms the applicability 
of existing PAGs for radiological emergencies. The intended audience of 
this document is Federal radiological emergency response and 
consequence management officials. In addition, State and local 
governments may find this document useful in response and consequence 
management planning. These guides are not intended for use at site 
cleanups occurring under other statutory authorities such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Superfund program, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's decommissioning program, or other Federal and 
State cleanup programs. In addition, the scope of this document does 
not include situations involving United States nuclear weapons 
accidents.
    Underlying the development and implementation of the 
recommendations in the report is a risk management framework for making 
decisions to provide for public safety and welfare. Appendix 2 provides 
a summary of the framework based upon the report, ``Framework for 
Environmental Health Risk Management,'' published in 1997 by the 
Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management. The stages in this 
framework--(1) Defining the problem and putting it into context, (2) 
analyzing the risks, (3) examining the options, (4) making decisions 
about which options to implement, (5) taking action, and (6) conducting 
an evaluation of the results--are applicable to each of the stages of 
response to an RDD or IND incident. However, the recommended guidelines 
for early and intermediate phase actions already incorporate 
consideration of the first four stages, so that action can be taken 
immediately to respond to the incident. All of the stages of the risk 
management framework will be applicable in the process of establishing 
the criteria for the late phase of the response, as described later in 
this report, because each situation will have its own unique problems, 
risks, options, and decisions.
    The Consequence Management, Site Restoration/Cleanup and 
Decontamination (CMS) Subgroup of the DHS RDD/IND Working Group 
accomplished this effort. The CMS Subgroup consists of subject matter 
experts in radiological/nuclear

[[Page 179]]

emergency preparedness and response. In addition to DHS, the following 
departments and agencies contributed to this effort: Department of 
Commerce (DOC), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy 
(DOE), Department of Labor (DOL), Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC).

(a) Introduction

    For the early and intermediate phases of response, this document 
presents levels of radiation exposure at which the Federal Government 
recommends that actions be considered to avoid or reduce adverse public 
health consequences from an RDD or IND incident. These PAGs incorporate 
guidance and regulations published by the EPA, Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA). For the late phase of the response, this 
document presents a process to establish appropriate levels based on 
site-specific circumstances. This document addresses the key questions 
at each stage of an incident (early, intermediate, and late) and 
constitutes advice by DHS to Federal, State, and local decision makers.
    The objectives of the guides are to aid decision makers in 
protecting the public, first responders, and other workers from the 
effects of radiation, while balancing the adverse social and economic 
impacts following an RDD or IND incident. Restoring the normal 
operation of critical infrastructure, services, industries, business, 
and public activities as soon as possible can minimize adverse social 
and economic impacts.
    These guides for RDD and IND incidents are not absolute standards. 
The guides are not intended to define ``safe'' or ``unsafe'' levels of 
exposure or contamination, but rather they represent the approximate 
levels at which the associated protective actions are justified. The 
guides give State and local decision makers the flexibility to be more 
or less restrictive as deemed appropriate based on the unique 
characteristics of the incident and local considerations.
    The PAGs can be used to select actions to prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from the adverse effects that may exist during any phase of 
a terrorist incident--the early (emergency) phase, the intermediate 
phase, or the late phase. There may be an urgent need to evacuate 
people; there may also be an urgent need to restore the services of 
critical infrastructure (e.g., roads, rail lines, airports, electric 
power, water, sewage, medical facilities, and businesses) in the hours 
and days following the incident--thus, some response decisions must be 
made quickly. If the decisions on the recovery of critical 
infrastructure are not made quickly, the disruption and harm caused by 
the incident could be inadvertently and unnecessarily increased. 
Failure to restore important services rapidly could result in 
additional adverse public health and welfare impacts that could be more 
significant than the direct radiological impacts.

(b) Characteristics of RDD and IND Incidents

    A radiological incident is defined as an event or series of events, 
deliberate or accidental, leading to the release, or potential release, 
into the environment of radioactive material in sufficient quantity to 
warrant consideration of protective actions. Use of an RDD or IND is an 
act of terror that produces a radiological incident.

(1) Radiological Dispersal Device

    An RDD poses a threat to public health and safety through the 
spread of radioactive materials by some means of dispersion. The mode 
of dispersal typically conceived as an RDD is an explosive device 
coupled with radioactive material. The explosion adds an immediate 
threat to human life and property. Other means of dispersal, both 
passive and active, may be employed.
    There is a wide range of possible consequences that may result from 
an RDD, depending on the type and size of the device, and how dispersal 
is achieved. The consequences of an RDD may range from a small, 
localized area, such as a single building or city block, to large 
areas, conceivably many square miles. However, most experts agree that 
the likelihood of impacting a large area is low. In most plausible 
scenarios, the radioactive material would not cause acutely harmful 
radiation doses, and the primary public health concern from those 
materials would be chronic risk of cancer to exposed individuals. 
Hazards from fire, smoke, shock (physical, electrical or thermal), 
shrapnel (from an explosion), industrial chemicals, and other chemical 
or biological agents may also be present.

(2) Improvised Nuclear Device

    An IND is a nuclear weapon originating from an adversary State or 
fabricated by a terrorist group from illicit special nuclear material 
that produces a nuclear explosion. The nuclear yield achieved by an IND 
produces extreme heat, powerful shockwaves, and prompt radiation that 
would be acutely lethal for a significant distance. It also produces 
radioactive fallout, which may spread far downwind and deposit over 
very large areas. If nuclear yield is not achieved, the result would 
likely resemble an RDD in which fissile weapons material was utilized.

(3) Differences Between Acts of Terror and Accidents

    Most radiological emergency planning has been conducted to respond 
to potential nuclear power plant accidents. RDD and IND incidents may 
differ from a nuclear power plant accident in several ways, and 
response planning should take these differences into account. First, 
the severity of an IND incident would be dramatically greater than any 
nuclear power plant accident (although an RDD would likely be on the 
same order of magnitude as a nuclear power plant accident). An IND 
would have vastly greater radiation levels and would create a large 
radius of severe damage from blast and heat, which could not occur in a 
nuclear power plant accident.
    Second, the release from an RDD or IND may start without any 
advance warning and would likely have a relatively short release 
duration. With a major nuclear power plant accident there is likely to 
be several hours of warning before the release starts, and the release 
is likely to be drawn out over many hours. This difference means that 
most early, and some intermediate phase, protective action decisions 
must be made more quickly (and with less information) in an RDD or IND 
incident if they are to be effective.
    Third, an RDD or IND incident is more likely to occur in a major 
city with a large population. Because of the rural setting in which 
many nuclear facilities are located, the number of people affected by a 
nuclear power plant incident may be less and the amount of critical 
infrastructure impacted is also likely to be smaller.
    Fourth, large nuclear facilities have detailed emergency plans that 
are periodically exercised, including specified protective action 
sectors, evacuation routes, and methods to quickly warn the public on 
the protective actions to take. This would not be the case in an RDD or 
IND incident. This level of radiological emergency planning typically 
does not exist for most cities and towns without nuclear facilities.
    Fifth, the type of radioactive material involved could and probably 
will be different from what is potentially

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released for a nuclear power plant incident.

(c) Phases of Response

    Typically, the response to an RDD or IND incident can be divided 
into three time phases--the early phase, the intermediate phase, and 
the late phase--that are generally accepted as being common to all 
nuclear incidents. Although these phases cannot be represented by 
precise time periods and may overlap, they provide a useful framework 
for the considerations involved in emergency response planning.

(1) Early Phase

    The early phase (or emergency phase) is the period at the beginning 
of the incident when immediate decisions for effective use of 
protective actions are required and actual field measurement data is 
generally not available. Exposure to the radioactive plume, short-term 
exposure to deposited materials, and inhalation of radioactive material 
are generally included when considering protective actions for the 
early phase. The response during the early phase includes initial 
emergency response actions to protect public health and welfare in the 
short term. Priority should be given to lifesaving and first-aid 
actions.
    In general, early phase protective actions should be taken very 
quickly, and the protective action decisions can be modified later as 
more information becomes available. If an explosive RDD is deployed 
without warning, there may be no time to take protective actions to 
reduce plume exposure. In the event of a covert dispersal, discovery or 
detection may not occur for days or weeks, allowing contamination to be 
dispersed broadly by foot, vehicular traffic, wind, rain, or other 
forces. If an IND explodes, there would only be time to make early 
phase, protective action recommendations to protect against exposure 
from fallout in areas many miles downwind from the explosion.

(2) Intermediate Phase

    The intermediate phase of the response may follow the early phase 
response within as little as a few hours. The intermediate phase of the 
response is usually assumed to begin after the source and releases have 
been brought under control and protective action decisions can be made 
based on measurements of exposure and radioactive materials that have 
been deposited as a result of the incident. Activities in this phase 
typically overlap with early and late phase activities, and may 
continue for weeks to many months, until protective actions are 
terminated.
    During the intermediate phase, decisions must be made on the 
initial actions needed to recover from the incident, reopen critical 
infrastructures, and return to a general state of normal activity. In 
general, intermediate phase decisions should consider late phase 
response objectives. However, some intermediate phase decisions will 
need to be made quickly (i.e., within hours) and should not be delayed 
by discussions on what the more desirable permanent decisions will be. 
All of these decisions must take into account the health, welfare, 
economic, and other factors that must be balanced by local officials. 
For example, it can be expected that hospitals and their access roads 
will need to remain open or be reopened quickly. These interim 
decisions can often be made with the acknowledgement that further work 
may be needed as time progresses.

(3) Late Phase

    The late phase is the period when recovery and cleanup actions 
designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment to acceptable 
levels are commenced, and it ends when all the recovery actions have 
been completed. With the additional time and increased understanding of 
the situation, there will be opportunities to involve key stakeholders 
in providing sound, cost-effective recommendations. Generally, early 
(or emergency) phase decisions will be made directly by elected public 
officials, or their designees, with limited stakeholder involvement due 
to the need to act within a short timeframe. Long-term decisions should 
be made with stakeholder involvement, and can also include incident-
specific technical working groups to provide expert advice to decision 
makers on impacts, costs, and alternatives.
    The relationship between typical protective actions and the phases 
of the incident response are outlined in Figure 1. Plainly, there is 
overlap between the phases, and this framework should be used to 
support a timely decision making process, irrespective of the 
perception of which incident phase might be applicable.
BILLING CODE 9110-21-P

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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN03JA06.000

BILLING CODE 9110-21-C

(d) Protective Actions and Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND 
Incidents

(1) Protective Actions

    Protective actions are activities that may be conducted in response 
to an RDD or IND incident in order to reduce or eliminate exposure to 
members of the public to radiation or other hazards. These actions are 
generic and are applicable to RDDs and INDs. The principal protective 
action decisions for consideration in the early and intermediate phases 
of an emergency are whether to shelter-in-place, evacuate, or relocate 
affected or potentially affected populations. Secondary actions include 
administration of prophylactic drugs, decontamination, use of access 
restrictions, and use of restrictions on food and water. In some 
situations, only one protective action needs to be implemented, while 
in others, numerous protective actions should be implemented.

(2) Protective Action Guides

    PAGs are the projected dose to a reference individual, from an 
accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material at which a 
specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is recommended. 
Thus, protective actions are designed to be taken before the 
anticipated dose is realized. The ``Manual of Protective Action Guides 
and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents'' \1\ published by the EPA 
(also known as the EPA PAG Manual) provides a significant part of the 
basis

[[Page 182]]

of this document and may be referred to for additional details.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ ``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions 
for Nuclear Incidents,'' U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, May 
1992, EPA-400-R-92-001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The existing PAGs meet the following principle criteria and goals: 
(1) Prevent acute effects, (2) reduce risk of chronic effects, and (3) 
require optimization to balance protection with other important factors 
and ensure that actions taken cause more benefit than harm.
    In this document, PAGs are generic criteria based on balancing 
public health and welfare with the risk of alternatives applied in each 
of the phases of an RDD or IND incident. The PAGs are specific for 
radiation and radioactive materials, and must be considered in the 
context of other chemical or biological hazards that may also be 
present. Though the PAGs are values of dose avoided, published dose 
conversion factors and derived response levels may be utilized in 
estimating doses, and for choosing and implementing protective actions. 
Other quantitative measures and derived concentration values may be 
useful in emergency situations; for example, for the release of goods 
and property from contaminated zones, and to control access in and out 
of contaminated areas.
    Because of the short time frames required for emergency response 
decisions, it is likely there will not be opportunities for local 
decision makers to consult with a variety of stakeholders before taking 
actions. Therefore, the early and intermediate phase EPA PAGs have been 
based on the significant body of work done in the general context of 
radiological emergency response planning, and represent the results of 
public comment, drills, exercises, and a consensus at the Federal level 
for appropriate emergency action.
    In order to use the PAGs to make decisions about appropriate 
protective actions, decision makers will need information on suspected 
radionuclides; projected plume movement and depositions; and/or actual 
measurement data or, during the period initially following the release, 
expert advice in the absence of good information. Sources of such 
information include: on-scene responders as well as monitoring, 
assessment, and modeling centers.

(3) Protective Action Guides for RDD and IND Incidents

    The PAGs for RDD and IND incidents are generally based on the 
following sources: the PAGs developed by EPA in coordination with other 
Federal agencies through the Protective Action Guide Subcommittee of 
the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee; guidance 
developed by the FDA for food and food products and the distribution of 
potassium iodide; and OSHA regulations.
    In order to use this guide, there may be a need to compare the PAG 
to the results of a risk assessment or dose projection. It should be 
emphasized that, in general, when making radiation dose projections, 
realistic assumptions should be used so the final results are 
representative of actual conditions.
    Table 1 provides a summary of the key actions and suggested PAGs 
for an RDD or IND incident.

                           Table 1.--Protective Action Guides for RDD or IND Incidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Phase                    Protective action      Protective action guide           Reference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Early..............................  Limit Emergency Worker  5 rem (or greater under      EPA PAG Manual.
                                      Exposure.               exceptional
                                                              circumstances\1\.
                                     Sheltering of Public..  1 to 5 rems projected        EPA PAG Manual.
                                                              dose\2\.
                                     Evacuation of Public..  1 to 5 rems projected        EPA PAG Manual.
                                                              dose\3\.
                                     Administration of       For potassium iodide, FDA    FDA Guidance \6\.
                                      Prophylactic Drugs.     Guidance dose values\4\
                                                              \5\.
Intermediate.......................  Limit Worker Exposure.  5 rem/yr...................  See Appendix 1.
                                     Relocation of General   2 rems, projected dose       EPA PAG Manual.
                                      Public.                 first year Subsequent
                                                              years: 500 mrem/yr
                                                              projected dose.
                                     Food Interdiction.....  500 mrem/yr projected dose.  FDA Guidance \7\.
                                     Drinking Water          500 mrem/yr dose...........  EPA guidance in
                                      Interdiction.                                        development.
Late...............................  Final Cleanup Actions.  Late phase PAG based on
                                                              optimization .
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In cases when radiation control options are not available or, due to the magnitude of the incident, are not
  sufficient, doses above 5 rems may be unavoidable. For further discussion see Appendix 1.
\2\ Should normally begin at 1 rem; however, sheltering may begin at lower levels if advantageous.
\3\ Should normally begin at 1 rem.
\4\ Provides protection from radioactive iodine only.
\5\ For other information on medical prophylactics and treatment please refer to http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugprepare/default.htm or http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/index/asp or http://www.orau.gov/reacts.
\6\ ``Potassium Iodide as a Thyroid Blocking Agent in Radiation Emergencies,'' December 2001, Center Drug
  Evaluation and Research, FDA, HHS (http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/5386fnl.htm).
\7\ ``Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds: Recommendations for State and Local
  Agencies,'' August 13, 1998, Office of Health and Industry Programs, Center for Devices and Radiological
  Health, FDA, HHS (http://www.fda.gov/cdhr/dmqrp/84.html).

(i) Early Phase PAGs
    For the early phase, the existing PAGs for evacuation, sheltering, 
relocation, and protection of emergency workers are appropriate for RDD 
and IND incidents. FDA guidance on the administration of stable iodine 
is also considered appropriate (only useful for an IND or NPP incident 
involving radioiodine release). The administration of other 
prophylactic drugs should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and 
depend on the nature of the event and radioisotopes involved. It can be 
expected that an initial zone will be established and controlled around 
the site of the incident, as is the case for other crime scenes and 
hazards. These guides allow for the refinement of that area if the 
presence of radiation or radioactive material warrants such action.
    The response during the early phase includes initial emergency 
response actions to protect public health and welfare in the short 
term. Priority should be given to lifesaving and first-aid actions. 
Incident commanders should define and enforce an allowable emergency 
dose limit in accordance with the immediate risk situation. Following 
IND detonation, the highest priority missions will include suppression 
of ignited fires to prevent further loss of life. High radiation doses 
to emergency personnel in IND situations, substantially exceeding the 
nominal occupational level of 5 rem may be unavoidable. While every 
effort to employ as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles 
after an

[[Page 183]]

IND event will be made, medically significant exposures may also be 
unavoidable (see Appendix 1, Section E). Medical evaluation of 
emergency response personnel after such exposure is recommended.
(ii) Intermediate Phase PAGs
    The decisions in the intermediate phase will focus on the return of 
key infrastructure and services, and the rapid restoration of normal 
activities. This will include decisions on allowing use of roads, 
ports, waterways, transportation systems (including subways, trains, 
and airports), hospitals, businesses, and residences. It will also 
include responses to questions about acceptable use and release of real 
and personal property such as cars, clothes, or equipment that may have 
been impacted by the RDD or IND incident. Many of the activities will 
be concerned with materials and areas that were not affected but for 
which members of the public may have a concern. Thus, the PAGs serve to 
guide decisions on returning to impacted areas, leaving impacted areas, 
and providing assurance that an area or material was not impacted. See 
Appendix 1 for a discussion of occupational safety and health 
standards.
    For the intermediate phase, relocation of the population is a 
protective action that can be used to reduce dose. Relocation is the 
removal or continued exclusion of people (households) from contaminated 
areas in order to avoid chronic radiation exposure, and it is meant to 
protect the general public. For the intermediate phase, the existing 
relocation PAGs of 2 rems in the first year and 500 mrems in any year 
after the first are considered appropriate for RDD and IND incidents. 
However, for some IND incidents, the area impacted and the number of 
people that might be subject to relocation could potentially be very 
large and could exceed the resources and infrastructure available. For 
example, in making the relocation decision, the availability of 
adequate accommodations for relocated people should be considered. 
Decision makers may need to consider limiting action to those most 
severely affected, and phasing relocation implementation based on the 
resources available.
    The relocation PAG applies principally to personal residences but 
may impact other facilities as well. For example, it could impact work 
locations, hospitals, and park lands as well as the use of highways and 
other transportation facilities. For each type of facility, the 
occupancy time of individuals should be taken into account to determine 
the criteria for using a facility or area. It might be necessary to 
avoid continuous use of homes in an area because radiation levels are 
too high. However, a factory or office building in the same area could 
be used because occupancy times are shorter. Similarly, a highway could 
be used at higher contamination levels because the exposure time of 
highway users would be considerably less than the time spent at home.
    The intermediate phase PAGs for the interdiction of food and water 
are set at 500 mrem/yr each for RDD and IND incidents. These values are 
consistent with those now used or being considered as PAGs for other 
types of nuclear incidents.
    The use of simple dose reduction techniques is recommended for 
personal property and all potentially contaminated areas that continue 
to be occupied. This use is also consistent with the PAGs developed for 
other types of nuclear incidents. Examples of simple dose reduction 
techniques would be washing of all transportation vehicles (e.g., 
automobiles, trains, ships, and airplanes), personal clothing before 
reuse, eating utensils, food preparation surfaces before next use, and 
other personal property, as practicable and appropriate.
(iii) Late Phase PAGs
    The late phase involves the final cleanup of areas and property 
with radioactive material present. Unlike the early and intermediate 
phases of an RDD or IND incident, decision makers will have more time 
and information during the late phase to allow for better data 
collection, stakeholder involvement, and options analysis. In this 
respect, the late phase is no longer a response to an ``emergency 
situation,'' and is better viewed in terms of the objectives of site 
restoration and cleanup.
    Because of the extremely broad range of potential impacts that may 
occur from RDDs and INDs (e.g., ranging from light contamination of one 
building to widespread destruction of a major metropolitan area), a 
pre-established numeric guideline is not recommended as best serving 
the needs of decision makers in the late phase. Rather, a process 
should be used to determine the societal objectives for expected land 
uses and the options and approaches available, in order to select the 
most acceptable criteria. For example, if the incident is an RDD of 
limited size, such that the impacted area is small, then it might 
reasonably be expected that a complete return to normal conditions can 
be achieved within a short period of time. However, if the impacted 
area is large, then achieving even low cleanup levels for remediation 
of the entire area and/or maintaining existing land uses may not be 
practicable.
    The Risk Management Framework described in Appendix 2 provides such 
a process and helps assure the protection of public health and welfare. 
Decisions should take health, safety, technical, economic, and public 
policy factors into account. Appendix 3 utilizes the framework to 
manage Federal RDD and IND site cleanup and restoration.
    Optimization (broadly defined) is a concept that is common to many 
State, Federal, and international risk management programs that address 
radionuclides and chemicals, although it is not always identified as 
such. Optimization is a flexible approach where a variety of dose and/
or risk benchmarks may be identified from State, Federal, or other 
sources (e.g., national and international advisory organizations). 
These benchmarks may be useful for analysis of remediation options and 
levels may move up or down depending on the site-specific circumstances 
and balancing of other relevant factors.
    Optimization activities are quantitative and qualitative 
assessments applied at each stage of site restoration decisionmaking, 
from evaluation of remedial options, to implementation of the chosen 
alternative. The evaluation of options for the late phase of recovery 
after an RDD or IND incident should balance all of the relevant 
factors, including:
     Areas impacted (e.g., size, location relative to 
population)
     Types of contamination (chemical, biological, and 
radiological)
     Other hazards present
     Human health
     Public welfare
     Ecological risks
     Actions already taken during the early and intermediate 
phases
     Projected land use
     Preservation or destruction of places of historical, 
national, or regional significance
     Technical feasibility
     Wastes generated and disposal options and costs
     Costs and available resources to implement and maintain 
remedial options
     Potential adverse impacts (e.g., to human health, the 
environment, and the economy) of remedial options
     Long-term effectiveness
     Timeliness
     Public acceptability, including local cultural 
sensitivities
     Economic effects (e.g., tourism, business, and industry)

[[Page 184]]

    The optimization process provides the best opportunity for decision 
makers to gain public confidence through the involvement of 
stakeholders. This process may begin during, and proceed independently 
of, intermediate phase protective actions.
    The Recovery Management Team (see Appendix 3) should develop a 
schedule with milestones for conducting the optimization process as 
soon as practicable following the incident. While the goal of the team 
should be to complete the initial optimization process within six 
months of the incident, the schedule must take into consideration 
incident-specific factors that would affect successful implementation. 
It should be recognized that this schedule may need to represent a 
phased approach to cleanup and is subject to change as the cleanup 
progresses.

(e) Federal Implementation

    This guidance describes the approach the Federal Government will 
take in making protective action recommendations and provides guidance 
for long-term site restoration following radiological and nuclear 
terror incidents. Appendix 3 provides additional details on the process 
that will be used to implement this guidance, focusing on describing 
the role of the Federal Government and how it will integrate its 
activities with State and local governments and the public. In 
particular, Appendix 3 addresses the scenario in which the Federal 
Government is expected to be the primary funding entity for cleanup and 
restoration activities. It should be recognized that for some 
radiological terror incidents, States might take the primary leadership 
role in cleanup and contribute significant resources toward restoration 
of the site. The appendix does not address such a scenario.

(f) Operational Guidelines

    Implementation of the PAGs is supported by operational guidelines 
that can be readily used by decision makers and responders in the 
field. Operational guidelines are levels of radiation or concentrations 
of radionuclides that can be accurately measured by radiation detection 
and monitoring equipment, and then related or compared to the PAGs to 
quickly determine if protective actions need to be implemented. Federal 
agencies are continuing development of operational guidelines to 
support the application of protective action recommendations in this 
document.
    Some values already exist that could potentially serve as 
operational guidelines for RDD and IND recovery operations. However, 
there are many more operational guidelines that need to be developed or 
applied in order to provide decision makers and responders with the 
capability to quickly determine that the suite of PAGs for RDDs and 
INDs are being met. Appendix 4 presents a summary of the potential 
types of operational guidelines likely needed for RDD and IND response 
operations.
    Some examples of existing values that could be used as operational 
guidelines for RDD and IND response operations include:

(i) Derived Response Levels

    The PAG Manual published by the EPA contains guidance and Derived 
Response Levels (DRLs) for use with the early phase PAGs. These values 
serve as operational guidelines to readily determine if protective 
actions associated with the PAGs need to be implemented. If 
concentrations of radionuclides obtained through field measurements are 
less than the DRLs, the PAGs will not be exceeded and, thus, a 
protective action may not need to be taken.

(ii) Derived Intervention Levels for Food

    The FDA has developed Derived Intervention Levels (DILs) for 
implementation of the PAGs for food. These DILs establish levels of 
contamination than can exist on crops and in food products and still 
maintain exposure levels below the food PAGs, and could therefore be 
used as operational guidelines for RDD and IND events.

(iii) Radiation Levels for Control of Access to Radiation Areas

    Another example of an operational guideline is a 2mR/hr radiation 
level that can be established for control of access to radiation areas 
during the response. The rationale for this operational guideline is 
that first responders need an easily measurable dose rate for 
restricting access to more highly contaminated areas. The operational 
guideline would not limit access by emergency workers performing duties 
such as rescuing victims, but it would allow the establishment of a hot 
zone boundary for an area to which unnecessary access should be 
prevented. While emergency workers' total doses would be monitored and 
decisions made accordingly, the 2mR/hr operational guideline is also 
useful to control access for non-emergency workers and members of the 
public who are subject to lower dose constraints. For example, non-
emergency workers may need limited access to infrastructure and 
facilities within the contaminated zone, and residents may need access 
to homes for limited time periods.
    Additional operational guidelines for use with PAGs in each phase 
of recovery will need to be developed for a wide range of personal and 
real property. Appropriations language from House Report 108-076, 
Making Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal 
Year 2003, and for Other Purposes, directs the DOE ``to develop 
standards for the cleanup of contamination resulting from a potential 
RDD event.'' Accordingly, DOE is leading an effort to develop needed 
standards, in the form of operational guidelines, for a wide range of 
personal (e.g., vehicles, equipment, personal items, debris) and real 
(e.g., buildings, roads, bridges, residential and commercial areas, 
monuments) property types likely to be impacted by an RDD or IND 
incident. The work is being coordinated with other Federal agencies, 
and an inter-agency work group has been established to foster 
collaboration and acceptance of the operational guidelines upon 
completion. The goal is to arrive at the needed set of operational 
guidelines that can then be incorporated into appropriate Federal 
response documents and used by decision makers and responders.

Appendix 1--Radiation Protection for the Responder and Planning for 
Implementation of the Protective Action Guides

    The purpose of this appendix is to discuss the context for the 
PAGs and to provide guidance for their application, particularly for 
the protection of emergency responders. Response organizations need 
to develop plans and protocols that address radiation protection 
during an RDD or IND incident and that ensure appropriate training 
for responders and decision makers. Although this appendix discusses 
some of the important issues and information that must be 
communicated, it is not intended to provide a comprehensive 
discussion of the topic. Other detailed reports on radiation risk, 
risk management decisionmaking, training, and public communication 
should be consulted in the development of plans, protocols, and 
training materials. Organizations that have published such reports 
include the National Council on Radiation Protection and 
Measurements, the International Commission on Radiological 
Protection, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the American 
Nuclear Society, and the Health Physics Society.

(a) The Protective Action Guides and Operations Guidelines Into 
Perspective

    The recommendations in this report were developed to assist 
decision makers and responders in planning for radiological

[[Page 185]]

emergencies, in particular, those related to terrorist incidents 
using RDDs and INDs. Decisions regarding protective actions for 
workers and the public during such incidents are risk management 
decisions, and the recommendations in this report are provided in 
that context. In all cases, all practical and reasonable means 
should be used to reduce or eliminate exposures that are not 
necessary to protect public health and welfare.

(b) The Difference Between PAGs for Emergencies and Other Operations

    Worker and public protection guidance and standards for normal 
operations are typically developed through risk management 
approaches and are documented in Federal and State regulations 
(e.g., 10 CFR part 20; 10 CFR part 835; 29 CFR 1910.1096). However, 
many factors or decision criteria differ during a radiological 
emergency versus normal operations. Some of the key decision 
criteria differences between emergency PAGs and typical occupational 
and public protection standards are shown in Table 1A.
    Although there are times when implementation of standards or 
guidelines can cause or enhance other risks, these secondary risks 
normally can be controlled. Standards for normal operations provide 
a margin of safety that is greater than that in guidelines for 
emergency response because that margin can be provided in a manner 
that ensures no significant increase in public health risk or 
detriment to the public welfare. Currently, the development of 
standards and guidelines for normal operations is done in a manner 
that provides reasonable assurance that implementation of the 
standards will not cause more risk than it averts.

  Table 1A.--Different Risk Management Considerations for Emergency and
                            Normal Operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Emergency                        Normal operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
An adversary may attempt to create       Key elements to radiation
 conditions that will cause high          protection are to contain
 radiation exposures, widespread          radioactivity and confine
 contamination, and mass disruption.      access to it.
Actions must be taken as soon as         There is adequate time to fully
 possible to minimize exposures even      characterize situations and
 when information on the risks is         determine risks and mitigating
 incomplete.                              measures.
Lack of action--due to unclear, overly   Inaction or delays may increase
 complicated, or reactive guidelines--    costs but rarely results in
 have a high possibility of causing       consequences that cannot be
 unintended consequences.                 mitigated.
During emergencies, the undesired        Consequences associated with
 consequences can be significant,         implementation of the standard
 uncontrollable, and unpredictable.       are well characterized,
                                          considered, and controlled so
                                          as not to be of concern from
                                          either a health or public
                                          welfare perspective.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the early phase of an emergency response, however, 
tradeoffs are not only cost-related but may directly impact public 
health and welfare. It is difficult to ensure that implementation of 
recommendations does not result in more harm than good.
    Guidelines that prevent or restrict a responder's ability to 
provide medical assistance based on an uncertain cancer risk may 
result in loss of life of incident victims. If the PAGs delay 
firefighters' ability to control fires, resulting property damage 
can seriously affect overall public welfare or even cause an 
increase to health risks associated with the incident. The decision 
maker's use of public protection PAGs also must consider secondary 
risks. Evacuation of the public could result in loss of life and 
injury as a result of the evacuation process that exceeds the 
increased public risk should the evacuations not occur. These and 
other considerations require that the PAGs and associated 
operational guides be developed so that decisions can appropriately 
consider risks, detriments, and costs associated with an RDD or IND 
incident, as well as those associated with implementation of the 
protective action to, on balance, benefit the public welfare.
    Emergency response actions should be carried out following a 
careful consideration of both the benefits to be achieved by the 
``rescue'' or response action (e.g., the significance of the outcome 
to individuals, populations, property, and the environment at risk 
considering their likely impaired status following an incident), and 
the potential for additional health impacts to those conducting the 
emergency response operation. That is, in making an emergency 
response decision, the potential for the success of the response/
rescue operation and the significance of its benefits to the 
community should be balanced against the potential for rescuers to 
be exposed to new and significant health and safety risks.
    Actions should be based on balancing risks and benefits. Nothing 
in this guidance should be construed to imply that appropriate steps 
should not be taken to minimize dose to workers and the public, 
consistent with the ALARA principle applied to radiation protection 
activities in the United States. However, actions similarly should 
not restrict lifesaving or property-saving actions necessary for 
protection of public and public welfare.

(c) Controlling Occupational Exposures and Doses to First Responders

    This section provides guidance for first responders concerning 
occupational doses of radiation, during an emergency response. In 
many emergency situations, actual exposure of workers, including 
first responders, may be controlled to low doses when proper 
precautions are taken. However, it is important to recognize that 
conditions that exist during an RDD or IND incident may limit the 
effectiveness of these precautions for some first responders. One of 
the major radiation protection controls used for normal operations 
is containment of the radioactive material. Another is to keep 
people away from the sources. However, during an RDD or IND 
incident, use of these controls may not be possible. As a result, 
radiation exposures, particularly to first responders, may be 
unavoidable and may have the potential to exceed limits used for 
normal operations. Nonetheless, every reasonable effort should be 
made to control doses to levels that are as low as practicable.

(d) Maintaining the ``As Low As Reasonably Achievable'' Principle

    To minimize the risks from exposure to ionizing radiation, 
employers of first responders should prepare emergency response 
plans and protocols in advance to keep worker exposures as low as 
reasonably achievable. These protocols should include, to the extent 
they can be employed, the following health physics and industrial 
hygiene practices:
     Minimizing the time spent in the contaminated area 
(e.g., rotation of workers);
     Maintaining the maximum distance from sources of 
radiation;
     Shielding of the radiation source from the receptor;
     Tailoring of hazard controls to the work performed;
     Properly selecting and using respirators and other 
personal protective equipment (PPE) may be useful to prevent 
exposure to internally deposited radioactive materials (e.g., alpha 
and beta emitters); and
     Using prophylactic medications, where medically 
appropriate, that either block the uptake or reduce the retention 
time of radioactive material in the body.
    The incident commander should be prepared to identify, to the 
extent possible, all hazardous conditions or substances and to 
perform appropriate site hazard analysis. Emergency management plans 
should include protocols to control worker exposures, establish 
exposure guidelines in advance, and outline procedures for worker 
protection. All activities should be performed in conjunction with 
emergency procedures that include provisions for exposure 
monitoring, worker training on the hazards involved in response 
operations and ways to control them, and medical monitoring.

(e) Understanding Dose and Risk Relationships

    Responders and incident commanders should understand the risks 
associated with radiation. PAG recommendations in this document 
provide a guideline level of 5 rems for worker protection and 
alternative

[[Page 186]]

response worker guidelines \2\ (see Table 1B) for certain activities 
where exposures below 5 rems cannot be maintained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Alternative response worker guidelines are applicable only 
during emergency situations. They typically apply during the early 
phase of the emergency but may also be applicable in later phases 
under emergency situations such as a fire or a structure failure 
that puts life and property at risk. In addition to the obvious life 
saving situation, other examples of where the guidelines may be 
applicable include situations where it is necessary to access 
controls to prevent or mitigate explosions, fires or other 
catastrophic events. The alternative response worker guidelines are 
not applicable to normal restoration or cleanup actions.

                  Table 1B.--Response Worker Guidelines
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total effective date
 equivalent (TEDE) guideline        Activity              Condition
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 rems......................  All occupational      All reasonably
                               exposures.            achievable actions
                                                     have been taken to
                                                     minimize dose.
10 rems *...................  Protecting valuable   Exceeding 5 rems
                               property necessary    unavoidable and all
                               for public welfare    appropriate actions
                               (e.g., a power        taken to reduce
                               plant).               dose. Monitoring
                                                     available to
                                                     project or measure
                                                     dose.
25 rems **..................  Lifesaving or         Exceeding 5 rems
                               protection of large   unavoidable and all
                               populations.          appropriate actions
                                                     taken to reduce
                                                     dose. Monitoring
                                                     available to
                                                     project or measure
                                                     dose.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* For potential does >10 rems, special medical monitoring programs
  should be employed, and exposure should be tracked in terms of the
  unit of absorbed dose (rad) rather than TEDE (rem).
** In the case of a very large incident such as an IND, incident
  commanders may need to consider raising the property and lifesaving
  response worker guidelines in order to prevent further loss of life
  and massive spread of destruction.

    It is likely during most RDD incidents that the radiation 
control measures discussed above will be able to maintain doses 
below the 5 rem occupational exposure PAG in almost all situations, 
including fire fighting; general emergency response; and transport 
to, and medical treatment of, contaminated victims at hospitals. 
However, in those situations in which victims are injured or trapped 
in high radiation areas or only be reached via high radiation areas, 
exposure control options may be unavailable or insufficient, and 
doses above 5 rem may be unavoidable.
    Response decisions allowing actions that could result in doses 
in excess of 5 rems can only be made at the time of the incident, 
under consideration of the actual situation. In such situations, 
incident commanders and other responders need to understand the risk 
posed by such exposures in order to make informed decisions. The 
Response Worker Guidelines for life and property saving activities 
in Table 1B are provided to assist such decisions.
    The catastrophic event represented by an IND can cause other 
immediate widespread physical hazards such as firestorm and building 
instability; emergency intervention will be integral to preventing 
further loss of life and additional destruction. This intervention 
may result in increased exposure to emergency response personnel. 
Exceeding the Response Worker Guidelines in Table 1B in such an 
event may be unavoidable.
    Persons undertaking an emergency mission covered under the 
alternative occupational PAG levels should do so with full awareness 
of the sub-chronic and chronic risks involved, including knowledge 
of numerical estimates of the risk of delayed effects, and they 
should be given reasonable assurance that normal controls cannot be 
utilized to reduce doses below the general 5 rem occupational 
exposure PAG. The 25 rem lifesaving Response Worker Guidelines 
provide assurance that exposures will not result in detrimental 
deterministic health effects (i.e., prompt or acute effects). If, 
due to extensive public health and welfare benefits (i.e., 
optimization considerations), response actions are deemed necessary 
that cause exposures that may exceed the 25 rem alternative Response 
Worker Guideline, such response actions should only be taken with an 
understanding of the potential acute effects of radiation to the 
exposed responder (Table 1C) and based on the determination that the 
benefits of the action clearly exceed the associated risks.

[[Page 187]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN03JA06.001

    The following paragraph is presented to help illustrate how 
certain toxicity information may be relevant in response 
decisionmaking during emergencies. It is important to note that the 
approach used below to translate dose to risk in this discussion is 
a simplistic approach useful in developing rough estimates of risks 
for comparative purposes given limited data. However, other more 
realistic approaches are often used in assessing risks for risk 
management decisions (other than for emergencies) when more complete 
information about the contaminants and the potential for human 
exposure is available. These other approaches rely on radionuclide-
specific risk factors (e.g., Federal Guidance Report 13 \3\ 
and EPA Health Effects Assessment Summary Tables).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ ``Risks from Low-Level Environmental Exposure to 
Radionuclides,'' Federal Guidance Report 13, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, January 1998, EPA 402-R-97-014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The estimated risk of fatal cancer \4\ for workers exposed to 10 
rem is 0.6 percent (six cases per thousand exposed). Workers exposed 
to 25 rem have an estimated risk of fatal cancer of 1.5 percent (15 
cases per thousand exposed). Because of the latency period of 
cancer, younger workers face a larger risk of fatal cancer than 
older workers (for example, when exposed to 25 rem, twenty to 30 
year-olds have a 9.1 per thousand risk of premature death, while 40 
to 50 year-olds have a 5.3 per thousand risk of premature death).\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Risk per dose of a fatal concern is assumed to be about 
6x10-4 per rem. Cancer incidence is assumed to be about 
7x10-4 per rem. (See Federal Guidance Report 13.
    \5\ Federal Guidance Report 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (f) Incident Commanders and Responders Need to Proper Training 
in Advance
    When the 5-rem guideline is exceeded, workers should be provided 
the following:
     Medical follow-up
     Training with respect to the risk associated with 
exposure to ionizing radiation
     A thorough explanation of the latent risks associated 
with receiving exposures greater than 5 rems.
    In addition, these PAGs represent dose constraint levels (e.g., 
when this level of dose is accumulated, the responder should not 
take part in the later stages of the response that may significantly 
increase their dose). It is assumed that doses acquired in response 
to a radiological incident would be ``once in a lifetime'' doses, 
and that future radiological exposures would be substantially less.
    Incident commanders and responders need a thorough understanding 
of the worker exposure guidelines for radiological emergency 
response, including the associated risks and specific worker 
protection procedures. The reader is referred to the EPA PAG Manual 
and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (May 1992), and the 
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) 
Radiological Emergency Response Health and Safety Manual (May 
2001).\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Available at http://www.nv.doe.gov/programs/frmac/DOCUMENTS.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(g) Occupational Standards

    Under the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
and equivalent statutes in the 26 States that operate OSHA-approved 
State plans, each employer is responsible for the health and safety 
of its employees. In accomplishing this, employers are expected to 
comply with the requirements of the Federal OSHA or State plan 
occupational safety and health standards applicable in the 
jurisdiction in which they are working. States with State plans 
enforce standards, under State law, which are ``at least as 
effective as'' Federal OSHA standards, and therefore may have more 
stringent or supplemental requirements. There are currently 22 
States and jurisdictions operating complete State plans (covering 
both the private sector and State and local government employees, 
including State and local emergency responders). Four of these State 
plans cover public (State and local government) employees only. 
Federal OSHA administers the safety and health program for the 
private sector in the remaining States and territories, and also 
retains authority with regard to safety and health conditions for 
Federal employees throughout the nation, but it does not have 
enforcement jurisdiction over State and local government employees.
    The primary occupational safety and health standard for 
emergency response is the Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency 
Response (HAZWOPER) standard (29 CFR 1910.120). The EPA has a Worker 
Protection (40 CFR 311) standard that applies the HAZWOPER standard 
to State and local workers in States that do not have their own 
occupational safety and health program.

[[Page 188]]

    For emergency response, the OSHA standard (among many other 
requirements) states that ``the individual in charge of the incident 
command system shall identify to the extent possible, all hazardous 
substances or conditions present and shall address as appropriate 
site analysis, use of engineering controls, maximum exposure limits, 
hazardous substance handling procedures, and use of any new 
technologies'' (29 CFR 1910.120(q)). As part of emergency 
preparedness activities, individuals authorized as incident 
commanders should receive the necessary training and planning prior 
to the incident, use the hazard information available, consult 
relevant standards, and apply all feasible and useful measures to 
minimize hazards to emergency responders.
    OSHA's ionizing radiation standard (29 CFR 1910.1096), which may 
also apply in certain circumstances, limits quarterly dose \7\ and 
includes other requirements such as monitoring, recordkeeping, 
training, and reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ 1.25 rems or rems if cumulative lifetime dose is less than 
5(n-18), where n is the worker's age at the last birthday, and 
adequate past and current exposure records are maintained to show 
exposures do not exceed the standard's radiation levels (29 CFR 
1910.1096).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The worker exposure levels are not PAGs but instead are 
regulatory limits that cannot be exceeded except under certain 
conditions. These occupational limits allow workers to receive 
radiation exposure during the course of performing their jobs. This 
limit offers the possibility that industrial and manufacturing 
facilities, critical infrastructures and other business operations 
could be reopened without having to be cleaned up, as long as they 
are in compliance with the 5 rem dose limit and other OSHA 
requirements found in 29 CFR 1910.1096. Otherwise, the relocation 
PAGs could be used by decision makers to protect their citizens.
    DOE employees and contractors are subject to DOE radiation 
protection regulations, and requirements for worker protection from 
radiation exposure are contained in 10 CFR part 835. These 
requirements apply to all DOE employees and contractors that may be 
exposed to ionizing radiation as a result of their work for DOE, 
including work relating to emergency response activities. Section 
835.3(d) indicates that nothing in the regulation ``shall be 
construed as limiting actions that may be necessary to protect 
health and safety.'' This clause is intended to recognize the fact 
that during emergencies, lifesaving or property-saving actions may 
necessitate actions that have the potential to cause doses in excess 
of the Department's radiation dose limits. Subpart N of section 835 
provides direction for emergency exposure situations and indicates 
that:
     The risk of injury should be minimized.
     Actual and potential risks should be weighed against 
benefits of such actions causing exposures.
     No individual should be forced to perform a rescue 
action that involves substantial personal risk.
     Individuals authorized to perform emergency actions 
that may result in exposures exceeding DOE dose limits should 
receive prior training and briefing on known or anticipated hazards.
    Under all circumstances, doses should be maintained as low as is 
reasonably achievable. Under DOE requirements, emergency response 
doses are not included with worker doses measured and calculated to 
demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Part 835 dose limits.
    Requirements for the protection of NRC employees are covered by 
NRC Management Directive 10.131, ``Protection of NRC Employees 
Against Ionizing Radiation.'' Section VI, Guidance for Emergency 
Exposure Controls During Rescue and Recovery Activities, deals 
specifically with radiation exposure control during emergencies. 
Section VI adopts the dose limits in the EPA PAG Manual (EPA 400-R-
92-001) for exposure of NRC employees during emergencies. Similarly, 
NRC and Agreement State licensees have established on-site exposure 
guidelines consistent with EPA PAGs.
    For an IND incident, the radiological consequences could be so 
severe that many workers would be exposed in activities, such as 
emergency lifesaving functions, that would result in doses in excess 
of the 5 rem limit for normal occupational activities.

Appendix 2--Risk Management Framework for RDD/IND Incident Planning

    This appendix contains a description of a risk management 
framework for making decisions to protect public health and welfare 
in the context of cleanup and site restoration following an RDD or 
IND incident. The framework is based on the report, ``Framework for 
Environmental Health Risk Management,'' mandated by the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments published by the Commission on Risk Assessment 
and Risk Management in 1997. This appendix provides specific 
material for RDD and IND incidents, and reference to the report is 
encouraged for the details of the general framework. Details of a 
plan for implementing this framework for certain RDD and IND 
incidents are provided in Appendix 4.
    The ``Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management'' is 
considered generally suitable for addressing the long-term recovery 
issues for RDDs and INDs. Given the time frames following an RDD or 
IND incident, there is generally not sufficient time in the early 
and intermediate phases to conduct full risk assessment and get 
stakeholder involvement. Therefore, in order for the framework to be 
effective for these phases, it must be used in planning and 
preparing for a radiological or nuclear incident. As a result, many 
of the principles have already been incorporated into the 
establishment of the PAGs for RDD and IND incidents on a generic 
basis.
    The framework is designed to help decision makers make good risk 
management decisions. The level of effort and resources invested in 
using the framework should be scaled to the importance of the 
problem, the potential severity and economic impact of the risk, the 
level of controversy surrounding the problem, and resource 
constraints. In the context of an RDD or IND incident, the risk 
management decisions involve responding to the consequences of a 
particular incident. The risks that must be considered are both 
radiation risks and potentially chemical or biological agents. Other 
factors to be considered include the continued sense of uncertainty 
and disruption in normal activities; the loss of, or limited access 
to, critical infrastructure and health care; and general economic 
disruption.
    The framework relies on the three key principles of broad 
context, stakeholder participation, and iteration. Broad context 
refers to placing all of the health and environmental issues in the 
real-world context following an RDD or IND incident, and is intended 
to assure that all public welfare related factors and impacts are 
taken into account. Stakeholder participation is critical to making 
and successfully implementing sound, cost-effective, risk-informed 
decisions. Iteration is the process of continuing to refine the 
information available, and therefore the decisions and actions that 
can be taken at any point in time. Together these principles outline 
a fair, responsive approach to making the decisions necessary to 
effectively respond to the impacts of an RDD or IND incident.
    Risk management is the process of identifying, evaluating, 
selecting, and implementing actions to reduce risk to public health 
and the environment. The goal of risk management is scientifically 
sound, cost-effective, integrated actions that reduce or prevent 
risks while taking into account social, cultural, ethical, public 
policy, and legal considerations. In order to accomplish this goal, 
information will be needed on the nature and magnitude of the risks 
present as a result of the incident, the options for reducing or 
eliminating the risks, and the effectiveness and costs of those 
options. Decision makers also consider the economic, social, 
cultural, ethical, legal, and public policy implications associated 
with implementing each option, as well as the unique safety and 
health hazards facing emergency workers and community health, or 
ecological hazards the cleanup actions themselves may cause. Often a 
stakeholder advisory group can provide the advice needed to consider 
all of the relevant information.
    Stakeholders can provide valuable input to decision makers 
during the long-term recovery effort, and the key decision makers 
should establish a process that provides for appropriate stakeholder 
input. Identifying which stakeholders need to be involved in the 
process depends on the situation. In the case of a site contaminated 
as a result of an RDD or IND incident, stakeholders may include 
those whose health, economic well-being, and quality of life are 
currently affected or would be affected by the cleanup and the 
site's subsequent use. They may also include those who are legally 
responsible for the site's contamination and cleanup, those with 
regulatory responsibility, and those who may speak on behalf of 
environmental considerations or future generations.
    Stakeholder input should be considered throughout all stages of 
the framework as appropriate, including analyzing the risks,

[[Page 189]]

identifying potential cleanup options, evaluating options, selecting 
an approach, and evaluating the effectiveness of the action 
afterwards. Their input will assist decision makers in providing a 
reasonable basis for actions to be taken. Further information on the 
importance and selection of stakeholders can be found in the 
Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management.
    Decision makers can also benefit from the use of working groups 
that can provide expert technical advice regarding the decisions 
that need to be made during the long-term recovery process. Further 
information on how to incorporate the use of technical working 
groups is provided later in this appendix.

(a) The Stages of the Risk Management Framework for Responding to RDD 
and IND Incidents

    The ``Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management'' has 
six stages:
    1. Define the problem and put it in context.
    2. Analyze the risks associated with the problem in context.
    3. Examine options for addressing the risks.
    4. Make decisions about which options to implement.
    5. Take actions to implement the decisions.
    6. Evaluate results of the actions taken.
    Risk management decisions under this framework should do the 
following:
     Clearly articulate all of the problems in their public 
health and ecological contexts, not just those associated with 
radiation.
     Emerge from a decisionmaking process that elicits the 
views of those affected by the decision.
     Be based on the best available scientific, economic, 
and other technical evidence.
     Be implemented with stakeholder support in a manner 
that is effective, expeditious, and flexible.
     Be shown to have a significant impact on the risks of 
concern.
     Be revised and changed when significant new information 
becomes available.
     Account for their multi-source, multimedia, multi-
chemical, and multi-risk contexts.
     Be feasible, with benefits reasonably related to their 
costs.
     Give priority to preventing risks, not just controlling 
them.
     Be sensitive to political, social, legal, and cultural 
considerations.

(1) Define the Problems and Put Them in Context

    In the case of RDDs, the initial problem is caused by the 
dispersal of radioactive material. This dispersion may also result 
in the release of other types of contaminants (chemical or 
biological) or create other types of public health hazards. 
Individuals exposed may include workers and members of the public, 
and there may be different associated assumptions; for example, how 
long the individuals will be exposed in the future.
    The potential for future radiation exposure must be considered 
within the context of the societal objectives to be achieved, and 
must examine the options in the context of all of the other sources, 
hazards, and impacts the community faces. There may also be broader 
public health or environmental issues that local governments and 
public health agencies have to confront and consider. Understanding 
the context of a risk problem is essential for effectively managing 
the risk.
    The goals of the recovery will extend well beyond the reduction 
of potential delayed radiation health effects, and may include:
     Public health protection goals, including acute 
hazards, long-term chronic issues, and protection of children and 
other sensitive populations.
     Social and economic goals, such as minimizing 
disruption to communities and businesses, maintaining property 
values, and protecting historical or cultural landmarks or 
resources.
     National security goals, such as maintaining and 
normalizing use of critical arteries, airports, or seaports for mass 
transit; maintaining energy production; and providing for critical 
communications.
     Public welfare goals, including maintaining hospital 
capacity, water treatment works, and sewerage systems for protection 
of community health; assuring adequate food, fuel, power, and other 
essential resources; and providing for the protection or recovery of 
personal property.

(2) Analyze the Risks

    To make effective risk management decisions, decision makers and 
other stakeholders need to know what potential harm a situation 
poses and how great is the likelihood that people or the environment 
will be harmed. The nature, extent, and focus of a risk assessment 
should be guided by the risk management goals. The results of a risk 
assessment--along with information about public values, statutory 
requirements, court decisions, equity considerations, benefits, and 
costs--are used to decide whether and how to manage the risks.
    Risk assessments can be controversial, reflecting the important 
role that both science and judgment play in drawing conclusions 
about the likelihood of effects on public health and the 
environment. It is important that risk assessors respect the 
objective scientific basis of risks and procedures for making 
inferences in the absence of adequate data. Risk assessors should 
provide decision makers and other stakeholders with plausible 
conclusions about risk that can be made on the basis of the 
available information, along with evaluations of the scientific 
support for those conclusions, descriptions of major sources of 
uncertainty, and alternative views.
    Stakeholders' perception of a risk can vary substantially 
depending on such factors as the extent to which the stakeholders 
are directly affected, whether they have voluntarily assumed the 
risk or had the risk imposed on them, and whether they are connected 
with the cause of the risk. For this reason, risk assessments should 
characterize the scientific aspects of a risk and note its 
subjective, cultural, and comparative dimensions. Stakeholders play 
an important role in providing information that should be used in 
risk assessments and in identifying specific health and ecological 
concerns that should be considered.

(3) Examine the Options

    This stage of the risk management process involves identifying 
potential recovery management options and evaluating their 
effectiveness, feasibility, costs, benefits, cultural or social 
impacts, and unintended consequences. This process can begin 
whenever appropriate, after defining the problem and considering the 
context. It does not have to wait until the risk analysis is 
completed, although a risk analysis often will provide important 
information for identifying and evaluating risk management options. 
In some cases, examining risk management options may help refine a 
risk analysis. Risk management goals may be redefined after decision 
makers and stakeholders gain some appreciation for what is feasible, 
what the costs and benefits are, and what contribution reducing 
exposures and risks can make toward improving human and ecological 
health.
    Once potential options have been identified, the effectiveness, 
feasibility, benefits, detriments, and costs of each option must be 
assessed to provide input into selecting an option. Key questions 
include determining (1) the expected benefits and costs; (2) who 
gains the benefits and who bears the costs; (3) the feasibility of 
the option given the available time; resources; and any legal, 
political, statutory, and technology limitations; and (4) whether 
the option increases certain risks while reducing others. Other 
adverse consequences may be cultural, political, social, or 
economic--such as economic impacts on a community, including reduced 
property values or loss of jobs; environmental justice issues; and 
harming the social fabric of a town or tribe by relocating the 
people away from a contaminated area.
    Many risk management options may be unfeasible for social, 
political, cultural, legal, or economic reasons--or because they do 
not reduce risks to the extent needed. For example, removing all the 
soil from an entire valley that is heavily contaminated with 
radioactive material may be infeasible. On the other hand, the costs 
of cleaning up an elementary school may be considered justified by 
their benefits: protecting children and returning daily activities 
to a sense of normalcy. Of course, the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of an option may change in the future as technology is 
improved or as society's values change.

(4) Make a Decision

    A productive stakeholder involvement process can generate 
important guidance for decision makers. Thus, decisions may reflect 
negotiation and compromise, as long as risk management goals and 
intent are met. In some cases, win-win solutions are available that 
allow stakeholders with divergent views to achieve their primary 
goals.
    Decision makers must balance the value of obtaining additional 
information against the need for a decision, however uncertain. 
Sometimes a decision must be made primarily on a precautionary 
basis. Every effort should be made to avoid ``paralysis by 
analysis,'' in which the need for additional information, or the 
inability to reach consensus, is used as an excuse to avoid or

[[Page 190]]

postpone decisionmaking. When sufficient information is available to 
make a risk management decision, or when additional information or 
analysis would not contribute significantly to the quality of the 
decision, the decision should not be postponed. ``Value-of-
information'' techniques can be used to provide perspective on the 
next steps to be taken.

(5) Take Action To Implement Decision

    When options have been evaluated and decisions made, a plan for 
action should be developed and implemented. Traditionally, 
implementation of protective actions is driven by decision makers' 
responsibilities to protect the public and the environment. State 
and local officials, business leaders, private industries, and the 
general public are generally the implementers of these protective 
actions. Actions may take considerable time for completion, and 
additional decisions may often be necessary as the actions proceed.

(6) Evaluate the Results

    Decision makers and other stakeholders must continue to review 
what risk management actions have been implemented and how effective 
these actions have been. Evaluating effectiveness involves 
monitoring and measuring, as well as comparing actual benefits and 
costs to estimates made in the decisionmaking stage. The 
effectiveness of the process leading to implementation should also 
be evaluated at this stage. Evaluation provides important 
information about: Whether the actions were successful; whether they 
accomplished what was intended; whether the predicted benefits and 
costs were accurate; whether any modifications are needed to the 
risk management plan to improve success; whether any critical 
information gaps hindered success; whether any new information has 
emerged that indicates a decision or a stage of the framework should 
be revisited; whether the process was effective; how stakeholder 
involvement contributed to the outcome; and what lessons can be 
learned to guide future risk management decisions or to improve the 
decisionmaking process.
    Evaluation is critical to accountability and to ensure wise use 
of valuable but limited resources. Tools for evaluation include 
environmental and health monitoring, research, disease surveillance, 
analyses of costs and benefits, and discussions with stakeholders.

(b) Technical Advisory Groups

    Making decisions on the appropriate cleanup approaches and 
levels following an RDD or IND incident of any significant size will 
undoubtedly be a challenging task for decision makers. As already 
noted, the technical issues may be complex, many potentially 
competing factors will need to be carefully weighed, and public 
anxiety can be expected to be high in the face of a terrorist act 
involving radioactive materials. In addition, it is recognized that 
different regulatory authorities and organizations historically have 
taken different cleanup approaches for radioactively contaminated 
sites. Given this context, decision makers will need to determine 
how best to obtain the necessary technical input to support these 
decisions and demonstrate to the public that the final decisions are 
credible and sound.
    There are a variety of ways this approach may be accomplished, 
and decision makers will need to tailor a process best suited to 
particular site circumstances. This section describes one process 
that is available to decision makers, which is based on the ``ad 
hoc'' mechanisms used for coordinating interagency expertise and 
assessing the effectiveness in general of the cleanup in response to 
the 2001 anthrax attacks. The anthrax cleanup involved the use of 
two technical groups that were used to advise key decision makers: a 
technical working group and a technical peer review advisory 
committee. (Unlike the other steps described in this appendix, these 
concepts are not described in the 1997 framework and are thus 
described in greater detail here.)

(1) Technical Working Group

    Decision makers may choose to convene a technical working group 
to provide multi-agency, multi-disciplinary expert input to the 
planning and implementation of the cleanup effort, especially in 
setting appropriate cleanup goals and developing strategies for 
meeting them.
    The group would be an ad hoc technical advisory group, not a 
decisionmaking body. It may include representatives from Federal, 
State, local, and tribal agencies. It may also include experts from 
the private sector or universities. Inclusion of a qualified local 
physician or health official also helps enhance the credibility of 
the working group within the community.
    The composition of the group and the scope of its charter will 
vary depending on the needs of the situation and the nature of the 
contamination. For example, expertise in chemical or radiation 
toxicology will be needed for attacks involving chemical or 
radioactive agents. In some cases (e.g., where there is simultaneous 
release of similar contamination at numerous locations), one working 
group may be charged with providing national-level advice to be 
applied locally at multiple individual sites. In other cases (i.e., 
where contamination is minimal or exposure is unlikely), a technical 
working group may not be necessary.
    A technical working group can provide expert input in the form 
of cross-agency coordination on technical issues, analysis of 
relevant requirements and guidelines, review of data and plans, and 
recommendations that will aid in ensuring that cleanup will be 
adequate. The group may also provide technical information to the 
Joint Information Center (JIC) to explain public health or 
environmental impacts to the public and the press. This group, like 
the advisory committee discussed below, reports to the decision 
maker, however, and not directly to the public. A technical working 
group can complement other ``special teams'' that may assist in the 
recovery effort, and representatives from these other special teams 
may be members of the technical working group.

(2) Technical Peer Review Advisory Committee

    For significant decontamination efforts, the key decision makers 
may choose to convene an independent committee of technical experts 
to conduct a deliberative and comprehensive post-decontamination 
review. The committee would evaluate the effectiveness of the 
decontamination process and make recommendations on whether the 
decontaminated areas or items may be reoccupied or reused. It is 
important to note that although this review may enhance the 
scientific credibility of the final outcome, final cleanup decisions 
rest with decision makers.
    The committee may consist of experts from the involved Federal 
agencies, State and tribal public health and environmental agencies, 
universities and private industry, the local health department, and 
possibly representatives of the employees and the community. To 
maximize objectivity, the committee would be an independent group 
that will advise and report to the decision makers, but not be a 
part of the decisionmaking team.
    The scientific expertise in the committee should reflect the 
needs of the decision makers in conducting a peer review of all 
aspects of the decontamination process (e.g., environmental 
sampling, epidemiology, risk assessment, industrial hygiene, 
statistics, and engineering). Agencies on the committee may also 
have representatives on the technical working group, but in order to 
preserve the objectivity of the committee, it is best to designate 
different experts to serve on each group. The chair and co-chair of 
the committee should not be a part of the decisionmaking group at 
the site.
    The decision makers should develop a charter for the committee, 
specifying the tasks committee members are intended to perform, the 
issues they are to consider, and the process they will use in 
arriving at conclusions and recommendations. The charter should also 
specify whether the individual members are expected to represent the 
views of their respective agencies or just their own opinions as 
independent scientific experts. Consensus among committee members is 
desirable but may not be possible. If consensus cannot be achieved, 
the charter should specify how decision makers expect the full range 
of opinions to be reflected in the final committee report. All 
members of the committee should agree to the terms of charter and 
sign it before participating.
    In general, the technical peer review committee would evaluate 
pre- and post-decontamination sampling data, the decontamination 
plan, and any other information key to assessing the effectiveness 
of the cleanup. Based on this evaluation, the committee would make 
recommendations to the decision makers on whether cleanup has 
reduced contamination to acceptable levels, or whether further 
actions are needed before re-occupancy.

Appendix 3--Federal Implementation

    This appendix provides an implementation plan for the protective 
action recommendations in the body of this

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document. It also describes how to implement the risk management 
framework for recovery after a radiological or nuclear incident 
described in Appendix 2. This implementation plan presents the 
Federal role in long-term site restoration, and how Federal 
departments and agencies will interact with State and local 
government counterparts and the public. The plan does not attempt to 
provide detailed descriptions of State and local roles and 
expertise. It is assumed those details would be provided in State-, 
area-, and local-level planning documents that address radiological/
nuclear terrorism incidents.
    This site cleanup implementation plan is intended to function 
under the National Response Plan (NRP) with Federal agencies 
performing work consistent with their established roles, 
responsibilities and capabilities. Agencies should be tasked to 
perform work under the appropriate Emergency Support Function, as a 
primary or support agency, as described in the NRP.
    This plan is designed to be compatible with the Incident 
Command/Unified Command (IC/UC) structure embodied in the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS). The functional descriptions and 
processes in this plan are provided to address the specific needs 
and wide range of potential impacts of an RDD or IND incident. 
During the intermediate phase, site restoration planners should 
begin the process described below, in coordination with the on-site 
IC/UC. Coordination of Federal activities may organize along IC/UC 
functional lines coordinating with the on-site organization to avoid 
redundancy. After early and intermediate phase activities have come 
to conclusion, and only long-term cleanup and site restoration 
activities are ongoing, the IC/UC structure may continue to support 
planning and decisionmaking for the long-term cleanup. The IC/UC may 
make personnel changes and structural adaptations to suit the needs 
of a lengthy, multifaceted and highly visible remediation process. 
For example, a less formal and structured command, more focused on 
technical analysis and stakeholder involvement, may be preferable 
for site restoration than what is required under emergency 
circumstances. Some of the Teams described below, such as the 
Decision Team or the Recovery Management Team may be coordinated 
from, or coincident with, functional portions of the IC/UC at the 
site. Although the makeup of the Teams may vary, the functions 
should remain the same.
    Radiological and nuclear terrorism incidents cover a broad range 
of potential scenarios and impacts. For the sake of this appendix, 
it is assumed that the incident is of sufficient size to trigger a 
State request for Federal assistance, and that the Federal 
Government is the primary funding agent for site restoration. In 
particular the process, described for the late phase in Section 
D.3.3 of this document, assumes an incident of larger size. For 
smaller incidents, all of the elements in this section may not be 
warranted. The process should be tailored to the circumstances of 
the particular incident. It should be recognized that for some 
radiological/nuclear terrorist incidents, States will take the 
primary leadership role and contribute significant resources toward 
restoration of the site. This section does not address such a 
scenario.
    As described earlier in the document, radiological/nuclear 
emergency responses are often divided roughly into three phases: (1) 
The early phase, when the plume is active and field data are lacking 
or not reliable; (2) the intermediate phase, when the plume has 
passed and field data are available for assessment and analysis; and 
(3) the late phase, when long-term issues are addressed, such as 
restoration of the site. For purposes of this appendix, the response 
to a radiological or nuclear terrorism incident is divided into two 
separate, but interrelated and overlapping, processes. The first is 
comprised of the early and intermediate phases of response, which 
consist of the immediate on-scene actions of State and local first 
responders under Incident Command/Unified Command (IC/UC), as well 
as those of Federal teams and officials, to perform incident 
stabilization, lifesaving activities, access control and security, 
emergency decontamination of persons and property, ``hot spot'' 
removal actions, dose reduction actions for members of the public 
and emergency responders, and resumption of basic infrastructure 
functions.
    The second process pertains to environmental restoration, which 
is initiated soon after the incident (during the intermediate phase) 
and continues into the late phase. The process starts with the 
convening of stakeholders and technical subject matter experts to 
begin identifying and evaluating options for the restoration of the 
site. The environmental restoration process overlaps the 
intermediate phase activities described above and should be 
coordinated with those activities.
    This implementation plan does not address law enforcement 
coordination during terrorism incident response, including how the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS will manage on-scene 
actions immediately following an act of terror. Also, victim triage 
and other medical response aspects are not addressed. The plan 
presented in this appendix is not intended for use at site cleanups 
occurring under other statutory authorities such as EPA's Superfund 
program, the NRC's decommissioning program, or State-administered 
cleanup programs.

(a) Response and Recovery Activities Overview

    The following are actions expected to occur according to 
existing plans, protocols, and capabilities. These early activities 
are primarily for context and are not intended to be exhaustive. The 
major change from current operating plans and protocols is the 
assumption of Federal leadership by DHS. The early phase of the 
response will be run at the scene by State and local responders, who 
are likely to make protective action decisions for the protection of 
public health, property, and environment early in the incident based 
on judgment, protocol, and what limited data are available. As 
Federal response assets arrive on scene, they will be incorporated 
into the on-scene incident command established by State and local 
officials and then become part of the unified command structure. 
Other Federal assets will be located in the Joint Field Office 
(JFO), co-located with a State/local Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC), if possible, to support the local incident management 
activities.

(1) Early Phase

    0-3 hours.
     Local incident command established
     Radiation detected and a terrorism incident recognized
     DHS Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) notified 
of incident and mobilized to provide support and coordination until 
JFO is operational
     DHS determines if this incident is an Incident of 
National Significance, as defined in the NRP
     Initial protective actions ordered (downwind shelter-
in-place/evacuation)
    Comments:
     Some Federal assets will self-deploy under their own 
authority (HHS, FBI, OSHA, EPA, DOE)
     Protective actions by locals likely to occur before 
Federal assets arrive
    6 hours.
     DHS designates a Principal Federal Official (PFO)
     Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) activated by DHS 
(i.e. Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), Aerial Measuring System 
(AMS), FRMAC, Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site 
(REAC/TS), Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT))
     Initial dispersion plots developed, other analyses 
done, and initial Federal protective action recommendations may be 
provided
     Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) deploys
    Comments:
     An ``Initial PFO'' may be named until the PFO can 
arrive at the site
     The PFO may deploy with the DEST
     The PFO is responsible for coordinating Federal assets 
in collaboration with other Federal officials
    6-12 hours.
     Initial JFO established to include FBI Joint Operations 
Center (JOC)
     Advance FRMAC stood up, field measurements being taken
     AMS arrives, provides initial deposition data to JFO
    12-24 hours.
     JFO operational
     Federal teams in place (NIRT, DEST, Advisory Team for 
Food and Health)
     PAG being provided by JFO to State and local decision 
makers
     State requests, and is granted, a major disaster or 
emergency declaration
    Early phase activities are expected to proceed as described 
under existing plans and agreements. If DHS declares an Incident of 
National Significance, the PFO will coordinate Federal activities 
from the JFO and integrate Federal activities in support of the 
State and local response. A Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act declaration will facilitate funding for 
public and individual assistance, and for recovery operations.

[[Page 192]]

    In general, the primary agencies expected to be represented in 
the unified command for an RDD or IND response incident are the 
agencies with primary response authority and include DHS, FBI, DOE, 
EPA, and other Federal, State, and local government agencies, as 
appropriate. Other Federal agencies (e.g., NRC, OSHA, U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, and DoD) will be requested to support the 
response in accordance with the NRP and NIMS.

(2) Intermediate Phase

    During the intermediate phase, actions initiated in the early 
phase will continue as needed, such as lifesaving, fire suppression, 
perimeter security, and field data collection and analysis. 
Preliminary shelter-in-place or evacuation may occur within the 
first hours at the order of local incident command, but as data 
become available, Federal, State, and local officials will have 
better information with which to make protective action decisions, 
assist emergency workers, and inform the public.
    Federal protective action recommendations will be provided to 
State and local governments on public dose constraints, restrictions 
regarding consumption of food and water, and dose reduction actions. 
Intermediate phase actions may include relocation, control of public 
access, decontamination of persons, decontamination/removal of ``hot 
spots,'' response worker dose monitoring, population monitoring, 
food and water controls, and clearance of personal property. Public 
information and communication programs should be implemented as soon 
as practicable. Federal officials will work with State and local 
officials to develop information for the public in coordination with 
the JIC. (See the ``Application of PAGs for RDD or IND Incidents'' 
for more information on intermediate phase protective actions and 
recommendations.)

(3) Late Phase--Recovery and Site Restoration Activities Process 
Overview

    As noted earlier, the long-term recovery process should be 
initiated during the intermediate phase. This process is 
interrelated with the ongoing intermediate phase activities, and the 
intermediate phase protective actions continue to apply through the 
late phase until cleanup is complete. However, the long-term 
recovery phase is likely to involve separate individuals who can 
focus on long-term restoration issues while others continue working 
on intermediate phase activities.
    Cleanup planning and discussions should begin as soon as 
practicable after an incident to allow for selection of key 
stakeholders and subject matter experts, planning, analyses, 
contractual processes, and cleanup activities. States may choose to 
pre-determine stakeholders. These activities should proceed in 
parallel with ongoing intermediate phase activities, and 
coordination between these sets of activities should be maintained. 
Preliminary remediation activities carried out during the 
intermediate phase--such as emergency removals, decontamination, 
resumption of basic infrastructure function, and some return to 
normalcy in accordance with intermediate phase guidelines--should 
not be delayed for the final site remediation decision.
    Presented below is a process for addressing environmental 
contamination that applies an optimization process for site cleanup. 
Optimization (described more fully in the ``Application of PAGs for 
RDD or IND Incidents'') is a flexible process in which numerous 
factors are considered to achieve an end result that balances local 
needs and desires, health risks, costs, technical feasibility, and 
other factors. The general process outlined below provides decision 
makers with input from both technical experts and stakeholder 
representatives, as well as providing an opportunity for public 
comment. The extent and complexity of the process for an actual 
incident should be tailored to the needs of the specific incident; 
for smaller incidents, the teams discussed below may not be 
necessary.
    The goals of the process described below are: (1) Transparency--
the basis for cleanup decisions should be available to stakeholder 
representatives, and ultimately to the public at large; (2) 
inclusiveness--representative stakeholders should be involved in 
decisionmaking activities; (3) effectiveness--technical subject 
matter experts should analyze remediation options, consider dose and 
risk benchmarks, and assess various technologies in order to assist 
in identifying a final solution that is optimal for the incident; 
and (4) shared accountability--the final decision to proceed will be 
made jointly by DHS, State, and local officials.
    If Federal agencies do not have their own authorities to enable 
them to participate in the overall recovery and restoration process, 
then DHS would issue mission assignments to the involved Federal 
agencies to participate in the overall recovery and restoration 
process. Additional funding may be provided to State/local 
governments to perform response/restoration activities through other 
mechanisms. The components of the process are as follows:

(i) Teams

(A) Decision Team

    Makeup: The Decision Team consists of the Secretary of DHS, the 
governor of the State, the mayor or equivalent, and the head of the 
lead Federal agency (or their respective designated representatives 
with authority to commit resources on behalf of affected persons).
    Function: The function of the Decision Team is to make the final 
decision on recommendations received from the Recovery Management 
Team, commit resources, and commence cleanup activities. The 
Decision Team will raise unresolved national level policy issues to 
the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) and/or to the 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, as appropriate.

(B) Recovery Management Team

    State and DHS officials should select a Recovery Management Team 
as soon as possible after the incident. The size and makeup of the 
team will be dependent on the incident, but would be expected to 
consist of senior-level officials. The Recovery Management Team will 
normally be located at the JFO in order to enhance information flow 
and response coordination.
    Makeup: The Recovery Management Team should include DHS, 
affected State and/or local representatives, and the Federal lead 
technical agency. The Recovery Management Team should be co-chaired 
by a DHS and State official. The makeup is flexible and may 
accommodate other individuals, as necessary.
    Functions: The functions of the Recovery Management Team are to 
select participants for the Stakeholder and Technical Working 
Groups; provide facilitation, oversight and guidance during the 
cleanup analyses and decisionmaking process; oversee working group 
interactions; maintain communications between working groups; 
receive and review options and recommendations; ensure the 
development and implementation of community involvement and public 
information strategy; and prioritize recommendations when they are 
forwarded to the Decision Team for action.

(C) Stakeholder Working Group

    The Stakeholder Working Group should be convened as soon as 
practicable, normally within weeks of the incident.
    Makeup: The Stakeholder Working Group should include selected 
Federal, State, and local representatives; local non-governmental 
representatives; and local business interests. The exact selection 
and balance of stakeholders is incident specific. The Stakeholder 
Working Group should be co-chaired by DHS and State and/or local 
representatives.
    Function: The function of the Stakeholder Working Group is to 
provide input to the Technical Working Group and the Recovery 
Management Team concerning local needs and desires for site 
restoration, proposed cleanup options, and recommendations for 
recovery.

(D) Technical Working Group

    The Technical Working Group should be convened as soon as 
practicable, normally within weeks of the incident.
    Makeup: The Technical Working Group should include selected 
Federal, State, local, and private sector subject matter experts in 
such fields as environmental fate and transport modeling, risk 
analysis, technical remediation options analysis, cost risk and 
benefit analysis, health physics/radiation protection, construction 
remediation practices, and relevant regulatory requirements. The 
exact selection and balance of subject matter experts is incident 
specific. The Technical Working Group should be chaired by the 
Federal lead technical agency assigned responsibility for performing 
cleanup operations and co-chaired by the State/local technical 
agency.
    Function: The Technical Working Group provides expert input on 
technical issues, analysis of relevant regulatory requirements and 
guidelines, risk analyses, and evaluation of options as directed by 
the Recovery Management Team. The actual technical analyses will be 
the responsibility of the Federal lead technical agency for cleanup. 
The Technical Working Group should also receive input from the 
Stakeholder Working

[[Page 193]]

Group. Technical Working Group written products are provided to the 
Recovery Management Team.

(ii) Activities

(A) Optimization and Recommendation (Lasts Weeks to Months)

    The Recovery Management Team, in consultation with the 
Stakeholder Working Group and Technical Working Group, will develop 
a process for the three teams to work together in order to provide 
the opportunity for local concerns to inform the work of the 
Technical Working Group. The Technical Working Group and Recovery 
Management Team should assist in answering questions the Stakeholder 
Working Group may have regarding technical issues and provide 
information regarding cleanup options.
    The Stakeholder Working Group should present local goals, needs, 
and desires for the use of the site, and prioritize current and 
future potential land uses and functions, such as utilities and 
infrastructure, light industrial, downtown business, and residential 
land uses. The lead technical agency will oversee technical 
optimization analyses for site cleanup in collaboration with the 
Recovery Management Team, Technical Working Group, and Stakeholder 
Working Group. The Technical Working Group will analyze assumptions, 
review risk analyses for various proposed remediation options, 
assess technical feasibility and cost of the options, and identify 
the estimated time to complete restoration options and their 
potential impacts on the local community.
    The Stakeholder Working Group will provide input to the 
Technical Working Group, but may also provide options and 
recommendations directly to the Recovery Management Team. The 
Technical Working Group will consider input from the Stakeholder 
Working Group in its analyses, and provide input to the Recovery 
Management Team on remediation options and recommended approaches 
and rationale. It is important that the Technical Working Group and 
the Stakeholder Working Group maintain confidentiality concerning 
all aspects of the analyses. All outside contacts, such as press 
interviews, concerning the ongoing work and deliberations should be 
coordinated through the Recovery Management Team.
    As the Technical Working Group completes its analyses and 
formulates its recommendations, it will present this information to 
the Recovery Management Team for final review. The Recovery 
Management Team will present the Decision Team with options, 
recommendations for final action, and supporting documentation.

(B) Public Review of Decision

    The Decision Team should publish a summary of the process, the 
options analyzed, and the recommendation for public comment. Public 
meetings may also be convened as appropriate. Public comment should 
be considered and incorporated as appropriate. A reconvening of the 
Recovery Management Team, Stakeholder Working Group, and Technical 
Working Group may be useful for resolving some issues.

(C) Execute Cleanup

    Assuming a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or 
emergency, DHS may issue mission assignments to the Federal 
departments and agencies that have the capability to perform the 
required cleanup or remediation activities. For significant de-
contamination efforts, decision makers may choose to employ a 
technical peer review advisory committee to conduct a review of the 
effectiveness of the cleanup.

(b) Implications of DHS as Lead Federal Agency

    In both the early and intermediate phases of the response, 
activities are expected to proceed as described under existing plans 
and agreements, except that the Federal response will be coordinated 
by DHS through the PFO. Anticipated actions include the following:
     When NIRT assets are called upon by the Secretary of 
DHS, they will come under the ``authority, direction, and control'' 
of the Secretary or his designee for the duration of the response. 
As such, they will not work for State or local governments, nor will 
they work independently under their agency of origin (either DOE or 
EPA), as they may under existing plans. A DOE senior energy official 
will act as the single point of contact for tasking of DOE nuclear/
radiological support requested by the PFO or Federal Coordinating 
Office (FCO).
     Federal, State, and local field teams and experts 
should coordinate data collection and analysis through the FRMAC 
(now a DHS-directed asset) once it is operational.
     All Federal information--such as protective action 
recommendations, analyses, projections, and information to be 
provided to the public--is expected to pass through the PFO or FCO, 
in coordination with State and local officials, prior to its release 
to the press and the public. A JIC may be established to provide the 
organizational structure for coordinating and disseminating official 
information to the public. It is recognized, however, that in some 
cases, on-scene responding Federal agencies may need to communicate 
directly with the media/public on tactical operations and matters 
affecting public health and safety, particularly early in the 
response.

Appendix 4--Operational Guidelines for Implementation of the Protective 
Action Guides During RDD or IND Events

    As noted in Section F of the document, operational guidelines 
are levels of radiation or concentrations of radionuclides that can 
be accurately measured by radiation detection and monitoring 
equipment, and then related or compared to the PAGs to quickly 
determine if protective actions need to be implemented. In most 
situations, the guidelines will be given in terms of external gamma 
rates or media-specific radionuclide concentration units. Both 
external and internal exposure potential will be considered in their 
development.
    This appendix describes examples of measurable guidelines that 
will be developed by groups or categories to assist decision makers 
and response workers in deciding on and applying protective actions. 
This appendix discusses the guidelines qualitatively and does not 
provide actual values. The operational guidelines will be developed 
to provide reasonable assurance that the PAGs, the dose levels 
recommended in this report, can be met for appropriate situations 
under assumed circumstances. The guidelines will also consider the 
impact of protective actions, such as rinsing of vehicles to remove 
contamination, and when control of wash water is necessary. Actual 
conditions may warrant development of incident-specific guides, and 
this document does not preclude such development. Part of the 
development process will include the development of tools to allow 
for the preparation of site-specific operational guidelines that can 
be tailored to the emergency and the required response.
    At this time, the operational guidelines are subdivided into six 
groups. They are:
     Access Controls During Emergency Response Operations 
(Group A)
     Relocation Areas (Group B)
     Critical Infrastructure Utilization in Relocation Areas 
(Group C)
     Temporary Access to Relocation Areas for Essential 
Activities (Group D)
     Transportation and Access Routes (Group E)
     Property Control for Release of Property to Non-
impacted Areas (Group F)
    The purpose of operational guidelines for each of these groups 
is discussed in the following paragraphs, along with examples of 
specific operational guides that are needed for each group. However, 
as discussed in Section F, some operational guidelines have been 
previously developed and are available (e.g., EPA PAG Manual \8\ and 
``Radiological Emergency Response Health and Safety Manual'' \9\). 
At this time, the appendix contains no recommendations for actual 
values. As they are developed, information on recommended 
operational guidelines and associated tools will be made available 
for review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ ``Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions 
for Nuclear Incidents,'' U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, May 
1992, EPA-400-R-92-001.
    \9\ ``Radiological Emergency Response Health and Safety 
Manual,'' May 2001, available at http://www.nv.doe.gov/programs/frmac/DOCUMENTS.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(a) Access Controls During Emergency Response Operations (Group A)

    The operational guidelines in this group are intended for use 
during emergency response operations. They guide responders in 
establishing radiological control zones or boundaries in affected 
areas where response activities are being conducted. These 
operational guides are not intended to restrict emergency responder 
access but rather to inform responders of potential radiological 
hazards existing in the areas and to provide tools for those 
responsible for radiation protection during response activities. 
Group A operational guidelines may be used to restrict access of 
non-essential personnel and members of the public to specific areas.
    These guidelines are most applicable during the early and 
intermediate phases of

[[Page 194]]

the emergency when the situation has not been fully stabilized or 
characterized and may therefore need to be applied initially with 
limited data and then revised (e.g., areas reclassified or 
remarked), as appropriate. Group A operational guidelines are 
generally for the areas directly impacted by the RDD or IND incident 
where first responders and emergency response personnel are working. 
However, they may also be applicable in contaminated areas where 
unrelated accidents or emergencies occur after the RDD or IND 
situation has been stabilized. Group A operational guidelines are 
not intended to restrict emergency response or lifesaving actions, 
but they are rather intended to help focus radiological protection 
resources on areas of highest priority. They do, however, define 
areas that should be restricted to the public and non-essential 
personnel. Examples of operational guidelines being developed in 
this group include those for the following:

(1) Life and Property Saving Measures

    Areas exceeding guidance levels pose a significant radiological 
hazard even if access is for short periods. Access should be 
permitted only when there is a significant benefit associated with 
the activity to be conducted that outweighs the associated 
radiological risks. The PAGs applied for development of these 
operational guides include the 25 rem lifesaving response worker 
guidelines (Table 1B in Appendix 1) and the property-saving 
guidelines that are applicable when it is not possible to limit 
response worker dose to the 5 rem worker PAG.

(2) Emergency Worker Demarcation

    Areas exceeding these guides should not be used to restrict 
response worker access. However, the public and non-essential 
personnel should not be allowed general access to the areas 
exceeding these levels. To the extent time and resources permit and 
do not interfere with response actions, officials responsible for 
radiation protection should establish procedures to monitor worker 
access and exposures in these areas. In most situations, the worker 
protection PAG of 5 rems is applicable (Table 1 in the main text and 
Table 1B in Appendix 1).

(b) Relocation Areas (Group B)

    The operational guidelines for this group are intended as 
screening values to delineate areas that exceed the relocation PAGs. 
These, or similar operational guides, have been developed or are 
presented in the FRMAC manual (Volume II) and will be assessed. 
Examples of operational guidelines being developed in this group 
include:

(1) Relocation From Residential Areas

    Areas exceeding these levels pose a significant possibility of 
causing doses that exceed relocation PAGs under normal residential 
use, and unless specific assessments indicate otherwise, the public 
should be relocated from the areas. The 2 rems in the first year and 
0.5 rem/yr thereafter (Table 1) are applicable for the development 
of these operational guidelines. Temporary access may be consistent 
with Group D, Temporary Access Operational Limits.

(2) Relocation Considerations for Commercial/Industrial Areas

    Areas exceeding these guides pose a significant likelihood for 
causing doses that exceed public relocation PAGs under normal 
industrial or commercial use scenarios and should be considered for 
relocation. The 2 rems in the first year and 0.5 rem/yr thereafter 
(Table 1) are applicable for the development of these operational 
guidelines unless the employers have radiation protection programs 
in place to protect workers consistent with applicable requirements 
(e.g., OSHA 29 CFR 1910.1096, NRC 10 CFR 20, DOE 10 CFR 835), or 
unless site-specific analyses justify other operational limits. 
Temporary access for essential activities should be guided by 
operational guides in Group D. Or, if the facility is providing a 
service necessary to maintain public welfare, Group C operational 
limits should serve as a guide.

(3) Other Areas

    These operational guides apply to areas that are not used as 
residences and are not normal work places (e.g., parks, cemeteries, 
monuments). The value of these guidelines will likely differ from 
the relocation areas previously mentioned because of differing 
occupancy and use, although the dose guidelines remain 2 rems in the 
first year and 0.5 rems/yr thereafter (Table 1). Access to such 
areas should be limited if the guides are exceeded.
    These relocation operational guidelines will provide reasonable 
assurance that the worker or the public, as appropriate, will not 
exceed PAGs, and that appropriate radiological protection 
supervision is available in, and focused on, the higher risk areas 
so as to provide protection and oversight for emergency responders.

(c) Critical Infrastructure Utilization in Relocation Areas (Group C)

    The operational guidelines for this group are intended as 
screening values to ensure facilities critical to the public welfare 
can continue to operate if needed. These guides only apply to 
facilities in areas that exceed relocation PAGs and, as a result, 
have been closed for general use and access. The operational 
guidelines are generally applicable during intermediate phase 
activities.
    During the emergency activities, Group A operational guidelines 
will generally be applicable or in use. Group C operational guides 
assume a generally stable and characterized situation. The levels 
are derived assuming employees spend two thousand hours per year (a 
more realistic value may be employed if known) on the job and that 
the maximum dose will be less than 5 rems/yr. Facilities that exceed 
these operational guides and are essential for overall public 
welfare may need to be assessed to identify specific conditions and 
possible mitigation controls. In the following list of possible 
operational guidelines, a number of different guides have been 
identified, and future analyses may indicate that the same 
operational guidelines may be used for all or some of the facilities 
so that the list may be compressed.

(1) Hospitals

    These guidelines are recommended to allow continued use of 
health care facilities and services that are in areas that exceed 
relocation criteria. If alternative facilities and services are 
available, they should be employed before applying these guidelines.

(2) Airports, Railroads, and Ports

    These guidelines are recommended to allow use of transport 
facilities located in areas exceeding relocation guidelines that are 
essential to providing services and products necessary for the 
welfare of the region.

(3) Water and Sewer Facilities

    These guidelines are for utilities in relocation areas that are 
necessary to provide services for the region.

(4) Power and Fuel

    These guidelines are for utilities in relocation areas that are 
necessary to provide services for the region.
    It is emphasized that these guidelines only apply when 
continuous operation of these and other facilities are essential to 
maintaining the public welfare and when this cannot be achieved 
under Group B or Group D guidelines for relocation and temporary 
access decisions, respectively.

(d) Temporary Access to Relocation Areas for Essential Activities 
(Group D)

    The public, or employees of businesses, may need to have 
temporary access to residences or commercial, agricultural, or 
industrial facilities in order to retrieve essential records or 
equipment, conduct maintenance to protect the facility, prevent 
environmental damage, attend to animals, or retrieve pets. These 
operational guides are levels at which these actions can be taken 
without radiological supervision. The public or employees may 
occasionally access (a few days per month) the areas not exceeding 
these guides. Temporary access to relocation areas that exceeds the 
levels should only be permitted under the supervision, or with the 
permission of, radiation protection personnel. These operational 
guidelines will be derived to provide assurance that the doses will 
be below the 0.5 rem relocation PAG (Table 1, after the first year) 
for the following:

(1) Worker Access to Businesses for Essential Actions

    Areas meeting these levels may be accessed for limited periods 
to retrieve essential materials or perform essential functions 
(e.g., perform facility maintenance, attend to animals, maintain 
security).

(2) Public Access to Residences for Retrieval of Critical Property, 
Pets, or Records

    Areas in relocation areas meeting these criteria may be accessed 
by the public for limited periods to attend to important 
maintenance, retrieve needed records, or retrieve pets.

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(e) Transportation and Access Routes (Group E)

    The operational guidelines for this group are intended to assist 
in determining if transportation routes or access ways may be used 
by the public for general, limited, or restricted use. The 
relocation PAGs are used as the basis for operational guidelines for 
general access. Restricted use may be based on other guidelines as 
well. For example, operational guides may be defined for industrial/
commercial use of various roads, bridges, or access ways. These may 
be necessary to allow for access between non-relocation areas via a 
relocation area or to allow for emergency recovery access in the 
immediate area of the RDD or IND incident. These operational guides 
assume regular or periodic use and are not appropriate for one-time 
events, such as evacuation or relocation actions. In general, these 
operational guidelines need to be developed giving consideration to 
the relocation PAGs, worker protection guidelines, and potential for 
combined doses. Three examples of operational guidelines for this 
group are discussed as follows, and as these are developed, it is 
possible that all or some of the categories can be consolidated.

(1) Bridges

    Bridges meeting these operational guidelines are acceptable for 
public vehicular use (or restricted use, where appropriate).

(2) Streets and Thoroughfares

    Streets and thoroughfares meeting these operational limits are 
acceptable for general vehicular passage or restricted vehicular 
passage, as appropriate.

(3) Sidewalks and Walkways

    These operational limits are for non-vehicular access (e.g., 
individuals walking from parking lots or trains to places of 
business, or workers delivering goods). They should also apply to 
bridges and streets if significant non-vehicular passage is 
anticipated.

(f) Release of Property From Radiologically Controlled Areas (Group F)

    During response and recovery operations, property (vehicles, 
equipment, and waste) will need to be cleared from controlled areas. 
The operational guidelines in this group will be developed to 
support such actions. Because retrieval of cleared or released 
properties would be difficult, wherever practicable, these levels 
should be similar to those likely to define late phase goals. For 
this reason, they should not be applied to property that will remain 
in use in controlled areas. Many areas may not exceed relocation 
PAGs and therefore, they will be accessible to the public at levels 
considerably above the operational guides in this group. Use of such 
property should not be assumed unacceptable merely because it 
exceeds these guides. These operational guidelines should also be 
used for screening property that was outside the controlled area. In 
general, the operational guides in this group provide reasonable 
assurance that the property cleared is acceptable for long-term, 
unrestricted use (or designated disposition in the case of wastes) 
without further or future reassessment. Property includes the 
following:

(1) Personal Property (Except Waste)

    These operational guides will apply to property to be 
permanently cleared from the affected area for general reuse. They 
should not be used for property that will continue to be used in the 
affected areas (e.g., areas where residual activity is significantly 
above background).

(2) Waste

    The RDD or IND incident may generate significant quantities of 
waste that contain small amounts of radioactivity. This waste may be 
rubble resulting from the device or from demolition associated with 
recovery, or it may be in the form of municipal waste or industrial 
waste from areas that are contaminated at levels below the 
relocation PAGs and associated operational guidelines. Waste meeting 
these operational limits may be considered for disposal in normal 
landfills, and waste exceeding these limits should be disposed at 
appropriate low-level radioactive waste sites.

(3) Hazardous Waste

    Hazardous waste resulting from the RDD or IND or associated 
recovery operations will contain varied levels of residual 
radioactive material. Waste meeting these criteria may be considered 
for treatment and disposal to a legally permitted facility. Waste 
exceeding these concentrations should be managed as mixed waste.

(4) Real Property

    Relocation PAGs and associated operational guides will be 
developed for application to the management of real property, but it 
is recognized that the optimization process applied during late 
phase activities (which will likely overlap with the intermediate 
phase) will be applied to areas that contain residual radioactive 
material at concentrations below the operational guides for 
relocation. Until the optimization process determines the target 
cleanup levels, it is not possible to generically define release 
operational guidelines for release of real property. Tools and unit 
concentrations to dose factors may be developed that can be applied 
on a site-specific basis by decision makers involved in the 
optimization to help define interim, or even final, operational 
guides for certain areas. However, no suggested or recommended 
generic operational guidelines can be developed before optimization 
process considerations.
    Group F operational guides are intended to provide guidance for 
permanent clearance of property leaving radiologically controlled 
areas. These guides are developed to provide reasonable assurance 
that attaining them will minimize or eliminate the need for further 
response actions. It will be difficult to collect or re-call 
``released property'' should late phase decisions about ``safe 
exposures'' identify more restrictive levels than those used to 
release property in the early and intermediate phases. Therefore, 
the property control operational guides (Group F) will be based on 
potential doses that are a fraction of the intermediate phase PAGs. 
Wherever practicable, these levels should be similar to those likely 
to define late phase goals. As with all the operational guidelines, 
alternative levels may be developed and used if conditions and needs 
justify. Group F operational guides are not applicable to continued 
use of property in impacted areas.

    Note: Although agencies have identified values for selected 
operational guides, none have reached consensus. The development of 
these values will continue as part of an interagency process. 
Several sources exist that contain useful operational guidelines or 
information to support the development of operational guidelines 
that will eventually be included directly, or by reference with, the 
recommendations in this document and subsequent reports documenting 
the operational guidelines. The interagency workgroup developing 
these guidelines will consider these and other materials being 
developed by Federal agencies and other groups, such as the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI) and National Council on 
Radiation Protection and Measurement (NCRP). Consistent with 
direction from Congress in FY2003 Supplemental Appropriations 
Legislation, the DOE is conducting analyses and developing models to 
support the completion of operational guidelines identified in this 
appendix. A significant fraction of the operational guidelines were 
completed and submitted for interagency review in late FY2005. 
Completion of the analyses and revisions based on interagency input 
(and peer review) is anticipated in the middle of FY2006. As the 
operational guidelines are developed and worked through the 
interagency process, they will be made available for review on the 
Internet.

Appendix 5--Acronyms/Glossary

AMS

    Aerial Measuring System--A DOE technical asset consisting of 
both fixed wing and helicopter systems for measuring radiation on 
the ground; a deployable asset of the NIRT.

ALARA

    As low as reasonably achievable--A process to control or manage 
radiation exposure to individuals and releases of radioactive 
material to the environment so that doses are as low as social, 
technical, economic, practical, and public welfare considerations 
permit.

ANSI

    American National Standards Institute.

CFR

    Code of Federal Regulations.

CMS

    Consequence Management Site Restoration, Cleanup and 
Decontamination Subgroup.

DEST

    Domestic Emergency Support Team--A technical advisory team 
designed to pre-deploy and assist the FBI Special Agent in

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Charge. The DEST may deploy after an incident to assist the FBI and 
the PFO.

DHS

    Department of Homeland Security.

DIL

    Derived Intervention Level--the concentration of a radionuclide 
in food expressed in Becquerel/kg which, if present throughout the 
relevant period of time (with no intervention), could lead to an 
individual receiving a radiation dose equal to the PAG.

DOD

    Department of Defense.

DOE

    Department of Energy.

DRL

    Derived Response Level--A level of radioactivity in an 
environmental medium that would be expected to produce a dose equal 
to its corresponding PAG.

EOC

    Emergency Operations Center.

EPA

    Environmental Protection Agency.

FBI

    Federal Bureau of Investigation.

FCO

    Federal Coordinating Officer.

FDA

    Food and Drug Administration.

FRMAC

    Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center--A 
coordinating center for Federal, State, and local field personnel 
performing radiological monitoring and assessment--specifically, 
providing data collection, data analysis and interpretation, and 
finished products to decision makers. The FRMAC is a deployable 
asset of the NIRT.

HHS

    Department of Health and Human Services.

HAZWOPER

    Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard (29 
CFR 1910.120).

HSOC

    Homeland Security Operations Center--DHS headquarters to 
integrate and provide overall steady-state threat monitoring and 
situational awareness for domestic incident management on a 24/7 
basis.

HSPD

    Homeland Security Presidential Directive.

IC/UC

    Incident Command/Unified Command--A system to integrate various 
necessary functions to respond to emergencies. The system is widely 
used by local responders. Under Unified Command, multiple 
jurisdictional authorities are integrated.

IIMG

    Interagency Incident Management Group--A headquarters-level 
group to facilitate national-level domestic incident management and 
coordination of Federal operations and resources for certain 
incidents defined in HSPD-5 or in anticipation of such incidents.

IND

    Improvised Nuclear Device--Nuclear weapons that are fabricated 
by an adversary State or terrorist group from illicit nuclear 
material and that could produce nuclear explosions.

JFO

    Joint Field Office--The operations of the various Federal 
entities participating in a response at the local level should be 
collocated in a Joint Field Office whenever possible, to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of Federal incident management 
activities.

JIC

    Joint Information Center--A focal point for the coordination and 
provision of information to the public and media concerning the 
Federal response to the emergency.

JOC

    Joint Operations Center--The focal point for management and 
coordination of local, State and Federal investigative/law 
enforcement activities.

NCRP

    National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement.

NIMS

    National Incident Management System--The Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 and HPSD-5 directed the DHS to develop a NIMS. The purpose 
of the NIMS is to provide a consistent nationwide approach for 
Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and 
efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
domestic incidents.

NIRT

    Nuclear Incident Response Team--Created by the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, the NIRT consists of radiological emergency response 
assets of the DOE and the EPA. When called upon by the Secretary for 
Homeland Security for actual or threatened radiological incidents, 
these assets come under the ``authority, direction, and control'' of 
the Secretary.

NRC

    Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

NRP

    National Response Plan--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and 
the HPSD-5 directed the DHS to develop an NRP. The purpose of the 
NRP is to integrate Federal Government domestic emergency 
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-
discipline, all-hazards plan.

OSHA

    Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

PAG

    Protective Action Guide--Provides the projected dose to a 
reference individual, from an accidental or deliberate release of 
radioactive material at which a specific protective action to reduce 
or avoid that dose is recommended.

PFO

    Principal Federal Official--The PFO will act as the Secretary of 
Homeland Security's local representative, and will oversee and 
coordinate Federal activities for the incident.

PPE

    Personal Protective Equipment.

R

    Roentgen--Measure of exposure in air.

RAD

    Radiation absorbed dose.

RAP

    Radiological Assistance Program--A DOE emergency response asset 
that can rapid deploy at the request of State or local governments 
for technical assistance in radiological incidents. RAP teams are a 
deployable asset of the NIRT.

RDD

    Radiological Dispersal Device--A device or mechanism that is 
intended to spread radioactive material from the detonation of 
conventional explosives or other means.

REAC/TS

    Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site--A DOE asset 
located in Oak Ridge, TN, with technical expertise in medical and 
health assessment concerning internal and external exposure to 
radioactive materials. REAC/TS is a deployable asset of the NIRT.

rem

    The conventional unit of dose equivalent. The product of the 
absorbed dose in rad, a quality factor related to the biological 
effectiveness of the radiation involved and any other modifying 
factors.

RERT

    Radiological Emergency Response Team--An EPA team trained to do 
environmental sampling and analysis of radionuclides. RERT provides 
assistance during responses and takes over operation of the FRMAC 
from DOE at a point in time after the emergency phase. RERT is a 
deployable asset of the NIRT.

TEDE

    Total Effective Dose Equivalent--The sum of internal and 
external doses.

    Dated: December 5, 2005.
Robert Stephan,
Assistant Secretary, Office of Infrastructure Protection, Preparedness 
Directorate.

[FR Doc. 05-24521 Filed 12-30-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-21-P