[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 244 (Wednesday, December 21, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 75713-75717]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-24297]



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  Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 21, 2005 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 75713]]



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

11 CFR Part 100

[Notice 2005-29]


Electioneering Communications

AGENCY: Federal Election Commission.

ACTION: Final rules.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Federal Election Commission is amending its rules defining 
``electioneering communication'' under the Federal Election Campaign 
Act of 1971, as amended (``FECA'' or the ``Act''). The changes modify 
the definition of ``publicly distributed'' and the exemptions to the 
definition of ``electioneering communication'' consistent with the 
ruling of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Shays 
v. FEC, portions of which were affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit. Specifically, the changes 
eliminate the exemption from the electioneering communication 
provisions for certain tax-exempt organizations and revise the 
definition of ``publicly distributed,'' a term used in the regulatory 
definition of ``electioneering communication.'' The Commission is not 
adopting any other regulatory exemptions considered in this rulemaking. 
The Commission is also deferring further consideration of a proposed 
exemption for advertisements promoting films, books and plays until 
after completing the rulemakings that respond to Shays v. FEC. Further 
information is provided in the supplementary information that follows.

DATES: The rules at 11 CFR 100.29 will become effective on January 20, 
2006.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Mai T. Dinh, Assistant General 
Counsel, Mr. J. Duane Pugh Jr., Senior Attorney, Ms. Margaret G. Perl, 
Attorney, or Mr. Daniel K. Abramson, Law Clerk, 999 E Street, NW., 
Washington, DC 20463, (202) 694-1650 or (800) 424-9530.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(``BCRA''), Public Law 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002), amended FECA by 
adding a new category of communications, ``electioneering 
communications,'' to those already regulated by the Act. See 2 U.S.C. 
434(f)(3). Electioneering communications are television and radio 
communications that refer to a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
office, are publicly distributed within 60 days before a general 
election or 30 days before a primary election, and are targeted to the 
relevant electorate. See 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(A)(i); 11 CFR 100.29(a)(1) 
through (3). Electioneering communications carry certain reporting 
obligations and funding restrictions. See 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(1) and (2), 
and 441b(a) and (b)(2).
    BCRA exempts certain communications from the definition of 
``electioneering communication,'' 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(B)(i) to (iii), 
and specifically authorizes the Commission to promulgate regulations 
exempting other communications as long as the exempted communications 
do not promote, support, attack or oppose (``PASO'') a candidate. 2 
U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(B)(iv), citing 2 U.S.C. 431(20)(A)(iii).
    On October 23, 2002, the Commission promulgated regulations to 
implement BCRA's electioneering communications provisions. Final Rules 
and Explanation and Justification on Electioneering Communications, 67 
FR 65190 (Oct. 23, 2002) (``EC E&J''). In those regulations, the 
Commission defined electioneering communications as limited to 
communications that are publicly distributed ``for a fee.'' Former 11 
CFR 100.29(b)(3)(i). The Commission also exempted from the 
electioneering communication provisions any communication that is paid 
for by any organization operating under section 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (``IRC''). Former 11 CFR 100.29(c)(6).
    These two rules were invalidated in Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 
28 (D.D.C. 2004) (``Shays District''), aff'd, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 
2005), reh'g en banc denied, No. 04-5352 (DC Cir. Oct. 21, 2005) 
(``Shays Appeal''). In Shays District, the court held that the 
regulation limiting electioneering communications to communications 
publicly distributed for a fee did not satisfy the requirements set out 
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (``Chevron''). The court further held that the 
explanation supporting the section 501(c)(3) exemption did not satisfy 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2) (``APA''). Shays 
District at 124-29. The District Court remanded the case for further 
action consistent with its decision. The Commission appealed the 
District Court's decision regarding the limitation to communications 
publicly distributed ``for a fee,'' but did not appeal the decision 
regarding the exemption for section 501(c)(3) organizations. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the 
District Court, holding again that the ``for a fee'' regulation did not 
satisfy Chevron. Shays Appeal at 108.
    In response to the District Court's decision, the Commission 
published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on August 24, 2005. See 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Electioneering Communications, 70 FR 
49508 (Aug. 24, 2005) (``NPRM''). The NPRM raised a range of options 
for a number of regulatory exemptions to the definition of 
``electioneering communication.'' The comment period closed on 
September 30, 2005. The Commission received 47 comments from 113 
commenters with regard to the various issues raised in the NPRM. The 
Commission held a public hearing on October 20, 2005, at which seven 
witnesses testified. The comments and a transcript of the public 
hearing are available at http://www.fec.gov/law/law_rulemakings.shtml 
under ``Electioneering Communications 2005.'' For purposes of this 
document, the terms ``comment'' and ``commenter'' apply to both written 
comments and oral testimony at the public hearing.
    Under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 553(d), and the Congressional Review of 
Agency Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1), agencies must submit final 
rules to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President 
of the Senate and publish them in the Federal Register at least 30 
calendar days before they take effect. The final rules that follow were 
transmitted to Congress on December 15, 2005.

[[Page 75714]]

Explanation and Justification

Former 11 CFR 100.29(c)(6)--Exemption for Section 501(c)(3) 
Organizations

    BCRA provides three exemptions from the ``electioneering 
communication'' definition. 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(B)(i) through (iii). In 
addition, BCRA permits, but does not require, the Commission to 
promulgate regulations exempting other communications ``to ensure the 
appropriate implementation'' of the electioneering communication 
provisions. 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(B)(iv). BCRA limits this exemption 
authority to communications that do not PASO any clearly identified 
candidate for Federal office. Id.
    Pursuant to this authority, the Commission exempted from the 
``electioneering communication'' definition any communication that is 
paid for by any organization operating under section 501(c)(3) of the 
IRC. See 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3); former 11 CFR 100.29(c)(6). The 
Commission explained that it believed ``the purpose of BCRA is not 
served by discouraging such charitable organizations from participating 
in what the public considers highly desirable and beneficial activity, 
simply to foreclose a theoretical threat from organizations that has 
not been manifested, and which such organizations, by their very 
nature, do not do.'' EC E&J, 67 FR at 65200. Under the IRC, 
organizations described in IRC section 501(c)(3) may not ``participate 
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of 
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) 
any candidate for public office.'' See 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3).
    In considering a challenge to the exemption for section 501(c)(3) 
organizations, the District Court held that the Explanation and 
Justification for 11 CFR 100.29(c)(6) did not provide a sufficient 
analysis under the APA. See Shays District at 128. The District Court 
remanded this regulation to the Commission for further action 
consistent with its order. Id. at 130. Instead of appealing this aspect 
of the District Court decision, the Commission chose to initiate this 
rulemaking to determine whether the Commission should retain the 
exemption for section 501(c)(3) organizations.
    In these Final Rules, the Commission is eliminating the exemption 
for section 501(c)(3) organizations from the definition of 
``electioneering communications'' by removing paragraph (c)(6) from 11 
CFR 100.29. In BCRA, Congress defined ``electioneering communication'' 
in terms that are easily understood and objectively determinable. 2 
U.S.C. 434(f)(3). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld all of BCRA's 
electioneering communication provisions, and rejected a challenge based 
on unconstitutional overbreadth. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 
189-211 (2003).
    Many commenters addressed the overlap between the IRC section 
501(c)(3) prohibition on political activity and BCRA's requirement that 
any exemption for section 501(c)(3) organizations not permit PASO 
communications. There was no consensus among the commenters on this 
issue. Some supported retaining the exemption and argued that as a 
matter of law this prohibition in the IRC prevents section 501(c)(3) 
organizations from engaging in communications that PASO Federal 
candidates. Some urged the Commission to distinguish between 
communications that PASO individuals in their capacities as candidates, 
and communications that PASO individuals in their capacities as 
legislators or public officials. The commenters asserted that the IRS 
recognizes this distinction.
    Other commenters urged the Commission to eliminate the exemption 
for section 501(c)(3) organizations. Some argued that section 501(c)(3) 
organizations are permitted under the IRC to engage in PASO 
communications, and that some section 501(c)(3) organizations do, in 
fact, make PASO communications. Some asserted that the boundaries of 
the IRC prohibition on campaign participation or intervention are not 
clear.
    In written comments submitted in this rulemaking, the IRS stated 
that the tax laws and regulations do not allow section 501(c)(3) 
organizations to promote or oppose candidates for Federal office, but 
do permit grass roots lobbying. The IRS explained that all the facts 
and circumstances must be considered to determine whether a 
communication by a section 501(c)(3) organization constitutes 
prohibited campaign intervention or permissible lobbying. The IRS 
comments referred to Revenue Ruling 2004-6, 2004-6 I.R.B. 328, that 
identifies a non-exhaustive list of 11 factors that ``tend to show'' 
whether a communication would be permissible for a section 501(c)(3) 
organization. The IRS comments also make clear that its use of the 
phrase ``promote or oppose candidates for Federal office'' was in the 
context of tax law, and not campaign finance law, and that its use of 
this phrase was not necessarily synonymous with PASO.
    The comments submitted in this rulemaking suggest, but do not 
establish, that the IRC prohibition on political activity by section 
501(c)(3) organizations and BCRA's requirement that no exemption permit 
PASO communications are not perfectly compatible. Rescinding the 
blanket exemption for section 501(c)(3) organizations does not 
represent a conclusion that the IRC prohibition on political activity 
and the BCRA prohibition on exempting PASO communications are 
incompatible as a matter of law or administrative practice, only that 
no such compatibility was demonstrated to a reasonable certainty in 
this rulemaking.
    Some commenters argued that an exemption for section 501(c)(3) 
organizations is needed so that these organizations may produce or 
cooperate in the production of public service announcements (``PSAs''). 
The Commission understands that in many instances Federal candidates 
and officeholders participate in PSAs motivated by a desire to support 
the charitable or other public service endeavor discussed in the PSA. 
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, ``such broadcasts could 
`associate a Federal candidate with a public-spirited endeavor in an 
effort to promote or support that candidate.' '' See Shays Appeal at 
109.
    The Commission's experience in the last election cycle suggests 
that section 501(c)(3) organizations do not engage in many 
electioneering communications, which calls into question the present 
need for the exemption. Many commenters agreed that section 501(c)(3) 
organizations rarely refer to Federal candidates in television and 
radio advertisements. In fact, none of the commenters provided an 
example of a broadcast, cable or satellite communication by a section 
501(c)(3) organization that was publicly distributed after BCRA's 
effective date and that referred to a Federal candidate during the 30-
day and 60-day electioneering communication time frames.
    The comments persuade the Commission that the best course, at this 
time, is to rescind the exemption and apply the same general 
electioneering communication rules to section 501(c)(3) organizations 
as were upheld in McConnell. Removing the regulatory exemption for 
section 501(c)(3) organizations will mean that communications by these 
organizations will be subject to BCRA's electioneering communications 
provisions, including any other statutory or regulatory exemptions that 
may apply.

[[Page 75715]]

11 CFR 100.29(b)(3)(i)--``For a Fee''

    BCRA defines ``electioneering communication,'' in part, as a 
communication ``made within (aa) 60 days before a general or runoff 
election * * * or (bb) 30 days before a primary or preference 
election.'' 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(II) (emphasis added). In 
implementing this provision, the Commission's rules interpret ``made'' 
as ``publicly distributed'' so that an electioneering communication is, 
in part, a communication that is ``publicly distributed within 60 days 
before a general election * * * or within 30 days before a primary or 
preference election.'' 11 CFR 100.29(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also 
EC E&J, 67 FR at 65191.
    The former rules further defined ``publicly distributed'' as 
``aired, broadcast, cablecast or otherwise disseminated for a fee 
through the facilities of a television station, radio station, cable 
television system, or satellite system.'' Former 11 CFR 100.29(b)(3)(i) 
(emphasis added). The Commission included the ``for a fee'' requirement 
because ``[m]uch of the legislative history and virtually all of the 
studies cited in legislative history and presented to the Commission in 
the course of [the 2002] rulemaking focused on paid advertisements in 
considering what should be included within electioneering 
communications.'' EC E&J, 67 FR at 65192 (citations to studies 
omitted). Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that 
the ``for a fee'' provision created an additional element in the 
electioneering communication test, and accordingly did not satisfy 
Chevron step one.\1\ Shays District at 128-129; Shays Appeal at 109.
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    \1\ The first step of the Chevron analysis, which courts use to 
review an agency's regulations, asks whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise questions at issue. The second step considers 
whether the agency's resolution of an issue not addressed in the 
statute is based on a permissible construction of the statute. See 
Shays District at 51-52 (citing Chevron).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address the courts' concerns, the NPRM proposed eliminating the 
phrase ``for a fee'' from the definition of ``publicly distributed'' in 
11 CFR 100.29(b)(3)(i). See 70 FR at 49509. Some commenters supported 
the removal of the ``for a fee'' language. One commenter supported 
exempting unpaid communications that do not PASO any Federal candidate 
because this approach would be preferable to eliminating the ``for a 
fee'' concept entirely.
    The Commission is adopting the proposed rule removing the ``for a 
fee'' language from the definition of ``publicly distributed'' in 11 
CFR 100.29(b)(3)(i). As noted above, the underlying electioneering 
communication provision in BCRA provides a bright-line test that was 
upheld against constitutional challenges in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 
93 (2003). Revised section 100.29(b)(3)(i) will make all unpaid 
communications subject to BCRA's electioneering communications 
provisions and any statutory or regulatory exemptions that may 
apply.\2\
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    \2\ To the extent that Advisory Opinions (``AO'') 2004-7 and 
2004-14 relied on the ``for a fee'' provision in 11 CFR 
100.29(b)(3)(i) to determine that a communication was not an 
electioneering communication, those portions of the AOs are 
superseded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters noted that section 501(c)(3) organizations that 
create and distribute PSAs often retain little or no control over when 
their PSAs will be broadcast. As a result, these commenters are 
concerned that a broadcast, cable, satellite system or radio station 
operator (collectively ``broadcaster'') will publicly distribute a PSA 
that refers to a Federal candidate within the electioneering 
communications timeframes, without the knowledge of the section 
501(c)(3) organization. Additionally, one commenter suggested that 
broadcasters may not always be able to review the content of PSAs to 
determine whether they constitute electioneering communications. The 
commenter was concerned that broadcasters would be held responsible in 
these circumstances for making electioneering communications.
    The Web site of the Advertising Council, Inc. (``Ad Council''), 
presents information that is useful in analyzing section 501(c)(3) 
organizations' and broadcasters' liability.\3\ The Web site lists 
expiration dates for thousands of PSAs and explains that ``[o]ur PSAs 
should never be run past their expiration dates.'' The site also 
``encourage[s] all PSA Directors [of broadcasters] to check their 
inventories for expired materials.'' See ``PSA Expiration Dates'' at 
http://psacentral.adcouncil.org (visited Dec. 2, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ The Advertising Council, Inc., is a private, non-profit 
organization that describes itself as ``the leading producer of PSAs 
since 1942.'' It uses donated funds and services to produce, 
distribute, and promote ``thousands'' of PSAs on behalf of non-
profit organizations and government agencies. See About the Ad 
Council, http://www.adcouncil.org/about (visited Dec. 2, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission encourages section 501(c)(3) organizations to 
provide broadcasters with either an expiration date or some indication 
that the PSA should not be run in the applicable 30-or 60-day 
electioneering communication periods, if the PSA features a Federal 
candidate. In these circumstances, the Commission would not hold the 
section 501(c)(3) organization liable for making an electioneering 
communication if the broadcaster publicly distributes the PSA contrary 
to those instructions. Additionally, if a section 501(c)(3) 
organization produces a PSA that features an individual who becomes a 
Federal candidate after the PSA has been provided to broadcasters, then 
the section 501(c)(3) organization will not be responsible for making 
an electioneering communication if the PSA is publicly distributed as 
an electioneering communication.
    If an incorporated broadcaster provides free airtime for a PSA that 
satisfies the definition of ``electioneering communication,'' then the 
broadcaster may be responsible for making an electioneering 
communication. See 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3) and 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(2). The Ad 
Council's Web site indicates that many broadcasters have PSA directors 
who review PSAs and who are encouraged to check for expiration dates. 
It will not be burdensome for these PSA directors to review PSAs that 
refer to clearly identified Federal candidates and ensure that the PSAs 
are not publicly distributed as electioneering communications.
    BCRA's definition of [ldq x uo]electioneering 
communication'' also includes an exemption for ``a communication 
appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through 
the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are 
owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or 
candidate.'' 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(B)(i) and 11 CFR 100.29(c)(2). The 
Commission has recognized that, under certain circumstances, a 
broadcaster's public distribution of a communication made by another 
person will qualify for the press exemption from the definitions of 
``contribution'' and ``expenditure.'' See AOs 1982-44 and 1987-8 
(applying 2 U.S.C. 431(9)(B)(i) and the corresponding regulations). 
Similarly, the Commission has recognized that the provision of free 
airtime to candidates or appearances on interview shows can fall within 
the press exemption at 2 U.S.C. 431(9)(B)(i). See AOs 1998-17 and 1996-
16, respectively. An unpaid communication that is indistinguishable in 
all its material aspects from AOs 1998-17, 1996-16, 1987-8 or 1982-44 
is also entitled to the press exemption from the ``electioneering 
communication'' definition.

[[Page 75716]]

11 CFR 100.29(c)(5)--Exemption for State and Local Candidates

    In 2002, the Commission promulgated a limited exemption from the 
electioneering communication rules for State and local candidates, 
consistent with the authority Congress granted to the Commission to 
create exemptions. See 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(B)(iv); 11 CFR 100.29(c)(5), 
EC E&J, 67 FR at 65199. In this NPRM, the Commission proposed to either 
clarify the exemption in 11 CFR 100.29(c)(5), or to repeal it as part 
of a proposal to rely on only the statutory exemptions. See 70 FR at 
49513.
    Of the commenters that addressed this exemption, one took no 
position. The others described the exemption as ``a proper exercise of 
the Commission's clause (iv) authority,'' and called its repeal 
permissible, but not necessary. Those commenters who addressed the 
proposed clarifications to the exemption did not object to the changes.
    The Commission has decided that it will retain the exemption for 
State and local candidates. In the time since this exemption took 
effect, the Commission is not aware of any instances in which this 
exemption enabled State or local candidates to circumvent BCRA. Section 
100.29(c)(5), however, is being amended to incorporate certain 
clarifications proposed in the NPRM. These changes remove a reference 
to a statutory provision and rearrange portions of the rule to improve 
readability without substantively changing the rule. See final 11 CFR 
100.29(c)(5).
    As an additional clarification to this exemption, the Commission is 
adding a cross reference to 11 CFR 300.71 for communications paid for 
by State or local candidates that PASO a Federal candidate. In 2002, 
the Commission determined that such communications are governed by 
Title I of BCRA, and not by the electioneering communication provisions 
in subtitle A of Title II of BCRA. See EC E&J,\ 67 FR at 65199. The new 
cross reference refers readers to the Title I regulation that addresses 
PASO communications by a State or local candidate.

Exemption for All Communications That Do Not PASO a Federal Candidate

    The NPRM sought comment on exempting all communications that do not 
PASO a Federal candidate. See 70 FR at 49513. Unlike exemptions that 
focus on the maker of the communication, this proposal would have 
focused on the communication's content and treated all speakers 
equally.
    Several comments addressed this proposal. These commenters opposed 
this proposal, either on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with 
Congressional intent or that it would not be useful without a 
definition of PASO.
    The Commission is not adopting such an exemption. To do so, the 
Commission would replace entirely Congress's preferred bright-line 
definition of ``electioneering communication'' with the standard that 
Congress relegated to the back-up definition. Such an across-the-board 
replacement of Congress's standard with its second choice standard 
would impermissibly contravene Congressional intent.

Petition for Rulemaking To Exempt Advertisements Promoting Films, Books 
and Plays

    The Commission received a Petition for Rulemaking requesting the 
creation of an exception to the electioneering communications 
regulations for the promotion and advertising of ``political 
documentary films, books, plays and similar means of expression.'' The 
Commission published a Notice of Availability seeking comment on the 
petition. See Notice of Availability of Rulemaking Petition: Exception 
for the Promotion of Political Documentary Films from ``Electioneering 
Communications,'' 69 FR 52461 (Aug. 26, 2004). The comments received 
were summarized in the NPRM. At that time, the Commission proposed 11 
CFR 100.29(c)(7) to exempt communications promoting films, books or 
plays, provided the communications are run within the ordinary course 
of business of the persons paying for such communications, and provided 
the communications do not PASO a Federal candidate. See 70 FR at 49514. 
The proposed exemption would have applied beyond ``political'' works to 
include advertising for any film, book or play. See NPRM, 70 FR at 
49514.
    Several commenters supported the proposed rule and no commenters 
objected to it. All of the commenters who addressed this proposal 
suggested revisions to the proposed rule to either expand or limit the 
scope of the exemption.
    The Commission has decided to defer any final decision regarding 
the proposed exemption for advertisements promoting films, books and 
plays until after the Commission has completed all rulemakings required 
by the Shays District and Shays Appeal rulings. Accordingly, the 
Commission intends to address the issues presented in the Petition for 
Rulemaking in the near future.

Certification of No Effect Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b) (Regulatory 
Flexibility Act)

    The Commission certifies that the attached rules will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The basis for this certification is that there are few ``small 
entities'' affected by these final rules, and these rules do not impose 
any significant costs. The Commission's revisions to the electioneering 
communications rules could affect individuals (not within the 
definition of ``small entities'') and some non-profit organizations. 
Based on the record before it, the Commission believes there are not a 
substantial number of ``small entities'' that are affected by these 
final rules.
    First, removing the ``for a fee'' requirement from the definition 
of ``publicly distributed'' only affects the small number of 
communications that qualify as electioneering communications and that 
are publicly distributed without charge. There are very few small non-
profit organizations that receive donated time for such advertising or 
participate in public access programming. Large national non-profit 
organizations that run public service announcements on donated time are 
not ``small organizations'' under section 601(4) of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. Similarly, to the extent these rules affect media 
organizations donating the time or running their own programming, they 
do not fall within the definition of ``small business.''
    Second, removing the exemption for communications paid for by 
section 501(c)(3) organizations does not affect a substantial number of 
small organizations because the factual record developed by the 
Commission in these proceedings indicates that few, if any, section 
501(c)(3) organizations make broadcast, cable or satellite 
communications that refer to Federal candidates during the 
electioneering communication time frames to the targeted audience. 
Additionally, many of these organizations may not be able to afford 
expensive radio and television advertising. To the extent they can 
afford such advertisements, they are already limited in what campaign 
activity they may engage in under the IRC.
    Even if the number of small organizations affected by the rules 
were substantial, these small entities would not feel a significant 
economic impact from the final rules. There is no indication in the 
record before the Commission that the inability of any small non-profit 
organizations to

[[Page 75717]]

publicly distribute communications that refer to Federal candidates 
(such as public service announcements, public access programming, and 
lobbying ads) during the electioneering communications windows would 
decrease available funds, or hamper fundraising, or otherwise 
economically disadvantage these organizations. Therefore, the 
Commission certifies that the attached rules will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

List of Subjects

11 CFR Part 100

    Elections.

0
For reasons set out in the preamble, Subchapter A of Chapter 1 of title 
11 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

PART 100--SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS (2 U.S.C. 431)

0
1. The authority citation for 11 CFR part 100 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 2 U.S.C. 431, 434, and 438(a)(8).


0
2. Section 100.29 is amended by:
0
(a) Revising paragraph (b)(3)(i);
0
(b) Revising the introductory text of paragraph (c);
0
(c) Adding the word ``or'' to follow the semi-colon in paragraph 
(c)(4);
0
(d) Revising paragraph (c)(5); and
0
(e) Removing paragraph (c)(6).
    Revisions read as follows:


Sec.  100.29  Electioneering communication (2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)).

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3)(i) Publicly distributed means aired, broadcast, cablecast or 
otherwise disseminated through the facilities of a television station, 
radio station, cable television system, or satellite system.
* * * * *
    (c) The following communications are exempt from the definition of 
electioneering communication. Any communication that:
* * * * *
    (5) Is paid for by a candidate for State or local office in 
connection with an election to State or local office, provided that the 
communication does not promote, support, attack or oppose any Federal 
candidate. See 11 CFR 300.71 for communications paid for by a candidate 
for State or local office that promotes, supports, attacks or opposes a 
Federal candidate.

    Dated: December 15, 2005.
Scott E. Thomas,
Chairman, Federal Election Commission.
[FR Doc. 05-24297 Filed 12-20-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6715-01-P