[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 243 (Tuesday, December 20, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 75489-75500]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-24142]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility
Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations
I. Background
Pursuant to section 189a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the
Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly notice.
The Act requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments
issued, or proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the
authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an
operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such
amendment involves no significant hazards consideration,
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a
hearing from any person.
This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or
proposed to be issued from November 23, 2005 to December 8, 2005. The
last biweekly notice was published on December 6, 2005 (70 FR 72667).
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under
the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation
of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown
below.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination. Within 60 days after the date of publication of this
notice, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and
any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who
wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written
request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result,
for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will
occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received may be examined at the Commission's Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. The
filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene
is discussed below.
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to
participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request
for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a
hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in
accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic
Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should
consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition
for leave to intervene is filed within 60 days, the Commission or a
presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel,
will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the
Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
will issue a
[[Page 75490]]
notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must
also set forth the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner/
requestor intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The
petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the
petitioner/requestor intends to rely to establish those facts or expert
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the petitioner/requestor to relief. A petitioner/
requestor who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the
Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve
to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that
the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration,
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held
would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final
determination is that the amendment request involves a significant
hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the
issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the
Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications
Staff; (2) courier, express mail, and expedited delivery services:
Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff; (3) e-mail addressed to the Office of the
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, [email protected];
or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention:
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, verification
number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of
the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and it is requested that copies be transmitted either by
means of facsimile transmission to (301) 415-3725 or by e-mail to
[email protected]. A copy of the request for hearing and petition
for leave to intervene should also be sent to the attorney for the
licensee.
Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding
officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition,
request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing
of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(a)(1)(i)-(viii).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible from the ADAMS Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS
or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS,
contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737 or
by e-mail to [email protected].
AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, et al., Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek
Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS), Ocean County, New Jersey
Date of amendment request: October 18, 2005.
Description of amendment request: The licensee proposes to revise
the OCNGS Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirement 4.4.B.1 to
provide an alternative means for testing the electromatic relief valves
located on the main steam system. The proposed change would allow
demonstration of the capability of the valves to perform their function
without requiring that the valves be cycled with steam pressure while
installed.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration. The licensee's analysis is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change modifies Technical Specifications (TS)
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.4.B.1 to provide an alternative
means for testing the Electromatic Relief Valves (EMRVs). Accidents
are initiated by the malfunction of plant equipment, or the failure
of plant structures, systems, or components. The performance of EMRV
testing is not a precursor to any accident previously evaluated and
does not change the manner in which the valves are operated. The
proposed testing requirements will not contribute to the failure of
the relief valves nor any plant structure, system, or component.
AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen) has determined that the
proposed change in testing methodology provides an equivalent level
of assurance that the relief valves are capable of performing their
intended safety functions. Thus, the proposed change does not affect
the probability of an accident previously evaluated.
The performance of EMRV testing provides confidence that the
EMRVs are capable of depressurizing the reactor pressure vessel
(RPV). This will protect the reactor vessel from overpressurization
and allow the Core Spray system to inject into the RPV as designed.
The proposed change involves the manner in which the EMRVs are
tested, and has no effect on the types or amounts of
[[Page 75491]]
radiation released or the predicted offsite doses in the event of an
accident. The proposed testing requirements are sufficient to
provide confidence that the EMRVs are capable of performing their
intended safety functions. In addition, a stuck open EMRV accident
is analyzed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (section
15.6.1). Since the proposed testing requirements do not alter the
assumptions for the stuck open EMRV accident, the consequences of
any accident previously evaluated are not increased.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not affect the assumed accident
performance of the EMRVs, nor any plant structure, system, or
component previously evaluated. The proposed change does not involve
the installation of new equipment, and installed equipment is not
being operated in a new of different manner. The change in test
methodology ensures that the EMRVs remain capable of performing
their safety functions. No set points are being changed which would
alter the dynamic response of plant equipment. Accordingly, no new
failure modes are introduced.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change will allow testing of the EMRV actuation
electrical circuitry, including the solenoid, and mechanical
actuation components, without causing the EMRV to open. Accordingly,
in-situ EMRV cycling is avoided, reducing the potential for valve
seat leakage. The valves will be tested in accordance with the
Inservice Test (IST) Program that involves testing the valve at a
test facility using steam. The combination of the IST and proposed
actuator test provides confidence that the EMRVs will perform their
design function.
The proposed change does not affect the EMRV set points or the
operational criteria that directs the EMRVs to be manually opened
during plant transients. There are no changes proposed which alter
the set points at which protective actions are initiated, and there
is no change to the operability requirements for equipment assumed
to operate for accident mitigation.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Thomas S. O'Neill, Associate General
Counsel, Exelon Generation Company, LCC, 4300 Winfield Road,
Warrenville, IL 60555.
NRC Branch Chief: Darrell J. Roberts.
Entergy Operations Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric
Station, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana
Date of amendment request: October 27, 2005.
Description of amendment request: This amendment proposes revisions
to the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirements (SR)
4.5.2e (Safety Injection), 4.6.2.1d (Containment Spray), and 4.7.3b
(Component Cooling Water/Auxiliary Component Cooling Water), by
removing the words ``during shutdown.'' Additionally, a revision to
delete TS SR 4.7.12.1c (Essential Services Chilled Water) is requested.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Deletion of TS SR 4.7.12.1c is an administrative change since
there are no valves in the essential services chilled water system
for which the TS SR 4.7.12.1c is applicable. The deletion of the
``during shutdown'' restriction from TS SRs 4.5.2e (Safety
Injection), 4.6.2.1d (Containment Spray), and 4.7.3b (Component
Cooling Water/Auxiliary Component Cooling Water) does not impact
system operation nor does it reduce TS SRs. Component actuations
that will be allowed to be performed online for these TS SRs are
either already actuated online for other TS SRs or the components to
be actuated online are currently stroked online in accordance with
the Inservice Testing Program. Therefore, the accident mitigation
features of the plant for previously evaluated accidents are not
affected by the proposed amendment.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Deletion of TS SR 4.7.12.1c is an administrative change since
there are no valves in the essential services chilled water system
for which the TS SR 4.7.12.1c is applicable. The deletion of the
``during shutdown'' restriction from TS SRs 4.5.2e (Safety
Injection), 4.6.2.1d (Containment Spray), and 4.7.3b (Component
Cooling Water/Auxiliary Component Cooling Water) does not impact
system operation nor does it reduce TS SR. Component actuations that
will be allowed to be performed online for these TS SRs are either
already actuated online for other TS SRs or the components to be
actuated online are currently stroked online in accordance with the
Inservice Testing Program. Therefore, the proposed change introduces
no new mode of plant operation and no new possibility for an
accident is introduced.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
There are no automatic valves in the essential services chilled
water system that actuate on an SIAS [safety injection actuation
signal]. Deletion of the ``during shutdown'' limitation does not
change the TS test requirements or surveillance frequency.
Therefore, existing TS surveillance requirements are not reduced by
the proposed change, thus no margins of safety are reduced.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: N.S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston & Strawn,
1700 K Street NW., Washington, DC 20006-3817
NRC Branch Chief: David Terao
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and
50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and 2),
Beaver County, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: November 7, 2005
Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise the
Technical Specifications (TSs), to adopt NRC-approved Revision 4 to
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical
Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-449, ``Steam Generator Tube
Integrity.'' The proposed amendment includes changes to the TS
definition of Leakage, TS 3/4.4.6, ``Reactor Coolant System Leakage,''
TS 3/4.4.5, ``Steam Generators,'' and adds TS 6.19, ``Steam Generator
(SG) Program,'' and TS 6.9.7, ``Steam Generator Tube Inspection
Report.'' The proposed changes are necessary in order to implement the
guidance for the industry initiative on Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
97-06, ``Steam Generator Program Guidelines.''
[[Page 75492]]
The NRC staff issued a notice of opportunity for comment in the
Federal Register on March 2, 2005 (70 FR 10298), on possible amendments
adopting TSTF-449, including a model safety evaluation and model no
significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination, using the
consolidated line item improvement process. The NRC staff subsequently
issued a notice of availability of the models for referencing in
license amendment applications in the Federal Register on May 6, 2005
(70 FR 24126). The licensee affirmed the applicability of the following
NSHC determination in its application dated November 7, 2005.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change requires a SG Program that includes
performance criteria that will provide reasonable assurance that the
SG tubing will retain integrity over the full range of operating
conditions (including startup, operation in the power range, hot
standby, cooldown and all anticipated transients included in the
design specification). The SG performance criteria are based on tube
structural integrity, accident induced leakage, and operational
LEAKAGE.
A SGTR [steam generator tube rupture] event is one of the design
basis accidents that are analyzed as part of a plant's licensing
basis. In the analysis of a SGTR event, a bounding primary to
secondary LEAKAGE rate equal to the operational LEAKAGE rate limits
in the licensing basis plus the LEAKAGE rate associated with a
double-ended rupture of a single tube is assumed.
For other design basis accidents such as a MSLB [main steamline
break], rod ejection, and reactor coolant pump locked rotor the
tubes are assumed to retain their structural integrity (i.e., they
are assumed not to rupture). These analyses typically assume that
primary to secondary LEAKAGE for all SGs is 1 gallon per minute or
increases to 1 gallon per minute as a result of accident induced
stresses. The accident induced leakage criterion introduced by the
proposed changes accounts for tubes that may leak during design
basis accidents. The accident induced leakage criterion limits this
leakage to no more than the value assumed in the accident analysis.
The SG performance criteria proposed change to the TS identify
the standards against which tube integrity is to be measured.
Meeting the performance criteria provides reasonable assurance that
the SG tubing will remain capable of fulfilling its specific safety
function of maintaining reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity
throughout each operating cycle and in the unlikely event of a
design basis accident.
The performance criteria are only a part of the SG Program
required by the proposed change to the TS. The program, defined by
NEI 97-06, Steam Generator Program Guidelines, includes a framework
that incorporates a balance of prevention, inspection, evaluation,
repair, and leakage monitoring. The proposed changes do not,
therefore, significantly increase the probability of an accident
previously evaluated.
The consequences of design basis accidents are, in part,
functions of the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 in the primary coolant and
the primary to secondary LEAKAGE rates resulting from an accident.
Therefore, limits are included in the plant technical specifications
for operational leakage and for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 in primary
coolant to ensure the plant is operated within its analyzed
condition. The typical analysis of the limiting design basis
accident assumes that primary to secondary leak rate after the
accident is 1 gallon per minute with no more than [500 gallons per
day or 720 gallons per day] in any one SG, and that the reactor
coolant activity levels of DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 are at the TS
values before the accident.
The proposed change does not affect the design of the SGs, their
method of operation, or primary coolant chemistry controls. The
proposed approach updates the current TSs and enhances the
requirements for SG inspections. The proposed change does not
adversely impact any other previously evaluated design basis
accident and is an improvement over the current TSs.
Therefore, the proposed change does not affect the consequences
of a SGTR accident and the probability of such an accident is
reduced. In addition, the proposed changes do not affect the
consequences of an MSLB, rod ejection, or a reactor coolant pump
locked rotor event, or other previously evaluated accident.
Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of
a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated
The proposed performance based requirements are an improvement
over the requirements imposed by the current technical
specifications. Implementation of the proposed SG Program will not
introduce any adverse changes to the plant design basis or
postulated accidents resulting from potential tube degradation. The
result of the implementation of the SG Program will be an
enhancement of SG tube performance. Primary to secondary LEAKAGE
that may be experienced during all plant conditions will be
monitored to ensure it remains within current accident analysis
assumptions.
The proposed change does not affect the design of the SGs, their
method of operation, or primary or secondary coolant chemistry
controls. In addition, the proposed change does not impact any other
plant system or component. The change enhances SG inspection
requirements.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different [kind] of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in [a] Margin of Safety
The SG tubes in pressurized water reactors are an integral part
of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and, as such, are relied
upon to maintain the primary system's pressure and inventory. As
part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the SG tubes are
unique in that they are also relied upon as a heat transfer surface
between the primary and secondary systems such that residual heat
can be removed from the primary system. In addition, the SG tubes
isolate the radioactive fission products in the primary coolant from
the secondary system. In summary, the safety function of [a] SG is
maintained by ensuring the integrity of its tubes.
Steam generator tube integrity is a function of the design,
environment, and the physical condition of the tube. The proposed
change does not affect tube design or operating environment. The
proposed change is expected to result in an improvement in the tube
integrity by implementing the SG Program to manage SG tube
inspection, assessment, repair, and plugging. The requirements
established by the SG Program are consistent with those in the
applicable design codes and standards and are an improvement over
the requirements in the current TSs.
For the above reasons, the margin of safety is not changed and
overall plant safety will be enhanced by the proposed change to the
TS.
The NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendments request
involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mary O'Reilly, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76 South Main Street, Akron, OH
44308.
NRC Branch Chief: Richard J. Laufer.
Florida Power and Light Company, Docket No. 50-389, St. Lucie Plant,
Unit No. 2, St. Lucie County, Florida
Date of amendment request: October 21, 2005.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment will
revise the Technical Specifications to allow operation with a reduced
reactor coolant system (RCS) flow rate of 300,000 gpm and a reduction
in the maximum thermal power to 89 percent of the rated thermal power.
The definition of rated thermal power remains unchanged at 2700 MWt.
The flow rate of 300,000 gpm is expected to conservatively bound an
analyzed steam generator tube plugging level of 42 percent per steam
generator. The re-analysis performed to support this reduction in RCS
flow used Westinghouse WCAP-9272-P-A methodology, the same methodology
approved for St. Lucie Unit 2 in License Amendment 138.
[[Page 75493]]
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
(1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed
amendment would not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
None of the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications
results in operation of the facility that adversely affects the
initiation of any accident previously evaluated. There is no adverse
impact on any plant system. Plant systems will continue to function
as designed, and all performance requirements for these systems
remain acceptable. The analysis, performed to support the proposed
changes, has included evaluations and/or analyses of all the
analyzed accident analyses, including the effects of changes on the
SG tube sleeve design. The analyses and evaluations have verified
that the accident analyses acceptance criteria continue to be met.
Dose consequences acceptance criteria have been verified to be met
for analyzed events. Therefore, the proposed changes do not
significantly increase the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
(2) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed
amendments would not create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms or limiting single
failures are introduced as a result of the proposed changes to the
Technical Specifications. Although the allowable tube plugging level
is increased, the criteria for tube plugging/sleeving and the tube
integrity considerations remain unchanged. The proposed changes have
no adverse effects on any safety-related systems and do not
challenge the performance or integrity of any safety-related system.
The DNBR [Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio] limits and trip
setpoints associated with the respective reactor protection system
functions have verified that the accident analyses criteria continue
to be met. Therefore, this amendment will not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
(3) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed
amendments would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The safety analyses of all analyzed design basis accidents,
supporting the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications,
continue to meet the applicable acceptance criteria with respect to
the radiological consequences, specified acceptable fuel design
limits (SAFDLs), primary and secondary overpressurization, and 10
CFR 50.46 requirements. The DNBR and the setpoint analyses are
performed on a cycle-specific basis to verify that the reactor
protection system functions continue to provide adequate protection
against fuel design limits. Evaluation of the steam line break and
LOCA [Loss of Coolant Accident] mass and energy releases determined
that the overall containment response remains acceptable. The
performance requirements for all systems have been verified to be
acceptable from design basis accidents' consideration. The proposed
amendment, therefore, will not involve a significant reduction in
the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross, Attorney, Florida Power & Light,
P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael L. Marshall, Jr.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-263, Monticello Nuclear
Generating Plant, Wright County, Minnesota
Date of amendment request: July 25, 2005.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would add
new Technical Specifications requirements to provide limiting
conditions for operation (LCOs) and action statements and corresponding
surveillance requirements for the Emergency Service Water (ESW) system.
In the absence of such new requirement, the current requirement at
Section 3.5.A.4 simply specifies that the unit be shutdown within 24
hours.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The Emergency Service Water (ESW) System is not an accident
initiator. The proposed change provides operability requirements and
surveillance requirements to ensure the ESW System is operable as
required for accident mitigation. The proposed operability
requirements and allowed outage time is consistent with the
requirements for the systems supported by the ESW System. The
[calculated radiological] dose to the public and the Control Room
operators [due to a postulated accident] are unaffected by the
proposed change. The proposed LCO provides direction with respect to
actions to be taken when support systems are inoperable.
The proposed Technical Specifications does not introduce new
equipment operating modes, nor does the proposed change alter
existing system relationships. The proposed amendment does not
introduce new failure modes.
Therefore, the proposed amendment will not significantly
increase the probability or the consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not introduce new equipment operating
modes, nor do they alter existing system relationships. The proposed
changes do not introduce new failure modes. They do not alter the
equipment required for accident mitigation and they appropriately
consider the effects on supported systems when a support system is
inoperable. When support systems are inoperable, actions are
specified consistent with safe plant operation.
Therefore, the proposed changes will not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in
the margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change provides specifications for the ESW System
that are consistent with current Technical Specification
requirements for other equipment. The proposed changes ensure that
the ESW and other support systems will be available when required
and provides adequate alternative actions when the support systems
are not available. The allowed outage times for the ESW subsystem is
consistent with that allowed for other equipment required for
accident mitigation. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve
a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jonathan Rogoff, Esquire, Vice President,
Counsel & Secretary, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, 700 First Street,
Hudson, WI 54016.
NRC Branch Chief: L. Raghavan.
Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun Station,
Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska
Date of amendment request: October 31, 2005.
Description of amendment request: Omaha Public Power District (the
licensee) has proposed to revise the Updated Safety Analysis Report
(USAR) Safety Analysis, General, Section 14.1,
[[Page 75494]]
as well as the radiological consequences analyses for the events of
Seized Rotor (SR), Section 14.6.2.8; Main Steam Line Break (MSLB),
Section 14.12.6; Control Element Assembly Ejection (CEAE), Section
14.13.4; and Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), Section 14.14.3. The
USAR sections for radiological consequences of events need to be
revised because of the planned replacement of the steam generators and
pressurizer in the fall of 2006.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes to the USAR discuss the changes to the
Seized Rotor (SR), Control Element Assembly Ejection (CEAE), Steam
Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) and Main Steam Line Break (MSLB)
events resulting from the installation of the replacement steam
generators (RSGs) and the replacement pressurizer (RPZR). These
changes do not affect an accident initiator previously evaluated in
the USAR or the Technical Specifications and will not prevent any
safety systems from performing their accident mitigating function as
discussed in the USAR or the Technical Specifications.
In all events evaluated, with the exception of the Control Room
dose of the MSLB concurrent iodine spike case, there is no margin
reduction. The Control Room dose of the MSLB concurrent iodine spike
case is increased from 2.5 rem to 4.5 rem. The calculated doses
resulting from the proposed changes to USAR Sections 14.1.6,
14.6.2.8, 14.12.6, 14.13.4 and 14.14.3 remain below the regulatory
limits set by 10 CFR 50.67.
Therefore, these changes do not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed changes are the result of changes in the analysis
of the radiological consequences of the SR, CEAE, SGTR and MSLB
events of the replacement of the steam generators (SGs) and the
pressurizer. The proposed changes do not modify or install any
safety related equipment. They do, however, change the licensing
basis by using fuel gap fractions from Reference 7.6 in accordance
with previously accepted license applications by other licensees and
by assuming shorter concurrent iodine spike durations in accordance
with Section 2.2 of Appendix E of RG 1.183, since the activity
released during the eight-hour spike duration exceeds the available
release.
Therefore, these changes do not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The calculated doses resulting from the proposed changes to USAR
Sections 14.1.6, 14.6.2.8, 14.12.6, 14.13.4 and 14.14.3 remain below
the regulatory limits set by 10 CFR 50.67. In all events evaluated,
with the exception of the Control Room dose of the MSLB concurrent
iodine spike case, there is no margin reduction. The Control Room
dose of the MSLB concurrent iodine spike case is increased from 2.5
rem to 4.5 rem. This margin reduction is primarily due to the
significant delay in the reactor coolant reaching 212 F with the
RSGs and RPZR (i.e., at 159.2 hours versus the 10.94 hours
applicable to the original steam generators). This analysis has
conservatively used a spike duration of 4 hours. If the updated
analysis took credit for the percentage of defective fuels
associated with Technical Specification concentrations when
developing the duration of the concurrent iodine spike (i.e., used
0.28% defective fuel versus the conservatively assumed 1% defective
fuel used in the analysis), the analysis would have resulted in an
estimated spike duration of 2 hours instead of 4 hours and the
control room dose would be significantly reduced.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in the safety margin.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: James R. Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn,
1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502.
NRC Branch Chief: David Terao.
Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun Station,
Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska
Date of amendment request: November 8, 2005.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would
revise the Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Technical Specifications (TS) to
add a new Limiting Condition for Operation 2.8.3(6) and modify Table 3-
4, Table 3-5, and Design Features 4.3.1 to address criticality control
during spent fuel cask loading operations in the spent fuel pool. This
request applies only to spent fuel cask loading in the spent fuel pool
and does not affect the licensing basis or invalidate our existing
exemption from the criticality monitoring requirements of Title 10,
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 70.24 for new and spent fuel storage.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
These proposed changes affect only operations in the spent fuel
pool during spent fuel cask loading operations. Plant power
operations and other spent fuel pool operations are not affected.
There are no changes to the design or operation of the power plant
that could affect system, component or accident functions resulting
from these changes.
Fuel loading into the spent fuel casks in the spent fuel pool
will not require any significant changes to spent fuel pool
structures, systems, or components, nor will their performance
requirements be altered. The potential to handle a spent fuel cask
was considered in the original design of the plant. Therefore, the
response of the plant to previously analyzed Part 50 accidents and
related radiological releases will not be adversely impacted, and
will bound those postulated during cask loading activities in the
cask loading area.
Accordingly, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
These proposed changes affect only operations in the spent fuel
pool during spent fuel cask loading operations. Plant power
operations and other spent fuel pool operations are not affected. No
new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or single failures are
introduced as a result of the proposed changes. All systems,
structures, and components previously required for mitigation of an
event remain capable of fulfilling their intended design function
with these changes to the TS.
Fuel handling procedures and associated administrative controls
for movement of spent fuel in the spent fuel pool remain applicable
and are being appropriately augmented to accommodate spent fuel cask
loading operations. Additionally, the soluble boron concentration
required to maintain keff <=0.95 for postulated accidents
associated with cask loading operations was also evaluated. The
results of the analyses, using a methodology previously approved by
the NRC, demonstrate that the amount of soluble boron assumed to be
in the pool water during these postulated accidents (800 ppm [part
per million]) is much less than the value at which the spent fuel
pool is normally maintained (approximately 1900 ppm).
Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated is not created.
[[Page 75495]]
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
An NRC-approved methodology was used to perform the criticality
analyses that provide the basis to incorporate a boron concentration
and a new burnup versus enrichment curve into the plant Technical
Specifications to ensure criticality safety margins are maintained
during spent fuel cask loading. Spent fuel casks at FCS are loaded
in the spent fuel pool in an area adjacent to the spent fuel racks.
No physical segregation such as a wall or gate exists between the
spent fuel racks and spent fuel cask loading area. The cask loading
area floor is approximately two feet lower than the floor on which
the spent fuel racks are located. Therefore, the spent fuel pool
water flows in and around the spent fuel racks and spent fuel casks
being loaded in a common pool. Neutronic coupling between fuel in
the spent fuel racks and fuel in the spent fuel cask has been
appropriately considered in the criticality analysis, including
accident events that postulate mis-loading of a fresh fuel assembly
into the cask and dropping a fuel assembly between the spent fuel
racks and spent fuel cask during loading.
The normal condition criticality analysis was performed assuming
no soluble boron in the spent fuel pool water and credit for fuel
burnup. The proposed new Technical Specification requirement to
permit only fuel assemblies with the minimum required burnup versus
enrichment to be loaded into the spent fuel cask preserves this
analysis basis. The accident condition criticality analysis was
performed assuming a minimum of 800 ppm boron in the spent fuel pool
during cask loading operations. All analyses account for
uncertainties at a 95[-] percent probability/95-percent confidence
level. The proposed new Technical Specification requirement to
maintain a minimum boron concentration of 800 ppm in the spent fuel
pool during spent fuel cask loading operations preserves this
analysis basis. For defense-in-depth, the spent fuel pool boron
concentration is typically maintained at approximately 1900 ppm
during normal operations and would not be expected to be reduced
during spent fuel cask loading operations.
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of
safety as a result of this change.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: James R. Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn,
1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502.
NRC Branch Chief: David Terao.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Diablo
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County,
California
Date of amendment requests: October 19, 2005.
Description of amendment requests: The proposed change allows a
delay time for entering a supported system Technical Specification (TS)
when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber, if risk
is assessed and managed consistent with the program in place for
complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Limiting
Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.8 is added to the TS to provide this
allowance and define the requirements and limitations for its use.
This change was proposed by the industry's Technical Specification
Task Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-372, Revision 4. The NRC staff
issued a notice of opportunity for comment in the Federal Register on
November 24, 2004 (69 FR 68412), on possible amendments concerning
TSTF-372, including a model safety evaluation and model no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC) determination, using the consolidated line
item improvement process. The NRC staff subsequently issued a notice of
availability of the models for referencing in license amendment
applications in the Federal Register on May 4, 2005 (70 FR 23252). The
licensee affirmed the applicability of the following NSHC determination
in its application dated October 19, 2005.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change allows a delay time for entering a supported
system TS when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable
snubber if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated seismic
event requiring snubbers is a low-probability occurrence and the
overall TS system safety function would still be available for the
vast majority of anticipated challenges. Therefore, the probability
of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased,
if at all. The consequences of an accident while relying on
allowance provided by proposed LCO 3.0.8 are no different than the
consequences of an accident while relying on the TS required actions
in effect without the allowance provided by proposed LCO 3.0.8.
Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are
not significantly affected by this change. The addition of a
requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change
will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, this change does
not involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of
a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed).
Allowing delay times for entering supported system TS when
inoperability is due solely to inoperable snubbers, if risk is
assessed and managed, will not introduce new failure modes or
effects and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures,
lead to an accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of
accidents previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to
assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further
minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident
previously evaluated.
Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in the Margin of Safety
The proposed change allows a delay time for entering a supported
system TS when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable
snubber, if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated seismic
event requiring snubbers is a low-probability occurrence and the
overall TS system safety function would still be available for the
vast majority of anticipated challenges. The risk impact of the
proposed TS changes was assessed following the three-tiered approach
recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.177. A bounding risk assessment
was performed to justify the proposed TS changes. The proposed LCO
3.0.8 defines limitations on the use of the provision and includes a
requirement for the licensee to assess and manage the risk
associated with operation with an inoperable snubber. The net change
to the margin of safety is insignificant. Therefore, this change
does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request
involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Richard F. Locke, Esq., Pacific Gas and
Electric Company, P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, California 94120.
NRC Branch Chief: David Terao.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Diablo
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County,
California
Date of amendment requests: October 19, 2005.
Description of amendment requests: The proposed amendments would
[[Page 75496]]
update the Technical Specification (TS) 5.3, ``Unit Staff
Qualifications,'' operator minimum qualification requirements contained
in the March 28, 1980, NRC letter to all licensees with the more recent
NRC-approved operator qualification requirements contained in American
National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) 3.1-
1993. In addition, the proposed changes remove the TS 5.3.1 plant staff
retraining and replacement training program requirements which have
been superseded by requirements contained in section 50.120 of Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR).
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change is an administrative change to revise the
Technical Specification (TS) 5.3.1 licensed operator minimum
qualification requirements and remove the plant staff retraining and
replacement training program requirements from the TS. The proposed
change does not directly impact accidents previously evaluated. The
Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) licensed operator training program
is accredited by the National Academy for Nuclear Training (NANT)
and is based on a systems approach to training consistent with the
requirements of 10 CFR 55. Although licensed operator qualifications
and training may have an indirect impact on accidents previously
evaluated, the NRC considered this impact during the rulemaking
process, and by promulgation of the revised 10 CFR 55 rule,
concluded that this impact remains acceptable as long as the
licensed operator training program is certified to be accredited and
is based on a systems approach to training. The DCPP plant staff
retraining and replacement training program meets the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.120.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change is administrative in nature and does not
affect the plant design, hardware, system operation, or operating
procedures. The DCPP licensed operator training program is
accredited by the NANT and is based on a systems approach to
training consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 55. Although
licensed operator qualifications and training may have an indirect
impact on accidents previously evaluated, the NRC considered this
impact during the rulemaking process, and by promulgation of the
revised 10 CFR 55 rule, concluded that this impact remains
acceptable as long as the licensed operator training program is
certified to be accredited and is based on a systems approach to
training. The DCPP plant staff retraining and replacement training
program meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.120.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change is administrative in nature and does not
affect the plant design, hardware, system operation, or operating
procedures. The change does not exceed or alter a design basis or
safety limit and thus does not reduce the margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Richard F. Locke, Esq., Pacific Gas and
Electric Company, P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, California 94120.
NRC Branch Chief: David Terao.
PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear
Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey
Date of amendment request: August 19, 2005.
Description of amendment request: The amendment would relocate the
Technical Specification response time testing tables to the Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment[s] relocate the instrument response time
limits for the reactor trip system (RTS) and engineered safety
feature actuation system (ESFAS) from the technical specifications
to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The proposed
amendment[s] conform to the guidance given in Enclosures 1 and 2 of
Generic Letter 93-08. Neither the response time limits nor the
surveillance requirements for performing response time testing will
be altered by this submittal. The overall RTS and ESFAS functional
capabilities will not be changed and assurance that action
requirements of the reactor trip and engineered safety features
systems are completed within the time limits assumed in the accident
analyses is unaffected by the proposed amendment[s].
Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the
proposed amendment[s] will not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
Response: No.
The proposed amendment[s] will not change the physical plant or
the modes of plant operation defined in the operating license[s].
The change does not involve the addition or modification of
equipment nor does it alter the design or operation of plant
systems.
Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the
proposed amendment[s] will not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
Response: No.
The measurement of instrumentation response times at the
frequencies specified in the technical specification provides
assurance that actions associated with the reactor trip and
engineered safety features systems are accomplished within the time
limits assumed in the accident analyses. The response time limits
and the measurement frequencies remain unchanged by the proposed
amendment[s].
There will be no effect on the manner in which safety limits or
limiting safety system settings are determined nor will there be any
effect on those plant systems necessary to assure the accomplishment
of protection functions.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jeffrie J. Keenan, Esquire, Nuclear Business
Unit--N21, P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.
NRC Branch Chief: Darrell J. Roberts.
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Public Service
Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit
No. 1, Fairfield County, South Carolina
Date of amendment request: November 15, 2005.
Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise the
Virgil
[[Page 75497]]
C. Summer Nuclear Station Technical Specifications (TS) 3/4.3.1,
``Reactor Trip System Instrumentation,'' and TS 3/4.3.2, ``Engineered
Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation,'' to implement the
allowed outage time and bypass test time changes approved by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the Westinghouse topical report WCAP-
14333-P-A, Rev. 1, ``Probabilistic Risk Analysis of the Reactor Trip
System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Test Times and
Completion Times,'' dated October 1998.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
Overall protection system performance will remain within the
bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no
hardware changes are proposed. The same reactor trip system (RTS)
and engineered safety feature actuation system (ESFAS)
instrumentation will continue to be used. The protection systems
will continue to function in a manner consistent with the plant
design basis. These changes to the Technical Specifications do not
result in a condition where the design, material, and construction
standards that were applicable prior to the changes are altered.
The proposed changes will not modify any system interface. The
proposed changes will not affect the probability of any event
initiators. There will be no degradation in the performance of, or
an increase in the number of challenges imposed on safety-related
equipment assumed to function during an accident. There will be no
changes to normal plant operating parameters or accident mitigation
performance. The proposed changes will not alter any assumptions or
change any mitigation actions in the radiological consequence
evaluations in the FSAR [final safety analysis report]. The
determination that the results of the proposed changes are
acceptable was established in the NRC SE [safety evaluation] issued
for WCAP [Westinghouse Commercial Atomic Power report]-14333, dated
July 15, 1998. Implementation of the proposed changes will result in
an insignificant risk impact. The proposed changes to Action 16 of
TS [Technical Specification] 3/4.3.2 are also acceptable as
demonstrated by meeting the acceptance criteria contained in
Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177.
The proposed changes to the AOTs [allowable outage times] and
bypass test times, reduce the potential for inadvertent reactor
trips and spurious ESF [engineered safety feature] actuations, and
therefore do not increase the probability of any accident previously
evaluated. The proposed changes do not change the response of the
plant to any accidents and have an insignificant impact on the
reliability of the RTS and ESFAS signals. The RTS and ESFAS will
remain highly reliable and the proposed changes will not result in a
significant increase in the risk of plant operation. This is
demonstrated by showing that the impact on plant safety as measured
by the increase in CDF [core damage frequency] is less than 1.0E-06
per year and the increase in LERF [large early release frequency] is
less than 1.0E-07 per year. In addition, for the AOT and bypass test
time changes, the ICCDP [incremental conditional core damage
probability] and ICLERP [incremental conditional large early release
probability] values are less than 5.0E-07 and 5.0E-08, respectively.
The proposed changes meet the acceptance criteria in Regulatory
Guides 1.174 and 1.177. Therefore, since the RTS and ESFAS will
continue to perform their functions with high reliability as
originally assumed, and the increase in risk as measured by the
``CDF, ``LERF, ICCDP, ICLERP risk metrics is within the acceptance
criteria of Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177, there will not be a
significant increase in the consequences of any accidents.
The proposed changes to the bypass test times and AOTs do not
adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the
design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility or
the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The
proposed changes do not alter or prevent the ability of structures,
systems, and components (SSCs) from performing their intended
function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event to
within the applicable acceptance criteria. The proposed changes do
not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological
release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences
of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes are
consistent with safety analysis assumptions and resultant
consequences.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
There are no hardware changes or any changes in the method by
which any safety-related plant system performs its safety function.
The proposed changes will not affect the normal method of plant
operation. No performance requirements will be affected or
eliminated. The proposed changes will not result in a physical
alteration to any plant system or a change in the method by which
any safety-related plant system performs its safety function. There
will be no setpoint changes or changes to accident analysis
assumptions.
No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result
of these changes. There will be no adverse effect or challenges
imposed on any safety-related system as a result of these changes.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin
of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed changes do not affect the acceptance criteria for
any analyzed event nor is there a change to any Safety Analysis
Limit (SAL). There will be no effect on the manner in which safety
limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for
operation are determined nor will there be any effect on those plant
systems necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection
functions. There will be no impact on the DNBR [departure from
nucleate boiling ratio] limits, FQ, FDH, LOCA [loss-of-coolant
accident] PCT [peak cladding temperature], peak local power density,
or any other margin of safety. The radiological dose consequence
acceptance criteria continue to be met.
Redundant RTS and ESFAS trains are maintained, and diversity
with regard to the signals that provide reactor trip and engineered
safety features actuation is also maintained. All signals credited
as primary or secondary, and all operator actions credited in the
accident analyses will remain the same. The proposed changes will
not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the design
basis. The calculated impact on risk is insignificant and meets the
acceptance criteria contained in Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177.
Although there was no attempt to quantify any positive human factors
benefit due to increased AOTs and bypass test times, it is expected
that there would be a net benefit due to the reduced potential for
spurious reactor trips and actuations associated with testing and
maintenance activities.
Implementation of the proposed changes is expected to result in
an overall improvement in safety, as follows:
Improvements in the effectiveness of the operating staff in
monitoring and controlling plant operation will be realized. This is
due to less frequent distraction of the operators and shift
supervisor to attend to RTS and ESFAS instrumentation Actions with
short AOTs.
The increased AOTs will provide more time for trouble shooting
and repair activities, therefore reducing the potential for spurious
trips and actuations.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Pursuant to 10CFR50.91, the preceding analyses provide a
determination that the proposed Technical Specification changes pose
no significant hazard as delineated by 10CFR50.92.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.929(c)
are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
[[Page 75498]]
Attorney for licensee: Thomas G. Eppink, South Carolina Electric &
Gas Company, Post Office Box 764, Columbia, South Carolina 29218.
NRC Branch Chief: Evangelos C. Marinos.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-
364, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Houston County,
Alabama
Date of amendment request: November 2, 2005.
Description of amendment request: The proposed change allows entry
into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of a
Technical Specification (TS), while in a condition statement and the
associated required actions of the TS, provided the licensee performs a
risk assessment and manages risk consistent with the program in place
for complying with the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Section 50.65(a)(4). Limiting Condition
for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 exceptions in individual TSs would be
eliminated, several notes or specific exceptions are revised to reflect
the related changes to LCO 3.0.4, and Surveillance Requirement 3.0.4 is
revised to reflect the LCO 3.0.4 allowance.
This change was proposed by the industry's Technical Specification
Task Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-359. The NRC staff issued a
notice of opportunity for comment in the Federal Register on August 2,
2002 (67 FR 50475), on possible amendments concerning TSTF-359,
including a model safety evaluation and model no significant hazards
consideration (NSHC) determination, using the consolidated line item
improvement process. The NRC staff subsequently issued a notice of
availability of the models for referencing in license amendment
applications in the Federal Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579).
The licensee affirmed the applicability of the following NSHC
determination in its application dated November 2, 2005.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified
condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions of the TS. Being in a
TS condition and the associated required actions is not an initiator
of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of
an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The
consequences of an accident while relying on required actions as
allowed by proposed LCO 3.0.4, are no different than the
consequences of an accident while entering and relying on the
required actions while starting in a condition of applicability of
the TS. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously
evaluated are not significantly affected by this change. The
addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced
by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore,
this change does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of
a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed).
Entering into a mode or other specified condition in the
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the
associated required actions of the TS, will not introduce new
failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other
unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed
the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The addition of
a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this
change will further minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change
does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from an accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in a Margin of Safety
The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified
condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition
statement and the associated required actions of the TS. The TS
allow operation of the plant without the full complement of
equipment through the conditions for not meeting the TS LCO. The
risk associated with this allowance is managed by the imposition of
required actions that must be performed within the prescribed
completion times. The net effect of being in a TS condition on the
margin of safety is not considered significant. The proposed change
does not alter the required actions or completion times of the TS.
The proposed change allows TS conditions to be entered, and the
associated required actions and completion times to be used in new
circumstances. This use is predicated upon the licensee's
performance of a risk assessment and the management of plant risk.
The change also eliminates current allowances for utilizing required
actions and completion times in similar circumstances, without
assessing and managing risk. The net change to the margin of safety
is insignificant. Therefore, this change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request
involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: M. Stanford Blanton, Esq., Balch and
Bingham, Post Office Box 306, 1710 Sixth Avenue North, Birmingham,
Alabama 35201.
NRC Branch Chief: Evangelos C. Marinos.
Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses
During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice,
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has
determined for each of these amendments that the application complies
with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The
Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set
forth in the license amendment.
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility
Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration
Determination, and Opportunity for A Hearing in connection with these
actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated.
Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an
environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in
10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment,
it is so indicated.
For further details with respect to the action see (1) the
applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's
related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as
indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at
the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint
North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),
Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS
or if there are problems in accessing the documents
[[Page 75499]]
located in ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397-4209,
(301) 415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-
318, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Calvert
County, Maryland
Date of application for amendments: January 27, 2005, as
supplemented on November 2, 2005.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments modify Technical
Specifications (TSs) requirements to adopt the provisions of Industry/
TS Task Force (TSTF) change TSTF-359, ``Increased Flexibility in Mode
Restraints.''
Date of issuance: December 2, 2005
Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented within
60 days.
Amendment Nos.: 276 and 253
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69:
Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 10, 2005 (70 FR
24648)
The supplemental letter dated November 2, 2005, provided additional
information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of
the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's
original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as
published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of these amendments is
contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 2, 2005.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No
Duke Energy Corporation, et al., Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina
Date of application for amendments: November 16, 2004, as
supplemented by letters dated May 3, July 6, September 13, October 6,
October 24 and November 15, 2005
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised the
Technical Specifications, on a one-time basis, to allow the nuclear
service water system headers for each unit to be taken out of service
for up to 14 days each for system upgrades.
Date of issuance: November 17, 2005
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 60 days from the date of issuance
Amendment Nos.: 228/223 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos.
NPF-35 and NPF-52: Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 26, 2005 (70 FR
21454)
The supplements dated May 3, July 6, September 13, October 6,
October 24, and November 15, 2005, provided additional information that
clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the November 16,
2004 application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's
original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as
published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated November 17, 2005.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No
Duke Energy Corporation, Docket Nos. 50-269 and 50-270, Oconee Nuclear
Station, Units 1 and 2, Oconee County, South Carolina
Date of application of amendments: August 18, 2005, as supplemented
by letter dated September 15, 2005
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised the
Technical Specifications 3.5.2.6 and 3.5.3.6 to accommodate the
replacement of the reactor building emergency sump suction inlet trash
racks and screens with strainers.
Date of Issuance: November 1, 2005
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 30 days from the date of issuance.
Amendment Nos.: 348/350
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-38 and DPR-47:
Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 31, 2005 (70 FR
51852)
The supplement dated September 15, 2005, provided additional
information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of
the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's
original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as
published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated November 1, 2005.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No
Entergy Gulf States, Inc., and Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-
458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana
Date of amendment request: March 8, 2005, as supplemented by
letters dated April 19, July 12, September 21, November 14, and
November 15, 2005
Brief description of amendment: The amendment enables the licensee
to make changes to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to reflect
the use of the non-single-failure-proof Fuel Building Cask Handling
Crane for dry spent fuel cask component lifting and handling
operations.
Date of issuance: December 1, 2005
Effective date: As of the date of issuance, with the implementation
to begin immediately and be completed by the next periodic update to
the USAR, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e).
Amendment No.: 149
Facility Operating License No. NPF-47: The amendment allows
revision of the USAR.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 26, 2005 (70 FR
21455). The supplemental letters dated April 19, July 12, September 21,
November 14, and November 15, 2005, provided additional information
that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the
application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's
original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as
published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated December 1, 2005.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No
Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear
Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska
Date of amendment request: May 25, 2005
Brief description of amendment: The amendment deleted from the
Cooper Nuclear Station Technical Specifications temporary footnotes
that have expired and are no longer in effect.
Date of issuance: December 5, 2005
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented
within 30 days of issuance.
Amendment No.: 213
Facility Operating License No. DPR-46: Amendment revised the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 5, 2005 (70 FR
38721)
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated December 5, 2005.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No
PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388, Susquehanna Steam
Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania
Date of application for amendments: January 28, 2005
[[Page 75500]]
Brief description of amendments: The amendments replace the
reference to American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) with a reference to ASME Code for
Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants in Technical
Specification 5.5.6.
Date of issuance: December 7, 2005
Effective date: As of the date of issuance, and shall be
implemented within 30 days.
Amendment Nos.: 228 and 204
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22: The amendments
revised the Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 24, 2005 (70 FR
29799)
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated December 7, 2005.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No
Union Electric Company, Docket No. 50-483, Callaway Plant, Unit 1,
Callaway County, Missouri
Date of application for amendment: September 9, 2005, as
supplemented by letters dated October 24 and November 3, 2005
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises Surveillance
Requirements (SRs) 3.7.3.1 and 3.7.3.2 and adds SR 3.7.3.3 in TS 3.7.3,
``Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating
Valves (MFRVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves
(MFRVBVs).'' The amendment also adds Figure 3.7.3-1 to the TSs to
specify the acceptable MFIV stroke, or closure, time with respect to
steam generator pressure.
Date of issuance: November 17, 2005
Effective date: Effective as of its date of issuance, and shall be
implemented no later than entry into Mode 3 during the startup from
Refueling Outage 15, which is scheduled for the spring of 2007.
Completion of the baseline testing of the main feedwater isolation
valves, which is described in the licensee's letters dated September 9
and October 24, 2005, and in Section 4.1.4 of the Safety Evaluation for
this amendment, shall be completed as part of the implementation of
this amendment.
Amendment No.: 170
Facility Operating License No. NPF-30: The amendment revised the
Technical Specifications.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 16, 2005 (70
FR 54776)The supplemental letters dated October 24 and November 3,
2005, provided additional information that clarified the application,
did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and
did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards
consideration determination.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained
in a Safety Evaluation dated November 17, 2005.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of December 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Catherine Haney,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05-24142 Filed 12-19-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P