[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 239 (Wednesday, December 14, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 73946-73959]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-7293]


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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

11 CFR Part 109

[Notice 2005-28]


 Coordinated Communications

AGENCY: Federal Election Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Election Commission requests comment on proposed 
revisions to its regulations regarding communications that have been 
coordinated with Federal candidates and political party committees. The 
Commission's current rules set out a three-prong test for determining 
whether a communication is ``coordinated'' with, and therefore an in-
kind contribution to, a Federal candidate or a political party 
committee. In Shays v. FEC, the Court of Appeals invalidated one aspect 
of the so-called content prong of the coordinated communications test, 
because the court believed that the Commission had not provided 
adequate explanation and justification for the current rules under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. To comply with the decision of the Court 
of Appeals, and to address other issues involving the coordinated 
communication rules, the Commission is issuing this Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking. No final decision has been made by the Commission on the 
issues presented in this rulemaking. Further information is provided in 
the supplementary information that follows.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before January 13, 2006. The 
Commission will hold a hearing on the proposed rules on January 25 or 
26, 2006, or both at 9:30 a.m. Anyone wishing to testify at the hearing 
must file written comments by the due date and must include a request 
to testify in the written comments.

ADDRESSES: All comments must be in writing, must be addressed to Mr. 
Brad C. Deutsch, Assistant General Counsel, and must be submitted in 
either e-mail, facsimile, or paper copy form. Commenters are strongly 
encouraged to submit comments by e-mail or fax to

[[Page 73947]]

ensure timely receipt and consideration. E-mail comments must be sent 
to either [email protected] or submitted through the Federal 
eRegulations Portal at www.regulations.gov. If e-mail comments include 
an attachment, the attachment must be in either Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) or 
Microsoft Word (.doc) format. Faxed comments must be sent to (202) 219-
3923, with paper copy follow-up. Paper comments and paper copy follow-
up of faxed comments must be sent to the Federal Election Commission, 
999 E Street, NW., Washington, DC 20463. All comments must include the 
full name and postal service address of the commenter or they will not 
be considered. The Commission will post comments on its website after 
the comment period ends. The hearing will be held in the Commission's 
ninth-floor meeting room, 999 E Street, NW., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Brad C. Deutsch, Assistant General 
Counsel, Ms. Amy Rothstein, or Mr. Ron B. Katwan, Attorneys, 999 E 
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20463, (202) 694-1650 or (800) 424-9530.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (``BCRA''), amended the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, 2 U.S.C. 431 et seq. (the 
``Act''), in a number of respects. In the portion of BCRA relevant to 
this proceeding, Congress repealed the Commission's pre-BCRA 
regulations regarding ``coordinated general public political 
communications'' and directed the Commission to promulgate new 
regulations on ``coordinated communications'' in their place. Pub. L. 
107-155, sec. 214(b), (c) (2002). On December 17, 2002, the Commission 
adopted regulations at 11 CFR 109.21 to implement BCRA's provisions 
regarding payments for communications that are coordinated with a 
candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, or a political party 
committee. See Final Rules and Explanation and Justification on 
Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 FR 421 (Jan. 3, 2003) 
(``2002 Coordination Final Rules'').
    Under the Act, as amended by BCRA, an expenditure ``made by any 
person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the 
request or suggestion of'' a Federal candidate, a candidate's 
authorized committee, the national, State, or local committee of a 
political party, or agents of any of the foregoing, is an in-kind 
contribution to the candidate or political party committee with which 
it has been coordinated, and is thus subject to the limitations, 
prohibitions, and reporting requirements of the Act. 2 U.S.C. 
441a(a)(7)(B)(i) and (ii). An ``expenditure'' is any payment ``made by 
any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal 
office.'' \1\ 2 U.S.C. 431(9)(A)(i).
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    \1\ In addition, the Act specifically provides that the 
financing of the republication of campaign materials prepared by the 
candidate, the candidate's authorized committee, or agents thereof, 
is an expenditure. 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(7)(B)(iii).
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    Thus, under the Act, a payment for a communication constitutes an 
in-kind contribution if two conditions are satisfied. First, the 
payment must qualify as an ``expenditure''; that is, it must be made 
for the purpose of influencing a Federal election. Second, the payment 
must be made ``in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at 
the request or suggestion of'' a candidate or political party committee 
or agents thereof. In addition, the Act provides that any disbursement 
for an ``electioneering communication'' \2\ that is coordinated with a 
candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, a political party 
committee, or agents thereof, is an in-kind contribution to the 
candidate or political party supported by the communication. 2 U.S.C. 
441a(a)(7)(C).
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    \2\ The Act and Commission regulations define an electioneering 
communication as any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication 
that (1) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
office; (2) is publicly distributed within 60 days before a general 
election or 30 days before a primary election for the office sought 
by the candidate referenced in the communication; and (3) can be 
received by 50,000 or more persons within the geographic area that 
the candidate referenced in the communication seeks to represent. 
See 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(C); 11 CFR 100.29.
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    To implement these provisions of the Act, 11 CFR 109.21 sets forth 
a three-prong test for determining whether a communication is a 
coordinated communication, and therefore an in-kind contribution to, a 
candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, or a political party 
committee. See 11 CFR 109.21(a). First, the communication must be paid 
for by someone other than a candidate, a candidate's authorized 
committee, a political party committee, or their agents (the ``payment 
prong''). See 11 CFR 109.21(a)(1). Second, the communication must meet 
one of four content standards (the ``content prong''). See 11 CFR 
109.21(a)(2) and (c). Third, the communication must meet one of five 
conduct standards (the ``conduct prong''). See 11 CFR 109.21(a)(3) and 
(d). A communication must satisfy all three prongs to be a 
``coordinated communication.''

I. The Content Prong

    This rulemaking is being initiated in response to court decisions 
that invalidated one aspect of the ``content prong'' of the coordinated 
communication test. See Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(``Shays District''), aff'd, Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(``Shays Appeal'') (pet. for reh'g en banc denied Oct. 21, 2005) (No. 
04-5352). As described more fully below, the District Court held the 
content prong as a whole to be invalid, while the Court of Appeals held 
the Commission's justification for one aspect of the content prong 
(specifically, the 120-day time frame in the fourth content standard) 
to be inadequate.
    The purpose of the content prong is to ``ensure that the 
coordination regulations do not inadvertently encompass communications 
that are not made for the purpose of influencing a Federal election.'' 
2002 Coordination Final Rules at 426. Accordingly, each of the four 
content standards that comprise the ``content prong'' identifies a 
category of communications that satisfies the content prong because its 
``subject matter is reasonably related to an election.'' Id. at 427.
    The first content standard is satisfied if the communication is an 
electioneering communication. See 11 CFR 109.21(c)(1). This content 
standard implements the statutory directive, described above, that 
disbursements for coordinated electioneering communications be treated 
as in-kind contributions to the candidate or political party supported 
by the communication.
    The second content standard is satisfied by a public communication 
\3\ made at any time that disseminates, distributes, or republishes 
campaign materials prepared by the candidate, the

[[Page 73948]]

candidate's authorized committee, or agents thereof. See 11 CFR 
109.21(c)(2). This content standard implements the Congressional 
mandate that the Commission's rules on coordinated communications 
address the ``republication of campaign materials.'' See Pub. L. 107-
155, sec. 214(c)(1) (2002).
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    \3\ 11 CFR 100.26 defines ``public communication'' as ``a 
communication by means of any broadcast, cable or satellite 
communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, 
mass mailing or telephone bank to the general public, or any other 
form of general public political advertising. The term public 
communication shall not include communications over the Internet.'' 
The District Court rejected the definition of ``public 
communication'' in the Commission's regulations because the 
definition categorically excludes all Internet communications. Shays 
District at 70. To comply with the Shays District decision, the 
Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that proposes to 
include certain Internet communications in the definition of 
``public communication.'' See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
Internet Communications, 70 FR 16967 (April 4, 2005). The proposed 
revision to the definition of ``public communication'' would have 
the effect of including certain Internet communications in the 
definition of ``coordinated communication,'' as well. The Commission 
has not yet issued final rules in this rulemaking.
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    The third content standard is satisfied if a public communication 
made at any time expressly advocates the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate for Federal office. See 11 CFR 
109.21(c)(3); see also 11 CFR 100.22. The Commission concluded that 
express advocacy communications, no matter when such communications are 
made, can be reasonably construed only as for the purpose of 
influencing an election.
    The fourth content standard is satisfied if a public communication 
(1) refers to a political party or a clearly identified Federal 
candidate; (2) is publicly distributed or publicly disseminated 120 
days or fewer before an election; \4\ and (3) is directed to voters in 
the jurisdiction of the clearly identified Federal candidate or to 
voters in a jurisdiction in which one or more candidates of the 
political party appear on the ballot. See 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4).
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    \4\ The term ``election'' includes general elections, primary 
elections, runoff elections, caucuses or conventions, and special 
elections. See 11 CFR 100.2.
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    In adopting the 120-day time frame for public communications for 
the fourth content standard, the Commission sought to create a bright-
line rule for public communications that fall short of express advocacy 
and do not republish campaign materials. The 120-day time frame 
``focuses the regulation on activity reasonably close to an election, 
but not so distant from the election as to implicate political 
discussion at other times.'' 2002 Coordination Final Rules at 430. The 
Commission noted that its intent was ``to require as little 
characterization of the meaning or the content of the communication, or 
inquiry into the subjective effect of the communication on the reader, 
viewer, or listener as possible.'' 2002 Coordination Final Rules at 430 
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-44 (1976)). The Commission 
emphasized that the regulation ``is applied by asking if certain things 
are true or false about the face of the public communication or with 
limited reference to external facts on the public record.'' Id.
    In adopting this time frame, the Commission relied on the fact 
that, in BCRA, Congress defined ``Federal election activity'' 
(``FEA''), in part, as voter registration activity ``during the period 
that begins on the date that is 120 days'' before a Federal election. 
The Commission reasoned that, in doing so, Congress ``deem[ed] that 
period of time before an election to be reasonably related to that 
election.'' Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. 431(20)(A)(i)).

II. Overview of Court Decisions in Shays v. FEC

    In Shays District, the District Court held that the Commission's 
coordinated communication regulations did not survive the second step 
of Chevron review.\5\ Shays District at 61-62. Specifically, the court 
concluded that limiting the coordinated communication definition to 
communications that satisfy the content standards at 11 CFR 
109.21(c)(1) through (4) would ``undercut[] [the Act's] statutory 
purpose of regulating campaign finance and preventing circumvention of 
the campaign finance rules.'' Id. at 63. The District Court reasoned 
that communications that have been coordinated with a candidate, a 
candidate's authorized committee, or a political party committee have 
value for, and therefore are in-kind contributions to, that candidate 
or committee, regardless of the content, timing, or geographic reach of 
the communications. See Shays District at 63-64.
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    \5\ The District Court described the first step of the Chevron 
analysis, which courts use to review an agency's regulations: ``a 
court first asks `whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that 
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.''' 
See Shays District, at 51 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). According to the 
District Court, in the second step of the Chevron analysis, the 
court determines if the agency's interpretation is a permissible 
construction of the statute that does not ``unduly compromise'' [the 
Act's] purposes by ``creat[ing] the potential for gross abuse.'' See 
Shays District at 91, citing Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 164-65 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).
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    The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed ``with the district 
court's suggestion that any standard looking beyond collaboration to 
content would necessarily `create an immense loophole,' thus exceeding 
the range of permissible readings under Chevron step two.'' Shays 
Appeal at 99-100. The Court of Appeals noted that ``we can hardly fault 
the [Commission's] effort to develop an objective, bright-line test 
[that] does not unduly compromise the Act's purposes.'' Shays Appeal at 
99 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the Court of Appeals 
expressly ``reject[ed] Shays and Meehan's argument that [the Act] 
precludes content-based standards under Chevron Step One.'' Id. As the 
Court of Appeals emphasized, ``time, place, and content may be critical 
indicia of communicative purpose. While election-related intent is 
obvious, for example, in statements urging voters to `elect' or 
`defeat' a specified candidate or party, the same may not be true of 
[other types of] ads [.]'' Id. Instead, the Court of Appeals found that 
``the challenged regulation's fatal defect is not that the [Commission] 
drew distinctions based on content, time, and place, but rather that, 
contrary to the [Administrative Procedure Act], the Commission offered 
no persuasive justification for * * * the 120-day time-frame and the 
weak restraints applying outside of it.'' Id. at 100. Specifically, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that, by limiting ``coordinated 
communications'' made outside of the 120-day window to communications 
containing express advocacy or the republication of campaign materials, 
``the [Commission] has in effect allowed a coordinated communication 
free-for-all for much of each election cycle.'' Id.
    The Court of Appeals found that the Commission had not adequately 
explained why ``120 days reasonably defines the period before an 
election when non-express advocacy likely relates to purposes other 
than `influencing' a Federal election.'' Id. at 101. Regarding the 
Commission's reliance on Congress's use of a 120-day time frame in 
BCRA's definition of FEA as voter registration activity, the Court 
observed that the Commission had provided no evidence that voter 
registration activity occurs on cycles similar to ``coordinated 
communications.'' Id. at 100.
    For these reasons, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
Commission had not provided adequate explanation under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (``APA'') for the Commission's decision to 
exclude communications distributed more than 120 days before an 
election, unless a communication contains express advocacy or 
republishes campaign materials. Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's invalidation of the Commission's 
coordinated communication rules. Id. at 101.

III. Alternative Proposals for Revising the Content Prong in 11 CFR 
109.21(c)

    The Commission is considering the seven alternatives described 
below to comply with the Court of Appeals decision in Shays Appeal. The 
regulatory text for each alternative,

[[Page 73949]]

except one,\6\ is set forth at the end of this NPRM. The Commission 
seeks comment on each alternative, including responses to the following 
questions: Is the alternative too broad or too narrow? Would the 
alternative potentially include public communications that are not made 
for the purpose of influencing a Federal election and that therefore 
should not be restricted and treated as in-kind contributions? 
Conversely, would the alternative potentially exclude public 
communications that are made for the purpose of influencing a Federal 
election and therefore should be treated as an in-kind contribution, 
provided that the payment and conduct prongs are also satisfied? The 
Commission invites commenters to provide examples of communications 
from previous election cycles demonstrating that an alternative may be 
either underinclusive or overinclusive. Would the alternative address 
the Court of Appeals' concerns regarding the potential for 
circumvention of the Act and for corruption or the appearance of 
corruption? Would the alternative properly effectuate congressional 
intent? Would the alternative provide sufficient guidance to 
individuals and organizations seeking to be actively involved in 
politics and to comply with the Commission's coordination rules?
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    \6\ See note 11 below.
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    The Commission notes that the alternatives presented in this NPRM 
are not limited to the exact terms of the regulatory language set forth 
for each alternative at the end of the NPRM. Instead, as the narrative 
describing each alternative makes clear, the final rules may be a 
variation of one of the alternatives or even a combination of 
components from different alternatives. The Commission specifically 
invites comment on whether a combination of components from several 
different alternatives would be appropriate. The Commission also seeks 
comment on whether it should adopt a content standard that is not 
presented as one of the alternatives in this NPRM.
    In addition, given that the content prong and the conduct prong of 
the coordinated communication test were intended to work together, the 
Commission seeks comment on whether adopting a given alternative with 
respect to the content prong would necessitate changing the conduct 
prong in 11 CFR 109.21(d) to ensure that only communications made for 
the purpose of influencing a Federal election are covered. If so, what 
amendments to the conduct prong should the Commission consider making?

Alternative 1--Retain Current 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4) but Revise the 
Explanation and Justification

    Alternative 1 would retain the current coordinated communication 
test at 11 CFR 109.21, including the 120-day time frame in the fourth 
content standard at 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4)(ii), but would revise the 
Explanation and Justification for 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4)(ii) by providing 
further explanation supporting the 120-day time frame.\7\
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    \7\ Although this first alternative proposal to implement the 
appellate court's decision in Shays Appeal would not change 11 CFR 
109.21(c)(4), the regulatory text of Alternative 1 as set forth at 
the end of this NPRM reflects proposed changes to 11 CFR 
109.21(c)(4)(ii), to address situations in which multiple candidates 
for Federal office appear in a given public communication. See 
Section IV-3 below.
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    The Court of Appeals emphasized that justifying the 120-day time 
frame, or another time frame, requires the Commission to undertake a 
factual inquiry to determine whether the temporal line that it draws 
``reasonably defines the period before an election when non-express 
advocacy likely relates to purposes other than `influencing' a Federal 
election'' or whether it ``will permit exactly what BCRA aims to 
prevent: evasion of campaign finance restrictions through unregulated 
collaboration.'' Shays Appeal at 101-02. Accordingly, the Commission 
seeks comment on the following questions raised by the Court of Appeals 
in Shays Appeal regarding the 120-day time frame:
    (1) Are a significant number of communications outside the 120-day 
period made for the purpose of influencing Federal elections, or are 
communications to influence Federal elections predominantly made within 
120 days of an election? Are there specific examples from the 2004 
election cycle of communications that the current coordination rules 
should have reached but did not or, conversely, examples of 
communications that the current rules should not have reached but did? 
Id. at 102.
    (2) Do communications made for the purpose of influencing House, 
Senate, and Presidential races--all covered by this rule--occur during 
approximately the same periods in relation to the general election or 
the primary election, or should different time frames apply to each? 
Id.
    (3) If the Commission were to retain the 120-day time frame, would 
persons aiming to influence elections shift spending outside of that 
period to avoid the rules' restrictions? Would the same phenomenon 
potentially take place if the Commission adopted a time frame longer or 
shorter than 120 days before a Federal election? In 2004, was there any 
evidence that spending shifted outside the 120-day period to avoid the 
rules' restrictions? Id.
    The Commission specifically invites comments in the form of 
empirical data that show the time periods before an election in which 
electoral communications generally occur. Do outside persons make 
electoral communications during time frames that differ from candidates 
or parties? Do early electoral communications, for example, that occur 
more than 120 days before an election, have an effect on election 
results?
    On its website, the Commission posts reports filed pursuant to the 
Act and Commission regulations. Some of these reports include 
information on independent expenditures by political committees filed 
under 11 CFR 104.4 and by persons other than political committees under 
11 CFR 109.10. Additionally, all political committees must report 
coordinated expenditures along with all other in-kind contributions 
under 11 CFR 109.21(b)(3), while political party committees must report 
their coordinated party expenditures separately under 11 CFR 109.37. 
See Form 3X, line 25 (summarizing entries from Schedule F). For the 
convenience of commenters, the Commission has extracted these data from 
the reports and posted them on its website.\8\ Do the data provide an 
empirical basis for retaining the 120-day time frame or establishing 
another time frame? For example, the data appear to indicate that, 
during the 2004 election cycle, (1) coordinated party expenditures made 
in connection with the general election were made mostly after 
September 1, 2004--roughly within 60 days of the general election, and 
(2) independent expenditures were made mostly after July 27, 2004--
roughly within 90 days of the general election.\9\ The Commission 
invites statistical analyses of these data. Specifically, to what 
extent is it possible to extrapolate from any identified patterns in 
party committee coordinated expenditures to

[[Page 73950]]

expenditures for coordinated communications by outside groups? Do the 
data support the conclusion that communications made for the purpose of 
influencing an election are almost always made, or are generally made, 
within the last 60 to 90 days before an election?
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    \8\ These data are available at http://www.fec.gov/press/coordruledata.shtml.
    \9\ A political party committee authorized to make coordinated 
expenditures may make such expenditures in connection with the 
general election before or after its candidate has been nominated. 
See 2 U.S.C. 441a(d), 11 CFR 109.34. See also 11 CFR 109.32(a). 
Generally, it is less likely that such expenditures would be made 
much before a candidate has been nominated. The Commission also 
notes that expenditures reported by political party committees as 
``coordinated expenditures'' include not only expenditures for 
communications but also all other coordinated expenditures.
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    The Commission also seeks comment on whether other existing 
analyses provide a basis for choosing a particular time frame. See, 
e.g., Michael M. Franz et al., The Election after Reform: Money, 
Politics and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ch. 7 (Michael J. 
Malbin ed., Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming Mar. 2006), available 
at http://www.cfinst.org/studies/ElectionAfterReform/chapters.html; Ken 
Goldstein & Joel Rivlin, Political Advertising in the 2002 Elections 
ch. 3 (forthcoming), available at http://polisci.wisc.edu/tvadvertising; Craig B. Holman, Buying Time 2000: Television 
Advertising in the 2000 Federal Elections 52-59 (2001), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/buyingtime2000.html; Jonathan 
Krasno & Kenneth Goldstein, The Facts About Television Advertising and 
the McCain-Feingold Bill, 35(2) PS: Political Science and Politics 207 
(2002), draft available at http://www.cfinst.org/studies/papers/goldstein&krasno.pdf; Donald F. McGahn, Remarks at Campaign Finance 
Reform Forum, Campaign Finance Institute (Jan. 14, 2005),\10\ available 
at www.cfinst.org/transcripts/pdf/1-14-05_Transcript_PanelThree.pdf.; 
see also data compiled by the University of Wisconsin Advertising 
Project, available at http://polisci.wisc.edu/tvadvertising.
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    \10\ ``The hotspot of the campaign didn't start until late 
September. * * * This cycle was very compressed when it came to the 
heavy spending. It eventually had in essence a four-week sprint as 
opposed to the eight- to ten-week sprint that we used to pay for.''
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Alternative 2--Adopt a Different Time Frame

    The Commission seeks comment on whether a time frame other than 120 
days would be more appropriate in bringing public communications that 
are made for the purpose of influencing a Federal election within the 
coordination regulations, while filtering out public communications 
that are not made for this purpose.\11\ Does empirical evidence support 
the adoption of a different time frame? Some States hold primary 
elections early in the election year. Under the current rule, a public 
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate and is 
distributed within the 120-day period preceding a primary election 
would satisfy the content standard at 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4), but the same 
public communication distributed shortly after the primary but still 
more than 120 days before the subsequent general election would not 
satisfy that standard. Accordingly, rather than retain the current rule 
covering communications made within the 120-day period before an 
election, whether primary or general, should the Commission adopt a 
time frame that covers an uninterrupted period of time starting 120 
days (or some other time period) before the primary election up to and 
including the day of the general election?
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    \11\ Because Alternative 2 does not propose a specific time 
frame, this NPRM does not set forth regulatory text for Alternative 
2.
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    The Commission also invites comment on whether to adopt a time 
frame covering the period from January 1 of each election year through 
the day of the general election. Would such an ``election year'' time 
frame begin too late for States that hold primaries early in the year? 
Conversely, would an ``election year'' time frame begin too early for 
States that hold primaries in September? Would such a time frame be 
appropriate for Presidential elections?
    In addition, the Commission seeks comment on whether to adopt a 
tiered approach, under which the range of communications that satisfy 
the fourth content standard would depend on the communication's 
proximity to an election. For example, for communications made within 
120 days before an election, the fourth content standard could be 
modified to capture any public communication that refers to a political 
party or clearly identified Federal candidate and is directed to the 
voters in the relevant geographical areas. For communications made 
between 120 and 240 days before an election, the fourth content 
standard could capture only public communications that promote, attack, 
support, or oppose (``PASO'') a political party or a clearly identified 
Federal candidate.\12\ The Commission invites commenters to provide 
examples of communications from previous election cycles to show 
whether a given time frame would be either underinclusive or 
overinclusive.
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    \12\ See Alternative 4 below for a more detailed discussion of 
the PASO standard.
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Alternative 3--Eliminate the Time Restriction From 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4)

    Alternative 3 would revise 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4) by eliminating any 
time restriction from the fourth content standard. Specifically, 
Alternative 3 would remove the requirement that a public communication 
be publicly distributed or otherwise publicly disseminated 120 days or 
fewer before an election. See 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4)(ii). Alternative 3 
would, however, retain the requirements that (1) the public 
communication refer to a political party or clearly identified 
candidate and (2) be directed to voters in the jurisdiction of the 
clearly identified candidate or to voters in the jurisdiction in which 
one or more candidates of the political party appear on the ballot. See 
11 CFR 109.21(c)(4)(i) and (iii). Thus, under this alternative, any 
public communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate or 
political party and is directed to voters in the relevant jurisdiction 
would satisfy the content prong of the coordinated communication test, 
regardless of when it is distributed.
    The Commission seeks comment on whether the fourth content standard 
without a time frame would still be effective in distinguishing 
communications made for the purpose of influencing a Federal election 
from communications made for other purposes, such as communications 
made for the purpose of lobbying for or against certain legislation. 
The Court of Appeals noted that ``to qualify as `expenditure' in the 
first place, spending must be undertaken `for the purpose of 
influencing' a federal election * * * [T]ime, place, and content may be 
critical indicia of communicative purpose. While election-related 
intent is obvious, for example, in statements urging voters to `elect' 
or `defeat' a specified candidate or party, the same may not be true of 
ads identifying a federal politician but focusing on pending 
legislation[.]'' Shays Appeal at 99. Does the fact that a communication 
refers to a clearly identified candidate or a political party and is 
directed to voters in the relevant geographical area by itself provide 
strong evidence that the communication is made for the purpose of 
influencing a Federal election, even if the communication is made a 
year or more before that election? Does the Commission have the 
statutory authority to regulate ``other categories of non-
electioneering speech--non-express advocacy, for example--outside the 
120 days''? Id. at 101. How should the Commission separate 
communications made for the purpose of influencing a Federal election 
from those without such purpose?
    The Commission also invites commenters to provide examples of 
communications from previous election cycles to show whether 
Alternative 3

[[Page 73951]]

would be either underinclusive or overinclusive.

Alternative 4--Replace the Content Standard in 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4) With 
a ``PASO'' Test

    Alternative 4 would replace the content standard in 11 CFR 
109.21(c)(4) with a new standard providing that a public communication 
would satisfy the content prong of the coordinated communication test 
if it refers to a political party or a clearly identified Federal 
candidate, is directed to voters in the jurisdiction of the clearly 
identified Federal candidate or to voters in a jurisdiction in which 
one or more Federal candidates of a political party are on the ballot, 
and the communication PASOs the political party or the clearly 
identified Federal candidate.\13\ Would such a standard have the 
potential to be unconstitutionally vague in practical application? Or, 
conversely, would such a standard `` `provide explicit standards for 
those who apply them ' and `give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited' ''? McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 170 n.64 (2003) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972)).
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    \13\ The PASO standard is found in BCRA and applies primarily to 
candidates and political party committees with respect to FEA. See 2 
U.S.C. 431(20)(A)(iii). But Congress also applied the PASO standard 
to the activity of certain tax-exempt organizations. For example, 
BCRA prohibits party committees from soliciting funds for, or making 
or directing donations to, certain tax-exempt organizations that 
make expenditures or disbursements for FEA, which includes public 
communications that PASO a Federal candidate. See 2 U.S.C. 
431(20)(A)(iii) and 441i(d)(1). BCRA also directed the Commission 
not to exempt any communications that PASO a clearly identified 
Federal candidate from the electioneering communication provisions. 
See 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(B)(iv). The Commission provided examples of 
communications that PASO and communications that do not PASO in 
Advisory Opinion 2003-25.
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    Alternatively, the Commission invites comment on whether 
Alternative 4, instead of using a PASO standard, should create a safe 
harbor exemption from the coordinated communication rules for certain 
kinds of communications. A communication that satisfies these criteria 
would, as a matter of law, not be treated as a coordinated 
communication. For example, such criteria could include the following:
     The communication is devoted exclusively to a particular 
pending legislative or executive branch matter.
     The communication's reference to a clearly identified 
Federal candidate is limited to urging the public to contact that 
candidate to persuade the candidate to take a particular position on 
the pending legislative or executive branch matters.
     The communication does not refer to the political party 
affiliation or the political ideology (e.g., ``liberal,'' 
``conservative,'' etc.) of a clearly identified Federal candidate.
     The communication does not refer to a clearly identified 
Federal candidate's record or position on any issue.
     The communication does not refer to a clearly identified 
Federal candidate's character, qualifications, or fitness for office.
     The communication does not refer to an election, voters or 
the voting public, or anyone's candidacy.
    If this criteria-based approach is adopted, should any of the 
criteria be eliminated from, or added to, the list? If adopted, should 
the regulation provide that a communication must meet all of the 
criteria on the list to qualify for the safe harbor exemption or should 
the regulation follow a more flexible approach and provide that a 
communication may meet some but not necessarily all of the criteria on 
the list and still qualify for the exemption? Should satisfaction of 
one or more specific criteria on the list, by itself, be sufficient to 
qualify for the exemption? By contrast, should any one or more criteria 
be critical to the analysis such that failure to meet these criteria 
would prohibit an organization from taking advantage of the safe 
harbor?
    The Commission seeks comment as to whether Alternative 4 should 
incorporate a time period limitation, such as a specific number of days 
before an election. If so, should this time period be 120 days before 
an election or should a different time frame be adopted? The Commission 
invites commenters to submit supporting empirical data. The Commission 
also invites commenters to provide examples of communications from 
previous election cycles to show whether Alternative 4 would be either 
underinclusive or overinclusive.

Alternative 5--Eliminate the Time Restriction From 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4) 
for Political Committees Only

    Alternative 5 would adopt a bifurcated test under which application 
of the 120-day time frame would depend on the identity of the person 
paying for the public communication. If a registered political 
committee, or an organization that is required to register as a 
political committee, pays for a public communication that refers to a 
political party or a clearly identified Federal candidate and the 
public communication is directed to voters in the jurisdiction of the 
clearly identified candidate or to voters in a jurisdiction in which 
one or more of the candidates of the political party appear on the 
ballot, then that public communication would be deemed as a matter of 
law to have been made for the purpose of influencing a Federal 
election. Such a public communication, when paid for by a political 
committee, would be deemed to have been made for the purpose of 
influencing a Federal election regardless of when it is distributed, 
because a political committee is an organization whose major purpose is 
to influence elections.\14\ Alternatively, should the time frame be 
eliminated only for public communications that are paid for by 
registered political committees or organizations that are required to 
register as political committees if the communication PASOs a political 
party or a clearly identified Federal candidate?
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    \14\ The Act defines a ``political committee'' as any committee, 
club, association, or other group of persons that receives 
``contributions'' or makes ``expenditures'' aggregating in excess of 
$1,000 during a calendar year. 2 U.S.C. 431(4)(A). See also 11 CFR 
100.5. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court, in 
order to avoid vagueness, narrowed the Act's references to 
``political committee'' to prevent their ``reach [to] groups engaged 
purely in issue discussion.'' 424 U.S. at 79. The Court concluded 
that ``[t]o fulfill the purposes of the Act [the words `political 
committee'] need only encompass organizations that are under the 
control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the 
nomination or election of a candidate.'' Id.
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    Under Alternative 5, if the person paying for the public 
communication is not a registered political committee or an 
organization that is required to register as a political committee, 
then the public communication would satisfy the content standard at 11 
CFR 109.21(c)(4) only if it occurs 120 days or fewer before an election 
or during whatever other time frame might be adopted. Are there data to 
justify the 120-day window? Do the data support another time frame?
    The Commission seeks comment on how such a bifurcated test would 
apply to other entities, such as non-Federal candidates and their 
campaign organizations. The Commission further seeks comment on how 
such a bifurcated test should apply to entities organized under section 
527 of the Internal Revenue Code that are not registered with the 
Commission as political committees. The Commission also seeks comment 
on the effect that this alternative approach would have on a candidate 
who has contacts that meet the conduct standard with an organization 
that is not registered as a political committee. If that organization

[[Page 73952]]

is subsequently found to have inappropriately failed to register as a 
political committee based on activity that was not known to the 
candidate, should the Commission provide in the regulation that the 
candidate would not be deemed to have accepted an in-kind contribution 
from the organization?
    In addition, the Commission invites commenters to provide examples 
of communications from previous election cycles to show whether 
Alternative 5 would be either underinclusive or overinclusive.

Alternative 6--Replace the Fourth Content Standard in 11 CFR 
109.21(c)(4) With a Standard Covering Public Communications Made for 
the Purpose of Influencing a Federal Election

    Alternative 6 would replace the fourth content standard in 11 CFR 
109.21(c)(4) with a new standard that would closely track the statute 
and simply require a communication to be a public communication made 
for the purpose of influencing a Federal election. The effect of 
adopting Alternative 6 would be to restrict some public communications 
that are not covered by current 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4), i.e., 
communications that are made for the purpose of influencing a Federal 
election but that are either: (1) Made more than 120 days before an 
election, or (2) made at any time and do not refer to a political party 
or a clearly identified Federal candidate. In addition, Alternative 6 
would exclude from regulation some communications that are covered by 
current 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4), i.e., communications that are made within 
120 days of an election and that do refer to a political party or a 
clearly identified Federal candidate but that are not made for the 
purpose of influencing a Federal election.
    Whether a given public communication is for the purpose of 
influencing a Federal election would depend on the facts and would be 
decided on a case-by-case basis. This is the approach some 
Commissioners used before 2002 when the Commission adopted a content 
prong for its coordinated communication regulations. Under such a case-
by-case approach, some public communications would be treated as having 
been made for the purpose of influencing a Federal election, even 
though no Federal candidate or political party is referenced in the 
communication, and regardless of how far in advance of an election such 
a communication is made. This approach would result in some public 
communications being restricted as coordinated communications without 
having to meet a content standard defined in the Commission's 
regulations. The Commission seeks comment on whether such a case-by-
case approach is appropriate and whether it would provide sufficient 
guidance to candidates, their authorized committees, political party 
committees, and outside organizations. Would such a standard have the 
potential to be unconstitutionally vague in practical application? Or, 
conversely, would such a standard `` `provide explicit standards for 
those who apply them' and `give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited' ''? McConnell, 540 
U.S. at 170 n.64 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-109); compare 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24, n. 24, 46-47, n. 53, 78 (Payments for 
media advertisements ``controlled by or coordinated with the 
candidate'' are treated as contributions, and ``for the purpose of 
influencing'' phrase ``presents fewer problems in connection with the 
definition of a contribution because of the limiting connotation 
created by the general understanding of what constitutes a political 
contribution.''). The Commission also invites commenters to provide 
examples of communications from previous election cycles to show 
whether Alternative 6 would be either underinclusive or overinclusive.

Alternative 7--Eliminate the Content Prong in 11 CFR 109.21(c) and 
Replace It With the Requirement That the Communication Be a Public 
Communication as Defined in 11 CFR 100.26

    Alternative 7 would eliminate the entire content prong in 11 CFR 
109.21(c), and would replace it with the requirement that the 
communication be a public communication as defined in 11 CFR 
100.26.\15\ Alternative 7 would also make some conforming amendments. 
Alternative 7 would be based on the assumption that if an organization 
or individual works with a candidate or a political party in making a 
public communication, then the communication inherently has value to 
the political entity it is coordinated with, regardless of timing or 
content. Accordingly, in Alternative 7, any public communication that 
satisfies the conduct prong of the coordinated communication test at 11 
CFR 109.21(d) would be deemed to have been made for the purpose of 
influencing a Federal election and thus be a ``coordinated 
communication,'' regardless of whether it refers to a clearly 
identified Federal candidate or political party and regardless of when 
or to whom the communication is distributed.
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    \15\ See note 3 above.
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    The Commission notes that, even though Alternative 7 would 
eliminate the entire content prong, it would nonetheless comply with 
the statutory requirement that disbursements for coordinated 
electioneering communications be in-kind contributions to the candidate 
supported by them and with the congressional mandate that the 
Commission's coordination rules address the ``republication of campaign 
materials.'' Specifically, under Alternative 7, all public 
communications (including electioneering communications and 
communications that republish campaign materials) would be coordinated 
communications as long as they satisfy the conduct prong.
    The Commission seeks comment on whether the conduct prong by 
itself, without any content prong, would be effective in distinguishing 
between public communications made for the purpose of influencing a 
Federal election and public communications made for other purposes, 
such as public communications made for the purpose of lobbying for or 
against certain legislation, or for supporting charitable or other non-
political causes. Assuming that it is true that a candidate or 
political party would not coordinate with an outside organization or 
individual if the resulting communication did not have value for the 
candidate or political party, does such value necessarily consist of 
influencing the candidate's election or the election of a political 
party's candidates? Would the conduct prong by itself, without any 
content prong, have the potential to be unconstitutionally vague in 
practical application? Or, conversely, would such a regulation `` 
`provide explicit standards for those who apply them' and `give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what 
is prohibited' ''? McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64 (quoting Grayned, 
408 U.S. at 108-109). The Commission also invites commenters to provide 
examples of communications from previous election cycles to show 
whether Alternative 7 would be either underinclusive or overinclusive.

IV. Other Issues Regarding the Content Prong

    The Commission also seeks comment on the following related issues.

[[Page 73953]]

1. The ``Directed to Voters'' Requirement in 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4)(iii)
    In the event that the Commission decides to retain a content prong, 
the Commission seeks comment on modifying the requirement in the fourth 
content standard that a public communication must be directed to voters 
in the jurisdiction of the clearly identified candidate or to voters in 
a jurisdiction in which one or more candidates of the political party 
appear on the ballot. See 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4)(iii). While the Act and 
Commission regulations defining ``electioneering communications'' 
require that 50,000 or more persons be able to receive the 
communication in the relevant geographic area, the fourth content 
standard does not specify how many persons must be able to receive a 
communication for it to be classified as a coordinated communication. 
See 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(C); 11 CFR 100.29(b)(3)(ii)(A) and (b)(5). 
Should 109.21(c)(4)(iii) be deemed satisfied if any person in the 
relevant geographic area can receive the communication? Should 11 CFR 
109.21(c)(4)(iii) be changed to specify a minimum number of persons 
that must be able to receive the communication? If so, what should the 
required minimum number of persons be? Has the current regulation 
without a required minimum number presented any difficulties to, or 
created any confusion for, those seeking to comply with it?
    The Commission notes that the fourth content standard applies to 
``public communications,'' and thus to communications made by means of 
newspapers, magazines, periodicals, billboards, mass mailing, and 
telephone banks. See 11 CFR 100.26. Is it appropriate to set a minimum 
for the ``directed to voters'' requirement that would exclude small and 
medium sized publications? If so, should the minimum number be based on 
the number of copies distributed or on estimates of the number of 
readers reached by the publications? Similarly, the definition of 
``public communication'' includes limited communications, such as 501 
pieces of mail or 501 telephone calls of an identical or substantially 
similar nature. See 2 U.S.C. 431(23) and (24); 11 CFR 100.26, 100.27, 
100.29. Would it be appropriate to exclude such limited mass mailings 
or telephone banks from the ``directed to voters'' requirement as de 
minimis even though they come within the Commission's definition of 
``public communication''?
    Under the current rules, the second and third content standards 
(i.e., the republication of campaign material and the express advocacy 
standards) do not contain a ``directed to voters'' requirement. Are 
communications that satisfy these standards so clearly made for the 
purpose of influencing a Federal election that a ``directed to voters'' 
requirement is unnecessary? In the alternative, should such a 
requirement be added to these two content standards as well?
    The Commission also seeks comment on whether to exempt from the 
coordination regulations communications that are distributed in the 
jurisdiction of a clearly identified congressional candidate when such 
distribution is part of, and incidental to, a larger advertising 
campaign. For example, an advertisement distributed nationally on cable 
television that refers to a U.S. Representative seeking reelection as 
one of several sponsors of a piece of legislation will presumably reach 
voters in the U.S. Representative's district. In such a case, the 
voters in the U.S. Representative's district would be reached only 
incidentally as part of the larger lobbying campaign. Would an 
exemption for communications that reach voters in the jurisdiction of 
the clearly identified congressional candidate only incidentally 
provide a reliable way of distinguishing communications that are made 
for the purpose of influencing a Federal election from lobbying or 
issue advocacy communications? Would such a standard be sufficiently 
clear to provide persons with prior notice of the types of 
communications that are affected? For such a standard to provide 
effective prior notice, must the Commission specify how many viewers 
are ``incidental''? In the alternative, should the Commission define 
``incidental'' in terms of a certain ratio between the number of 
persons who can receive the communication in the State or district of 
the clearly identified Senate or House candidate and the number of 
persons who can receive the communication outside that State or 
district? Should such an exemption be limited to public communications 
that are distributed nationwide? The Commission also invites comment on 
whether the regulations should provide that such an exemption would 
apply only if a communication does not PASO the clearly identified 
candidate.
2. Federal Candidate Endorsements of, and Solicitations of Funds for, 
Other Federal or Non-Federal Candidates or State Ballot Initiatives
    The Commission invites comment regarding the application of the 
coordinated communication test to situations in which Federal 
candidates endorse, or solicit funds for, other Federal and non-Federal 
candidates or State ballot initiatives. In Advisory Opinion 2004-01, 
the Commission considered a television advertisement that featured 
President Bush endorsing a congressional candidate. The advertisement 
was publicly distributed within 120 days of the Presidential primary in 
the State in which the advertisement aired. The Commission concluded 
that the ``material involvement'' conduct standard in 11 CFR 
109.21(d)(2) was satisfied because the President's agents ``review[ed] 
the final script in advance of the President's appearance in the 
advertisements for legal compliance, factual accuracy, quality, 
consistency with the President's position and any content that 
distracts from or distorts the `endorsement' message that the President 
wishes to convey.'' \16\ Advisory Opinion 2004-01. Similarly, in 
Advisory Opinion 2003-25, the Commission considered an advertisement 
featuring a U.S. Senator's endorsement of a candidate for mayor. In 
that opinion, the Commission determined that it was highly implausible 
that a Federal candidate would appear in a communication endorsing a 
local candidate without being materially involved in one or more of the 
decisions listed in the ``material involvement'' conduct standard.
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    \16\ The Commission further determined that, for advertisements 
distributed within 120 days of the Presidential primary in the State 
in which the advertisement aired, the advertisements' production and 
distribution costs paid for by the congressional candidate's 
committee but attributable to the President's authorized committee 
were contributions to the President's committee by the congressional 
candidate's committee, but that no contribution would result if the 
President's committee reimbursed the congressional candidate's 
committee for its attributable share of the costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission seeks comment on whether to exempt from the 
coordinated communication rules a Federal candidate's appearance or use 
of a candidate's name in a communication to endorse other Federal or 
non-Federal candidates. Do such endorsements benefit the endorsing 
candidate? The Commission also invites comment on whether any such 
exemption should be limited to communications that do not PASO the 
endorsing candidate. Does the fact that the endorsing candidate appears 
in the communication inevitably promote the endorsing candidate?
    Similarly, the Commission seeks comment on whether to exempt from 
the coordinated communication rules a Federal candidate's appearance in 
a communication that solicits funds for

[[Page 73954]]

other Federal or non-Federal candidates, party committees, political 
action committees, or other political committees. Do such solicitations 
benefit the candidate who makes them? The Commission also invites 
comment on whether any such exemption should be limited to 
communications that do not PASO the soliciting candidate, or, in the 
alternative, do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of the 
soliciting candidate.
    The Commission also seeks comment on whether a similar exemption 
from the coordinated communication rules should also apply to a Federal 
candidate's appearance in communications that endorse, or solicit funds 
for, State ballot initiatives.
3. Proposed Clarification of Application of 120-day Time Frame 
Requirement in 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4)(ii)
    Advisory Opinion 2004-01, discussed above, concerned President 
Bush's appearance in a television advertisement paid for by a 
congressional candidate where President Bush endorsed that 
congressional candidate. The Commission determined that any airing of 
the advertisement that occurred more than 120 days before the 
Presidential primary in the State in which the advertisement aired was 
not an in-kind contribution to President Bush because it did not 
satisfy the fourth content standard (i.e., 11 CFR 109.21(c)(4)). In 
making this determination, the Commission looked at whether the 
communication was aired within 120 days before the non-paying 
candidate's (i.e., President Bush's) election rather than whether it 
was aired within 120 days before the paying congressional candidate's 
election. The regulatory text for Alternative 1 reflects the 
Commission's proposal to amend its coordinated communication rules to 
incorporate the approach taken in Advisory Opinion 2004-01 and to make 
clear that the time frame applies only to the election of a Federal 
candidate who is clearly identified and who has not paid for the 
communication.
    This alteration would clarify that no in-kind contribution is made 
under the coordinated communication regulations to a candidate for 
Federal office who is referred to in a public communication if the 
referenced candidate will not appear as a Federal candidate on a ballot 
within 120 days of the distribution of the communication. See Advisory 
Opinion 2005-18, Concurring Opinion of Chairman Thomas, Vice Chairman 
Toner, Commissioners Mason, McDonald, and Weintraub.
    For example, a Senator whose reelection is not until 2008 appears 
in an advertisement with a 2006 House candidate. The advertisement is 
aired within 120 days of the House candidate's election, is paid for by 
the House candidate's campaign committee, and is aired in the State 
where the Senator will seek reelection in 2008. This advertisement 
would not be an in-kind contribution to the Senator because the 
advertisement was not aired within 120 days of the Senator's 2008 
election.
    The Commission seeks comment on whether the proposed language 
properly effectuates this clarification.

V. Issues Regarding the Conduct Prong

    The conduct prong of the Commission's coordinated communication 
regulations was not challenged in Shays v. FEC. Nonetheless, the 
Commission is taking this opportunity to evaluate how certain aspects 
of the conduct prong work in practice.

1. The ``Request or Suggest'' Conduct Standard in 11 CFR 109.21(d)(1)

    The first conduct standard of the coordinated communications test 
is satisfied if a communication is created, produced or distributed at 
the request or suggestion of a candidate, a candidate's authorized 
committee, or a political party committee, or their agents. See 11 CFR 
109.21(d)(1). The Commission invites comment on whether, even if the 
Commission decides to retain the content prong of the coordinated 
communication test, it should provide that if the first conduct 
standard is satisfied, the communication would automatically qualify as 
a coordinated communication without also having to satisfy any of the 
standards contained in the content prong. If a public communication is 
made at the request or suggestion of a candidate or a political party, 
then does that communication presumptively have value to the political 
entity that it was coordinated with, regardless of timing or content? 
Would such a proposal capture communications that are not made for the 
purpose of influencing elections? Are there examples of public 
communications, such as lobbying communications or communications 
supporting charitable or other non-political causes, that are made at 
the ``request or suggestion'' of a Federal candidate but that do not 
have value for the candidate's campaign?

2. The ``Common Vendor'' and ``Former Employee'' Conduct Standards in 
11 CFR 109.21(d)(4) and (5)

    The fourth standard of the conduct prong of the coordinated 
communication rules involves common vendors, and the fifth standard 
involves former employees. See 11 CFR 109.21(d)(4) and (5). The 
Commission intended these standards to implement Congress's requirement 
in BCRA that the Commission address ``the use of a common vendor'' and 
``persons who previously served as an employee of a candidate or a 
political party committee'' in the context of coordination. BCRA, Pub. 
L. No. 107-55, sec. 214(c)(2) and (3) (2002).
    The ``common vendor'' conduct standard is satisfied if (1) the 
person paying for the communication contracts with, or employs, a 
``commercial vendor'' to create, produce, or distribute the 
communication, (2) the commercial vendor has a previous or current 
relationship with the political party committee or the clearly 
identified candidate referred to in the communication that puts the 
commercial vendor in a position to acquire material information about 
the plans, projects, activities, or needs of the candidate or political 
party committee, and (3) the commercial vendor uses or conveys material 
information to the person paying for the communication about the plans, 
projects, activities, or needs of the candidate or political party 
committee, or material information used by the commercial vendor in 
serving the candidate or political party committee. See 11 CFR 
109.21(d)(4).
    The ``former employee'' conduct standard is satisfied if (1) the 
person paying for the communication was, or is, employing a person who 
was an employee of the candidate or the political party committee 
clearly identified in the communication, and (2) the former employee 
uses or conveys material information to the person paying for the 
communication about the plans, projects, activities, or needs of the 
candidate or political party committee, or material information used by 
the former employee in serving the candidate or political party 
committee. See 11 CFR 109.21(d)(5).
    The first three conduct standards in 11 CFR 109.21(d)(1)-(3) are 
satisfied only if either the principals themselves (i.e., candidates, 
their authorized committees, or political party committees) or their 
agents coordinate with the person paying for the

[[Page 73955]]

communication.\17\ However, because commercial vendors and former 
employees might not be agents of a candidate or a political party 
committee at the time they use or convey material information to a 
person paying for a communication, the ``common vendor'' and the 
``former employee'' conduct standards can be satisfied by persons other 
than the principals themselves or their agents. The Commission seeks 
comment on whether it should change the coordinated communication 
regulations to cover common vendors and former employees only if these 
common vendors and former employees are agents under the Commission's 
definition of agent in 11 CFR 109.3.\18\ Does the Commission have 
authority under the Act to make this change? If the Commission does 
make this change, would such agents then be covered by the first three 
conduct standards in 11 CFR 109.21(d)(1)-(3) or would the ``common 
vendor'' and the ``former employee'' conduct standards still cover some 
activities not captured by the first three conduct standards? If the 
Commission revises the common vendor and former employee conduct 
standards to cover only common vendors and former employees who are 
also agents, would that render these two conduct standards superfluous? 
If so, should the Commission then eliminate the conduct standards in 11 
CFR 109.21(d)(4) and (5)? Given that BCRA specifically required the 
Commission to promulgate regulations that addressed payments for the 
use of common vendors and for communications directed or made by 
persons who previously served as employees of a candidate or political 
party, does the Commission have authority under the Act to eliminate 11 
CFR 109.21(d)(4) and (5)?
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    \17\ The first conduct standard addresses communications 
produced at the request or suggestion of a candidate, an authorized 
committee, a political party committee, or an agent of any of the 
foregoing. See 11 CFR 109.21(d)(1). The second conduct standard 
addresses communications with which a candidate, an authorized 
committee, a political party committee, or an agent of any of the 
foregoing has been materially involved. See 11 CFR 109.21(d)(2). The 
third conduct standard addresses communications produced after one 
or more substantial discussions between the person paying for the 
communication, or that person's employees or agents, and the 
candidate clearly identified in the communication, the candidate's 
authorized committee, the candidate's opponent, or the opponent's 
authorized committee, or an agent of any of the foregoing. See 11 
CFR 109.21(d)(3).
    \18\ The definition of ``agent'' includes any person who has 
actual authority ``to make or authorize a communication that meets 
one or more of the content standards set forth in 11 CFR 109.21(c)'' 
on behalf of a political party committee or a Federal candidate or 
officeholder. See 11 CFR 109.3(a)(2) and (b)(2). For reasons 
unrelated to the issues addressed in this rulemaking, the Shays 
District court held that the Commission's definition of agent at 11 
CFR 109.3 violated APA requirements and remanded the regulation to 
the Commission for action consistent with its decision. Shays 
District at 88. In order to comply with the Shays District decision, 
the Commission has issued an NPRM that sought comment on whether the 
Commission should retain the current definition of ``agent'' and on 
several alternatives for revising the definition. See Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking on the Definition of ``Agent'' for BCRA 
Regulations on Non-Federal Funds or Soft Money and Coordinated and 
Independent Expenditures, 70 FR 5382 (Feb. 2, 2005). The Commission 
has not yet issued final rules in this rulemaking.
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    In the rulemaking proceeding that resulted in the 2002 Coordination 
Final Rules, the Commission received many comments on the common vendor 
conduct standard. Some of the comments expressed concern about the 
potential liability that would attach under the common vendor standard 
to candidates and party committees who employ the same vendors as other 
candidates and party committees because of the limited number of 
qualified vendors in a given geographic area.
    The Commission addressed this and other concerns in the 2002 
Coordination Final Rules by limiting the common vendor conduct standard 
to commercial vendors whose usual and normal business includes the 
creation, production, or distribution of communications; who have 
provided certain enumerated services to a candidate or party committee 
that put the vendor in a position to acquire information about the 
plans, projects, activities or needs of the candidate or party 
committee material to the creation, production, or distribution of the 
communication; who provide the specified services during the current 
election cycle; and who use or convey information about the candidate's 
or party committee's campaign plans, projects, activities or needs that 
is material to the creation, production, or distribution of the 
communication. See 68 FR 436-37. The Commission also excluded lobbying 
activities and information not related to a campaign from the scope of 
the rule.
    The Commission stated that it did not anticipate that a person who 
hired a vendor and followed prudent business practices would be 
inconvenienced by the common vendor conduct standard. See id. at 437. 
The Commission now invites comments on whether this supposition has 
proven to be correct.
    The Commission also seeks comment on whether it should create a 
rebuttable presumption that a common vendor or former employee has not 
engaged in coordinated conduct under 11 CFR 109.21(d)(4) and (5), if 
the common vendor or former employee has taken certain specified 
actions, such as the use of so-called ``firewalls,'' to ensure that no 
material information about the plans, projects, activities, or needs of 
a candidate or political party committee is used or conveyed to a third 
party. The Commission considered and rejected proposals to establish 
rebuttable presumptions and safe harbors in the common vendor conduct 
standard in the 2002 Coordination Final Rules. See id. More recently, 
however, the Commission recognized in the context of the first three 
conduct standards (11 CFR 109.21(d)(1)-(3)) that the presence of a 
firewall between staff assigned by a political committee to work 
directly with a candidate and staff assigned by the political committee 
to work on advertisements supporting that candidate was sufficient to 
refute certain allegations of coordination in a particular case. See 
Matter Under Review (``MUR'') 5506, First General Counsel's Report at 
5-8 (Commission found no reason to believe EMILY's List had violated 
section 441a of the Act based, in part, on a representation by EMILY's 
List that it had created a firewall whereby employees, volunteers, and 
consultants who handle advertising buys are ``barred, as a matter of 
policy, from interacting with federal candidates, political party 
committees, or the agents of the foregoing. These employees, volunteers 
and consultants are also barred from interacting with others within 
EMILY's List regarding specified candidates or officeholders.'').
    If the Commission decides to establish a rebuttable presumption or 
safe harbor in the common vendor and former employee conduct standards, 
what factors should the Commission consider in determining whether an 
effective firewall exists? Is the role of a firewall best addressed on 
a case-by-case basis through the enforcement process? Aside from 
setting up firewalls, are there other actions by a common vendor, 
former employee, or the political committees that engage them that the 
Commission should consider a safe harbor?
    The common vendor conduct standard and the former employee conduct 
standard incorporate the current election cycle \19\ as a temporal 
limit on their application. See 11 CFR 109.21(d)(4)(ii), (d)(5)(i). In 
the 2002 Coordination Final Rules, the Commission explained that 
``[t]he election cycle provides a clearly defined period of time that 
is reasonably related to an election.'' 2002 Coordination Final Rules 
at 436. The Commission invites comments on how this temporal limit 
works in practice. Is information about a candidate's campaign plans, 
products,

[[Page 73956]]

activities, or needs of such an ephemeral nature that its strategic 
significance dissipates shortly after the information is communicated, 
which may be long before the end of the election cycle, or does the 
information remain relevant throughout the election cycle? If the 
Commission concludes that the strategic value of such information does 
not necessarily last throughout an entire election cycle, should the 
Commission change the common vendor and former employee conduct 
standards to cover a shorter time frame? If so, how long should such a 
time frame be? Should the Commission adopt a 60-day time frame based on 
the Commission's determination, underlying its longstanding rule with 
respect to polling results, that such information outside of the 60-day 
time frame is of very little value? \20\ Alternatively, does the 
Commission's experience with the polling regulations provide evidence 
that the Commission should adopt a 180-day window for its coordination 
regulations? Alternatively, would retention of the election cycle time 
frame in the current rule more accurately align the rule with existing 
campaign practices?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ The term ``election cycle'' is defined in 11 CFR 100.3(b).
    \20\ The Commission's regulations on allocation of polling 
expenses at 11 CFR 106.4(g) provide that a candidate or political 
committee that receives poll results from a third party who 
commissioned and paid for the poll may report the value of the in-
kind contribution as an allocated percentage of the original cost of 
the poll, so long as the candidate or political committee received 
the poll results more than 15 days after the initial recipient 
received such results. Section 106.4(g) of the Commission's rules 
provides three tiers of discounted allocation based on how long the 
gap is between the original receipt of poll results and their 
receipt by a candidate or political committee--poll results received 
by a candidate or political committee between 16 and 60 days 
following receipt by the initial recipient may be allocated at 50 
percent of the original cost; between 61 and 180 days the allocation 
is at 5 percent of original cost; beyond 180 days, a candidate or 
political committee need not allocate any amount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The Use of Publicly Available Information in ``Coordinated 
Communications''--Proposed 11 CFR 109.21(g)

    The Commission seeks comment on whether to create a safe harbor 
that would make clear as a matter of law that (1) the use of publicly 
available information in connection with a public communication by any 
person paying for that public communication does not satisfy any of the 
conduct standards, and (2) a candidate's or political party committee's 
conveyance of publicly available information to any person paying for a 
public communication does not satisfy any of the conduct standards. 
This safe harbor in proposed 11 CFR 109.21(g) would cover situations in 
which a candidate, authorized committee, or political party committee 
has conveyed information publicly, such as, for example, at a campaign 
rally or on the candidate's or party's Web site or in a press release, 
or where such information is otherwise publicly available, such as 
having appeared in newspaper, television, or other press reports. 
Should such a safe harbor also cover situations in which the person 
paying for the communication has received the information both from the 
candidate, authorized committee, or political party committee, in a 
non-public context and also from a public source? How should the rules 
treat a situation in which the person paying for the communication did, 
in fact, receive the information only from the candidate, authorized 
committee, or political party committee, but could also have obtained 
the same information from a public source?
    The Commission also seeks comment on whether, if it adopts this 
safe harbor for the use of publicly available information, the burden 
of establishing whether the information was publicly available should 
be on the Commission or on the party seeking to make use of the safe 
harbor. If that burden were on the Commission, how would the Commission 
be able to establish that the information was not publicly available at 
the relevant time, given that some information, especially information 
available through the Internet, may be in the public domain only for a 
limited time period?

4. Relationship Between Conduct and Content Standards

    If the Commission broadens or eliminates the content standard for 
coordinated communications, the Commission seeks comment on whether it 
would be appropriate to narrow or otherwise modify any of the conduct 
standards. Are the conduct and content standards properly understood as 
dynamic and working in conjunction with each other?

VI. Issue Regarding the Payment Prong

    The payment prong (11 CFR 109.21(a)(1)) of the Commission's 
coordinated communication regulations was not challenged in Shays v. 
FEC. Nonetheless, the Commission is taking this opportunity to seek 
comment on whether it should clarify one aspect of the payment prong. 
Specifically, the Commission seeks comment on whether ``in whole or in 
part'' should be added to 11 CFR 109.21(a)(1) of the coordinated 
communication rules. The amendment would clarify that the payment prong 
is satisfied if a person other than the candidate, the candidate's 
authorized committee, or political party committee, pays for only part 
of the costs of the communication. Under this proposed amendment, 11 
CFR 109.21(a)(1) would be revised to read, ``Is paid, in whole or in 
part, by a person other than that candidate, authorized committee, 
political party committee, or agent of any of the foregoing.'' Does 
this amendment best effectuate the intended clarification of the 
payment prong? Would this clarification alter the application of the 
content or conduct prongs of the coordinated communication rules? Would 
this clarification inadvertently capture communications properly 
attributed under the time and space rules set forth at 11 CFR 
106.1(a)(1)?

VII. Party Coordinated Communications (11 CFR 109.37)

    The Commission notes that its ``party coordinated communication'' 
regulation at 11 CFR 109.37 also contains a three-prong test for 
determining whether a communication is coordinated between a candidate 
and a political party committee. Although not addressed in the Shays 
cases, the ``party coordinated communication'' test in 11 CFR 109.37 
has a content prong that is substantially the same as the one for 
``coordinated communications'' in 11 CFR 109.21(c).\21\ See 11 CFR 
109.37(a)(2). If the Commission decides to revise current 11 CFR 109.21 
as described in the alternatives set forth above, the Commission seeks 
comment on whether it should make conforming changes to the party 
coordinated communication regulations in 11 CFR 109.37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ 11 CFR 109.37(a)(2) differs from 11 CFR 109.21(c) in two 
ways: first, it does not contain a separate content standard for 
electioneering communications and, second, the content standard in 
section 109.37(a)(2)(iii), the equivalent of the fourth content 
standard in section 109.21(c)(4), can be satisfied only by reference 
to a clearly identified Federal candidate and not, as in section 
109.21(c)(4), also by reference to a political party.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addressing the conduct of national party officers under the 
national party soft money ban at 2 U.S.C. 441i(a), the Supreme Court 
stated, ``[n]othing on the face of [section 441i(a)] prohibits national 
party officers, whether acting in their official or individual 
capacities, from sitting down with state and local party committees or 
candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft money. As 
long as the national party officer does not personally spend, receive, 
direct, or solicit soft money, [section 441i(a)] permits a wide range 
of joint planning and electioneering activity.'' McConnell, 540 U.S. at 
160 (citing to Brief for Intervenor-

[[Page 73957]]

Defendants Sen. John McCain et al. in No. 02-1674 et al., p. 22, which 
stated that ``BCRA leaves parties and candidates free to coordinate 
campaign plans and activities, political messages, and fund raising 
goals with one another''); see also Advisory Opinion 2005-02 
(incorporating such principles). The Commission seeks comment on the 
relevance, if any, of this statement to the Commission's coordinated 
communication regulations. Does McConnell render the application of the 
conduct standards to coordination between a candidate and a political 
party committee at 11 CFR 109.37(a)(3) obsolete? Does it preclude a 
finding of coordination under the material involvement prong at 11 CFR 
109.21(d)(2)? Does the relationship between national party candidates 
and their parties justify adopting more permissive conduct standards 
for ``party coordinated communications'' in 11 CFR 109.37 than for 
coordinated communications in 11 CFR 109.21? If so, how should the 
conduct standards for ``party coordinated communications'' be amended?

Certification of No Effect Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b)

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Commission certifies that the attached proposed rules, if 
promulgated, would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. The basis for this certification 
is that any individuals and not-for-profit entities that would be 
affected by these proposed rules would not be ``small entities'' under 
5 U.S.C. 601. The definition of ``small entity'' does not include 
individuals, but classifies a not-for-profit enterprise as a ``small 
organization'' if it is independently owned and operated and not 
dominant in its field. 5 U.S.C. 601(4).
    Moreover, any State, district, and local party committees that 
would be affected by these proposed rules would be not-for-profit 
committees that do not meet the definition of ``small organization.'' 
State political party committees are not independently owned and 
operated because they are not financed and controlled by a small 
identifiable group of individuals, and they are affiliated with the 
larger national political party organizations. In addition, the State 
political party committees representing the Democratic and Republican 
parties have a major controlling influence within the political arena 
of their State and are thus dominant in their field. District and local 
party committees are generally considered affiliated with the State 
committees and need not be considered separately.
    Furthermore, any separate segregated funds that would be affected 
by these proposed rules would be not-for-profit political committees 
that do not meet the definition of ``small organization'' because they 
are financed by a combination of individual contributions and financial 
support for certain expenses from corporations, labor organizations, 
membership organizations, or trade associations, and therefore are not 
independently owned and operated.
    Most of the other political committees that would be affected by 
these proposed rules would be not-for-profit committees that do not 
meet the definition of ``small organization.'' Most political 
committees are not independently owned and operated because they are 
not financed by a small identifiable group of individuals. In addition, 
most political committees rely on contributions from a large number of 
individuals to fund the committees' operations and activities.
    To the extent that any State party committees representing minor 
political parties or any other political committees might be considered 
``small organizations,'' the number that would be affected by this 
proposed rule would not be substantial, particularly the number that 
would coordinate expenditures with candidates or political party 
committees in connection with a Federal election. Accordingly, to the 
extent that any other entities may fall within the definition of 
``small entities,'' any economic impact of complying with these rules 
would not be significant.
    With respect to commercial vendors whose clients include political 
party committees or other political committees, the proposed rules 
consider ways to reduce the existing regulatory restrictions. Thus, 
rather than adding an economic burden, the proposed rules would 
potentially have a beneficial economic impact on such commercial 
vendors.

List of Subjects in 11 CFR Part 109

    Elections, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Federal Election 
Commission proposes to amend Subchapter A of Chapter I of Title 11 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 109--COORDINATED AND INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES (2 U.S.C. 
431(17), 441a(a) AND (d), AND PUB. L. 107-55 SEC. 214(c))

    1. The authority citation for Part 109 would continue to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 2 U.S.C. 431(17), 434(c), 438(a)(8), 441a, 441d; Sec. 
214(c) of Pub. L. 107-55, 116 Stat. 81.

Alternative 1

    2. Section 109.21 would be amended by revising paragraphs (c)(1) 
and (c)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  109.21  What is a ``coordinated communication''?

* * * * *
    (c) Content standards. Each of the types of content described in 
paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(4) satisfies the content standard of this 
section.
    (1) An electioneering communication under 11 CFR 100.29.
    (2) A public communication that disseminates, distributes, or 
republishes, in whole or in part, campaign materials prepared by a 
candidate, the candidate's authorized committee, or an agent of any of 
the foregoing, unless the dissemination, distribution, or republication 
is excepted under 11 CFR 109.23(b). For a communication that satisfies 
this content standard, see paragraph (d)(6) of this section.
    (3) A public communication that expressly advocates the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate for Federal office.
    (4) A public communication, as defined in 11 CFR 100.26, and about 
which each of the following statements in paragraphs (c)(4)(i), (ii), 
and (iii) of this section is true. Payment for a public communication 
that otherwise satisfies paragraphs (c)(4)(i), (ii), and (iii) of this 
section is not an in-kind contribution to a candidate if the public 
communication is not publicly distributed or otherwise publicly 
disseminated 120 days or fewer before that candidate's own election.
    (i) The public communication refers to a political party or to a 
clearly identified candidate for Federal office;
    (ii) The public communication is publicly distributed or otherwise 
publicly disseminated 120 days or fewer before a general, special, or 
runoff election, or 120 days or fewer before a primary or preference 
election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has 
authority to nominate a candidate; and
    (iii) The public communication is directed to voters in the 
jurisdiction of the clearly identified candidate or to voters in a 
jurisdiction in which one or

[[Page 73958]]

more candidates of the political party appear on the ballot.
* * * * *

Alternative 3

    3. Section 109.21 would be amended by revising paragraphs (c)(4) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  109.21  What is a ``coordinated communication''?

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) A public communication, as defined in 11 CFR 100.26, and about 
which each of the following statements in paragraphs (c)(4)(i) and (ii) 
of this section is true.
    (i) The public communication refers to a political party or to a 
clearly identified candidate for Federal office; and
    (ii) The public communication is directed to voters in the 
jurisdiction of the clearly identified candidate or to voters in a 
jurisdiction in which one or more candidates of the political party 
appear on the ballot.
* * * * *

Alternative 4

    4. Section 109.21 would be amended by revising paragraph (c)(4) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  109.21  What is a ``coordinated communication''?

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) A public communication, as defined in 11 CFR 100.26, and about 
which each of the following statements in paragraphs (c)(4)(i), (ii), 
and (iii) of this section is true.
    (i) The public communication refers to a political party or to a 
clearly identified candidate for Federal office;
    (ii) The public communication promotes, supports, attacks, or 
opposes or the political party or clearly identified candidate for 
Federal office; and
    (iii) The public communication is directed to voters in the 
jurisdiction of the clearly identified candidate or to voters in a 
jurisdiction in which one or more candidates of the political party 
appear on the ballot.
* * * * *

Alternative 5

    5. Section 109.21 would be amended revising the introductory 
language for paragraph (c) and by adding a new paragraph (c)(5) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  109.21  What is a ``coordinated communication''?

* * * * *
    (c) Content standards. Each of the types of content described in 
paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) satisfies the content standard of this 
section.
* * * * *
    (5) A public communication, as defined in 11 CFR 100.26, and about 
which each of the following statements in paragraphs (c)(5)(i), (ii), 
and (iii) of this section is true.
    (i) The public communication is made by a political committee, as 
defined in 11 CFR 100.5;
    (ii) The public communication refers to a political party or to a 
clearly identified candidate for Federal office; and
    (iii) The public communication is directed to voters in the 
jurisdiction of the clearly identified candidate or to voters in a 
jurisdiction in which one or more candidates of the political party 
appear on the ballot.
* * * * *

Alternative 6

    6. Section 109.21 would be amended by revising paragraph (c)(4) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  109.21  What is a ``coordinated communication''?

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) A public communication, as defined in 11 CFR 100.26, that is 
made for the purpose of influencing an election for Federal office.
* * * * *

Alternative 7

    7. Section 109.3 would be amended by revising paragraphs (a)(2) and 
(b)(2) to read as follows:


Sec.  109.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (2) To make or authorize an electioneering communication as defined 
in 11 CFR 100.29 or a public communication as defined in 11 CFR 100.26.
* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) To make or authorize an electioneering communication as defined 
in 11 CFR 100.29 or a public communication as defined in 11 CFR 100.26.
* * * * *
    8. Section 109.21 would be amended by:
    a. Revising paragraph (a)(2);
    b. Removing and reserving paragraph (c)
    c. Revising the first sentence of paragraph (d)(6) to read as set 
forth below.
    The additions and revisions would read as follows:


Sec.  109.21  What is a ``coordinated communication''?

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (2) Is an electioneering communication as defined in 11 CFR 100.29 
or a public communication as defined in 11 CFR 100.26; and
* * * * *
    (c) [Removed and reserved.].
    (d) * * *
    (6) Dissemination, distribution, or republication of campaign 
material. A communication that disseminates, distributes, or 
republishes, in whole or in part, campaign materials prepared by a 
candidate, the candidate's authorized committee, or an agent of any of 
the foregoing, shall satisfy the conduct standards of paragraphs (d)(1) 
through (d)(3) of this section only on the basis of conduct by the 
candidate, the candidate's authorized committee, or the agents of any 
of the foregoing, that occurs after the original preparation of the 
campaign materials that are disseminated, distributed, or republished. 
* * *
* * * * *

Proposed Safe Harbor for Use of Publicly Available Information

    9. Section 109.21 would be amended by adding a new paragraph (g) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  109.21  What is a ``coordinated communication''?

* * * * *
    (g) Safe harbor for use of publicly available information.
    (1) The use of publicly available information by any person paying 
for a public communication in connection with a public communication 
does not satisfy any of the conduct standards in paragraph (d) of this 
section.
    (2) A candidate's or political party committee's conveyance of 
publicly available information to any person paying for a public 
communication does not satisfy any of the conduct standards in 
paragraph (d) of this section.

Proposed Clarification of ``Payment Prong''

    10. Section 109.21 would be amended by revising paragraph (a)(1) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  109.21  What is a ``coordinated communication''?

    (a) * * *
    (1) Is paid for, in whole or in part, by a person other than that 
candidate, authorized committee, political party

[[Page 73959]]

committee, or agent of any of the foregoing when the communication:
* * * * *

    Dated: December 8, 2005.
Scott E. Thomas,
Chairman, Federal Election Commission.
[FR Doc. E5-7293 Filed 12-13-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6715-01-P