[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 186 (Tuesday, September 27, 2005)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 56541-56559]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-19208]



[[Page 56541]]

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Part III





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 121



Improved Seats in Air Carrier Transport Category Airplanes; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / 
Rules and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 121

[Docket No. FAA-2002-13464-2; Amendment No. 121-315]
RIN 2120-AC84


Improved Seats in Air Carrier Transport Category Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule amends the FAA's regulations on the 
crashworthiness of passenger and flight attendant seats on transport 
category airplanes used in part 121 passenger-carrying operations. This 
final rule requires those transport category airplanes type-
certificated after January 1, 1958 which have not yet been manufactured 
that are used in part 121 passenger-carrying operations to have 
passenger and flight attendant seats that meet the current improved 
crashworthiness standards. This action is necessary because research, 
accident data, and analysis show that these improvements provide 
increased occupant protection in airplanes involved in impact-
survivable accidents.

DATES: This amendment becomes effective October 27, 2005. Transport 
category airplanes manufactured on and after October 27, 2009 used in 
part 121 passenger carrying operations must comply with this final 
rule.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Hal Jensen, Aircraft Engineering 
Division, AIR-100, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8807; facsimile 
(202) 267-5340, e-mail [email protected].

Authority for This Rulemaking

    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 
Title 49, Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, General 
requirements, and Section 44705, Air carrier operating certificates. 
Under section 44701(b), the FAA may prescribe minimum safety standards 
for an air carrier to which the agency issues a certificate under 
section 44705. Under section 44705, the FAA issues an operating 
certificate to a person desiring to operate as an air carrier if the 
FAA finds, after investigation, that the person properly and adequately 
is equipped and able to operate safely under Part A and the regulations 
and standards prescribed under it.
    This regulation is within the scope of section 44701 because it 
establishes new minimum safety standards that the seats in transport 
category airplanes that are used in part 121 passenger-carrying 
operations must meet to protect occupants of that airplane if it is 
involved in an impact-survivable accident. The regulation also is 
within the scope of section 44705 since the section requires that the 
person to whom the FAA issues an air carrier operating certificate be 
properly and adequately equipped to operate safely. The improved seats 
mandated by this regulation will increase the safety of air carrier 
operations.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy of this final rule using the 
Internet by:
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking's Web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    (3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a copy by filing a request with the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. To 
facilitate a prompt response, please make sure to identify the 
amendment number, notice number or docket number of this rulemaking in 
your request.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for 
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations 
within its jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a 
question about this document, you may contact your local FAA official, 
or the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can 
find out more about SBREFA on the Internet at our Web page, http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/, or by e-
mailing us at [email protected].

Background

A. History

1. Pre-SNPRM
    This final rule is in response to Section 303(b) of the Airport and 
Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987 (Pub. L. 100-223) (the 
Act of 1987) and follows a notice of proposed rulemaking published in 
1988 and a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking published in 2002 
(SNPRM). The Act of 1987 directed the Secretary of Transportation to:

    ``* * * initiate a rulemaking proceeding to consider requiring 
all seats onboard all air carrier aircraft to meet improved 
crashworthiness standards based upon the best available testing 
standards for crashworthiness.''

    In 1988 the FAA concurrently published a final rule, ``Improved 
Seat Safety Standards'' (53 FR 17640, May 17, 1988)(Amendment 25-64) 
and a notice of proposed rulemaking, ``Retrofit of Improved Seats In 
Air Carrier Transport Category Airplanes'' (53 FR 17650, May 17, 1988) 
(Notice 88-8). Amendment 25-64 upgraded the certification standards for 
occupant protection during emergency landing conditions in transport 
category airplanes from only a 9g static standard to an upgraded 9g 
static standard and a new 16g dynamic standard. Notice 88-8 proposed to 
prohibit, after June 16, 1995, the operation of transport category 
airplanes under parts 121 and 135 that were type-certificated after 
January 1, 1958 unless all seats onboard met the certification 
requirements of Sec.  25.785 in effect on June 16, 1988. These 
certification requirements include the 16g standard created by 
Amendment 25-64.
    The FAA received 70 comments to Notice 88-8. Based on these 
comments, we decided that we needed more information to determine the 
impact of Notice 88-8 on the aviation community. Even though much 
research and development on the dynamic testing of seats had been done 
to support the 16g standard, the process of certifying seats to the 16g 
standard was still new. The dynamic testing requirements for 16g seats 
represented an increase in sophistication and complexity over the 
simpler static testing used for 9g seats. Industry needed time to work 
out the technical problems of meeting the 16g seat standard, and we 
needed time to evaluate specific problems presented by industry and to 
develop proper guidance material for obtaining 16g seat certification.
    As these issues were addressed by industry and the FAA, our 
standards

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and guidance material evolved. This helped the aircraft seat 
manufacturing industry transition from producing 9g seats to 16g seats 
that could meet the new requirements. During this time, we never lost 
sight of the goal of improving the crashworthiness of seats in 
transport category airplanes. The significant actions taken during this 
time included:
     On March 6, 1990, we published an advisory circular (AC) 
to provide industry guidance on the dynamic test process. This was AC 
25.562-1, ``Dynamic Evaluation of Seat Restraint Systems & Occupant 
Protection on Transport Airplanes.'' AC 25.562-1A superseded AC 25.562-
1 on January 19, 1996.
     We worked with industry through the Society of Automotive 
Engineers SEAT Committee to develop a standard that would detail the 
requirements for dynamic testing of a 16g seat. That standard 
(Aerospace Standard (AS) 8049, Performance Standard for Seats in Civil 
Rotorcraft, Transport Aircraft and General Aviation Aircraft) was 
incorporated in Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C127 (Rotorcraft, 
Transport Airplane, and Normal and Utility Airplane Seating Systems) in 
1992 and revised in 1998 (TSO-C127a).
     We held a public meeting on October 23 and 24, 1995, in 
Seattle, Washington, to gather information on challenges the industry 
had in meeting our 16g dynamic seat certification requirements for new 
programs and for existing airplanes that would be affected by the 
proposed rulemaking. We presented our views and listened to comments 
from the aviation industry at that meeting. The information gained 
during this public meeting led us to reconsider the original rule 
proposed in Notice 88-8.
    From the mid-to-late 1990s, although industry and the FAA continued 
to address significant 16g seat issues primarily related to occupant 
protection, enough progress had been made that 16g seats were being 
produced and approved regularly. Therefore, we determined it was 
suitable to move forward with our proposed rulemaking to improve seats 
on transport category airplanes. As a result, we held a public meeting 
on December 8 and 9, 1998. The goals of this meeting were to discuss 
our proposed revisions to Notice 88-8 and to get current information 
and viewpoints. In addition to seeking comments at the public meeting, 
we reopened the docket for comments. We received approximately 40 
additional comments by the close of this comment period.
    The above is a summary of the events leading up to the publication 
of the SNPRM. For a more detailed discussion, please read the 
``Background'' section of the SNPRM.
2. SNPRM
    On October 4, 2002, the FAA published a supplemental notice of 
proposed rulemaking (SNPRM), ``Improved Seats in Air Carrier Transport 
Category Airplanes'' (67 FR 62294, October 4, 2002). The SNPRM proposed 
the following:
     For all airplanes manufactured on or after four years 
after the effective date of the final rule, all passenger and flight 
attendant seats on the airplane must meet the requirements of Sec.  
25.562 in effect on June 16, 1988 (proposed Sec.  121.311(j)(1));
     For all airplanes manufactured before four years after the 
effective date of the final rule, all passenger and flight attendant 
seats on the airplane must meet the requirements of Sec.  25.562 in 
effect on June 16, 1988, after any passenger seat or any flight 
attendant seat in that airplane is replaced (proposed Sec.  
121.311(j)(2)); and
     On or after fourteen years after the effective date of the 
final rule, no person could operate a transport category airplane type-
certificated after January 1, 1958, in passenger-carrying operations 
under this part unless all passenger and all flight attendant seats on 
the airplane meet the requirements of Sec.  25.562 in effect on June 
16, 1988 (proposed Sec.  121.311(k)).
    In preparing the SNPRM, the FAA hired a consultant to conduct an 
analysis of the benefits of 16g seats over 9g seats in transport 
category airplanes. This consultant, R.G.W. Cherry & Associates Limited 
(Cherry), performed this analysis and produced a report entitled ``A 
Benefit Analysis for Aircraft 16g Dynamic Seats'' (Report DOT/FAA/AR-
00/13/April 2000)(the Cherry Report).
    The Cherry Report studied those transport category airplane 
accidents that occurred from 1984 to 1998 and predicted the benefits to 
the occupants if 16g seats had been installed in those airplanes. It 
predicted:
     A range in the reduction of serious injuries to occupants 
in impact-survivable accidents if they were in 16g seats instead of 9g 
seats; and
     A range in the reduction of fatalities to occupants in 
impact-survivable accidents if they were in 16g seats instead of 9g 
seats.
    Since publication of the SNPRM, Cherry completed an addendum report 
entitled ``A Benefit Analysis for Aircraft 16-g Dynamic Seats 
Configured Without Enhancements to Head Injury Criteria'' (DOT/FAA/AR-
04/27, March 2003)(the Cherry Report Addendum). The Cherry Report 
Addendum assessed the incremental benefits resulting from the enhanced 
Head Injury Criteria.

B. Seat Classifications--9g/16g/16g ``Compatible''

    Currently, there are several classifications of seats in transport 
category airplanes used in part 121 operations. They are as follows:
1.9g Seats
a. What is a 9g seat?
    A 9g seat is tested to different load factors in different 
directions. The highest load factor is in the forward direction at 
9g's. This is why these seats are commonly referred to as 9g seats. The 
testing procedure is typically accomplished by applying a force to the 
seat through the safety belt by means of a cable and winch system. The 
minimum force that the seat must be capable of reacting in the forward 
direction without structural failure is 9 times the combined weight of 
the seat and a 170 pound occupant in each seat place. As an example, if 
a seat had three places and the seat weighs 100 pounds, then the seat 
must be capable of reacting 5490 pounds ((170 pounds per occupant times 
3 seat places plus 100 pounds of seat weight) times 9).
b. Regulations and the TSO for 9g Seats
    In 1952, the regulations for transport category airplane seats were 
revised to increase the emergency landing condition forward load factor 
from 6g's to 9g's. Five years later, the FAA issued TSO-C39 (``Aircraft 
Seats and Berths'') that included guidance on static testing to 9g's 
for seats that would be used in transport category airplanes. It is 
important to note that obtaining TSO C39 approval for a seat does not 
mean that the seat is approved for installation in an airplane. A 
separate approval, known as an installation approval, is necessary to 
show the seat's compliance with all the applicable regulations of the 
FAA. However, because TSO C39 was closely aligned with the other 
applicable regulations then in effect, installation approval was easy 
to attain if the seat had TSO C39 approval. This was generally the 
process for getting a 9g seat approved for use in an airplane until 
1988.
2.16g Seats
a. What is a 16g seat?
    For transport category airplanes, a 16g seat is one that meets the 
9g requirements of Sec.  25.561 and the

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dynamic requirements of Sec.  25.562. A 16g seat is tested in a manner 
that simulates the loads that could be expected in an impact-survivable 
accident. Two separate dynamic tests are conducted to simulate two 
different accident scenarios: one in which the forces are predominantly 
in the vertical downward direction and one in which the forces are 
predominantly in the longitudinal forward direction. The highest load 
factor is in the forward direction at 16 g's. This is why these seats 
are commonly referred to as 16g seats. The test procedure requires 
``crash testing'' the seat (i.e., rapidly decelerating the seat in 
accordance with the criteria in Sec.  25.562(b)). For the 16g test, 
this means deceleration must go from a minimum of 44ft/sec to 0 ft/sec 
in not more than 0.09 seconds with a peak deceleration of at least 
16g's. The seats are tested with seat floor tracks that are 
representative of those that will be used in the airplane installation.
    The seats are also tested with test dummies in each seat position. 
The reaction of the test dummies during the dynamic test imparts loads 
into the seat restraints and seat structure more accurately than the 
cable and winch system used in the 9g seat static pull test. The test 
dummies are instrumented to measure data like forces and accelerations 
that are then used for evaluating occupant protection criteria. As an 
example, accelerometers in the heads of the test dummies measure 
accelerations that are used in calculating the Head Injury Criteria 
(HIC). Limitations on an acceptable level of HIC serve to protect the 
occupant from serious head injury where head contact with seats or 
other structure can occur. 16g seats also:
     Protect the occupant from debilitating leg and spine 
injuries;
     Improve the attachment to the airframe;
     Protect crewmembers from serious chest injury when upper 
torso restraints are used; and
     Ensure occupants do not become trapped in their seats due 
to excessive seat deformation.
b. Regulations and the TSO for 16g Seats
    In 1988, the emergency landing conditions were revised to include 
dynamic landing conditions to improve occupant protection. Four years 
later, TSO-C127 (``Rotorcraft, Transport Airplane, Normal and Utility 
Airplane Seating Systems'') was issued and included guidance on dynamic 
testing of 16 g's for seats that would be used in transport category 
airplanes. As previously stated, TSO seat approval is not installation 
approval. Although TSO C127 is the basis for getting most 16g seats 
approved for use in transport category airplanes, installation approval 
is not as easy as it is for a 9g seat.
    The 16g seat installation approval process is more complicated than 
the 9g seat installation approval process because the dynamic standard 
includes several occupant protection criteria not required for the 9g 
seat. These occupant protection criteria can only be completely 
evaluated when the seat is considered in relationship to how and where 
it is installed in the airplane. For example, the dynamic test will 
cause a test dummy's upper torso and head to swing forward in an arcing 
motion since the test dummy is constrained only at the pelvis by the 
safety belt. A record of the motion of the test dummy's head through 
the arc, called a headpath trace, can be recorded during the testing 
for the TSO approval. The headpath trace is used during the 
installation approval process to ensure there is enough clearance from 
objects, like bulkheads or equipment mounted to partitions, to reduce 
the possibility of a head strike. Because airplane interior 
arrangements differ by airplane model--and even from operator to 
operator for the same airplane model--the headpath trace must be 
evaluated for each unique installation. This illustrates one reason why 
installation approval cannot rely solely on the TSO approval.
3. 16g ``Compatible'' Seats
    Transport category airplanes designed between 1952 and 1988 were 
required to have seats that met the 9g emergency landing conditions in 
Sec.  25.561. These standards were met by the static testing described 
above in the section entitled ``Regulations and TSO for 9g seats.'' 
Typically, the seats approved in those airplanes were also approved to 
TSO-C39. When Amendment 25-64 went into effect in 1988, any transport 
category airplane design submitted for approval was required to have 
seats that met both the 9g static standard in Sec.  25.561 and the 16g 
dynamic standard in Sec.  25.562.
    However, Amendment 25-64 applied only to new airplane designs like 
the Boeing B-777. Airframe manufacturers occasionally redesign an 
existing airplane design to meet marketing demands rather than develop 
a new design from scratch. These redesigned airplanes are referred to 
as derivative models, since they are based largely on a previously 
approved airplane design. An example of this is the Boeing B-737NG 
models (737-600, -700, -800, -900), which are based on the previously 
approved B-737 airplane design. The basis for a derivative model design 
approval is the regulations in place at the time of the original design 
approval. However, for a variety of reasons, the derivative model 
design will be approved to regulations more current than those in 
existence when the original design was approved, but not quite to the 
level of the regulations current at the time of application for a 
derivative model design approval.
    There are numerous derivative transport category airplane models 
approved after 1988 whose original design was approved before 1988. 
These airplane models' seats do not meet all the requirements of Sec.  
25.562 (16g seats), but meet more than the requirements of Sec.  25.561 
(9g seats). The dynamic standard in Sec.  25.562 includes criteria to 
evaluate the seat's structural integrity and occupant protection during 
dynamic testing. Most of the derivative models meet the seat structural 
integrity requirements in Sec.  25.562 but none or only a few of the 
occupant protection requirements in Sec.  25.562. Seats that have been 
approved to meet the 9g requirements in Sec.  25.561 and the seat 
structural integrity requirements in Sec.  25.562 are commonly called 
16g ``compatible'' seats.

Discussion of Comments

A. Request for Extension

    Based on requests for an extension of the comment period from the 
Aerospace Industries Association, Airbus, the Aviation Technical and 
Safety Committee Cabin Safety Working Group, The Boeing Company, the 
General Aviation Manufacturers Association and the Regional Airline 
Association, the FAA extended the SNPRM's comment period from December 
3, 2002 to March 3, 2003.

B. General Summary

    In addition to the requests for extension, the FAA received forty-
six comment submissions in response to the SNPRM. Two of these comment 
submissions are duplicates and one is an attachment from another 
comment, from which it had been separated. In addition, two individual 
commenters address issues about passengers with disabilities and are 
directed at other rulemaking initiatives. We will not address these two 
comment submissions in this discussion of comments.
    Of the remaining forty-one comment submissions, twelve commenters 
either express support for the proposed rule or their support can be 
implied from their comments. Another ten commenters generally support 
the proposed rule, but suggest changes. These twenty-two commenters are 
mostly individuals and

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companies that provide aircraft interior components. Among the reasons 
given for their support:
     The results of the cost-benefit analysis are reasonable 
and the amortized cost of seat upgrades will be offset by increased 
ticket prices;
     Any safety increase justifies any rise in ticket prices;
     Economies of scale will make safety improvements 
economical;
     The deaths and injuries being avoided far outweigh the 
issue of cost to conform to the proposed rule; and
     The safety of passengers and their ability to survive an 
impact-survivable accident is very important.
    Six of these commenters also favor shorter implementation periods 
than those proposed in the SNPRM.
    Fourteen commenters oppose the proposed rule. These commenters are 
mostly air carriers and airframe manufacturers. These commenters base 
their opposition on a belief that:
     The cost-benefit analysis is flawed because it fails to 
adequately address issues like how the costs would impact an industry 
struggling in a post-9/11 travel economy or whether the industry's 
limited resources would be better spent on other safety initiatives 
that would result in bigger dividends;
     The proposed rule is contrary to the Safer Skies and 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) initiatives; and/or
     No convincing accident data exists to support the need for 
16g seats and, therefore, a convincing safety benefit case cannot be 
made for requiring 16g seats.
    The remaining five commenters recommend one or more of the 
following actions in addition, or as alternatives, to the proposed 
rule:
     Requiring the use of rearward facing seats;
     Making child restraint improvements and setting up 
regulatory changes that would mandate securing all children in safety 
seats;
     Requiring the use of three-point harness restraints or 
shoulder harnesses;
     Requiring the use of air bags;
     Requiring the use of a standardized seat belt latching 
mechanism or, without such standardization, telling passengers of any 
variations among seat belt latching mechanisms;
     Improving seat belt security, using fewer seats or 
changing seating configuration; and
     Focusing the FAA's attention on flight crew safety and 
health issues.
    Some of those commenters expressing support or opposition for the 
proposed rule also recommend some of the above actions as possible 
alternatives.

C. Acronyms

    In this Discussion of Comments section, we use the following 
acronyms or abbreviated company names to identify the associated 
commenters:
     Air Transport Association (ATA)
     AMSAFE Aviation (AMSAFE)
     Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA)
     Association of European Airlines (AEA)
     Association of Flight Attendants (AFA)
     Association of Professional Flight Attendants (APFA)
     Aviation Technical and Safety Committee Cabin Safety 
Working Group (ATASCO)
     B/E Aerospace, Inc. (B/E)
     The Boeing Company (Boeing)
     The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT)
     National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation (NADA/F)
     RECARO Aircraft Seating (RECARO)
     Regional Airline Association (RAA)
     Sicma Aero Seat Services (Sicma)

D. Removal of Retrofit Requirements

    As stated in the regulatory evaluation supporting the SNPRM, the 
FAA believed there were two viable options to improve seats in 
transport category airplanes operating under part 121 at that time:
     Requiring full 16g seats in newly manufactured airplanes 
only (Option 2 in the SNPRM's regulatory evaluation); and
     Requiring full 16g seats in newly manufactured airplanes 
and replacement with full 16g seats for all other in-service airplanes 
(Option 5 in the SNPRM's regulatory evaluation).
    While Option 2 was projected to have a benefit-to-cost ratio 
greater than 1.0 at that time, it also averted fewer fatalities and 
serious injuries than Option 5. Therefore, we decided to move forward 
with Option 5.
    Based on the comments received to the SNPRM, we decided to re-
evaluate the retrofit requirements of proposed Sec. Sec.  121.311(j)(2) 
and 121.311(k). After detailed consideration, we now believe the final 
rule should not contain these retrofit requirements and that we should 
proceed with the requirement for newly manufactured airplanes only.
    There are several reasons why the FAA's current analysis of Options 
2 and 5 has resulted in a different conclusion from that in the SNPRM. 
All of these reasons are the result of the dramatic changes in the 
airline industry since the publication of the SNPRM.
1. Accelerated Retirement of Pre-1992 Manufactured Airplanes
    Initially, the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 significantly 
impacted the airline industry because many people were less likely to 
fly. Rather than flying airplanes with empty seats, many airlines 
choose to ``park'' or ``retire'' their older airplanes. While the 
impact of the terrorist attacks on passenger boardings has passed, the 
industry remains in poor shape financially for reasons including, but 
not limited to, high fuel prices and increased competition from low-
cost carriers. Therefore, those older airplanes that are inefficient to 
operate remain ``retired.''
    Since 9/11, part 121 operators have ``retired'' over 1,360 
airplanes. This represents 23.6% of the pre-9/11 part 121-fleet. The 
majority of these airplanes were manufactured before 1992 (for example, 
B-727, B-737-100/200/300, B-747-100/200, DC-9, F-100, DC-10, L-1011, 
MD-80) and were certified for 9g seats. Due to the high operating costs 
associated with these airplanes, it is unlikely that many of these 
``retired'' airplanes will find their way back into the part-121 fleet.
    The retirement of these pre-1992 manufactured airplanes has 
occurred at a rate far faster than that projected in the SNPRM's 
regulatory evaluation. In that regulatory evaluation, those seats 
installed on airplanes manufactured prior to 1992 fell into one of two 
categories: Group I or Group II seats.\1\ In 1999, the seats in Groups 
I and II totaled 477,991 and comprised approximately 66% of the total 
seats in the part 121-fleet. For 2004, the projected seat total barely 
changed (477,707) and comprised approximately 54% of the part 121-
fleet. The decrease from a projected 66% to a projected 54% was based 
on more airplanes with 16g seats entering the part 121-fleet. For the 
last forecast year in the SNPRM's regulatory evaluation (2020), these 
seats were projected to still make-up approximately 20% of all seats in 
the part 121-fleet. Therefore, with such a significant percentage of 
potential 9g seats projected to be in the part 121-fleet over the 
course of the forecast period (1999-2020), the need

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for the retrofit requirement was more apparent.
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    \1\ Group I covered those seats in airplanes manufactured before 
1992 having seats installed before 1992. While 16g seats were being 
installed before this date, the majority of these seats are 9g. 
Group II covered those seats in airplanes manufactured before 1992 
having replacement seats installed after 1991. Some (unknown) 
proportion of seats in this group may have partial 16g performance 
although no airplane model in this group is 16g certificated.
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    However, the accelerated retirement of so many pre-1992 
manufactured airplanes alters this conclusion. These airplane 
retirements mean approximately 155,000 Group I and Group II seats were 
removed from the part-121 fleet. By comparison, for the last forecast 
year of the SNPRM's regulatory evaluation (2020), only 109,020 Group I 
and Group II seats were projected to have been removed from the part-
121 fleet. The removal of these 155,000 seats also has a dramatic 
affect on the percentages discussed before. The percentage of Group I 
and Group II seats in the 2004 part-121 fleet drops from a projected 
54% to an actual 36%. These seats are now at a level previously 
projected to occur in 2011.
    Based on this accelerated retirement of pre-1992 manufactured 
airplanes, the FAA believes the level of occupant protection has 
increased dramatically over the past few years in the part-121 fleet. 
The FAA also believes the accelerated retirement of pre-1992 
manufactured airplanes will continue to occur as airlines strive to 
increase the efficiency of their operations.
2. Increased Appeal and Use of Regional Jets
    One factor that assisted in the accelerated retirement of pre-1992 
manufactured airplanes is the continued appeal of regional jets and the 
new ways airlines are using these airplanes. As pointed out in the 
comment from RAA, within the last 10 years, the U.S. regional fleet has 
rapidly transitioned from a mostly turboprop fleet to a majority 
regional jet fleet. As of October, 2004, almost 1,600 regional jets 
were in operations with part 121 carriers, with over 600 more on firm 
order and options and conditional orders for over 1,700 more.\2\
    Most of these regional jets are newer designs that must meet the 
requirements of Amendment 25-64. According to RAA, in 2004, about 77% 
of the entire regional fleet was capable of meeting at least the 
structural requirements of Amendment 25-64.
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    \2\ Figures from the Regional Air Service Initiative (http://www.regionalairservice.org).
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    The effects of 9/11 on the airline industry have increased the 
appeal of the regional jet. Whereas, in the past, the regional jet was 
primarily used to replace turboprops or open new markets, several 
airlines are now using it as a tool to replace inefficient larger jets 
on certain routes. In addition, JetBlue and USAirways have placed large 
orders for regional jets that will be used in their own operations.
    Based on developments such as these, the FAA expects that regional 
jets will play an even larger role in the part 121-fleet than 
considered for the SNPRM. As a result, this will further increase the 
percentage of 16g seats in the part 121-fleet.
3. Effect of Certification Costs
    Based on the dramatic changes in the part-121 fleet over the past 3 
years, which are expected to continue for the foreseeable future, the 
FAA believes the resource expenditure associated with retrofitting 
seats on existing airplanes would no longer be cost beneficial.
    As stated before, the installation approval process for a 16g seat 
is more complicated than the installation approval process for a 9g 
seat because the dynamic standard includes occupant protection criteria 
not required for the 9g seat. The occupant criteria can only be 
completely evaluated when the seat is considered in relationship to how 
and where it is installed in the airplane's cabin. A seat's 
installation in relationship to other seats and other objects in the 
airplane affects the number of dynamic tests that must be successfully 
completed. If all seats were uniformly installed at the same distance 
from one row to the next in every airplane, only a few forward tests 
would be required: perhaps one to show structural adequacy and one or 
two to demonstrate occupant protection. However, this is not the case. 
Cabin configurations vary from airplane to airplane and also from 
operator to operator. Some operators even have different configurations 
within the same airplane model in their fleets.
    Therefore, different tests are required to determine the effect of 
such things as seatback video monitors, bulkheads, partitions, seat 
pitch and seat angle (seats installed in tail sections where the 
fuselage tapers are frequently installed at an angle relative to the 
other rows). These examples represent some of the installation issues 
that result in numerous forward dynamic testing for a single airplane 
configuration. The testing and resultant seat approval can be used for 
other airplanes of the same model that have identical configurations. 
However, even if another operator uses the same seating configurations, 
if it uses seats from a different seat manufacturer or a different seat 
model from the same manufacturer, a new series of tests will be 
required.
    Because approval to Sec.  25.562 is largely dependent on the 
airplane's interior, considerable effort is expended by the seat 
manufacturer and the airframe manufacturer to ensure the seat design 
will work with the airplane design prior to any seat testing. If 
failure to meet Sec.  25.562 becomes evident during testing, there are 
several options available to resolve the non-compliance: the seat can 
be redesigned, the seat can be reconfigured within the airplane, or the 
airplane can be redesigned. Usually redesigning the airplane is the 
last option chosen due to expense and time needed to integrate the 
change. But, if required, the design change can be accomplished at less 
expense in airplanes manufactured in the future than in existing 
airplanes. Upgrading existing airplanes to meet Sec.  25.562 may 
require modification and substantiation of a range of seat pitches, 
changes to bulkheads to which flight attendant seats are mounted, 
increasing seat setbacks from bulkheads, partitions, and emergency 
exits, and removal of seats in some circumstances. All of these 
concerns can be handled more effectively when time is allowed for 
proper planning of the redesign and integration in airplanes 
manufactured in the future. Resolving the same non-compliances in 
existing airplanes require more costly modifications to the interiors 
and is more likely to result in the loss of revenue-generating seats.
4. Conclusion
    Based on the above, the FAA decided to mandate improved seats for 
only those airplanes type-certificated after January 1, 1958 which have 
not yet been manufactured. While this requirement may require airframe 
manufacturers to make design modifications, we believe that the four-
year compliance period provides sufficient time for them to develop 
efficient solutions.
    The FAA still believes that this final rule is necessary to improve 
occupant protection in impact-survivable accidents. We believe that 
these types of accidents can still occur and this rule focuses on 
protecting occupants when these accidents do occur. Although we 
recognize that most of the seats in the current part-121 passenger 
carrying fleet are capable of meeting the dynamic testing structural 
criteria, we want to ensure that all occupant protection criteria `` 
including HIC `` are met. In addition, the airplanes covered by this 
final rule include several models that have hundreds of outstanding 
orders. These airplanes will remain in the part-121 passenger carrying 
fleet the longest and should, therefore, offer the best level of 
occupant protection available for seat certification. Finally, as we 
discuss below in more detail, this final rule is also cost-beneficial, 
with a benefits-to-costs ratio of 2.27 to 1 (or,

[[Page 56547]]

2.15 to 1 and 1.98 to 1 when underlying estimates are in present value 
at 3% and 7%. respectively).
    We acknowledge that, for some yet-to-be manufactured airplanes, the 
requirement of this final rule will have no practical effect as 16g 
seats are already mandated as a result of the airplane's certification 
basis. Specifically, the requirements of Amendment 25-64 are applicable 
to those airplanes for which an application for a type certificate was 
made on or after June 16, 1988. Therefore, no action should be 
necessary to bring those airplanes into compliance with this final rule 
assuming that they comply fully with Sec.  25.562. In general, this 
final rule will require compliance action for those new production 
airplane models that were type-certificated after January 1, 1958 and 
before June 16, 1988 and derivatives of such models for which an 
application for an amended type-certificate was made after January 1, 
1958.
    We do not believe that the removal of the retrofit requirement will 
cause an increase in the use of 9g seats. There is no incentive for 
seat manufacturers and operators to reverse the current trend away from 
9g seats. Both domestic and foreign seat manufacturers have changed the 
way they manufacture seats in order to meet the requirements for 16g 
``compatible'' and 16g seats. It currently does not make financial 
sense for them to run a separate 9g seat manufacturing line to meet a 
declining need. While some seats are sold with a 9g label, it is our 
belief that these seats are the same seats that are sold as 16g 
``compatible.'' We see no reason why this situation would change. 
However, we will continue to monitor this issue. If we see an increase 
in the use of 9g seats, we will consider taking action to stop this 
development.

E. Discussion of Non-Retrofit Comments

    Since the retrofit requirements have been removed from this final 
rule, the comments that address only those provisions (i.e., proposed 
Sec. Sec.  121.311(j)(2) and 121.311(k)) are no longer relevant to this 
rulemaking action and will not be addressed in detail in this final 
rule. We discuss the other comments received about the SNPRM in the 
following order:
     General comments about the cost-benefit analysis;
     Comments about the cost side of the cost-benefit analysis;
     Comments about the benefit side of the cost-benefit 
analysis;
     General comments about flight attendant seats;
     Comments about the cost-benefit analysis for flight 
attendant seats;
     General technical comments; and
     Other comments.
    In the following discussion of comments, we use the term ``newly 
manufactured airplanes.'' This means those transport category airplanes 
type certificated after January 1, 1958 and manufactured on or after 
October 27, 2009, that are used in part 121 passenger-carrying 
operations.

Cost-Benefit Analysis--General

Proposed Rule Will Result in Increased Ticket Prices

    A commenter states that the proposed rule would result in increased 
ticket prices. The commenter believes these higher prices would then 
force some of the traveling public to drive instead of fly, thereby 
increasing their risk of injury or death. This commenter suggests that 
we perform further analysis on this issue.
    FAA Response: The FAA has greatly reduced the scope of this 
rulemaking from that proposed in the SNPRM. This change produces a 
reduction in predicted costs from $519 million to $34.7 million (or, 
$22.3 million and $13.3 million in present value at 3% and 7%, 
respectively).
    Based on historical evidence and the vastly lower predicted costs 
of this rulemaking, we do not expect that this final rule will result 
in an increase in ticket prices.

Cost-Benefit Ratio Does Not Justify the Change

    A commenter believes the cost-benefit ratio does not justify the 
proposed rule.
    FAA Response: For the base case scenario presented in the 
regulatory evaluation supporting this final rule (i.e., using accident 
rates for the 1984-1998 period), the total costs of this rulemaking, 
over the analysis period, are $34.7 million (or, $22.3 million and 
$13.3 million in present value at 3% and 7%, respectively). The total 
benefits of installing fully compliant 16g seats are $78.9 million (or, 
$47.9 million and $26.4 million in present value at 3% and 7%, 
respectively). Therefore, this rulemaking is cost-beneficial, with a 
benefit-to-cost ratio of 2.27 to 1 (or, 2.15 to 1 and 1.98 to 1 when 
underlying estimates are in present value at 3% and 7%, respectively).
    While the final rule in its entirety is cost-beneficial, the FAA 
notes that, separately, the requirements for passenger seats and flight 
attendant seats are each cost-beneficial. For passenger seats, the 
benefits of installing fully compliant 16g seats are approximately 
$76.3 million (or, $46.4 million and $25.5 million in present value at 
3% and 7%, respectively), as compared to the costs of $33.7 million 
(or, $21.5 million and $12.8 million in present value at 3% and 7%, 
respectively).
    For flight attendant seats, the benefits of installing fully 
compliant 16g seats are $2.5 million (or, $1.5 million and $850,000 
million in present value at 3% and 7%, respectively), as compared to 
the costs of approximately $954,000 ($731,000 and $529,000 in present 
value at 3% and 7%, respectively).
    A copy of this regulatory evaluation is in the docket for this 
final rule. You can get a copy of this analysis by using any of the 
methods listed above in the ``Availability of Rulemaking Documents'' 
section of this final rule.

Analysis Fails to Accurately Account for Impact on Small Businesses

    RAA states that the FAA fails to accurately account for the 
proposal's impact on small business operators.
    FAA Response: The FAA performed a regulatory flexibility analysis 
for both the proposed rule and this final rule. Both assessments showed 
no significant impact on small businesses. A detailed discussion of 
this determination is located later in this document in the section 
entitled ``Regulatory Flexibility Analysis'' and in the regulatory 
evaluation supporting this final rule.

Analysis Fails to Consider Differences Between Regional Transport 
Category Airplanes and Very Large Transport Category Aircraft

    RAA believes the cost-benefit analysis does not consider the 
differences between regional transport category airplanes and very 
large transport category airplanes. RAA argues that the benefit 
methodology assumes there will be 100 occupants per accident, while the 
average number of seats on regional transport category airplanes is 
well below 50 occupants.
    FAA Response: The Cherry Report does not assume there will be 100 
occupants per accident. The methodology in the Cherry Report used 100 
occupants as an example to explain the concept of ``survivability 
chains.'' Of the 25 accidents that provided enough information for 
analysis, the number of passenger and flight attendant seats ranged 
from 38 to about 350.

Analysis Fails to Account for Fewer Flight Attendants in Regional 
Transport Category Airplanes

    RAA states that regional transport category airplanes typically 
have only one flight attendant, not two. According

[[Page 56548]]

to RAA, this difference further skews the cost-benefit analysis.
    FAA Response: Based on the FAA's flight attendant requirements as 
specified in Sec.  121.391, the SNPRM's regulatory evaluation assumed 
one flight attendant per 50 passengers regardless of the aircraft size. 
Therefore, the cost and benefit calculations were normalized between 
regional transport category airplanes and larger transport category 
airplanes. This assumption remains in the regulatory evaluation 
supporting this final rule. We believe this assumption is conservative 
as air carriers often provide more flight attendants than the number 
required by regulation.

Rulemaking Does Not Provide the Most Safety Value for the Economic 
Investment

    Boeing states the proposed rule does not provide the most safety 
value for the economic investment. Boeing states that since the 
aircraft manufacturing and airline industries have been reeling from 
some of the worst economic conditions in their histories, it is now 
more important than ever to invest in the safety initiatives that 
provide the best return. Therefore, Boeing believes we should reexamine 
the cost-benefit analysis.
    FAA Response: As discussed above, based, in part, on comments 
received, the FAA reconsidered the proposed rule and removed 
requirements from the final rule to upgrade seats in existing 
airplanes. However, it still requires improved seats in newly 
manufactured airplanes. As a result, the costs of this final rule are 
substantially less than those of the proposed rule (from $519 million 
to $34.7 million). As noted above, this rulemaking is now cost 
beneficial with a benefits to costs ratio of 2.27 to 1.

Cost-Benefit Analysis--Costs

Costs Too Low

    ATA believes the FAA's cost-benefit analysis is faulty because we:
    (1) Failed to consider the high costs of upgrading monument walls 
to support flight attendant seats;
    (2) Failed to consider the high costs associated with removing 
seats to meet the front-row head injury criteria (HIC); and
    (3) Failed to consider the cost of demonstrating compliance with 
the more complex requirements than were discussed in previous 16g seat 
retrofit comment periods (1998, 1988).
    ATASCO agrees that the FAA's cost forecast is ``too low'' and ``far 
from the realistic cost.'' ATASCO would like the FAA to perform the 
cost-benefit analysis again based on the comments received.
    FAA Response: As for the issue of removing seats to comply with 
front-row HIC, the FAA notes that reasonable solutions and 
alternatives, like air-bag technology, exist and/or can be developed to 
prevent the need for removing a row of seats. Since this final rule 
does not require compliance for four years from its effective date, we 
believe that this compliance date provides industry with enough time to 
carry out cost-effective solutions.
    As for ATA's concerns about compliance costs, we have included 
estimates of compliance costs in our cost-benefit analysis for this 
final rule.
    Finally, our analysis includes estimates of the costs associated 
with strengthening monument walls to support 16g flight attendant 
seats. We based our estimates on data provided by an airframe 
manufacturer.

Analysis Fails to Consider Increase in Certification Costs

    Boeing asserts that the FAA's cost analysis does not consider the 
added complexity of the new certification requirements. Boeing 
maintains that certification to the dynamic requirements of Sec.  
25.562 is more complex and time consuming than certification to the 
static testing requirements. This added complexity takes more time and 
resources for the airframe manufacturer, as well as the seat suppliers 
and the airlines. Boeing believes this ``complexity-factor'' is 
overlooked by our cost analysis.
    ATA agrees with Boeing.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees that dynamic testing is more complex 
and time consuming than static testing. In addition, we acknowledge 
that we did not include this ``complexity-factor'' in the SNPRM's 
regulatory evaluation.
    However, to ensure the accuracy of our estimates of the 
certification costs in the regulatory evaluation supporting this final 
rule, we obtained updated cost information from Boeing on this subject 
and have included it in our analysis. Since our estimates are now in-
line with Boeing's cost information, we believe that the regulatory 
evaluation supporting the final rule does consider the complexity of 
certification to the dynamic requirements of Sec.  25.562.

Cost-Benefit Analysis--Benefits

Analysis Fails to Consider Declining Accident Rate

    Boeing believes the cost-benefit analysis fails to account for 
declining accident rates over the past decade. Boeing claims the 
accident statistics used by the FAA to support the proposed rule ignore 
impressive improvements made in aviation safety. Based on these 
improvements, Boeing maintains that the benefits analysis does not 
consider a declining future accident rate that is consistent with the 
Safer Skies goals. Boeing believes the FAA should revise the regulatory 
analysis to match FAA published safety goals.
    RAA agrees with Boeing, stating that the Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team (CAST) projects an 80% reduction in accidents by 2007 through 
implementing a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) retrofit, 
implementing constant descent approach and other safety enhancement 
procedures. RAA states that the FAA's cost-benefit analysis should 
account for these safety improvements when forecasting the accident 
rate for the next 20 years.
    ATA and AAPA agree with RAA and Boeing.
    FAA Response: In the regulatory evaluation supporting this final 
rule, the FAA has performed sensitivity tests of our accident rate 
using multiple time periods. In each case, the predicted benefits 
exceed the predicted costs of this final rule.
    Considerable progress has been made under CAST and Safer Skies to 
reduce the accident rate. However, we believe that impact-survivable 
accidents can still occur and this rule focuses on protecting occupants 
when these accidents do occur.

Analysis Fails to Consider Impact of September 11

    Boeing comments that the FAA enplanement estimates do not account 
for the slowing world economy and the effects of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks. Boeing recommends that the FAA update the benefit 
analysis to reflect future estimated enplanements using 2001 or, 
preferably, 2002 data.
    ATA agrees, stating that forecasts for future enplanements have 
decreased and this should impact the cost-benefit analysis.
    FAA Response: The FAA acknowledges that we based the proposed 
rule's regulatory evaluation on pre-9/11 information. At that time, the 
long-term effects of 9/11 on enplanements were difficult to predict.
    However, for the regulatory evaluation supporting this final rule, 
we based our enplanement estimates on the data in ``FAA Aerospace 
Forecasts for Fiscal Years 2003-2014'' (FAA-APO-03-1, March 2003). This 
forecast accounts for recent world events, including the events of 
September 11, 2001.

[[Page 56549]]

Analysis Fails to Consider U.S. Fleet Changes

    Boeing states the benefit analysis does not account for changes in 
fleet capacity and fleet age resulting from recent world events. Boeing 
argues that the current part 121-fleet has changed dramatically since 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Boeing states that many 
airlines are retiring their oldest aircraft because of system 
overcapacity and most of these retired aircraft have 9g seats. Boeing 
recommends that the FAA revise the benefit analysis to reflect this 
change.
    FAA Response: Since, in the final rule, the FAA is no longer 
requiring existing seats to be retrofitted, changes in fleet capacity 
resulting from recent world events have only a negligible effect on the 
cost-benefit analysis. However, as we stated above, part 121-fleet 
changes since 9/11 are a factor in our decision to remove the retrofit 
provisions from the final rule. In particular, the retirement of old 
airplanes and the addition of new airplanes since 9/11 result in a 
younger fleet with more airplanes that are fully or partially compliant 
with Sec.  25.562. We believe that newly manufactured seats used for 
replacement seats in existing airplanes--even when labeled as 9g 
seats--have, in general, the capability of meeting the 16g structural 
requirements. Based on this, when operators replace 9g seats with newly 
manufactured seats, the level of occupant protection improves. These 
factors support our decision for not going forward with rulemaking that 
affects the existing fleet.

``Double Counting'' of Benefits

    Boeing believes the FAA gave credit to seat improvements for lives 
already saved by other safety initiatives. Boeing states that a subset 
of accident scenarios used to justify 16g seats includes accidents 
involving controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), wind shear, takeoff 
with improper flap/slat setting, and approach and landing accidents. 
Boeing believes we are ``double counting'' benefits already realized 
through other safety actions. Therefore, Boeing believes we should 
remove such accidents from the Cherry Report and recalculate the 
benefits.
    FAA Response: Even though the accident rate has declined, impact-
survivable (as well as non-survivable) accidents will still occur. For 
these impact-survivable accidents, installation of 16g seats in new 
airplanes will reduce the number of fatalities and serious injuries.
    Further, the FAA reassessed the accidents used in the Cherry Report 
to determine if any of the accidents studied would not have happened 
today based on any regulatory change since their occurrence. We found 
that none of these regulatory changes would have directly affected the 
outcome of the accidents in the Cherry Report. Of further note, 10 of 
the 25 accidents studied yielded no reduction of fatalities or serious 
injuries due to using improved seats. This attests to the non-bias of 
the assessment.

Safety Analysis Inadequate

    ATA states that the FAA's safety analysis is inadequate.
    FAA Response: The FAA has continued to assess the merits of 16g 
seats since this rule was first proposed in 1988. During that time, we 
examined many options available to improve seats in transport category 
airplanes.
    Based on this review, we believe there is a clear need to improve 
safety for passengers and flight attendants in the event of an impact-
survivable accident. The Cherry Report demonstrates this need. Based on 
the predicted benefits of 16g seats over 9g seats in the Cherry Report 
and in the regulatory evaluation supporting this final rule, this final 
rule should achieve that goal.

Accidents Studied not Appropriate for this Analysis and No Proof 16g 
Seats Would Have Reduced Fatalities and Serious Injuries in Accidents 
Studied

    Boeing states the benefit analysis was not well correlated with the 
types of accidents where 16g seats would have been an influence in 
saving lives. For example, Boeing claims the Cherry Report cited 
accidents where survival was a matter of chance. Boeing argues that 
such accidents are atypical of those used to justify part 25 standards. 
According to Boeing, it is inappropriate to use such accidents to 
justify the need for equipment that was not specifically designed to be 
effective in these severe events. Boeing believes that the FAA should 
not use these accidents in the benefit analysis.
    In addition, Boeing believes the assessment of whether the use of 
16g seats would have actually reduced the number of fatalities and 
serious injuries is ``inadequate.'' Boeing believes the Cherry Report's 
assessment approach is nothing more than ``guesswork.''
    FAA Response: The FAA believes that the accidents studied were 
appropriate. The Cherry Report looked at only those impact-survivable 
accidents that had sufficient textural data from NTSB accident reports 
to make a determination whether a 16g seat would have made a difference 
in occupant survivability. The resulting 25 accidents were then studied 
to determine the difference in fatalities and serious injuries to 
occupants had 16g seats been in place. The assessment of these 
accidents was then used to make a more general assessment on similar 
impact-survivable accidents that lacked adequate textural information 
in the accident reports to make an individual finding.
    The FAA also disagrees with Boeing's negative assertion about the 
Cherry Report's assessment approach. The Cherry Report used a logical 
three-stage assessment approach that eliminated any ``guesswork.'' 
First, as stated above, the Cherry Report determined which accidents 
were valid to study to evaluate the effect of 16g seats. The Cherry 
Report then looked at each space within the accident aircraft that 
exhibited a similar threat to the occupants. This prevented making 
gross assumptions about the effect of 16g seats on occupant 
survivability for the entire aircraft based on the worst-case area of 
the aircraft for each accident. Finally, for each space that posed a 
similar threat to the occupants, the Cherry Report then examined that 
space on a seat-by-seat basis to determine the effect a 16g seat would 
have made had it been in place. The FAA believes this assessment 
approach is the best analysis to date to predict the benefits of 16g 
seats. Nonetheless, as we stated before, we reevaluated the Cherry 
Report to see if any of the accidents studied would not have happened 
today based on any regulatory change since their occurrence. We found 
that none of these regulatory changes would have directly affected the 
outcome of the accidents in the Cherry Report. Therefore, we believe 
that these accidents remain valid candidates for evaluating the effect 
of 16g seats and provide sufficient proof of the benefits of such 
seats.
    While survival for each occupant in an accident may be a matter of 
chance to some extent, the Cherry Report's analysis determined that the 
use of 16g seats would have increased those chances of survival for 
occupants in those accidents evaluated.

Analysis Overstates Benefits of Streamlined Seat Certification Process

    ATA states the cost-benefit analysis is inaccurate and overstates 
the benefits of the FAA-Industry Seat Certification Streamlining 
activities. More importantly, ATA points out that this streamlining 
process does not yet exist. ATA believes we should not include 
efficiencies from streamlining the seat certification process in the 
cost-benefit analysis until they have been demonstrated.

[[Page 56550]]

    AAPA agrees, claiming that our analysis takes credit for 
undemonstrated certification streamlining.
    Boeing concurs, stating that the efforts to improve the seat 
certification process over the past several years have not materially 
improved the cost or flow time to certify seats. Therefore, Boeing 
argues that before the FAA can take the benefit from these activities, 
there must be demonstrated results.
    FAA Response: The regulatory evaluation supporting the SNPRM did 
not quantify any benefits from the effects of the Seat Certification 
Streamlining efforts. The regulatory evaluation only stated that 
potential unclaimed benefits exist due to the efforts made by both 
industry and the FAA under the Seat Certification Streamlining program. 
This is the same approach used in the regulatory evaluation supporting 
this final rule.
    To try to reduce certification costs and simplify the seat 
certification process, we will continue to work with industry under the 
Seat Certification Streamlining program. In the past, this cooperation 
has resulted in the FAA implementing many of industry's recommendations 
to improve the seat certification process and reduce costs.

Analysis Overestimates Performance of 16g Seats

    Boeing states the benefits analysis vastly overestimates the 
expectation of 16g seat performance in past accident scenarios. Boeing 
believes we should recalculate the benefits to reflect this more 
accurately.
    FAA Response: The performance expectation of 16g seats is based on 
long-standing FAA/industry-coordinated research. The genesis of the 16g 
seat standard came from recognition that many deaths or serious 
injuries in general aviation airplanes could be avoided if the 
crashworthiness of the airplane was improved. Additional research 
showed this also applied to transport category airplanes. Please refer 
to the ``Background'' section above for more information on the 
development of the 16g standard. The FAA viewed the new dynamic seat 
standards as a necessity and major improvement over existing static 
seat standards. While it is difficult to precisely quantify the 
improvements of seats that meet the dynamic standard over seats that 
meet only the static standard, we believe the estimates used to develop 
the regulatory evaluation are reasonable, justified and the best 
available data. No commenter provided data or expert opinion to dispute 
our assessment of 16g seat performance during the comment period.

Use of High Benefit Estimates in Error

    Boeing is concerned that, in the FAA's benefit analysis, we used 
the Cherry Report's ``high'' benefit estimate of the decrease in 
fatalities and serious injuries because of the possible unmeasured 
benefits of ``better than 9g seats.'' Boeing believes that, of the 
accidents analyzed, it is likely that many of the accidents did not 
involve aircraft with ``better than 9g seats.'' According to Boeing, 
only five of the accidents studied definitely involved aircraft with 
``better than 9g seats.'' Therefore, any unmeasured benefit of ``better 
than 9g'' seats should be specific to those 5 accidents.
    ATA states that by using the ``high'' benefit estimate from the 
Cherry Report, we inaccurately stated the true costs/benefits of the 
proposed rule. ATA believes the use of the Cherry Report's ``high'' 
benefit estimate is not reasonable because of the number of 16g 
compatible seats in the fleet.
    FAA Response: Based on our review of the comments received and a 
re-examination of the Cherry Report, the FAA agrees that the ``median'' 
benefit estimate from the Cherry Report represents a better estimate 
based on the available data. For the regulatory evaluation supporting 
this final rule, we have reassessed the benefits using the Cherry 
Report's ``median'' benefits estimate of the decrease in fatalities and 
serious injuries.

Flight Attendant Seats--General

Inclusion in Rule--General--Support

    Goodrich Aircraft Interior Products strongly supports the inclusion 
of the 16g standard for flight attendant seats in the proposed rule. 
This support is based on the potential for additional passenger lives 
being saved by flight attendants who would not be injured due to their 
being seated in 16g seats during an accident.
    IBT concurs, stating that the FAA has recognized the critical role 
of cabin crews in evacuating airplanes in survivable accidents.
    An individual commenter also supports the inclusion of flight 
attendant seats in the proposed rule, stating there is little value in 
increasing passenger survivability without providing an equal increase 
for flight attendants.
    A second individual commenter agrees, stating that cabin crews 
should be afforded the best crash protection against incapacitating 
injuries that could prevent them from performing their role during 
emergency evacuations.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees and is requiring flight attendant 
seats and passenger seats in newly manufactured airplanes to meet all 
the requirements of Sec.  25.562. In this manner, the requirements for 
passenger and flight attendant seats are the same.

Inclusion in Rule--General--Opposition

    An individual commenter states that the link between flight 
attendants and passengers being safely evacuated seems very tenuous at 
best and does not justify the high cost of the proposed rule.
    A second individual commenter believes we have not fully developed 
the argument for flight attendant seat upgrades. This individual states 
that this issue should be the subject of an independent proposal. This 
individual also points out that variations in seat mounting add 
complexity and expense to the proposal and that we need to recognize 
this in our analysis.
    AAPA also recommends that we exempt cabin attendant seats from this 
final rule.
    FAA Response: The FAA believes sufficient information exists to 
support how important flight attendants are in passenger evacuation. 
However, we acknowledge the decision to upgrade flight attendant seats 
was not based on an independent study. Historically, NTSB reports have 
not consistently addressed the role of flight attendants in passenger 
evacuation in every accident. Under the best of circumstances, this 
information can be subjective and difficult to assess accurately. In 
the qualitative assessment of the benefits gained by including flight 
attendant seats in the proposal, we recognized the effect that trained 
personnel have on the successful evacuation of passengers who survive 
an accident's impact because of improved seats. We carefully analyzed 
the Cherry Report's findings and determined there were sufficient 
accident cases where the flight attendant would have survived with a 
16g seat. We believe the flight attendants who would have survived an 
accident as a result of being restrained in a 16g seat would have 
helped these passengers to safety, thereby avoiding these fatalities. 
Our regulatory evaluation shows that the final rule is cost-beneficial 
for the inclusion of both passenger and flight attendant seats.

Inclusion in Rule--Need Testing Specific to Flight Attendant Seats

    APFA strongly opposes including flight attendant seats in the rule. 
APFA believes testing specific to cabin attendant seats should be 
undertaken to adequately determine the safety of these seats before 
changes are mandated.

[[Page 56551]]

APFA claims that the assumption cannot be made that such seats will 
perform in a manner similar to passenger seats. Therefore, APFA 
concludes that flight attendant seats should meet the 16g standard, but 
stresses the differences between different seat types and 
configurations.
    FAA Response: The dynamic standard of Sec.  25.562 is suitable for 
all seats used in transport category airplanes and the FAA does not 
intend to delay this rule by undertaking a new study. Although accident 
reports have shown that flight attendant seats typically withstand a 
crash better than passenger seats in the same area and we recognize 
that passenger seats and flight attendant seats are mounted 
differently, we do not believe that those differences warrant any 
further performance analysis.

Inclusion in Rule--Costs Too High

    ATASCO asserts that we should exclude flight attendant seats 
because of the high costs required to make flight attendant seats 
comply with Sec.  25.562.
    FAA Response: One reason the FAA decided to proceed with this 
rulemaking for newly manufactured airplanes only was the high cost of 
mandating the upgrade of flight attendant seats on existing airplanes.
    However, for newly manufactured airplanes, we contend that the 
incremental costs of changing current designs to address seat mounting 
issues is justified by the benefits (i.e., lives saved by flight 
attendants in impact-survivable accidents). In addition, we believe 
that manufacturers will be able to accomplish and implement these 
design changes prior to October 27, 2009.

Rule Should Apply to Newly Manufactured Aircraft Only

    With 55% ($285.7 million) of the overall undiscounted upgrade costs 
related to flight attendant seats, Airbus questions the need for their 
replacement. Airbus believes the accident data does not support the 
assumption that cabin attendants would be ``less safe'' in 9g seats 
than passengers in 16g seats. Airbus also states that, to justify this 
cost, it is assumed that each cabin attendant who does not suffer fatal 
or serious injuries due to the introduction of 16g seats would then 
take actions to avert further passenger fatalities. Airbus believes 
this assumption is an uncertain estimate. Airbus recommends that we 
apply the 16g standard of Sec.  25.562 only to new aircraft programs.
    FAA Response: The high costs associated with replacing flight 
attendant seats in existing airplanes was part of the reasoning that 
led the FAA to revise the proposal so that this final rule applies to 
newly manufactured airplanes only.
    However, we disagree with Airbus' comment about the role of flight 
attendants during emergency evacuations. As we stated above, we contend 
that a review of aircraft accidents indicates that the presence of 
flight attendants during an evacuation after an impact survivable 
accident improve passenger survivability. The Cherry Report 
specifically refers to cases where flight attendants assisted 
passengers to safety. Therefore, we contend it is reasonable to expect 
that surviving flight attendants trained in emergency procedures will 
save lives in an impact survivable accident.

Allow for TSO-C127 Compliant Flight Attendant Seat Installation

    Boeing states that this final rule should allow for the 
installation of TSO-C127 compliant flight attendant seats because full 
compliance with Sec.  25.562 requires upgrades to the monuments on 
which flight attendant seats are mounted. Boeing believes this violates 
the assumption in the SNPRM about minimizing the impact to the aircraft 
structure. Therefore, Boeing recommends that any implementation of 
flight attendant seat upgrades should exclude upgrade requirements for 
galleys, lavatories, partitions, or other items on which these seats 
are mounted.
    FAA Response: The FAA is requiring one level of safety for seats 
throughout the cabin of newly manufactured airplanes. How a seat is 
secured to the airframe is crucial to ensuring that flight attendants 
are adequately protected. Therefore, the mounting structures for flight 
attendant seats that have been dynamically tested must be capable of 
supporting the seats consistent with current airworthiness 
requirements. Dynamically tested flight attendant seats have been 
successfully certified on numerous aircraft with many different 
mounting configurations. We contend that providing industry with a 
four-year period in which to comply with this rule provides enough time 
for industry to develop cost-effective solutions for any unique 
installation issues that 16g flight attendant seats may present.

Separate Rulemaking for Flight Attendant Seats

    An individual commenter recommends placing the provisions affecting 
flight attendant seats in a separate rulemaking project. In this way, 
the complications and costs associated with covering flight attendant 
seats can be thoroughly examined.
    FAA Response: The FAA believes we have conducted a thorough 
examination of the costs and other implications associated with 
applying the 16g standard to flight attendant seats. This analysis 
supports our decision to include flight attendant seats in the final 
rule. A separate rulemaking would result in a delay in providing the 
same crash protection for flight attendants as would be afforded 
passengers under this rule.

Flight Attendant Seats--Cost-Benefit Analysis

Analysis Fails to Consider Impact on Aircraft Structure and Monuments

    Boeing states that the FAA's cost analysis fails to consider the 
impact of including flight attendant seats on the aircraft structure 
and monument design. Boeing believes we did not include the costs 
resulting from increased monument weight needed to support seats with 
higher loading capability in the cost analysis. In addition, Boeing 
states that because windscreens, partitions, and flight attendant seats 
are tested as a system, a change to the seats will require added 
testing and certification costs. Boeing argues that we do not account 
for these costs in our analysis.
    ATA agrees with Boeing and believes that we also did not include 
the high costs to upgrade monument walls for flight attendant seats in 
the cost analysis.
    Airbus states we did not consider the cost to modify the support 
structure for wall-mounted seats or to replace their components if the 
new dynamic test criterion is applied.
    Finally, ATASCO states that compliance with Sec.  25.562 will 
require potential cabin interior re-design and additional certification 
activities.
    FAA Response: While the regulatory analysis supporting the SNPRM 
did not specifically break down the costs for testing and certification 
of improved flight attendant seats, these costs were included in that 
analysis and considered the use of monuments, partitions and wind 
screens, consistent with current policy. The regulatory analysis for 
this final rule also includes such costs. However, to ensure the 
accuracy of our estimates of the certification costs in the regulatory 
evaluation supporting this final rule, we obtained updated cost 
information from Boeing on this subject and have included it in our 
analysis. Our estimates are now in-line with Boeing's cost information.
    As for any increased aircraft weight associated with improving 
flight

[[Page 56552]]

attendant seats, the FAA expects that any changes that might be 
required of monuments will not significantly increase airplane weight. 
However, we did include weight increases of 13 pounds per airplane for 
flight attendant dynamic seats and 36 pounds per airplane for passenger 
seats in our analysis. We recalculated costs based on this new data 
supplied by Boeing.
    Finally, as for other impacts associated with improving flight 
attendant seats, the FAA has provided industry with adequate time to 
develop cost effective solutions to this rule.

Impact on Seating at Monument Locations

    Boeing comments that our cost analysis did not examine the impact 
on seating arrangements at monument locations and the cost of new 
technologies to mitigate this impact.
    ATASCO agrees, stating that compliance with Sec.  25.562 will 
require the possible loss of an entire seat row due to configuration 
changes.
    FAA Response: The FAA believes that new technologies, like 
inflatable restraints, provide low-cost solutions that will prevent the 
loss of a seat row and the associated revenue. In fact, we re-evaluated 
the issue, and, in the final rule's regulatory evaluation, estimated 
the acquisition/installation costs for seat-belt air bags necessary to 
meet the front row HIC requirement. The regulatory evaluation for this 
final rule estimates that about four percent of all seats will require 
such restraints. Use of these restraints is less costly than removing a 
row of seats to meet front row HIC requirements.

Technical Comments

Structural Requirements of Sec.  25.562 Sufficient

    AEA believes the structural requirements of Sec.  25.562 provide a 
significant increase in safety. However, the extra requirements for 
occupant protection (e.g., HIC) would require costly recertification 
programs and changes in seat layout. AEA argues that a safety case is 
missing for those extra requirements since the cost-benefit analysis 
does not specify the percentage of fatalities and injuries because of 
unfulfilled HIC and front-row rules.
    FAA Response: The FAA believes it is necessary to propose a rule 
that ensures one level of safety for all occupants. HIC is an important 
aspect of occupant protection criteria. Therefore, we believe that a 
rule that requires compliance with only the structural requirements of 
Sec.  25.562 is not meeting the intent or gaining the maximum benefit 
of Amendment 25-64.
    We acknowledge that the cost to ensure HIC is met increases the 
cost of seat certification. However, we believe that this cost increase 
is justified by the benefits of HIC compliance.

Exclusion of 16g Seat Compliance From Sec.  25.785

    IBT objects to the exclusion of 16g seat compliance from Sec.  
25.785, as was originally outlined in the 1988 NPRM. IBT believes this 
omission weakens the rule.
    AMSAFE agrees, remarking that proposing compliance with Sec.  
25.562 while excluding the requirements of Sec.  25.785 weakens the 
proposed rule.
    FAA Response: The FAA does not agree that the exclusion of the 
requirements of Sec.  25.785 weakens this final rule. We believe the 
intent of this final rule is to improve seats in transport category 
airplanes based on dynamic testing. We also believe that Sec.  25.562 
accomplishes that goal without creating the extra burden of requiring 
compliance with the provisions of Sec.  25.785.

AC 25.562-1A ``Exemption'' From Head Injury Protection Requirements

    IBT raises concerns over what it terms as an exemption from the 
head injury protection requirements of Sec.  25.562(c)(5) afforded by 
AC 25.562-1A. IBT states that this AC permits the extension of seat 
pitch away from a vertical hazard as a method of compliance with Sec.  
25.562. IBT believes that such an extension of seat pitch introduces a 
potential head injury hazard from the occupant of such a seat striking 
his own legs and/or the aircraft floor. IBT concludes that requiring a 
16g seat without requiring HIC testing and adherence to HIC standards 
does not promote an acceptable safety level.
    AMSAFE agrees, recommending removal of what it terms as the AC 
25.562-1A ``loophole'' that allows an applicant to move or extend seat 
pitch away from a vertical hazard. By so moving or extending the seat, 
the occupant can strike his or her own legs or the floor of the 
airplane. The resulting HIC from this impact is not considered in this 
process. AMSAFE believes that removing the ``loophole'' will also 
reduce the potential for liability losses.
    FAA Response: The FAA disagrees with the comments of IBT and 
AMSAFE. AC 25.562-1A provides acceptable methods for complying with 
Sec.  25.562. This can include avoidance of the hazard by locating the 
seat such that the occupant's head cannot strike an object. Also, we do 
not believe the measurements obtained when a test dummy strikes itself 
are accurate for use in calculating HIC and predicting injury. Without 
an accurate means of measuring this phenomenon, we do not believe this 
situation should be evaluated as part of the criteria for determining 
compliance with Sec.  25.562. We also do not believe that a head strike 
with the airplane floor occurs to an extent that it should be added to 
the Sec.  25.562 criteria or evaluated under Sec.  25.785. We believe 
this phenomenon is rare, if it does occur. Testing of this nature would 
require a representative floor structure be included in the dynamic 
test and this would dramatically increase the test's complexity.

Seat Track Failures

    RECARO asks how we will handle situations in which a seat track 
fails, resulting in a failed 16g certification test.
    FAA Response: Since seat track ``crowns'' are tested and approved 
under 16g dynamic standards, failures of the seat track crowns will be 
unacceptable. Traditionally, these types of failures require a redesign 
of the seat track fitting to lessen loads to the seat track crowns. 
This usually results in a change or replacement of the seat track 
fitting. Since the dynamic testing standard was developed in 
correlation with 9g static floors and seat tracks, the FAA does not 
expect this to be an issue in a 16g certification test.
    Finally, we do not intend to provide new guidance on how seat 
tracks are evaluated under dynamic testing in this final rule.

Exemption for New Aircraft Configured With Either TSO-C127a Seats or 
Seats Partially Compliant With Sec.  25.562

    B/E recommends that FAA consider modifying the proposed rule to 
allow new aircraft configured with TSO-C127a seats or seats that are 
partially compliant with Sec.  25.562 to be delivered as currently 
certified if the procurement time frame extends more than four years 
past the effective date of this final rule. B/E believes that it should 
be a goal not to interrupt existing aircraft procurement programs or 
add to the certification and logistical costs for upgrades. Therefore, 
B/E believes an airplane, such as a B737NG, should continue to be 
deliverable up to and beyond the effective date of the final rule, as 
long as seat part numbers and aircraft configuration remain unchanged. 
Beyond the four-year time frame, B/E recommends that 9g seats be 
upgraded to partial 16g compliance, similar to the seats on the B737NG.

[[Page 56553]]

    FAA Response: The FAA disagrees with B/E's recommendation. We 
believe that seats in newly manufactured airplanes should meet all the 
requirements of Sec.  25.562 by the compliance date. The four-year time 
frame after the effective date of this rule should allow industry 
enough time to set up cost-effective measures for meeting the rule and 
to adjust their procurement programs accordingly.

Nominally Compliant 16g Seats

    B/E recommends that nominally compliant 16g seats keep the 
compliance baseline of their original certification.
    FAA Response: The FAA believes that seats in newly manufactured 
airplanes should meet all the requirements of Sec.  25.562 by the 
compliance date. This rule does not affect existing airplanes that 
already have ``nominally compliant 16g'' or partially compliant 16g 
seats since it applies only to newly manufactured airplanes. However, 
airplanes with those same certification bases that have not yet been 
manufactured must comply with all the requirements of Sec.  25.562 by 
the compliance date.

``Full-up'' Amendment 25-64 Configurations

    B/E recommends that for ``full-up'' Amendment 25-64 configurations, 
any new seat or cabin configuration be certified to the same 
requirements.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees that airplanes with Amendment 25-64 in 
their certification basis must be ``full-up'' (i.e., meet all the 
requirements of Sec.  25.562). We also contend that newly manufactured 
airplanes, regardless of their certification basis, should meet all the 
requirements of Sec.  25.562 by October 27, 2009.

Pre-Amendment 25-64 Aircraft

    Airbus states that requiring 16g seats on pre-Amendment 25-64 
aircraft would force many changes in the surrounding cabin, as well as 
the supporting structure. Airbus states that, for aircraft not having 
Sec.  25.562 in their certification basis, there is no easy ``take 
out'' and ``fit in a new part'' solution, as their cabin interiors are 
not designed to address the new requirement. Airbus recommends that FAA 
provide guidance on how installation criteria have to be considered for 
pre-Amendment 25-64 aircraft programs.
    FAA Response: The FAA acknowledges that requiring 16g seats on pre-
Amendment 25-64 airplanes will require airframe manufacturers to make 
changes to these airplanes. However, this rule provides enough time for 
airframe manufacturers to determine the best way to comply with this 
final rule, whether it be through the use of new seating arrangements, 
seat and/or cabin interior design modifications and/or new, cost-
effective technologies (both for the seats and the cabin interior).

Certification Costs

    Boeing states that seat certification streamlining activities have 
not materially improved the cost or time needed to certify seats. 
Boeing believes the use of a single seat track for dynamic testing 
would help.
    FAA Response: The FAA received information from industry in June of 
2003 that set forth practices that would result in considerable savings 
in both costs and time associated with certifying seats. This 
information was developed partly as a result of activities initiated 
under the seat certification streamlining efforts. However, in both the 
regulatory evaluation supporting the SNPRM and the regulatory 
evaluation supporting this final rule, we made no use of anticipated or 
realized reductions in cost from the results of the seat certification 
streamlining efforts.
    As to Boeing's comment about the use of a single seat track for 
dynamic testing, this proposal can be addressed under the policy review 
process in Part 1 of the Seat Certification Streamlining Effort or 
discussed with the Transport Airplane Directorate outside the 
Streamlining Effort.

Compliant Installation Not Possible for Certain Seats

    Airbus believes there might be cases where a compliant installation 
is not possible for a given seat. For example, swivel cabin attendant 
seats arranged in cabin zones restricted in space might not be 
certifiable to the new standard. This scenario would require Airbus to 
install fixed cabin attendant seats under the rule.
    ATASCO agrees, stating that cabin interior re-design may decrease 
the number of passenger seats.
    FAA Response: While the FAA acknowledges that some seats may 
present more difficulties than others to comply with this final rule, 
we believe that only one standard should apply to all seats in the 
passenger cabin. We also believe this rule provides enough time for 
airframe manufacturers to address this concern by using new seat 
arrangements, design modifications, and cost-effective new 
technologies, both for seats and the cabin interior.

Average/Standard Track Crown

    Boeing states that we should define an average track crown. Boeing 
believes that this is consistent with other conventions used in the 
dynamic testing and certification of seats.
    In addition, Boeing recommends that FAA allow a specific seat track 
crown section to be used as a ``standard track'' for all certification 
testing and compliance findings. Boeing states that this would reduce 
the number of required tests for certifying seats, while still allowing 
the seat to be fully substantiated for the dynamic loads.
    ATA concurs, stating that, for streamlining seat approval, the FAA 
should allow the use of a new industry-standard seat track in the 
dynamic testing of seats in conjunction with TSO-C127 or Sec.  25.562. 
The specific configuration of this standard track could be defined by a 
joint industry-FAA initiative.
    FAA Response: The FAA disagrees that this rule should address the 
issue of allowing for the use of a generic track crown. The current 
dynamic standard requires that the seat remain attached to the floor 
throughout dynamic testing. This requires that a seat track 
representative of the one installed on the airplane be used for dynamic 
testing. As such a proposal would require a change to Sec.  25.562, it 
is outside the scope of this rulemaking action.
    We would welcome adoption by industry of a standardized seat track 
that meets all of the requirements for dynamic testing. Industry 
proposals of this nature can be submitted to the FAA and evaluated 
under the policy review process in Part 1 of the Seat Certification 
Streamlining Effort or discussed with the Transport Airplane 
Directorate outside the Streamlining Effort.

Full-Scale Dynamic Tests Preferable to Component Tests

    AFA states that a migration from full-scale dynamic testing to 
component tests should be resisted, as it will likely lead to a 
proposal to eliminate the former. AFA's comments praise the virtue of 
full-scale dynamic tests, as they evaluate how the seat, restraint, 
occupant, and the near-vicinity aircraft interior interact.
    FAA Response: The FAA does not see component testing as a 
substitute for full-scale dynamic testing for first time approvals. We 
have said that component testing can be accepted only for design 
changes to seats that have been previously approved using the full-
scale dynamic tests required by Sec.  25.562. We believe that component 
testing can be utilized effectively to integrate design changes that 
may improve safety but that would otherwise not be integrated

[[Page 56554]]

if full-scale testing were required for every change. We share AFA's 
concern about the fidelity of component testing and the extent that it 
could be used in the future for seat approvals. There are no current 
policies that allow component testing without confirmation of the 
original design using full-scale dynamic testing.

Track Failure During Testing

    Sicma recommends that seats tested to a ``16g compatible'' standard 
be accepted and not subject to more testing. Sicma states that dynamic 
testing has already been accomplished, and it has never had a track 
failure on a 14g down test.
    FAA Response: The FAA does not agree with Sicma's recommendation. 
We note that track failures are most likely to occur during the 16g 
longitudinal test and that track failures during a 14g down test are 
extremely rare. Also, we believe that, for newly manufactured 
airplanes, full compliance to Sec.  25.562 is readily achievable due to 
the current knowledge and capabilities in dynamic seat design and 
certification. The four-year period before compliance with the rule is 
required provides enough time to develop feasible solutions to meeting 
all the occupant protection criteria of Sec.  25.562.

Flawed Testing

    An individual commenter states that flaws exist in the tests used 
to gather supporting data for the HIC portion of Sec.  25.562. Based on 
these flaws, the HIC test can be proven to have no technical merit and 
could lead to designs with lower levels of safety. This individual 
recommends we remove the criterion from future regulations involving 
aircraft seating.
    FAA Response: The commenter did not offer any specifics as to why 
he believes flaws exist in the tests. The FAA issued Amendment 25-64 
based on the recommendations of GASP. These recommendations have been 
the foundation for technical standards developed by industry and 
guidance developed by us with public participation. We continue to 
review these standards and policies with industry groups and make 
appropriate changes, when necessary. So far, these standards and 
policies have served the aviation community well. We welcome any valid 
data to support the commenter's concerns.

TSO-C127

    ATA and Boeing recommend that new seats installed on new production 
aircraft should meet TSO-C127, ensuring dynamic seat testing. They 
would like to see this requirement become effective four years from the 
rule's effective date. ATA and Boeing believe that installation 
limitations relative to seat dynamic testing should be consistent with 
the airplane's type certificate. For example, airplanes that have 
partial Sec.  25.562 compliance as part of their certificate basis 
would continue to contain TSO-C127 compliant seats, while fully 
compliant airplanes would continue to contain fully compliant 16g 
seats.
    FAA Response: For newly manufactured airplanes, the FAA believes 
that flight attendant and passenger seats should comply with all the 
requirements of Sec.  25.562. Allowing installation limitations 
consistent with the airplane's original type certificate would 
undermine the intent of the rule and would result in only limited or no 
compliance with Sec.  25.562. We seek to establish the highest level of 
safety for passenger and flight attendant seats that is currently 
practicable throughout the part 121-fleet. The commenters' proposal 
would do little more than allow partially compliant 16g seats to be 
accepted in newly manufactured airplanes and would not significantly 
alter the current configuration of seats in the existing fleet.

Ability of Tracks To Withstand Loads Imposed by 16g Seats

    ATASCO questions the ability of existing seat tracks to withstand 
the loads imposed by 16g seats. The group goes on to recommend that FAA 
examine the strength of seat tracks in airplane models other than the 
B-777.
    FAA Response: When the performance requirements currently in Sec.  
25.562 were developed, the strength of tracks then on airplanes was 
evaluated. Using analysis and testing, we determined that track 
strengths were satisfactory when coupled with a seat designed to meet 
the dynamic criteria. Based on this previous analysis and testing, we 
do not consider any further testing to be required.

General Comments

No Accident Data To Support Need for 16g Seats

    Based on recent safety improvements, RAA believes it is reasonable 
to project that there will be no more than 2 or 3 impact-survivable 
accidents within the next 20 years. Since RAA also projects that 80% of 
the seats will be 16g compliant in the next three years without a rule 
mandate, RAA believes that the impact-survivable accident rate in 
regional airplanes without 16g compliant seats will be less than one 
accident in the next 20 years. Therefore, RAA believes that the 
proposed rule will not make any difference in reducing the fatalities 
or serious injuries that may occur in the regional fleet.
    FAA Response: The FAA believes the Cherry Report accurately 
determines the fatalities and serious injuries that could have been 
averted had 16g seats been installed in those airplanes studied. 
Despite recent improvements made in accident prevention, we strongly 
believe that the potential for impact-survivable accidents still 
exists. The use of 16g seats will improve passenger survivability in 
such accidents in the future irrespective of the type of aircraft in 
which these seats are installed.
    As for regional carriers who operate smaller transport category 
airplanes, these airplanes have less energy absorbing structure below 
the floor than larger transport category airplanes. Therefore, we 
believe that these carriers might benefit even more from the 
installation of seats that meet the dynamic testing requirements than 
their counterparts that operate larger transport category airplanes.

Lack of a Convincing Safety Argument

    AEA believes that some aspects of the proposed rule have not been 
fully thought through since they are missing a convincing safety case 
and impact assessment. AEA also believes that the FAA does not give 
credit for investments in improved seats already made by airlines.
    FAA Response: The FAA did consider and give credit for airplanes 
that used seats that complied with parts of Sec.  25.562 or were simply 
later production seats believed to perform better than traditional 
early model 9g seats. The study, ``Improved Seats in Transport Category 
Airplanes: Analysis of Options,'' prepared by the FAA's Office of 
System Safety (ASY)(November 2000) grouped the current fleet into 5 
categories. These categories included aircraft with seats ranging from 
early 9g seats to fully compliant 16g seats.
    The 2003 Cherry Report Addendum updated their data and concludes 
that fully compliant 16g seats could have averted 45 fatalities and 40 
serious injuries over the analysis period. HIC improvement accounts for 
39% of the averted fatalities and 46% of the averted serious injuries.

Suggested Alternatives

    Several commenters recommend the following in addition or as an 
alternative to the proposed rule to increase survivability in impact-
survivable accidents:

[[Page 56555]]

    (1) Using rearward facing seats (five commenters);
    (2) Making child restraint improvements and regulatory changes that 
would mandate securing all children in safety seats (six commenters);
    (3) Using three-point harness restraints (one commenters) or 
shoulder harnesses (one commenter);
    (4) Using air bags (one commenter);
    (5) Improving seat belt security, using fewer seats or changing 
seating configuration (one commenter); and
    (6) Using standardized seat belt latching mechanisms or, without 
such standardization, telling passengers about any variations (one 
commenter).
    Finally, one commenter states that the FAA should focus our 
attention on flight crew safety and health issues rather than on 
improving seats.
    FAA Response: While the FAA accepts that some of these alternatives 
may improve accident survivability, these commenters do not offer any 
persuasive evidence why we should abandon the approach contained in the 
SNPRM to adopt a suggested alternative. We have performed extensive 
research on the subject of improving survivability in impact-survivable 
accidents and have explored many options. We believe the approach taken 
in this final rule is the most effective and efficient way to improve 
survivability in impact-survivable accidents.
    As for the comment about flight crew safety and health issues, we 
believe our attention should be on both improving seats and flight crew 
safety and health issues. We have several offices that deal with flight 
crew safety and health issues and these offices are continuously 
analyzing ways to further improve these areas. However, improving seats 
in transport category aircraft is also an important issue. Our focus on 
this issue does not detract in any way from our continuing commitment 
to address flight crew safety and health issues.

Rule Not Consistent With Safer Skies Partnership or Commercial Aviation 
Safety Team (CAST) Objectives

    Boeing and ATA believe the proposed rule is not consistent with the 
Safer Skies partnership or Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) 
objectives, which are intended to direct safety investment where it has 
the most leverage.
    FAA Response: The FAA started the 16g seat initiative in response 
to a directive from Congress before the existence of CAST. We believe 
that we need to complete the 16g seat initiative since the safety 
concerns that led to its initial development are still valid.
    We also recognize that considerable progress has been made under 
CAST to reduce the accident rate. In fact, we used a lower accident 
rate in predicting the benefits of this final rule in addition to the 
rate used for the SNPRM. CAST goals are to dramatically reduce 
accidents through accident prevention. However, we recognize that 
impact-survivable accidents can still occur, and this rule focuses on 
protecting occupants when these accidents do occur.

Rule Will Not Influence Types of Accidents With Most Fatalities

    Boeing states the proposed rule will not influence the types of 
accidents that have the most fatalities.
    In addition, Boeing contends that other safety initiatives will 
serve to reduce the number of accidents, further reducing the benefits 
of the proposed rule.
    FAA Response: While this rulemaking action does not necessarily 
address those accidents that result in the most fatalities, it does 
improve survivability for passengers and crewmembers when impact-
survivable accidents occur. Regardless of improvements in accident 
prevention, there is still a need to improve passenger and crewmember 
survivability since other accident prevention measures have not 
eliminated all impact-survivable accidents.

HIC Compliance

    AMSAFE recommends requiring HIC compliance in all situations, 
regardless of strike hazard fidelity.
    FAA Response: The FAA is using existing policy for meeting HIC 
requirements and does not intend to expand the scope or definition of 
compliance with HIC.

Inclusion of HIC

    ATA states that most of the benefits of improved seats are achieved 
through structural criteria, not HIC. Adding HIC only creates 
significant costs without commensurate benefits.
    ATA also argues that the FAA has not accurately projected the cost 
of front row HIC. HIC requirements, especially front row HIC, are 
expensive and have not been proven to have a significantly higher 
value.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees that most of the benefits of improved 
seats come from compliance with the structural requirements. While the 
Cherry Report (upon which the SNPRM's benefits were based) does not 
assess the specific safety benefits from HIC improvements, the Cherry 
Report Addendum concludes that 39% of the fatalities and 46% of the 
serious injuries averted by installing fully compliant 16g seats can be 
attributed to HIC improvements.
    In our regulatory evaluation supporting this final rule, the cost 
of seat certification included HIC for all seats, front row as well as 
row-to-row. The FAA recognizes that front row HIC requirements can lead 
to compliance alternatives that cost the operator more than row-to-row 
HIC compliance alternatives. However, we do not agree that the value 
for the front row alternative must be commensurate with the row-to-row 
alternative. To do so implies that passengers in the front row should 
be given a lower protection level than passengers in the following rows 
simply because it may cost more to protect those passengers in the 
front row. We do not agree with this reasoning.

Quarterly Reports

    NADA/F supports the proposed rule. It also recommends that airlines 
file quarterly public reports updating their progress in complying with 
the rule.
    FAA Response: The FAA believes NADA/F was directing this comment at 
seat replacement on existing airplanes. Because the final rule will not 
require seats on the existing fleet to be upgraded, the comment is no 
longer relevant. When mandating actions similar to that set forth in 
this rule, we typically mandate only compliance time frames and do not 
require progress reports.

Applicability to Part 135 Operators, Flight Deck Seats, and Cargo-Only 
Airplanes

    IBT states that the rule should address part 135 operators, flight 
deck seats and seats on cargo-only aircraft. IBT states that the 
omission of these seats is not consistent with our stated philosophy of 
``one level of safety'' and should be remedied.
    NADA/F also recommends that part 121 air cargo aircraft meet the 
new standards within three years of this final rule.
    FAA Response: Regarding flight deck seats, the FAA's review of the 
accidents studied showed that the existing seats performed well in 
impact-survivable accidents. Therefore, we do not see any need to 
mandate any crashworthiness improvements to these seats.
    As for cargo-only airplanes, the final rule does not apply to these 
airplanes because they do not carry passengers for compensation or 
hire. However, transport category aircraft manufactured

[[Page 56556]]

four (4) years after the effective date of this final rule that have 
convertible or combination configurations will have to meet the same 
standards required for all-passenger carrying transport category 
airplanes operated under part 121 because those airplanes carry 
passengers.
    As for transport category airplanes operated under part 135, at the 
time Notice No. 88-8 was published, a significant number of transport 
category airplanes were operated under part 135. Accordingly, Notice 
88-8 proposed that seats on transport category airplanes operated under 
part 135 in air carrier operations or scheduled intrastate common 
carriage meet the same standards as seats on transport category 
airplanes operated under part 121. In 1995, we issued Amendment Nos. 
119, 121-251, and 135-58, ``Commuter Operations and General 
Certification and Operations Requirements;'' Final Rule (60 FR 65832; 
December 20, 1995)(the Commuter Rule). The Commuter Rule requires all 
operators conducting scheduled passenger-carrying operations in 
airplanes that have passenger-seating configurations of 10 through 30 
seats (excluding crewmember seats) and in turbojet airplanes regardless 
of seating configuration that formerly conducted operations under part 
135, to conduct those operations under part 121. As a consequence of 
the Commuter Rule, the operation of virtually all transport category 
airplanes previously operated under part 135 now comes under part 121. 
Only nonscheduled, on-demand operations remain in part 135. Since the 
scope of this final rule is limited to transport category airplanes, it 
is no longer necessary to apply to this rule to part 135 operations.

Expedited Final Rule Issuance

    NADA/F recommends that we issue the final rule by January 31, 2003.
    FAA Response: Because the comment period did not close until March 
3, 2003, the FAA was unable to meet the commenter's requested issue 
date. Also, after a comment period closes, we must analyze and address 
each comment. Other considerations, such as reviewing alternatives 
based on public comments, can further lengthen that process. Although 
we understand the commenter's intent, we must develop a final rule in 
accordance with all statutory and procedural requirements.

Rule Should Not Apply to Certain Aircraft

    ATA recommends this rule not apply to aircraft that do not have 
Sec.  25.562(c)(5) in their original certification basis.
    FAA Response: The FAA contends that all flight attendant and 
passenger seats in newly manufactured airplanes should meet the 
requirements of Sec.  25.562, including Sec.  25.562(c)(5). Occupants 
must be protected from head trauma as accident investigations have 
shown it to be a primary cause of serious injuries and fatalities in 
impact-survivable aviation accidents. In addition, in developing the 
recommendation that led to Sec.  25.562(c)(5), GASP made it a primary 
goal to reduce the likelihood of fatal or serious head trauma, 
concussion, and unconsciousness to airplane occupants. We found this 
goal to be appropriate for all of civil aircraft, and it has therefore 
been addressed in the new emergency landing dynamic conditions 
applicable to aircraft certificated under parts 23, 25, 27 and 29.

Expedited Compliance Date

    Several commenters recommend an expedited compliance date:
    (1) NADA/F recommends that all newly constructed aircraft be 
equipped with ``safer'' seats by June 30, 2003, or sooner;
    (2) RECARO recommends a shortened compliance period of two years to 
replace the proposed four-year period for newly manufactured airplanes;
    (3) IBT believes the four-year compliance period for newly 
manufactured aircraft is problematic considering the industry's current 
economic situation.
    FAA Response: For newly manufactured airplanes, we believe the 
current compliance time frame of four years after the effective date of 
the final rule is reasonable. We believe this time frame provides 
enough time for industry to adjust to this new requirement while still 
ensuring that an improved safety level is reached in the near future. 
Although we would like to see the improved seats installed as quickly 
as possible, shortening that compliance time frame will drive costs up 
disproportionate to the benefits.

Concept of 16g Compatible Seats

    ATA believes the proposed rule ignores 16g compatible seats.
    FAA Response: Although the concept of 16g compatible seats was 
recognized in the 1998 Public Meeting, it applied only to the existing 
fleet. Since the final rule will not apply to the existing fleet, the 
commenters' concerns no longer apply. However, the FAA wants to clarify 
that the 1988 rulemaking initiative did not recognize the concept of 
16g compatible seats. The 1988 NPRM would have required seats to meet 
all the requirements of Sec.  25.562 for part 121 and part 135 
operations, including all cargo operations. Additionally, the SNPRM and 
the Options Study did give credit for having partially compliant seats 
installed.

Joint Aviation Authorities Technical Standard Order (JTSO) Approval

    Sicma recommends that the FAA consider accepting JTSO approval for 
determining compliance with the proposed rule. Sicma believes that this 
would streamline the certification process, as the requirement to have 
an FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO) in addition to the JTSO approval 
is redundant.
    FAA Response: The FAA does not recognize a JTSO or a European 
Aviation Safety Agency Technical Standard Order (ETSO) approval on its 
own. A separate FAA Letter of TSO Design Approval is required. When the 
JTSO/ETSO is identical to the FAA TSO, the FAA Letter of TSO Design 
Approval can be issued with a minimum of review. Also, an approval to 
TSO-C127a is only an approval to a standard. It is not approval for 
installation. Installation approval is based on an airplane's type 
design and can vary depending on the specific airplane model. This rule 
serves to make one standard, that contained in Sec.  25.562, applicable 
to all newly manufactured airplanes. TSO approval of a seat does not 
necessarily ensure compliance with Sec.  25.562, although it is 
generally the basis for that certification.

Harmonization

    ATASCO CSWG asks the FAA to consider issues of worldwide 
harmonization when moving forward with these regulatory changes.
    NADA/F agrees, recommending that we do all that is possible to 
promote the safest seats as a harmonization standard with the JAA.
    FAA Response: Although the FAA supports harmonization when 
appropriate, we believe that aviation safety will improve significantly 
by issuing this final rule and, therefore, do not want to further delay 
its implementation while undertaking harmonization efforts. We also 
note that the seat certification streamlining effort is addressing 
harmonization issues.

Impact on Seating

    Airbus comments that applying Sec.  25.562 to all passenger seats 
would compel changes in aircraft seating configurations. For example, 
it may create one row of seating without the ability to recline. Airbus 
believes that FAA has not considered the economic impact of these 
changes.

[[Page 56557]]

    FAA Response: The FAA acknowledges that this is a possibility. 
However, we believe there is enough time from the effective date of the 
rule for industry to develop cost-effective solutions that will not 
require changes in aircraft seating configurations, or actions such as 
installing seat belt air bags.
    As for the comment about the ability of seats to recline, we are 
aware that, as of today, many seats located at or near overwing exits 
do not recline. Airbus did not present any data to show that this has 
created an economic impact.

Tax Incentives

    A commenter proposes tax incentives to accelerate compliance with 
the proposed rule.
    FAA Response: It is beyond the scope of the FAA's authority to 
effectuate such changes.

Inclusion of Military Aircraft

    NADA/F recommends that the military be directed by Executive Order, 
or whatever rulemaking is available, to have all military aircraft 
upgraded with safer seats. NADA/F believes the compliance standards 
should be as high as, or higher than, those for commercial aircraft.
    FAA Response: This request is outside the scope of this proposal.

Expedited Testing

    NADA/F recommends that we expedite any testing needed to proceed 
with safer seats for all aircraft.
    FAA Response: The FAA believes the standards set forth in current 
emergency landing dynamic conditions adequately improve seat safety 
over 9g static seats. These standards were developed after extensive 
research and testing by the FAA, NASA, and industry. The standards were 
developed to provide improved safety for passenger and crewmembers 
based on the seat technology of the day. Because we consider these 
standards to be adequate, no additional testing is needed at this time.

Air Bag TSO

    AMSAFE recommends the timely issuance of an air bag TSO as an 
acceptable means of compliance with Sec.  25.562.
    FAA Response: Currently, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) 
Seat Committee is working on an Aerospace Standard for inflatable 
restraint systems. Once the SAE issues that document, the FAA may 
consider issuing a TSO for inflatable restraint systems that 
incorporates that document.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    There are no current or new requirements for information collection 
associated with this amendment.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to these regulations.

Economic Assessment, Regulatory Flexibility Determination, Trade Impact 
Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal agency to 
propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that 
the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the 
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the 
Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2531-2533) prohibits agencies from 
setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade 
Act also requires agencies to consider international standards and, 
where appropriate, use them as the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies 
to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other 
effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate 
likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation).
    In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined this rule (1) has 
benefits that justify its costs, is a ``significant regulatory action'' 
as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and is 
``significant'' as defined in DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures; 
(2) will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities; (3) will not reduce barriers to international trade; 
and (4) does not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal 
governments, or on the private sector. These analyses, available in the 
docket, are summarized below.

Total Costs and Benefits of This Rulemaking

    This final rule amends FAA regulations dealing with improved 
crashworthiness standards for passenger and flight attendant seats on 
new transport category airplanes used in part 121 passenger-carrying 
operations. The rule requires all such airplanes type-certificated 
after January 1, 1958 (starting with those manufactured four years 
after this rule's effective date) to comply with all the requirements 
of 14 CFR 25.562, which is applicable to airplane models for which an 
application for a type-certificate is made on or after June 16, 1988. 
Therefore, no action should be necessary to bring those airplanes into 
compliance with this final rule assuming that they comply fully with 
Sec.  25.562. Essentially, from an incremental cost/benefit standpoint, 
the new production airplanes to be affected by this rule are those 
models that were type-certificated after January 1, 1958 and before 
June 16, 1988 and derivatives of such models for which an application 
for an amended type-certificate was made after January 1, 1958.

Total Costs of This Rulemaking

    The total costs of this rulemaking, over the analysis period, are 
$34.7 million (or, $22.3 million and $13.3 million in present value at 
3% and 7%, respectively). These costs are composed of seat belt air 
bags costs of $19.3 million (or, $12.4 million and $7.5 million in 
present value at 3% and 7%, respectively), additional fuel burn costs 
of $12.6 million (or, $7.7 million and $4.2 million in present value at 
3% and 7%, respectively), and certification and testing of the improved 
seats of $2.7 million (or $2.2 million and $1.6 million in present 
value at 3% and 7%, respectively).

Total Benefits of This Rulemaking

    The total benefits of this rulemaking are $78.9 million (or, $47.9 
million and $26.4 million in present value at 3% and 7%, respectively). 
The benefits were calculated by estimating the number of fatalities and 
serious injuries that could be averted as a result of installing the 
improved seats beginning in 2009; averted casualties are based on 
estimated future enplanements of new-production airplanes now to be 
covered by improved seat standards.

Total Costs and Benefits of This Rulemaking

    In summary, the total costs of this rulemaking, over the analysis 
period are $34.7 million (or, $22.3 million and $13.3 million in 
present value at 3%

[[Page 56558]]

and 7%, respectively). The total benefits of installing fully compliant 
16g seats are $78.9 million (or, $47.9 million and $26.4 million in 
present value at 3% and 7%, respectively). This rulemaking is cost-
beneficial with a benefits to cost ratio of 2.27 to 1 (or, 2.15 to 1 
and 1.98 to 1, when underlying estimates are in present value at 3% and 
7%, respectively). Therefore, the FAA contends that the quantifiable 
benefits of the rule adequately justify the costs of the rule.

Who Is Potentially Affected by This Rulemaking?

    This rulemaking affects anyone who operates transport category 
airplanes used in part 121 passenger-carrying operations on or after 
October 27, 2009.

Our Cost Assumptions and Sources of Information

     Discount rate--3% and 7%.
     Period of Analysis 2005-2034.
     Monetary values expressed in 2004 dollars.
     Cost of certificating and installing a fully compliant 16g 
passenger seat instead of a 9g passenger seat, $212.
     Cost of certificating and installing a fully compliant 16g 
passenger seat instead of a partially compliant 16g (i.e., without HIC) 
passenger seat, $126 ($32 non-recurring and $94 recurring).
     Cost of certificating and installing a fully compliant 16g 
flight attendant seat instead of a partially compliant flight attendant 
seat, $302 ($135 non-recurring, and $167 recurring).
     Acquisition cost of installing a seat belt air bag, for 
front-row HIC requirement, $722 ($700 seat belt, $22 certification).\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ We have assumed the cost associated with this rule based on 
the cost of installing a seat belt equipped with an air bag 
(inflatable restraints). Other options, such as shoulder harnesses, 
y-belts, padding to the bulkhead or increasing the distance between 
the bulkhead and the seat back, may also be sufficient to meet the 
HIC requirements of this rule and may be less costly. We believe the 
costs of this rule could be much lower when a combination of options 
is used. For a complete explanation of the estimated costs of this 
rule, please read the final regulatory evaluation located in the 
docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Annual maintenance cost and one-time overhaul cost of seat 
belt air bag, $150, and $388, respectively.
     Increased weight per aircraft, for passenger seat 
requirements, 36 pounds.
     Increased weight per aircraft, for flight attendant seat 
requirements, 13 pounds.
     Fuel costs are based on FAA's forecast data.

Final Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a 
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, 
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the 
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the Act requires agencies to 
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the 
rationale for their actions. The Act covers a wide-range of small 
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and 
small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in 
the Act. However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule 
is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act provides that 
the head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility 
analysis is not required. The certification must include a statement 
providing the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning 
should be clear.
    The rule will affect manufacturers of part 25 transport category 
airplanes type-certificated after January 1, 1958 and manufactured 
after four years following the effective date of this final rule. It 
will also affect air carriers conducting operations under part 121. For 
manufacturers and part 121 operators, a small entity is one with 1,500 
or fewer employees. No part 25 airframe manufacturer has 1,500 or fewer 
employees. Consequently, the rule will not have a ``significant 
economic impact on a substantial number'' of small part 25 
manufacturers.
    There are approximately 100 part 121 operators in the potential 
pool of small entities. In the regulatory evaluation for the SNPRM, the 
FAA performed a detailed analysis of the economic impacts on 33 of 
these operators who clearly: (1) Had less than 1,500 employees (the 
size threshold for classification as a small entity); (2) were not 
subsidiaries of larger organizations; and, (3) reported operating 
revenue to the Department of Transportation. The FAA believed these 33 
were representative of the affected small firms. The FAA performed a 
detailed analysis of potential small-entity impacts on the small 
operators and determined that the proposed rule would not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The FAA invited comments on this assessment from interested and 
affected parties. Though no comments were received on FAA's small-
entity-impact methodology, the FAA did receive comments on the 
significant costs for all operators (whether small or not) to retrofit 
the existing fleet--especially in light of the difficult financial 
condition of operators in recent years. The FAA removed the SNPRM's 
retrofit requirement, therefore eliminating improved seat costs for the 
existing fleet.
    Consequently, the Administrator certifies that the rule will not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities (manufacturers or operators).

International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from 
establishing any standards or engaging in related activities that 
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not 
considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires 
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that 
they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed the 
potential effect of this final rule and determined that it will impose 
the same costs on domestic and international entities and thus have a 
neutral trade impact.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act) is intended, 
among other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal 
mandates on State, local, and tribal governments. Title II of the Act 
requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing 
the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule 
that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more (adjusted 
annually for inflation) in any one year by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $120.7 million in lieu of $100 
million.
    This final rule does not contain such a mandate. The requirements 
of Title II do not apply.

[[Page 56559]]

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this 
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the 
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government, and therefore does not have federalism implications.

Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska

    Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 
3213) requires the FAA, when modifying its regulations in a manner 
affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to 
which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation, 
and to establish appropriate regulatory distinctions. In the NPRM, we 
requested comments on whether the proposed rule should apply 
differently to intrastate operations in Alaska. We didn't receive any 
comments, and we have determined, based on the administrative record of 
this rulemaking, that there is no need to make any regulatory 
distinctions applicable to intrastate aviation in Alaska.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically 
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy 
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has 
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical 
exclusion identified in paragraph 312d and involves no extraordinary 
circumstances.

Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or 
Use

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211, 
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We have determined that it is not 
a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order because it is 
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, 
and it is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the 
supply, distribution, or use of energy.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety, Transportation.

The Amendment

0
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration 
amends Part 121 of Chapter I of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations 
as follows:

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 44101, 44701-44702, 
44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903-44904, 
44912, 46105.

0
2. Amend Sec.  121.311 by adding paragraph (j) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.311  Seats, safety belts, and shoulder harnesses.

* * * * *
    (j) After October 27, 2009, no person may operate a transport 
category airplane type certificated after January 1, 1958 and 
manufactured on or after October 27, 2009 in passenger-carrying 
operations under this part unless all passenger and flight attendant 
seats on the airplane meet the requirements of Sec.  25.562 in effect 
on or after June 16, 1988.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 20, 2005.
Marion C. Blakey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 05-19208 Filed 9-26-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P