[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 182 (Wednesday, September 21, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 55492-55498]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-18806]
[[Page 55491]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Part IV
Department of Transportation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Aviation Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
14 CFR Part 121
Flightdeck Door Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting Systems; Proposed
Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 182 / Wednesday, September 21, 2005 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 55492]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 121
[Docket No. FAA-2005-22449; Notice No. 05-07]
RIN 2120-AI16
Flightdeck Door Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting Systems
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Aviation Administration proposes to require
passenger-carrying transport category airplanes used in domestic, flag,
and supplemental operations to have a means to allow the flightcrew to
visually monitor the door area outside the flightdeck. This means would
allow the flightcrew to identify persons requesting entry into the
flightdeck, and to detect suspicious behavior or potential threats.
Second, the FAA proposes that, for operations requiring the presence of
flight attendants, the flight attendants have a means to discreetly
notify the flightcrew of suspicious activity or security breaches in
the cabin. The proposed changes address standards adopted by the
International Civil Aviation Organization following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before November 21, 2005.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments [identified by Docket Number FAA-2005-
22449] using any of the following methods:
DOT Docket Web site: Go to http://dms.dot.gov and follow
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590-0001. Due to the suspension of paper mail delivery
to DOT headquarters facilities, we encourage commenters to send their
comments electronically.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For more information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document.
Privacy: We will post all comments we receive, without change, to
http://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. For
more information, see the Privacy Act discussion in the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document.
Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to
http://dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-401 on the plaza level of
the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Comments that you may consider to be of a sensitive security nature
should not be sent to the docket management system. Send those comments
to the FAA, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington DC 20591.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe Keenan, Air Carrier Operations
Branch, Flight Standards Service, 800 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8166, facsimile (202) 267-
9579, e-mail: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also
invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or
federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include supporting data. We ask that you send us two copies of written
comments.
We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel
concerning this proposed rulemaking. The docket is available for public
inspection before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to
review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section
of this preamble between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. You may also review the docket using the
Internet at the Web address in the ADDRESSES section.
Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit
http://dms.dot.gov.
Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we
receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider
comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring
expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments
we receive.
If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this
proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the
postcard and mail it to you.
Availability of Rulemaking Documents
You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
(1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket
Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search);
(2) Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations Web page at; or
(3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make
sure to identify the docket number or notice number, of this rulemaking
Authority for this Rulemaking.
Background
Activities Leading to This Proposal
Besides the steps the FAA took immediately after the terrorists'
acts on September 11, 2001, the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation (OST), Congress, and the FAA, took several longer terms
actions to prevent hijackings on passenger-carrying airplanes used in
air carrier service.
On September 16, the Secretary of Transportation announced
the creation of two rapid-response teams (RRT) to develop
recommendations for improving security within the national aviation
system. One team was tasked to develop recommendations to improve
security at the Nation's airports; the other team was tasked to develop
recommendations for aircraft integrity
[[Page 55493]]
and security, with a specific focus on cockpit access.
Members of the aircraft integrity and security RRT included
representatives from American Airlines, The Boeing Company, Association
of Flight Attendants, and the Air Line Pilots Association. Members of
the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation
Administration supported the RRT. In addition to regular team meetings,
the RRT met with representatives from the airline operators, pilot and
flight attendant associations, and parts manufacturers. The RRT also
received numerous recommendations from the public as the result of an
e-mail address setup on the FAA Web site.
On October 1, the RRT for aircraft integrity and security presented
its final report to the Secretary of Transportation. The report made 17
recommendations. One recommendation recognized the need for (i)
reinforced flightdeck doors and (ii) severe limitations to flightdeck
entry. Anticipating the new severe limitations to flightdeck entry, the
RRT made four recommendations for flightdeck access. As part of one
recommendation, the RRT addressed the flightcrew's need for
notification of a potential threat in the cabin by stating:
With the flightdeck no longer readily accessible to flight
attendants, they must have a method for immediate notification to
the flight deck during a suspected threat in the cabin. On receipt
of such a warning, the pilot would check to make sure that the
flight deck door is secure and begin immediate landing procedures.
Consideration should be given to systems that might be installed in
the aircraft as well as a device that could be carried by a crew
member. In those aircraft equipped with an automated evacuation
alarm system, it may in the near term be an effective tool for such
notification.
The RRT recommended that the ``industry develop a plan of feasible
alternatives for emergency warnings within 30 days.''
A second flightdeck access recommendation addressed the value of
monitoring the area outside the flightcrew's compartment door. The RRT
stated:
There is a consensus that cameras to monitor and view the area
outside the flight deck door may add value. There should be
continuous lighting outside the flight deck door for visibility, as
well as to provide lighting for cameras. However, placement of a
monitor in the limited space on the flight deck is a challenge.
While there may be value in video or audio systems which provide
information about activities throughout the cabin, we have no
consensus on whether or how to proceed with this technology.
The RRT recommended that the ``industry evaluate the use of cameras
and lighting outside the flight deck door within 6 months.''
On November 19, Congress passed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) (Pub. L. 107-71). Section 104(b) of
the ATSA states that the FAA Administrator may develop and implement
methods--
(1) To use video monitors or other devices to alert pilots in
the flight deck to activity in the cabin, except that use of such
monitors or devices shall be subject to nondisclosure requirements
applicable to cockpit video records under [49 U.S.C. 1114(c)], * * *
and
(3) To revise the procedures by which cabin crews of aircraft
can notify flight deck crews of security breaches and other
emergencies, including providing for the installation of switches or
other devices or methods in an aircraft cabin to enable flight crews
to discreetly notify the pilots in the case of a security breach
occurring in the cabin.
On November 25, 2002, Congress passed the Homeland
Security Act (HSA) to create the Department of Homeland Security (Pub.
L. 107-296). Section 1403(b) of the HSA amended the ATSA to state that
the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, may ``Require that
air carriers provide flight attendants with a discreet, hands-free,
wireless method of communicating with the pilots.''
International Standards
At the time of the terrorists' attack, the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), an international body consisting of 188
member countries, was reviewing proposed changes to Annex 6 of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation. Annex 6, Part I contains
requirements for the operation of airplanes involved in international
commercial air transport.
In light of the attack and comments received from its members
States, ICAO proposed new provisions with a particular focus on
security of the flightcrew compartment (also known as the flightdeck).
Those provisions contained requirements for a flightdeck door and
related requirements for locking, unlocking, and monitoring the area
outside the door, and discreet notification of the flightcrew in the
event of security breaches in the cabin. ICAO adopted the provisions in
Chapter 13, Security, on March 15, 2002.
Standard 13.2, Security of the flight crew compartment, states:
13.2.1 In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew
compartment door, this door shall be capable of being locked, and
means shall be provided by which cabin crew can discreetly notify
the flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security
breaches in the cabin.
13.2.2 From 1 November 2003, all passenger-carrying airplanes of
a maximum certificated take-off weight mass in excess of 45500 kg or
with a passenger seating capacity greater than 60 shall be equipped
with an approved flight crew compartment door that is designed to
resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to
resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. This door shall
be capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot's station.
13.2.3 In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew
compartment door in accordance with 13.2.2:
(a) This door shall be closed and locked from the time all
external doors are closed following embarkation until any such door
is opened for disembarkation, except when necessary to permit access
and egress by authorized persons; and
(b) Means shall be provided for monitoring from either pilot's
station the entire door area outside the flight crew compartment to
identify persons requesting entry and to detect suspicious behaviour
or potential threat.
The deadline for implementation of the ICAO standards was November
1, 2003.
Discussion of the Proposal
The FAA proposes to amend part 121 by requiring a means for the
flightcrew to monitor the area outside the flightdeck door and a means
for the cabin crew to discreetly notify the flightcrew of a suspicious
activity or security beach in the cabin. For purposes of this rule,
flightcrew refers to pilots and flight engineers, and cabin crew refers
to crewmembers. The purpose of monitoring is to identify anyone
requesting entry to the flightdeck and to detect suspicious behavior or
potential threats. The proposal would set forth a standard that would
allow industry to consider various options to comply with the final
rule.
The proposed rule addresses the ICAO standard. The ICAO standard
applies to all passenger-carrying airplanes of a maximum certificated
take-off mass in excess of 45,500 kg (approximately 100,309 lbs) or
with a passenger seating capacity greater than 60 involved in
international commercial air transport. This proposed rule applies only
to passenger-carrying operations conducted under part 121 that require
a lockable door between the cockpit and passenger compartment. Neither
the ICAO standard nor this proposed rule will apply to all-cargo
operations. Additionally, part 121 operations do not encompass all
passenger-carrying airplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass
in excess of 45500 Kg (the ICAO standard) operated in the U.S.
[[Page 55494]]
Accordingly, since some airplanes may operate both domestically and
internationally under other operational rules (e.g., parts 91, 125 and
135), the U.S. will not fully comply with the ICAO standard.
The FAA's proposed rule will require passenger-carrying part 121
operators to retrofit their aircraft with a means to monitor the area
on the cabin side of the flightdeck door and adopt measures to comply
with the flightcrew notification requirement. Since there is a retrofit
requirement, the FAA proposes to give industry 2 years to comply from
the time a final rule is adopted. This time should be sufficient for
industry to consider various options, rather than requiring the
industry to focus solely on one possible option in order to meet a more
immediate implementation date.
In proposed Sec. 121.313(k), the use of the phrase ``a means to
monitor from the flightdeck side of the door'' permits at least two
methods to comply with the proposed rule, covering monitoring from the
flightdeck. The first method is a video system. The video system would
transmit video images to a monitor or monitors appropriately situated
on the flightdeck to allow viewing of the area outside the flightdeck
(herein referred to the ``door area'') from the flightdeck side of the
door. A crewmember would provide audio confirmation to the flightcrew
that the door area is clear, including confirmation that the lavatory
is clear. A second method would involve visual identification of the
door area, coupled with an audio confirmation procedure. Through a
viewing device installed in the flightdeck door, one person on the
flightdeck would view the door area and identify the person seeking
access. Then a crewmember would provide audio confirmation that the
door area is clear while viewing the outside door area. For example,
before providing audio confirmation to the flightdeck, the crewmember
would (1) assure that no passengers are standing near the door area,
and (2) that no passenger is in any forward lavatory.
The FAA believes both methods comply with the intent of ICAO's
requirement that the door area outside the flightdeck must be
monitored. The purpose of monitoring is to identify people requesting
access to the flightdeck. Prior to opening the flightdeck door,
identifying people by a properly designed video camera system and audio
confirmation or through operational procedures using audio and other
visual identification means are both appropriate. Since the FAA's
proposed rule is a performance standard, other methods may be developed
to comply with this rule and the FAA seeks input from industry for
other means of compliance.
Proposed Sec. 121.582 would heighten security requirements by
giving the cabin crew a means to discreetly notify the flightcrew of
suspicious activity or security breaches in the cabin. The FAA agrees
with the ICAO position that discreet notification of the flightcrew
should be provided. The FAA believes that current, on board
communication crew alert systems could, along with FAA-approved
operator-developed procedures, meet this requirement. For example,
subtly keying the interphone in a specific manner could be used. The
rule would also allow the use of more sophisticated technology, such as
hands-free, wireless method as considered by Congress in the Homeland
Security Act. However, any installed system must protect against false
alarms or nuisance alerts that would make the system unreliable.
While an airplane is moving for purposes of a flight segment,
proposed Sec. 121.584 requires part 121 operators to keep the
flightdeck door locked and closed unless an authorized person uses a
device and procedure required by Sec. 121.313(k) to view the area
outside the flightdeck compartment door. In proposed Sec. 121.584(a),
the phrase ``airplane moves in order to initiate a flight segment''
includes movement under its own power or if the airplane is being moved
by another device for example, a tug. In proposed Sec. 121.584(a)(1),
the phrase ``a person authorized to be on the flightdeck'' is anyone
who obtained access to the flightdeck pursuant to Sec. 121.547.
Proposed Sec. 121.584(a)(2) requires that the procedures in Sec.
121.584(a)(1)(i) and (ii) be satisfactorily accomplished before the
crewmember in charge of the flightdeck authorizes the door to be
unlocked and opened. In proposed Sec. 121.584(a)(2), the phrase ``the
crewmember in charge'' means the flightcrew member in charge of the
flightdeck at the time the door is opened, which may be the first
officer if the pilot-in-command is not on the flightdeck. It is the
FAA's intent to meet the ICAO standard that requires monitoring the
area outside the flightdeck door by permitting the use of a peep hole
to view a large area outside the flightdeck door in conjunction with
the audio confirmation, for example, from a crewmember who is outside
the flightdeck and who can observe that the flightdeck door area is
secure.
Proposed Sec. 121.584(a) requires every certificate holder
operating under part 121 to implement this rule at the time the final
rule is published if the operator already has the means to monitor the
area outside the flightdeck door as required by proposed Sec.
121.313(k) (such as a peephole). The FAA has determined there is no
reason to delay the security benefits of this operating rule for
operators that can meet the rule at the time of final rule publication.
Operators of airplanes that currently do not have a means to monitor
the area outside the flightdeck door, have 2 years from the date the
final rule is published to install such devices (such as a video
system). But during that 2-year period, once an airplane is equipped
with a means to monitor the area outside the flightdeck, then the
certificate holder and the crewmembers must comply with proposed
section 121.584(a) when operating that airplane.
The U.S. filed a difference with ICAO for Annex 6, Part 1, Chapter
13, provision 13.2.3 on November 6, 2002. The FAA will significantly
alter its filing concerning the difference associated with this
provision to reflect the rule that is finally adopted. This proposed
rule does not meet ICAO standards in the following areas.
The proposal in this action will not be implemented before
the November 1, 2003, ICAO deadline.
Any passenger-carrying airplanes operated under parts 91,
125, and 135 including international commercial air transport
operations with a maximum certificated takeoff mass in excess of 45500
kg or with a seating capacity of greater than 60 (as ICAO requires),
are not covered by this proposed rule.
The proposed rule will permit an alternative means to
monitor the area outside the flightdeck door from the flightdeck side
of the door, instead of from either pilot station, as ICAO requires.
Harmonization Effort
The FAA considers adopting and maintaining coordinated standards
between the United States and its counterparts to be a high priority.
The FAA is working informally with the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)
and Transport Canada Civil Aviation to ensure the proposed rulemakings
on flightdeck door monitoring and crew alerting systems are similarly
worded and have the same requirements. On August 1, 2003, the JAA
published Amendment 6 to JAR-OPS 1, Commercial Air Transportation
(Aeroplanes). This amendment requires a means or procedure by which the
cabin crew can notify the flightcrew in the event of suspicious
activity or security breaches in the cabin. Additionally, the JAA is
finalizing a separate amendment to JAR-OPS 1 that,
[[Page 55495]]
like this proposed rule, requires monitoring of the door area outside
the flight crew compartment.
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), the FAA has determined that there are no requirements for
information collection associated with this proposed rule.
Economic Assessment, Regulatory Flexibility Determination, Trade Impact
Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal agency to
propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination the
benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the
Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. sections 2531-2533) prohibits agencies
from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade
Act requires agencies to consider international standards and, where
appropriate, use them as the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies
to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other
effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more annually adjusted for inflation, which makes the 2004
value about $120,700,000.
In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined this proposed rule
(1) would have benefits that justify its costs; (2) would be a
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866 and would be ``significant'' as defined in DOT's
Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (3) would not have a significant
impact on a substantial number of small entities; (4) would move toward
existing and potential international standards as the basis of U.S.
standards; and (5) would not impose an unfunded mandate on State,
local, or tribal governments, or on the private sector. The FAA has
placed these analyses in the docket and they are summarized in the
following sections.
Regulatory Evaluation Summary
Costs--The FAA requests comments on the methodology, assumptions,
and results of the economic analysis and asks commenters to provide
supporting data, documentation, and rationale for their comments.
If the operators decide to develop appropriate procedures to comply
with the proposed rule, the FAA estimates that there could be minimal
compliance costs. Although not required to do so, operators may decide
to comply by installing a video camera surveillance system. Thus, the
following FAA's estimated costs of installing a video camera
surveillance system represent the high-end cost of complying with the
proposed rule.
Based on numbers developed at the end of 2003, the proposed rule
would affect 6,190 airplanes (4,487 turbojets, 1,203 regional jets, and
500 large (>20 seats) turboprops). If a final rule were issued on
January 1, 2004, the 2-year compliance period would allow 550 of these
airplanes to be retired in 2004 and 2005 and not be retrofitted,
resulting in 5,640 retrofitted airplanes. Further, 4,360 airplanes that
are projected to be manufactured between 2004 and 2013 would have these
systems installed as original operating equipment.
Certificate holders that choose to install a video camera system to
comply with this rule, would incur the following costs. Some turbojets
would need a two- or three-camera system while regional jets, including
turbojets and turboprops, would need a one-camera system. AirWorks,
AEI/AD Aerospace, and Goodrich are the only vendors currently supplying
these systems for airplanes. Many of their systems have Supplemental
Type Certificates (STCs) issued by the FAA. These vendors are selling
their systems to several European and Asian airlines as a result of
United Kingdom (UK) Department for Transport Directive 21(a), issued on
January 27, 2003, which strictly follows the ICAO requirements
including the November 1, 2003 deadline. Thus, the FAA bases its
estimated average costs on the vendors' reported costs.
Using the systems we examined produced the following costs. For a
future production airplane, this system would cost $16,000 for a
turbojet and $9,000 for a regional jet or turboprop. It would take 16
labor hours ($1,280) to install on a turbojet and 12 labor hours ($960)
on a regional jet. The total cost would be $17,280 for a turbojet and
$9,960 for a regional jet or turboprop. Production schedules would not
be disrupted.
For an existing airplane, the retrofitting kit would cost $17,000
for a turbojet and $10,000 for a regional jet or turboprop. If the
retrofit were completed during a regularly scheduled maintenance check,
it would take 48 labor hours ($3,840) for a turbojet and 36 hours
($2,880) for a regional jet or turboprop. The per airplane retrofit
cost would be $20,840 for a turbojet and $12,880 for a regional jet or
turboprop. If the retrofit must be completed during a dedicated
maintenance session, labor time would increase to 96 hours ($7,680) for
a turbojet and 72 hours ($5,760) for a regional jet or turboprop. In
addition, the airplane would be out of service for 1 day resulting in
lost net revenue ranging from $7,850 to $21,550 for a turbojet
depending upon its type and size and from $1,600 to $4,850 for a
regional jet or turboprop.
However, the FAA believes the airlines have sufficient compliance
time to complete the retrofit during a scheduled maintenance check. For
the most popular airplane models, several video camera surveillance
system STCs already exist. In addition, the FAA anticipates all
remaining airplane models will have STCs issued by mid-2004. Thus,
airlines will have from 18 to 24 months to comply with the rule. During
that time the FAA believes each airplane will have an overnight
maintenance check during which the retrofit could be accomplished
without loss of revenue time. To the extent these retrofits could not
be completed during regularly scheduled maintenance, the FAA
underestimated the potential compliance costs. The FAA specifically
requests comments on this particular assumption.
The total cost to install this system on future production
airplanes between 2004 and 2014 would be $64 million, or a present
value of $44 million. The total cost to retrofit this system on
existing airplanes during 2004 and 2005 would be $102 million ($34
million in 2004 and $68 million in 2005), which has a present value of
$91 million.
The FAA estimates an average of 1 hour per year to inspect and
maintain the system, resulting in a total maintenance expenditure of
$5.5 million between 2004 and 2014, which has a present value of $3.5
million. As the mean times between failures for the components would be
longer than 10 years, the FAA calculates no replacement costs during
the time frame of this analysis.
The system would add between 12 and 17 pounds to an airplane's
weight, which would increase average annual per airplane fuel
consumption between 68 and 328 gallons. Using a price of
[[Page 55496]]
$0.80 per gallon, the FAA calculates the total additional fuel cost to
be $14 million between 2004 and 2014, which has a present value of $9
million.
As shown in Table 1, the total costs between 2004 and 2014 of
installing video camera surveillance systems would be $185 million,
which has a present value of $148.5 million.
Table 1.--Total and Present Values of Costs To Install Video Camera
Surveillance Systems in Part 121 Airplanes (2004-2014)
[In 2003 $millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Present value
Source of cost Total cost total cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Install on Future Production Airplanes $64.0 $44.0
Retrofit on Existing Airplanes........ 102.0 92.0
System Maintenance.................... 5.5 3.5
Fuel Consumption...................... 14.0 9.0
------------------
Total............................. 185.5 148.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As shown in Table 2, the largest annual expenditures would be in
2004, $40 million, and, in 2005, $76 million. The present value of the
costs in 2004 and 2005 would be about 70 percent of the total present
value costs. The annual costs thereafter would be about $6.5 million to
$9 million for the new airplanes and for fuel and maintenance.
Table 2.--Total Costs by Year for Part 121 Operators of Having Video Camera Surveillance Systems
[In 2003 $millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Future
production Retrofitting Fuel and Present
Year airplanes airplanes maintenance Total cost value
cost cost cost total cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004............................................. $5.675 $33.750 $0.481 $39.906 $37.295
2005............................................. 6.290 68.523 1.089 75.902 66.309
2006............................................. 6.126 0.000 1.616 7.742 6.343
2007............................................. 6.863 0.000 1.824 8.687 6.656
2008............................................. 6.379 0.000 1.889 8.268 5.922
2009............................................. 6.192 0.000 1.949 9.141 5.452
2010............................................. 5.766 0.000 2.007 7.773 4.867
2011............................................. 6.089 0.000 2.066 8.155 4.772
2012............................................. 5.462 0.000 2.130 7.592 4.153
2013............................................. 4.542 0.000 2.196 6.738 3.449
2014............................................. 4.399 0.000 2.261 6.660 2.812
-------------
Total........................................ 63.783 102.273 19.508 186.564 148.030
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The cost of instituting a flightdeck alerting system for crewmember
could be met by a variety of measures such as special signals through
the interphone system or modifying existing crew notification devices
or procedures. As such, the FAA determines that this proposed
requirement would impose minimal costs.
Benefits--The proposed rule is one of a series of rulemaking
actions aimed at preventing or deterring an occurrence similar to the
September 11 terrorist attacks. It is designed to ensure that pilots do
not open the flightdeck door and admit a potential hijacker because the
pilots will be able to recognize who is trying to gain entry. It is
also designed to alert the pilots to problems in the cabin through the
crew discreet monitoring system and allow them to take the appropriate
actions.
As witnessed on September 11, 2001, terrorist acts can result in
the complete destruction of an airplane with the loss of all on board
and with huge collateral damage far exceeding that of the airplane and
passengers. The economic and social costs of the September 11 attacks
have been measured in the billions of dollars. While the FAA cannot
predict the frequency and severity of future terrorist acts against
aviation, it does expect that there will be such attempts. The value of
preventing a single loss of an average flight is estimated to be about
$375 million, without consideration of collateral damage. However, the
potential benefits from preventing the destruction of an operating
airplane cannot be precisely quantified nor specifically allocated to
each of the multiple parallel regulatory actions being taken by the FAA
and other Federal agencies. The FAA concludes that there is a high
probability that the benefits of this proposed rule would exceed its
costs. In addition to preventing the extraordinary costs of another
attack, this proposed rule responds to the interest of the U.S.
Congress as specified in the ATSA. Further, the need for this proposed
rule is illustrated by the fact that ICAO has made flightdeck
surveillance a requirement for airplanes with more than 60 seats that
travel internationally.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor,
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes,
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the
businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals
[[Page 55497]]
and to explain the rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide-
range of small entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit
organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or
final rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. If the agency determines that it would, the
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in
the RFA. However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule
is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the
head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis
is not required. The certification must include a statement providing
the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be
clear.
As a proxy for the operator's ability to afford the cost of
compliance, the FAA calculated the ratio of the total cost of the rule
as a percentage of annual revenue. The FAA determined that the maximum
percentage would be 1.7 percent for one small airline while only two
other airlines would have percentages greater than 1 percent. It should
be emphasized that these estimated costs are for the high cost method
of compliance, which would not be required by the proposed rule. The
FAA does not believe that such costs represent a significant economic
impact.
Accordingly, pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.
605(b), the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
certifies that this proposed rule would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from
engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate
domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary
obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international
standards and where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S.
standards. The FAA assessed the potential effect of this proposed
rulemaking and determined that the proposed amendment is largely
consistent with JAA and ICAO standards. However, the international
standards are being reviewed and they may be moving closer to the FAA
position. Therefore, the FAA determined that this proposed rule would
be in compliance with the Trade Agreement Act.
Unfunded Mandates Assessment
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act) is intended,
among other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal
mandates on State, local, and tribal governments. Title II of the Act
requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing
the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule
that may result in a $100 million or more expenditure adjusted annually
for inflation, which is about $120,700,000 in 2004, in any one year by
State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant
regulatory action.''
This proposed rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do
not apply.
Regulations Affecting Interstate Aviation in Alaska
Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.
3213) requires the Administrator, when modifying regulations in Title
14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in a manner affecting
interstate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to which Alaska
is not served by transportation modes other than aviation, and to
establish such regulatory distinctions as he or she considers
appropriate. Because this proposed rule would apply to the
certification of future designs of transport category airplanes and
their subsequent operation, it could, if adopted, affect interstate
aviation in Alaska. The FAA therefore specifically requests comments on
whether there is justification for applying the proposed rule
differently in interstate operations in Alaska.
Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this proposed rulemaking action qualifies for the
categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no
extraordinary circumstances.
Energy Impact
The energy impact of this proposal has been assessed in accordance
with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Public Law 94-163,
as amended (42 U.S.C. Section 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. It has been
determined that this proposal is not a major regulatory action under
the provisions of the EPCA.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121
Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend part 121 of Title 14 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, as follows:
PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL
OPERATIONS
1. The authority citation for part 121 is revised to read:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 44701-
44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 46105.
2. Section 121.313 is amended by adding new paragraph (k) to read
as follows:
Sec. 121.313 Miscellaneous equipment.
* * * * *
(k) Except for all-cargo operations as defined in section 119.3 of
this subchapter, after (insert date 2 years after final rule
publication date) for all passenger-carrying airplanes that require a
lockable flightdeck door in accordance with paragraph (f) of this
section, a means to monitor from the flightdeck side of the door the
area outside the flightdeck door to identify persons requesting entry
and to detect suspicious behavior and potential threats.
3. Add new Sec. 121.582 as follows:
Sec. 121.582 Means to discreetly notify a flightcrew.
Except for all-cargo operations as defined in section 119.3 of this
subchapter, after (insert date 180 days after final rule publication
date), for all passenger carrying airplanes that require a lockable
flightdeck door in accordance with 121.313(f), the certificate holder
must have an approved means by which the cabin crew can discreetly
notify the flightcrew in the event of suspicious activity or security
breaches in the cabin.
4. Add new Sec. 121.584 as follows:
Sec. 121.584 Requirement to view the area outside the flightdeck
door.
(a) From the time the airplane moves in order to initiate a flight
segment through the end of that flight segment,
[[Page 55498]]
no person may unlock or open the flightdeck door unless:
(1) A person authorized to be on the flightdeck uses an approved
audio procedure and an approved visual device to verify that:
(i) The area outside the flightdeck door is secure, and;
(ii) If someone outside the flightdeck is seeking to have the
flightdeck door opened, that person is not under duress, and;
(2) After the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) have been
satisfactorily accomplished, the crewmember in charge on the flightdeck
authorizes the door to be unlocked and open.
(b) Before (insert date 2 years after final rule publication date)
paragraph (a) applies only to the operation of an airplane that is
equipped with a means to monitor the flightdeck door area as required
by Sec. 121.313(k).
Issued in Washington, DC on September 14, 2005.
John M. Allen,
Acting Director, Flight Standards Service.
[FR Doc. 05-18806 Filed 9-20-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P