[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 177 (Wednesday, September 14, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54412-54416]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-18193]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318]
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., Calvert Cliffs Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Exemption
1.0 Background
The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc. (the licensee) is the
holder of Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69,
which authorize operation of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit
Nos. 1 and 2 (CCNPP), respectively. The licenses provide, among other
things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and
orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) now
or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors located in
Calvert County in Maryland.
2.0 Request/Action
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50,
Section 50.68, ``Criticality accident requirements,'' sets forth
requirements for which a licensee shall comply in lieu of maintaining a
monitoring system capable of detecting a criticality as described in 10
CFR 70.24. In particular, subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 50.68 requires
that plant procedures shall prohibit the handling and storage at any
one time of more fuel assemblies than have been determined to be safely
subcritical under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible by
unborated water.
By letter dated December 21, 2004, as supplemented on May 31, 2005,
the licensee submitted a request for an exemption from the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) during the pent fuel pool (SFP) activities
related to the underwater handling, loading, and unloading of the
Transnuclear NUHOMS-32P[supreg] dry shielded canister (DSC), as
described in its proposed Amendment to Materials License No. SNM-2505,
dated December 12, 2003, for the plant-specific independent spent fuel
storage installation (ISFSI) at CCNPP.
In summary, the licensee is unable to satisfy the above requirement
for handling of the Transnuclear NUHOMS-32P[supreg] DSC authorized by
10 CFR Part 72 at CCNPP. Section 50.12(a) allows licensees to apply for
an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 if the application
of the regulation is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of
the rule and special conditions are met. The licensee stated in its
application that compliance with 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) is not necessary
for handling the Transnuclear NUHOMS-32P[supreg] DSC system to achieve
the underlying purpose of the rule.
3.0 Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when: (1) The exemptions are
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and
(2) when special circumstances are present. Therefore, in determining
the acceptability of the licensee's exemption request, the NRC staff
has performed the following regulatory, technical, and legal
evaluations to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12 for granting
the exemption.
3.1 Regulatory Evaluation
The CCNPP Technical Specifications (TSs) currently permit the
licensee to store spent fuel assemblies in high-density storage racks
in its SFP. In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(4),
the licensee takes credit for soluble boron for criticality control and
ensures that the effective neutron multiplication factor
(keff) of the SFP does not exceed 0.95, if flooded with
borated water. Subsection 50.68(b)(4) also requires that if credit is
taken for soluble boron, the keff must remain below 1.0
(subcritical) if flooded with unborated water. However, the licensee is
unable to satisfy the requirement to maintain the keff below
1.0 (subcritical) with unborated water, which is also the requirement
of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1), during cask handling operations in the SFP.
Therefore, the licensee proposed an exemption from 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1)
to permit the performance of spent fuel loading, unloading, and
handling operations related to dry cask storage without being analyzed
to be subcritical under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible
by unborated water.
Appendix A, ``General Design Criteria (GDC) for Nuclear Power
Plants,'' to 10 CFR Part 50 provides a list of the minimum design
requirements for nuclear power plants. According to GDC 62,
``Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling,'' the
licensee must limit the potential for criticality in the fuel handling
and storage system by physical systems or processes. Since CCNPP was
licensed prior to the issuance of the Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, GDC
62 is not directly applicable. However, CCNPP was licensed to the 1967
draft GDC, as discussed in Appendix 1C of the CCNNP Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The comparable draft GDC is Criterion
66, ``Prevention of Fuel Storage Criticality,'' that states:
``Criticality in new and spent fuel storage shall be prevented by
physical systems or processes. Such means as geometrically safe
configurations shall be emphasized over procedural controls.''
[[Page 54413]]
Section 50.68 of 10 CFR Part 50 provides the NRC requirements for
maintaining subcritical conditions in SFPs. Section 50.68 provides
criticality control requirements that, if satisfied, ensure that an
inadvertent criticality in the SFP is an extremely unlikely event.
These requirements ensure that the licensee has appropriately
conservative criticality margins during handling and storage of spent
fuel. Section 50.68(b)(1) states, ``Plant procedures shall prohibit the
handling and storage at any one time of more fuel assemblies than have
been determined to be safely subcritical under the most adverse
moderation conditions feasible by unborated water.'' Specifically, 10
CFR 50.68(b)(1) ensures that the licensee will maintain the pool in a
subcritical condition during handling and storage operations without
crediting the soluble boron in the SFP water.
The licensee is authorized under plant-specific Materials License
No. SNM-2505 to construct and operate an ISFSI at CCNPP. The ISFSI
permits the licensee to store spent fuel assemblies in large concrete
dry storage casks. As part of its ISFSI loading campaigns, the licensee
transfers spent fuel assemblies to a DSC in the cask pit area of the
SFP. The licensee performed criticality analyses assuming the DSC fully
loaded with fuel having the highest permissible reactivity and
determined that a soluble boron credit was necessary to ensure that the
DSC would remain subcritical in the SFP. Since the licensee is unable
to satisfy the requirement of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) to ensure subcritical
conditions during handling and storage of spent fuel assemblies in the
pool with unborated water, the licensee identified the need for an
exemption from the 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) requirement to support DSC
loading, unloading, and handling operations without being subcritical
under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible by unborated
water.
The NRC staff evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent
criticality of the spent nuclear fuel at CCNPP during DSC loading,
unloading, and handling. The NRC staff has established a set of
acceptance criteria that, if met, satisfy the underlying intent of 10
CFR 50.68(b)(1). In lieu of complying with 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1), the NRC
staff determined that an inadvertent criticality accident is unlikely
to occur if the licensee meets the following five criteria: \1\
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\1\ The criteria have been used previously in the review of
similar exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) for
Diablo Canyon Units No. 1 and 2 and Sequoyah Units No. 1 and 2. The
evaluations for these exemptions are available in the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System under accession numbers
ML040300693 and ML041540213, respectively.
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1. The cask criticality analyses are based on the following
conservative assumptions:
a. All fuel assemblies in the cask are unirradiated and at the
highest permissible enrichment,
b. Only 75 percent of the Boron-10 in the fixed poison panel
inserts is credited,
c. No credit is taken for fuel-related burnable absorbers, and
d. The cask is assumed to be flooded with moderator at the
temperature and density corresponding to optimum moderation.
2. The licensee's ISFSI TSs require the soluble boron concentration
to be equal to or greater than the level assumed in the criticality
analysis, and surveillance requirements necessitate the periodic
verification of the concentration both prior to and during loading and
unloading operations.
3. Radiation monitors, as required by GDC 63, ``Monitoring fuel and
waste storage,'' are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to
detect excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety
actions.
4. The quantity of other forms of special nuclear material, such as
sources, detectors, etc., to be stored in the cask will not increase
the effective multiplication factor above the limit calculated in the
criticality analysis.
5. Sufficient time exists for plant personnel to identify and
terminate a boron dilution event prior to achieving a critical boron
concentration in the DSC. To demonstrate that it can safely identify
and terminate a boron dilution event, the licensee must provide the
following:
a. A plant-specific criticality analysis to identify the critical
boron concentration in the cask based on the highest reactivity loading
pattern.
b. A plant-specific boron dilution analysis to identify all
potential dilution pathways, their flowrates, and the time necessary to
reach a critical boron concentration.
c. A description of all alarms and indications available to
promptly alert operators of a boron dilution event.
d. A description of plant controls that will be implemented to
minimize the potential for a boron dilution event.
e. A summary of operator training and procedures that will be used
to ensure that operators can quickly identify and terminate a boron
dilution event.
3.2 Technical Evaluation
In determining the acceptability of the licensee's exemption
request, the NRC staff reviewed three aspects of the licensee's
analyses: (1) Criticality analyses submitted to support the ISFSI
license application and its exemption request, (2) boron dilution
analysis, and (3) legal basis for approving the exemption. For each of
the aspects, the staff evaluated whether the licensee's analyses and
methodologies provide reasonable assurance that adequate safety margins
are developed and can be maintained in the CCNPP SFP during loading of
spent fuel into canisters for dry cask storage.
3.2.1 Criticality Analyses
For evaluation of the acceptability of the licensee's exemption
request, the NRC staff reviewed the criticality analyses provided by
the licensee in support of its ISFSI license application.
First, the NRC staff reviewed the methodology and assumptions used
by the licensee in its criticality analysis to determine if Criterion 1
of Section 3.1 above was satisfied. The licensee stated that it took no
credit in the criticality analyses for burnup or fuel-related burnable
neutron absorbers. Specifically, the licensee stated that its
criticality analyses did not take credit for integral burnable
absorbers, integral fuel burnable absorbers, nor control element
assemblies. The licensee also stated that all assemblies were analyzed
at the highest permissible enrichment, 4.5 weight percent Uranium-235
at CCNPP. Additionally, the licensee stated that all criticality
analyses for a flooded DSC were performed at temperatures and densities
of water corresponding to optimum moderation conditions. Finally, the
licensee stated that it credited 90 percent of the Boron-10 content for
the fixed neutron absorber in the DSC. NUREG-1536, ``Standard Review
Plan for Dry Cask Storage System,'' states that ``[f] or a greater
credit allowance [i.e., greater than 75 percent for fixed neutron
absorbers] special, comprehensive fabrication tests capable of
verifying the presence and uniformity of the neutron absorber are
needed.'' As part of an amendment to the Part 72 license for the
Transnuclear NUHOMS-32P[supreg] design, the NRC staff reviewed and
accepted the results of additional data supplied by the manufacturer
that demonstrated that a 90-percent credit for the fixed neutron
absorbers was acceptable. Therefore, for the purposes of this
exemption, the staff finds a 90-percent credit acceptable on the basis
that it has previously been reviewed and approved by the NRC.
Subsequently, based on its review of the criticality analyses and the
information submitted in its exemption request, the
[[Page 54414]]
NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied Criterion 1.
Second, the NRC staff reviewed the proposed CCNPP ISFSI TSs and the
licensee's criticality analyses credit soluble boron for reactivity
control during DSC loading, unloading, and handling operations. Since
the boron concentration is a key safety component necessary for
ensuring subcritical conditions in the pool, the licensee must have a
conservative ISFSI TS capable of ensuring that sufficient soluble boron
is present to perform its safety function. The licensee stated that
ISFSI TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.2.1.1 requires that
the NUHOMS-32P[supreg] DSC cavity be moderated by water with a boron
concentration greater than or equal to 2450 ppm to accommodate cask
operations. In all cases, the boron concentration required by the ISFSI
TS ensures that the keff will be below 0.95 for the analyzed
loading configuration. Additionally, the licensee's ISFSI TS contain
surveillance requirements (SRs) that assure it will verify the boron
concentration is above the required level both prior to and during DSC
loading, unloading, and handling operations. Specifically, SRs 4.2.1.1
and 4.2.1.2 require verification of the boron concentration in the SFP
within 24 hours prior to either insertion of the first spent fuel
assembly into a DSC for loading operations or flooding the DSC cavity
for unloading operations. Additionally, both SRs require the licensee
to reconfirm the boron concentration is above the TS LCO limit at
intervals not to exceed 48 hours until such time as the DSC is removed
from the SFP. Based on its review of the CCNPP ISFSI TS, the NRC staff
finds that the licensee has satisfied Criterion 2.
Third, the NRC staff reviewed the CCNPP UFSAR and the information
provided by the licensee in its exemption request to ensure that it
complies with GDC 63. GDC 63 requires that licensees have radiation
monitors in fuel storage and associated handling areas to detect
conditions that may result in a loss of residual heat removal
capability and excessive radiation levels and initiate appropriate
safety actions. As previously described, since CCNPP was licensed prior
to the issuance of the GDC listed in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, GDC
63 is not directly applicable. However, CCNPP is licensed to the 1967
draft GDC as discussed in its UFSAR, Appendix 1C. The comparable draft
GDC is Criterion 18, ``Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage,'' that states
the following: ``Monitoring and alarm instrumentation shall be provided
for fuel and waste storage and handling areas for conditions that might
contribute to loss of continuity in decay heat removal and to radiation
exposure.'' The NRC staff reviewed the CCNPP UFSAR, 1967 draft GDC, and
exemption request to determine whether the licensee had provided
sufficient information to demonstrate compliance with the intent of GDC
63. In its exemption request, the licensee stated that three area
radiation monitors are provided for detecting high radiation levels in
the fuel storage areas. Specifically, the monitors are located in the
SFP area, on the spent fuel handling machine, and in the new fuel
storage area. At the montors' alarm setpoints, audible and visual
alarms annunciate locally and in the Control Room. Based on its review
of the exemption request, the CCNPP UFSAR, and the 1967 draft GDC, the
NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied Criterion 3.
Finally, as part of the criticality analysis review, the NRC staff
evaluated the storage of non-fuel-related material in a DSC. The NRC
staff evaluated the potential to increase the reactivity of a DSC by
loading it with materials other than spent nuclear fuel and fuel
debris. The approved contents for storage in the NUHOMS-32P[supreg]
cask design are listed in the CCNPP ISFSI TS LCO 3.1.1 (1), ``Fuel to
be Stored at ISFSI.'' This ISFSI TS LCO restricts the contents of the
DSC to only fuels (14 x 14 Combustion Engineering-type pressurized
water reactor fuel) irradiated at CCNPP. As such, CCNPP is prohibited
from loading other forms of special nuclear material, such as sources,
detectors, etc., in the DSC. Therefore, the NRC staff determined that
the loading limitations described in the CCNPP ISFSI TSs will ensure
that any authorized components loaded in the DSCs will not result in a
reactivity increase. Based on its review of the loading restrictions,
the NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied Criterion 4.
3.2.2 Boron Dilution Analysis
Since the licensee's ISFSI application relies on soluble boron to
maintain subcritical conditions within the DSCs during loading,
unloading, and handling operations, the NRC staff reviewed the
licensee's boron dilution analysis to determine whether appropriate
controls, alarms, and procedures were available to identify and
terminate a boron dilution accident prior to reaching a critical boron
concentration.
By letter dated October 25, 1996, the NRC staff issued a safety
evaluation (SE) on licensing topical report WCAP-14416, ``Westinghouse
Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology.'' This SE specified
that the following issues be evaluated for applications involving
soluble boron credit: the events that could cause boron dilution, the
time available to detect and mitigate each dilution event, the
potential for incomplete boron mixing, and the adequacy of the boron
concentration surveillance interval.
In its exemption request, the licensee described the criticality
analyses performed to determine the worst-case bounding
keff. The CCNPP criticality calculations employed the KENO
V.a code with the 44-group ENDF/B-V cross section library. The
calculations determined the minimum soluble boron concentration
required to maintain subcriticality (keff < 1.0) following a
boron dilution event in a NUHOMS-32P[supreg] DSC loaded with fresh 4.5
weight percent enriched fuel assemblies that bound the CCNPP fuel
designs (Combustion Engineering (CE) 14 x 14 fuel). The results of the
calculations for the bounding case indicate that subcriticality is
maintained with 1650 ppm of soluble boron in the SFP.
The TS requirements for the NUHOMS-32P[supreg] Cask System include
a minimum boron concentration requirement of 2450 ppm boron when spent
fuel assemblies with enrichments less than or equal to 4.5 weight-
percent (wt-percent) U-235 are loaded into a DSC canister. The approval
of this exemption is limited to the DSC loading, unloading, and
handling of CE 14 x 14 fuel assemblies enriched to a maximum of 4.5 wt-
percent U-235. The use of fuel-related burnable absorbers is credited
in the analysis. The NUHOMS-32P[supreg] soluble boron TS requirements
ensure that keff is maintained less than 0.95. TS SRs
require the boron concentration in the DSC water to be verified within
24 hours prior to the insertion of the first spent fuel assembly into a
DSC and reconfirmed at intervals not to exceed 48 hours until such time
as the DSC is removed from the SFP.
The licensee contracted with Transnuclear to perform a criticality
analysis to determine the soluble boron concentration that results in a
keff equal to 1.0 for 4.5 wt-percent U-235 fuel enrichments
using the same methodology as approved in the Standardized NUHOMS Cask
System Final Safety Analysis. The analysis determined the critical
boron concentration level for 4.5 wt-percent U-235 enriched fuel was
1650 ppm. The boron concentration within the canister would have to
decrease from the TS limit to the critical boron concentration before
criticality is possible. The licensee based its boron dilution analyses
and its preventive and
[[Page 54415]]
mitigative actions on dilution sources with the potential to reduce the
boron concentration from the TS minimum values for the two fuel
enrichment bands to the respective concentration for criticality.
During the current analysis the licensee identified all credible
potential sources that could dilute the SFP to critical conditions. The
licensee determined that the limiting boron dilution event occurs when
water from the fire protection system (FPS), with a maximum flow rate
of 1000 gpm from the most limiting hose (a 3-inch diameter with a 2-
inch nozzle), is added to the SFP. The licensee's calculations show
that at least 4 hours will be available to terminate the event before
the DSC water boron concentration decreases from 2450 ppm to the
critical concentration of 1650 ppm, assuming a straight dilution to the
SFP overflow limit and a feed and bleed operation thereafter with
instantaneous complete mixing.
To demonstrate that sufficient time exists for plant personnel to
identify and terminate a boron dilution event, the licensee provided a
description of all alarms available to alert operators, and plant
controls that will be implemented. There is no automatic level control
system for the SFP; therefore, the SFP will overflow on an uncontrolled
water addition. However, a high level alarm in the control room would
alert personnel of a potential boron dilution event within 15 minutes
for a 1000 gpm dilution rate. In addition to the SFP high level alarm,
annunciator alarms for the FPS exist in the Control Room, which would
alert operators to identify and terminate the worst-case boron dilution
source. This means that there would be more than 3 additional hours
before the critical boron concentration of 1650 ppm within the DSC is
reached. The NRC staff finds that this is acceptable.
The CCNPP's SFP is a large rectangular structure filled with
borated water that completely covers the spent fuel assemblies. A 3.5-
foot wall divides the pool, with the north half associated to Unit 1
and the south half associated to Unit 2. A slot in the dividing wall
has removable gates, which allow movement of the fuel assemblies
between the two halves of the pool. The slot is normally open and the
removable gate stored in the Unit 1 SFP close to the west end of the
south wall. However, to ensure the applicability of the assumptions in
its dilution and criticality evaluations, the licensee has committed to
revise the fuel-handling procedure to include an initial condition that
requires the slot between the two pools to be open and the gate to be
stored in its proper storage location when a DSC is present in the Unit
1 SFP.
To ensure that operators are capable of identifying and terminating
a boron dilution event during DSC loading, unloading, and handling
operations, operator training will be conducted. During training
activities operators will receive revised alarm manual procedures which
verify that the SFP boron concentration is in compliance with the new
ISFSI TS limit prior to the loading of a NUHOMS-32P[supreg] DSC.
Based on the NRC staff's review of the licensee's exemption request
dated December 21, 2004, as supplemented on May 31, 2005, and its boron
dilution analysis, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has provided
sufficient information to demonstrate that an undetected and
uncorrected dilution from the TS required boron concentration to the
calculated critical boron concentration is very unlikely. Based on its
review of the boron analysis and enhancements to the operating
procedures and operator training program, the NRC staff finds the
licensee has satisfied Criterion 5.
Therefore, in conjunction with the conservative assumptions used to
establish the TS required boron concentration and critical boron
concentration, the boron dilution evaluation demonstrates that the
underlying intent of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) is satisfied.
3.3 Legal Basis for the Exemption
3.3.1 Authorized by Law
This exemption results in changes to the operation of the plant by
allowing the operation of the new dry fuel storage facility and loading
of the NUHOMS-32P[reg] DSC. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the
NRC to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. In
addition, the granting of the licensee's exemption request will not
result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or
the intent of the Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemption is
authorized by law.
3.3.2 No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) is to ensure that
adequate controls are in place to ensure that the handling and storage
of fuel assemblies is conducted in a manner such that the fuel
assemblies remain safely subcritical. Based on the NRC staff's review
of the licensee's exemption request, the licensee has demonstrated that
sufficient controls are in place to provide reasonable assurance that
there is no undue risk to public health and safety given conservative
assumptions in the criticality analysis (Criterion 1 above);
surveillances periodically verify the boron concentration before and
during loading and unloading (Criterion 2 above); radiation monitoring
equipment is used to detect excessive radiation and initiate
appropriate protective actions (Criterion 3 above); only fuel
authorized by the ISFSI TS will be loaded and stored in the ISFSI
(Criterion 4 above); and boron dilution events have been analyzed, and
there are sufficient monitoring capabilities and time for the licensee
to identify and terminate a dilution event prior to achieving a
critical boron concentration in the cask (Criterion 5 above).
Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that the underlying purpose of the
rule has been satisfied and that there is no undue risk to public
health and safety.
3.3.3 Consistent with Common Defense and Security
This exemption results in changes to the operation of the plant by
allowing the operation of the new dry fuel storage facility and loading
of the NUHOMS-32P[reg] DSC. This change to the fuel assembly storage
and handling in the plant does not affect the national defense strategy
because the national defense is maintained by resources (hardware or
software or other) that are outside the plant and that have no direct
relation to plant operation. In addition, loading spent fuel into the
NUHOMS-32P[reg] DSC in the SFP does not affect the ability of the
licensee to defend the plant against a terrorist attack. Therefore, the
common defense and security is not impacted by this exemption request.
3.3.4 Special Circumstances
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the NRC staff
reviewed the licensee's exemption request to determine if the legal
basis for granting an exemption had been satisfied. With regards to the
six special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), the NRC staff
finds that the licensee's exemption request satisfies 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
``Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would
not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.'' Specifically, the NRC
staff concludes that since the licensee has satisfied the five criteria
in Section 3.1 of this exemption, the application of the rule is not
necessary to achieve its underlying purpose in this particular case.
[[Page 54416]]
3.4 Summary
Based upon the review of the licensee's exemption request to credit
soluble boron during DSC loading, unloading, and handling in the CCNPP
SFP, the NRC staff concludes that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) the
licensee's exemption request is acceptable. However, the NRC staff
places the following limitations and/or conditions on the approval of
this exemption:
1. This exemption is limited to the loading, unloading, and
handling of the DSC for only the TN NUHOMS-32P[reg] at CCNPP.
2. This exemption is limited to the loading, unloading, and
handling in the DSC at CCNPP of Combustion Engineering 14x14 fuel
assemblies that had maximum initial, unirradiated U-235 enrichments of
4.5 weight percent.
4.0 Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee an exemption from
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) for the loading, unloading, and
handling of the components of the Transnuclear NUHOMS-32P[reg] dry cask
storage system at CCNPP. However, since the licensee does not have an
NRC-approved methodology for evaluating changes to the analyses or
systems supporting this exemption request, the NRC staff's approval of
the exemption is restricted to those specific design and operating
conditions described in the licensee's December 21, 2004, exemption
request. The licensee may not apply the 10 CFR 50.59 process for
evaluating changes to specific exemptions. Any changes to the design or
operation of (1) the dry cask storage system, (2) the SFP, (3) the fuel
assemblies to be stored, (4) the boron dilution analyses, or (5)
supporting procedures and controls, regardless of whether they are
approved under the general Part 72 license or perceived to be
conservative, will invalidate this exemption. Upon invalidation of the
exemption, the licensee will be required to comply with NRC regulations
prior to future cask loadings.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment (70 FR 51853).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of September, 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ledyard B. Marsh,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05-18193 Filed 9-13-05; 8:45 am]
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