[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 161 (Monday, August 22, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48985-48987]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-4554]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-424 AND 50-425]


Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.; Notice of Consideration 
of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards; Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. 
NPF-68 and NPF-81 issued Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. 
(SNC), for operation of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), 
Units 1 and 2, located in Burke County, Georgia.
    The proposed amendment would revise, on a one-time basis, Technical 
Specification (TS) 5.5.9, ``Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance 
Program,'' to incorporate changes in the SG inspection scope for VEGP, 
Unit 2 during Refueling Outage 11 and the subsequent operating cycle. 
The proposed changes are applicable to Unit 2 only for inspections 
during Refueling Outage 11 and for the subsequent operating cycle. The 
proposed changes modify the inspection requirements for portions of SG 
tubes within the hot leg tubesheet region of the SGs. The license for 
VEGP, Unit 1 is affected only due to the fact that Units 1 and 2 use 
common TSs.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(10 CFR) Section 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in 
accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required 
by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed changes by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
Amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated?
    No. The previously analyzed accidents are initiated by the 
failure of plant structures, systems, or components. The proposed 
changes that alter the SG inspection criteria do not have a 
detrimental impact on the integrity of any plant structure, system, 
or component that initiates an analyzed event. The proposed changes 
will not alter the operation of, or otherwise increase the failure 
probability of any plant equipment that initiates an analyzed 
accident. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    Of the applicable accidents previously evaluated, the limiting 
transients with consideration to the proposed changes to the SG tube 
inspection criteria, are the SG tube rupture (SGTR) event and the 
steam line break (SLB) accident.
    During the SGTR event, the required structural integrity margins 
of the SG tubes will be maintained by the presence of the SG 
tubesheet. SG tubes are hydraulically expanded in the tubesheet 
area. Tube rupture in tubes with cracks in the tubesheet is 
precluded by the constraint provided by the tubesheet. This 
constraint results from the hydraulic expansion process, thermal 
expansion mismatch between the tube and tubesheet and from the 
differential pressure between the primary and secondary side. Based 
on this design, the structural margins against burst, discussed in 
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.121, ``Bases for Plugging Degraded PWR 
[Pressurized-Water Reactor] SG Tubes,''

[[Page 48986]]

are maintained for both normal and postulated accident conditions.
    The proposed changes do not affect other systems, structures, 
components or operational features. Therefore, the proposed changes 
result in no significant increase in the probability of the 
occurrence of a SGTR accident. At normal operating pressures, 
leakage from primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) below 
the proposed limited inspection depth is limited by both the tube-
to-tubesheet crevice and the limited crack opening permitted by the 
tubesheet constraint. Consequently, negligible normal operating 
leakage is expected from cracks within the tubesheet region. The 
consequences of an SGTR event are affected by the primary-to-
secondary leakage flow during the event.
    Primary-to-secondary leakage flow through a postulated broken 
tube is not affected by the proposed change since the tubesheet 
enhances the tube integrity in the region of the hydraulic expansion 
by precluding tube deformation beyond its initial hydraulically 
expanded outside diameter.
    The probability of a SLB is unaffected by the potential failure 
of a SG tube as this failure is not an initiator for a SLB.
    The consequences of a SLB are also not significantly affected by 
the proposed changes. During a SLB accident, the reduction in 
pressure above the tubesheet on the shell side of the SG creates an 
axially uniformly distributed load on the tubesheet due to the 
reactor coolant system pressure on the underside of the tubesheet. 
The resulting bending action constrains the tubes in the tubesheet 
thereby restricting primary-to-secondary leakage below the midplane.
    Primary-to-secondary leakage from tube degradation in the 
tubesheet area during the limiting accident (i.e., SLB) is limited 
by flow restrictions resulting from the crack and tube-to-tubesheet 
contact pressures that provide a restricted leakage path above the 
indications and also limit the degree of potential crack face 
opening as compared to free span indications. The primary-to-
secondary leak rate during postulated SLB accident conditions would 
be expected to be less than that during normal operation for 
indications near the bottom of the tubesheet (i.e., including 
indications in the tube end welds). This conclusion is based on the 
observation that while the driving pressure causing leakage 
increases by approximately a factor of two, the flow resistance 
associated with an increase in the tube-to-tubesheet contact 
pressure, during a SLB, increases by up to approximately a factor of 
three. While such a leakage decrease is logically expected, the 
postulated accident leak rate could be conservatively bounded by 
twice the normal operating leak rate if the increase in contact 
pressure is ignored. Since normal operating leakage is 
administratively limited (by NEI [Nuclear Energy Institute] 97-06) 
to less than 0.10 gpm (150 gpd) in the Vogtle Unit 2 steam 
generators, the attendant accident condition leak rate, assuming all 
leakage to be from lower tubesheet indications, would be bounded by 
0.20 gpm, which is less than the accident analysis assumption of 
0.35 gpm included in Section 15.1.5 of the Vogtle Unit 2 UFSAR. 
Hence it is reasonable to omit any consideration of inspection of 
the tube, tube end weld, bulges/overexpansions or other anomalies 
below 17 inches from the top of the hot leg tubesheet. Therefore, 
the consequences of a SLB accident remain unaffected.
    Based on the above discussion, the proposed changes do not 
involve an increase in the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    No. The proposed changes do not involve the use or installation 
of new equipment and the currently installed equipment will not be 
operated in a new or different manner. No new or different system 
interactions are created and no new processes are introduced. The 
proposed changes will not introduce any new failure mechanisms, 
malfunctions, or accident initiators not already considered in the 
design and licensing bases.
    Based on this evaluation, the proposed change does not create 
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any 
accident previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    No. The proposed changes maintain the required structural 
margins of the SG tubes for both normal and accident conditions. 
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 97-06, ``Steam Generator Program 
Guidelines,'' Revision 1 and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.121, ``Bases 
for Plugging Degraded PWR Steam Generator Tubes,'' are used as the 
bases in the development of the limited hot leg tubesheet inspection 
depth methodology for determining that SG tube integrity 
considerations are maintained within acceptable limits. RG 1.121 
describes a method acceptable to the NRC for meeting General Design 
Criteria (GDC) 14, ``Reactor coolant pressure boundary,'' GDC 15, 
``Reactor coolant system design,'' GDC 31, ``Fracture prevention of 
reactor coolant pressure boundary,'' and GDC 32, ``Inspection of 
reactor coolant pressure boundary,'' by reducing the probability and 
consequences of a SGTR. RG 1.121 concludes that by determining the 
limiting safe conditions for tube wall degradation the probability 
and consequences of a SGTR are reduced. This RG uses safety factors 
on loads for tube burst that are consistent with the requirements of 
Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 
Code.
    Application of the limited hot leg tubesheet inspection depth 
criteria will preclude unacceptable primary-to-secondary leakage 
during all plant conditions. The methodology for determining leakage 
provides for large margins between calculated and actual leakage 
values in the proposed limited hot leg tubesheet inspection depth 
criteria.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
hazards consideration under the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 
50.92(c).

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The 
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the 
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day 
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, 
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the 
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment 
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a 
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after 
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will 
occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Documents may 
be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document Room 
(PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
     Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the 
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of 
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person 
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who

[[Page 48987]]

wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written 
request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests 
for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in 
accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic 
Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should 
consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the 
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 
O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic 
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition 
for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a 
presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief 
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, 
will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the 
Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following general requirements: (1) The name, address and telephone 
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the 
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the 
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the 
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must 
also identify the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor 
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
    Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for 
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinion which support the contention on which the petitioner intends to 
rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner/requestor 
must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of 
which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to 
rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The petition must 
include sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists 
with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions 
shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under 
consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would 
entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner/requestor who fails to 
satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one contention will 
not be permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If 
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no 
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment 
request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held 
would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
    Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be 
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding 
officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition, 
request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing 
of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(I)-(viii).
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the 
Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications 
Staff; (2) courier, express mail, and expedited delivery services: 
Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and 
Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of the 
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, [email protected]; 
or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: 
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, verification 
number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and 
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of 
the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and it is requested that copies be transmitted either by 
means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to 
[email protected]. A copy of the request for hearing and petition 
for leave to intervene should also be sent to Arthur H. Domby, Esquire, 
Troutman Sanders, NationsBank Plaza, 600 Peachtree Street, NE., Suite 
5200, Atlanta, GA 30308-2216, the attorney for the licensee.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated August 12, 2005, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint 
North, File Public Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from 
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to 
ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in 
ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1-
800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of August 2005.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Christopher Gratton,
Sr. Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate II, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5-4554 Filed 8-19-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P