[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 153 (Wednesday, August 10, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 46569-46570]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-15758]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration


Pipeline Safety Advisory Bulletin; Inspecting and Testing Pilot-
Operated Pressure Relief Valves

AGENCY: Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration, DOT

ACTION: Notice of advisory bulletin.

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SUMMARY: This notice announces a pipeline safety advisory bulletin 
about pilot-operated pressure relief valves installed in hazardous 
liquid pipelines. The bulletin provides pipeline operators guidance on 
whether their inspection and test procedures are adequate to determine 
if these valves function properly. Malfunctioning of a pilot-operated 
pressure relief valve was a contributing factor in an accident 
involving a petroleum products pipeline in Bellingham Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  L.M. Furrow by phone at 202-366-4559, 
by fax at 202-366-4566, by mail at U.S. Department of Transportation, 
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, 20590, or by e-mail at 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: After its investigation of an accident 
involving a 16-inch petroleum products pipeline operated by the Olympic 
Pipe Line Company in Bellingham, Washington, the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) made the following recommendation to 
the Research and Special Programs Administration: \1\
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    \1\ The Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs 
Improvement Act (Pub. L. 108-426, 118; November 30, 2004) 
reorganized the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) 
into two new DOT administrations: the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Research and 
Innovative Technology Administration. RSPA's regulatory authority 
over pipeline and hazardous materials safety was transferred to 
PHMSA.
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    Develop and issue guidance to pipeline operators on specific 
testing

[[Page 46570]]

procedures that can (1) be used to approximate actual operations during 
the commissioning of a new pumping station or the installation of a new 
relief valve, and (2) be used to determine, during annual tests, 
whether a relief valve is functioning properly. (P-02-4)
    The recommendation arose from NTSB's evaluation of a test Olympic 
had done to check the pilot of a pilot-operated pressure relief valve 
in a pumping station at its new Bayview products terminal. NTSB found 
the test was inadequate to determine if the pilot was configured 
properly or if it was operating reliably. Furthermore, NTSB concluded 
that the DOT regulations governing the testing of relief valves and 
other safety devices on hazardous liquid pipelines provide insufficient 
guidance to ensure that test protocols and procedures will effectively 
indicate malfunctions of pressure relief valves or their pilot 
controls.\2\
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    \2\ Under 49 CFR 195.262(c), the safety devices in each new 
pumping station must be tested under conditions approximating actual 
operations and found to function properly before the pumping station 
may be used. Also, under 49 CFR 195.428, each pressure limiting 
device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure 
control equipment must be inspected and tested annually to determine 
that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, 
and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of 
operation for the service in which it is used.
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    According to NTSB's accident report \3\--available online at http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/P_Acc.htm--Olympic installed pressure control 
devices to protect the Bayview terminal piping and components from 
overpressure by the 16-inch pipeline. These devices consisted of (1) a 
control valve to throttle back the inflow of product; (2) a downstream 
pilot-operated pressure relief valve designed to divert excess product 
if a set pressure was exceeded; and (3) upstream remotely controlled 
block valves that would stop the inflow if a pressure of 700 psig was 
reached inside the terminal.
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    \3\ Pipeline Rupture and Subsequent Fire in Bellingham, 
Washington, June 10, 1999, Pipeline Accident Report NTSB/PAR-02/02, 
October 11, 2002.
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    The report explains that the pilot of the relief valve had been 
configured for low-pressure operation, with a set point of 100 psig. 
Consequently, during start-up of the Bayview terminal, the relief valve 
opened at a pressure lower than intended. To correct the problem, 
Olympic replaced the pilot spring (with an identical spring) and 
increased the set point to 700 psig. (Olympic did not consult the valve 
manufacturer's specifications and was unaware that a different piston, 
cover, and O-ring were necessary for high-pressure configuration.) The 
pilot was then tested in situ with a hydraulic pump rig to be sure the 
pilot valve opened at the correct pressure. Olympic used the same test 
procedure it used to test relief valves under DOT's regulations.
    The accident investigation disclosed that increasing the set 
pressure of the pilot had compressed the pilot spring so much that 
rising inlet pressure could not lift the piston, making operation of 
the pilot completely unreliable. Although the pilot set point 
apparently had been tested, the test procedure did not reveal that the 
pilot had been configured for low-pressure operation and thus would not 
consistently open at the intended pressure. NTSB observed that if the 
relief valve did not open because of pilot malfunction and downstream 
pressure rose above 700 psig, a block valve would close and increase 
pressure in the 16-inch pipeline, which is what happened in the 
accident.

Advisory Bulletin (ADB-05-05)

    OPS shares NTSB's concern that pipeline operators could be 
conducting in-service tests that do not identify unreliable pilot-
operated pressure relief valves. Therefore, we are issuing the 
following advisory bulletin:
    To: Operators of hazardous liquid pipelines regulated by 49 CFR 
part 195.
    Subject: Inspecting and testing pilot-operated pressure relief 
valves.
    Purpose: To assure that pilot-operated pressure relief valves 
function properly.
    Advisory: Operators should review their in-service inspection and 
test procedures used on new, replaced, or relocated pilot-operated 
pressure relief valves and during the periodic inspection and testing 
of these valves. Operators can use the guidance stated below to ensure 
the procedures approximate actual operations and are adequate to 
determine if the valves functions properly.
    Guidance: The procedures should provide for the following:
    (a) During installation, review the valve purchase order (or 
comparable documentation), valve name-plate, and manufacturer's 
specifications. Verify that the valve is:
    (1) Compatible with the material and maximum operating pressure of 
the pipeline;
    (2) Compatible with or protected from environmental attack or 
damage;
    (3) Compatible with the hazardous liquid transported at all 
anticipated operating temperatures and pressures;
    (4) In conformity with the manufacturer's specifications for the 
valve model and type of service, and with the purchase order (or 
comparable documentation);
    (5) Configured according to the manufacturer's specifications for 
the pilot and in-line valves; and
    (6) Operable at the set pressure (i.e., activation of the pilot 
valve opens the in-line valve).
    (b) If the pilot assembly of a previously installed valve is 
reconfigured or repaired ``
    (1) Do the work according to the manufacturer's specifications;
    (2) Test the valve to ensure it is operable at the set pressure 
(i.e., activation of the pilot valve opens the in-line valve) or, if 
testing the in-line valve would be unsafe or environmentally hazardous, 
tests the pilot valve according to paragraph (d) below; and
    (3) Document the work.
    (c) Verify that the valve set pressure is consistent with ``
    (1) The design or configuration of the pilot valve and in-line 
valve; and
    (2) Use of the valve as a primary overpressure protection device or 
as a backup safety relief device.
    (d) Test the pilot valve at least twice and verify that it 
activates consistently at the intended set pressure.
    (e) During periodic inspections and tests, review the valve 
installation to determine if it has been modified since the last 
inspection. If so, verify that the pilot sensor and valve inlet and 
discharge piping are properly sized and placed and that the 
installation is consistent with the intended design.
    (f) Document all verifications, and sign, date, and keep for the 
operating life of the valve all documentation.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on August 4, 2005.
Stacey Gerard,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 05-15758 Filed 8-9-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P