[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 149 (Thursday, August 4, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44942-44946]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-4147]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-261]
Carolina Power and Light Company, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric
Plant, Unit No. 2; Exemption
1.0 Background
Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L or the licensee) is the holder
of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-23, which authorizes
operation of the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2
(HBRSEP2). The license provides, among other things, that the facility
is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of a pressurized-water reactor located in
Darlington County, South Carolina.
2.0 Request/Action
By letter dated February 22, 2005, as supplemented by letters dated
May 10, July 6, and July 14, 2005, the licensee submitted a request for
an exemption from the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.68(b)(1) during the spent fuel pool
(SFP) activities related to the underwater handling, loading, and
unloading of the dry shielded canister (DSC) NUHOMS[supreg] -24PTH, as
described in proposed Amendment No. 8 to Certificate of Compliance No.
1004 listed in 10 CFR 72.214 at HBRSEP2.
Section 50.68(b)(1) of 10 CFR sets forth the following requirement
that must be met, in lieu of a monitoring system capable of detecting
criticality events.
Plant procedures shall prohibit the handling and storage at any
one time of more fuel assemblies than have been determined to be
safely subcritical under the most adverse moderation conditions
feasible by unborated water.
The licensee is unable to satisfy the above requirement for
handling of the Transnuclear (TN) NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH DSC authorized
by 10 CFR Part 72 at HBRSEP2. Section 50.12(a) allows licensees to
apply for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 if the
application of the regulation is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule and special conditions are met. The
licensee stated in the application that compliance with 10 CFR
50.68(b)(1) is not necessary for handling the TN NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH
DSC system to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.
3.0 Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when (1) the exemptions are
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and
(2) when special circumstances are present. Therefore, in determining
the acceptability of the licensee's exemption request, the staff has
performed the following regulatory, technical, and legal evaluations to
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12 for granting the exemption.
3.1 Regulatory Evaluation
The HBRSEP2 Technical Specifications (TS) currently permit the
licensee to store spent fuel assemblies in high-density storage racks
in its SFP. In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(4),
the licensee takes credit for soluble boron for criticality control and
ensures that the effective multiplication factor (keff) of
the SFP does not exceed 0.95, if flooded with borated water. Section
50.68(b)(4) of 10 CFR also requires that if credit is taken for soluble
boron, the keff must remain below 1.0 (subcritical) if
flooded with unborated water. However, the licensee is unable to
satisfy the requirement to maintain the keff below 1.0
(subcritical) with unborated water, which is also the requirement of 10
CFR 50.68(b)(1), during cask handling operations in the SFP. Therefore,
the licensee's request for exemption from 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) proposes
to permit the licensee to perform spent fuel loading, unloading, and
handling operations related to dry cask storage without being
subcritical under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible by
unborated water.
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A,
``General Design Criteria (GDC) for Nuclear Power Plants,'' provides a
list of the minimum design requirements for nuclear power plants.
According to GDC 62, ``Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and
handling,'' the licensee must limit the potential for criticality in
the fuel handling and storage system by physical systems or processes.
HBRSEP2 was licensed prior to the issuance of the GDC listed in 10 CFR
50, Appendix A; therefore, GDC 62 is not directly applicable. However,
HBRSEP2 has committed to a plant-specific version of the 1967 draft GDC
as discussed in its Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),
Section 3.1.2. The comparable GDC is Criterion 66, ``Prevention of Fuel
Storage Criticality,'' that states: ``Criticality in the new and spent
fuel storage pits shall be prevented by physical systems or processes.
Such means as geometrically safe configurations shall be emphasized
over procedural controls.''
Section 50.68 of 10 CFR Part 50, ``Criticality accident
requirements,'' provides the NRC requirements for maintaining
subcritical conditions in SFPs. Section 50.68 provides criticality
control requirements that, if satisfied, ensure that an inadvertent
criticality in the SFP is an extremely unlikely event. These
requirements ensure that the licensee has appropriately conservative
criticality margins during handling and storage of spent fuel. Section
50.68(b)(1) states, ``Plant procedures shall prohibit the handling and
storage at any one time of more fuel assemblies than have been
determined to be safely subcritical under the most adverse moderation
conditions feasible by unborated water.'' Specifically, 10 CFR
50.68(b)(1) ensures that the licensee will maintain the pool in a
subcritical condition during handling and storage operations without
crediting the soluble boron in the SFP water.
The licensee is authorized under general license to construct and
operate
[[Page 44943]]
an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) at HBRSEP2. The
ISFSI permits the licensee to store spent fuel assemblies in large
concrete dry storage casks. As part of its ISFSI loading campaigns, the
licensee transfers spent fuel assemblies to a DSC in the cask pit area
of the SFP. The licensee performed criticality analyses of the DSC
fully loaded with fuel having the highest permissible reactivity and
determined that a soluble boron credit was necessary to ensure that the
DSC would remain subcritical in the SFP. Since the licensee is unable
to satisfy the requirement of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) to ensure subcritical
conditions during handling and storage of spent fuel assemblies in the
pool with unborated water, the licensee identified the need for an
exemption from the 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) requirement to support DSC
loading, unloading, and handling operations without being subcritical
under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible by unborated
water.
The NRC staff evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent
criticality of the spent nuclear fuel at HBRSEP2 during DSC loading,
unloading, and handling. The NRC staff has established a set of
acceptance criteria that, if met, satisfy the underlying intent of 10
CFR 50.68(b)(1). In lieu of complying with 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1), the
staff determined that an inadvertent criticality accident is unlikely
to occur if the licensee meets the following five criteria:
1. The cask criticality analyses are based on the following
conservative assumptions:
a. All fuel assemblies in the cask are unirradiated and at the
highest permissible enrichment,
b. Only 75 percent of the Boron-10 in the fixed poison panel
inserts is credited,
c. No credit is taken for fuel-related burnable absorbers, and
d. The cask is assumed to be flooded with moderator at the
temperature and density corresponding to optimum moderation.
2. The licensee's ISFSI TS require the soluble boron concentration
to be equal to or greater than the level assumed in the criticality
analysis, and surveillance requirements necessitate the periodic
verification of the concentration both prior to and during loading and
unloading operations.
3. Radiation monitors, as required by GDC 63, ``Monitoring Fuel and
Waste Storage,'' are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to
detect excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety
actions.
4. The quantity of other forms of special nuclear material, such as
sources, detectors, etc., to be stored in the cask will not increase
the effective multiplication factor above the limit calculated in the
criticality analysis.
5. Sufficient time exists for plant personnel to identify and
terminate a boron dilution event prior to achieving a critical boron
concentration in the DSC. To demonstrate that it can safely identify
and terminate a boron dilution event, the licensee must provide the
following:
a. A plant-specific criticality analysis to identify the critical
boron concentration in the cask based on the highest reactivity loading
pattern.
b. A plant-specific boron dilution analysis to identify all
potential dilution pathways, their flowrates, and the time necessary to
reach a critical boron concentration.
c. A description of all alarms and indications available to
promptly alert operators of a boron dilution event.
d. A description of plant controls that will be implemented to
minimize the potential for a boron dilution event.
e. A summary of operator training and procedures that will be used
to ensure that operators can quickly identify and terminate a boron
dilution event.
On March 23, 2005, the NRC issued Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS)
2005-05, ``Regulatory Issues Regarding Criticality Analyses for Spent
Fuel Pools and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations.'' In RIS
2005-05, the NRC identified an acceptable methodology for demonstrating
compliance with the 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) requirements during cask
loading, unloading, and handling operations in pressurized-water
reactor SFPs. The NRC staff has determined that implementation of this
methodology by licensees will eliminate the need to grant future
exemptions for cask storage and handling evolutions. However, since the
licensee submitted its exemption request prior to issuance of the RIS
and identification of an NRC-acceptable methodology for compliance with
the regulations, the NRC staff has determined that it is still
appropriate to consider the exemption request.
3.2 Technical Evaluation
In determining the acceptability of the licensee's exemption
request, the staff reviewed three aspects of the licensee's analyses:
(1) criticality analyses submitted to support the ISFSI license
application and its exemption request, (2) boron dilution analysis, and
(3) legal basis for approving the exemption. For each of the aspects,
the staff evaluated whether the licensee's analyses and methodologies
provide reasonable assurance that adequate safety margins are developed
and can be maintained in the HBRSEP2 SFP during loading of spent fuel
into canisters for dry cask storage.
3.2.1 Criticality Analyses
For evaluation of the acceptability of the licensee's exemption
request, the NRC staff reviewed the criticality analyses provided by
the licensee in support of its ISFSI license application. First, the
NRC staff reviewed the methodology and assumptions used by the licensee
in its criticality analysis to determine if Criterion 1 was satisfied.
The licensee stated that it took no credit in the criticality analyses
for burnup or fuel-related burnable neutron absorbers. The licensee
also stated that all assemblies were analyzed at the highest
permissible enrichment. Additionally, the licensee stated that all
criticality analyses for a flooded DSC were performed at temperatures
and densities of water corresponding to optimum moderation conditions.
Finally, the licensee stated that it credited 90 percent of the Boron-
10 content for the fixed neutron absorber in the DSC. NUREG-1536,
``Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage System,'' states that
``[f]or a greater credit allowance [i.e., greater than 75 percent for
fixed neutron absorbers] special, comprehensive fabrication tests
capable of verifying the presence and uniformity of the neutron
absorber are needed.'' As part of an amendment to the Part 72 license
for the Transnuclear NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH design, the NRC staff
reviewed and accepted the results of additional data supplied by the
manufacturer that demonstrated that a 90-percent credit for the fixed
neutron absorbers was acceptable. These tests and corresponding results
are detailed in Appendix P of the Standardized NUHOMS[supreg] FSAR.
Therefore, for the purposes of this exemption, the staff finds a 90-
percent credit acceptable on the basis that it has previously been
reviewed and approved by the NRC. Subsequently, based on its review of
the criticality analyses and the information submitted in its exemption
request, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied Criterion
1.
Second, the NRC staff reviewed the proposed HBRSEP2 ISFSI TS. The
licensee's criticality analyses credit soluble boron for reactivity
control during DSC loading, unloading, and handling operations. Since
the boron concentration is a key safety component necessary for
ensuring subcritical conditions in the pool, the licensee must have a
conservative ISFSI TS capable of ensuring that sufficient soluble boron
is present to perform its safety function. The ISFSI TS applicable
[[Page 44944]]
to the NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH DSC, and attached to the Certificate of
Compliance No. 1004, contain the requirements for the minimum soluble
boron concentration as a function of fuel assembly class, DSC basket
type, and corresponding assembly average initial enrichment values. In
all cases, the boron concentration required by the ISFSI TS ensures
that the keff will be below 0.95 for the analyzed loading
configuration. Additionally, the licensee's ISFSI TS contain
surveillance requirements that assure it will verify the boron
concentration is above the required level both prior to and during DSC
loading, unloading, and handling operations. Based on its review of the
HBRSEP2 ISFSI TS, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied
Criterion 2.
Third, the NRC staff reviewed the HBRSEP2 Updated FSAR and the
information provided by the licensee in its exemption request to ensure
that it complies with GDC 63. GDC 63 requires that licensees have
radiation monitors in fuel storage and associated handling areas to
detect conditions that may result in a loss of residual heat removal
capability and excessive radiation levels and initiate appropriate
safety actions. As previously described, HBRSEP2 was licensed prior to
the issuance of the GDC listed in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A; therefore, GDC
63 is not directly applicable. However, HBRSEP2 has committed to a
plant-specific version of the 1967 draft GDC as discussed in its
Updated FSAR, Section 3.1.2. The comparable GDC is Criterion 18,
``Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage,'' that states the following:
``Monitoring and alarm instrumentation shall be provided for fuel and
waste storage and associated handling areas for conditions that might
result in loss of capability to remove decay heat and detect excessive
radiation levels.'' The NRC staff reviewed the HBRSEP2 Updated FSAR,
plant-specific GDC, and exemption request to determine whether the
licensee had provided sufficient information to demonstrate compliance
with the intent of GDC 63. In its exemption request, the licensee
stated that an area radiation monitor is located in the area of the
SFP. Additionally, station procedures specify appropriate safety
actions upon a high radiation alarm, including evacuation of local
personnel, determination of cause, and determination of potential low
water level in the SFP. In addition, personnel working in the area of
the SFP wear individual, gamma-sensitive, electronic alarming
dosimeters that provide an audible alarm should the dose or dose rate
exceed pre-established setpoints. Based on its review of the exemption
request, the HBRSEP2 Updated FSAR, and the licensee's plant-specific
GDC, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied Criterion 3.
Finally, as part of the criticality analysis review, the NRC staff
evaluated the storage of non-fuel-related material in a DSC. The NRC
staff evaluated the potential to increase the reactivity of a DSC by
loading it with materials other than spent nuclear fuel and fuel
debris. The approved contents for storage in the NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH
cask design are listed in the HBRSEP2 ISFSI TS Limiting Condition for
Operation (LCO) 1.2.1 ``Fuel Specifications.'' This ISFSI TS LCO
restricts the contents of the DSC to only fuels and non-fissile
materials irradiated at HBRSEP2. As such, HBRSEP2 is prohibited from
loading other forms of special nuclear material, such as sources,
detectors, etc., in the DSC. Therefore, the NRC staff determined that
the loading limitations described in the HBRSEP2 ISFSI TS will ensure
that any authorized components loaded in the DSCs will not result in a
reactivity increase. Based on its review of the loading restrictions,
the NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied Criterion 4.3.2.2.
Boron Dilution Analysis. Since the licensee's ISFSI application
relies on soluble boron to maintain subcritical conditions within the
DSCs during loading, unloading, and handling operations, the NRC staff
reviewed the licensee's boron dilution analysis to determine whether
appropriate controls, alarms, and procedures were available to identify
and terminate a boron dilution accident prior to reaching a critical
boron concentration.
By letter dated October 25, 1996, the NRC staff issued a safety
evaluation on licensing topical report WCAP-14416, ``Westinghouse Spent
Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology.'' This safety evaluation
specified that the following issues be evaluated for applications
involving soluble boron credit: the events that could cause boron
dilution, the time available to detect and mitigate each dilution
event, the potential for incomplete boron mixing, and the adequacy of
the boron concentration surveillance interval.
The criticality analyses performed for the NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH DSC
are described in Section 6 of Appendix P of the FSAR for the
Standardized NUHOMS[supreg] Horizontal Modular Storage System for
Irradiated Nuclear Fuel. For this boron dilution evaluation, the
licensee employed the same criticality analysis methods, models, and
assumptions. These HBRSEP2 criticality calculations are based on the
KENO V.a code. The calculations determined the minimum soluble boron
concentration required to maintain subcriticality (keff <
1.0) following a boron dilution event in a NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH DSC
loaded with fuel assemblies that bound the HBRSEP2 fuel designs
(Westinghouse 15 x 15 fuel). Both intact and damaged fuel over the
range of soluble boron concentrations permitted for various enrichments
and basket types were evaluated. The results of these calculations for
the bounding case indicate that subcriticality is maintained with 73
percent or more of the minimum boron concentration levels required in
the ISFSI TS for all basket types as a function of initial enrichment.
Calculations were performed by the licensee to determine the time
required to dilute the SFP such that the boron concentration is reduced
from the NUHOMS[supreg] TS (required boron concentration for
maintaining keff < 0.95) to a just subcritical boron
concentration (keff < 1.0) for fuel loaded into a
NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH DSC.
The HBRSEP2 SFP is a large structure filled with borated water that
completely covers the spent fuel assemblies with more than 21 feet of
water above the top of the fuel racks and the fuel cask. The cask lay
down area is not separated by any structure from the remainder of the
SFP. Thermal gradients generated by stored fuel and operation of the
SFP cooling system will cause significant mixing within the pool. The
licensee assumed that all unborated water introduced from any
uncontrolled dilution source instantaneously mixes with the water in
the SFP (i.e., no unborated water is lost prior to its mixing with
borated water). The configuration of the pool and the mixing of the
coolant provide reasonable assurance that this assumption is valid for
low to moderate dilution flow rates.
The volume of water in the SFP is 240,000 gallons. To reduce the
boron concentration by a factor of 0.73 from the TS for keff
<= 0.95 and approach a keff of 1.0 requires the addition of
75,530 gallons of unborated water. Three examples of potential dilution
sources were identified by the licensee: a 2-gpm flowrate from small
failures or misaligned valves that could occur in the normal soluble
boron control system or related systems, the failure of the 2-inch
demineralized water header, and the maximum credible dilution event
involving the rupture of a fire protection system header.
To demonstrate that sufficient time exists for plant personnel to
identify and terminate a boron dilution event, the licensee provided a
description of
[[Page 44945]]
all alarms available to alert operators, and plant procedures,
administrative controls, and training that will be implemented in
response to an alarm. There is no automatic level control system for
the SFP; therefore, any large, uncontrolled water addition would cause
the SFP to overflow. However, a high level alarm in the control room
would alert personnel of a potential boron dilution event when the
water level reaches the high level setpoint.
The highest uncontrolled dilution flow rate was determined to be
the fire protection header on the SFP floor for fire hose station 104.
As stated in the letter dated July 6, 2005, this fire protection header
will be isolated during DSC loading and unloading to preclude this as a
source of uncontrolled dilution to the SFP. The licensee has revised
DSC loading and unloading procedures to include a requirement to close
the fire protection system valve (FP-71) prior to placing fuel in the
DSC during loading and prior to placing the loaded DSC back in the SFP
during unloading. This change has resulted in the most limiting
uncontrolled dilution source being identified as the assumed break of a
2-inch demineralized water header, which could cause a dilution flow of
approximately 103 gpm. No other single source has been identified that
would exceed this dilution rate. Therefore, the time to reach a
critical boron concentration, as provided by licensee, is estimated to
be 755 minutes.
In the case of the 103-gpm demineralized water pipe rupture, there
would be no alarm from the demineralized water system. However, there
would be available approximately 10 hours to isolate the leak once the
SFP high level alarm was received. This analysis provides reasonable
assurance that dilution flows leading to pool overflow would be
detected and isolated well before the critical boron concentration
could be reached from credible dilution sources.
The licensee stated that plant procedures do allow for continued
operation with the SFP high level alarm illuminated. The licensee
stated that operating procedures had been revised to specify that, if
the SPF high level alarm is illuminated and there is fuel in the DSC in
the SFP, then continuous coverage to monitor the SFP water level will
be required. A local level indicator is available in the SFP. The
personnel providing continuous coverage when the SFP Hi Level Alarm is
illuminated or inoperable can use this indication to detect possible
dilution of the SFP. The available time before criticality by dilution
is sufficient to allow identification and termination of any credible
source of dilution.
When fuel is loaded in the DSC in the SFP, boron analyses of the
SFP water are required at least once every 48 hours per the TS. Small
dilution flows may not be readily identified by level changes in the
SFP due to operational leakage through the pool liner and the SFP
cooling system. The licensee determined that a dilution flow of 2 gpm
would require approximately 26 days to dilute the boron concentration
of the SFP near to that calculated as the critical boron concentration.
Therefore, the reduction in boron concentration due to a dilution
flowrate of 2 gpm would be detected by the required boron concentration
surveillance well before a significant dilution occurs.
To ensure that operators are capable of identifying and terminating
a boron dilution event during DSC loading, unloading, and handling
operations, operator training will be conducted. This training will
highlight the boron concentration requirements for loading the DSC, the
potential for criticality should boron concentration levels decrease,
and the need for timely mitigating activities if a boron dilution event
occurs. Operators and other personnel involved in the dry fuel storage
implementation will receive this new training prior to loading of the
first DSC. Additionally, before each DSC loading evolution, the crew
involved in performance of the work will receive a pre-job briefing,
where the need for boron concentration control will be discussed.
Based on the NRC staff's review of the licensee's boron dilution
analysis, the NRC staff finds the licensee has provided sufficient
information to demonstrate that an undetected and uncorrected dilution
from the TS-required boron concentration to the calculated critical
boron concentration is very unlikely. Based on its review of the boron
analysis and enhancements to the operating procedures and operator
training program, the NRC staff finds the licensee has satisfied
Criterion 5.
Therefore, in conjunction with the conservative assumptions used to
establish the TS-required boron concentration and critical boron
concentration, the boron dilution evaluation demonstrates that the
underlying intent of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) is satisfied.
3.3 Legal Basis for the Exemption
3.3.1 Authorized by Law
This exemption results in changes to the operation of the plant by
allowing the operation of the new dry fuel storage facility and loading
of the NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH DSC. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows
the NRC to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. In
addition, the granting of the licensee's exemption request will not
result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or
the intent of the Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemption is
authorized by law.
3.3.2 No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
The underlying purposes of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) is to ensure that
adequate controls are in place to ensure that the handling and storage
of fuel assemblies is conducted in a manner such that the fuel
assemblies remain safely subcritical. Based on the NRC staff's review
of the licensee's exemption request, the licensee has demonstrated that
sufficient controls are in place to provide reasonable assurance that
there is no undue risk to public health and safety given conservative
assumption in the criticality analysis (criterion 1 above);
surveillances periodically verify the boron concentration before and
during loading and unloading (criterion 2 above); radiation monitoring
equipment is used to detect excessive radiation and initiate
appropriate protective actions (criterion 3 above); only fuel
authorized by the ISFSI TS will be loaded and stored in the ISFSI
(criterion 4 above); and boron dilution events have been analyzed, and
there are sufficient monitoring capabilities and time for the licensee
to identify and terminate a dilution event prior to achieving a
critical boron concentration in the cask (criterion 5 above).
Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that the underlying purpose of the
rule has been satisfied and that there is no undue risk to public
health and safety.
3.3.3 Consistent with Common Defense and Security
This exemption results in changes to the operation of the plant by
allowing the operation of the new dry fuel storage facility and loading
of the NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH DSC. This change to the fuel assembly
storage and handling in the plant does not affect the national defense
strategy because the national defense is maintained by resources
(hardware or software or other) that are outside the plant and that
have no direct relation to plant operation. In addition, loading spent
fuel into the NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH DSC in the SFP does not affect the
ability of the licensee to defend the plant against a terrorist attack.
Therefore, the common defense and
[[Page 44946]]
security is not impacted by this exemption request.
3.3.4 Special Circumstances
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific Exemption,'' the NRC staff
reviewed the licensee's exemption request to determine if the legal
basis for granting an exemption had been satisfied. With regards to the
six special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), the NRC staff
finds that the licensee's exemption request satisfies 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
``Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would
not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.'' Specifically, the NRC
staff concludes that since the licensee has satisfied the five criteria
in Section 3.1 of this exemption, the application of the rule is not
necessary to achieve its underlying purpose in this particular case.
3.4 Summary
Based upon the review of the licensee's exemption request to credit
soluble boron during DSC loading, unloading, and handling in the
HBRSEP2 SFP, the NRC staff concludes that pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2) the licensee's exemption request is acceptable. However,
the NRC staff places the following limitations/conditions on the
approval of this exemption:
1. This exemption is limited to the loading, unloading, and
handling of the DSC for only the TN NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH at HBRSEP2.
2. This exemption is limited to the loading, unloading, and
handling in the DSC at HBRSEP2 of Westinghouse 15 x 15 fuel assemblies
that had maximum initial, unirradiated U-235 enrichments corresponding
to the TS limitations in LCO 1.2.1 for Amendment 8 to the
NUHOMS[supreg] -24PTH cask design.
4.0 Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants CP&L an exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) for the loading, unloading, and
handling of the components of the Transnuclear NUHOMS[supreg]-24PTH dry
cask storage system at HBRSEP2. However, since the licensee does not
have an NRC-approved methodology for evaluating changes to the analyses
or systems supporting this exemption request, the NRC staff's approval
of the exemption is restricted to those specific design and operating
conditions described in the licensee's February 22, 2005, exemption
request. The licensee may not apply the 10 CFR 50.59 process for
evaluating changes to specific exemptions. Any changes to the design or
operation of (1) the dry cask storage system, (2) the spent fuel pool,
(3) the fuel assemblies to be stored, (4) the boron dilution analyses,
or (5) supporting procedures and controls, regardless of whether they
are approved under the general Part 72 license or perceived to be
conservative, will invalidate this exemption. Upon invalidation of the
exemption, the licensee will be required to comply with NRC regulations
prior to future cask loadings.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment (70 FR 43462). This exemption is
effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of July 2005.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ledyard B. Marsh,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E5-4147 Filed 8-3-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P